NERC

System Protection and Control

Task Force
Presented to the Edison Electric
Institute
Minneapolis, MN
October 11, 2004
Outline
● Distance Relay Applications
● Zone 3 – Remote Backup
● Other Remote Backup Methods
● Blackout Recommendations
● SPCTF Clarification of Ratings
● SPCTF Recommendations to NERC PC
● SPCTF Exception Criteria
● Some Possible Mitigation Methods
● SPCTF Future Activities
● Q&A
2
Distance Relay Applications
● Most common method of protecting for transmission line faults
● Calculates distance (impedance) by measuring voltage,
current, and the relationship between them at the relay
location
● Can be used with variety of communications systems for
instantaneous protection of entire line
● Zone 1 (underreaching, no time delay)
● Zone 2 (slightly overreaching, minimal time delay
● Zone 3 (significant overreaching, longer time delay) to provide
remote backup protection for failure of other protection
systems
● Load carrying capability (relay loadability) is inversely
proportional to distance relay chord length at respective angle

3
Distance Relay Applications
Sample Distance Relay Characteristic (Zone 2)

X
Z RELAY

1.25 Z LINE

Z LINE

Z RELAY 30
0
30

MTA R
LINE
4
Zone 3 – Remote Backup Applications

● A Method of Providing Remote Backup

Extended
Zone 2
Time Zone 3

Normal Zone 2
Zone 2
Time Zone 2

Zone 1 Zone 1

Long Line Short Line Next Line

5
Other Remote Backup Methods
● Direct Transfer Trip
 Allow relays to be set shorter
 Uses communications systems for remote
backup
● Alternative Relay Characteristics
 Blinder Characteristics
 Lenticular Characteristics
 Proprietary Load-Tolerant Characteristics (ex.
– Schweitzer Electric Labs Load
Encroachment Characteristic)
6
Remote Backup – Direct Transfer Trip
● Requires additional communication
equipment
● Must Be Redundant – Communication
equipment more prone to fail than
relaying, breakers, or other equipment
● Requires correct operation of protective
relays on primary protected element
● Can not back up for failure of DC battery
systems, or for failure of instrument
transformers
7
Remote Backup –Blinder Characteristics

● Typically applied to older

jX
electromechanical relays MTA

● Separate, supervising
element
● Allows full relay reach for
fault angles 300 LOAD ANGLE

● Provides reasonable arc-

resistance coverage
● Can be customized to R

permit required load flow

B B
● Not a good option for 1 2

retrofit
8
Remote Backup – Lenticular Characteristics

● Available on solid-state and

some modern
jX
microprocessor relays MTA
● Incorporated into relay
design
● Allows full relay reach for
fault angles
● Provides limited arc- 300 LOAD ANGLE
resistance coverage
● Can be customized to
permit required load flow
R
● Can be a good option for
retrofit if available on
preferred relay
9
Remote Backup – SEL Load Encroachment
● Example of proprietary load-
tolerant characteristics jX MTA
● Can be found only on most
modern microprocessor relays
● Incorporated into relay design
● Allows full relay reach for fault
angles Load-Encroachment

● Provides good arc-resistance 300 LOAD ANGLE

coverage
● Can be customized to permit
required load flow R
● Most modern microprocessor
relays have some form of load-
tolerant characteristic, so
proprietary characteristics are
a good retrofit option
10
Blackout Recommendations
● NERC Recommendation 8a
 Approved by NERC Board of Trustees on
February 10, 2004

● US – Canada Power System Outage Task

Force Recommendation 21a (Joint Task
Force Recommendation 21a)

 Final Report Published on April 4, 2004

11
 NERC Recommendation 8a
● All transmission owners shall, no later than September 30, 2004,
evaluate the zone 3 relay settings on all transmission lines
operating at 230 kV and above for the purpose of verifying that
each zone 3 relay is not set to trip on load under extreme
emergency conditions. In each case that a zone 3 relay is set so as
to trip on load under extreme conditions, the transmission operator
shall reset, upgrade, replace, or otherwise mitigate the overreach of
those relays as soon as possible and on a priority basis, but no
later than December 31, 2005. Upon completing analysis of its
application of zone 3 relays, each transmission owner may no later
than December 31, 2004 submit justification to NERC for applying
zone 3 relays outside of these recommended parameters. The
Planning Committee shall review such exceptions to ensure they
do not increase the risk of widening a cascading failure of the
power system.
 The NERC investigation team recommends that the zone 3 relay, if
used, should not operate at or below 150% of the emergency ampere
rating of a line, assuming a .85 per unit voltage and a line phase angle
of 30 degrees.
12
Joint Task Force Recommendation 21a
NERC
● Industry is to review zone 3 relays on lines
of 230 kV and higher.

