Computer-aided Hazard

Identification

Paul Chung (p.w.h.chung@lboro.ac.uk)

Department of Computer Science
 Hazards and Operability
(HAZOP) Studies
Established and widely used technique
in the process industry for hazard
identification
Time consuming, labour intensive
process:
Tedious
Expensive
 Computer-aided HAZOP
Different levels of support:
Electronic report form
Electronic data (on plant, on fluids, etc.)
Automated Hazard Identification
Continuous operation
Batch operation
 Automated Hazard
Identification
Continuous operation
From basic research to commercial product HAZID
Basic technology
Signed directed graph (SDG) representation
Fault propagation
Go through a list of deviations systematically and
identify the faults that cause the deviations and the
consequences that result from the faults and
deviations
 HAZID Overview
Automated extraction of plant design from a
CAD system, e.g. Intergraph SmartPlant P&ID
Convenient forms for adding any missing
process specific information
Tick boxes for selecting analysis options:
Deviations, e.g. more flow, less flow, etc.
Items to HAZOP, etc.
 HAZID Overview
HAZOP style output in different output
formats
XML, with HTML web page view.
Excel spreadsheet.
Query facility for viewing analysis results
e.g. viewing faults and consequences relating to a
particular plant item
e.g. viewing the propagation path between a
particular fault and consequence
Compare facility for viewing the difference
between two HAZID runs
Useful for after making a change to the design
7

Hazid Operation

Select SP P+ID
From SmartPlant
Hazid maps SP icons
to Hazop Process
Run Hazid data wizard, models
Extract plant data from
SP database:
*Plant Items Converts P+I diagram
*Piping, valves, fittings to Analysis model
*Controls
*Fluids information:
Temperature
Pressure Hazid analyses plant and
Fluid name generates Hazop Report
7

Hazid Operation

Select SP P+ID
From SmartPlant
Hazid maps SP icons
to Hazop Process
Run Hazid data wizard, models
Extract plant data from
SP database:
*Plant Items Converts P+I diagram
*Piping, valves, fittings to Analysis model
*Controls
*Fluids information:
Temperature
Pressure Hazid analyses plant and
Fluid name generates Hazop Report
7

Hazid Operation

Select SP P+ID
From SmartPlant
Hazid maps SP icons
to Hazop Process
Run Hazid data wizard, models
Extract plant data from
SP database:
*Plant Items Converts P+I diagram
*Piping, valves, fittings to Analysis model
*Controls
*Fluids information:
Temperature
Pressure Hazid analyses plant and
Fluid name generates Hazop Report
7

Hazid Operation

Select SP P+ID
From SmartPlant
Hazid maps SP icons
to Hazop Process
Run Hazid data wizard, models
Extract plant data from
SP database:
*Plant Items Converts P+I diagram
*Piping, valves, fittings to Analysis model
*Controls
*Fluids information:
Temperature
Pressure Hazid analyses plant and
Fluid name generates Hazop Report
8

Mapping SmartPlant to Hazid models

SmartPlant Hazid Model

Database Types
Mapping created by user
References for all company,
then mapping is >95%
automatic
Automatic mapping by Hazid:
= Centrifugal Pump

= Valve

= ?????
Mixer
Stripper User makes choice
Absorber
Reactor

**This User mapping is required only once for the whole Project**
9

Checking Automatic Nozzle Mapping

Hazid model is process function: But P+ID is piping:

Vapour Out N4
Port

Vapour/Liquid N1
Vapour
In Port
N3
Liquid N5

Liquid Out
Port N2

User confirms nozzle functions:

N1 is vapour/liquid in port,
N2 and N3 are liquid out ports,
N4 is a vapour out port
N5 is Cleanout liquid in port.
7

Hazid Operation

Select SP P+ID
From SmartPlant
Hazid maps SP icons
to Hazop Process
Run Hazid data wizard, models
Extract plant data from
SP database:
*Plant Items Converts P+I diagram
*Piping, valves, fittings to Analysis model
*Controls
*Fluids information:
Temperature
Pressure Hazid analyses plant and
Fluid name generates Hazop Report
 Equipment Knowledge Base

Knowledge about behaviour of equipment

Interaction between Faults, Deviations and Consequences

Consequence These links are called

arcs in Hazid

Fault Deviation

Fault - can cause Consequence

Fault - can cause Deviation to process variable
Deviation can cause another Deviation
Deviation can cause Consequence
 Equipment Knowledge Base
Knowledge about Faults and Consequences
This is mainly engineering knowledge and experience

