Euthyphro

Euthyphro (/ˈjuːθɪfroʊ/; Ancient Greek: Εὐθύφρων,

romanized: Euthyphrōn; c. 399–395 BC), by Plato, is a Socratic
dialogue whose events occur in the weeks before the trial of
Socrates (399 BC), between Socrates and Euthyphro.[1] The
dialogue covers subjects such as the meaning of piety and justice.
As is common with Plato's earliest dialogues, it ends in aporia.

In this dialogue, Socrates meets Euthyphro at the porch of the

archon basileus (the 'king magistrate') at that time. Socrates tells
him that he is preparing to go to court against the charges of
Meletus on the grounds of impiety. Euthyphro tells Socrates that
he is going to court himself to prosecute his father for binding a
worker in chains and leaving him to die. This has granted him the
ire of his own family who believe his father was in the right. The
worker had killed a fellow worker, which they believe exempts his
father from liability for leaving him bound in the ditch to starve to
death. Since Euthyphro seems assured of himself, Socrates asks Henri Estienne's 1578 edition of
him to define piety. His help will clarify Socrates' case in the Euthyphro, parallel Latin and Greek
courtroom. If Socrates is asked to define piety, he can simply rely text.
on Euthyphro's definition. This however leads to the main
dilemma of the dialogue when the two cannot come to a
satisfactory conclusion. Is something pious because the gods approve of it? Or do the gods approve of it
because it is pious? This aporic ending has led to one of the longest theological and meta-ethical debates
in history.

Characters
Socrates, the Athenian philosopher. He questions the nature of piety in this dialogue.
Euthyphro, the Athenian prophet. His father owned land on the island of Naxos. His father's
harsh treatment of a paid servant (a thetes under the Solonian Constitution) leads to
Euthyphro raising charges against him. According to his own statements in this dialogue, his
claims to prophecy and divination were considered a joke to other Athenians. He attempts to
provide Socrates with a definition of piety but none are sufficient. It is entirely possible as
well that Euthyphro was created by Plato as a literary device. His name in ancient Greek is
ironically "straight thinker" or "Mr. Right-mind."[2] A combination of εὐθύς (euthys), which
means straight or direct and φρονέω (phroneô) which means to think or to reason. If
Euthyphro and his father were historical people then this places the murder charges brought
by Euthyphro and the main actions of this dialogue sometime between 405 BC and 399 BC,
 when the Athenian settlers were expelled from the Island of Naxos after the defeat at the
Battle of Aegospotami.

Background
The dialogue in Euthyphro occurs near the court of the archon basileus (king magistrate), where Socrates
and Euthyphro encounter each other; each man is present at the court for the preliminary hearings to
possible trials (2a).

Euthyphro has come to present charges of murder against his own father who, after arresting one of his
workers (Thetes) for killing a slave from the family estate on Naxos Island, tied him and threw him in a
ditch where he died of exposure to the elements (3e–4d) while Euthyphro's father waited to hear from the
exegetes (cf. Laws 759d) about how to proceed. Socrates is astonished by Euthyphro's confidence in
being able to prosecute his own father for the serious charge of manslaughter, despite the fact that
Athenian Law allows only relatives of the dead man to file suit for murder (Dem. 43 §57). Euthyphro
dismisses the astonishment of Socrates, which confirms his overconfidence in his own critical judgment
of religious and ethical matters.

In an example of Socratic irony, Socrates says that Euthyphro obviously has a clear understanding of
what is pious or holy (τὸ ὅσιον to hosion) and impious or unholy (τὸ ἀνόσιον to anosion).[3] Because he
is facing a formal charge of impiety, Socrates expresses the hope to learn from Euthyphro, all the better to
defend himself in the trial, as he himself is being accused of religious transgressions.

Euthyphro says that what lies behind the charge of impiety presented against Socrates, by Meletus and
the others, is Socrates' claim that he is subjected to a daimon (divine sign), which warns him of various
courses of action (3b). From the perspective of some Athenians, Socrates expressed skepticism of the
accounts about the Greek gods, which he and Euthyphro briefly discuss, before proceeding to the main
argument of their dialogue: the definition of "piety". Moreover, Socrates further expresses critical
reservations about such divine accounts that emphasize the cruelty and inconsistent behaviour of the
Greek gods, such as the castration of the early sky-god Uranus, by his son Cronus; a story Socrates said is
difficult to accept (6a–6c).

