Group 3 Report Part 1 and 2

CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH
AFFECT CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Sources:
• Revised Penal Code
• Revised Penal Code – Criminal Law Book 1 (2021)
By Luis B. Reyes
Andrei Dave Nebril

Sam Portes
Memory Aid
Circumstances affecting criminal liability -
JEMAA
J = Justifying Circumstances
E = Exempting Circumstances
M = Mitigating Circumstances
A = Aggravating Circumstances
A = Alternative Circumstances
Coverage
A. Justifying Circumstances (Art. 11)

B. Exempting Circumstances (Art. 12)
C. Absolutory and Extenuating Causes under
the RPC (Art. 20;124, last paragraph; Art. 280,
last paragraph; 332; 344)
Definition of Terms
• Imputability
• is the quality by which an act may be ascribed to a person as its author or owner. It implies that the act
committed has been freely and consciously done and may, therefore, be put down to the doer as his very
own.
• Responsibility
• is the obligation of suffering the consequences of crime. It is the obligation of taking the penal and civil
consequences of the crime.
While imputability implies that a deed may be imputed to a person, responsibility implies that
the person must take the consequence of such a deed.
Definition of Terms
• Guilt
• is an element of responsibility, for a man cannot be made to answer for the
consequences of a crime unless he is guilty.
• Justifying circumstances
• are those where the act of a person is said to be in accordance with law, so that such
person is deemed not to have transgressed the law and is free from both criminal and
civil liability.
Definition of Terms
• Exempting circumstances (non-imputability)
• are those grounds for exemption from punishment because there is wanting in the agent of the
crime any of the conditions which make the act voluntary or negligent.
• Absolutory Causes
• are those where the act committed is a crime but for reasons of public policy and sentiment
there is no penalty imposed.
• Extenuating Circumstances
• Those which have the same effect as mitigating circumstances but are not among those
enumerated in Article 13 but are provided for in certain articles of the RPC and apply only to
certain felonies. They are called “Special Mitigating Circumstances”.
Definition of Terms
• Relatives by affinity (because of marriage)
• are parents-in-law, son or daughter-in-law, and brother or sister-in-law.
• Consanguinity
• refers to blood relatives or relationship by blood
• 1st degree – spouse, children
• 2nd civil degree – brothers and sister
• 3rd civil degree – uncle and niece or aunt and nephew
• 4th civil degree – first cousins
Part 1: Justifying Circumstance
Sources:
By Luis B. Reyes
Andrei Dave Nebril

Justifying Circumstance
WHEN RIGHT
Art. 11: Justifying Circumstance
Article 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances
concur;
First. Unlawful aggression.
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
2. Any one who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse, ascendants, descendants, or
legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or his relatives by affinity in the same degrees and
those consanguinity within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites
prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are present, and the further requisite, in case the
revocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making defense had no part therein.
Art. 11: Justifying Circumstance
3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first and second
requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this Article are present and that the person defending
be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive.
4. Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does not act which causes damage to another,
provided that the following requisites are present;
First. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;
Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.
5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office.
6. Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose.
Memory Aid
Justifying Circumstance
Self-defense
D = defense of a relative
D = defense of a stranger
A = avoidance of injury or evil
F = fulfillment of a duty or lawful exercise of right or
office
O = obedience to a lawful order
Article 11 – Justifying Circumstance
In stating that the persons mentioned therein "do not

