Vinson B. Pineda vs.

Atty De
Jesus, Atty. Ambrosio and
Atty. Mariano G.R. No. 155224
August 23, 2006
Facts:

Aurora Pineda filed for declaration of nullity of

marriage against Vinson Pineda. Aurora proposed a
settlement regarding visitation rights and the separation of
properties which was accepted by Vinson. Settlement was
approved by the trial court and their marriage was declared
null and void.

Throughout the proceedings the respondent

counsels were compensated but they still billed petitioner
additional legal fees in amounting to P16.5M. Vinson
refused to pay the additional fees but instead paid P1.2M.
 Respondents filed a complaint with the same
trial court.

Trial court ordered Vinson to pay a total of P9M.

CA reduced the amount to a total of P2M.
Issue:

 Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the

claim for additional legal fees.
 Whether or not the respondents were entitled to
additional legal fees.
Held:

 A lawyer may enforce his right to his fees by filing

the petition as an incident of the main action. RTC
has jurisdiction.
 The respondents were seeking to collect P50M which
was 10% of the value of the properties awarded to
Vinson. What respondents were demanding was
additional payment for service rendered in the same
case.
 The professional engagement between petitioner and
respondents was governed by quantum meruit.
 Rule 20.4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
advises lawyers to avoid controversies with clients
concerning their compensation and to resort to judicial
action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.
Suits to collect fees should be avoided and should be filed
only when circumstances force lawyers to resort to it.
 In this case, there was no justification for the additional
legal fees sought by respondents. It was an act of
unconscionable greed. Therefore the respondents are not
entitled to additional fees.
 Francisco l. Rosario, Jr.,
vs. Lellani De Guzman, et.al.,
G.R. No. 191247 July 10, 2013
Facts:

Spouses de Guzman engaged the legal services of Atty.

Francisco L. Rosario, Jr. as defense counsel in a complaint filed
against them involving their property in Parañaque City. Petitioner’s
legal services commenced from the RTC and ended up in this SC.

Spouses de Guzman, represented by petitioner, won their case

at all levels. While the case was pending before SC, Spouses de
Guzman died in a vehicular accident. Thereafter, they were substituted
by their children.

After which, petitioner filed a Motion to Determine Attorney’s

Fees before the RTC. He alleged, among others, that he had a verbal
agreement with the deceased spouses that he would get 25% of the
market value of the subject land if the case filed against them would
be dismissed.
 Despite the fact that he had successfully represented
them, respondent heirs refused his written demand for payment
of the contracted attorney’s fees. Petitioner insisted that he was
entitled to an amount equivalent to 25% percent of the value of
the subject land on the basis of quantum meruit.

RTC denied petitioner’s motion on the ground that it was

filed out of time. The RTC stated that the said motion was filed
after the judgment rendered in the subject case had long become
final and executory. The RTC said that it had already lost
jurisdiction over the case because a final decision could not be
amended or corrected except for clerical errors or mistakes.
There would be a variance of the judgment rendered if his claim
for attorney’s fees would still be included.
Issue:

 Whether or not the trial court may still hear the

motion to determine attorney's fees despite the
judgment in the case has become final and
executory.
Held:

YES, the court may still hear the said motion. The
attorney’s fees being claimed by the petitioner refers to the
compensation for professional services rendered and not as
indemnity for damages.

Thus, to grant petitioner’s motion would not result

in a double award of attorney’s fees. And contrary to the
RTC ruling, there would be no amendment of a final and
executory decision or variance in judgment.

In this case, petitioner opted to file his claim as an

incident in the main action, which is permitted by the
rules.
 While a claim for attorney’s fees may be filed before
the judgment is rendered, the determination as to
the propriety of the fees or as to the amount thereof
will have to be held in abeyance until the main case
from which the lawyer’s claim for attorney’s fees may
arise has become final. Otherwise, the determination
to be made by the courts will be premature.
The Conjugal Partnership of
the Spouses Cadavedo vs.
Atty. Lacaya G.R. No. 171388
January 15, 2014
Facts:

Spouses Cadavedo acquired a homestead grant over

a parcel of land in Zamboanga del Norte. They were
issued Homestead Patent on March 13, 1953 and Original
Certificate of Title on July 2, 1953.