After claiming to know and be able to tell more astonishing divine stories, Euthyphro spends little time
and effort defending the conventional Greek view of the gods. Instead, he is led to the true task at hand,
as Socrates forces him to confront his ignorance by pressing Euthyphro for a definition of "piety"; yet,
Socrates finds flaw with each definition of "piety" proposed by Euthyphro (6d ff.).

At the dialogue's conclusion, Euthyphro is compelled to admit that each of his definitions of "piety" has
failed, but, rather than correct his faulty logic, he says that it is time for him to leave, and excuses himself
from their dialogue. To that end, Socrates concludes the dialogue with Socratic irony: Since Euthyphro
was unable to define "piety", Euthyphro has failed to teach Socrates about piety. Therefore, from his
dialogue with Euthyphro, Socrates received nothing helpful to his defense against a formal charge of
impiety (15c ff.).

It is easier to understand Socrates' arguments in this dialogue if the reader keeps in mind that Athenian
religion revolved around specific rituals and practices with no reference to sacred scripture, at least in the
same sense as later Abrahamic religions.[4] Priests might worship only one specific god while not paying
respect to the others. Euthyphro uses Zeus as evidence for his notions of piety while disregarding Uranus
and Cronus, for example.

The argument
Socrates asks Euthyphro to offer him a definition of piety or
holiness. The purpose of establishing a clear definition is to
provide a basis for Euthyphro to teach Socrates the answer to the
question: "What is piety?" Ostensibly, the purpose of the dialogue
is to provide Socrates with a definitive meaning of "piety", with
which he can defend against the charge of impiety in the pending
trial.

Socrates seeks a definition of "piety" that is a universal

(universally true), against which all actions can be measured to
determine whether or not the actions are pious. To be universal,
the definition of "piety" must express the 'essence' (ousia) of the
thing defined (piety), a clear and unambiguous standard to which
each particular instance of piety will conform.[5]

A Roman bust of Socrates (Louvre)

The dialogue
Ostensibly in order to better defend himself in an upcoming trial for being an impious citizen of Athens,
Socrates asks Euthyphro for a clear definition of piety (holiness); he offers Socrates four definitions.

First definition
Euthyphro's first definition of piety is what he is doing now, that is, prosecuting his father for
manslaughter (5d). Socrates rejects Euthyphro's definition, because it is not a definition of piety, and is
only an example of piety, and does not provide the essential characteristic that makes pious actions pious.

Second definition
Euthyphro's second definition: Piety is what is pleasing to the gods. (6e–7a) Socrates applauds this
definition, because it is expressed in a general form, but criticizes it saying that the gods disagree among
themselves as to what is pleasing. This means that a given action, disputed by the gods, would be both
pious and impious at the same time – a logical impossibility. Euthyphro argues against Socrates' criticism,
by noting that not even the gods would disagree, among themselves, that someone who kills without
justification should be punished. Yet Socrates argues that disputes would still arise – over just how much
justification actually existed; hence, the same action could be pious and impious; again, Euthyphro's
definition cannot be a definition of "piety".

Third definition
To overcome Socrates' objection to his second definition of piety, Euthyphro amends his definition. (9e)
Euthyphro's third definition of piety is: "What all the gods love is pious, and what they all hate is
impious." In reply, Socrates poses the question that would eventually become known in philosophy as the
Euthyphro dilemma: "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious? Or is it pious because it is loved
by the gods?". Euthyphro seems unsure as to what the question means and so Socrates applies a dialectic
technique: an analogy, to clarify his question (10a). He persuades Euthyphro to agree that when we call a
thing "carried", it is simply because it is being carried by someone and not because it possesses an
inherent characteristic, which could be called "carried". That is, "being carried" is not an essential trait of
the thing being carried but a condition, a state that the object is currently in. He then moves to what we
call "beloved" (φιλούμενόν filoumenon). Is something "beloved" in and of itself (like being big or red), or
does it become beloved when it is loved by someone? Clearly, the answer is again the latter, something
becomes beloved when it is loved. So then, continues Socrates, something beloved by the gods (θεοφιλές
theofiles) becomes so because it is loved by them, to which Euthyphro agrees and Socrates moves to the
conclusion that reveals his contradiction: What is beloved by the gods cannot be pious. Euthyphro
seems to be taken aback so Socrates reminds him the definitions he gave previously (10e). He had said
that something is loved by the gods because it is pious, which means that their love follows from
something inherent in the pious. And yet they just agreed that what is beloved is put in that state as a
result of being loved. So piety cannot belong to what is beloved by the gods since according to Euthyphro
it does not acquire its characteristics by something (the act of being loved) but has them a priori, in
contrast to the things that are beloved that are put in this state through the very act of being loved. It
seems therefore that Euthyphro's third argument is flawed.

