CHALLENGER

DISASTER
 News:
Colombia Disaster – Kalpana Chawla, an American
Indian, a victim

Our reactions:
Shock, Pity, Outrage
Responsibility?
Rewind…17 years
back…
 Date : January 28, 1986
Place : Kennedy Place Centre,
Florida, U.S.
  Preparations on for NASA’s launch
of 25th space shuttle into space
 SRM contractor- Morton Thiokol
 Crew members:
 Francis R. Scobee, Michael J.
Smith, Ronald E. McNair, Ellison
S. Onizuka, Judith A. Resnik,
Gregory B. Jarvis

 Unique mission: TISP program –

Sharon McAuliffe – first teacher to
be in space
 Long awaited launch – already
delayed five times due to bad
weather & technical snags
Time : 11.38 AM EST
White arrow points to the
small glow that can be
seen between Challenger
and the Solid Rocket
Boosters.
73.162 seconds
later…
Sending shock waves
everywhere…
The dream becomes debris…
 What went wrong?
– Strong puffs of dark grey smoke - emitted
from the right-hand SRB.
– The booster's casing ballooned under
stress of ignition-opening a gap through
which hot gases above 5,000 °F leaked
out.
– The primary O-ring too cold to seal in
time. The secondary O-ring was not in its
seated position due to the metal bending.
– No barrier to the gases, both O-rings were
vapourized across 70 degrees of arc.
– As the vehicle approached Max Q, the
period of maximum aerodynamic pressure
on the vehicle, it slammed through the Camera captures grey smoke
escaping from the right-hand
most intense wind shear ever experienced SRB
to date in the space shuttle program.
 What went wrong?

• O-ring seal in its right solid rocket booster (SRB) failed

• Seal failure caused a flame leak from the solid rocket booster, which
impinged upon the adjacent external fuel tank
• The flame caused structural failure of the external tank, and
aerodynamic forces promptly broke up the orbiter
• Failure of O-ring
– Faulty design of solid rocket booster
– Insufficient low temperature testing of O-ring material and joints
 VEHICLE BREAKUP
• The breakup of the vehicle began at an altitude of
48,000 feet.
• Challenger veered from its correct attitude and was
immediately torn apart by abnormal aerodynamic
forces .
• The robustly-constructed crew cabin detached in one
piece and. Within ten seconds the cabin was
undergoing free fall.
• The crew cabin impacted the ocean surface at roughly
334 km/h, far beyond the structural limits of the crew
compartment or crew survivability levels.
 What REALLY went wrong?
Engineers Managers

• Warned of dangers of
• Ignored warnings,failed to report
launching a cold day
technical concerns to their
superiors
• Robert Ebeling and Roger
Boisjoly, engineers
• Thiokol knew about the problem
working on SRM project at since 1977; Almost half of the
Thiokol, complained to shuttle flights had experienced O-
Alan McDonald and ring erosion in the booster field
Thiokol management joints. But management did not
about cold weather support the redesign task force
problems with solid rocket
motors
 What REALLY went wrong?
A teleconference - to discuss the low temperature performance of the
boosters - held between engineers and management from Kennedy Space
Center, Marshall Space Flight Center and Morton-Thiokol
• Engineers : If O-rings were colder • Marshall's SRB Project Manager, Larry
than 53°F, there was no guarantee Mulloy: Data was inconclusive and
the O-rings would seal properly challenged the engineers
and temperature forecasts for the
• Managers believed O-rings could be eroded
launch day was 31°F.
up to one third of their diameter and still
seat properly, regardless of the
• Alan McDonald appealed to NASA temperature
management not to launch
• Engineers refused to sign the
recommendation • Recommendation stated that the cold was
still a safety concern, but data inconclusive
 What REALLY went wrong?
Jerald Mason, senior executive at Thiokol said,
“Take off your engineering hat and put on your management hat."
Management was
• Anxious to launch for economic considerations, political
pressures, and scheduling backlogs.
Economic Reasons
• Had to fly the shuttle soon to prove the Space Transportation
System's cost effectiveness and potential for commercialization.
Scheduling Backlogs
• Launch pad had to be refurbished in time for next mission, for a
probe that would examine Halley's Comet, before Russia did so.
Political Consideration
• President Reagan, in his State of the Union address, was going to
talk on education and was expected to mention the shuttle and the
first teacher in space, Christa McAuliffe
What REALLY went wrong?
Unconcern for safety procedures
• Due to the low temperature, a significant amount
of ice built up on the fixed service structure that
stood beside the shuttle.
• Ice might be shaken loose and strike the shuttle.
• Launch postponed by an hour to give the ice
team the time to remove ice.
• Launch escape system -undesirable due to
"limited utility, technical complexity and
excessive cost in dollars, weight or schedule
delays.” – Crew lives could have been saved had
ejector seat and full pressure suits been used.
 What was done? – Rogers
Commission
Included Neil Armstrong and • Found : NASA's organizational culture
Chairman of State, William Rogers and flawed decision-making processes,
a key contributing factor to the accident.
• NASA managers did not know of
Thiokol's initial concerns about the
effects of the cold on the O-rings, and
did not understand that Rockwell viewed
the large amount of ice present on the
pad as a constraint to launch.
• It concluded that: “...failures in
communication... based on incomplete
It said, Challenger disaster and sometimes misleading information,
was "an accident rooted in a conflict between engineering data and
history.” management judgments.”
 Impacts…
• Thiokol agreed to "voluntarily accept" the monetary penalty in exchange
for not being forced to accept liability
• NASA
– Created a new Office of Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance.
– Initiated a total redesign of the space shuttle's solid rocket boosters.
– Streamlined and cleansed communication line
– Designed anonymous reporting system
– Made astronauts more active in decision making process
– Appointed a shuttle astronaut as NASA administrator

• But Columbia Accident still happened!

• Columbia Accident Investigation Board: NASA failed to learn many of
the lessons of Challenger - had not set up a truly independent office for
safety oversight & the same "flawed decision making process" that had
resulted in the Challenger accident was responsible for Columbia's
destruction.
 So what is in it for you?
Lessons for Engineers
• Engineers at managerial position should not ignore their own
engineering experience, or the expertise of their subordinate
engineers
• Managers, even if with engineering experience, should remember that
they may not be up to date on current engineering practices as are
the actual practicing engineers.
• If there is insufficient data, engineers should discourage launching
until all the facts were known about the problem.
• Engineers should remember their implicit social contract with society
• Engineers should protect the safety and well-being of public in all
their professional efforts. This is part of the implicit social contract all
engineers have agreed to when they accepted admission to an
engineering college.