1.

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR. v. HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE

G.R. No. 132988 July 19, 2000

PRINCIPLE:

Local autonomy signified a more responsive and accountable local government

structure instituted through a system of decentralization. Decentralization simply means the
devolution of national administration, not power, to local governments. Local officials remain
accountable to the central government as the law may provide

FACTS:

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of AO 372, which “directs” among others, the
LGUs to “reduce total expenditures … by at least 25% of the authorized regular appropriations
for non-personal services items…” He contends that the President, in issuing AO 372, was in
effect exercising the power of control over LGUs. The Constitution vests in the President,
however, only the power of general supervision over LGUs, consistent with the principle of local
autonomy.

On the other hand, the Solicitor General, in representing respondents, claims that AO
372 was issued to alleviate the "economic difficulties brought about by the peso devaluation"
and constituted merely an exercise of the President's power of supervision over LGUs. It
allegedly does not violate local fiscal autonomy, because it merely directs local governments to
identify measures that will reduce their total expenditures for non-personal services by at least
25 percent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not AO 372, insofar as it “directs” LGUs to reduce their expenditures by 25%
is a valid exercise of the President’s power of general supervision over local governments.

RULING:

Yes, it is a valid exercise of the President’s power of general supervision over LGUs
insofar as it “directs” them to reduce their expenditure by 25%.

Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the President’s power over local
governments to one of general supervision. It read as follows:
 “SECTION 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision
over local governments….”

This provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. The heads of
political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the
electorate, to whom they are directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the
Presidents supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of
their legitimate powers.
Decentralization simply means the devolution of national administration, not power, to
local governments. Local officials remain accountable to the central government as the law may
provide. The difference between decentralization of administration and that of power was
explained in detail in Limbona v. Mangelin as follows:

"Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization

of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central
government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local
governments 'more responsive and accountable,' and 'ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective
partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress.' At the same
time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs
and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises
'general supervision' over them, but only to 'ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law.' He has no control over their acts in the sense
that he can substitute their judgments with his own.

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political

power in the favor of local government units declared to be autonomous. In that
case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its
future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a
constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to 'self-immolation,'
since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to
the central authorities but to its constituency."

Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not
completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions.
Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions.

Consequently, the Local Government Code provides:

"x x x [I]n the event the national government incurs an unmanaged public sector
deficit, the President of the Philippines is hereby authorized, upon the
recommendation of [the] Secretary of Finance, Secretary of the Interior and
Local Government and Secretary of Budget and Management, and subject to
 consultation with the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress and the
presidents of the liga, to make the necessary adjustments in the internal revenue
allotment of local government units but in no case shall the allotment be less
than thirty percent (30%) of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of
the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year x x x."

There are therefore several requisites before the President may interfere in local fiscal
matters: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations
with the presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents
of the various local leagues; and (3) the corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of
the Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget and Management.
Furthermore, any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than thirty percent (30%)
of the collection of national internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current
one.

While the wordings of Section 1 of AO 372 have a rather commanding tone, and while it
is true that the requirements of Section 284 of the Local Government Code have not been
satisfied, the directive to "identify and implement measures x x x that will reduce total
expenditures x x x by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriation" is merely advisory in
character, and does not constitute a mandatory or binding order that interferes with local
autonomy. The language used, while authoritative, does not amount to a command that
emanates from a boss to a subaltern.

Rather, the provision is merely an advisory to prevail upon local executives to recognize
the need for fiscal restraint in a period of economic difficulty. Indeed, all concerned would do
well to heed the President's call to unity, solidarity and teamwork to help alleviate the crisis. It
is understood, however, that no legal sanction may be imposed upon LGUs and their officials
who do not follow such advice.

In sum, while Section 1 of AO 372 may be upheld as an advisory effected in times of

national crisis.

The Petition is GRANTED.

2.

SULTAN ALIMBUSAR P. LIMBONA v. CONTE MANGELIN, ET. AL.

G.R. No. 80391 February 28, 1989

PRINCIPLE:
 And while it is within the discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish their
erring colleagues, their acts are nonetheless subject to the moderating band of this Court in the
event that such discretion is exercised with grave abuse.