At that juncture of their dialogue, Euthyphro does not understand what makes his definition of "piety" a
circular argument; he agrees with Socrates that the gods like an action because it is pious. Socrates then
argues that the unanimous approval of the gods is merely an attribute of "piety", that divine approval is
not a defining characteristic of "piety". That divine approval does not define the essence of "piety", does
not define what is "piety", does not give an idea of "piety"; therefore, divine approval is not a universal
definition of "piety".

Linguistic note

Socrates' argument is convoluted not only because of its structure but because of the language used, and
is said to have "reduced translators to babble and driven commentators to despair".[6] The text presents
the argument through a distinction between the active and the passive voice, as for example when
Socrates asks about the difference between a "carried thing" (φερόμενον) and "being carried" (φέρεται),
both using the word "carried" in the English translation.

Fourth definition
In the second half of the dialogue, Socrates suggests a definition of "piety", which is that "piety is a part
of justice",[7] but he leads up to that definition with some other observations and questions, starting with:

... Are you not compelled to think that all that is pious is just?

Yet, Socrates later says that the information provided in his question to Euthyphro is insufficient for a
clear definition of "piety", because piety belongs to those actions we call just, that is, morally good;
however, there are actions, other than pious actions, which we call just (12d); for example, bravery and
concern for others. Piety is only a portion of Justice and is not sufficient in giving a clear view of justice.
Socrates gives a comparison to even numbers. If a definition of even numbers were provided it would not
be suitable to clarify what numbers are because it is only a group of numbers and not the entire thing as a
whole. Socrates asks: What is it that makes piety different from other actions that we call just? We cannot
say something is true, because we believe it to be true. We must find proof.

Euthyphro's response
In response, Euthyphro says that piety is concerned with looking after the gods (12e), but Socrates
objects, saying that "looking after", if used in its ordinary sense (with which Euthyphro agrees) would
imply that when one performs an act of piety one thus makes one of the gods better – an example of
hubris, a dangerous human emotion frowned upon by the Greek gods. (13c) In turn, Euthyphro responds
that "looking after" involves service to others, and Socrates asks: What is the end product of piety?
Euthyphro replies with his earlier (third) definition, that: Piety is what is loved by all the gods. (14b).

Final definition
Euthyphro then proposes a fifth definition: "Piety is an art of sacrifice and prayer". He proposes the
notion of piety as a form of knowledge, of how to do exchange: Giving gifts to the gods, and asking
favours in return. (14e) Socrates presses Euthyphro to say what benefit the gods perceive from human
gifts – warning him that "knowledge of exchange" is a type of commerce. (14e) Euthyphro objects that
the gifts are not a quid pro quo, between man and deity, but are gifts of "honour, esteem, and favour",
from man to deity. (15a) In other words, Euthyphro admits that piety is intimately bound to the likes of
the gods. The dialogue has come full circle, and Euthyphro leaves Socrates without a clear definition of
"piety" as he faces a trial for impiety (ἀσέβεια asebeia).

History
Fragments of this dialogue exist on a papyrus from the 2nd century. The oldest surviving medieval
manuscript was made in 895 by Arethas of Caesarea and copied by Johannes Calligraphus.

This dialogue is notable for containing one of the few surviving fragments of the poet Stasinus, a relative
of Homer and author of the lost work Cypria.[8] Socrates quotes him to show his disagreement with the
poet's notion that fear and reverence are linked. The quoted excerpt is as follows: Of Zeus, the author and
creator of all these things,/ You will not tell: for where there is fear there is also reverence.

