CHALLENGER

DISASTER
- HOW BETTER PROJECT MANAGEMENT COULD HAVE SAVED IT

Final Project

GROUP 22:
• Madhavi Shrine
• Sriram Krishnamoorthy
• Jyothsna Dasari
• Abhishek Sharma
 Why Challenger?
01 - SCOPE

End is Beginning
02 Lorem

The Whole Story

03 Lorem

Learnings
04 Lorem

CONTENTS Conclusion
05 Lorem
WHY ‘CHALLENGER’ ?

1. Challenger is Science Project run by Everyone else;

Destined to doom.

2. Engineering and Managerial errors explained but

not from Project Management perspective

3. Reduced Unknown-Unknown
SCOPE

Our case study would be looking at the incident from the perspective of Risk Management
Plan followed by NASA. We intend to evaluate the Risk Management Program based on 4
parameters:
- Risk Identification,
- Risk Evaluation (Qualitative and Quantitative),
- Risk handling and
- Risk Control
And propose a better and strategical approach for Risk Management.
END IS THE BEGINNING

Video Link
THE WHOLE STORY
NASA’s Strategy

I Reusable Space Transportation System

II
Manned
Space
Station

III
Planetary Exploration to Mars
CONTEMPORARY SITUATIONS

Cold War:
Vietnam War: Civil Unrest and
Assassinations: Fight between US-
Impact on US
Political Instability USSR to win Space
Economy
war

Liking from President

Unstable Competition from
Nixon made Space
Management in European Space
Shuttle Program
NASA Agency
priority

Tainted Study results

showing low cost of
program with 60
Launches/yr.
NASA SUCCUMBS: CHANGES SHUTTLE DESIGN

• Accepted partially reusable design of Shuttle to save research money.

• Chose Solid rocket boosters (SRBs) over safer liquid-fueled boosters

• Enlisted support of US Air Force to increase its political clout and to guarantee a steady customer base
• Shuttle payload bay was required to meet Air Force size and shape requirements, which placed key constraints on the ultimate design.
• The weight reduction required the elimination of the design’s air breathing engines, resulting in a single-pass unpowered landing limiting
the safety and landing versatility of the vehicle.

• Selected Rockwell as the prime contractor for building Orbiter; proposal did not include an Escape System, to reduce weight and cost.
• Space Shuttle Program became the first U.S. manned spacecraft without a launch escape system for the crew.

• Awarded bidding to Thiokol for Solid Rocket Boosters because of its low cost, $100 million lower than the nearest competitor.
• - Some believed that other competitors, who ranked higher in technical design and safety,
RISK IDENTIFICATION
Risk Identification

Prior to first launch – hazards reduction process described in NASA Handbook

Risk assessment process was overseen by Senior safety review board

“Aggregation of risks has to remain acceptable”

Safety Risk Classification system

By 1985, 700 components classified as C1

 Risk Identification

Teleconferencing – primary method of communication with vendors

NASA’s Flight Readiness Review (FRR) meetings
•Determine overall status, as well as establish the baseline in terms of significant changes since the last mission.
•Review significant problems resolved since the last review, and significant anomalies from the previous flight.
•Review all open items and constraints remaining to be resolved before the mission.
•Present all new waivers since the last flight.

• Paperwork increases with number of flights

• Paperwork Vs timelines

• Thiokol requests NASA for waivers

• “Waivers were simply a way of saying that we believe that the risk is an
acceptable risk”

• Flying with acceptable risk became NASAs culture

• Weather conditions and its importance

• Paperwork and waivers : launch constraints had to be resolved or waived.

• Launch constraint gets waived for a number of flights
Risk Response

Strategy to be followed

Escalat
Avoid
e

Mitigat
Accept
e

Transfe
r
Risk Response

Representative's from NASA and

Thiokol sitting in different locations

Better communication between

engineers and their supervisors

People needed to be held accountable for

their decisions and responsibility

Proper checks and balances to people in

authority
Risk Control

Documentation and its importance in decision making

Too less or too much ???

Jeopardize
Safety
norms

Faulty decision
making
 Risk control failures

Factors leading to disaster:

Poor
Launch Mechanical Faulty
Decision
conditions failures communication
making

Succumbing to political pressure No open communication culture

Non adherence to Safety norms Risk assessment issues
Technical compromises • Aggregating the risks
Insufficient testing • Inappropriate assessment
Inappropriate waivers & classification of risk
Safety personnel’s exclusion from discussions • Qualitative instead of quantitative
Creating undue pressure to go ahead

NASA Thiokol
•Risk Identification (Jyothsna)
• 
•1. Does there appear to have been a structured process in place for risk identification at either NASA or Thiokol?
•2a. How should one identify or classify trade-off risks such as trading off safety for political acceptability?
•2b. What level of risk should have been acceptable for launch?
• 
•Risk Quantification (Abhishek)
•3a. Given the complexity of the Space Shuttle Program, is it feasible and/or practical to develop a methodology for quantifying ri
sks, or should each situation be addressed individually? Can we have both a quantitative and qualitative risk evaluation system in
place at the same time?
•3b. How were the identified risks quantified at NASA? Is the quantification system truly quantitative or is it a qualitative system
?
• 
•Risk Response (Risk Handling) (Sriram)
•4a. What should be the determining factors in deciding which risks are brought upstairs to the executive levels for review before
selecting the appropriate risk response mechanism?
•4b. Did the engineers at Thiokol and NASA do all they could to convince their own management that the wrong risk response me
chanism was about to be taken?
•4c. How could the chains of communication and responsibility for the Space Shuttle Program have been made to function better?
• 
• 
•Risk Control: (Madhavi)
•5. How much documentation should be necessary for the tracking of a risk management plan? Can this documentation become o
ver excessive and create decision-making problems?
•6. If you were on a jury attempting to place liability, whom would you say was responsible for the Challenger disaster?
THANK
YOU