FACTS:

Petitioner Sultan Alimbusar Limbona was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative
Assembly or Batasang Pampook of Central Mindanao. He was invited by the Chairman of the
Committee on Muslim Affairs of the House of Representatives in his capacity as Speaker of the
Assembly.

Consistent with the said invitation, petitioner sent a telegram to Acting Secretary of the
Assembly to wire all Assemblymen that there shall be no session in November. Instead, the
Assembly held two sessions in defiance of petitioner's advice. After declaring the presence of a
quorum on the motion to declare the seat of the Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in
attendance voted in the affirmative, hence, the chair declared said seat of the Speaker vacant.

Petitioner then went to the Court praying that the judgment would declare the
questioned proceedings null and void, and holding his election as the Assembly’s Speaker valid
and subsisting.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the so-called autonomous government is subject to the jurisdiction of

the national courts. What is the extent of self-government given to the autonomous
governments of Region XII?

RULING:

Yes, the so-called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted,
are still subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts.

The autonomous governments of Mindanao were organized in Regions IX and XII by

Presidential Decree No. 1618 promulgated on July 25, 1979. Among other things, the Decree
established “internal autonomy” in the two regions “[w]ithin the framework of the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution,” with
legislative and executive machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities specified
therein.

It requires the autonomous regional governments to “undertake all internal

administrative matters for the respective regions,” except to “act on matters which are within
the jurisdiction and competence of the National Government,” “which include, but are not
limited to, the following:
 (1) National defense and security;
(2) Foreign relations;
(3) Foreign trade;
(4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and quasi-banking, and
external borrowing,
(5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of all natural
resources;
(6) Air and sea transport
(7) Postal matters and telecommunications;
(8) Customs and quarantine;
(9) Immigration and deportation;
(10) Citizenship and naturalization;
(11) National economic, social and educational planning; and
(12) General auditing.

In relation to the central government, it provides that “[t]he President shall have the
power of general supervision and control over the Autonomous Regions ...”

Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of

power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local governments “more responsive and accountable,” “and
ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective
partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress.” At the same time, it
relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to
concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises “general supervision” over them, but
only to “ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.” He has no control over
their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power
in the favor of local governments units declare to be autonomous. In that case, the
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum
intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of
power amounts to “self-immolation,” since in that event, the autonomous government
becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.

Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these two
senses, thus:

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the

Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. Here shall be
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao, and the Cordilleras as hereinafter
provided.

Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
 xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 15. Mere shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in
the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical
areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic
and social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of
this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of
the Republic of the Philippines.

An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter category [CONST.

(1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted
principles on the effects and limits of “autonomy.” On the other hand, an autonomous
government of the former class is under the supervision of the national government acting
through the President (and the Department of Local Government).

If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its
acts are, debatably beyond the domain of the Court in perhaps the same way that
the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond its jurisdiction. But if it is
autonomous in the former category only, it comes unarguably under its jurisdiction. An
examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the autonomous governments of
Mindanao persuades the Court that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second
sense, that is, in which the central government commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential
Decree No. 1618, in the first place, mandates that “[t]he President shall have the power of
general supervision and control over Autonomous Regions.”

Hence, the Court assumes jurisdiction. And if they can make an inquiry in the validity of
the expulsion in question, with more reason can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.

The Petition is GRANTED.

3.

REYNALDO R. SAN JUAN v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

G.R. No. 92299 April 19, 1991

PRINCIPLE:

Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in

Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of
autonomy.
FACTS:

When the position of Provincial Budget Officer for the province of Rizal was left vacant,
petitioner Reynaldo R. San Juan requested Director Reynaldo Abella of the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) Region IV to endorse the appointment of Ms. Dalisay Santos to
the contested position. On the other hand, Director Abella recommended the appointment of
the private respondent, Cecilia Almajose, as PBO of Rizal on the basis of a comparative study of
all Municipal Budget Officers of the said province which included three nominees of the
petitioner. Subsequently, the DBM Undersecretary signed the appointment papers of the
private respondent as PBO of Rizal.