Reception
In the early 3rd century BC, the Epicurean Metrodorus of Lampsacus wrote a pamphlet titled Against the
Euthyphro which is now lost. This is the oldest literary criticism of this dialogue in the ancient world.[9]

Diogenes Laertius listed the dialogue as belonging to the first tetralogy in the 1st century BC. He
considered it one of the tentative dialogues and gave On Holiness as an alternate title. He also mentioned
that some teachers used it as the first dialogue in their courses meaning that it was in antiquity seen as the
most suitable introduction to Plato's works.[10] He also claimed that after the events of this dialogue,
Euthyphro was persuaded not to prosecute his father though that is not supported by any of Plato's own
writings.[11][12]

In the surviving fragment of On Plato's Secret Doctrines by Numenius of Apamea he suggests that the
character of Euthyphro was entirely fictitious and represented the Athenian popular religion.[13] He
reasoned that Plato had to criticize the Athenian religion in dialogue form rather than directly attacking it
in order to avoid being executed like Socrates himself.[14]

In the Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy it is stated that the Euthyphro was Plato's first
dialogue.[15]

The dialogue returned to obscurity in the Latin speaking scholarly world until it was rediscovered in the
Renaissance age. The dialogue was translated into Armenian in the 11th century.[16] The Byzantine
scholar Manuel Chrysoloras owned a copy of the Euthyphro. Francesco Filelfo completed the first Latin
translation in 1436. Rinuccio da Castiglione completed a second translation a short time later in 1440
though it is considered of lower quality. Marsilio Ficino completed a third in 1484 in Florence in his
translated collection of Plato's dialogues. The first edition of the Greek text appeared in Venice in
September 1513 by Aldo Manuzio under an edition published by Markos Musuros.

The influential Plato translator Friedrich Schleiermacher did not appreciate this dialogue. He saw it as "a
very inferior work compared to Laches and Charmides.[17] Olof Gigon likewise rated it poorly in the 20th
century. He felt the dialogue relied too heavily on word games and semantics.[18]

Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff approved of the dialogue for separating piety from divine
command theory.[19] Michael Erler praised the dialogue for showing reflection on logical and
grammatical issues.[20]

One criticism of this dialogue that was raised by Peter Geach is that the dilemma implies you must search
for a definition that fits piety rather than work backwards by deciding pious acts (i.e. you must know
what piety is before you can list acts which are pious). It also implies something cannot be pious if it is
only intended to serve the gods without actually fulfilling any useful purpose.[21]

Texts and translations

Greek text at Perseus (https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.0
1.0169)
Plato: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus. Greek with translation by Harold N.
Fowler. Loeb Classical Library 36. Harvard Univ. Press (originally published 1914).
Fowler translation at Perseus (https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:
1999.01.0170)
Plato: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo. Greek with translation by Chris Emlyn-Jones and
William Preddy. Loeb Classical Library 36. Harvard Univ. Press, 2017.
ISBN 9780674996878 HUP listing (http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=97806749
96878)
Plato. Opera, volume I. Oxford Classical Texts. ISBN 978-0198145691
Translated by Woods & Pack, 2007 (http://ssrn.com/abstract=1023143)
 Bundled with Socrates' Defense (aka Apology), Crito, and the death scene from Phaedo
(http://ssrn.com/abstract=1023142)
Translated by Jowett, 1891 (http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/euthyfro.html) at the Classics
Archive (http://classics.mit.edu)
G. Theodoridis, 2017: full-text translation (https://bacchicstage.wordpress.com/plato/euthyph
ron-2/)
Plato. Complete Works. Hackett, 1997. ISBN 978-0872203495
The Last Days of Socrates, translation of Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo. Hugh
Tredennick, 1954. ISBN 978-0140440379. Made into a BBC radio play (https://genome.ch.b
bc.co.uk/a809ca5ed4ce4e68b2b208df1e5cb78b) in 1986.
"Four Texts on Socrates: Plato's Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito, and Aristophanes' Clouds."
Translated by Thomas G. West and Grace Starry West. Cornell University Press, 1998.
ISBN 978-0801485749

