Introduction
AVIATION
SECURITY
Security and Safety
is First Priority
Annex 17. ICAO
Doc 8973/6 - Restricted
Chapter 3. NATIONAL AVIATION SECURITY PROGRAMME
Responsibilities
3.3.10 Aircraft Operators have a responsibility to the travelling public for the security of their
operations. This normally includes the protection of aircraft and the security of areas where
baggage, cargo and mail are handle or stored. The operators must also comply with such
security regulations as The State may promulgate.
TRAINING OBJECTIVES
Extracted from GSP, Chapt. IX A.1.
IN GENERAL :
PROMOTE SECURITY AWARENESS AND VIGILANCE.
IN PARTICULAR:
ENSURE ADEQUATE KNOWLEDGE AND
RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPOND TO ACTS OF
UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE.
THREAT
THREATVS
VSMEASURES
MEASURES
THREATS AGAINST AIRLINE AIRLINE SECURITY
• PROPERTY CRIME
• Theft.
• Pilferage. • Physical Security
• REVENUE CRIME
• Ticket Fraudulent. • Investigation Security
• Falsifying Doc.
• HIJACKING, BOMBING, • Aviation Security
• SABOTAGE/TERROR.
• DISRUPTIVE/UNRULY PAX. • Airline/Airport/State Policy/MOU
• Drunken.
• Fight amongst pax. • All Management/User/Staff
• Sexual Harassment.
• Smoking Banned,etc.
• DRUG SMUGLING
• INADMISSIBLE Others :
• Specific Security
• INTERNAL PROBLEMS
• No Sense of Security. Vetting Personal.
• No Challenging. VVIP Flight Security
• Collusion.
Fraud Doc. Security
Computer Security
Terrorist Act
Histories :
• September,11. 2001 “Terrorist attack WTC-USA”
• October,12. 2002 “Bombing Attack Kuta-Bali and
Philippine Embassy-Manado”
• Mc.Donald Bombing- UPG
• Terrorist are opportunistic
BLACK SEPTEMBER TRAGEDY
Two hijacked airliners slammed
into the twin towers of the World
Trade Centre early on Tuesday
September 11, 2001.
ICAO, AMENDMENT 1Oth to ANNEX 17.
effective on 15 April 2002, applicable on 1 July 2002
• Applicability of Annex 17 provisions to domestic flights
• International cooperation relating to threat information
• National Quality Control
• Appropriate Authority
• National Aviation Security Committee
• Access Control, Passengers & their cabin and hold baggage, in-
flight security personnel
• Locking of cockpit doors and other procedures aimed at preventing
flight deck intrusion (protection of the cockpit)
• Code-sharing/collaborative arrangements
• Human factors and management of response to act of unlawful
interference
• Appropriate security controls, including background checks on
persons other than passengers
• Security of passports and the standardization of airline and airport
personnel identity document
REFERENCES
International Regulation
• ICAO, AMENDMENT 1Oth to ANNEX 17.
• ICAO, Doc.8973
• IATA, SECURITY MANUAL
• IOSA (IATA OPERATION SAFETY AUDIT)
National Regulation
• UU NO. 15/ 1992 ( PENERBANGAN )
• UU No.4 Thn.1976 ( Perubahan & Penambahan Beberapa Pasal Dlm. KUHP bertalian Dgn.
Perluasan Berlakunya Ketentuan Per UU Pidana, Kejahatan Penerbangan dan Kejahatan Terhadap
Sarana/Prasarana Penerbangan)
• PP NO. 3/2001 ( AVIATION SECURITY & SAFETY)
• KM NO.54/ 2004 ( PROGRAM NASIONAL PENGAMANAN PENERBANGAN SIPIL)
• KM. 14/1989 (PENERTIBAN PAX, BRG, & KARGO, YG DIANGKUT PSWT UDARA SIPIL)
• SKEP NO. 40/II/1995 (JUKNIS KM.14/1989)
• SKEP DIRJENHUBUD NO. SKEP/ 100/ VII / 2003 (PETUNJUK TEKNIS PENANGANAN
PENUMPANG PESAWAT UDARA SIPIL YG MEMBAWA SENJATA API BESERTA PELURU
& TATACARA PENGAMANAN PENGAWALAN TAHANAN DALAM PENERBANGAN SIPIL)
• INSTRUKSI NO : INST/01/II/96 (PEMAKAIAN BAGGAGE STRAPPING PD BRG BAWAAN
PAX)
DOC 8973/6 - RESTRICTED
Chapter 3. NATIONAL AVIATION SECURITY PROGRAMME
Responsibilities
3.3.10 OPERATORS HAVE A RESPONSIBILITY TO THE
TRAVELLING PUBLIC FOR THE SECURITY OF THEIR
OPERATIONS. THIS NORMALLY INCLUDES THE
PROTECTION OF THE AIRCRAFT AND THE SECURITY
OF AREAS WHERE BAGGAGE, CARGO AND MAIL ARE
HANDLE OR STORED.THE OPERATORS MUST ALSO
COMPLY WITH SUCH SECURITY REGULATIONS AS THE
STATE MAY PROMULGATE.
