TAY BRIDGE

DISASTER
28th December 1879
 The Tay bridge, completed February 1878 designed by
noted railway engineer Sir Thomas Bouch, was a
monument of strength for the railways, and for Scotland,
nearly two miles long, consisting of 85 spans and at the
time it was the longest bridge in the world. The 85 spans
carried a single railway track, 72 of which were
supported on deck trusses, the remaining 13 spans were
longer through trusses above the railway track (“High
Girders”) to allow ships with tall masts to pass under.
 The Disaster
28th of December 1879, A violent storm  estimated
at Beaufort force 10/11 was blowing down the Tay
estuary at right angles to the bridge. At
approximately 7:15 p.m. , an express train
consisting of a heavy locomotive, six passenger cars
and 75 people, traversed the Tay bridge. As the train
reached the centre of the bridge the 13 centre
spans(“high girders”) of the bridge gave way and
the train plunged into the icy water below, killing all
75 souls aboard.
 BEFORE
Through Trusses (“High Girders”)
 AFTER
All 13 Through trusses(“High Girders”) gave
way as the train passed over.
 The Investigation
Investigators quickly determined many faults in the design,
material and process that had contributed to the failure of the
bridge . The investigation found faults in 5 main areas:
-Poor quality materials
-Weak Lugs (projections from the columns where cross
bracings were attached)
-Piers were not constructed properly
-Poor design
-Maintenance
 Poor Quality Materials
The columns supporting the 13 longest spans of the bridge
were made out of cast iron, which is a very brittle under
tension, whilst the wrought iron used in the cross bracing is
very durable.
It was also found that the cast iron columns, were cast (when
material is introduced into a mould while liquid, and allowed
to solidify into a specific shape) horizontally, with the result
that the walls of the columns were not of even thickness. This
design flaw in the use of materials with different properties led
to the collapse of the Tay Bridge.
 Piers not Constructed Properly
Investigations found that the Piers on which the columns were
constructed were inadequate to support the bridge during high winds.
On the Tay bridge, the columns supporting the spans were bolted into,
only two layers of masonry on the pier.
During wind the masonry into which the column bolts were anchored
would lift up by a small amount. This movement may have led to the
failure of cross bracing.T he diagram on the next page , shows how
this type of movement was amplified in the final collapse.
Thomas Bouch the bridge designer, used10 pounds per for the design
of the bridge, he calculated that a wind load of this strength would not
cause uplift on the bolts securing the bases of the columns. Bouch used
a lower wind loading in an attempt to save money(the higher the wind
loading the more bracing and structure strengthening must be used),
the value he should have used should have been at least 40 pounds per
square foot.
Here you can clearly
see that the columns
were only bolted into
the first two layers of
masonry
 Weak Lugs
Another element of the design faulted by investigators was how weak the lugs
were, Lugs are projections from the columns where the cross bracing is attached to.
It was found that The lugs, due to poor smelting and casting holes instead of
drilling them, were unnecessarily weak. Thomas Bouch the designer believed that
the individual lugs could hold 60 tons, but when tested in the investigation the lugs
proved to break at only 20 tons, The lugs In the disaster play a major role, in all the
theories presented later in this presentation.

Casting is the
process of pouring
molten metal into a
mould. In this case
errors in casting A lug is a type of joint:
lead to the lugs a projection from a
being weak column is attached to
cross bracing
 Maintenance
A clear Issue put forward by investigators was; maintenance or a lack of, the bridge
bore clear evidence that the central structure had been deteriorating for months before
the final accident .
The Maintenance inspector, Henry Noble, had heard the joints of the wrought iron-
cross bracings, “chattering” a few months after the bridge opened , this sound was an
indication that the joints were loose and needed to be tightened or replaced.

When the cross bars are loose they become useless in bracing the columns, therefore
the structure is weaker. Instead of reporting the incident or at least tightening the
joints, the maintenance inspector hammered shims (small thin pieces) of iron in-
between the joints to stop them from rattling, this may have stoped the rattling but did
nothing to fix the underlying problem. From this It was clear that bridge inspectors
needed more knowledge of bridges and how they work, in order to properly fix
problems instead of doing “botch” jobs
 Poor Design
The design of the bridge was generally overall flawed, here are the reasons
-The Trough Trusses (“High Girders”) Were top heavy, and
vulnerable to high winds, no extra strengthening in the
columns and cross bracing were present to compensate for
this.
-There was never enough cross bracing to support the bridge
-Design of the piers were, as discussed earlier was inadequate
stop uplift on the bolts securing the bases of the columns.
-The poor quality or wrong materials were used in the design
of the bridge
-Lugs were not adequate (even if built correctly) a stronger
way of connecting the cross bracing to the columns should
have been used.
-Thomas Bouch's design generally underestimated the load
and overestimated the strength of the bridge, In a safe
structural design Common practise would be to
Overestimate the load and underestimate the strength, the
complete opposite of what Bouch did
 THEORIES
There are so many factors and possible causes
involved, and not enough surviving evidence,
that no-one cause has been proven, instead
there are a number of theory's, all of which are
explained in this presentation.
-Blow down by the wind Theory
-Train derailment theory
-Fatigue theory
Blown Down By the Wind Theory
As mentioned previously the columns were not correctly anchored into the
pier, such as-that in a strong wind the masonry into which the column bolts
were anchored would lift up by a small amount.

