This Term

Part 3: Political Institutions

12. How Government Works
13. Presidential and parliamentary regimes
14. Coalition and single-party governments
15. Federalism and decentralisation
16. Courts and central banks
17. READING WEEK
Part 4: Political Outcomes
18. Economic performance
19. Public spending and equality
20. Women’s political representation
21. Politics in ethnically divided societies
22. Revision and exam preparation
 GV101 Week 12

How Government Works:

Majorities, Consensus,
Agendas, and Vetoes
 Outline
1. Institutions of Democratic Government

2. Two Models of Democracy

Majoritarian
Consensus

3. Designs of Democracy Around the World

4. Understanding How Government Institutions Work

The spatial model
Agenda-setters and veto players
 Institutional Choices in Democracies
Electoral System: Majoritarian or Proportional?

Regime Type: Presidential or Parliamentary?

Cabinet: Single-Party or Coalition?

Legislature: Unicameral or Bicameral?

Federalism: Unitary or Federal/Decentralised?

Referendums: Never or Frequent?

Constitution: Parliamentary sovereignty or Constitutional supremacy?

Central Banks: Politically controlled or Independent?

 Two Models of Democracy:
Majoritarian and Consensus
Arend Lijphart, 1984 & 2012

Majoritarian Democracy
Government by/for the people = government by the majority
=> no constraints on the will of the majority
e.g. single-party government in a parliamentary system
(the “Westminster Model”)

Consensus Democracy
Government by/for the people = government by “consensus”
=> constraints on the will of the majority
e.g. coalition government and/or
a presidential system (e.g. Hamilton et. al., 1788)
Institutions Which Restrict Majority Rule
“checks and balances”
Presidential regime (vs. parliamentary regime)
means coalitions have to be built issue-by-issue in the parliament

Coalition and/or minority government (vs. single-party government)

forces compromises to be made inside cabinets and inside parliament

Bicameral legislature (vs. unicameral legislature)

means that coalitions have to be built across two chambers

Federalism/Decentralisation (vs. unitary state structure)

restricts the power of the central government

Referendums
allow a majority in the public to over-ride the parliamentary majority

Bills of Rights + Constitutional Courts (vs. parliamentary sovereignty)

allow a Supreme Court to block the parliamentary majority

Independent Central Bank (vs. control by Finance Minister)

restricts the ability of the government to shape economic policy
 Four ‘Ideal Types’ of Democracy

Regime Type

Parliamentary Presidential

Majoritarian Consensus

Single- “Westminster” United States

Party Model Model
Government
Type
Consensus Super-Consensus

Coalition Continental European Latin American

Model Model
 Designs of Democracy Around the World
Parliamentary Hybrid (e.g. Semi-Pres.) Presidential
Single-Party Coalition Single-Party Coalition Single-Party Coalition
Belgium*, Austria*,
Czech Rep., Bulg., Croatia,
Greece, Denm., Eston., Portugal, Finland,
Europe Spain*, Germ.*, Hung., Romania, France, Lith., Cyprus
UK Irel., Ital., Russia* Maced., Pol.,
Latvia, Mold., Serbia,
Neth’s, Norw., Slovak., Switz.*
Swed. Ukraine
Argent.*, Bolivia,
Costa Rica, Brazil*,
Canada*, Dom. Rep., Chile,
Americas Jamaica, El Salv., Guat., Colombia,
Trinidad & Tob. Guy., Hond., Ecuador,
Mexico*, Panama,
Nicar., Peru, Paraguay,
USA*, Venez.* Uruguay
Australia*, Bangl., India*,
Asia, Botswana, Israel, Maurit., Madagascar, Indonesia, Benin,
Pacific, Japan, NZ, PNG, Mongolia, Mali Malawi, Philippines
Africa, Lesotho, Sri Lanka, Taiwan Mozambique,
Middle East Nepal, Thailand, Namibia,
South Africa Turkey S. Korea

*= federal/decentralised system
 Understanding How Government
Institutions Work
The Spatial Model: Basic Assumptions

1. Politics and policy-making can be conceptualised in a political ‘space’

(e.g. a Left-Right dimension)

2. Each actor (e.g. a legislator or a party) has an ‘ideal policy’ in this

policy space

3. When making a choice between different policies, each actor will vote
for the policy which is closest to his/her ideal policy

