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Frege's Puzzles; Sense

vs. Reference

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 Teaching Assistants
 Brenden MURPHY
bjmurphy@connect.carleton.ca
office h: 12:00-1:00pm
Paterson 330A
 Mark TOVEY
mtovey@connect.carleton.ca
office h:

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 Identity

 It’s a relation (a = b), but:

1. between objects?

2. between signs (i.e. names of objects)?

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 If it’s a relation between objects then:

“a = b” doesn’t differ from “a = a”

We would say that an object is identical to itself.

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 If it’s a relation between signs then:

given that signs are arbitrary we would lose

contact with what the signs stand for (“the
subject matter”) and, again, “a = b” would not
differ from “a = a”.

It would amount of saying that the word “a” is

identical to the word “b”.

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 Cognitive Value

 “a = b” and “a = a” (e.g.: “Superman is

Superman” vs. “Superman is Clark Kent”) differ
in cognitive value.

 If “a = b” merely concerns the objects a and b,

its cognitive content would not differ from the
one of “a = a”.

All we would know is that an object is identical

with itself.
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 If “a = b” merely concerns the signs “a” and “b”,
its cognitive content would not differ from the
one of “a = a”.

All we would know is that signs “a” and “b” are

identical.

 It seems that identity is neither a relation

between objects, nor a relation between signs
(nouns/names).

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 Formulating Frege’s Problem

Terminology:

 n = a referring expression [e.g. “Tully”]

 r(n) = r is the referent of n [e.g. Tully(“Tully”)]

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 S = a sentence containing the singular term 
[e.g. “Tully smokes” is a sentence containing the
singular term “Tully”]

 S/ = a sentence obtained by replacing the

occurrences of  with occurrences of  [e.g.
“Jane smokes” can be obtained by replacing
occurrences of “Tully” with occurrence of “Jane”
in “Tully smokes”]

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 Substitution Principle (Begriffsschrift):

If S is about r(), then if r() = r(),

S and S/ have the same cognitive value.

[if “Tully smokes” is about the referent of “Tully”

then, if the referent of “Tully” = the referent of
“Cicero” , “Tully smokes” and “Cicero smokes”
have the same cognitive value]

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 2 Assumptions

1. Substitution principle

2. Identity relates objects

 These two assumptions generate the following

paradox:

“a = b” differs in cognitive value from “a = a”,

yet, according to the substitution principle they
do not differ.
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 Solution:

reject either (1) or (2),

i.e. either the substitution principle or the view

that identity relates objects.

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 Solution 1: Early Frege (Begriffsshrift 1879)

Rejection of assumption 2:

Identity is not a relation between objects (it’s a

relation between signs).

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 Solution 2: Later Frege

(“Über Sinn und Bedeutung “ / “Sense and

Reference” 1892)

The sense/reference solution.

Rejection of assumption 1, i.e. the substitution

principle.

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 Substitution of coreferential singular terms
preserves truth value but not cognitive value.

In substituting terms with the same sense

cognitive value is preserved .

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 Frege’s Puzzles

 Cognitive value

“Hesperus = Hesperus” is trivial and non-

informative, whereas “Hesperus = Phosphorus”
is informative.

So, the cognitive value of these sentences

ought to differ. Where does the difference come
in?

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 Frege’s solution

“Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” express two

distinct senses (Sinne),

I.e. the modes of presentations of the

referent (Bedeutung), i.e. Venus, associated
with both terms are different.

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 Proper Names

 A proper name expresses a sense and refers

to an object.

 The sense of a proper name, say “Tully”, is the

mode of presentation of the object, Tully, it
stands for. Intuitively, a sense is that property of
a linguistic expression in virtue of which it is
understood (grasped) by a competent speaker.

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 Sense and thought

The sense of a sentence (thought) is determined

by the senses of its constituents.

Different senses make different contributions to

a thought.

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 Sense vs. Reference

 Sense determines reference

r(n) = r(s)n))

[e.g. the referent of “Tully” is the referent of the

sense of “Tully”]

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 Reference is a function

Any two terms having the same sense refer to

the same object, i.e.

If s(n) = s(m), then r(n) = r(m)

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 Frege’s Semantics

 Three worlds

1. Language

2. World of senses/thoughts

3. Reality

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1. sign proper name predicate sentence

   

2. sense/thought sense sense thought

   

3. referent object concept Truth Value

 object falling

under the concept

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 A proper names is a linguistic expression
which:

(i) expresses a sense and

(ii) stands for/refers to/designates an object.

 An object is the ontological reflection of a name.

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 Sentences are compound proper names whose
referents are either the Truth or the False which
are objects.

 The Bedeutung of a sentence (the truth

value) is determined by the Bedeutung of its
constituents, just as the sense of a sentence
(the thought expressed) is determined by the
senses of its constituents.

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 Oratio Obliqua
 Oratio obliqua vs oratio recta; i.e indirect
discourse vs direct discourse; intensional
contexts vs extensional context

(1) Sue believes that Hesperus is a star

(2) Hesperus = Phosphorus
So: (3) Sue believes that Phosphorus is a star

 How to block this inference, i.e. the substitution

salva veritate of ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’?
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 Frege’s Solution

 (i) “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” express

different senses;

 (ii) Senses are the constituents of thoughts

(Gedanke),

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 (iii) an attitude ascription relates a subject with a
thought;

 So: (iv) (1) and (3) do not relate Sue with the
same thought and, therefore, may differ in truth
value.

 The moral is that the names “Hesperus” and

“Phosphorus” cannot be substituted salva
veritate in oratio obliqua constructions.

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 Ordinary Senses vs. Indirect
Senses

 The ordinary sense is what is referred to, via an

indirect sense, by embedded expressions.

 Since embedded expressions switch reference,

Frege gives up semantic innocence.

E.g.: “Hesperus” in (1) and “Phosphorus” in (3)

do not refer to Venus, but to their ordinary
sense, which differ.
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 (1) gets represented as:

(1a) BEL (Sue, <MP(Hesperus), MP(being a

star)>)

while (3) as:

(1b) BEL (Sue, < MP(Phosphorus), MP(being a

star)>)

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 MP(Hespeus) differs from MP(Phosphorus)

Thus as (1a) and (3a) show, (1) and (3) do not

relate Sue with the same thought.

Thus, they may well differ in truth value.

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 Moral:

Coreferring expressions / terms / names cannot

be substituted salva veitate in oblique / oratio
obliqua / intensional contexts.

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