After having been informed of the private respondent's appointment, the petitioner
wrote letter-protest against the said appointment. Through its Director of the Bureau of Legal &
Legislative Affairs (BLLA), DBM ruled that the petitioner's letter-protest is not meritorious
considering that it validly exercised its prerogative in filling-up the contested position since
none of the petitioner's nominees met the prescribed requirements. Subsequently, the DBM
Secretary denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The petitioner wrote another letter-protest to the public respondent CSC reiterating his
position regarding the matter. Subsequently, CSC issued the questioned resolutions which
prompted the petitioner to file for certiorari before the Court praying for their nullification.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the private respondent is lawfully entitled to discharge the functions of
PBO of Rizal pursuant to the appointment made by public respondent DBM's Undersecretary
upon the recommendation of then Director Abella of DBM Region IV.

RULING:

No, the private respondent is not lawfully entitled to discharge the functions of PBO of
Rizal because her recommendation does not come from the local chief executive, in this case
from the petitioner, as prescribed by law.

The petitioner's arguments rest on his contention that he has the sole right and privilege
to recommend the nominees to the position of PBO and that the appointee should come only
from his nominees. In support thereof, he invokes Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112 which
provides that:

Sec. 1. All budget officers of provinces, cities and municipalities shall be

appointed henceforth by the Minister of Budget and Management upon
recommendation of the local chief executive concerned, subject to civil service
 law, rules and regulations, and they shall be placed under the administrative
control and technical supervision of the Ministry of Budget and Management.

There is no question that under Section 1 of Executive Order No. 112 the petitioner's
power to recommend is subject to the qualifications prescribed by existing laws for the position
of PBO. Consequently, in the event that the recommendations made by the petitioner fall short
of the required standards, the appointing authority, the Minister (now Secretary) of public
respondent DBM is expected to reject the same.

Before the promulgation of Executive Order No. 112 on December 24, 1986, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local Government Code vested upon the
Governor, subject to civil service rules and regulations, the power to appoint the PBO (Sec. 216,
subparagraph (1), BP 337). The Code further enumerated the qualifications for the position of
PBO. Thus, Section 216, subparagraph (2) of the same code states that:

(2) No person shall be appointed provincial budget officer unless he is a citizen of

the Philippines, of good moral character, a holder of a degree preferably in law,
commerce, public administration or any related course from a recognized college
or university, a first grade civil service eligibility or its equivalent, and has
acquired at least five years experience in budgeting or in any related field.

The issue before the Court is not limited to the validity of the appointment of one
Provincial Budget Officer. The tug of war between the Secretary of Budget and Management
and the Governor of the premier province of Rizal over a seemingly innocuous position involves
the application of a most important constitutional policy and principle, that of local autonomy.

The 1935 Constitution had no specific article on local autonomy. However, in

distinguishing between presidential control and supervision, the Constitution clearly limited the
executive power over local governments to “general supervision . . . as may be provided by
law.” The President controls the executive departments. He has no such power over local
governments. He has only supervision and that supervision is both general and circumscribed
by statute.

The exercise of greater local autonomy is even more marked in the present Constitution.
Article II, Section 25 on State Policies provides:

Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

The 14 sections in Article X on Local Government not only reiterate earlier doctrines but
give in greater detail the provisions making local autonomy more meaningful. Thus, Sections 2
and 3 of Article X provide:

Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
 Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for
a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall,
initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units
their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications,
election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and
duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and
operation of the local units.

When the Civil Service Commission interpreted the recommending power of the
Provincial Governor as purely directory, it went against the letter and spirit of the constitutional
provisions on local autonomy. If the DBM Secretary jealously hoards the entirety of budgetary
powers and ignores the right of local governments to develop self-reliance and resoluteness in
the handling of their own funds, the goal of meaningful local autonomy is frustrated and set
back.

The right given by Local Budget Circular No. 31 which states:

Sec. 6.0 — The DBM reserves the right to fill up any existing vacancy where none
of the nominees of the local chief executive meet the prescribed requirements.

is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The DBM may appoint only from the list of
qualified recommendees nominated by the Governor. If none is qualified, he must return the
list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal requirements and ask
for new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and qualifications.

The Petition is GRANTED.

4.