incur any criminal liability," Article 11 recognizes the
acts of such persons as justified. Such persons are not
criminals, as there is no crime committed.
Prosecution
Proof of Self
defense
In self-defense, the burden of proof rests upon the accused. His duty is to establish
self-defense by clear and convincing evidence, otherwise, conviction would
follow from his admission that he killed the victim. He must rely on the strength
of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that for the prosecution.
Self-defense, must be proved with certainty by sufficient, satisfactory and
convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on the
part of the person invoking it and it cannot be justifiably entertained where it is
not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but, in itself, is
extremely doubtful.
Article 11 Par. 1 – Justifying
Circumstance
The following do not incur any criminal liability:
1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the
following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression.
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.
Article 11 – Justifying Circumstance (Par. 1)
1st Requisite:
The first requisite of self-
defense is that there be
unlawful aggression on the
part of the person injured or
killed by the accused – a sine
qua non requirement.
Aggression
2 Kinds
1. Unlawful
- is equivalent to assault or at least threatened assault of an immediate and imminent
kind. There is unlawful aggression when the peril to one's life, limb or right is either
actual or imminent. There must be actual physical force or actual use of weapon.
2. Lawful
- The fulfillment of a duty or the exercise of a right in a more or less violent manner
is an aggression, but it is lawful.
Lawful Aggression Illustration
A, a policeman who, after firing five cautionary Stop or I’ll shoot!
shots into the air, aimed directly at the escaping
detainee when he had already reasons to fear that
the latter would be able to elude him and his
pursuing companions.
At 2am, A, alone in her house, was
awakened by loud noises coming from the
2nd floor. Upon checking, A, saw a
hooded figure in the person of B opening
her jewelry chest. B, upon noticing A, then
immediately reached something inside his
jacket. Upon noticing the action of B, A
struck B’s head with a baseball bat causing
him to fall unconscious.
Article 249 of the new Civil Code provides that "(t)he
owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude
any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For
this purpose, he may use such force as may be reasonably
necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened
unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property."
Thus, under the new Civil Code a person may use force or
violence to protect his property; and if in protecting his
property such person uses force to prevent its being taken by
another, the owner of the property is not an unlawful
aggressor, because he is merely exercising a right.
1st Requisite: Unlawful Aggression
There is unlawful aggression when the peril to one's life, limb or right is either actual or imminent.
There must be actual physical force or actual use of weapon. (People vs. Crisostomo, No. L-
38180, Oct. 23, 1981, 108 SCRA 288, 298)
There must be an actual physical assault upon a person, or at least a threat to inflict real injury.
In case of threat, the same must be offensive and positively strong, showing the wrongful intent to
cause an injury. (U.S. vs. Guysayco, 13 Phil. 292, 295)
Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack, or imminent danger
thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude.
There is unlawful aggression when the peril to one's life, limb (People vs. Sumicad, 56 Phil. 643,
647), or right is either actual or imminent.
Unlawful Aggression
Peril to one's life.
1. Actual — that the danger must be present, that is, actually in existence.
2. Imminent — that the danger is on the point of happening. It is not

