Contingency in

power system
What is contingency?

 A contingency is the loss or failure of a small part of the power system (e.g. a
transmission line), or the loss/failure of individual equipment such as a generator
or transformer.
 It can also be defined as the non-functionality in the power system of a device
such as generator, transformer, transmission line and more or the change of the
device state which may include the possibility in a transformer substation of an
unplanned opened circuit breaker.
Sudden Disturbances

Weather
1. Conductor failure on overhead line - snow and ice loading. The broken ends may touch
the ground, causing an earth fault, as well as an open circuited phase;
2. Joint failure on overhead line - snow and ice loading; as with conductor failure;
conductor clashing on overhead line - wind or loss of snow/ice load;
3. Tower failure on overhead line - tower collapse due to snow/ice loads on conductors,
conditions worsened by high winds. Sometimes a run of several towers can be affected;
3. Insulator flashover on overhead line or outdoor substation - current leakage across dirty
insulator surfaces due to moisture, condensation, freezing fog, lightning. The dirt may be
caused by industrial pollution or, in coastal regions, wind blown salt deposits;
4. Conductor heating on overhead line - a combination of weather conditions such as low
wind speed, high ambient temperatures, perhaps high solar radiation leading to higher than
expected conductor core temperatures at specified current flows;
5. Conductor sag on overhead line - may be caused by conductor heating or by
mechanical loading from snow/ice/freezing fog;
6. Conductor overheating in cables - apart from the obvious cause of excessive current flows
(low voltages could contribute to these), higher than expected temperature could be
caused by increased soil thermal resistivity following very dry weather.
Some of the more frequent factors which may cause disturbances, together with the parts
of the system most likely to be affected are:
1. Flashover to vegetation from overhead lines.
2. Falling trees or windblown materials (including kites!) contacting overhead lines
causing flashovers, usually to earth;
3. Ground subsidence affecting overhead line towers and resulting in contact ;
4. Ground excavation or subsidence damaging cables;
5. Smoke and fire products, usually from grass or forest fires, blowing across overhead lines
and resulting in flashovers; the heat and smoke can produce conducting paths
between the line conductors anywhere along the line span.
Balance between demand and
generation
This can cause:
1. loss of transfers in to/out of external systems or lower voltage networks;
2. transmission circuit trippings isolating parts of the system with embedded generation or
demand; etc.
As a general comment, this form of disturbance can be one of the most dangerous to
system viability, and also one of the most frequent, in that many disturbances may result in
some imbalance during their development.
Plant Failure
Generation failures differ from other plant failures in several respects:
1. The generation margin is shared system-wide.
2. As a result, a generation loss will be felt to a greater or lesser extent across the whole
system.
3. The loss of output from a generator may be partial, say as a consequence of the failure of
some auxiliary plant.
4. There is often more warning of an incipient reduction in output than of decrease in
throughput capacity such as experienced with lines, and trans- formers (or of var output,
as with reactive compensation devices).
5. Generation failures are one of the commonest forms of plant failure.
Human Intervention
1. Human error on the part of utility personnel can occur at all stages of the production of
electricity - planning/design, plant manufacture, plant installation, maintenance/testing,
operation.
2. The ones that immediately come to mind are switching errors, in decision or execution,
and mistakes involving protection.
3. Whereas the results of the first will often be immediately apparent, those of the second
may not be apparent for months or years
Forms of System Failure

The conditions which may lead to a lesser or greater system failure will include:
1. Overloads
2. Voltages outside limits
3. Frequency outside limits
4. Instability (transient, dynamic, voltage)
5. Disconnection of substation or generating station
6. System splitting.
Cause of system failure

Some of the incidents which could lead to these conditions are:

1. Fault on primary equipment
2. Protective gear maloperation
3. Communications maloperation
4. Protective gear settings exceeded
5. Equipment ratings exceeded
6. Voltages outside limits
7. Steady state limits exceeded
8. Transient stability limits exceeded
9. Dynamic oscillations
10. Voltage decay/collapse .
Definition and Concepts used
in emergency control
 Control in an emergency can be defined as the special facilities and procedures
provided by a utility to enable it to maintain and restore viable operation following an
incident which disturbs the system operating conditions to a point where the available
system capacity is no longer sufficient to meet demand in all or parts of the system, or
where abnormal splits exist within the network.
 Credible Contingency: It is a contingency or fault which has been specifically foreseen in
the planning and operation of the system, and against which specific measures have
been taken to ensure that no serious consequences would follow its occurrence. It has
sometimes been called a ‘defined contingency’.
 Non-Credible Contingency: Each utility or interconnected group will adopt its own
standards and security criteria reflecting its views and experience on continuity of supply,
plant reliability, importance of demand supplied and fault statistics. It is usually more
severe and not specifically defined, for which only general preventive measures are
taken.
System States