RODOLFO T. GANZON v. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 93252, 93746, and 95245 August 5, 1991

PRINCIPLE:

Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of

administration, not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the central
government in the manner the law may provide. Since local governments remain accountable
to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose
disciplinary action against local officials.
FACTS:

The petitions of Mayor Rodolfo T. Ganzon originated from a series of administrative

complaints, ten in number, filed against him by various city officials on various charges. He was
then ordered two preventive suspensions by the Court of Appeals. Amidst the two successive
suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for prohibition against the respondent
Secretary of Local Government (now, Interior) in the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, where he
succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction. Meanwhile, the respondent Secretary
issued another order, preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days, the third
time in twenty months.

Subsequently, the Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order, barring the
respondent Secretary from implementing the suspension orders, and restraining the
enforcement of the Court of Appeals' two decisions.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President's alter ego, can
suspend and/or remove local officials.

RULING:

Yes, the Secretary, as the President’s alter ego, can suspend and/or remove local
officials as the law may provide. However, in this case, the respondent Secretary was found to
have this power exercised in an oppressive manner and with grave abuse of discretion.

It is noteworthy that under the Charter, “local autonomy” is not instantly self-executing,
but subject to, among other things, the passage of a local government code, a local tax
law, income distribution legislation, and a national representation law, and measures designed
to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the
Constitution places the local government under the general supervision of the Executive. It is
noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code
provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal
powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the
President. Thus:

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for
a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall,
initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units
their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide for the qualifications,
election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and
duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and
operation of the local units.
 As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means “a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization.” The
Constitution does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the national government
over the affairs of local governments and as put by political adherents, to “liberate the local
governments from the imperialism of Manila.” Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the
relation of partnership and inter-dependence between the central administration and local
government units, or otherwise, to user in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken
such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation,
however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-
government.

The sole objective of a suspension is simply “to prevent the accused from hampering the
normal cause of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses” or
to keep him off “the records and other evidence.” It is a means, and no more, to assist
prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local official. Under the Local
Government Code, it cannot exceed sixty days, which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty
days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be
lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.

Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the
accused is held to insure his presence at the trial. In both cases, the accused (the respondent)
enjoys a presumption of innocence unless and until found guilty. It is temporary and as the
Local Government Code provides, it may be imposed for no more than sixty days. A longer
suspension is unjust and unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than tyranny.

Imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all
intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to
all intents and purposes, his suspension permanent. It is also to mete out punishment in spite
of the fact that the Mayor's guilt has not been proven. Worse, any absolution will be for naught
because needless to say, the length of his suspension would have, by the time he is reinstated,
wiped out his tenure considerably.

The Court is not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from
exercising a legal power, yet it is of their opinion that the Secretary of Interior is exercising that
power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.

Therefore, the Court is allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer the duration of his
third suspension and lifting, for the purpose, the Temporary Restraining Order earlier issued.
Insofar as the seven remaining charges are concerned, the Court is urging the Department of
Local Government to undertake steps to expedite the same, subject to Mayor Ganzon's usual
remedies of appeal, judicial or administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, the
Court is precluding the Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on those
remaining complaints, notwithstanding findings of prima facie evidence.
 In resumé the Court is laying down the following rules:

1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of

administration, not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the central
government in the manner the law may provide;

2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism;

3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was
meant but to deny legislative control over local governments; it did not exempt the latter from
legislative regulations provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental premise of
autonomy;

4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may,
by law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local officials;

5. “Supervision” and “investigation” are not inconsistent terms; “investigation” does not
signify “control” (which the President does not have);

6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may serve the suspension so far ordered, but
may no longer be suspended for the offenses he was charged originally; provided:

a) that delays in the investigation of those charges “due to his fault, neglect or
request, (the time of the delay) shall not be counted in computing the time of
suspension.” [Supra, sec. 63(3)]

b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the
petitioner commits another or other crimes and abuses for which proper charges are
filed against him by the aggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension shall not be a
bar to his being preventively suspended again, if warranted under subpar. (2), Section
63 of the Local Government Code.

The Petitions are DISMISSED.

5.

Cordillera Broad Coalition vs COA

G.R. no. 79956 August 5, 1991

PRINCIPLE:
 The constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution refers to
the administrative autonomy of local government units or, in a more technical language, the
decentralization of government authority.

