The moral psychology of contempt

Michelle Mason (Ed.)

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The Moral Psychology
of Contempt
 Moral Psychology of the Emotions

Series Editor:
Mark Alfano, Associate Professor, Department of
Philosophy, Delft University of Technology

How do our emotions influence our other mental states (perceptions, beliefs,
motivations, intentions) and our behavior? How are they influenced by our
other mental states, our environments, and our cultures? What is the moral
value of a particular emotion in a particular context? This series explores the
causes, consequences, and value of the emotions from an interdisciplinary
perspective. Emotions are diverse, with components at various levels (bio-
logical, neural, psychological, social), so each book in this series is devoted to
a distinct emotion. This focus allows the author and reader to delve into a spe-
cific mental state, rather than trying to sum up emotions en masse. Authors
approach a particular emotion from their own disciplinary angle (e.g., con-
ceptual analysis, feminist philosophy, critical race theory, phenomenology,
social psychology, personality psychology, neuroscience) while connecting
with other fields. In so doing, they build a mosaic for each emotion, evaluat-
ing both its nature and its moral properties.

Other titles in this series:

The Moral Psychology of Forgiveness,
edited by Kathryn J. Norlock
The Moral Psychology of Pride,
edited by Adam J. Carter and Emma C. Gordon
The Moral Psychology of Sadness,
edited by Anna Gotlib
The Moral Psychology of Anger,
edited by Myisha Cherry and Owen Flanagan

Forthcoming titles in the series:

The Moral Psychology of Disgust,
edited by Nina Strohminger and Victor Kumar
The Moral Psychology of Compassion,
edited by Justin Caouette and Carolyn Price
The Moral Psychology of Regret,
edited by Anna Gotlib
The Moral Psychology
of Contempt

Edited by Michelle Mason

Published by Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd.
Unit A, Whitacre Mews, 26–34 Stannary Street, London SE11 4AB
www.rowmaninternational.com

Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd. is an affiliate of Rowman & Littlefield

4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706, USA
With additional offices in Boulder, New York, Toronto (Canada), and Plymouth (UK)
www.rowman.com

Selection and editorial matter © 2018 Michelle Mason.

Copyright in individual chapters is held by the respective chapter authors.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any
electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems,
without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote
passages in a review.

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN: HB 978-1-78660-415-6

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Available

ISBN: 978-1-78660-415-6 (cloth : alk. paper)
ISBN: 978-1-78660-417-0 (electronic)

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of

American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper
for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48–1992.

Printed in the United States of America

To my family.
 Contents

Acknowledgmentsix
List of Figures xi
List of Tables xiii
The Moral Psychology of Contempt: An Introduction xv
Michelle Mason

PART 1: INTRODUCING CONTEMPT: PRACTICAL

AND HISTORICAL CONTEXTS 1
1 Contempt, Honor, and Addressing Racism 3
Macalester Bell
2 Contempt in Classical Philosophy 17
Michael Pakaluk
3 “I Had Lever Die Than to Be So Shamed”: Contempt
in Arthurian Society and Ours 37
Felicia Nimue Ackerman
4 The Epistemic Function of Contempt and Laughter
in Nietzsche 57
Mark Alfano

PART 2: THE MORAL PSYCHOLOGY OF CONTEMPT 77

5 Understanding Contempt against the Background of Blame 79
Bertram F. Malle, John Voiklis, and Boyoung Kim

vii
viii Contents

6 Rejecting the Unworthy: The Causes, Components,

and Consequences of Contempt 107
Ira J. Roseman
7 Contempt’s Evaluative Presentation and Connection
to Accountability 131
Zac Cogley

PART 3: CONTEMPT, SELF-CONCEIT, AND

THE MAINTENANCE OF MORAL AND
SOCIAL HIERARCHIES 151
8 Above and Beneath Contempt 153
David Sussman
9 Contempt: At the Limits of Reactivity 173
Michelle Mason
10 Contempt as an Other-Characterizing, “Hierarchizing”
Attitude193
Stephen Darwall

