631693

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HPY0010.1177/0957154X16631693History of PsychiatryCutting

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History of Psychiatry
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Max Scheler’s theory of the © The Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/0957154X16631693
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psychopathology

J Cutting
Institute of Psychiatry, London

Abstract
The philosopher Max Scheler (1874–1928) set out a hierarchical theory of values and emotions in the
early twentieth century. This inspired Kurt Schneider to distinguish two sorts of depressive illness, each
conforming to a Störung (disorder) in different levels of Scheler’s hierarchy. No other psychopathologist,
except Stanghellini, gave the matter much attention. I believe that Scheler’s theory is a rich source of insight
into psychopathology, general and neuropsychiatric. I therefore give an account of Scheler’s scheme, review
its extant applications (Schneider’s, Stanghellini’s), and present suggestions as to its continuing potential
relevance in a wide range of psychopathological conditions.

Keywords
Depressive illness, emotion, Kurt Schneider, Max Scheler, psychopathology, schizophrenia

Introduction
Max Scheler (1874–1928) published his most famous work Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die
materiale Wertethik (Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values) in two sections in
Husserl’s journal of phenomenology, one in 1913 and the other in 1916. It was translated into
English in 1973 and is usually referenced ‘Formalism’ (Scheler, 1913–1916/1973). The presenta-
tion of Scheler’s hierarchical scheme of values is in the first part (1973: 81–110), that on emotions
in the second part (1973: 239–369). There is some discussion of the same matters as they apply to
love and sympathy in his next most well known work, Zur Phänomenologie der Sympathiegefühl
und von Liebe und Hass (On the Phenomenology of Feelings of Sympathy and on Love and Hate).
This was also published in 1913, later editions being retitled Wesen und Formen der Sympathie
and translated as The Nature of Sympathy (Scheler, 1913/1954). Formalism, however, sets out the
matter comprehensively and succinctly, as nowhere else in Scheler’s writings.

Corresponding author:
J Cutting, Mill Wood, Wall Hill, Forest Row, East Sussex RH18 5EG, UK.
Email: jccutting@outlook.com

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2 History of Psychiatry 

There were four levels in the hierarchy. Frings (1997) – the joint translator of Formalism, the editor
of Scheler’s Collected Works for decades, and his most knowledgeable commentator – saw ramifica-
tions of this hierarchy throughout Scheler’s philosophy. But all such ramifications, also hierarchically
arranged, for example sort of emotion experienced, sets of iconic human figures embodying such
values and who subconsciously influence a human being’s course of life, derive from the primacy,
and the independence from any knower, of value. I shall discuss all this in the following. Sometimes
Scheler mentions a fifth level of value – usefulness – whose position in the scheme is uncertain and
which has no correlative feeling. I shall discuss this too, along with a further problem concerning the
different labels given to the four sets of values in sections 1 and 2 of Formalism.
I do not intend to consider Scheler’s place in philosophy as a whole, nor to pigeonhole him as
representing some form of ‘ism’. What I do want to stress, however, is that my encounter with
his writings was quite revelatory, and I wish to convey this to the reader with the hope that he or
she will be tempted to explore Scheler’s writings on this and other topics. Something in Scheler’s
works – whether stemming from his profound acquaintance with psychology and psychiatry,
or whether arising from his superb insights into the nature of the human being – seemed to open
a door into the theoretical basis of psychopathology that I had not found hitherto in anything I
had read.
The structure of the present article is as follows: first an account of Scheler’s hierarchical
systems of value, emotion and the iconic human types who embody them is presented; then the
writings of the few psychopathologists who have appreciated his construct; and finally, sugges-
tions as to Scheler’s potential relevance to various sorts of psychopathology.