FACTS:

After the People Power Revolution, Executive Order No. 220 (E.O. No. 222), issued by
the President in the exercise of her legislative powers under Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of the 1987
Constitution, created the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR). It was created to accelerate
economic and social growth in the region and to prepare for the establishment of the
autonomous region in the Cordilleras.

During the pendency of this case, Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for
an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region," was enacted and signed into law. The
Act recognizes the CAR and the offices and agencies created under E.O. No. 220 and its
transitory nature is reinforced in Art. XXI of R.A. No. 6766, to wit:

SEC. 3. The Cordillera Executive Board, the Cordillera Region Assembly as well as all
offices and agencies created under Execute Order No. 220 shall cease to exist
immediately upon the ratification of this Organic Act.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the creation of the CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of
the local autonomy for the provinces and city which compose the CAR?

RULING:

No. CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for
political autonomy for the Cordilleras.
we note the obvious failure to show how the creation of the CAR has actually diminished the
local autonomy of the covered provinces and city. It cannot be over-emphasized that pure
speculation and a resort to probabilities are insufficient to cause the invalidation of E.O. No.
220.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

6.

De Leon vs Esguera
G.R. no. 78059 August 31, 1987
PRINCIPLE:

the 1987 Constitution ensures the autonomy of local governments and of political
subdivisions of which the barangays form a part, and limits the President's power to "general
supervision" over local governments.

FACTS:

In the Barangay elections held on May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected
Barangay Captain and the other petitioners, as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores,
Taytay, Rizal under the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP 222).

On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon received a Memorandum antedated

December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent on February 8, 1987 designating respondent
Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain. The designation made by the OIC Governor was "by
authority of the Minister of Local Government.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the OIC Governor, by authority of the Minister of Local Govt., had the
power to replace the Barangay officials?

RULING:

No. The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on February 2, 1987. By that date,
therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have been superseded. Having
become inoperative, respondent OIC Governor could no longer rely on Section 2, Article III,
thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners.
Petitioners must now be held to have acquired security of tenure specially considering that the
Barangay Election Act of 1982 declares it "a policy of the State to guarantee and promote the
autonomy of the barangays to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities. Similarly, the 1987 Constitution ensures the autonomy of local governments and
of political subdivisions of which the barangays form a part, and limits the President's power to
"general supervision" over local governments. Relevantly, Section 8, Article X of the same 1987
Constitution further provides in part:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years ...
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law, therefore, the term of
office of six (6) years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.
WHEREFORE, (1) The Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Governor on February 8, 1987
designating respondents as the Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen, respectively, of
Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, are both declared to be of no legal force and effect; and (2) the
Writ of Prohibition is granted enjoining respondents perpetually from proceeding with the
ouster/take-over of petitioners' positions subject of this Petition. Without costs.

171.

City of General Santos vs. Commission on Audit

GR No. 199439

FACTS:

Gensan passed an Ordinance to entice those employees who were unproducttive due to health
reasons to avail of the incentives being offered therein by way of early retirement package".
COA assailed the ordinance and argued that in order for it to be valid there must be a law
authorizing the same
and also an early retirement program should be by virtue of a valid reorganization pursuant to
law validating it. It added that nowhere in Local Govt Code provide a specific power for LGU to
establish an early retirement program.
Petitioner contended and cite Sections 16 and 76 of the Local Government Code as its authority
to reorganize. It argues that these provisions necessarily imply the authority of petitioner city to
provide retirement benefits, separation pay, and other incentives to those affected by the
reorganization.

ISSUE:

WHETHER RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON AUDIT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

WHEN IT CONSIDERED ORDINANCE NO. 08, SERIES OF 2009,IN THE NATURE OF AN EARLY
RETIREMENT PROGRAM REQUIRING A LAW AUTHORIZING IT FOR ITS VALIDITY

RATIO:

There was no grave abuse of discretion on part of COA. By grave abuse of discretion is meant
such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere
abuse of discretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and
must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law
Under RA 7165, Section 458: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. – (a) The
Sangguniang Panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants
pursuant to section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the
city as provided for under section 22 of this Code, and shall:

RULING:
WHEREFORE, The assailed Commission on Audit decision are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION
insofar as Section 6 of Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, as amended by Ordinance No. 11,
series of 2009, is declared as VALID.
SO ORDERED.