Bibliography217
Index235
Notes on Contributors 243
 Acknowledgments

I would like to begin by thanking series editor Mark Alfano for the invita-
tion that propelled the present work into existence. Most of the subsequent
contributions began life as presentations at a two-day conference hosted by
the Philosophy Department at Brown University, while I enjoyed a visiting
professorship there. For logistical and financial support for the conference,
I thank Bernard Reginster and the Program for Ethical Inquiry, Emma Kirby,
Katherine Scanga, the Office of the Dean of Faculty, and Cogut Center for
the Humanities director Amanda Anderson. Thanks, too, to the conference
participants—Felicia Nimue Ackerman, Nomy Arpaly, Macalester Bell, Zac
Cogley, Boyoung Kim, Bertram Malle, Ira Roseman, and David ­Sussman—
and to audience members whose questions helped the presenters to improve
on early work. Steve Darwall, Michael Pakaluk, and Mark Alfano complete a
roster of contributors with whom it has been a true pleasure to work. Finally,
for their guidance (and patience), I owe a debt of gratitude to my editor at
Rowman & Littlefield International, Isobel Cowper-Coles, and editorial
assistant Natalie Linh Bolderston.

ix
 List of Figures

CHAPTER 4

4.1 Timeline of Nietzsche’s engagement with contempt,

laughter, and curiosity. 62
4.2 Treemap of Nietzsche’s engagement with contempt,
laughter, and curiosity. 62
4.3 Relevant passages from The Gay Science.63
4.4 Venn diagram of Nietzsche’s engagement with contempt,
laughter, and curiosity. 65

CHAPTER 5

5.1 Principal component scores of twenty-eight acts of moral

criticism plotted in the first two dimensions of the three-
dimensional space. The acts are shown in four groups
(derived from cluster analysis performed on the component
scores), and their respective marker variables (medoids)
and constituent acts are listed on the right. From Voiklis,
Cusimano, et al. (2017). 97
5.2 Predicted component scores for five acts of contempt (scorn,
disdain, despise, lose all respect, show contempt) plotted
in the three dimensions of properties of moral criticism
(revealed by principal components analysis of the ratings for

xi
xii List of Figures

twelve acts of moral criticism on ten properties). Symbols ×,

+, ∆, and ◯ indicate the locations for acts of moral criticism,
divided into four groups by cluster analysis (and represented
by marker variables denounce, let X have it, object to, and
admonish). Symbol  and associated verb labels indicate
locations for the acts of contempt. 98
 List of Tables

CHAPTER 5

5.1 Content codes for classifying aspects of contempt. 86

5.2 Frequencies for targets of contempt in 200-entry sample
from COCA. 88
5.3 Frequencies for sources of contempt in 200-entry sample
from COCA. 90
5.4 Percentages (and raw frequencies) of sources of contempt
by targets of contempt in 200-entry sample from COCA. 92
5.5 Frequency of contempt episodes in COCA classified as
Mental (private events in the person’s mind) or Social
(either nonverbal or verbal). 93
5.6 Percentages and (raw frequencies) of addressee types
for social expressions of contempt. 95