‘System state’ is a concise statement of the viability of the system in its current operating mode.
 Normal - all loadings are within continuous capabilities of the plant, with voltages and
frequency within agreed operational limits. System conditions following any credible
contingency are acceptable.
 Normal (alert) - if a credible contingency occurs, action can be taken within the time scales
allowed by plant capability to restore the system to a normal state. Very rapid or immediate
action is not necessary.
 Alert - this state requires very rapid or immediate action. If a credible contingency occurs the
system will enter the emergency state. Alternatively, the existing conditions are such that action
must be taken rapidly to prevent unacceptable overloading, voltage conditions, frequency
changes, or plant tripping caused by protective gear operation, or loss of supply, or system split.
 Emergency - unacceptable loading, voltage or frequency conditions already exist on the
system, or demand has been lost, or the system is split. Action must be taken immediately to
bring the system to an acceptable state.
Severity of disturbance in terms of system minutes lost –
energy not supplied due to disturbance (MWh) x 60
-
maximum system demand met to date (MW)
THE EFFECTS OF VARIOUS TYPES OF FAULT
OR DISTURBANCE ON SYSTEM
PERFORMANCE

 It is proposed to extend system failure by considering what faults or disturbances are most
likely to cause such failures, and also how these disturbances could degrade into more
severe conditions, including complete system failure.

Sudden Deficit of Generation or Equivalent

 This type of disturbance can develop in various ways - most directly through the loss of
generation within the system, or complete loss of interconnection to neighbors.
 Time available
Contingency Possible results Containment actions to implement
actions
Sudden loss of System frequency Increase generation 1/1O’s secs to
generation secs
Reduce demands 1/1O’s secs to
secs
Transmission Increase generation Secs to
overloads Reconfigure network minutes
Reduce demands
Transient stability Increase generation millisecs
Reconfigure network
Reduce demands
System oscillations Increase generation Secs to
Reconfigure minutes
Reduce demands
System voltage drop Increase generation millisecs/secs
Q and/or P to mins (if
Reconfigure progressive
Reduce demands change)
Table 1: Effect of sudden loss of generation; (b) possible second stage effects if
insufficient or incorrect action is taken on sudden loss of generation
 Contingency Possible second stage effects

System frequency Insufficient demand disconnected: frequency fall not halted -

cumulative loss of generation and system collapse
Excessive demand disconnected/poor damping of governors -
oscillation of frequency/cumulative loss of generation/system
collapse

Sequential tripping of overloaded circuits, possibly leading to

uncontrolled system split with necessary consequence of
Transmission overloads
generator- demand imbalances (possibly large) in separate
sections
System oscillations and tripping of circuits (e.g. on impedance-
Transient stability
protection) leading possibly to uncontrolled system split
System oscillations Build up of oscillations/circuit trippings, up to uncontrolled system
split with generation-demand imbalances in separate sections
Cumulative voltage fall as tap changers operate/transmission
System voltage drop voltages fall and currents increase, with circuit trippings,
generator excitation systems limiting, system voltage collapse and
probably system instability
 Time available
Contingency Possible results Containment actions
to implement
actions

Sudden loss of System frequency Reduce generation 1/1O’s secs to

demand rise secs

Reduce Q on reactive
1/1O’s secs to
sources
System voltage rise secs to
Reduce generation
minutes

Transmission Reduce generation

Reconfigure networks Secs to mins
overload

Reduce generation
Transient instability Reconfigure networks Millisecs

Reduce generation Secs to mins

System oscillations

Table 2: Effect of a sudden loss of demand; (b) possible second stage effects if
insufficient or incorrect action is taken on sudden loss of demand
 Contingency Possible second stage effects

Too responsive governors lead to oscillation of

System frequency rise frequency with cumulative loss of generation and
demand and possibly total loss of system

Voltage rise not halted; if very severe, extensive

System voltage rise faults/tripping of circuits possibly resulting in system
collapse

Sequential tripping of overloaded circuits leading

possibly to uncontrolled system split with necessary
Transmission overload consequence of generation- demand imbalances
(possibly large) in separate sections

System oscillations and tripping of circuits (e.g. on

impedance protection) leading possibly to uncontrolled
Transient instability system split and generation- demand imbalances in
separate sections
 • Sudden Deficit of Demand or Equivalent