172.

Betoy vs Board of Directors, National Power Corp

GR Nos. 156556-57

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and supplemental petition
for mandamus, specifically assailing National Power Board Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No.
2002-125, as well as Sections 11, 34, 38, 48, 52 and 63 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9136,
otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA). Also assailed is
Rule 33 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the EPIRA.
On June 8, 2001, the EPIRA was enacted by Congress with the goal of restructuring the electric
power industry and privatization of the assets of the National Power Corporation (NPC).
On November 18, 2002, pursuant to Section 63 of the EPIRA and Rule 33 of the IRR, the NPB
passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-124 which, among others, resolved that all NPC personnel
shall be legally terminated on January 31, 2003and shall be entitled to separation benefits.
As a result of the foregoing NPB Resolutions, petitioner Enrique U. Betoy, together with
thousands of his co-employees from the NPC were terminated.
However, amongst the petitions raised – it is noteworthy that petitioners argued that Section
11, Section 48 and Section 52 of RA 9136 (EPIRA) for being violative of Section 13, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution and, therefore, unconstitutional.

Issue:

Whether or not the designation of secretaries as board of directors of National Power

Corporation valid.

RATIO:

The delegation of the said official to the respective Board of Directors were designation by
Congress of additional functions and duties to the officials concerned, i.e., they were designated
as members of the Board of Directors.
Designation connotes an imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person already
in the public service by virtue of an earlier appointment. Designation does not entail payment
of additional benefits or grant upon the person so designated the right to claim the salary
attached to the position.Without an appointment, a designation does not entitle the officer to
receive the salary of the position. The legal basis of an employee’s right to claim the salary
attached thereto is a duly issued and approved appointment to the position, and not a mere
designation.

RULING:

This Court, therefore, finds the designation of the respective members of the Cabinet, as ex-
officio members of the NPB, valid.

173.

Imbong vs. Ochoa

GR No. 204819

FACTS:

Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise
known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law),
challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning
it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and
lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces the controversy, as presented
in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions-in-intervention.
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional.

ISSUES:

Whether or not RH Law is unconstitutional in view of Autonomy of Local Government.

RATIO:

A reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health
care facilities, the hiring of skilled health professionals, or the training of barangay health
workers, it will be the national government that will provide for the funding of its
implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The national government still has the say
when it comes to national priority programs which the local government is called upon to
implement like the RH Law.
RULING:

No. It is not unconstitutional. The LGU’s are merely encouraged to provide these services. There
is nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as making the availability of these
services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to
an undue encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local
governments.

174.

Judge Dadole vs. Commission on Audit,

GR no. 125350

FACTS:

Acting on the DBM's Local Budget Circular No. 55, the Mandaue City Auditor issued notices of
disallowances to RTC and MTC Judges, in excess of the amount (maximum of P1000 and P700 in
provinces and cities and municipalities, respectively) authorized by said circular. The additional
monthly allowances of the judges shall be reduced to P1000 each. They were also asked to
reimbursed the amount they received in excess of P1000 from the last six months.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Local Budget Circular No. 55 void for going beyond the supervisory powers of
the President.

RATIO:

Yes. Although the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise of
local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of
supervision by the President. Sec 4 Art X of 1987 Constitution: "The President of the Philippines
shall exercise general supervision over local governments. x x x" The said provision has been
interpreted to exclude the power of control.

The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter egos of the
President. As such, they are subject to the power of control of the President; he will see to it
that the local governments or their officials were performing their duties as provided by the
Constitution and by statutes, at whose will and behest they can be removed from office; or
their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. They are subject to the President's
supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their
legitimate powers. The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a LGU if he or
she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the President's
supervisory powers over LGUs

RULING:

Within 90 days from receipt of the copies of the appropriation ordinance, the DBM should have
taken positive action. Otherwise, such ordinance was deemed to have been properly reviewed
and deemed to have taken effect. Inasmuch as, in the instant case, the DBM did not follow the
appropriate procedure for reviewing the subject ordinance of Mandaue City and allowed the
90-day period to lapse, it can no longer question the legality of the provisions in the said
ordinance granting additional allowances to judges stationed in the said city.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed decision and resolution, dated
September 21, 1995 and May 28, 1996, respectively, of the Commission on Audit are hereby set
aside.