xiii
 The Moral Psychology of Contempt:
An Introduction
Michelle Mason

The eye roll, the smirk, the unilateral lip curl. These, psychologists tell us,
are typical expressions of contempt. Across cultures, such expressions mani-
fest an emotional response to norm violations—whether in the context of a
marriage on the rocks, an encounter with a racist or demagogue, or a country
in the grip of political unrest. Since some such violations transgress moral
norms, one would expect contempt to be of interest not only to psychologists
but to moral philosophers as well. The phenomenon of contempt naturally
presses questions concerning whether we should, as a moral matter, attempt
to regulate it: whether by attempting to cultivate or extirpate contempt as an
attitude toward others’ or our own violations of the relevant moral norms.
For scholars of ancient ethics, contempt—and its correlate, shame—play a
familiar role in policing violations of an ethical code. Witness, for example,
Aristotle’s (1934) portrait of the contemptuous megalopsuchos (and, correla-
tively, his defense of the role of shame in the ethical cultivation of the young). If
it is no longer fair to say, as I did fifteen years ago (Mason 2003), that contem-
porary moral philosophers have neglected contempt, affording contempt a role
in the moral psychology of the mature moral agent still risks appearing objec-
tionably retrograde. For some modern moral philosophers, it is obvious that
contempt is never morally warranted because, as directed at persons, it violates
an unconditional duty of respect for persons as such (see, e.g., Hill 2000a). Oth-
ers might anticipate support from situationist psychology in arguing that a mor-
ally warranted contempt presupposes cross-situationally stable, globalist traits
of character—traits whose existence we purportedly have reason to doubt (see,
e.g., Doris 2002). Yet a third source of objection cites deleterious effects of con-
tempt in order to mount consequentialist arguments against its moral propriety.
While modern moral philosophers’ worries about contempt are motivated
by normative scruples, more vexing is the paucity of psychological work
xv
xvi The Moral Psychology of Contempt: An Introduction

to build on Rozin et al.’s landmark CAD Triad Hypothesis (Rozin et al.

1999). According to that hypothesis, three emotions—contempt, anger, and
disgust—are typically elicited by violations of, respectively, communal
­
codes, individual rights, and purity/sanctity. Subsequent psychological stud-
ies employing verbal measures demonstrate that “contempt and its synonyms
often cluster together with hate or disgust and also, on a more abstract level,
with anger” (Fischer and Giner-Sorolla 2016). The data thus suggest that
people find it difficult to agree on how to talk about distinct causes, char-
acteristics, and implications of contempt versus hate, disgust, and anger.
Moreover, despite Rozin et al.’s pioneering work, subsequent studies have
failed to replicate a one-to-one association between contempt and violations
of communal codes, suggesting that the unique characteristic of contempt
does not lie in the type of eliciting event (Hutcherson and Gross 2011; Rus-
sell, Piazza, and Giner-Sorolla 2012).
Such results have led psychologists to propose that contempt differs from
attitudes such as anger in its appraisal and typical action tendencies (Fischer and
Roseman 2007; see also Hutcherson and Gross 2011). In particular, we are more
apt to suppose that we can change those we are angry at and to relinquish all
hope of such chance for those we hold in contempt. In terms of action tenden-
cies: Roseman (2001) includes contempt among the “exclusion” family of emo-
tions and anger, in contrast, among the “attack” family. Fischer and Roseman
(2007) found that contempt, more often than anger, was associated with ignoring
the other person, gossiping about him or her, and socially excluding him or her.
What counsel regarding contempt do these limited psychological studies
support? Is there reason to be wary of admitting contempt to the class of
reactive attitudes that, in their warranted forms, play an essential role in hold-
ing ourselves and others accountable to moral norms? If so, what are those
reasons? Would an enlightened, prescriptive moral psychology constrained
by an unconditional duty of respect for all persons necessarily be a moral psy-
chology bereft of contempt? Or were ancient philosophers, such as Aristotle,
perhaps correct in suggesting that there is a legitimate role for contempt in
the fully virtuous life? If so, how might we best delineate that role in the lives
of modern moral agents?
These questions about contempt are especially pressing in times of
increased social polarization. It is especially fitting, then, to begin our investi-
gation of contempt with Macalester Bell’s contribution. Bell places questions
about contempt in the context of debates about how best to address racism,
debates culminating in the removal of Confederate statues throughout the
southern United States as this volume heads to production. Drawing on her
distinction between a passive contempt “of indifference and inattention”
and an active contempt that “presents its target as low while never ceasing
to regard the target as a potential threat” (Bell, this volume, section “Apt
10 Macalester Bell

