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Myanmar’s

Humanitarian
Dilemma

Richard Takhun
PhD Candidate
03 May 2020
14th Dec 2022 03 May 2020
Richard Takhun (21.12.2021) 1
Revolution and Resistance

After such inhuman actions of


st

nd
1. Shadow government formed by military,
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elected parliament

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representatives (called NUG, 1. the front line resistance
national unity government) becomes guerrilla force.
2. Three finger salute 2. young people mostly under 30.
3. Demonstrations 3. They call themselves People
Defence Force (PDF).
4. Strikes
4. learned how to make smoke
5. CDM, civil disobedience bombs and handmade guns on
movements. the internet.
6. Banging pots and pans 5. They go In the forests, trained
7. Silent strikes by ethnic militias for basic
8. EAOs especially Karen, Kachin warfare techniques and
ad Chin militias plotting to sabotage military-
linked facilities.

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Conflict Map before the Coup Conflict Map after the Coup as of March 2022

Red area signify conflicts


engaged between Military
and PDFs or EAOs or
coalition forces

Myanmar Conflict Map


Sources: The Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) 194, ISP – Myanmar 195 3
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Sources : UNOCHA

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Humanitarian Needs
3700 shot to
death

33000
1400000
Civilian
displaced
Houses
people
Burnt Down

Seriously
This is the tip of the iceberg Underfunded
• Opportunity cost of Feb 1 military
coup in Myanmar. Education
Only 28% is
sector in
funded
Even if the crisis stops now crisis

• Myanmar is hitting a major long-term Health


System total
development challenges and collapsed
recuperation will take, probably,
decades.
The opportunity cost of Feb 1 Coup in Myanmar 6
Difficulties to deliver aids in Myanmar
• Across Myanmar, intense fighting, airstrikes and artillery fire have limited access to communities, causing
delayed service delivery, and making program implementation more expensive and difficult to execute.
• Supply chain disruptions coupled with inflation have increased the cost of fuel, transport, electricity, and
other inputs, directly affecting project management and contingency and emergency responses.
• Public road and water transport had been suspended to most locations
• Humanitarian access remains severely constrained by movement restrictions imposed by the Military
• In Kachin, Sagaing and many places introduced an unofficial travel ban, preventing humanitarian partners
from moving in and around the township. As a result, several hundreds of IDPs have little or no access to
basic services, including health.
• humanitarian partners have been experiencing lengthy blackouts of mobile and internet connections in
several townships.
• Arrests and detentions of humanitarian workers by the Military is hindering the delivery of assistance to
affected people in conflict affected areas.
• Humanitarians continue to advocate with all relevant stakeholders for unimpeded and safe access to people in
need for the delivery of critical lifesaving assistance.
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Argument against aid as an authoritarian
development tool
• aid promotes growth in democracies but not in autocracies
(Dollar and Burnside 2004; Dollar and Levin 2005; Isham,
Kaufmann, and Pritchett 1997; Kosack 2003; Svensson
1999).
• Because of lower corruption in democracies (Dollar and
Burnside 2004),
• civic participation that improves the performance of aid
projects (Isham, Kaufmann, and Pritchett 1997),
• the provision of public goods that increase productivity
(Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009; Smith 2008),
• aid can be effective and that it should be targeted selectively
to countries that are likely to use it as intended
• case for democracy and castigating aid agencies for their
ongoing funding of dictatorships.
 It is true that all the aid agencies and organizations have to
get the permissions from Myanmar Military to execute their
aid program
 Should the aid be channeling through Military generals who
are most corrupted, it is like supporting the military
Government, fueling their survival

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Argument for aid as a necessary tool for needy
However, there is also an argument from the perspective of objective moral
values
 What should we do to 1.4 million displaced people who does not even have
their basic needs for survival?
 Should we left them to their ruin or
 should we do what we can?

 According to the numerous studies, since the end of the Cold War donors
have tended to route aid away from the governments of poorly governed countries, and
aid has tended to be associated with positive reforms although not necessarily democratization.

 whether aid promotes or prevents democratic reform depends upon the political and
social characteristics of the country in question.

 Implicit in the other side’s argument is the belief that aid is an essential ingredient
enabling dictators to stay in power, and that should it be cut off entirely and
Hopefully, government reform would follow.

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Yet there is almost no real evidence to support this,

 Soviet aid to Cuba collapsed in the 1990s, yet Fidel Castro


remained in power for another two decades,

 Similarly, although humanitarian aid was still sent to


Zimbabwe under Mugabe, Western aid to his government
was effectively cut off, but with little appreciable impact on
his hold on power.

 One thing Myanmar generals are not afraid of is the


outside world!
 Because of the resource curse of Myanmar
 Myanmar is rich in its mineral resources
 Aid is nothing for generals, but it can be life saving tools for
many hundred thousands people if we can effectively
channel.
 The most urgent - Establishing a viable humanitarian
corridor

 So my conclusion is if we can re-frame about the question :

 “ how should we effectively channel aids in Myanmar” 10


03 May 2020
Richard Takhun (21.12.2021) 11

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