175.

THE PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL vs. THE COMMISSIONERS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 182574

PRINCIPLE:

LGUs are subject only to the power of general supervision of the President, the President’s
authority is limited to seeing to it that rules are followed and laws are faithfully executed
FACTS: Petitioner, through an approved Sangguniang Panlalawigan resolution, granted and
released the disbursement for the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits of the
province’s officials and employees without any prior approval from the President. The COA
disallowed the premium payment for such benefits since petitioner disregarded AO 103 and RA
6758. The COA ruled that under AO 103, no government entity, including a local government
unit, is exempt from securing prior approval from the President granting additional benefits to
its personnel.

ISSUE:

Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the disallowance for the
premium paid for the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits granted by the
Province of Negros Occidental to its 1,949 officials and employees.

RULING:
Yes.
The COA gravely abused its discretion in applying AO 103 to disallow the premium payment for
the hospitalization and health care insurance benefits of petitioner’s officials and employees
since the prohibition applies only to "government offices/agencies, including government-
owned and/or controlled corporations, as well as their respective governing boards." Nowhere
is it indicated in Section 2 that the prohibition also applies to LGUs. The requirement then of
prior approval from the President under AO 103 is applicable only to departments, bureaus,
offices and government-owned and controlled corporations under the Executive branch. Sec. 4
of Article X of the Constitution states that the President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and
municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure
that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and
functions.
Since LGUs are subject only to the power of general supervision of the President, the
President’s authority is limited to seeing to it that rules are followed and laws are faithfully
executed. The President may only point out that rules have not been followed but the President
cannot lay down the rules, neither does he have the discretion to modify or replace the rules.
Thus, the grant of additional compensation like hospitalization and health care insurance
benefits in the present case does not need the approval of the President to be valid.

176.

THE NATIONAL LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY vs. HON. VICTORIA ISABEL A. PAREDES,
G.R. No. 130775

PRINCIPLE:

The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local government, which
exclude the power of control

FACTS:

The Department of the Interior and the Local Government (DILG) was appointed as interim
caretaker to administer and manage the affairs of the Liga ng mga Barangay in giving remedy to
alleged violations made by the incumbent officer of the Liga in the conduct of their elections. It
had issued 2 memorandum circulars which alter, modify, nullify or set aside the actions of the
Liga. Petitioner contends that the appointment DILG constitutes undue interference in the
internal affairs of the Liga, since the latter is not subject to DILG control and supervision. As for
the respondent judge, she contends that DILG exercises general supervisory jurisdiction over
LGUs including the different leagues based on sec. 1 of Admin. Order No. 267 providing for a
broad premise of the supervisory power of the DILG.
ISSUE:

Whether or not DILG Secretary as alter-ego of the President has power of control over the Liga
ng mga Barangay.

RULING:

No.
Sec. 4, Art. X of the Constitution provides that the President of the Philippines shall exercise
general supervision over local government, which exclude the power of control. The local
government as applied in this section also extends to the Liga ng mga Barangay. As the entity
exercising supervision over the Liga, the DILG’s authority is limited to seeing to it that the rules
are followed, but it cannot lay down such rules itself nor does it have the discretion to modify
or replace the same. The Court is convinced that the assailed order was issued with grave abuse
of discretion while the acts of the respondent Secretary, including DILG Memorandum Circulars
No. 97-176 and No. 97-193, are unconstitutional and ultra vires, as they all entailed the
conferment or exercise of control — a power which is denied by the Constitution even to the
President.

24.

ALTERNATIVE CENTER FOR ORGANIZATIONAL REFORMS AND DEVT INC ET AL.

VS. RONALDO ZAMORA ET AL.
G.R. No. 144256 June 8, 2005

Principle:

Internal Revenue Allotment shall be automatically released.

