Risk Processes Audit

29th November to 5th December

2006
 Idku Operations
• 2 part review as part of the diagonal audit
slice through the organisation.
– Look at the process of hazard identification
and assessment from start to finish including
the application of the PTW in the risk process.
– Look at the imported risks onto the Idku site
covering both portable tools and equipment
and plant. The use of ‘temporary process
equipment, using the condensate export
pump as an example.
 Findings
• Good points
– Overall awareness of the risk assessment process and the
availability/need for job risk assessments.
– Extensive number (363) of generic risk assessments on the
shared drive where a great deal of time and effort has taken
place.
– Staff keen to implement the risk assessment process to plant
activities.
– Daily 16.00hrs PTW meeting identifies all activities requested to
take place from 19.00hrs, issue of permits is not always
approved based upon SIMOPS in same area and risks.
– Control of imported temporary process equipment is by the
EIR/EC procedure.
– Temporary portable equipment procedure in place.
 Findings
• Points for improvement
– The shared drive at Idku is not available at Abu Qir? Information
has to be passed by CD. (linked with Cairo when link working)
– There is the potential for an over-reliance upon ‘generic’ risk
assessments for activities which may seem routine but the
environment in which they are performed may not be.
– Disciplines may become complacent with generic risk
assessments without considering new hazards.
– Where crane usage is needed the relationship between the load
and crane capacity at various radii was unclear to several
‘production personnel’ during the permit application review
process.
– The management of Abu Qir base remained unclear to several
members of Idku management despite a memo with RACIE from
the Operations GM’s.
Risk Assessments
Environment
Generic Risk
Assessment
Environment
Specific Risks

Task
Generic Risk
Assessment
 Further Findings
• Further points for improvement
– Delays are experienced in the EIR process.
– No timeframe is given for a change in the MoC procedure (ref to
Zafraana also)
– There is the potential for temporary portable equipment/plant to
enter the site without inspection (by HSE).
– No clear separation between Health Safety and Environmental
risks discussed during the risk assessments or indication that
Health and Environment has been taken into consideration.
– Operations RR does not include Abu Qir risks.
– Review Corporate Risk procedures to achieve synergy between
processes.
– 2 risk assessment procedures exist Corporate and Operations
(both are the same)
– The Risk Register ‘Risk Description’ box should be split between
Hazard and Consequences. (applies to company wide registers)
 PTW System Comments
• The PTW procedure RPC-MS-OPS-PTW-401 (7th Aug 2000) is not
an approved document. Several other Operations procedures
related to risk are also unapproved.
• A PTW board was not available in the WDDM control room. (permits
on a table)
• A site plan with live PTW not available (believed will be available
soon)
• CCR PTW checked expired 07.00hrs (not renewed) gas test not
completed………Production did not withdraw permit.
• The PTW does not document whether Health or Environmental risks
are considered in terms of hazardous impacts.
• A distance of 2m above ground is still referred to on permits for the
wearing of safety harnesses.
 Overall view
• Good processes generally in place, need to be
aware of the unusual and plan for the
unexpected.
• RACIE needs further development and clarity.
• Resources need to be devoted to putting the
finishing touches to the development, and
update of the Operations Governance system.
•