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Kyle Donnelly PHIL 200

Phaedo, Kinship Argument

October 06, 2011 Page 1

The primary issue being discussed in the third argument of the Phaedo is the immortality of the soul after the death of the body. Immediately preceding the kinship argument Socrates gives, the soul is determined to be prior to the body based on the nature of recollection and the universal awareness of absolutes (Phdo. 72e3-77a5). One of the participants in the debate, Simmias, raises doubts about the eternal future of the soul since the recollection argument only firmly establishes the existence of the soul before the body (Phdo. 77a6-77b7). Socrates' goal becomes proving that the soul exists forever both before birth and after death; that is, the soul is immortal. Socrates begins the argument by separating substances into two distinct types: compounded and uncompounded. He defines compounded things to be anything capable of being dissolved into smaller parts and uncompounded things to be anything where no such decomposition is possible (Phdo. 78b1078c3). Socrates observes that anything capable of being decomposed is necessarily prone to change while uncompounded substances are considered to be permanent and stay the same (Phdo. 78c5-78c7). These premises serve to equate compound, decomposable, and changing things as well as uncompounded, inseparable, and static things. The next step of the argument investigates types of perceptions. Mental or abstract ideas like absolute beauty and equality are admitted to be constant, but anything perceived by the senses is prone to variation (Phdo. 78d1-78e7). Socrates then suggests that the mind grasps invisible things and the senses are restricted to visible (or simply tangible in some way) objects and Cebes does not object (Phdo. 79a1-4). Socrates uses the last two arguments to link visible and invisible with changing and unchanging entities, respectively (Phdo. 79a5-9). An additional premise is that the mind and body are absolutely distinct from each other, which is supported by Cebes (Phdo. 79b1-2). It is apparent to everyone that the body is visible, but the soul is incapable of being sensed tangibly, making it more like the unseen (Phdo. 79b3-13). Based on the connection made between the invisible and static qualities of objects, the soul is unchanging while the body is variable. The final proposition Socrates makes in the argument is that the soul governs and directs the body, just as the divine (immortal) rules the mortal (Phdo. 80a1-4). This leads Cebes to associate the soul with the divine and the body with the mortal (Phdo. 80a6-7). This parallelism means that the soul is divine in addition to unchanging. When incorporating the equivalency from the first conclusion above, the soul is demonstrated to have the the following properties: divine, immortal, unchanging, uniform, and indissoluble. Socrates explicitly states this (Phdo. 80b1-5), proving the original goal of finding the soul to be immortal is true.

Kyle Donnelly PHIL 200

Phaedo, Kinship Argument

October 06, 2011 Page 2

The technique Socrates employed in this argument is fairly straightforward. By investigating a few complementary pairs of properties, he establishes a basis that can be expanded on by examining the mind and soul from different aspects. It is natural and easy to follow when Socrates examines the types of perception, then applies those types to the body and soul to drive them further apart. Moving from categories of perceptions to the examination of self and finally to role of the divine, Socrates finds many attributes to give to the soul before reaching the ultimate property: immortality. I think the first piece of evidence is solid, since it only involves a definition of a compound substance. Separability is the most direct determining factor for whether something is compound, so that is a very safe premise. The third and fourth premises the body is distinct from the soul and the divine rules over the mortal seem fairly conservative, but I do not think they are self-evident enough to serve as a foundation. Further discussion rather than simply stating them as fact would be a much more rigorous way to conduct the proof. I find the distinction between between ideas and senses weak. Socrates appears to use idea in an a priori context, but there are plenty of ideas that develop over time. A priori knowledge and tangible reality are not all-encompassing since beliefs, desires, and the like are also real. Beliefs or inclinations can clearly change over time, so the propositions that follow (To be seen is to change, to be intangible is to be constant) must be rejected. It is understandable that Cebes missed this if he also interpreted ideas in an strictly a priori way, but it should have been clear that the senses are not the complement of ideas. To summarize, tangibility is a subset of changeability and they are not equivalent. A second problem I find in this argument is the parallel relationship Socrates introduces between the divine and the soul. As I mentioned, the premise itself is rather weak without any attempt to establish it clearly. Even if we assume the propositions themselves are true, the use of the same verb only sets up a parallel, not an equivalency. Socrates actually seems to realize this by using the phrase most like the divine (Phdo. 80b1-4). Because the comparison is loose and this is the final premise, the conclusion that the soul is immortal is probable at best. I found this argument as a whole to be very interesting and well thought-out. There are many steps, most of which can be accepted as true and all of the propositions work cohesively to create the structure Socrates needs. Each premise and subsequent proposition or conclusion is relevant to the final goal. The most blatant issues I find are Socrates' tendency to declare different properties to be identical when one is really a subset of the other and his lack of distinction between mutually exclusive and complementary groups. Without those problems the argument would be much stronger.

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