Scheler’s hierarchy of values (and ramifications of this throughout

the human being)
There are, according to Scheler (1913–1916/1973), four fundamentally different sorts of values
available to the human being, two of which are also open to the non-human animal. They are
organized in a hierarchy, separate levels of which contain values restricted to agreeableness, vital-
ity, mentality, or holiness, respectively, from bottom to top (of which non-human animals can only
partake of the bottom two). There are positive and negative examples of the generic values at each
level. What is evaluated at the lowest level is confined to whether something is agreeable or disa-
greeable. At the vital level there is a cluster of values, the common denominator of which is the
beneficial quality of something to promote life. To this end, something can be noble or vulgar,
vigorous or lethargic, excellent or tawdry, wholesome or rotten, or invite appetite or disgust. The
mental level encompasses all those values which are known only to someone in possession of Geist
(always tricky to translate into English, but meaning something like ‘spirit and higher mind’).
Scheler actually calls these values ‘geistigen Werte’, and gives various examples: (1) the sense of
beauty or ugliness and aesthetic values in general; (2) the appreciation that something can be right
or wrong in a legal or moral sense (as opposed to correct or incorrect), which grounds the notions
of society and statehood; (3) the ability to grasp that things can be true or false, which underpins
the very possibility of philosophy and science; (4) awareness of culture in general; and (5) the
facility to love or hate (as opposed to simply liking or not liking something – see below). The
fourth level of values refers exclusively to those pertaining to the heilig (holy) and unheilig (unholy,
sacrilegious(?) might be better in English).
The higher levels of values are distinguished from the lower in four respects: (1) the higher
endure more – compare a work of art with the taste of wine; (2) the higher are less divisible – com-
pare again a work of art (whose value is ruined if cut up) with a piece of cloth (whose value only
halves if cut in two); (3) the higher found the lower – ‘the value of what is useful is founded on

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what is agreeable’, Scheler (1913–1916/1973: 94) says, indicating that this occasionally intro-
duced fifth level in his scheme is the lowest of all); and (4) the higher evoke a greater ‘depth of
contentment … nothing to do with pleasure’ (p. 96).
To each level of value there corresponds, in any knower capable of grasping the value, a specific
set of feelings, also positive or negative. To agreeableness there are sensible feelings (sinnlichen
Fühlens) such as pleasure or pain. To vitality (Lebenswerten) there are feelings (Lebensgefühle) of
liveliness or languor, being glad or gloomy about something, a sense of courage or anxiety, and
appetite or disgust. To mental values there correspond aesthetic feelings of a sense of beauty or
ugliness, joy or sorrow (as opposed to being ‘gay’ or ‘not gay’) and respect or disrespect. Holiness
or its absence are registered by feelings of bliss or despair.
These fundamental sorts of feelings, moreover, are also distinguished from one another by
certain characteristics. The sensible feelings of pleasure or pain are localized in parts of the body,
are impervious to any act of attention or control, are not directly related to the human being as a
person but are rather simply there as ‘dead’ facts present in time now as opposed to auguring some
future event, and are incapable of being reproduced in the same form either in ourselves at some
later date or contagiously from others at the actual time. Vital feelings, such as vigour or fatigue,
are not localized, but suffuse the ‘lived body’ (Leib); they manifest a unity unlike the patchy dis-
position of sensible feelings, and they have an intentional nature that can reveal advantages or
dangers yet to come (think of anxiety). Mental feelings are directly connected to the self (‘Ich’;
the translators used the word ‘Ego’) so that the feeler says ‘I feel sad’, whereas vital feelings
pervade the body rather than the self. Feelings derived from the registering of values of holiness
are independent even of the self and are not about anything at all (which mental feelings are), but
bathe everything in inner and outer worlds with their effects. They are the ‘correlates of the
moral value of our personal being, and for this reason they are the metaphysical and religious
self-feelings par excellence’ (p. 343).
To complement all this, there are clusters of iconic people who personify these levels of values
and feelings, who influence an individual human being in a profound and subtle way throughout
life, and who essentially form their character through actual meetings with larger-than-life exem-
plars (think Uncle Bertie) or through fictional encounters (James Bond or Kafka’s K). This is set
out in an article entitled Vorbilder und Führer (Exemplars of person and leaders; Scheler,
1933/1987). Personifying the value of agreeableness and the feeling of pleasure is the man-about-
town (who knows where to buy the best oysters, for example). The vital level is represented by the
hero (whose courage is tested to the limit). Then come the artist, jurist and scientist who embody
aesthetic, legal and truth-seeking values at a mental level. Above all these, there is the founder of
a religion – Christ or Mohammed, and their saints and sages – whose very lives personify the
human being as a moralist.
All this is spell-binding and remarkably coherent, save for a few inconsistencies and question-
able translations. One is the labelling of the third level of values in section 1 of Formalism as
geistigen Werte, but in section 2 of the book the emotions corresponding to values of holiness are
referred to as geistigen Gefühle. The translators render seelischen as ‘psychic’, but this does not
properly denote what Scheler is talking about and I prefer the term ‘mental’. Scheler’s overall
scheme (ambiguous in English because the untranslatable word geistig) seems best conveyed by
values of agreeableness, vitality, mentality and holiness, with the corresponding emotions being
sensible, vital, ‘mental’ and religious. As for ‘usefulness’, Frings (1997) confidently places this
between values of agreeableness and vital values, but Scheler says quite specifically that values of
agreeableness found usefulness. Furthermore, what Scheler appreciates, more than anyone else, is
the fundamental difference in certain feelings yet the superficial similarity in the vocabulary used
to refer to them. This becomes particularly important when we move on to discuss Schneider’s