required that the attack already begins, for it may be too late.
Unlawful Aggression
Peril to one’s limb –
When a person is attacked, he is in imminent danger of death or bodily harm.
The blow with a deadly weapon may be aimed at the vital parts of his body, in
which case there is danger to his life; or with a less deadly weapon or any other
weapon that can cause minor physical injuries only, aimed at other parts of the body,
in which case, there is danger only to his limb.
The peril to one's limb may also be actual or only imminent.
Peril to one's limb includes peril to the safety of one's person from physical injuries.
Unlawful Aggression
“Mere threatening attitude is not unlawful aggression.”
Examples of threats to inflict real injury:
1. When one aims a revolver at another with the intention of shooting him. (Dec. Sup. Ct.
Spain, Sept. 29, 1905)
2. The act of a person in retreating two steps and placing his hand in his pocket with a
motion indicating his purpose to commit an assault with a weapon. (Dec. Sup. Ct. Spain,
June 26, 1891)
3. The act of opening a knife, and making a motion as if to make an attack. (Dec. Sup. Ct.
Spain, Oct. 24, 1895)
Unlawful Aggression
The following does not constitute unlawful aggression:
1. Insulting words no matter how objectionable they may have been, without
physical assault, could not constitute unlawful aggression.
2. A light push on the head with the hand.
3. Mere threatening attitude is not unlawful aggression.
Unlawful Aggression
Also:
3. Retaliation is not self-defense.
4. A public officer exceeding his authority may
become an unlawful aggressor.
5. No unlawful aggression when there is agreement to fight.
6. When the aggressor flees, unlawful aggression no longer exists.
Unlawful Aggression
When the aggressor flees, unlawful aggression no longer exists.
- The attack made by the deceased and the killing of the deceased by defendant should succeed each
other without appreciable interval of time.
- When the killing of the deceased by the accused was after the attack made by the deceased, the accused
must have no time nor occasion for deliberation and cool thinking.
VS
Retreat to take more advantageous position.
- If it is clear that the purpose of the aggressor in retreating is to take a more advantageous position to
ensure the success of the attack already begun by him, the unlawful aggression is considered still
continuing, and the one making a defense has a right to pursue him in his retreat and to disable him.
Unlawful Aggression
However, a slap on the face is an unlawful
aggression.
Since the face represents a person and his dignity,
slapping it is a serious personal attack. It is a
physical assault coupled with a willful disregard, nay,
a defiance, of an individual's personality. It may,
therefore, be frequently regarded as placing in real
danger a person's dignity, rights and safety. (People
vs. Sabio, G.R. No. L-23734, April 27, 1967)
Unlawful Aggression
In the absence of direct evidence to determine who provoked the conflict, it
has been held that it shall be presumed that, in the nature of the order of
things, the person who was deeply offended by the insult was the one who
believed he had a right to demand explanation of the perpetrator of that
insult, and the one who also struck the first blow when he was not satisfied
with the explanation offered. (U.S. vs. Laurel, 22 Phil. 252)
2nd Requisite:
Reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent
or repel it.
This second requisite of defense presupposes the existence of unlawful aggression,
which is either imminent or actual.
Hence, in stating the second requisite, two phrases are used, namely: (1) "to prevent"
and (2) "to repel.”
The second requisite of defense means that (1) there be a necessity of the course of
action taken by the person making a defense, and (2) there be a necessity of the means
used. Both must be reasonable.
The reasonableness of either or both such necessity depends on the existence of
unlawful aggression and upon the nature and extent of the aggression.
Reasonable Necessity
Reasonable necessity does not mean that when the aggressor makes use of a bolo, the person
defending must also make use of a bolo. What the law requires is rational equality. Rational is the
means employed. Rationally necessary to prevent or repel it.
Factors to be considered in order to be said that the means employed is rationally necessary:
(a) Nature and the number of the weapon used by the aggressor
E.g. To use a firearm against a dagger or a knife, in the regular order of things, does not imply any
difference between such weapons. (Dec. Sup. Ct. of Spain, Oct. 27, 1887)
This ruling is subject to the limitations mentioned in the case of People vs. Padua, supra, namely: (1)
there was no other available means; or (2) if there was other means, the one making a defense could
not coolly choose the less deadly weapon to repel the aggression.
Reasonable Necessity of the Means Employed
(b) Physical condition, size, weight and other personal circumstances of the
aggressor versus that of the person defending himself.
e.g.
1. Thus, when the one defending himself who was of middle age, was
cornered, had his back to the iron railing, and three or four men bigger, and
stronger than he were striking him with fists, such person was justified in
using a knife. (People vs. Ignacio, 58 Phil. 858)
2. The aggressor was a bully, a man larger and stronger, of known violent
character, with previous criminal records for assault. He attacked with fist
blows a smaller man who was then armed with a bolo. In spite of having
received, as a warning, a cut with a bolo on the left shoulder, the aggressor
continued to attempt to possess himself of the bolo. Killing him with a bolo
was justified in this case. (People vs. Sumicad, 56 Phil. 643)
(c) Place, time and location of the assault
e.g.
People v De la Cruz (61 Phil. 344)
The accused, a woman, was walking home with a party including the deceased, Francisco Rivera. It was
already dark and they were passing a narrow path. When the other people were far ahead, the deceased who
was following the accused suddenly threw his arms around her from behind, caught hold of her breasts,
kissed her, and touched her private parts. He started to throw her down. When the accused felt she could not
do anything more against the strength of her aggressor, she got a knife from her pocket and stabbed him.
Held: She was justified in making use of the knife in repelling what she believed to be an attack upon her
honor since she had no other means of defending herself.
Points to Consider Re 2nd Requisite
1. Necessity of the course of action taken.
The necessity of the course of action taken depends on the existence of
unlawful aggression. If there was no unlawful aggression or, if there was, it
has ceased to exist, there would be no necessity for any course of action to
take as there is nothing to prevent or to repel.
In determining the existence of unlawful aggression that induced a person to
take a course of action, the place and occasion of the assault and the other
circumstances must be considered.
2. Necessity of the means used
The means employed by the person making a defense must be rationally
necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression.
3. Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel unlawful aggression to be
liberally construed in favor of law-abiding citizens.
These are dangerous times. There are many lawless elements who kill for the thrill of killing.
There is no adequate protection for the law-abiding citizens. When a lawless person attacks
on the streets or particularly in the victim's home, he should assume the risk of losing his life
from the act of self-defense by firearm of his victim; otherwise, the law abiding citizens will
be at the mercy of the lawless elements. Hence, the requisite of reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression should in these times of danger
be interpreted liberally in favor of the law-abiding citizens.
(People vs. So, 5 CAR [2s] 671, 674)
2nd Requisite Illustration
A saw B who owes him P1,000. A asked
B to pay his debt right on the spot. B told
A that he has no money but promised to
pay him within a week. A got furious.
After throwing insulting words at B, he
immediately punched him. B took a gun
from his bag and fired at A’s head
causing the death of the latter.
2nd Requisite Illustration
B, husband of A (the accused) was
kneeling over her as she lay on her back
on the ground and his hand choking her
neck. A pulled out a knife, stabbed B,
plunging it at the left side of B’s body. A
died.
Circumstance
3rd Requisite:
Lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.
Provocation
PROVOCATION - refers to any immoral act or conduct, unjustified act or
conduct which stirs a person to do wrong.
SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION - adequate to stir a person to do the

