E/08/033 BANDARA H.M.J.

S ASSIGNMENT 2 EF 524-BUSINESS LAW

TAY BRIDGE DISASTER (1879)

INTRODUCTION
The Tay Bridge disaster occurred on 28 December 1879, when the first Tay Rail Bridge, which crossed the Firth of Tay between Dundee and WormIT in Scotland, collapsed during a violent storm while a train was passing over it. The bridge was designed by the noted railway engineer Sir Thomas Bouch, using a lattice grid that combined wrought and cast iron. Major engineering flaws were the cause of the collapse, and the disaster ruined Bouch's reputation as an engineer.

THE DISASTER
During a violent storm on the evening of 28 December 1879, the centre section of the bridge, known as the "High Girders", collapsed, taking with it a train that was running on its single track. All 75 people believed to be on the train including 5 staff were killed, a figure which was only established by a meticulous examination of ticket sales, some from as far away as King's Cross. There were 60 known victims, but only 46 bodies were found, two of which were not recovered until February 1880.

CAUSES
Investigators quickly determined many faults in design, materials, and processes that had contributed to the failure. Bouch claimed to have received faulty information regarding wind loading, but his later statements indicated that he may have made no allowance for wind load at all.Bouch had been advised that calculating wind loads was unnecessary for girders shorter than 200 feet (61 m), and had not followed this up for his new design with longer girders. The section in the middle of the bridge, where the rail ran inside high girders (through trusses), rather than on top of lower ones (deck trusses), to allow a sea lane below high enough for the masts of ships, was potentially top heavy and very vulnerable to high winds. Neither Bouch nor the contractor appeared

to have regularly visited the on-site foundry where iron from the previous half-built bridge was recycled. The cylindrical cast iron columns supporting the 13 longest spans of the bridge, each 245 ft (75 m) long, were of poor quality. Many had been cast horizontally, with the result that the walls were not of even thickness, and there was some evidence that imperfect castings were disguised from the (very inadequate) quality control inspections. In particular, some of the lugs used as attachment points for the wrought iron bracing bars had been "burnt on" rather than cast with the columns. However, no evidence of the burnt-on lugs has survived, and the normal lugs were very weak. They were tested for the Inquiry by David Kirkaldy and proved to break at only about 20 long tons (20 t) rather than the expected load of 60 long tons (61 t). These lugs failed and destabilised the entire centre of the bridge during the storm.

OFFICIAL INQUIRY
The official enquiry was chaired by Henry Cadogan Rothery, Commissioner of Wrecks, supported by Colonel Yolland (Inspector of Railways) and William Henry Barlow, President of the Institution of Civil Engineers. They concluded that the bridge was "badly designed, badly built and badly maintained, and that its downfall was due to inherent defects in the structure, which must sooner or later have brought it down. For these defects both in the design, the construction, and the maintenance, Sir Thomas Bouch is, in our opinion, mainly to blame." There was clear evidence that the central structure had been deteriorating for months before the final accident. The maintenance inspector, Henry Noble, had heard the joints of the wrought-iron tie-bars "chattering" a few months after the bridge opened in June 1878, a sound indicating that the joints had loosened. This made many of the tie-bars useless for bracing the cast-iron piers. Noble did not attempt to re-tighten the joints, but hammered shims of iron between them in an attempt to stop the rattling.[1] The enquiry destroyed Bouch's professional reputation: "The chief blame for this casualty rests with Sir Thomas Bouch" wrote the chairman, albeit noting that it was his decision alone to lay the blame publicly. The enquiry recommended the Board of Trade to impose a rule catering for wind loading of 50 or 55 lb per square foot in future structures.

AFTERMATH
Some authors have claimed that the final carriages were blown off the line and hit the girders, and caused the collapse. The theory was put forward by Bouch in his defence. It was discredited at the official enquiry, and fails to address the question of why the bridge would be weak enough that it could fail due solely to a derailment. It also fails to explain why over half a mile of bridge was destroyed rather than just the part where the train derailed. The locomotive, NBR no. 224, a 4-4-0 designed by Thomas Wheatley and built at Cowlairs Works in 1871, survived the disaster, being salvaged from the river and repaired. It remained in service until 1919,

acquiring the nickname of "The Diver"; many superstitious drivers were reluctant to take it over the new bridge.