of it, marking the passing and publicly displaying a person’s name is a way
of honoring the dead when the vast majority of people who die get no such
public recognition.
In many of the recent campus protests, students expressed their complaints
about the ethics of honoring racists using the language of comfort: they
objected that they do not feel comfortable working or studying on campuses
which honor and venerate persons who are notorious for their racist attitudes.
At a campus-wide meeting at Bryn Mawr College, one student of color
openly wept as she shared how distraught she felt going to class in a building
named for a woman who would have despised her.
While these expressions of emotional pain and distress are troubling,
I don’t think the ethical issues surrounding racism, contempt, and de-honoring
are best conceptualized in terms of comfort and discomfort. Our social insti-
tutions, especially our institutions of higher education, cannot aim to create
anodyne environments. Discomfort and pain are often ineliminable parts of
the educational process, and comfort on campus cannot be the goal, or even
a goal, of higher education. However, I do think social institutions have a
crucial role to play in creating the conditions necessary for self-respect and
respect for others, and because of this, people may legitimately critique the
institutions and practices of their communities, including the practices of
honoring and dishonoring, when these institutions undermine the social con-
ditions necessary for full respect.
To be a fully self-respecting person one ought to recognize one’s equal
moral worth and have a good sense of the esteem and deference one merits,
but as Robin Dillon has pointed out, the recognition at issue is not simply
cognitive; recognizing one’s equal moral worth is not just a matter of com-
ing to believe that one has equal moral value.14 Dillon distinguishes between
intellectual understanding and experiential understanding. As she points out,
it is one thing to understand, intellectually, that a loved one has died, but it
is another thing altogether to stand in front of a loved one’s coffin, see their
dead body, and really feel and appreciate the loss. So too when it comes to
self-respect, it is one thing to understand, intellectually, that one has equal
moral worth, but it is another thing to understand this experientially.
Dillon is especially interested in the nature of self-respect, but her insight
generalizes to respect tout court: as I see it, to respect oneself or another
experientially requires that we live in a society that reflects and expresses
the fundamental equal moral worth of all persons and distributes moral status
fairly; that is, the society publicly esteems those worthy of esteem and dises-
teems those worthy of disesteem. As social creatures, we come to have this
experiential understanding of our moral worth and status when we live in a
society with social institutions, practices, and traditions that reflect this back
Another random document with
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[Inhalt]
 22. Phalanger celebensis (Gr.)

Ta f e l X V F i g u r 1 (c. ⅓ n. Gr.)

Nachdem J e n t i n k 1885 (Notes Leyden Mus. VII, 104) in seiner

klärenden Monographie der Gattung Cuscus Licht in die Verwirrung
gebracht, die über Phalanger celebensis bis dahin geherrscht hatte,
und O. T h o m a s 1888 (Cat. Mars. p. 206) weiterhin darüber, mit
ausreichender Synonymie, gehandelt, bleibt vorerst wenig über die
Art zu sagen. J e n t i n k (p. 91 und 106) stellte das Vorkommen in
Süd-Celebes noch etwas in Frage, allein ich selbst erhielt 1871 in
Makassar ein Junges (B 391), W e b e r (Zool. Erg. I, 114 1890) fand
die Art in Goa und neuerdings sah ich aus E v e r e t t s Sammlungen
(vom October 1895) von Indrulaman, 2300′ hoch am Pik von
Bonthain, ein Exemplar 1 und erwarb daraus ein Junges ebendaher
für das Museum. Dieses besitzt ausserdem Exemplare von
Kakaskassen, Kali und Manado in der Minahassa und von
Gorontalo, im Ganzen 7. H i c k s o n (Nat. N. Cel. 1889, 83) nennt
die Art auf der Insel Talisse, nahe der Nordspitze von Celebes,
häufig. T h o m a s (p. 207) führt sie auch von Sangi auf, und zwar
nach einem von mir gesammelten Exemplar; allein die Sangi Form
ist, wie wir gleich sehen werden, abzutrennen. Die Celebes Art
wurde noch nicht abgebildet (s. bei T h o m a s pl. XXI, 4 nur das
Ohr). Wie J e n t i n k (p. 106 Anm. 2) schon wahrscheinlich machte,
hatte G r a y (P. Z. S. 1858 pl. LXII) nicht celebensis, sondern
Exemplare von San Cristoval, Salomo Inseln, abgebildet, und
T h o m a s (p. 204) stellte klar, dass es Exemplare von Ph. orientalis
breviceps gewesen waren. Figur 1 Tafel XV ist ein Männchen von
Kakaskassen (B 2841), das grösste der in Dresden vorhandenen
Exemplare in c. ⅓ n. Gr.
Über die Schwanzschuppen mit centraler Papille, die besonders an
der Schwanzbasis auftreten, handelte d e M e i j e r e (Haren
Zoogd., Diss. 1893, 10 u. 54), sowie R e h (Jena Zeitschr. 29, 166,
1894). Die Tastlinien des Schwanzes erforderten vielleicht noch eine
specielle mikroskopische Untersuchung.