SECURITY
ICAO, DOC. 8973
“Security is not so much a law enforcement
problem, but one of awareness of security by
the management and staff of all organizations
involved in day to day operations”
HIRARKI PROSEDUR PENGAMANAN YANG
DITERAPKAN OLEH AIRLINES
ICAO, amendment 10th to Annex
17
ICAO Doc 8973
National Aviation Security Program
Airport Security Program Airline Security Program
Safe Guarding International Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful
Interference
• Hijack
•Bomb Threat
•Sabotage/terror lain
STANDARD ORGANISASI KEAMANAN NASIONAL &
INTERNASIONAL UNTUK MELINDUNGI PENERBANGAN
SIPIL DARI TINDAK GANGGUAN MELAWAN HUKUM
ICAO Based on Annex 17 & Doc 8973
STATE LEVEL
(NATIONAL AVIATION SECURITY COMMITTEE)
AIRPORT LEVEL AIRLINE LEVEL
(AIRPORT SECURITY (AIRLINE SECURITY
COMMITTEE) COMMITTEE)
Memonitor dan mengontrol implementasi prosedur aviation
Security yang dijalankan oleh masing institusi dengan satu goal yang sama
Yaitu terciptanya penerbangan yang aman dan selamat.
TANGGUNGJAWAB STATE, AIRPORT DAN AIRLINE
DALAM KEAMANAN PENERBANGAN
State • Membuat peraturan (program)security
• Memberikan training isi program tersebut
kepada institusi yang berada
Airport dibawahnya/staff
• Melakukan Survey, Inspeksi dan
Audit atas implementasi prosedur.
Airline
In flight Security Coordinator (Pilot in Command)
Ground Security Coordinator (Station Manager)
SECURITY &
SAFETY “Differences”
Peraturan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia No 3 Tahun 2001
Tentang
Keamanan dan Keselamatan Penerbangan
Bab 1. Ketentuan Umum
Pasal 1
Dalam Peraturan Pemerintah ini yang dimaksud dengan :
1. Keamanan dan Keselamatan Penerbangan adalah suatu kondisi untuk
mewujudkan penerbangan dilaksanakan secara aman dan selamat sesuai dengan
rencana penerbangan.
2. Keamanan penerbangan adalah keadaan yang terwujud dari penyelenggaraan
penerbangan yang bebas dari gangguan dan/atau tindakan yang melawan
hukum.
3. Keselamatan penerbangan adalah keadaan yang terwujud dari penyelenggaraan
penerbangan yang lancar sesuai dengan prosedur operasi dan persyaratan
kelaikan teknis terhadap sarana dan prasarana penerbangan beserta
penunjangnya.
SECURITY SAFETY
divine line is blur
• The lost TWA 800 was caused by a defect in the aircraft,
namely, insulation in the wiring loom.
• Valuejet was lost through incorrect carriage of dangerous goods.
• Pan Am 103 was the only one of the three that was a security
incident, the cause being a terrorist bomb introduced into the
aircraft by exploiting a weakness in the handling of interline
baggage.
The final effects were same, all acft. being lost. And what’s the difference ?
ANNEX 13 - AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
INVESTIGATION
• CHAPTER 5. INVESTIGATION
ORGANIZATION AND CONDUCT OF THE
INVESTIGATION
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE CONDUCTING THE
INVESTIGATION
5.11 If, in the course of an investigation it becomes known,
or it is suspected, that an act of unlawful interference
was involved, the investigator-in-charge shall
immediately initiate action to ensure that the AVIATION
SECURITY authorities of the state(s) concerned
are so informed.