Joint Task Force

● Recommends that NERC broaden the
review to include operationally significant
115 kV and 138 kV lines, e.g., lines that
are part of monitored flowgates or
interfaces. Transmission owners should
also look for zone 2 relays set to operate
13
like zone 3s.
SPCTF Clarification on Ratings
● NERC Recommendation 8a footnote
states “…emergency ampere rating…”
● NERC PC Minutes – March 24 suggests
“…long time summer emergency
ampere rating…”
● SPCTF Clarification (June 18) – “Highest
seasonal ampere circuit rating …” that
“… most closely approximates a 4-hour
rating…” considering the “…lowest
ampere rated device in the line…”
14
SPCTF Recommendations
Approved by NERC PC – July 15, 2004
● TPSO – transmission protection system owner
● Current process to address only zone-3 relays
● Zone-3 relays defined as remote backup relays
(IEEE C37.113 clause 5.3.7.1)
● Inject regions into zone-3 process – build on
their natural relationships with the TPSO's
● TPSOs to respond to regions by dates
established in NERC recommendation 8a
15
Implementation Timeline for NERC Recommendation 8a
Activities

12/31/2004 12/31/2005
TPSOs Submit to Regions: TPSOs Submit to Regions:
- Certification of conformance to loadability - Certification of full conformance
- Violation mitigation (before 12/31/05) plans - Implementation dates for outstanding violations
- Applications for exceptions
9/30/2004
TPSOs report to Regions
on Zone 3 reviews

9/30/2004 -
2/10/2004 - 9/30/2004 12/31/2004 1/1/2005 - 12/31/2005
TPSOs review Zone 3 relays TPSOs mitigate TPSOs mitigate
for conformance violations violations

2/10/2004 Today 10/31/2004 1/31/2005 2/1/2006

NERC Rec. 8A Regions Report Regions report Regions report
Issued by Board TPSO completion TPSO responses TPSO responses
of 9/30 review of 12/31/04 of 12/31/05
to SPCTF to SPCTF to SPCTF

16
SPCTF Recommendations (Continued)
● Regions to assure that all TPSOs have responded
and respond to NERC 1 month later
● Establish Two Classes of Exception – Temporary
and Technical
● Temporary Exceptions to Request Delayed
Schedule for Workforce or Construction Clearance
Issues
● Technical Exceptions to Address Conditions Where
Thermal Limits Are Not the Practical Limiting
Condition
● SPCTF Developing Technical Exception Criteria
● SPCTF to Review All Exception Requests and
17
Report to PC
SPCTF Recommendations (Continued)
● Denied Requests Must Be Mitigated in 1 Year
● All Other Load-responsive Relays to Be Reviewed
and Addressed on a Schedule to Be Developed by
SPCTF
● Exceptions to Be Reviewed by Regions
● Regions to Identify Critical Lines 115kv and Above
for Inclusion in Review (Joint TF Recommendation
21a)

18
SPCTF Exception Criteria
● Temporary exceptions
● Technical exceptions
 Realistic circuit ratings
 Achieve minimum acceptable protection
 Network topology
● Transmission system must be adequately protected,
and distance relaying must also allow for maximum
practical load flow
● Distance relaying must not contribute to cascading
outages
19
Temporary Exceptions
● Permit delayed implementation because of
workforce issues, construction outage constraints,
or availability of replacement equipment
● Not intended to provide for budget relief
● TPSOs must do all possible to mitigate with existing
equipment

20
Ratings and Technical Exceptions

● NERC Recommendation 8a refers to

circuit thermal ratings
● SPCTF Clarified to highest seasonal 4-
hour rating of most limiting circuit element
● Thermal ratings may not represent
practical circuit capabilities
● Technical Exceptions attempt to address
the other practical circuit capabilities
21
Technical Exceptions
Twelve Individual Technical Exception Criteria
● Establishes lower margins for shorter-term circuit
ratings (1)
● Address other system rating limitations that
present more realistic actual system criteria (6)
● Establish ratings based on minimally-adequate
protection (2)
● Natural system limitations due to topology (4)

22
Technical Exception #1

Utilize 15-Minute Rating of Transmission Line

 “The tripping relay should not operate at or below 115% of the
15-minute winter emergency rating assuming a 0.85 per unit
voltage and a line phase angle of 30 degrees.”
● Original blackout recommendations were developed to
permit operator response time
 With longer-term ratings, equipment will take longer to load-up
thermally
 With a 15-minute rating, system is rated “closer to the edge”
 NERC investigation team advises that 15% of the original margin
is for tolerances, and 35% is to allow longer response time

23
Technical Exceptions #2, 3, and 4
The protective relays need to accommodate
the power transfer capability of a
transmission line
2. Line only
 Recertify when line is changed
3. Line and breaker interrupter rating
 Recertify when breaker is underrated or
changed
4. Line and actual source impedance
 Recertify annually
24
Maximum Power Transfer Diagram

Sending Receiving
XS = 0 XL XR = 0

VS VR ER = 1.0 PU
R
ES = 1.0 PU

VS  VR  sin 
P
XL
The maximum real power that a transmission
line can transfer occurs when the voltage
angle across the line reaches 90º.
25
Maximum Power Transfer Capability

26
Technical Exception #2, 3 and 4
● Exception 2
 Uses the line reactance only
 1.0 per-unit source voltage at both ends
 No additional margin

● Exception 3
 Uses the line reactance, plus source reactance at each end
reflecting the breaker interrupting ratings
 1.05 per-unit source voltage at both ends
 No additional margin