This small movement is enough to cause excessive tension and compression in

the cross bracing, especially in the centre cross bracings which are longer and
take more weight. These forces are to much for the weak cast iron lugs which
fail (attaching the cross bracing to the columns ).The cross bracing with the
most strain (middle cross bracing on second layer above the pier) would fail
first, this strain would then be transferred onto the next layer and then the
next, and so on.

The result of this is that the whole pier has now only 1/3 of the strength that it
would normally have if it was fully braced, the bridge is now very flexible and
sways violently in strong gusts. The combined force of the wind blowing
against the bridge and the heavy train traversing is to much for the unbraced
columns, which fail and send the train plunging into the water below.

The windward column and
masonry lifts up from the pier
causing extra stress on the
inner bracing
Lugs holding
Inner bracing to
column fail
The lifting up of the The combined wind and the
columns and masonry train is too much for the
causes the inner bracing weakened bridge to handle,
to fail, the bridge now the column opposite to the
only has 1/3 of its original direction of the wind fails
strength. and the bridge collapses.
 Train Derailment Theory
This theory was put forward in defence of the designer Thomas Bouch. This Theory
suggests that the train which was traversing the bridge, travels over a kink in the rails,
causing the train to derail, and crash into the side of the bridge. This sends a sudden
shock through the entire structure, causing the cast iron lugs connecting the cross
bracing to the columns, to fracture leading to the subsequent collapse of the pier
structure. This Theory, however has the least evidence and fails to explain why 13
piers collapsed instead of just the piers the train was traversing

Cast iron lug at bottom of

pier fails, leading to the
collapse of the bridge
 Fatigue Theory
This theory, like the last suggests that the wind was not the cause of the collapse of
the bridge, instead it claims that dynamic (moving) effects caused the failure of the
cast iron lugs due to fatigue (Fatigue refers to constant varying stresses, which
overtime cause cracks to form in a material, these cracks eventually reach a size
where the structure fails).

The only evidence to support this theory, comes from eye witness reports from
painters and fitters who say that the piers would shake from side to side whenever a
train crossed the bridge, this movement could have caused fatigue in the lugs,
consequently causing the bridge to fail. Limited evidence can be found in high
quality photographs which show some evidence of fatigue in the lugs, this limited
evidence however is not enough to prove that the bridge failed due to fatigue.
Disaster Within the Community
The downing of the Tay Bridge effectively cut off the north of
Scotland from the railway network, back in 1879 the railway
was the only effective means of travel, the cities of Aberdeen
and Dundee were servery deprived, everything and everyone
that travelled in and out of the cities was by train. As a result
of the bridge failure business and industry suffered greatly in
northern Scotland, any goods or passengers had to be
transferred onto a boat to make any journey to northern
Scotland.
 Prevention
In order to have prevented the Tay bridge from collapsing, several design aspects
must be changed. Using the materials available at the time and at a reasonable price,
this is what would have needed to be changed in Thomas Bouch’s design for it to be
safe.
-The columns, in order to support the bridge, needed to be anchored more
deeply into the pier.
-Columns, cross bracing and lugs should have been constructed with
wrought iron and or steel.
-Extra cross bracing was required to support the columns
-Another solution entirely would be to build the whole pier out of stone
rather than of iron, this would cost more, but would be virtually
indestructible and easier to maintain.
 Lessons learned and things changed
The bridge building industry after 1879 changed significantly,
It saw the end of cast iron as a use for bridge building, the
disaster also resulted in many cast iron bridges all over the
world being replaced.
An important lesson learned by the bridge building industry at
the time was that it was better to spend more money on a safe
bridge than on a cheap bridge that could fail at any time.
The outcome of Tay bridge disaster saw, for the first time,
quality control inspectors who make sure what is being built is
to a certain degree of quality