Pakistan -

Future scenarios
 Why study Pakistan?
• Geo-political location
• Epicenter for conflicts
• First Islamic State in Modern Era
GEO-POLITICAL LOCATION
TAJIKISTAN

IRAN AFGHANISTAN

N
CHINA
T A NE
IS PAL
K
PA
INDIA

MYANMAR
ARABIAN
PENINSULA

ARABIAN BANGLADESH

SEA
SRI LANKA
Conflicts linked to
Pakistan
 Historical background
• Factors that combined to form Pakistan
– Feudal class in West Pakistan
– Indian Muslim Elite
– East Pakistan peasantry
– British Imperial policy
• The real story started with the first invaders
of Sindh in 711 AD.
• Xxx
Map Of Islamic Political power in
India

1000 AD

1192 AD

1250AD

711 AD

1300AD
 Sunni Islam In India
Shaikh Ahmed Wahabism
Sirhindi 1524-1624 1760

Shah Walliullah
1760
Colonial age
Saiyyad Ahmed Shahid 1857
1831

Deobandi Sir Sayed Ahmed Khan

Movement ~ 1867 1875
Ahle Hadith Group
1880
Aligarh Muslim
Ahmed Reza Movement
Ilyas
Barelvi 1903
Tablighi Jamat
1927 Madudi Others
Jamat-e-Islamic Memons, Ahmediyas etc.
1941

Pakistan
1947
Post-Colonial age
 Mughal to Modern Era
• Emperor Akbar lost Kandhar in 1584 to Safavid Iran. Shia
power dominates Middle East.
• Jehangir and Shahjehan turned inwards towards Bijapur
and Golkonda.
• Aurngazeb completes the conquest by 1680. Gives rise to
Maratha power.
• 1760 Shah Walliullah invites Ahmed Shah Durrani to fight
the Marathas. Leads to Battle of Panipat.
• 1857 Mughal Emperor deposed.
• 1860 Syed Ahmad starts the Aligarh Movement
• 1860 Deoband school started.
 Causes of alienation
• Early Delhi Sultans from Qutubuddin Aibek to Ibrahim
Lodhi lived aloof from the people and the land
– Ruler and ruled relationship
• Akbar changed the relationship that was accepted by the
people and other rulers
• Jehangir came to power and withdrew from daily life
allowing the court factions to rule. We see the rise of the
‘foreign’ faction
• Aurangazeb’s policies led to massive revolts and alienation
of the rulers.
• Mughal collapse and rise of Maratha and Sikh power fed the
alienation
• British period only fed the alienation as India became
modern and the prospect of representative government led
to the fear of being subsumed in the Indian civilization.
 Models of Statehood
• Traditional State
• Praetorian state
• Islamic State
 Traditional Model of Statehood
• Tri-fold division of separation of powers
– Executive, Legislative & Judiciary
– Criminal Justice, Military & Revenue
• Military coups interrupted by periods of
civilian rule
• Punjabi dominated
• Anatole Levin
• Cohen’s Notes
Ethnic distribution
 Praetorian State
• BIA composition
– ~52 % was Muslim
• At Partition the Pakistani Army got itself a
state
– Sikandar Hayat Khan’s Quote from Hugh
Tinker
• Composition of the Praetorian State
AYUB KHAN YAHYA KHAN

ZIA UL HAQ PARVEZ

MUSHARRAF
 Modern Islamic State
• President = Sultan
 Evolution of Muslim League
• 1905. Founding the League in Lucknow
• 1915-16. Joint sessions in same city as INC
• 1921. Jinnah Joins ML
• 1937. ML contests the elections
• 1946. Jinnah calls for Direct Action
• 1947. League takes over Pakistan.
• 1954. Gen. Iskandar Mirza stages coup
• 1958 Ayub Khan becomes dictator
 Factors of Power

America

Army
ISI Allah

Aman
Common
People
 American Players
• POTUS
• CIA
• SD
• Central Command
 Pak Military players
• President
• Army Chief
• ISI Chief
• Corps Commanders
 Religious Players
• Islamist political
parties
• Islamist militant
Organizations
Iqbal’s Islamic States in India

Islands of Muslim states in a Hindu Sea. Unsustainable.