Die Eingeborenen der Minahassa nennen das Thier kussi, die

Maleiisch Sprechenden kussu. Ich sah einmal im März 1871 in der
Nähe von Manado um 11 Uhr Mittags zwei sich Paarende auf einem
hohen Baume. Das Weibchen hielt sich aufrecht, indem es mit den
Vorderfüssen einen Zweig umklammerte. Beim ersten Schusse
trennten sie sich, aber erst nach mehreren Schüssen fiel einer von
etwa 80 Fuss Höhe mit gespreizten Beinen herab und lebte noch.
Die Eingeborenen fangen sie, wenn sie sich auf einem einzeln
stehenden Baum aufhalten, indem einer hinaufklettert, worauf das
Thier sich herabfallen lässt, und ein Anderer fängt es dann unten
ein. Auf bergigem Terrain soll es sich, verfolgt, wie eine Kugel
[34]zusammenballen und herabrollen, was nicht gerade
wahrscheinlich klingt. Bei Tage sieht es schlecht, aber kriecht doch
umher. Es frisst allerlei Früchte. Die Eingebornen sagen, wenn man
Einen sieht, müsse man schnell die Zahl 11 aussprechen, wenn
zwei, die Zahl 12, sonst gelinge der Fang nicht. Das Fleisch wird
gern gegessen und soll wie Wildschwein schmecken.

1 Vgl. auch E v e r e t t bei H a r t e r t : Nov. Zool. III, 150 1896. ↑

[Inhalt]
 23. Phalanger sangirensis n. sp.

Ta f e l X V F i g u r 2 u n d 3 (c. ⅓ n. G r . )

Phalanger Ph. celebensi (Gr.) similis, sed

subaureo-flavescens et facie albescenti.

H a b . In insulis Sangi.

L o n g . corp. c. 40, caud. c. 25 cm.

Es liegen mir 5 Exemplare von den Sangi Inseln vor, und zwar 3 von
Gross Sangi (2 aus meinen Sammlungen und ein kürzlich
erhaltenes) und zwei von Siao (1893 erhalten). Sie unterscheiden
sich leicht von den Celebes Exemplaren durch ihre goldigen Töne,
sind farbiger und heller im Ganzen und haben auch mehr oder
weniger ein helles Gesicht. Die Abbildung ergiebt die Unterschiede,
bei deren zweifellosem Vorhandensein ich nicht zögere, die Sangi
Form als insulare abzutrennen. Bemerkenswerth ist vielleicht, dass 2
Junge von Ph. celebensis eine gewisse Ähnlichkeit mit sangirensis
in der Färbung zeigen (jedoch ohne helle Gesichtzeichnung). Kommt
diese Annäherung stets vor 1, so könnte sie bedeuten, dass die
Sangi Form die ältere ist, indem die celebische nur noch im
Jugendkleide die Färbung der Stammform bewahrt hat. Figur 2 und
3 Tafel XV sind zwei Männchen von Gross Sangi in c. ⅓ n. Gr. (2085
und 2239, von mir mitgebracht). In der Grösse kommen sangirensis
und celebensis einander gleich. Bei den mir vorliegenden 5
Exemplaren von Sangi ist ebensowenig eine Spur eines
Rückenstreifens vorhanden. In der Färbung differiren sie mehr oder
weniger untereinander, sie sind dunkler und heller; ein Exemplar von
Siao nähert sich selbst celebensis, allein differirt doch genügend, um
bei einem Gesammtvergleiche der 5 Sangi Exemplare einerseits mit
den 7 von Celebes andrerseits keinen Zweifel über die Berechtigung
von sangirensis aufkommen zu lassen.

