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Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
Program (CARP)
What is CARP?
The evaluation of the current land acquisition and distribution (LAD) record under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) must be viewed in context, to see the true picture of CARP in this
administration.
Previous administrations boast of high LAD performance simply because CARP during the earlier periods
focused on alienable and disposable lands of the public domain (A&D lands), and unused agricultural
government-owned lands (GOLs). These types of lands subjected to CARP were unopposed. Private
agricultural lands (PALs) occupy the last rung in the implementation ladder. PALs are difficult to cover
under CARP due to the resistance of landowners. The challenges from landowners have the net effect of
dragging, if not altogether halting, CARP implementation.
Republic Act No. 9700 (CARP Extension with Reforms or Carper) sets June 30, 2014, as the deadline for the
issuance of the notice of coverage (NOC), which is the first legal step in the LAD activity. Congress wanted
to complete LAD by 2014, subject to a master plan to be formulated by the Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council (PARC). It did not come to fruition because no plan was formulated. PARC was in hiatus for 10 years
(2006 to 2016) when the Carper deadline took effect.
President Duterte reactivated the PARC on Sept. 12, 2016. The PARC immediately revoked stock distribution
option plans and agribusiness venture arrangements, which ran counter to the provisions of agrarian reform
laws.
Aware of the restrictions imposed by the Carper deadline, the President issued Executive Order No. 75, Series of
2019, to cover unused GOLs, thus making available at least 300,000 hectares to our landless farmers and
farmworkers. The inventory includes the Yulo King Ranch or YKR in Busuanga, Coron in Palawan (8,000 hectares),
the Davao Penal Colony or Dapecol in Davao del Norte (5,000 hectares) and the Aurora State College of
Technology or Ascot in Baler, Aurora (110 hectares).
The President mandated the DAR to parcelize all collective Cloas, and provided funding for this parcelization
through the use of government and international funding facilities. He also directed the DAR to complete the
LAD process by 2022.
The President is focusing on the distribution of Cloas to agrarian reform beneficiaries (ARBs) nationwide.
Agrarian reform cooperatives and the unbanked segment of the ARBs have increased credit access through the
Land Bank of the Philippines.
The Duterte administration is heir to an agrarian reform program with several
shortcomings. While it is a fact that 4.8 million hectares of agricultural lands have been
distributed to 2.7 million ARBs, there is still a lack of sufficient support services to ARBs and
their dependents. The lack of support services is the proximate cause why ARBs engage in
illegal sales or lease transactions.
The CARP in the Philippine setting has a mixed record. We have successful agrarian reform
cooperatives. Inversely, there are ARBs who are still waiting to be installed despite the fact
that Cloas have been issued to them. We have ARBs in possession of their awarded titles
who have been removed from what they already own through violent means.
Today, there are 10 million rice farmers in the Philippines. Extrapolating their
number of dependents, they constitute a big portion of the over 100 million
Filipinos today, and they are in trouble.
Not much of their land can be reached by irrigation facilities and rain has not been
heavy on lands depending on rain for water.
On the other hand, the rice tariffication law, recently passed but lacking yet in
publicized IRR (implementing rules and regulations) is a good law. It thinks
primarily about food security for 100 million Filipinos rather than just protecting
the parochial needs of some 10 million Filipino rice farmers.
For decades, in the name of “protecting” the farmers, rice importation was limited
by quota restrictions. There was tons of money to be made, reportedly by
bureaucrats who approved the import allocation, the traders who cornered the
importation permits and which allegedly acted as a “cartel” in order to dictate
market prices. And, of course, there were the smugglers-scarcity being the mother
of smuggling.
Divine intervention came last year when these market aberrations resulted in a
price supply deficit and prices of rice went to the roof-hiking inflation rate and
negatively affecting the gross domestic product. The government was shocked
and, thus, the RTL was born.
Today, the full effect of the law has not yet been felt generally by retail consumers
because as Agriculture Secretary William D. Dar said “although some 2.5 million
tons of rice have already been imported up to August,” the traders are withholding
their market entry in order to command higher prices.
The average production cost of palay is at P12 per kilo. People from the mountains
in other rice-growing parts of the country say some greedy wholesalers there are
buying farm-gate palay at only P8 per kilo stealthily citing what is happening in
some parts of Luzon.
But Agriculture Committee Senate Chairman Sen. Cynthia A. Villar debunked the
case explaining that those being sold at P8 per kilo in Luzon were those that have
been severely damaged by the typhoon rain causing unwanted moisture.
Buying palay at P8 per kilo will certainly kill the poor farmer, who is forced to agree
to this confiscatory price just to be able to pay for the children’s schooling, have
food money for the family and buy the seeds for the next planting.
Can one-fathom cruelty as offensive as this? There are those who pretend to
“help” the farmers in need but the financial arrangement is such that in the
medium term, the poor farmer will be so much buried in obligations that he is
forced to give up his land as payment.
We have heard of those who are now landed “oligarchs” precisely by “helping”
farmers this way.
LGUs should start buying palay at P20 per kilo (average) to stop these greedy
traders.
Dar said LGUs, after all, are autonomous and mere resolution of their local
legislative bodies can authorize the LGU officials to borrow from LandBank and
buy palay from farmers at P15 to P17 per kilo (above production cost) and certainly
way above the “criminal” rate of P8 per kilo.
It is important the government acts with dispatch because the so-called Rice
Competitiveness Enhancement Fund (RCEF) of P10 billion will still be
implemented only in the 2020 budget of the DA.
The P10-billion funds to be distributed to the aggrieved farmers are without
interest for six years but their usage is limited to just seed distribution and
machinery. What about working capital?
After helping the farmers from the above, will be RTL benefit the rice-eating
populace of over 100 million Filipinos? Yes, but not yet perfectly now.
The government buying palay priced at P20 to P22 per kilo for now, therefore,
would be of big help. With retail price currently at P38 per kilo, there are enough
margins to be shared among the trader, retailer and even the government to pay
for LandBank’s interest.
The point is that government must have the correct moral posture-of placing its
heart nearest the interest of the poorest sectors of society, which include our
millions of rice-industry dependent Filipinos.