Through his wisdom God is the founder of

the universe of things . . . .And so, as being

the principle through which the universe is
created, divine wisdom means art, or
exemplar, or idea, and likewise it also means
law, as moving all things to their due ends.
Accordingly the Eternal law is nothing
other than the exemplar of divine wisdom
directing the motions and acts of everything.
 
St. Thomas Aquinas, ST Q. 93,a.1
St. Thomas Aquinas (1225 – 1274)
Natural Law
 St. Thomas Aquinas:
Natural Law
1.Pre-Notes:
Moral Case
Biographical notes
Metaphysical Background

2. Theory of the Natural Law

Law in General
Eternal Law
Natural Law in particular:
Precepts of the Natural Law
Further questions

3. Contemporary Moral Principles

Principle of Double Effect
Theory of Proportionate Reason
Suggested Readings:
Timothy McDermott, ed., “Preface: What
the Summa is About,” St. Thomas Aquinas,
Summa Theologiae (Maryland: Christian
Classics,1989), xvii-lviii.
Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., Saint Thomas
Aquinas. Vol. I: The Person and His Work,
trans. Robert Royal (Washington, D.C.: The
Catholic University of America Press, 1996)
Ramon Reyes, Ground and Norm of Morality
(Manila: Ateneo de Manila University Press,
1989), Ch. 5.
Frederick Copleston, Thomas Aquinas (N.Y.:
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1976), pp. 9-
15; 199-242.
James Rachels, The Elements of Moral
Philosophy (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 1986), Ch. 4.
Choosing Death: Physicians, Patients, 1. Pre-Notes
and End-of-Life Care
Today, many physicians have come to
believe that prolonged, life-sustaining
treatment is not always in the patient's
best interest, even if providing such
treatment would mean life over death. . . .
As medical technology advances with
unprecedented speed, physicians are more
able than ever to help patients with a slew
of aggressive, life-saving treatments. But in
treating the diseases, the physicians often
neglect to care for the patient, and heroic
life-saving measures often prolong lives
that many feel are no longer worth living
because of the pain and misery in which
they leave the patient.
In tonight's episode of ER, we are confronted
with a wrenchingly painful situation: a
mother watches her child suffer agonizing
pain as he slowly dies from ADL, a
degenerative disease for which there is no
cure. Joi, his mother, is well acquainted with
the suffering her son is going through: her
older son died of the same genetic disorder a
few years earlier. In order to spare her
younger son the trauma of dying in a cold,
impersonal hospital, she seeks a way to have
him spend his final days at home. Dr. Ross
helps make that wish a reality by prov-iding
her with a "patient activated analgesic," a
pump that supplies painkilling narcotics to
her son, which she can administer without
any trained medical personnel in attendance.
As Joi watches her son die, she and Dr.
Ross discuss ways in which her child's
suffering can be relieved even further,
since the amount of pain medication
she is administering to her son seems
to be having little effect. Dr. Ross
explains how much is safe to give, but
then goes on to explain how she can
increase the medicine doses so that she
will eventually drug her child to the
point of death -- should she wish to
make that decision. Unable to bear
Ricky's agonized suffering, Joi finally
chooses to administer the lethal dose
and kills her own son.
This episode raises a series of
tangled ethical questions. First and
foremost, there is the question of
Dr. Ross' role. Did he do the right
thing when he explained to the
patient’s mother how to medicate
her son such that death will occur?
Second, there is also the issue of the
mother’s decision.
What do you think?
As Joi watches her son die, she and Dr.
Ross discuss ways in which her child's
suffering can be relieved even further,
since the amount of pain medication she
is administering to her son seems to be
having little effect. Dr. Ross explains how
much is safe to give, but then goes on to
explain how she can increase the
medicine doses as demanded to ease the
pain. He also tells her that since the heart
can only take so much, an increased dose
could also lead to death. Doing as Dr.
Ross instructed, Joi gradually increased
the dose as demanded until Ricky
eventually died.
Is there any immoral act committed
here?
Life of St. Thomas: 1225-1274
– Born 1225 at Roccasecca of noble family on the decline;
– At age 5, Thomas was brought to the Oblate of Benedictine Abbey of
Montecassino for education;
At age 6 when asked what he wanted most to know, answered:
"What is God?" All his life he sought to fill out the answer.
– In Naples, Thomas was captivated by preaching of new Dominican
friars, enters novitiate. Sent off quickly to Paris because of opposition
of family, captured and interned by family for a year; could not be
budged.
– In 1244, at age twenty, start his studies as Dominican friar in the
university of Paris under master Albert the Great, the famous German
friar who was just beginning his encyclopedic commentaries on the
work of Aristotle.
– 1273: Back in Naples, Dec. 6, refuses to write anymore despite urging
of his devoted secretary Brother Reginald: "All that I have written
now seems to me as straw--compared with the vision I have had"
(apparently a profound mys­tical experience). Health begins to fail.
– 1274: Called to Council of Lyons, considered so important that
despite failing health he took off; fell critically ill at castle of Maenza,
dies at Abbey of Fossanova, March 7.
Best Known Works (two systematic treatises):
(a) Summa Contra Gentiles (A Summary Against the Gen-
tiles): an apology for the Christian faith; aims was to show
that the Christian faith rests on a rational foundation and
that the principles of philosophy do not necessarily lead to a
view of the world which excludes Christianity either
implicitly or explicitly.
(b) Summa Theologica (A Summary of Theology): a sys-
tematic and summary exposition of theology for "novices"
in this branch of study; divided into 3 parts; but the second
part is itself divided into 2 parts, known respectively as the
Prima secundae (first part of the second part) and the
Secunda secundae (second part of the second part):
It is this metaphysical framework–God as both first
and final cause--that enables Aquinas to assert that
from the very fact that the human being has a nature,
he is dyna-mically oriented toward a goal, a final end.
This orienta-tion to­ward a final end is not something up
to the hu-man being's free choice; it is already inscribed
in her nature, and her will in particular, as an a priori
necessary tendency she can do nothing about.
The moral life, in this context, involves the realm of the
human being's free choice as he walks to­ward or away
from his end--who is God. (Metaphysics of Natural Law, 148)
 2. Theory of the Natural Law
a. The Nature of
Law in General
 “Law is a kind of direction or measure for human activity
through which a person is led to do something or held
back.” (Q.90,a.1)
 “Now direction and measure come to human acts from
reason.” (Q.90,a.1)