1 W e b e r (Zool. Erg. I, 114 1890) sagt von einem Jungen von Ph. celebensis
von Goa in Süd Celebes, dass es ganz verschieden von der Mutter gefärbt sei,
kastanienfarben und oben dunkel. Dies scheint sich also nicht Ph. sangirensis
anzunähern. ↑
[Inhalt]
 24. Phalanger ursinus (Temm.)

Diese Art ist bis jetzt nur von Nord Celebes mit Sicherheit nachgewiesen.
J e n t i n k (Notes Leyden Mus. VII, 91 1885) hielt es sogar für möglich, dass sie
vielleicht überhaupt auf Nord Celebes beschränkt sei. O. T h o m a s (Cat. Mars.
1888, 197) führt auch kein Exemplar von Süd Celebes auf. Das Museum besitzt
17, davon 7 aus der Minahassa, 3 von der Insel Lembeh bei Kema, 3 von
Tjamba in Süd Celebes (1882 1), 3 von Tonkean in Nordost Celebes und 1 von
der Insel Peling. Im August 1871 erlegte ich bei Poso an der Tominibucht
mehrere Exemplare, von denen eins im Berliner Museum ist, wie auch ein von
mir im Gorontaloschen erhaltenes. Es beweist dies das Vorkommen über ganz
Celebes; Te i j s m a n n (Natuurk. Tijdschr. Nederl. Ind. 38, 77 1879) behauptete
dies schon; ohne Exemplare als Unterlage kann man aber auf solche
allgemeine Angaben nicht viel Gewicht legen. Die Tonkean Exemplare zeichnen
sich durch ihre, besonders auf der hinteren Körperhälfte lebhaft gelbgraue
Färbung vor allen obigen und auch sonst beschriebenen aus, sie machen daher
nicht den schwärzlichen Eindruck wie die anderen; 2 von der Insel Lembeh
nähern sich ihnen in dieser Beziehung etwas, das 3. ist jedoch sehr dunkel. Das
von Peling ist das hellste von allen, es ist sehr gelblichgrau. Ob auf die
Färbungsdifferenzen der Tonkean und Peling Exemplare etwas zu geben sei, d.
h. ob sie locale Abänderungen repräsentiren, oder ob dort auch dunkle
Exemplare vorkommen, lässt sich erst bei mehr Material beurtheilen. Der Name
des Thieres im Buginesischen und Makassarischen ist memu, s. auch
Te i j s m a n n l. c.; in der Minahassa, sagt er (l. c. 23, 368 1861), heisse das
Männchen lokkon, das Weibchen kuseh. Es existirt noch keine genügende
Abbildung der Art, denn die L e s s o n sche (Cent. Zool. I, 10 1830) ist den
heutigen Anforderungen nicht entsprechend. Ph. ursinus lässt sich jedoch
gegenüber allen anderen Phalanger Arten keinen Augenblick verkennen. [35]

1 S. auch E v e r e t t und H a r t e r t : Nov. Zool. III, 150 1896. ↑

[Inhalt]
 Index.
albayensis Elera, Phlœomys 29.

alfurus Less., Babirusa 15.

Anoa depressicornis 12. 13. 14. 15.

Anoa mindorensis 12. 13.

Antilope depressicornis 12.

arctoides Js. Geoffr., Macacus 5.

Babirusa alfurus Less. 15.

Bos mindorensis 13.

brachyceros Gr., Bubalus 15.

breviceps Thos., Phalanger orientalis 33.

Bubalus brachyceros Gr. 15.

Bubalus bubalus 13.

bubalus, Bubalus 13.

Bubalus indicus 12.

Bubalus mainitensis Heude 13.

Bubalus mindorensis Heude 12. 13.