Time available to
Contingency Possible results Containment actions implement
actions
Reconfigure network
Sudden loss of Transmission overload Adjust generation Secs to mins
transmission Adjust generation and demand
Reconfigure network
Transient instability Adjust generation millisecs
Adjust generation and demand
Reconfigure network
System oscillations Adjust generation Secs to mins
Adjust generation and demand
Reconfigure network Secs to mins
Voltage falls Adjust generation or reactive power
Adjust generation and demand
 Contingency Possible second stage effects

Sequential tripping of overloaded circuits possibly

leading to uncontrolled system splits with necessary
Transmission overload
consequence of generation- demand imbalances
(possibly large) in separate sections

System oscillations and tripping of circuits (e.g. on

impedance protection) possibly leading to
Transient instability
uncontrolled system split with generation demand
imbalances in separate sections

Build up of oscillations/circuit trippings possibly

leading to uncontrolled system split with
System oscillations
generation-demand imbalances in separate
sections

Cumulative voltage fall as tap changers

operate/transmission voltages fall and currents
Voltage falls
increase, generation excitation systems limit, system
voltage collapse and probably instability
PATTERN OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF A
SUDDEN DISTURBANCE

 Some sequence of events leads to a significant imbalance between demand

and generation in all or parts of the system. There can be a wide range of
compounding factors - errors in operational planning, errors in control,
maloperation of protective gear, tele communications failure, etc.
 The system or its separate parts should stabilize at points S1 or S2 through the
action of governors and load frequency control, disconnection of demand or
less frequently disconnection of generation - all actions intended to eliminate any
imbalance between demand and generation, and to restore the frequency to its
nominal value.
 If, however, these control actions are not matched sufficiently closely to the
imbalance, further adjustments of generation will be called for, and if these are
outside the capability of the plant and its control loops, further disconnection of
demand or loss of generation may occur; these possible cases, all of which have
occurred in practice.
Typical mechanisms of large
scale system disturbances
 DESIGN CRITERIA FOR EMERGENCY
CONTROL FACILITIES

 A number of almost self-evident criteria will establish the basic implementation of an

emergency control scheme:
1. The most appropriate system variable/s should be chosen to initiate emergency action;
2. The actions taken should be the minimum necessary to contain the disturbance,
particularly where adjustment of generation output or disconnection of demand are
concerned;
3. The actions should be implemented at the geographical locations on the system where
they are most effective in containing the disturbances, and run least risk of precipitating
further problems.
4. The emergency control system should have a functional reliability such that the probability
of avoiding demand disconnection as a result of its successful operation is several times
greater than the probability of demand disconnection as a result of its possible maloperation.
An alternative, simpler approach would be to seek a reliability from the emergency control
system no worse than that obtained from first line protective systems;
5. The actions taken and the reasons for these should be indicated to the operator;
6. Alarms should be given when the emergency system is not functioning or its correct
operation is doubtful (e.g. suspect data);
7. It should be possible for the operator to over-ride incoming telemetry known to be
incorrect and, where pre-defined logic is used, to select alternatives in line with actual power
system conditions;
8. the control system must be robust, that is it must meet its criteria and objectives whatever
the state of the power system;
9. decision and action times must be less than the time at which further significant
degradation of the system would occur. Other
How to control contingency

 Most of the literature on normal and emergency control deals with technical aspects, and
published information for the general assessment of system control costs is hard to find.
 The main items needed for emergency control will be:
• disconnection and reconnection of demand by telecommand in selectable groups of
substations-the usual facility is to be able to switch demand at one substation at a time;
• mimic diagram- the necessity for mimic diagrams is contentious, but a recent Cigre survey
on graphical interfaces showed some two-thirds of the respondents in favour of their
provision. Reasons given included: better overview of the system; information available to
all dispatchers simultaneously; better monitoring of disturbed conditions; the basic system is
always available even if all the on-line systems are not functioning;
• extended ranges on instrumentation to cover abnormal operating conditions - this should
present no problems with digital displays, provided instrument transformer ratios are
suitable;
 simultaneous transformer tap changing for selectable groups of transformers;
 broadcast telegraph messages to selectable groups of substations;
 broadcast speech;
 software enhancement: identification of system splits; provide alarms for high levels of
overload and other abnormalities in operating conditions: flexible selection of groups of
substations and parameters associated with these (e.g. summated generation, demand
and transfer, available generation margins); computational assistance to cover a wider
range of contingencies with user- friendly input to define and compute the end results of
these contingencies;
 the system control structure and telecommunications - turning to emergencies within the
system control facilities, the security provided for normal operation such as triangulation of
data links to outstations, and duplication or equivalent of EMS systems should be
adequate. The additional hazard will be the total loss of the normal control centre, and to
cover this, an emergency centre with limited facilities can be provided.
Thank You