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4 History of Psychiatry 

separation of two sorts of depressive illness. Positive feelings occur at all four levels – pleasure,
being glad about something (Sichfreuen), joy (Freude) and blissfulness (Seligkeit) – as do negative
feelings – displeasure, gloominess (Betrübtheit), sadness (Traurigkeit) and despair (Verzweiflung).
Frings and Funk translate betrübt as sad, which is not what Scheler meant, as he said that vital feel-
ings are directed to the future which sadness is not, whereas gloominess is. We shall see that one
psychopathologist actually considered that the loss of the ability to experience Traurigkeit (sad-
ness) was at the core of endogenous depression. This makes no sense unless sadness and gloomi-
ness are separate emotional states, and makes no sense either of Schneider’s pinpointing endogenous
depression to the vital level of emotion unless gloominess is a vital emotion and sadness a mental
emotion – see below. It is therefore crucial to be aware of phenomenological differences between
emotions if we are to make any sense out of psychopathology.

Extant applications of Scheler’s hierarchy of values and emotions

The only two psychopathologists to have seen the potential psychopathological relevance of
Scheler’s scheme are Kurt Schneider (1920/2012) and Stanghellini and Ballerini (2007).
Kurt Schneider knew Scheler personally and professionally. In his 1920 article he gives a good
account of the section on emotion in Formalism which was summarized earlier. He then moves on
to a discussion as to how two sorts of depressive illness – endogenous depression and reactive
depression – might be characterized by a Störung (disturbance) in different layers of Scheler’s
scheme. An endogenous depression, according to Schneider (1920/2012: 205–6), is one where
there are:

disturbances of feelings of the lived body and vital feelings can come to dominate the clinical picture of
endogenous depression … Matters are different in reactive depression. It is not as if disturbances of vital
feelings … are totally absent in reactive depression; however, they are much rarer and most importantly
they are exclusively secondary symptoms. The primary disturbance in reactive depression is the disturbance
of mental feelings.

What Schneider further appreciates from Scheler’s formulation is that a person can simultaneously
experience several emotions, if each is from a different layer. We have not covered this so far, but
it is something that Scheler brings forward in support of his stratified system. Someone grieving,
for example, whose sadness is a negative emotion at the mental level, can nevertheless experience
a positive feeling of pleasure, at the sensible level, on tasting a glass of wine. If all feelings (we are
using emotions and feelings interchangeably in this article) were on the same level, with merely
different intensities and incidental qualities being invoked to explain their different nature, as virtu-
ally all previous theorists of emotion assumed, this simultaneous having of two contrasting emo-
tions would be impossible. Scheler gives other examples – the martyred saint blissfully accepting
pain. Schneider then realizes that this aspect of Scheler’s theory neatly explains the otherwise para-
doxical situation of someone in the throes of an endogenous depression who complains bitterly that
he or she has no feelings, a not uncommon psychopathological fact, and one which no-one else has
been able to explain. But if the endogenous depressive is feeling something – whether appropri-
ately or inappropriately (see below) – at the vital level, but is not feeling anything at the mental
level, then Scheler’s scheme, which allows preservation of feelings at one level and dilapidation of
feelings at another level, is tailor-made to account for this.
Schneider’s application of Scheler’s philosophical notions about emotions seems, therefore,
quite revolutionary and revelatory. They have, furthermore, a bearing on the long-standing
nosological debate about whether depressive illness is unitary or manifold (e.g. Kendell, 1976):