WEST PAKISTAN

EAST PAKISTAN
WEST PAKISTAN

EAST PAKISTAN
 GEOGRAPHICAL
LOCATION
• Area: 8,03,940
Sq km
PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY
NORTH WEST HILLY REGION

BALUCHISTAN PLATEAU

FERTILE INDUS
VALLEY
ETHNO REGIONAL
STATUS

PUNJAB
ETHNO REGIONAL
STATUS

BALUCHISTAN
BALUCH TRIBAL GIRL
ETHNO REGIONAL
STATUS

SINDH
 LARKANA

HYDERABAD
THATTA
SINDHI WOMEN FOLK
ETHNO REGIONAL
STATUS
NWFP
PATHAN FOLK DANCE
CHILDREN OF NWFP
 MUZAFFARABAD

BAGH

RAWALKOT
KOTLI
MIRPUR
GHANCHE

GILGIT
GHIZER
DIAMIR SKARDU
GHANCHE

GILGIT
GHIZER
DIAMIR SKARDU
TURKEY

AFGHANISTAN

IRAN
•AFGHANISTAN

•THAILAND
 Political Parties
• Traditional party based politics
– Pakistan Muslim League (PML). Various factions
– Pakistan peoples party (PPP)
– Mohajir Quam (MQM)
• Islamist parties
– JUI. Various groups
– JEI. Various groups
• Islamist terrorist parties
– Lashkar-e-Taiba
– Jaish-e-Mohammed
– Sipah-e-Saheba
• Military Islamists
– Retired Officers from Military and ISI
 Traditional
Political Leaders

Nawaz Sharif Benazir Bhutto Shaukat Aziz

Pakistan Muslim League Pakistan Peoples Party PM of Pakistan
In exile in Saudi Arabia
 Islamist Parties
Political Parties

Fazalur Rehman
JUI
Qazi Hussain Sami-ul- Haq
JEI JUI(S)
 Islamist Parties
Terrorists

Jaish-e-Mohammed Sipah-E-Saheba
Lashkar-eTaiba
Maulana Azhar Md. Azaam Tariq
Hafiz Mohd Saeed
These three represent the forces of extremism and all have militias
attached to their movements.
 ISI/Military
Islamists

Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul Lt. Gen. Asad Durrani Lt. Gen.Javed Nasir

