Handout: Pietro Montanari, July, 5 2022

(Summer Seminar on A. Laks’ Second Republic)

1) Preamble #1, content

BOOK IV
A) theios nomos, 716a-717a
A1) god
A2) godly praxis
B) homilemata, “relationships” [730b], 717a-718c (= timia)
B1) first sequence of homilemata, 717a-718b
- punishment and persuasion (connect. to the interlude), 718c

–– Interlude (intermezzo), 718c-724b

BOOK V
B) homilemata, 726a-730b (= timia)
B2) the soul, 726a-728b
- “seven ways” to harm the soul, 727a-728a
- “judgement/punishment on evildoing”, 728b-c
B2) second sequence of homilemata, 728c-730b
C) bios [730b] e personal character (= epaineta), 730b ff
C1) divine epitedeumata [theià, 732d-e], 730b-732d
- paideutic function of praise and blame, 730b
- aletheia (pistotes) and the “contest for virtue”, 730c-731d
- amathia and “excessive self-love”, 731d-732b
- men before fate, 732b-d
C2) human epitedeumata [anthropina, 732e], 732e-734e
- the most beautiful life and pleasure, 732e-733d
- types of good and bad life (bioi), 733d-734e

I. “Socrates implemented”

2) Laks, p. 137:
“(…) the encompassing description of the virtuous life is inescapably reminiscent of
Socrates. To be sure, few if any of the citizens in Plato’s best human city are likely to
have the inquiring mind of a Socrates (…) but aren’t these citizens supposed to be
implementing Socratic principles?”

3) Laws IV, 705d-706a (Rowe)

“But look back what was said at the start, about the laws of Crete looking to one thing,
and in particular at you two saying that |705d5| this was warfare, (…) Now you two in
turn must keep an eye on me as you follow the present legislation, |705e| in case I
legislate something that doesn’t aim at virtue, or aims only at a part of virtue. For I
propose that the only correctly established law is one that, just like an archer, always
aims at this, namely, the thing that alone is uninterruptedly |706a| always accompanied
by some fine result (ὅτῳ ἂν συνεχῶς τούτων ἀεὶ καλόν τι συνέπηται μόνῳ), and ignores
all the rest, be it wealth or anything else of this sort, if it lacks what was just
mentioned.”

3b) Laws I: 626d-e (Rowe)

“Stranger from Athens (…) you seem to me to be worthy of being called after the
goddess (τῆς θεοῦ ἐπωνυμίας ἄξιος) Athena! By correctly following the argument up to
its starting-point [up to its cause, its principle?] (τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἐπ᾽ ἀρχὴν ὀρθῶς
ἀναγαγὼν σαφέστερον) |626d5| you have made it more perspicuous, so that you will
easily discover that we were correct in saying just now that everyone is an enemy of
everyone else in public life, and in private life each is enemy to himself.”

4) Sophist, 230b-c (Rowe?)

(τῆς δόξης ἐκβολή)
They ask questions on whatever someone thinks he’s talking sense about when in fact
he is talking nonsense; and then, because the (b5) people whose beliefs they are
examining are continually shifting their position, their task is easy. They use the
conversation to collect those beliefs together and put them side by side, thereby
revealing them as contradicting one another not just on the same subjects but in relation
to the same things and in the same respects. When the people being examined see what
is happening, they are angry (χαλεπαίνουσι) with themselves but become less
aggressive (ἡμεροῦνται) towards others; and it is in this way that they are (c1) liberated
from those great, obstinate beliefs about themselves – the most pleasing of all
liberations for the listener to hear, and the most secure […] for the person who
experiences it. (…) those soul-cleansers of ours think the same about a soul: namely
that it will not get the benefit of any lessons applied to it until someone challenges it and
causes the person being challenged to be ashamed of himself (εἰς αἰσχύνην
καταστήσας), removes those beliefs of his that obstruct the lessons to be learned, and
renders him clean and pure, thinking he knows only the things he does know and no
more.

5) Laks, p. 138:
“Sections A and B [scil. “relationships” and “personal character”] fall under the heading
“honor” and “praise/blame” (…). The distinction echoes the one that Aristotle draws in
the Nichomachean Ethics between two categories of goods [timia and epaineta]. (…)
The distinction [Plato] makes between the two kinds of goods is clearly the same as
Aristotle’s (…)”.