4. If no policy is agreed, the existing policy (the ‘status quo’) remains

=> With no institutions: policies should converge on the position of the

‘median voter’ (the ‘median voter theorem’) (Black, 1958)
 SQ X

Left Right
A B C D E
 SQ X

Left Right
A B C D E
 Y X

Left Right
A B C D E
 Y X

Left Right
A B C D E
 Y Z

Left Right
A B C D E
 Y Z

Left Right
A B C D E
 Z

Left Right
A B C D E
 Two Key Institutions Powers
George Tsebelis, 2002

Agenda-setting power
the right to make a proposal (at the beginning of the
policy process), or to propose an amendment
e.g. the government in a parliamentary system

Veto power
the right to block a proposal
e.g. the median member of a parliament
a party in a coalition government
the median member of a second chamber
a Supreme Court
the median voter in a referendum
 Majoritarian Government:
Dictatorship of the Majority Party
Assumptions:
A, B & C are in the Left party, and D & E are in the Right party
B is the Leader of the Left party (the agenda-setter)
=> if there is party cohesion, B is the dictator

X SQ

Left Right
A B C D E
 Consensus Government:
Compromise, but Possible Gridlock
Assumptions:
A & B are in the Left party, C is in the Centre party
The Left party and Centre party are in coalition
B is the Prime Minister (the agenda-setter)
=> B has to make a compromise proposal, because C is a veto player

X SQ

Left Right
A B C D E

set of policies that C

prefers to the status quo
(‘winset’)
 Consensus Government:
Compromise, but Possible Gridlock
Assumptions:
A & B are in the Left party, C is in the Centre party
The Left party and Centre party are in coalition
B is the Prime Minister (the agenda-setter)
=> B has to make a compromise proposal, because C is a veto player

Left Right
A B C D E

set of status quo policies

that B and C cannot agree
to change
(‘gridlock interval’)
 Consensus Government:
Compromise, but Possible Gridlock
But, bigger distance between ‘veto players’
=> bigger gridlock interval

Left Right
A B C D E

set of status quo policies

that B and C cannot agree
to change
(‘gridlock interval’)
 Tsebelis’s Two Main Propositions

1. More veto players => less policy change

e.g. coalition government, presidential system, bicameralism,
supreme court, central bank, referendum etc.

2. Bigger policy distance between veto players => less policy

change
e.g. coalition government between two ideologically similar parties
vs. coalition government between two ideologically different
parties
 Testing Tsebelis’s Propositions
Tsebelis, 1999

Observations
Number of “significant laws” (labour law) passed between 1981
and 1991
By 15 countries in Western Europe:
AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, DE, GR, IR, IT, LU, NL, PT, ES, SW, UK

Measurement of Veto-Players and Ideological Distance

Single-party majority governments (e.g. UK) => 1 veto player
Coalition or minority governments => 2+ veto players
“Distance” between veto players => left-right positions of parties
(using expert judgements of party positions)
Results
 Pros and Cons of Majoritarian and
Consensus Democracy
Majoritarian Consensus

Pros Decisive government Slow & deliberative decisions

Clear responsibility Broad political compromises
Electoral promises kept Protection of minority interests

Cons Decisions too quick Decisions too slow

‘Elective dictatorship’ No clear responsibility
No compromises Electoral promises broken
Threat to minority interests Vetoes by minority groups
 In Sum
There is a wide range of institutional designs of democracy

Lijphart’s distinction between majoritarian and consensus democracy is

a useful summary of the main models of democratic government

The classic majoritarian model is single-party government in a

parliamentary system (e.g. Westminster)

There are lots of different consensus models, e.g. presidentialism,

coalition government, federalism, bicameralism etc.

Tsebelis’s veto player theory helps us understand the political and policy
implications of the different models of democracy, e.g.
“If an exogenous shock occurs, a government with many veto players with
big ideological distances among them cannot handle the situation and
cannot agree on the necessary policies” (Tsebelis, 2002, p.185)
 References
Black, Duncan (1958) The Theory of Committees and Elections, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Hamilton, Alexander, John Jay and James Madison (1788) The Federalist,
New York, NY: McLean.
Lijphart, Arend (1984) Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus
Government in Twenty-One Countries, New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press.
Lijphart, Arend (2012) Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and
Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, 2nd edn, New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
Tsebelis, George (1999) ‘Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary
Democracies: An Empirical Analysis’, American Political Science Review 93:
591-608.
Tsebelis, George (2002) Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work,
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
 To Do
What are the key political institutions in your adopted country?
Presidential, parliamentary or hybrid?
Single-party, coalition or minority government?
Federal or unitary?
Unicameral or bicameral?
How common are referendums?
Strong or weak courts?
Independent central bank?

How do government institutions work in your adopted country?

e.g. who are the agenda-setters, and who has veto power?

What are the advantages and disadvantages of the majoritarian

and consensus models of democracy?