These three are very vocal in their Islamist views and represent
the fundamentalist faction of the Pakistan military
 Pakistan Identity
• Not India
• Modern Islamic state
• Religious identity
– Similar to KSA, Israel & USA
 Unrest in Pakistan
• Religious unrest
• Civil society
• Law & Order
• Civil Vs Military
– Military vs Judiciary
• Drugs
– Heronization of Pakistan
• Status of Women
 Sharif-Punjab
• The looming threat to the Musharraf-Bhutto deal is that it could be confronted
on the streets of Pakistan. The lawyers' movement has shown in recent months
that the popular mood is ripe for agitation. That focuses attention on another
former prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, who was recently cleared by the
Supreme Court to return from exile to Pakistan. Sharif was ousted in
Musharraf's coup in 1999.
Musharraf wants Sharif to stay away from Pakistan, as he fears that his power-
sharing arrangement with Bhutto might unravel under Sharif's expected
onslaught.
Why is Sharif so important? His sustained campaign against army rule has
found resonance in Pakistani public opinion. A sure sign is that the perennial
time-servers in Pakistani politics, the powerful Chaudhry clan ruling Punjab
these past five years as Musharraf's surrogates, have begun edging closer to
Sharif in recent weeks. It is rumored that as many as 21 members of
Parliament belonging to the ruling Pakistan Muslim League (PML) have put
out feelers to Sharif for political accommodation.
 One scenario
• The Musharraf-Bhutto deal, at its core, contains three key elements. Bhutto will be allowed to
contest general elections scheduled for next year; she will enjoy immunity from prosecution for any
misdeeds while in power as prime minister (1988-90 and 1993-96); Bhutto, in turn, will support
Musharraf's game plan to amend the Pakistani constitution to allow him to be re-elected without any
fear of judicial review. Musharraf took power in a bloodless coup in 1999 and has since refused to
relinquish his uniform and his post of chief of army staff.
The deal anticipates that when the dust settles, the Musharraf-Bhutto duo will be ensconced in power
in Islamabad with all the trappings of a practicing democracy, including a brand-new Parliament
constituted through "free and fair" general elections. This would represent the coalescing of the
"moderate center" in Pakistani politics.
The underlying assumption is that such a regime will have the moral courage and authority to
cleanse Pakistan of the "jihadi" culture, and put it on the course of an enlightened, moderate Muslim
country.
In the Anglo-US plan, while London provided the brain, Washington undertook the tough
assignment of persuading Musharraf to change horses midstream. In turn cajoling, threatening and
conciliating, Washington softened up the general over the past several months.
 MMA Scenario
• Musharraf and the PML that supports him also don't see eye to eye on
the deal with Bhutto that Washington wants. The PML would rather
have the post-2002 alliance with the six religious parties (Muttahida
Majlis-e-Amal) continue. There is an inherent contradiction here,
which has begun to surface. The PML fears, rightly, that the general's
deal with Bhutto will weaken the alliance.
But Musharraf cannot countenance the continuance of the alliance
with the religious parties, as that would militate against his
"enlightened moderation agenda" and would tarnish his modern,
reformist image in Western capitals. Besides, Sharif is forging
alliances with some of the Islamic parties.
• The irony is that there are several reasons Sharif ought to have been Washington's man in Islamabad. Sharif can handle
the menagerie of Islamists. He arguably possesses the right political pedigree to squeeze the jihadist culture out of
Pakistan. Second, for the average Pakistani, Sharif is a desi neta (native leader). He has gained in credibility as a
nationalist.
People have chosen to forgive him for his previous notoriously corrupt administration and his mercurial style of
governance. Bhutto, on the other hand, is tarnished politically by her deal with Musharraf as well as her proximity to
the US. She is yet to realize that her aura in Pakistan is turning out to be very different from her aura in the US or
Britain.
Third, Sharif is genuinely pro-market and is friendly to large capital. He has taken care not to be branded as pro-US,
but he isn't reflexively opposed to US interests, either. For him, modernization is something independent of
Americanization. Indeed, despite his conservative rhetoric, Sharif has a proven record as a pragmatist.
Yet if Washington has opted for Bhutto, the considerations are obvious. Sharif will refuse to be a participant in
America's "war on terror". He understands that the US is the primary issue in Pakistan. He has sized up that the public
expects him to be the marker of the beginning for Pakistan's "post-US era", no matter what his own gut instincts tell
him. Least of all, Sharif's experience with Washington during his last term as prime minister was far from happy.
Equally, Musharraf would see Sharif as opportunistic, authoritarian, dangerously maneuvering, personality-cultish and
incessantly plotting to extend his influence. There is no naivety about Musharraf. He knows his days as president are