FACTS:

President Estrada pursuant to Sec 22, Art VII mandating the Pres. to submit to Congress
a budget of expenditures within 30 days before the opening of every regular session, submitted
the National Expenditures program for FY 2000. The President proposed an IRA of
P121,778,000,000. This became RA 8760 also known as General Appropriations Act (GAA) for
the Year 2000. It provides under the heading “ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS”
that the IRA for local government units shall amount to P111,778,000,000”.
While the GAA appropriates P111,778,000,000 of IRA as Programmed Fund, it appropriates a
separate amount of P10 Billion of IRA under the classification of Unprogrammed Fund, the
latter amount to be released only upon the occurrence of the condition stated in the GAA.
Petitioners contend that the said provisions violates the LGUs autonomy by unlawfully
reducing the IRA allotted by 10B and by withholding its release by placing the same under
“Unprogrammed funds” and they argue that the GAA violated the constitutional mandate of
automatically releasing the IRAs when it made its release contingent on whether revenue
collections could meet the revenue targets originally submitted by the President, rather than
making the release automatic.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject GAA violates LGUs fiscal autonomy by not automatically
releasing the whole amount of the allotted IRA.

RULING:

Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution provides: Local government units shall have a just
share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to
them.
Respondents thus infer that the subject constitutional provision merely prevents the executive
branch of the government from “unilaterally” withholding the IRA, but not the legislature from
authorizing the executive branch to withhold the same.
As the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically release the just share of
local governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature not to pass laws that might
prevent the executive from performing this duty.
Since, under Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution, only the just share of local governments is
qualified by the words “as determined by law,” and not the release thereof, the plain
implication is that Congress is not authorized by the Constitution to hinder or impede the
automatic release of the IRA.
In another case, the Court held that the only possible exception to mandatory automatic
release of the IRA is, as held in Batangas. Wherefore, petition is granted. XXXVII and LIV Special
Provisions 1 and 4 of the Year 2000 GAA are hereby declared unconstitutional insofar as they
set apart a portion of the IRA.

206.

LEAGUE OF PROVINCES v. DENR

G.R. No. 1753668 April 11, 2013

Principle:

Facts:

A confusion of rights erupted as a result of overlapping applications over the same area of land.
One application was for quarry permits (which eventually converted to applications for small-
scale mining permits) that was filed with the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Office (PENRO) and the other one was an application for exploration permit of Atlantic Mines
and Trading Corporation (AMTC) filed with DENR Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MBG). An
inquiry was conducted which ultimately led to the DENR rendering a decision in favor AMTC
and the nullification and cancellation of the small-scale mining permits that was issued by the
Governor of Bulacan.

Petitioner contends that that Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991
and Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076 which confer respondents DENR and the DENR Secretary the
power of control are unconstitutional as the Constitution states that the President (and
Executive Departments and alter-egos) has the power of supervision only, not control, over acts
of the local government units, and grants the local government units autonomy.

Issue:

Whether or not Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code and Section 24 of
R.A. No. 7076 are unconstitutional.

Ruling:
No.

Control of the DENR/DENR Secretary over small-scale mining in the provinces is granted
by three statutes: (1) R.A. 7061 or The Local Government Code of 1991; (2) R.A. 7076 or the
People's Small Scale Mining Act of 1991; and (3) R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of
1995.

Control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his/her duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for the latter. Supervision is the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower
officers perform their function in accordance with law.

The Constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Article X, Sec. 2 of the

Constitution refers to the administrative autonomy of the LGUs or the decentralization of
government authority. It does not make local governments within the State. Administrative
autonomy may involve devolution of powers, but it is still subject to limitations, like following
national policies or standards and those provided by the Local Government Code, as the
structuring of LGUs and the allocation of powers/responsibilities/resources among the LGUs
and local officials are placed by the Constitution to Congress under Article X Section 3.

It is the DENR which is in-charge of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to control
and supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the country’s natural resources,
pursuant to the provisions of Section 17, b(3)(III) of the LGC. Hence, the enforcement of the
small-scale mining law by the provincial government is subject to the supervision, control and
review of the DENR. The LGC did not fully devolve to the provincial government the
enforcement of the small-scale mining law.