Taken as a rule and measure, law can be present in two man-

ners, first, and this is proper to the reason, as in the ruling and
measuring principle, and in this manner it is in the reason
alone; second, as in the subject ruled and measured, and in this
man-ner law is present wherever it communicates a tendency to
something, which tendency can be called derivatively, though
not essentially, a ‘law.’ (Q.90,a.1)
 “Law is engaged above all with the plan of things for
human happiness…every law is shaped to the common good.”
(Q.90, a.2)

It is nothing than a reasonable direction of beings

toward the common good, promulgated by the one who
is charged with the community. (ST,I-II,q.90,a.4,c)

Natural Law
 As stated above, law is nothing but a dictate of b. Eternal
practical reason issued by a sovereign who governs a Law
complete community. Granted that the world is
ruled by divine Providence, . . . [then] it is evident
that the whole community of the universe is governed
by God’s mind. Therefore the ruling idea of things
which exists in God as the effective sovereign of them
all has the nature of law. . . . It follows that this law
should be called eternal. (Q.91,a.1,c)
 Ideas in the divine mind and in the human mind do not
stand in the same relationship to things. For the human
mind is measured by things, in such wise that its concept
is not true of itself, but because it agrees with a thing.
According to what a thing is or is not objectively so the
view we form of it is true or false. God’s mind,
however, is the measure of things, for, as we have
shown, each has truth to the extent that it reflects the
divine mind. Consequently the divine mind is true of
itself, and hence the exemplar there is truth itself. (Q
93, a.1, R.3).
The Eternal Law is
nothing other than the
exemplar of divine
wisdom directing the
motions and acts of
everything. (Q.93,a.1)

Eternal Law
Pre-Note 1:

Law is a rule and measure, as we have said, and therefore

can exist in two manners, first as in the thing which is the
rule and measure, second as in the thing that is ruled and
measured, and the closer the second to the first the more
regulated and measured it will be. Since all things are
regulated and measured by Eternal Law, as we have seen,
it is evident that all somehow share in it, in that their
tendencies to their own proper acts and ends are from its
impression. (Q.91,a.2)

Natural Law
 c. Natural Law

Pre-Note 2:  A thing may be known in two ways,

the first, in itself, the other, in its effects,
in which some likeness to it is
discovered, as when not seeing the sun
itself we nevertheless see daylight. So
then it should be said that no one, except
God himself and the blessed who see him
in his essence, can know the Eternal
Law as it is in itself, but that every
rational creature can know about it
according to some dawning, greater or
lesser, of its light. (Q 93, a.2)
 Natural Law

The natural law is nothing other

than the sharing in the Eternal
Law by intelligent creatures.
Precepts of the Natural law
 The precepts of the natural law are to human conduct
what the first principles of thought are to demonstration.
There are several first principles of thought, and so, also,
several precepts of natural law. (Q.94,a.2)

That which first appears is the real, and some

insight into this is included in whatsoever is
apprehended. This first indemonstrable principle,
‘There is no affirming and denying the same
simultaneously’, is based on the very nature of the
real and the non-real: on this principle, as Aristotle
notes, all other propositions are based.
 Precepts of the Natural law
To apply the analogy: as to be real first enters into
human apprehending as such, so to be good first
enters the practical reason’s apprehending when it
is bent on doing something. For every agent acts on
account of an end, and to be an end carries the
meaning of to be good.
 The first principle for the practical reason is based on the
meaning of good, namely that it is what all things seek after. And
so this is the first command of law, ‘that good is to be sought and
done, evil to be avoided’. (Q94,a.2)

Synderesis
Primary Precepts of
the Natural Law
Reason, reflecting upon human beings’ natural inclinations,
promulgates the order of the primary precepts of natural
law which follows the order of natural inclinations:
1. Every substance tends to conserve its existence according to
its own kind. Together with all substances, human beings
have a natural tendency to preserve their being, and reason
reflecting on this tendency as present in human beings
promulgates the precept, that life is to be preserved.
2. Human beings have inclinations that is common to all
animals. These are inclinations involving propagation of
species and bringing up offsprings. Again, reason reflecting
on these tendencies, promulgates the precept that the species
is to be propagated and children educated.
 Primary Precepts of the Natural Law

3. Human beings have inclinations proper to rational beings. In

virtue of the rational nature of human beings, there are those
inclinations to know the truth, live in society . . . etc. Again,
reason, reflecting on these inclinations of the rational nature,
promulgates such precepts as human beings should seek the
truth and avoid ignorance, especially about those things
knowledge of which is necessary for the right ordering of
human lives, and that human beings should live in society
with others.

According to the natural law, then, everything that is right

by nature is right either
– because the universal nature of being is such, or
– because the universal nature of animal is such, or
– because the rational nature is such.
Secondary Precepts of
the Natural Law
Reason, reflecting further on human nature can discover
even less general and more particular precepts. There is a
decreasing generality in the precepts.
The moral agent's action may begin with the more
universal precepts. But she cannot stop there because
the more universal the precept is, the less it has to say
about what action to pursue. Hence, the moral agent, in
the process of practical reasoning, must move forward
beyond the realm of general rules through a series of
more and more particular judgments, until eventually
reaching the single decision to act or not to act.
We can thus isolate three moments in the whole process of
applying the natural law:
First, we are disposed to “do good and avoid evil.” This is
synderesis: the disposition by which a human being is in
possession of the fundamental principle of morality.
Second, reason discerns the matter at hand and applies the
general principles of natural law to the concrete situation.