Bubalus moellendorffi Nehring 13.

cagsi A. B. Meyer, Sciurus 28. 29.

candida Gthr., Gymnura 32.

celebensis (Gr.), Phalanger 33. 34.

ceramicus Gr., Sus 18.

civetta Schreb., Viverra 12.

Crateromys schadenbergi (A. B. Meyer) 32.

Cryptoprocta ferox Th. Benn. 10.

cumingi Wtrh., Phlœomys 29. 31. 32. 33.

Cuscus 33.

Cynocephalus 5.

cynomolgus L., Macacus 4.

Cynopithecus niger (Desm.) 1. 5. 7. 8.

Cynopithecus nigrescens (Temm.) 2. 5. 7.

depressicornis, Anoa 12. 13. 14. 15.

depressicornis, Antilope 12.

Elephas primigenius 19.

fasciatus Desm., Paradoxurus 12.

ferox Th. Benn., Cryptoprocta 10.

fur Slark, Macacus 4.

fuscomanus Fisch.-Waldh., Tarsius 8.

fuscus Fisch.-Waldh., Tarsius 8. 9.

Gymnura candida Gthr. 32.

imhausi A. M.-E., Lophiomys 33.

indicus, Bubalus 12.

inornatus Gr., Macacus 2.

leucomus Müll. Schl., Sciurus 25.

leucomystax Gr., Paradoxurus 10. 12.

Lophiomys imhausi A. M.-E. 33.

Macacus arctoides Js. Geoffr. 5.

Macacus cynomolgus L. 4.

Macacus fur Slark 4.

Macacus inornatus Gr. 2.

Macacus maurus F. Cuv. 1. 2. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Macacus melanotus Ogilb. 5.

Macacus ocreatus Ogilb. 1. 2. 4.

Macacus philippinensis Js. Geoffr. 4.

Macroxus philippensis Wtrh. 29.

mainitensis Heude, Bubalus 13.

maurus F. Cuv., Macacus 1. 2. 4. 5. 6. 7.

melanotus, Ogilb., Macacus 5.

mindanensis Steere, Sciurus 28. 29.

mindorensis, Anoa 12. 13.

mindorensis, Bos 13.

mindorensis Heude, Bubalus 12. 13.

mindorensis, Probubalus 12.

moellendorffi Nehring, Bubalus 13.

musanga Gr., Paradoxurus 11. 12.

musschenbroeki Schl., Paradoxurus 10. 11. 12.

niger (Desm.), Cynopithecus 1. 5. 7. 8.

niger (Desm.), Paradoxurus 12.

niger Finsch, Sus 18. 19.

nigrescens (Temm.), Cynopithecus 2. 5. 7.

ocreatus Ogilb., Macacus 1. 2. 4.

Paguma 11.

pallidus Nehring, Phlœomys 29. 30.

papuensis Less., Sus 18.

Paradoxurus fasciatus Desm. 12.

Paradoxurus leucomystax Gr. 10. 12.

Paradoxurus musanga Gr. 11. 12.

Paradoxurus musschenbroeki Schl. 10. 11. 12.

Paradoxurus niger (Desm.) 12.

Paradoxurus philippensis Jourd. 12.

Paradoxurus philippinensis Temm. 29. [36]

Paradoxurus typus 12.

Phalanger celebensis (Gr.) 33. 34.

Phalanger orientalis breviceps Thos. 33.

Phalanger sangirensis A. B. Meyer 34.

Phalanger ursinus (Temm.) 34.

philippensis Wtrh., Macroxus 29.

philippensis Jourd., Paradoxurus 12.

philippensis Wtrh., Sciurus 29.

philippensis A. B. Meyer, Tarsius 8. 9.

philippinensis Js. Geoffr., Macacus 4.

philippinensis Temm., Paradoxurus 29.

Phlœomys albayensis Elera 29.

Phlœomys cumingi Wtrh. 29. 31. 32. 33.

Phlœomys pallidus Nehring 29. 30.

Phlœomys (?) schadenbergi A. B. Meyer 32.

Porcula salvania Hdgs. 15.

primigenius, Elephas 19.