II. The motive of “evil” in the first preamble

(this is NOT the title of a section of André’s chapter)

6) Laks, p. 136
“The first striking fact about the general preamble is that it does not quite if in the
official of a preamble as construed in book 4. To begin with, the development starts (…)
with a law-like threat about the inevitability of divine distribution (…). The rest of the
preamble consists in an invitation to follow a set of prescriptions (…) followed not by
any law in particular, but by the whole legislative body”.

7) Polarities
(from the passage on theios nomos, IV 716a-717a)
Explicit:
(praise VS. blame, reward VS. punishment)
1) god benevolent, VS. deserting god (ira dei?),
2) assimilation to the god/good, VS. assimilation to “evil”,
3) theos-metron, VS. anthrōpos-metron,
4) pious life, VS. impious life
(inclusion, VS. exclusion from worship/rituals),
5) political friendship, VS. dissociation, isolation.
Implicit:
priority of to koinon (or nomos) over to idion, VS. priority of the individual over
the common/the law.

8) Laws IV, 716a-b (Rowe)

“|716a| With him [the god] Lady Justice always follows, taking vengeance on those who
abandon the divine law [ἀεὶ συνέπεται δίκη τῶν ἀπολειπομένων τοῦ θείου νόμου
τιμωρός]. The one who is destined to be happy follows Lady Justice meekly and
moderately [ταπεινὸς καὶ κεκοσμημένος]. But anyone who is puffed up with arrogance
[μεθ᾽ ὕβρεως], (…) and (…) thinks he needs neither ruler nor any leader, but even
thinks himself capable of leading others—he is left behind, deserted by the god
[καταλείπεται ἔρημος θεοῦ]. Once left behind, though, he takes up with yet |716b|
others like himself, (…) but before too long he pays a well-deserved penalty to Lady
Justice, and causes utter ruin to himself, his household, and his city.”

9) Laws V, 728a-c (Rowe)

(δίκη τῆς κακουργίας: Rowe: “judgment on evildoing;”
Schöpsdau: “Strafe für böses Tun.”)
“You see, practically no one rationally calculates the greatest so-called judgment (…)
on evildoing [δίκην τῆς κακουργίας]. And the greatest one is to become like evil men
[τὸ ὁμοιοῦσθαι τοῖς οὖσιν κακοῖς ἀνδράσιν], and in becoming like them, to avoid good
men |728b5| and good conversations, and to cut oneself off [ἀποσχίζεσθαι] from them,
while sticking like glue to the others, seeking companionship with them. And when one
becomes naturally adapted to such people, it is necessary for one to do and suffer what
such |728c| people do and say to each other. Now this suffering [τοῦτο… τὸ πάθος] is
certainly not a “judgment,” since what is just (to dikaion)—that is, what is a real
judgment (hê dikê)—is a fine thing (rather, it is retribution [τιμωρία δέ], suffering that
follows upon injustice); both the one who meets with {136} this and the one who avoids
it are wretched, the one because he is not cured, the other because he is destroyed in
order that many others |728c5| may be saved.”

9b) Theaetetus, 176d-177a (…1903…?)

(ζημία ἀδικίας, 176d: penalty of unrighteousness)
…unless they depart from their “cleverness,” [ἂν μὴ ἀπαλλαγῶσι τῆς δεινότητος]
the blessed place that is pure of all evil things [τῶν κακῶν καθαρὸς τόπος] will not
receive them after death, and here on earth they will always live the life like themselves
—evil men associating with evil [κακοὶ κακοῖς συνόντες]…

10) Laws IV, 716c-717a (Rowe)

Let us observe, then, (…) the finest and truest of all principles, |716d5| namely, that for
the good person to sacrifice and commune with the gods, (…) is always finest, best, and
most effective in furthering a happy life, (…) whereas for the bad person |716e| the
opposites of these things naturally hold. For the bad person is impure of soul, whereas
his opposite is pure, and it is never right for either a good man or a god to receive gifts
from a polluted one. |717a| So all the great effort of the impious having to do with the
gods is pointless, though for the pious it is most opportune.
This, then, is the target we must aim at.”