Third, there is the judgment to do something because it is good

or avoid it because it is evil. This whole process is what we call
conscience

Do Good and Primary Less General

Avoid Evil Judgment
Precepts Precepts

Synderesis Conscience
Further
Clarifications:

First: The term, “natural law” itself is misleading

because it implies that ethical laws are like "laws
of nature" or scientific laws.
Second: It also misleading to think of it as being
similar to civil law: they apply equally to all
human beings, regardless of the conventions,
customs, or beliefs of their particular society.
Therefore, we can say that natural law refers to
ethical guidelines or rules that stipulate what
people ought to do rather than what they in fact
do, and that they apply equally to all humanity
because they are rooted in human nature itself.
 Further
Clarifications:
Third: Note the Significant Role of Reason:
Through reason, the human being can reflect on
his fundamental inclinations of his nature
(Remember: these are inclinations to the dev-
elopment of his potentials and attainment of his
good).
And then, having reflected on his fundamental
inclinations, the human being promulgates to
himself the natural moral law.
Thus, by the light of his reason, the human
being can arrive at some knowledge of the
natural law. And since this law is a participation
in or reflection of the eternal law – the human
being is not left in ignorance of the eternal law
which is the ultimate rule of all conduct.
 Further
Questions:
(a) But why should we take our "inclinations" seriously?
There are two modes in the determination of judgment:
 Way of cognition: I take a certain judgment, let us
say, s is p, and I wonder how it is determined. Roughly, it
may be determined by antecedent cognitions. Perhaps, the
predicate is really contained in the subject (analytic). Or we
take a proposition of experience, and we determine the
truth of this proposition by antecedent knowledge.
 Way of inclination: Many judgments are determined
not by way of cognition but by way of inclination. We say
"yes" or "no" to all sorts of propositions as a result of
inclination. Is this arbitrary thinking? In many cases,
cognition is not available and all we have is judgment by
way of inclination.
 Further
Questions:

Very often though, in the case of natural

law, the inclination involved is not purely
intellectual. We cannot give a strictly demons-
trable justification for our knowledge of the
natural law. All we can say perhaps is that the
inclination involved is that of the good, honest
will, and the expert is the prudent, the wise.
Thus: We can conclude that the natural law is
known by reason, but reason sort of divines
our inclinations.
 Further
Questions:
(b) Is natural moral law one and the same for all human
beings?
Obviously, one and the same for all, in its primary and
more easily known rules. As for secondary precepts,
although more complicated, they are still rather close in
meaning to primary principles. Hence, they are relatively
right for all and are known to all, in most cases. But the
more particular we get, the more remote are these
precepts from the primary. These precepts are not easily
known by all.
What this means is that the more particular moral
precepts, requiring developed capacities of practical
reasoning, may be erroneously or inadequately grasped
by some people who are led astray by bad reasoning or
corrupt habits.
 Further
Questions:

(c) Can Natural Law be Changed?

It is sometimes claimed that human nature is always and
everywhere the same, hence natural moral laws must be
permanent and incapable of change. This claim is too
rigorous and simplistic.
On the basis of decreasing universality: the primary precepts
remain immutable. But as we move to more particular
precepts, these can be "changed"--i.e., the circumstances of an
act may be such that it no longer falls under the class of
actions prohibited by reason.
In its general form then, the precepts remains valid.
 Conclusion:

 All other things being equal, we hold that it is better to

live than to die, that it is better that mothers should take care
of their babies rather than dispose of them, that it is better not
to lie than to lie. This is so because of what these things are:
because a human being is a being, because a mother is a
mother, because human beings are rational agents.
 We express these natures rationally, and thus we have the
first component of the definition of law: it is a work of the
reason. But it is a reason measured by things, which bows
before things: that is what we mean when we say that things
are right by nature.
Thus, the natural law exists in nature before it exists in our
judgment, and it enjoys the latter existence – that is what
natural law means! – by reason of what the nature of things is.
Even then, human reason is not the
ultimate, but only the proximate or
immediate promulgator of the natural
moral law. As mentioned before, this
law is not without a relation to
something above itself: it is related
always to the eternal law.
 Moral
Lifeboat Case Absolutism

Suppose you were on a military convoy

from the United States to England during
World War II. Your ship was attacked
and sunk. Your life raft was carrying 24
persons, although it was designed to
carry only 20. You had good reason to
believe that the raft would sink unless
four people were eliminated, and four
people on board were so seriously injured
in the catastrophe that they were
probably going to die anyhow. Because
no one volunteered to jump overboard,
you, as the ranking officer on the boat,
decided to have them pushed overboard.
Were you morally justified in doing so?
 Moral absolutism
Moral absolutism can refer either to "the belief that some
objective standard of moral truth exists independently of
us or that certain actions are right or wrong regardless of
their consequences."