On April30, 1955, the spouses Cadavedo sold the

subject lot to the spouses Ames which was subsequently
issued in the name of the spouses Ames.
 The spouses Cadavedo filed an action before the
RTC against the spouses Ames for sum of money and/or
voiding of contract of sale of homestead after the latter
failed to pay the balance of the purchase price.

The spouses Cadavedo initially engaged the

services of Atty. Rosendo Bandal who, for health reasons,
later withdrew from the case; he was substituted by Atty.
Lacaya.
 Atty. Lacaya amended the complaint to assert the nullity
of the sale and the issuance of TCT in the names of the
spouses Ames as gross violation of the public land law.
The amended complaint stated that the spouses
Cadavedo hired Atty. Lacaya on a contingency fee
basis:

“10. That due to the above circumstances, the plaintiffs

were forced to hire a lawyer on contingent basis and if
they become the prevailing parties in the case at bar, they
will pay the sum of P2,000.00 for attorney’s fees”
 The spouses Cadavedo subsequently hired Atty.
Lacaya in two other cases in connection with the subject
lot

In 1981, when the spouses were placed in

possession of the subject lot. Atty. Lacaya asked for one-
half of the subject lot as attorney’s fees. He caused the
subdivision of the subject lot into two equal portions,
based on area, and selected the more valuable and
productive half for himself; and assigned the other half to
the spouses Cadavedo.
 Unsatisfied with the division, Vicente and his sons-
in-law entered the portion assigned to the respondents and
ejected them

Eventually, Vicente and Atty. Lacaya entered into a

compromise agreement ( re: the ejectment case), re-
adjusting the area and portion obtained by each. Atty.
Lacaya acquired 10.5hectares of the subject lot, which
was approved by the MTC
 Cadavedo filed before the RTC an action against
the respondents, assailing the MTC-approved compromise
agreement: that the respondents be ejected from their one-
half portion of the subject lot; that they be ordered to
render an accounting of the produce of this one-half
portion; and to fix the attorney’s fees on a quantum meruit
basis, with due consideration of the expenses that Atty.
Lacaya incurred while handling the civil cases

On appeal, the CA granted the ½ of the lot as

attorney’s fees.
Issue:

 Whether the grant of attorney’s fees by the Court of

Appeals is valid
Held:

No, the written agreement providing for a

contingent fee of P2,000.00 should prevail over the oral
agreement providing for one-half of the subject lot

The alleged contingent fee agreement consisting of

one-half of the subject lot was not reduced to writing prior
to or, at most, at the start of Atty. Lacaya’s engagement as
the spouses Cadavedo’s counsel
contingent fee contract:
- agreement in writing
- where the fee, often a fixed percentage of what may be
recovered in the action, is made to depend upon the
success of the litigation
- payment of which is not made during the pendency of
the litigation involving the client’s property but only
after the judgment has been rendered in the case
handled by the lawyer
 Atty. Lacaya is entitled to receive attorney’s fees on a quantum
meruit basis:
- the parties impliedly set aside any express stipulation on the
attorney’s fees, and submit the reasonableness of such fees to the
court’s discretion
- ‘as much as he deserves’ —basis for determining a lawyer’s
professional fees in the absence of a contract taking into account
certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees
- essential requisite: acceptance of the benefits by one sought to be
charged for the services rendered under circumstances as
reasonably to notify him that the lawyer performing the task was
expecting to be paid compensation for it
- a device to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable
postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain benefit without
paying for it
Under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and
Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
factors to name a few, are considered in determining the
reasonableness of the fees to which a lawyer is entitled:
1) importance of the subject matter of the controversy
2) time spent and the extent of the services rendered
3) customary charges for similar services
4) amount involved in the controversy
5) benefits resulting to the client from the service