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there are at least two varieties according to this Schelerian-Schneiderian exegesis. The explication
of a hitherto inexplicable aspect of depressive psychopathology – anhedonia with distress about
this very anhedonia – seems to be a further bonus. No-one else ever took up these nuggets of
wisdom, which seem now quite astounding.
It should be said, as critique, however, that it is not clear what Schneider meant by a disturbance
(Störung) at the mental and vital levels. He says that:

It is possible that the disturbance of the vital feelings is so severe that psychic [mental, in our scheme]
feelings cannot actually manifest themselves, in a similar way to how people can come to be dominated by
strong feelings of pain. (Schneider, 1920/2012: 206)

In other words, he is saying that emotions at one level are so overwhelming that they swamp emo-
tions at another level. If so, and it is not at all certain that this can explain the overall psychopathol-
ogy of a depressive illness (see below), why does he keep referring to the primary problem in both
endogenous and reactive depression as a Störung (disturbance) at some level? Or, perhaps more to
the point, what does he mean by Störung? Is it a quantitative change – too much, too little? Or
could it be, as I argue below, that in the case of endogenous depression the vital layer of feelings is
unimpaired, whereas the mental feelings are defunct or dilapidated? As a result, the human being
thus afflicted would be running on an intrinsically normal vital layer of feelings. This would only
be apparently morbid because their companion layer of mental feeling, which complements this
and contributes to the overall panoply of feelings any normal person has available, would be non-
effective. Any Störung in endogenous depression would not then be at the level of vital feelings but
one level above.
In favour of this formulation is the article by Schulte (1961) entitled ‘Nicht-traurig-sein-können
im Kern melancholischer Erlebens’ (not-to-be-able-to-be-sad as the core of the melancholic’s
experience), which, without invoking anything that Scheler wrote, proposes that Traurigkeit (sad-
ness), a mental emotion in Scheler’s scheme, is not only lost in at least one sort of depressive ill-
ness but is the very core psychopathological phenomenon that needs explaining. Both Schulte and
Schneider refer to the fact that someone in the middle of an endogenous depressive illness who
hears of the death of someone they would hitherto have grieved for cannot do this, that is, cannot
experience Traurigkeit, until they recover from the depressive illness. Schulte even says that in his
experience the onset of grieving is the first sign that the depressive illness is on the mend, in other
words, the return of the ability to experience sadness heralds the remission of the illness. The
‘depressive’ is not therefore sad at all, but is he or she who cannot be sad. Mourning and melan-
cholia (Freud, 1917/1957) and the entire evidence base for cognitive psychology’s intervention in
depression are utterly undermined by this simple psychopathological observation. Scheler’s thesis,
Schneider’s application of it and Schulte’s independent insight all look to be critical stages in what
should be a comprehensive psychopathological re-evaluation of depressive illness. Not a bit of it:
a recent, mainstream American textbook on Melancholia (Taylor and Fink, 2006: 15) repeats the
establishment view that melancholia is based on ‘pervasive sadness’.
Stanghellini and Ballerini’s (2007) study of ‘values in persons with schizophrenia’ is the only
other psychopathological investigation in the entire 100 years since Scheler’s Formalism appeared
which acknowledges his, Scheler’s, philosophical feat. It is not so closely linked to Scheler’s
scheme of values as was Schneider’s, and the concept of value adopted by the authors deviates
from Scheler’s. Nevertheless, it is an arresting counterpoint to Schneider’s take on Scheler. The
authors are interested in what, at root, makes the schizophrenic who he or she is: what is the
‘anthropological and existential matrix they arise from’, as the authors put it. They find, during
in-depth interviews, that the schizophrenic has feelings of radical uniqueness and exceptionality,

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6 History of Psychiatry 

and that this stems from a sense of being beholden to values which are ‘eccentric’ vis-a-vis the
commonality of values which drive their contemporaries. The schizophrenic feels the weight of
‘metaphysical concerns’ and feels excluded from ‘socially shared values’. Stanghellini and
Ballerini do not place all this precisely in Scheler’s hierarchy, but it is clear from their findings and
remarks that, unlike their ‘normal’ contemporaries, the schizophrenic is over-reliant in their life on
the highest values in Scheler’s system – geistig as opposed to vital.