Probubalus mindorensis 12.

rosenbergi Jent., Sciurus 26.

salvania Hdgs., Porcula 15.

samarensis Steere, Sciurus 28. 29.

sangirensis A. B. Meyer, Phalanger 34.

sangirensis A. B. Meyer. Tarsius 8. 9.

schadenbergi (A. B. Meyer), Crateromys 32.

schadenbergi A. B. Meyer, Phlœomys (?) 32.

Sciurus cagsi A. B. Meyer 28. 29.

Sciurus leucomus Müll. Schl. 25.

Sciurus mindanensis Steere 28. 29.

Sciurus philippensis Wtrh. 29.

Sciurus rosenbergi Jent. 26.

Sciurus samarensis Steere 28. 29.

Sciurus steeri Gthr. 27.

Sciurus tingahi A. B. Meyer 27.

Sciurus tonkeanus A. B. Meyer 25.

Sciurus weberi Jent. 25.

spectrum (Pall.), Tarsius 8. 9. 10.

steeri Gthr., Sciurus 27.

Sus ceramicus Gr. 18.

Sus niger Finsch 18. 19.

Sus papuensis Less. 18.

tangalunga Gr., Viverra 12.

Tarsius fuscomanus Fisch.-Waldh. 8.

Tarsius fuscus Fisch.-Waldh. 8. 9.

Tarsius philippensis A. B. Meyer 8. 9.

Tarsius sangirensis A. B. Meyer 8. 9.

Tarsius spectrum (Pall.) 8. 9. 10.

tingahi A. B. Meyer, Sciurus 27.

tonkeanus A. B. Meyer, Sciurus 25.

Trilophomys 33.

typus, Paradoxurus 12.

ursinus (Temm.), Phalanger 34.

Viverra civetta Schreb. 12.

Viverra tangalunga Gr. 12.

weberi Jent., Sciurus 25.

[Inhalt]

Abh. Ber. K. Zool. Anthr. Ethn. Mus. Dresden 1896/7 Nr. 6

Meyer, Säugethiere Celebes-Philippinen Taf. I

M a c a c u s m a u r u s F. Cuv.
 c. ⅙ n. Gr.

Abh. Ber. K. Zool. Anthr. Ethn. Mus. Dresden 1896/7 Nr. 6

Meyer, Säugethiere Celebes-Philippinen Taf. II

1–2 Macacus maurus F. Cuv. 3–4 Cynopithecus niger (Desm.)

¾ n. Gr.
Abh. Ber. K. Zool. Anthr. Ethn. Mus. Dresden 1896/7 Nr. 6
Meyer, Säugethiere Celebes-Philippinen Taf. III

1–2 M a c a c u s m a u r u s F. Cuv. 3–4 C y n o p i t h e c u s n i g e r

(Desm.)

¾ n. Gr.
 Abh. Ber. K. Zool. Anthr. Ethn. Mus. Dresden 1896/7 Nr. 6
Meyer, Säugethiere Celebes-Philippinen Taf. IV

T a r s i u s p h i l i p p e n s i s A. B. Meyer

n. Gr.

Abh. Ber. K. Zool. Anthr. Ethn. Mus. Dresden 1896/7 Nr. 6

Meyer, Säugethiere Celebes-Philippinen Taf. V
 P a r a d o x u r u s m u s s c h e n b r o e k i Schl.

⅕–⅙ n. Gr.

Abh. Ber. K. Zool. Anthr. Ethn. Mus. Dresden 1896/7 Nr. 6: Meyer, Säugethiere Celebes-
Philippinen
Taf. VI
 P a r a d o x u r u s m u s s c h e n b r o e k i Schl.

Abh. Ber. K. Zool. Anthr. Ethn. Mus. Dresden 1896/7 Nr. 6

Meyer, Säugethiere Celebes-Philippinen Taf. VII
 B u b a l u s m i n d o r e n s i s Heude

c. 1⁄12 n. Gr.

Abh. Ber. K. Zool. Anthr. Ethn. Mus. Dresden 1896/7 Nr. 6

Meyer, Säugethiere Celebes-Philippinen Taf. VIII