See also
Divine command theory
Euthyphro dilemma
Dialectic
Socratic dialogues

Notes
1. a Greek given name meaning "Right-minded, sincere"; entry "εὐθύφρων (https://www.perse
us.tufts.edu/hopper/morph?l=euqu%2Ffrwn&la=greek#lexicon)" attempt to establish a
definitive meaning for the word piety in Liddell, Scott, & Jones, An English–Greek Lexicon.
2. Wyss, Peter. "A Map of Euthrypo" (https://open.conted.ox.ac.uk/sites/open.conted.ox.ac.uk/fi
les/resources/PLA_HO2.pdf) (PDF). University of Oxford.
3. Stephanus page 5d: λέγε δή, τί φῂς εἶναι τὸ ὅσιον καὶ τί τὸ ἀνόσιον.
4. Pedro, De Blas, ed. (2005). Essential Dialogues of Plato. Barnes and Noble. p. 570.
ISBN 9781593082697.
5. Cooper, John M. (1997). "Euthyphro (introduction)". In Cooper, John M.; Hutchinson, D. S.
(eds.). Plato: Complete Works. Indianapolis: Hackett. pp. 1–2. ISBN 978-0-87220-349-5. p.
1. Cf. Euthyphro 11a τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν μοι αὐτοῦ οὐ βούλεσθαι δηλῶσαι, πάθος δέ τι περὶ
αὐτοῦ λέγειν (ed. Burnet 1903 (http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3At
ext%3A1999.01.0169%3Atext%3DEuthyph.%3Asection%3D11a)).
6. Cohen, S. Marc (1971). "Socrates on the Definition of Piety: Euthyphro 10A–11B". Journal
of the History of Philosophy. 9: 4. doi:10.1353/hph.2008.1803 (https://doi.org/10.1353%2Fh
ph.2008.1803). S2CID 170219853 (https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:170219853).
7. Euthyphro 12d μόριον γὰρ τοῦ δικαίου τὸ ὃσιον (ed. Burnet 1903 (http://www.perseus.tufts.
edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0169%3Atext%3DEuthyph.%3Asectio
n%3D12d)).
8. Barnes and Noble, Essential Dialogues of Plato
9. Philodemus, On Piety, col. 25, 702-5, col 34, 959-60, Obbink
10. "LacusCurtius • Diogenes Laërtius: Plato" (https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/
Texts/Diogenes_Laertius/Lives_of_the_Eminent_Philosophers/3/Plato*.html).
11. Diogenes Laertios 2,29.
12. Alexander Tulin: Dike Phonou. The Right of Prosecution and Attic Homicide Procedure,
Stuttgart 1996, S. 73–77.
13. "Numenius" (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/numenius/). The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. 2021.
14. Numenios, fragment 23, ed. by Édouard des Places : Numénius: Fragments , Paris 1973, p.
61 f.
15. Westerink, Leendert Gerrit (2011). Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy.
Prometheus Trust. ISBN 978-1898910510.
16. Zur armenischen Übersetzung siehe Elizabeth A. Duke u. a. (Hrsg.): Platonis opera, Band 1,
Oxford 1995, S. XII; Frederick C. Conybeare: On the Ancient Armenian Version of Plato. In:
The American Journal of Philology 12, 1891, S. 193–210.
17. Friedrich Schleiermacher: Euthyphron. Introduction . In: Friedrich Daniel Ernst
Schleiermacher: About the philosophy of Plato , ed. by Peter M. Steiner, Hamburg 1996, pp.
124–128, here: 124.
18. Olof Gigon: Platons Euthyphron. In: Fritz Meier (Hrsg.): Westöstliche Abhandlungen,
Wiesbaden 1954, S. 6–38, hier: 12 f.
19. Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff: Platon. Sein Leben und seine Werke, 5. Auflage, Berlin
1959 (1. Auflage Berlin 1919), S. 157.
20. Michael Erler: Platon, Basel 2007, S. 130.
21. "PLAto's "EUTHYPHRO": An Analysis and Commentary" (https://studylib.net/doc/8115846/pl
ato-s--euthyphro---an-analysis-and-commentary).

Further reading
Allen, Reginald E. (1970). Plato's 'Euthyphro' and the Earlier Theory of Forms. London:
Routledge & K. Paul. ISBN 0-7100-6728-3.
Dorion, Louis-André (2012). "Euthyphron". In Goulet, Richard (ed.). Dictionnaire des
philosophes antiques. Vol. 5, part 1. Paris: CNRS. pp. 661–669. ISBN 978-2-271-07335-8.

External links
Euthyphro, in a collection of Plato's Dialogues (https://standardebooks.org/ebooks/plato/dial
ogues/benjamin-jowett) at Standard Ebooks
Euthyphro (https://librivox.org/search?title=Euthyphro&author=Plato&reader=&keywords=
&genre_id=0&status=all&project_type=either&recorded_language=&sort_order=catalog_dat
e&search_page=1&search_form=advanced) public domain audiobook at LibriVox
Guides to the Socratic Dialogues (https://web.archive.org/web/20110503011108/http://user
s.hartwick.edu/burringtond/dialogues/index.html), a beginner's guide

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