AVIATION SECURITY
Defined by ICAO, Annex 17
Paduan upaya manusia dan
sarana/prasarana pendukung untuk
melindungi penerbangan sipil
internasional dari Act of Unlawful
Interference (Sabotase, Pemboman, Pembajakan,
Teror).
Acts of unlawful interference,
an act of :
Violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight if
that act is likely to endanger the safety of the aircraft.
Destroying an acft.In serving or causing damage to such an
acft.Which renders it incapable of flight or which is likely to endanger
its safety in flight.
Placing or causing to be placed on an acft. In service, by any means
whatever, a device or substance which is likely to destroy that
acft.Or causing damage to it which renders it in capable of flight, or
causing damage to it which is likely to endanger its safety in-flight.
HOW TO HANDLING
ACT OF UNLAWFUL
INTERFERENCE
Airline Security Vulnerabilities
Hal yang harus dicegah masuk ke Aircraft
Ground Staff
Air Crew Catering, Cleaning &
I. MASUKNYA ALAT Porter Service
PENGANCAMCatering.
KEDALAM KABIN
(dibawa pax atau
Pax. & Carry on Bagg
dgn cara lain) Garuda Indonesia
Checked Baggage
II. MASUKNYA BOM
KEDALAM PESAWAT, Boarding Gate
MELALUI BAGASI
ATAU DGN CARA
LAIN Cargo & Mail
Refueling
Remembrances :
Th. 1981 : JKT-PLM-MES (WOYLA)
Th. 1994 : BTH-SGN (Refugee Vietnam)
Th. 2002 : SIN-CGK (Disruptive/Unruly Pax.)
AVIATION SECURITY
THE CARACTERS
• PREVENTION/PROTECTION & FOR DEALING
THE EMERGENCY SITUATION;
• IMPLEMENTED SECURITY AWARENESS TO ALL STAFF;
• PERFORMED BY ALL EMPLOYEE;
• PERFORMED THE PROCEDURES CONSTANCY;
• SINERGIES BETWEEN AVSEC STATE/AIRPORT/AIRLINE
ANCAMAN BOM • POLITIK
• KRIMINAL
Bom di check/cabin Baggage/cargo/tempat lain • PRIBADI
(jelas,tersamar,tdk dpt terdeteksi, unwitting accomplice/titipan)
• SAKIT JIWA
ON GROUND :
INFO : ADA BOM DI PESAWAT AIRPORT SECURITY :
• ISI BOMB THREAT CALL • STERILE AREA
CHECKLIST? • SCREENING PAX & BAGGAGE, CARGO,
• INFO KK DAN INSPECTOR CATERING, CLEANERS, DLL
AVSEC? • PAX.PROFILLING
• MENDARAT • ISI BOMB WARNING • PAX. BAG.RECONCILIATION
ASSESSMENT?
• PARKIR
• TINDAKLANJUT, DLL PRE FLIGHT SECURITY CHECK :
• PROSEDUR
EVAKUASI DAN INFLIGHT : • PENGECEKAN PETUGAS STATION
PEMERIKSAAN A/C
ADA BOM DI PESAWAT • PENGECEKAN PETUGAS TEKHNIK A/C
• TINDAK LANJUT
• CARI ? • PENGECEKAN COCKPIT CREW
• MENDARAT?
• PENGAMATAN CABIN CREW
• DITEMUKAN ?
• PENGAMANAN ?
BOMB THREAT
BOMB THREAT :
Motif
• Hanya main-main
• Hanya menakut-nakuti
• Upaya melambatkan keberangkatan
• Pelampiasan jengkel, dendam, sakit jiwa
• Memeras, menuntut, memaksa kehendak
PENILAIAN & PENANGANAN ANCAMAN BOM
PENERIMA ANCAMAN VIA
TELPON HRS MENGISI Supervisor
report
/MELENGKAPI BOMB THREAT on duty
CALL CHECKLIST
USED:
AIRLINE/AIRPORT SPECIFIC
STATION MANAGER
EMERGENCY MENGANALISA ANCAMAN DGN & ADVISE BY
PLAN BOMB WARNING ASSESSMENT INSPECTOR AVSEC
TDK PERLU
NO SPECIFIC
TINDAKLANJUT
BOMBING
ANNEX 13 - AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
BOMBING : INVESTIGATION
• TIDAK ADA PEMBERITAHUAN CHAPTER 5. INVESTIGATION
ORGANIZATION AND CONDUCT OF THE
INVESTIGATION
MELEDAK RESPONSIBILITY OF THE STATE
CONDUCTING THE
INVESTIGATION
5.11 If, in the course of an investigation it
•
INVESTIGATION ? Seyogyanya Tim
becomes known, or it is suspected, that an act of
unlawful interference was involved, the
investigator-in-charge shall immediately
terdiri dari (BY POLRI, DEP.HUBUD, initiate action to ensure that the AVIATION
AIRLINE, DLL atau NATIONAL SECURITY
COMMITTEE)
SECURITY authorities of the state(s) concerned
are so informed.