Reasons for absolutism

(i) Basic values cannot be measured or com-pared.
They cannot be quantified, hence, they cannot be
traded off for another. Basic values are
incommensurable.
(ii) Consequences cannot be used to determine moral
judgments because we must make moral judgments
also by evaluating the motives of the person
performing the action. The motive of an action is
what a person wants to accomplish by performing the
action.
Principle of Double Effect

 Provides the conditions under which an indirectly willed

evil may not be imputed to the agent and therefore is allowed.

 It is morally permissible to perform an action that has

two effects, one good and the other bad, if the following
conditions are present:

1 A proportionately grave reason must be had in

order
Theto justify
and the
the admission in of the indirect, evil

2
The evil
act may not be
goodevileffectitself.
must It at
is also
least
effect.
The
equally
more In otherofwords,
intention
positively
directly proceed
the a from
articulated
agent proportionally
must
asthe
the
beact;
act
good, serious
oritself
else
i.e.,

3
reason
the
the
must
bad must
immediate
be exist
effect
good for
effect performing
is unintended,
ormust at bethegood.
not the
veryeven action.
Theleast bad
as a
This
direct
effectfourth
indifferent;
means condition
is unavoidable
to the good iseffect;
if the also
good known
effect is as to bethe

4 “principle
achieved; of proportionality” or proportionate
reason.
?
Problems and Controversies

According to the principle of double effect, an

evil effect is only admissible if this effect is not
the immediate result of the action, i.e., if the
action is not evil in itself (intrinsically evil).
evil
Some theologians “see how a specific kind of action
could be condemned generally, that is, in most cases,
Thebecause
moral judgment
the actionisgenerally
to be “made doesnot serious
so much
harmabout
and a
humanAreact
there
relatively certain
in little
itself as aactions
good. separatewhich
. . . But is are
itentity, always
thebut andthe
possibility
rather of
absolutely
individual
an absolute
human evil, independent
condemnation
act should be of any
ofevaluated
any possible
physical
insofar
action,
as ita
justifying
contributes to intention
condemnation or destroys of the
applying the agent?
in building
advance of to the
all possible
(human)
society.”
cases without exception, that leaves many a
contemporary Christian ethicist uncomprehending.
 C. van der Poel
According to the
principle, directly
willed evil effects are
never permissible, Wouldare
What notthe
these arguments
reasons?
while indirectly also hold true for some
willed effects at times If it wereofnever allowed
instances directly willedto
are. E.g., direct admit indirectly willed evil
evil effects?
effects, life would become
therapeutic abortion
is never permissible, unbearable, much good

?
while indirect could not be done, and it
therapeutic abortion would be unreasonable to
act in a contrary manner.
is.

Problems and Controversies

Caution
Rightly it has been
The warning of pointed out that common
Holy Scripture must not sense
be
takes it for but
forgotten granted
mustthat such amost
be taken distinction exists.
seriously: thatIf
a we
bombing
shouldraid “noton do
a military object
evil that goodcauses
may the loss
come”
of(Rom
civilian lives
3:8). Theas mere
a side-effect,
fact thatthis
theispurpose
not imputed
of an
toaction
the army mendoes
is good in the same
not way as
already if they
justify had
any kind
killed the civilians
of means. If thedirectly to undermine
evil caused by the the
means is
morale
greaterofthan
the enemy.
the good realized by the purpose of
the action,
There thena itmorally
is indeed can never be allowed.
relevant difference
between directly and indirectly willed evil effects.
Indirectly willed evil effects are more readily
justified than those directly willed. The reason is
that directly willed effects are aimed at with
deliberate purpose and definite determination, so
that they come about with greater certainty.
As a rule of thumb, indirectly willed evil C
effects are more readily allowed because
they usually come about with less o
certainty and are pursued and aimed at
with less determination of the will. n
Nevertheless the superior purpose of the
ultimate end can also at times permit c
directly willed evil effects, more readily
than those of a material nature, but at
l
times also those of a biological and
psychological nature. (An evil effect of a
u
psychological nature would be the si
deception caused by a lie.)
But since as a rule they bring about o
greater evil than indirectly willed evil
effects and are caused with greater n
freedom of will, it stands to reason that
such instances will be much rarer.
 Proportionate Reason

