Computational Reactor Physical and Criticality Safety

Group at the SUT INPE Bratislava

G. Farkas, V. Slugeň, J. Haščík, B. Vrban, J. Lüley, M. Stacho, A. Bouhaddane, M. Petriska

Slovak University of Technology, Faculty of Electrical Engineering and Information Technology,

Institute of Nuclear and Physical Engineering, Ilkovičova 3, 812 19 Bratislava, Slovakia

CRITICALITY SAFETY ISSUES FRESH FUEL STORAGE FACILITY Calculation of

critical number of
 Criticality Safety Analysis of fresh and spent fuel storage and
fuel assemblies
handling facilities. Calculations related to the VVER-440 units were flange
performed: rubber seal The objective was to evaluate the minimal
critical number of 4.87 % enriched VVER
 Fresh fuel storage with transport containers and storage grids wood
air or water
type of FAs grouped in tight configuration
for three different surroundings:
 Spent fuel storage pool – compact and reserve grid fuel cylindrical •clean water
assemblies nest
 T-12 transport cask air or water
pinewood
•water with boron acid
•air
fuel assembly
 Application of conservative approach and calculation of keff was keff vs. lattice pitch for 4.87 % enr. (VVER) fuel
performed for normal and various postulated emergency conditions Transport container grid transport
container assemblies in water surroundings

in order to evaluate the final maximal keff values. 4x4

6 x 10 storage
grid
COMPUTATIONAL CODES AND APPROACHES cadmium plate
cloth
 Monte Carlo code MCNP5 1.6 with ENDF/JENDL/JEFF libraries foil coat

FA
 SCALE 6.1, NJOY 99, SERPENT 1.1.7
keff vs. lattice pitch for 4.87 % enr. (VVER) fuel
 Code validation  is conducted analyzing the BaW XI(2) case of assemblies in water + boron acid (12.8 g/kg)

the Criticality Safety Validation Suite. HANDLING FACILITIES T-12 transport surroundings
cask central tube
T-12 transport
 Based on this validation  bias and its uncertainty are calculated cask
according formulas: air or water upper spacer
grid
 bias  keff
bench
 k eff
calcul
 bias   bench
2
  calcul
2 revolving table
with 6 T-12
fuel assembly
casks
revolving plate cylindrical coat
 Conservative approach  is applied in order to evaluate the final air or water
maximal keff. revolving table
Results of keff calculation for 4.87 % enr.
 All conditions improving neutron multiplication are taken into lower spacer
grid
(VVER) fuel assemblies in water surroundings
in dependence on lattice pitch
account.
 The maximal effective multiplication factor:
max
k eff  k eff
conser
  bias  1.645  bench
2
  calcul
2
  conser
2 revolving plate bottom

REFERENCES SPENT FUEL STORAGE FACILITIES

Compact grid Reserve grid Fuel assemblies
 Criticality safety analyses associated with the fresh and spent fuel
storages and handling facilities (NPP Mochovce 1&2). 54 hermetic
603 absorption tubes
54 hermetic
tubes
tubes with FAs
 Subcriticality analysis of the spent fuel storage facility loaded with
head
fresh and spent 4.87% enr. Gd II type of FAs (NPP Mochovce 1&2). II iiI I II iiI
I
 CSA analysis related to the transport and storage of fresh and mixing grid

spent FAs (NPP Mochovce 1 & 2).

 Assessment of multiplication properties for the 2nd gen. type of FA in concrete coolant - water
spent fuel
assembly
concrete 296 positions for
spacer grid

spent FAs
comparison with the 1st gen. type of FAs (NPP Mochovce 1 & 2). absorption hermetic
coolant - water
fuel pins
tube tube casing

head supporting grid

Results –fresh fuel storage facility f bottom

cooling
pipes
CASE – SG11/21 CASE – SG12/22 CASE – SG13/23

CASE – CG11/21 CASE – CG12/22 CASE – CG13/23

supporting spent fuel
grid assemblies supporting grid

spent FAs in spent FAs in spent FAs in spent FAs in

hermetic tubes absorption tubes absorption casing hermetic tubes absorption tubes
tube

head with the

joining structure
air-air water-water air-water
water with
air clean water
boron acid steel column

fuel pins

spacer grid

casing

supporting

Results –transport cask & revolving table

grid

CASE – TC11/21 CASE – TC12/22 CASE – TC13/23 CASE – RT11/21 CASE – RT12/22 CASE – RT13/23
Results – Compact grid Results – C
bottom part

CASE - A CASE - B
ompact grid
(emergency cases)

Investigated emergency cases:

• Diagonal downfall of fresh FA
water with water with
air clean water air clean water • Longitudinal downfall of fresh FA
boron acid boron acid
• Longitudinal downfall of fresh FA on the hermetic tubes
All positions (AT + HT) loaded Loading with 4.87 % enr. fresh
with 4.87 % enr. fresh FAs FAs and 4 empty layers
DIAGONAL FA DOWNFALL LONGITUDINAL FA DOWNFALL
CASE – C1/D1 CASE – C2/D2 CASE – E11 CASE – E12 ON HERMETIC TUBES

CASE – E31 CASE – E32

Results –Reserve grid  Loading with fresh FAs

 Loading with fresh FAs
 4 empty layers  4 layers of 45 MWd/kg -
CASE – R1 CASE – R2 burned FAs

Loading with 4.87 % enr. fresh Loading with 4.87 % enr. fresh  Loading with fresh FAs  Loading with fresh FAs
LONGITUDINAL FA DOWNFALL  4 empty layers  4 layers of 45 MWd/kg -
FAs and 4 layers of 45 (50) FAs and 4 layers of 45 (50) burned FAs
MWd/kg burned FAs MWd/kg burned FAs CASE – E21 CASE – E22

 Loading with fresh FAs  Loading with fresh FAs

Full loading (including HT) with Full loading (including HT) with  4 empty layers  4 layers of 45 MWd/kg -
4.87 % enr. fresh FAs 45 MWd/kg burned FAs burned FAs