UNRULY/DISRUPTIVE
TYPES OF INCIDENT
• Endangering the safety of an aircraft • Fight among passengers
• Drunkenness • Sexual Harassment
• Illegal consumption of drugs • Sexual activity
• Refusal to stop consuming alcohol • Passengers refusal to leave the aircraft
• Refusal to stop to using electronic • Verbal or physically abusive or threatening actions
device or words directed to staff on duties during check in,
• Interference with the air crews on at the lounge, boarding gate and inflight
duties • Actions which cause discomfort to another
• Assault on the Airline staff on passenger or inappropriate behavior which
duties continues after warning to cease has been issued by
crew member or staff on duties
• Others disorderly or riotous conduct during check
in, at the lounge, boarding gate, inflight or arrival
INFLIGHT DISRUPTIVE PAX
RECCOMEND TO BOARD ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN :
• Verbal Warning
• Warning Card
• Restraint unruly Pax
• Divert (if the problem escalate
AIRLINES FIT WITNESS FORM
& jeopardize to flight safety)
POLICIES
UNFIT
AIRLINE, PORT SEC.
STAND BY AT THE GATE
1. Verbal Warning 2 times
2. Ground warning card
REJECT TO BOARD HAND OVER TO
PAX & HIS/HER BAG
POLICE
DISRUPTIVE PAX
monitoring
PRE FLIGHT POST FLIGHT
How to Handling Hijack
Hijack Occurred
AIRLINE
On the Ground :
• Keep calm & don’t panic
Airline Policy :
• Avoid making any sudden movements AIRPORT
• Inform properly before making any
• Safe Pax movement
• Safe Air Crew • If possible, transmit much information
• Safe Aircraft via comm. frequency
• Use as many technical ops reason as NEGOTIATOR
possible in order to delay departure
• etc
In The Air :
• Keep calm & don’t panic
POLICE/ARMY
• Inform ATC via comp chnnl by
code 7500
• Avoid any action that might GOVERMENT
invite/trigger premature
• Intensify alertness & vigilance on Parking at
pax. Isolated area
• Maintain normal atmosphere in
the cabin MEDICAL
• Deter his intention & make reason SUPPORT /HOSPITAL
to landing
• etc
FLOWCHART ALUR KOORDINASI
MENGHADAPI PEMBAJAKAN PESAWAT UDARA
AIRLINE COMPANY
INITIAL INFO CONFIRMED CHANNEL
CODE 75XXX
ATC
RECEIVED ‘HJ’ SIGNAL BRANCH OFFICE / KK
And ‘EM’ displayed
KABANDARA / OIC
YELLOW LEVEL
KEPOLISIAN TNI AU Ref: KM 54 2004
BAB IX
“Tanggungjawab
DIRJRND
HUBUD”
CRISIS CENTER
NEGOSIATOR
EMERGENCY TEAM
BANDARA SETEMPAT
REQUESTED TO LAND
CODE 77XXX
RED LEVEL
Ref : KM 54
2004 BAB
PASCA PENYERBUAN IX
“Tanggungja
wab
TNI AU / POLISI Kepolisian
SAFE LAND
SIAGA RI”
Contingency Plan
Tahapan ancaman dan Klasifikasi Kesiagaan
“SIAGA III” (atau kategori Hijau) : Green Alert – Normal Status
yaitu tahap sekuriti yang substantif
dimana segala prosedur sekuriti rutin • Diberlakukan Standar Security
harus selalu dilakukan sebagai Minimum/Sec Measures
standar.