11) Laws IV, 716b-c (Rowe)

So what sort of action is dear to and follows the god? There is only one sort, |716c| and
one ancient saying expressing it, namely, that ‘like is dear to like’ when in proper
measure [ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον ὄντι μετρίῳ φίλον], whereas those without proper measure
[τὰ δ᾽ ἄμετρα] are dear neither to each other nor to what is in proper measure [οὔτε
ἀλλήλοις οὔτε τοῖς ἐμμέτροις]. Now for us the god would be the measure of all things
in the highest degree [θεὸς… πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον… μάλιστα], much more so, I
imagine, than any ‘man,’ as some people say.”

12) Other passages commented in the chapter:

i. the soul and the seven ways to harm it, p. 139-40, which concludes the section
on the homilemata with a second sequence of goods
ii. the divine side of the epitedeumata (habits, personal qualitiy, character), with a
description of “the most beautiful life”, p. 140-41
iii. the “excessive self-love,” p. 141
iv. the human side of the epitedeumata, the connection between life and pleasure, p.
142

13) Way of doing harms to the soul, 727a-728a

(as reported by Laks, p. 139-40):
1) The presumption of being able to judge everything by oneself
2) Self-complacency, shifting responsibility
3) Abandoning oneself to pleasure
4) Avoiding toil
5) Overvaluing life and fearing death
6) Neglecting virtue/soul in favor of beauty/body
7) Loving riches

14) Laws V: 734b

“For it is either because of ignorance [scil. false knowledge, self-deceptive knowledge],
lack of self-control [scil. moral weakness], or both that the mob of humanity |734b5| in
general live lives lacking in temperance” (Rowe) (ἢ γὰρ δι’ ἀμαθίαν ἢ δι’ ἀκράτειαν ἢ
δι’ ἀμφότερα, τοῦ σωφρονεῖν ἐν-(5)δεὴς ὢν ζῇ ὁ πᾶς ἀνθρώπινος ὄχλος).

15) Laws V: 730b-c, 730e-731a (Rowe)

Th envious (from: “the competition for virtue”; Wettkampf um die Tugend, Schöpsdau;
729c-d, 729e-731b).
“The untrustworthy person, on the other hand, is one fond of a voluntary lie, while
the one fond of an involuntary one is lacking in understanding. Neither |730c5|
condition is enviable. For the one who is untrustworthy or ignorant is entirely
friendless. As time goes by he is known for what he is, and in harsh old age, toward the
end of life, has prepared a state of utter loneliness for himself, so that whether his
comrades and children are living or not, his life becomes pretty much |730d| like that of
one bereft of them. (…)
Let all of us be lovers of victory when it comes to virtue, but not enviously so. For
someone of this sort makes a city great, since, while competing himself, he does not
hinder others with false accusations. The envious person, by contrast, |731a5| who
thinks he can only come out on top by falsely accusing others, both lessens his own
efforts to attain true virtue and discourages his competitors by criticizing them”
“unjustly. Because of these things he does his part to make the whole city untrained in
the competition for virtue, |731b| and to diminish its good reputation.”

III. “The theological foundation of the law”

16a) Laws IV: 713e-714a (Rowe)

(before the preamble)
“The account [of Cronus] has some truth for us even today. It says that insofar as cities
have not a god but rather some mortal as ruler, there can be no respite either from
evils |713e5| or from hardships, (οὐκ ἔστιν κακῶν αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ πόνων ἀνάφυξις) and it
thinks that we should imitate by means of every contrivance the way of life that is
{119} said to have existed under Cronus, and, by obeying in private and public
whatever element of immortality is present within us, manage both our households and
cities, |714a| giving the name (eponomazontas) “law” (nomos) to the regulation
(dianomê) deriving from the understanding (nous) [repartition of nous?] (τὴν τοῦ
νοῦ διανομὴν ἐπονομάζοντας νόμον).
But if there is one human being, or a sort of oligarchy, or even a democracy, having a
soul that grasps at appetites and pleasures, and wishes to be filled with these, and retains
nothing, but is in the grip of an endless and insatiable evil plague—if |714a5| someone
like that is going to rule a city, or rule some private individual, trampling the laws
underfoot, there is, as we said just now, no contrivance for its salvation.”