Potential applications of Schelerian philosophy of values and

emotions
Scheler’s scheme of values and emotions is only one aspect of a rich philosophical body of thought
of potential relevance to psychopathology. Even restricting discussion to the topic of values and
emotions, there are sufficient untapped veins to inform our subject much more than the meagre
examples so far would suggest.

Anorexia nervosa
The psychopathology of this serious and life-threatening condition has been woefully neglected by
the great psychopathologists of the twentieth century. British and North American researchers have
been most active in the field, and the competing psychopathological theories which have emerged
can be boiled down to the following: (a) ‘morbid fear of fatness’ (Russell, 1970, although he
changed his view later; see below) or a ‘phobia’ of the same ilk (Crisp, 1970); (b) a variety of
depression (Cantwell et al., 1977); (c) an obsessive-compulsive neurosis (Holden, 1990); (d) a
disorder of body image (Bruch, 1974: ch. 6); and (e) ‘abstinence from food (from) some emotion’
(Lasègue, 1873), ‘want of appetite … due to a morbid mental state’ (Gull, 1874) and ‘lack of
appetite … non-eating … inappetency’ (Russell, 1995). If the two originators of the condition and
the most distinguished contemporary authority all concur that the essence of the condition has
something to do with a lack of appetite, expressed precisely in the name of the condition – anorexia
nervosa – then we should take this seriously. They had no acquaintance with philosophical notions
of appetite, but it seems to me that they were right to concentrate on this aspect and to eschew any
claim that the condition was a mere variety of some other neurotic condition.
Invoking Scheler’s scheme of values and emotions, anorexia nervosa is indeed a disorder of the
valuation of food and the feelings engendered by this negative appraisal. Appetite, according to
him, is a vital feeling, and therefore anorexia nervosa is a disorder of the vital evaluation of food
and all its consequences. The other proposed explanations largely fall away when this crucial fact
is appreciated. The core feeling engendered by food is not, however, disgust. Consider this auto-
biographical account:

I ate my breakfast. I ate 51 flakes … How do they make them, I wonder, each one, if you look carefully,
as rugged and pitted as a rock face … look at the tray … A grilled cheese sandwich. Cheese is the hardest
food to digest and it contaminates everything you eat it with … Everything sits on the tray, approximate,
self-sufficient, unbreachable, as if sealed in an invisible skin … when the lunch tray arrives I decide I have
to eat something … I choose a green apple and a cube of nondescript yellow cheese … First I slice the
apple into quarters, then eighths, then sixteenths … I am too frightened to put a forkful of this in my
mouth. At the moment I would rather die than eat. (Shute, 1992: 38, 46)

What we see here is rather a transformation of food into something inanimate – like a ‘rock face’,
‘unbreachable’, ‘sealed in an invisible skin’. It seems as if the whole vital lure of the food has been

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wiped out, just as in depressive illness the entire gamut of feelings at a mental level – joy and
sadness – were obliterated.
The other explanations for anorexia nervosa – phobia, obsessional neurosis, depressive equiva-
lent, body image disorder – cannot do justice to the psychopathological facts. For example, Von
Gebsattel (1938/1958) made out a case for the obsessive-compulsive subject’s being at root dis-
gusted with the seediness of everything, and engaged in cleaning rituals to ward all this off. But the
anorexic, in the extract above at least, makes no mention of the sliminess or filthiness of food but
is rather preoccupied with its non-vital nature. Anomalous bodily experiences of inappropriately
deemed fatness are also on the cards as a primary trigger for the entire condition, but if this were
so, why is it that a whole host of neuropsychiatric conditions with quite extreme body image dis-
orders (Cutting, 1997: 260–3) do not lead to anorexia? The suggestions that anorexia nervosa is a
phobia or a form of depression are, in my view, way off beam, because in both cases vital feelings
– anxiety predominantly – are preserved, or exaggerated, not lost.
In summary, I propose that anorexia tout court is indeed the psychopathological core of
anorexia nervosa and should inform further research and treatment.