“SIAGA II” (atau kategori Kuning) :
yaitu tahap sekuriti dimana
penanggung jawab keamanan
nasional/wilayah, atau Garuda Amber Alert – Intermdt Status
menilai atau yakin adanya
kemungkinan ancaman yang • Diberlakukan Peningkatan
membahayakan nyawa sehingga Standar Security/Additional
semua kegiatan penerbangan harus
dilakukan dengan kewaspadaan yang Sec. Measures
lebih dari biasanya.
“SIAGA I” (atau kategori Merah) : Red Alert – Full Alert Status
yaitu tahap sekuriti dimana terdapat
alasan yang meyakinkan bahwa • Diberlakukan Maksimum
bahaya jelas dihadapi dan untuk itu Standar Sec/Full Sec Measures
diperlukan upaya sekuriti secara
penuh.
34
ILUSTRA
SI
Additional cost for anti-terrorist security measures borne by air carriers and airport
Anti-terror training of air crews as well as security and awareness training for all staff
working at airports :
For such training British Airways spends € 1.2 m annually alone for its
operational bases LHR and LGW;
KLM spent some € 4 m in the two years preceding 1 April 2003;
Lufthansa spent additional € 2.5 m since 09/11 for crew training
Reinforced cockpit doors :
British Airways already spent € 14.7 m for reinforced cockpit doors (part
and labors, not including dedicated aircraft downtime);
KLM spent around € 16 m for the strengthening of cockpit doors since
09/11;
Lufthansa spent € 16.5 m for hardened cockpit doors (phase & and 2)
since 09/11
Onboard means of surveillance and new operational onboard procedures
British Airways already spent € 9.9 m (part and labour, not including
dedicated aircraft downtime) for these security measures;
Lufthansa has calculated to spent € 8.2 m for the installation of onboard video
systems since 09/11 through 2004
Intensified guarding of aircraft and patrols around the airport perimeter fence
British Airways, cost for this at LHR and LGW are € 12.9 m per year;
For KLM spent around € 14 m in the two years preceding 1 April 2003;
By the and of 2003, Lufthansa estimates to have spent an additional € 3 m for
extra aircraft guarding services at Frankfurt and Munich alone
Regular background checks on staff and certification of security staff
British Airways, total cost in 2003 will be € 2.8 m, but are expected to
reduce to about 700 000 € per year
KLM incurred € 350 000 in additional costs for staff background checks in the
year preceding 1 April 2003;
Since 09/11, Lufthansa incurred € 1.45 m in additional costs for internal
background checks
Indirect costs for Catering and Cleaning Service
British Airways, annual costs for these services € 1.06 m higher, compared to pre
09/11 levels
During the two years preceding 1 April 2003, KLM incurred € 7 m in
additional costs imputable to security
SECURITY & SAFETY
AIRLINE • Everybody makes a habit
out of it.
• Every loophole is guarded.
• Sophisticated equipment
are installed.
• Detailed regulations are
Human developed.
Regulations
Equipment
Environment
THE FORBIDDEN ITEMS
• Entering weapon into the cabin
(by passenger or other ways, for hijacking).
• Entering explosive devices/ into the aircraft for destroying
• Weapons of mass destruction terrorism (postal
chemical/biological/anthrax & radiation)
W E A P O N
WEAPON
• Firearm of any kind from which a shot may be fired by the
force of an explosion, including starter pistols, compressed
air or BB guns, and flare pistols.
• Knives (sabers, swords, hunting knives, others cutting
instruments considered dangerous.
• Bludgeons (blackjack, similar instruments).
• Substance (explosives/ammunition/gasses) which can result
in an explosion or fire, and tear gas, mace whether in a
pistol/canister/container.
• Other dangerous articles not commonly thought as a deadly
weapon but could be used as weapon or would constitute a
weapon, or is reasonably capable of being converted into
weapon, including toy/dummy/replica of weapon.
MOBILE GUNS
KNIFE GUNS
IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE (I.E.D)
Nokia, model 3210
THE PHILOSOPHY
THE PHILOSOPY
• We do not talk about
the lost things you
have.
• We are worry if your
baggage being
inserted something
by someone, and
they are endanger to
flight.
HUMAN FACTORS FAILURES
• Airport employees failing to close the doors
behind them.
• Failing to take other measures including
controlling pedestrian access through cargo
facilities and vehicle gates.
Thank you for joining
C.A.S.O