Out

In

Fault Bearing failure Consequences

Casing damage
Seal damage and leakage
Loss of discharge pressure
Flow disturbance
Pump stops
7

Hazid Operation

Select SP P+ID
From SmartPlant
Hazid maps SP icons
to Hazop Process
Run Hazid data wizard, models
Extract plant data from
SP database:
*Plant Items Converts P+I diagram
*Piping, valves, fittings to Analysis model
*Controls
*Fluids information:
Temperature
Pressure Hazid analyses plant and
Fluid name generates Hazop Report
HAZOP Style Output from
HAZID
 HAZID Viewer Queries
Standard format questions:
What causes could there be for a selected
hazard?
What consequences are there for a given
failure mode?
How is a given hazard realised?
Show a path of deviations for propagation
Display all hazards with a given severity
rank or higher
Filtered Output showing Fault
Paths for a given Hazard
 Automated Batch Plant
Hazard Identification
Batch operation
Early research prototype (CHECKOP)
Basic technology
Action representation
State-based simulation
Go through a set of operation instructions
systematically and identify potential ambiguities,
operating problems and hazards
Applying guidewords such as before, after, no
action, etc.
CHECKOP System Overview
Simple Batch Reactor
Example
 CHECKOP Plant Description
instance(tank101 isa tank, [content info [reactantA],
outports info [out is [pump101,in]]]).
instance(pump101 isa pump, [status is offline, outports
info [out is [valve101,in]]]).
instance(valve101 isa valve, [status is closed, outports
info [out is [reactor101, in2]]]).
instance(reactor101 isa stirred_tank_reactor, [
outports info [out1 is [valve103,in], out2 is [valve106,in]],
heatSink info [hout is [jacket101,hin]],
reaction info [reaction_ab_p]
]).
 Operating instruction format
Natural language
Easy for user
Requires natural language processing
Could be ambiguous
Structured template
Easy for computer to process
Limited expressive power
 Operating instruction format
Object Action
valve101 open
Object Action until Condition
mixer on until elapsed-time 20 minute
Object1 Action Object2 Filler-word Fluid
until Condition
reactor101 fill-from tank101 with reactantA
until volume 30 percent
 CHECKOP Operating
Procedure Input
charge reactor101 with reactantA: {
(1) valve101 open
(2) pump101 start
(3) reactor101 fill_from tank101 with
reactantA until volume 30 percent
(4) pump101 stop
(5) valve101 close
}
etc
 Deviation Generation
Combine each single action in the procedure
with guide words, from:
No action Simple omission.
Early/Late action Sequence of procedure
changed (how many steps feasible?).
Early/Late action termination until condition of
action varied.
Then, simulate the effect of executing the
new procedure on the plant, detect hazards.
 Batch HAZOP Output
Operation Keyword Consequences

(3) No action (6) agitator running while vessel empty

reactor101 fill (17) cannot empty [reactantA, productP]
from tank101 from reactor101 to tank103 because content
with reactantA of reactor is [reactantB].
until volume
Early action reactor101 cannot be filled from tank101
30 percent
(-2) because there is no flow path.
Late action reactor101 cannot be filled from tank101
(+3) because there is no flow path.
 Batch HAZOP Output
Operation Keyword Consequences

(3) Early no consequence.

reactor101 fill termination
from tank101 (to only 10
with reactantA percent)
until volume Late (17) cannot empty [reactantA, productP]
30 percent termination from reactor101 to tank103 because content
(to 50 of reactor is [reactantA, productP].
percent) (17) contamination in tank103.
 Future Work on CHECKOP
Aformal structured language for operating
instructions
More guide words
OtherAction change other variables of theAction
model
Rules for reasonable deviations
What are the most likely mistakes in operation?
Integrate with HAZID
HAZID is strong on process hazards, CHECKOP
better for operating errors, etc.
HAZOP of start-up, shutdown, maintenance, etc.
 Conclusions
Automated hazard identification
continuous operation
commercial tool that can reduce the time of HAZOP
batch operation
promising area of research and development for identifying
problems associated with human errors and operating
procedures
Benefits:
Doing HAZOP earlier, and on modifications.
Consistent, repeatable, complete hazard identification
method.
 Acknowledgements
The work described in this presentation is
being funded by
HAZID T
echnologies Ltd
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research
Council, UK
Thanks are also due to my colleagues
Dr Steve McCoy
Mr Dingfeng Zhou