● Exception 4
 Uses the line reactance, plus actual system source reactances at
both ends
 1.05 per-unit source voltage at both ends
 No additional margin
27
Technical Exception #5
Special Considerations for Series-
Compensated Lines
Tripping relay should not operate at or
below the greater of:
1. 1.15 times the highest emergency rating
of the series capacitor
2. Itotal (calculated under Exception 2, 3, or
4 using full line inductive reactance)
Assuming
0.85 per unit voltage
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line phase angle of 30º
Technical Exception #6
Weak Source Systems
● The tripping relay should not operate at or below
1.414 times 1.15 times Ifault assuming a 0.85 per
unit voltage and a line phase angle of 30
degrees where Ifault is the maximum end of line
three-phase fault current magnitude
FAULT
OPEN
TRANSMISSION SYSTEM

LOAD CENTER
R

29
Technical Exceptions #7 and 8
● Distance relays must be
able to adequately
protect line
X
● Exception 7 applies to Z RELAY
simple 2-terminal lines
1.25 Z APPARENT
● Exception 8 applies to 3
(or more) terminal lines Z APPARENT

● Establishes an
emergency rating based
on relay loadability
● Must be recognized by 30 0
Z RELAY 30

reliability coordinator
MTA R
● RC must take action
APPARENT
when load reaches this
30
rating
Technical Exception #7 and #8
Requires That All of Following Conditions Are Met:
● Most Sensitive Tripping Element Set for  125% of
Apparent Impedance
● MTA Set As Close as Possible to 90 degrees
● Calculate a Short-Term Rating Iemergency Based on
Relay Setting
● Iemergency Used in All Planning and Operational
Modeling for the STE Rating
● No current or Subsequent Planning Contingency
Analyses Identify Conditions where Recoverable
Flow is > Iemergency
Otherwise, must fully mitigate the conditions
31
Technical Exception #9
Generation Remote to Load
For one line connecting the aggregate generation to the
system:
● The tripping relay should not operate for 1.15 times the
Imax assuming a 0.85 per unit voltage and a line phase
angle of 30 degrees
For multiple lines connecting the aggregate generation to
the system:
● The tripping relay should not operate for 1.15 times Imax
assuming a 0.85 per unit voltage and a line phase angle
of 30 degrees if all the other lines that connect the
generator to the system are out of service
● Imax is defined as: MVA
I max  max

32 3  Vrelay
Exception 9 – Generator Connected by Single Line

LOAD BUS

GENERATION BUS

33
 Exception 9 – Generator Connected via Multiple Lines

GENERATION CENTER
LOAD BUS A

LOAD CENTER
R
LOAD BUS B
OPEN

R
LOAD BUS C
OPEN

34
Technical Exception #10
Load Remote to Generation
The tripping relay should not operate for 1.15 times the
maximum current flow as calculated by the TPSO
assuming a 0.85 per unit voltage and a line phase
angle of 30 degrees.

GENERATION CENTER
LOAD BUS A

LOAD CENTER
R
LOAD BUS B

R
LOAD BUS C

R
35
Technical Exception #11
Remote Cohesive Load Center
The tripping relay should not operate for 1.15 times the
maximum current flow as calculated by the
transmission owner assuming a 0.85 per unit voltage
and a line phase angle of 30 degrees.
TRANSMISSION SYSTEM

LOAD CENTER
R

R
36
Technical Exception #12
Cohesive Load Center Remote to Transmission
System
The Tripping relay should not operate for 1.15 times the
maximum current flow as calculated by the TPSO
assuming a 0.85 per unit voltage and a line phase angle
of 30 degrees.
TRANSMISSION SYSTEM

LOAD CENTER
R

R
37
Some Possible Mitigation Methods
● Must adequately protect system
● Increase distance relay maximum torque
angle
● Utilize load-tolerant relay characteristics
(blinders, lens characteristics, SEL load
encroachment, etc)
● Utilize transfer trip for remote backup
● Transmission system modifications to
facilitate protection
● Others?
38
SPCTF – Next Distance Relay Activities

● All other load responsive relays (230 kV and

above, and lower voltage level critical facilities)
must also not limit practical loading capability
● Includes Zone 2 relays, pilot-scheme relays, and
overcurrent relays
 DCB Carrier Schemes can improperly operate on
through load if lines are consuming significant real
and reactive power
● Will have a different schedule for analysis,
reporting, and mitigation
● Must adequately protect electrical system
39
SPCTF Contacts
For detailed questions or suggestions, please contact
● Bob Cummings – NERC Staff
 Bob.Cummings@nerc.net
 609-452-8060
● Charles Rogers – SPCTF Chairman
 cwrogers@cmsenergy.com
 517-788-0027
● Mark Carpenter – SPCTF Vice Chairman
 mcarpen1@txued.com
 817-215-6868
● We Need everyone’s help for us to do the best possible
job!

40
Questions?
● Charles Rogers (Consumers Energy) – Chairman,
SPCTF
● Bob Cummings (NERC) – Director – Reliability
Assessments and Support Services

41