The theory seeks to reduce ethical

decisions to a single fundamental principle
of proportion –

“An action is morally good if the pre-moral

values that it promotes outweigh the pre­
moral disvalues it promotes; otherwise it
is morally evil.”

More simply, "proportionate reason

discerns whether there is sufficient reason
to justify the pre-moral evil.”
 Pre-moral values or disvalues are physical,
Pre-moral evil is destructive of some aspect of
psychological, or social values considered prior to
who
theirwe are,evaluation.
moral of what itThemeans
notiontoofbe truly evil or
pre-moral
human.
good is Pre-moral
the result ofevil makes
human us lessi.e.,
finitude, fullyall our
human. But these
human actions realities
contain featuresremain pre-moral
that either enhance or
restrict
evil untilour
all humanity and the
the necessary potential are
conditions for human
goodness and
considered. (Moralgrowth. Because evil
evil is pre-moral of which
these
pre-moral/ontic evils, we are not able to realize all the
isvalues
doneopenwithout a sufficient reason.) (Kenneth
to us in any one action without causing or
Overberg, SJ, Conscience in Conflict (Cincinnati, Ohio: St. Anthony
tolerating
Messenger Press,some
1991),degree
37. of pre-moral/ontic evil.

Proportionate Reason
 Proportionate Reason

What “Proportionality” Entails:

(a) There is an objective difference between a merely

“good” reason and a truly proportionate one.
(b) A proportionate reason is not to be identified only
with the intention or end of a moral agent.
(c) Proportionate reason is not convertible with the
notion of “better results” or “net good.”
(d) The concept of proportionate reason is not
reducible to a simple numerical calculus.
 Proportionate Reason
In cases where basic goods are in conflict
(e.g., life vs. truth), the moral theory of
proportionate reason uses the following
criteria:

First criterion: The value at Second criterion: There must be an

stake is at least equal to that essential link between the evil and
sacrificed. Negatively, an good aspect of the action and if the
action
ThirdisCriterion
disproportionate evilbeing
: Theifvalue is necessary
soughtsince there
will notis be
no
a lesser value is preferred alternative way of attaining the good
to run
undermined in the long by the contemplated
a higher value. This criterion that must be obtained. Evil in this
action. Negatively, an action case
isan
is
disproportionate
effect of the action
if the
and a
is sometimes called the
manner of protecting the means good willto theundermine
good desired. this
This is
“principle of best service.”
good in the long run. also sometimes referred to as the
“principle of last resort” -- we have
exhausted all possible alternatives.
 Conclusion
The theory of proportionate reason must be exercised with due
caution and tentativeness because by its very nature, it appeals
not to the usual way of cognition but to a certain connatural and
prediscursive component to moral judgment that cannot be
adequately subjected to analytic reflection. There is something
that comes to us immediately and in an intuitive prediscursive
way, prior to an adequate moral analysis, that springs from a
delicate moral sensitivity. Reflective analysis reinforces what one
grasps in this intuitive manner.
Given this intuitive character of discerning by way of the theory
of proportionate reason, it must be engaged in the spirit of
discernment, i.e., an inner connaturality with what is good, and
inner connaturality with God which springs from fidelity to a
fundamental commitment to Him. We are not simply concerned
here with a rational (read: logical) analysis of the situation but
with a reasoning heart. Richard A. McCormick. See “A Commentary on
Commentaries” in Doing Evil to Achieve Good, ed. Richard A.
McCormick and Paul Ramsay, Chicago: Loyola University.