16b) Laws IV: 715d (Rowe)

(before the preamble)
But the city in which the law is ruled over and without control (ἄκυρος νόμος) is a city
for which I see destruction near at hand. But where the law is a despotic ruler over
the rulers (δεσπότης τῶν ἀρχόντων), and the rulers are slaves of the law (δοῦλοι τοῦ
νόμου), there I distinctly see safety (σωτηρίαν… καθορῶ) |715d5| and all the good
things that gods have given to cities.”

17) M. Ficino on Platonic Tyche

(Comm. to the Laws, transl. by Arthur Farndell, p. 92-3)
“But Plato considers that three factors above all are conducive to the implementation of
the lawgiver's resolution: God, fortune, and art. These three are said to govern the whole
human realm. (...) But when Plato says that God, fortune, and art linked to God govern
the whole human realm, his words can be briefly explained like this: God within all,
moves all through all. He moves the spheres of the world. The meeting of the spheres
is elsewhere called fate, but here is more happily referred to as fortune. From fortune
proceed the various conditions which befall external things and bodies. God also moves
souls by filling minds with light, whence are kindled both the art of reflecting and the
art of acting. Finally, from art proceeds the configuration of external things and of the
body.”

18) Laws XII 966e, 967d-e (Rowe)

“{418} Athenian: Now we know, don’t we, that there are two points—which we went
through in our previous discussions—that lead to belief in gods?
CLEINIAS: Which ones?
ATHENIAN: One is what we said about the soul, that it is the oldest and most divine of
all the things whose movement, once it has received |966e| its generation, provides them
with ever-flowing being. The other point has to do with the movement (that it possesses
an order) of the stars and of the other things controlled by the understanding (nous) that
sets the universe in order.”
(…)
“ATHENIAN: No mortal person can ever become steadfastly god-fearing unless he has
grasped these two things we’re now |967d5| discussing: that soul is the oldest of all the
things that have partaken of generation, is immortal, and rules all bodies, and in addition
to these—something that has been said many times—that there is an understanding
(nous) present in the stars which is the leader of all the beings.”

IV. The structural paradox

19) Laws IV 720d (Rowe)

(Medical analogy 1)
“[The free doctor] doesn’t prescribe anything until he has somehow persuaded [the free
patient].”

20) Laws IV 720c-d (Rowe)

(Medical analogy 2)
“He [the free doctor] investigates [diseases] from their starting-point and guided by
nature (ταῦτα ἐξετάζων ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς καὶ κατὰ φύσιν), in consultation with the patient
himself and his friends, at once learning something himself from those who are sick,
while also, to the extent |720d5| possible, teaching the invalid himself (διδάσκει τὸν
ἀσθενοῦντα αὐτόν).”

21) Laws IX, 857c-d (Rowe)

(Medical analogy 3)
“…if one of those doctors who undertake to practice medicine on the basis of their
experiences, without an account, were ever to come across a free doctor conversing
(διαλεγόμενον) with a free patient, |857d| coming close to doing philosophy in the
arguments being used, getting a grip on the disease from its starting-point, and
ascending to the entire nature of bodies (καὶ τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν ἐγγὺς χρώμενον μὲν τοῖς
λόγοις, ἐξ ἀρχῆς τε ἁπτόμενον τοῦ νοσήματος, περὶ φύσεως πάσης ἐπανιόντα τῆς τῶν
σωμάτων) he would quickly and violently laugh and would have no “arguments” to
state other than…”

22) Laks, p. 146-47

(Medical analogy 4, referred to X, 885c-d)
"Plato construes an analogical relationship of the free doctor’s conversation with his
patient and that of the lawgiver with the atheist: both the doctor in book 9 and the
Athenian in book 10 deal with the nature and properties of elementary bodies. To be
sure we are not informed about the exact content […] But the fact is that in the
preamble under consideration, the lawgiver “ascends to” question concerning bodies no
less than the free doctor is supposed to (…)."