numbered if there is a popular uprising against army rule. And Sharif is a skillful agitator, especially in the heartland
province of Punjab, which accounts for 56% of Pakistan's population and happens to be his political base.
• Sharif's close associates have made it clear that the prospect of him buckling under
Musharraf's pressure tactic is virtually nil. Sharif calculates that given the prevailing
popular mood in Pakistan, he has a ready-made platform if he were to campaign on an
anti-US, anti-Musharraf platform. It was in Punjab that the suspended (and then
reinstated) chief justice of the Supreme Court, Iftikhar Chaudhry (a fellow Punjabi),
mobilized the most rapturous mass support in his public campaign against Musharraf's
authoritarian rule.
Sharif estimates that he can call the general's bluff threatening to detain him. He could
even secure an anticipatory bail from the court. Once his juggernaut gets going from
Punjab, he knows Musharraf will be left with no means to block him. Sharif counts on
the Supreme Court to ensure that a level playing field is available at the next general
elections.
He doesn't think Musharraf any longer has the option of imposing emergency rule, as the
courts will frustrate such a move. The only exit route for Musharraf will then be to
declare martial law. But that is uncharted territory. No previous military dictator in
Pakistan dared to take that route in the face of popular opposition to army rule.
 Three Flaws
• One is the fundamental flaw in Pakistan’s political system.
• The second major problem that the country faces is linked with the absence of real democracy, and that is the country’s
many burgeoning jihadi and Islamist groups. For twenty-five years, the military and Pakistan’s powerful intelligence
agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI, have been the paymasters of myriad mujahedin groups. These were
intended for selective deployment in first Afghanistan and then Kashmir, where they were intended to fight proxy wars
for the army, at low cost and low risk. Twenty eight years after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, however, the
results have been disastrous, filling the country with thousands of armed but now largely unemployed jihadis, millions
of modern weapons, and a proliferation of militant groups.
While the military and intelligence community in Pakistan may have once believed that they could use jihadis for their
own ends, the Islamists have followed their own agendas. As the recent upheavals in Islamabad have dramatically
shown, they have now brought their struggle onto the Pakistani streets and into the heart of the country’s politics.
Ironically, it was exactly groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammad, who were originally nourished by the military, that have
now turned their guns on their creators, and which have been responsible for the recent rash of assassination attempts
on President Musharraf. It is now clearer than ever that Musharraf cannot have the blessings of the Americans while
continuing to employ the jihadis. In the battle for the soul of Pakistan, Musharraf has to choose
• The third major issue facing the country is its desperate educational crisis. No problem in Pakistan casts such a long
shadow over its future than the abject failure of the government to educate more than a fraction of its own people: at
the moment a mere 1.8% of Pakistan’s GDP is spent on government schools. The statistics are dire: 15% of these
government schools are without a proper building; 52% without a boundary wall; 71% without electricity.
• But in Pakistan the literacy figure is under half (it is currently 49%), and falling: instead of investing in education,
Musharraf’s military government is spending money on a cripplingly expensive fleet of American F-16s for its Air
Force. As a result out of 162 million Pakistanis, 83 million adults of 15 years and above are illiterate. Among women
the problem is worse still: 65% of all female adults are illiterate. As the population rockets, the problem gets worse.
 Historical factors
• The late British period marked the end of feudalism and the beginning
of modernism and representative govt in India. As such the fear of the
Muslims(who cannot be modernized) was that the former ruling class
would be marginalised and negated in a composite India which was
democratic. The problem is the majority form of democracy that the
British had implemented in India. This leads to a simple majority to
run the show eventually.
But there were three other local reasons for the Partition- The non
reform of the Feudal class in the areas of Paksitan, the Indian Muslim
elite fears of being marginalized and the East Bengal peasantry being
resentful of their Hindu Zamindars. Offcourse the big external factors
were the British need to ensure no single power develops regionally,
the Cold War exigencies, and the unstated pro quid quo for the
creation of Israel.
 Statistics

Urban Rural Population

Religions
 Demographics

Ethnic makeup

Population breakdown
Politics
Pakistan Major Business
Pakistan : Land Use
 Quality of Life factors

Education Spending

Comparative
rankings
 Fault lines In Pakistan
• Ethno-Regional
– Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, & Balochistan
• Political, Economic, Water
• Religious
– Sunni vs Shia, Ahmediya, Christian & Hindu
• Urban vs Rural
– Karachi and Lahore vs provinces