Anxiety neurosis
Here there is no mystery, no radically competing hypotheses. Yet a Schelerian take on the condition
seems to me to encapsulate the matter best of all. In Scheler’s scheme, anxiety is a vital feeling,
largely experienced in the body, that something awful is about to happen. As a morbid state of
affairs it must then be a mis-evaluation of the potential harm of some thing or situation. Vital feel-
ings point to the future, predicting positive or negative outcomes of some developing situation, and
morbid anxiety is therefore a feeling that something speciously untoward is about to happen.

Depressive illness (further considerations)

Schneider’s and Schulte’s deliberations on the nature of a depressive illness, considered above,
were hugely insightful. But there are other aspects of this condition which are illuminated by
Scheler’s hierarchy of values and emotions. Assuming, as I do, that an endogenous depressive ill-
ness (melancholia in other schemes) is characterized by a loss of feelings at the mental level
(Schulte) and a preservation or exaggeration of feelings at the vital level (Schneider’s Störung
being interpreted as an exaggeration here), then there might be other hitherto inexplicable psycho-
pathological features which can be accommodated. One such is the sense of hopelessness or despair
experienced by many such subjects.
Ratcliffe’s (2013) paper ‘What is it to lose hope?’ crystallizes the problem. He quotes autobio-
graphical accounts of depressives who experienced ‘a paralysis of hope’, that ‘all sense of hope had
vanished’ and that ‘there were no words to explain the depths of my despair’. Ratcliffe emphasizes
that the depressive’s experience is not ‘loss of hopes’, but ‘loss of hope’. In other words, it is the
not-being-able-to experience hope, not the particular things that one could hope for, that is at stake.

Schizophrenia (further considerations)

The relevance of Scheler’s scheme of values and emotions for the understanding of schizophrenia
was first touched upon by Stanghellini and Ballerini (2007). The schizophrenic is he or she who is
overly liable to evaluate their situation within a metaphysical, scientific or artistic paradigm. There
is a considerable literature supporting this, from Minkowski’s (1927/1987) observations through to
the vignettes on the matter provided by Naudin et al. (2000). What is not so well appreciated is that

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8 History of Psychiatry 

the loose collection of areas in which the schizophrenic exhibits compromised knowledge – known
in mainstream psychiatry as negative symptoms and variously formulated within psychopathology
as ‘lack of common sense’ (Blankenburg, 1969/2001) or a ‘loss of vital contact with reality’
(Minkowski, 1927/1987) – is best seen as de-valuations or mis-valuations of a whole region of
values open to the human being. Minkowski’s core psychopathological insight about schizophrenia
would carry more weight, in my view, if he had framed it within Scheler’s scheme of values. The
schizophrenic, according to this revamped view, is he or she who lacks the wherewithal to evaluate
the vital values in anything in his environment and world. Thus, he or she does not lack contact
with reality, the nature of which and the means of grasping which Minkowski anyway leaves up in
the air, but simply loses out on a whole realm of values concerning what is of vital concern to him
or her.

Conclusions
Further suggested applications of Scheler’s scheme would be speculative, but I hope I have given
enough information to inspire future psychopathological formulations based on his ideas.
Psychopathology always seems to be at a crossroads. Many articles during the twentieth
century, for example Janzarik (1976/1987), reported a ‘crisis in psychopathology’. The thrust of
these is that either biological or psychological or pragmatic solutions – the last geared to benefit
pharmaceutical or legal parties – threaten to sideline and obscure what should be a pure scientific
endeavour. Much of this criticism is itself a biased plea for some specific viewpoint.
What the deliberations in the present article show, I hope, is that if one takes the highest possible
analysis of the human being – the philosophical – and chooses a philosopher who is exquisitely
au fait with the topic of our concern, then a lot of the peculiarities of our subject simply melt away
with the insight that such philosophy provides.

Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial or not-for-profit
sectors.

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