wrongful act and when it is proportionate to the gravity of the act.
Thus, to engage in a verbal argument cannot be considered sufficient
provocation.
Circumstance
Reason for the third requisite of self-defense.
When the person defending himself from the attack by another gave sufficient
provocation to the latter, the former is also to be blamed for having given cause for the
aggression.
Hence, to be entitled to the benefit of the justifying circumstance of self-defense,
the one defending himself must not have given cause for the aggression by his
unjust conduct or by inciting or provoking the assailant.
Requisite of "lack of sufficient provocation" refers exclusively to "the person
defending himself."
Provocation
Cases in which third requisite of self-defense considered present.
The third requisite of self-defense is present —
1. When no provocation at all was given to the aggressor by the person defending himself;
e.g. A shot B to death, because B was running amuck and with a dagger was rushing towards A manifestly
intending to stab A, there was no provocation whatsoever on the part of A.
2. When, even if a provocation was given, it was not sufficient;
e.g. A, having discovered that B had built a part of his fence on A's land, asked B why he had done so. This
question angered B who immediately attacked A. If A would kill B to defend himself, the third requisite of self-
defense would still be present, because even if it is true that the question of A angered B, thereby making B
attack A, such provocation is not sufficient. (U.S. vs. Pascua, 28 Phil. 222) A had a right to demand explanation
why B had built the fence on A's property.
Provocation
3. When, even if the provocation was sufficient, it was not given by the
person defending himself;
e.g. A was walking together with his cousin B. B saw C, his archenemy at
the City Plaza. B approached C and immediately asked him to a fight. A
tried to calm B but B immediately slapped C. C, in retaliation, pulled out a
knife and stabbed C on the chest. He, thereafter tried to stab A as well but A
roundhouse-kicked C which made the latter to fall, hit his head on a corner
of an iron bench, and die as a result.
Provocation
4. When, even if a provocation was given by the person defending himself, it
was not proximate and immediate to the act of aggression. (Decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain of March 5, 1902 and of April 20, 1906).
e.g. A slapped the face of B one or two days before and B, upon meeting A,
attacked the latter but was seriously injured when A defended himself, the
provocation given by A should be disregarded, because it was not proximate
and immediate to the aggression made by B. In this case, the third requisite
of self-defense is still present.
3rd Requisite Illustration
People vs. Dolfo (C.A., 46 O.G. 1621)
A was an electrician while B was his assistant. A called B to him, who instead of approaching
asked him, "Why are you calling me?" A considered the retort as a provocative answer and
suddenly threw a 4 by 2 inches piece of wood at B. B retaliated by throwing at A the same
piece of wood. A picked up the piece of wood, approached B and started to beat him with the
piece of wood. B defended himself with a screwdriver and inflicted a mortal wound on A.
Questions:
(1) Was there sufficient provocation on the part of B when he retorted "Why are you calling
me?"
(2) Was there reasonable necessity in using the screwdriver to repel the attack?
Answer:
(1) B's answer of "Why are you calling me?" when summoned by A might have mortified and
annoyed the latter but it was not a sufficient provocation. The provocation must be sufficient or
proportionate to the act committed and adequate to arouse one to its commission. It is not
sufficient that the provocative act be unreasonable or annoying. A small question of self-pride
does not justify hurting or killing an opponent.
(2) The act of A in hurling the piece of wood at B when his pride was hurt constituted unlawful
aggression. Subsequent act of A in attacking B with the piece of wood, after B had hurled back
the thrown piece of wood, was a continuation of the unlawful aggression already begun. The
subsequent act of A placed B in his defense, justifying the use of a reasonable means to repel it.
(3) In determining whether or not a particular means employed to repel an
aggression is reasonable, the person attacked should not be expected to judge things
calmly and to act coolly or serenely as one not under stress or not facing a danger to
life or limb. The test is: Considering the situation of the person defending himself,
would a reasonable man placed in the same circumstance have acted in the same
way? In this case, the screwdriver was a reasonable means to repel the unlawful
aggression of A. B was justified in killing him with it. All the three requisites of
self-defense were present. Hence, accused B must be, as he was, acquitted.
All the elements of self-defense are present in this case.
Battered Woman Syndrome
RA 9262 aka Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004
(VAWC)
Sec. 26. Battered Women Syndrome as a Defense. — Victim- survivors who

are found by the courts to be suffering from battered women syndrome do
not incur criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the absence of any of
the elements for justifying circumstances of self- defense under the Revised
Penal Code.
In the determination of the state of mind of the woman who was suffering
from battered woman syndrome at the time of the commission of the crime,
the courts shall be assisted by expert psychiatrist/ psychiatrists/psychologists.
(VAWC)
A battered woman has been defined as a woman "who is

repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or
psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to
do something he wants her to do without concern for her
rights. Battered women include wives or women in any form
of intimate relationship with men.
Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman,
the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice.
Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with
a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in
the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.
(VAWC)
Flight, incompatible with self-defense

An accused went into hiding after the
hacking incident. Suffice it to state that flight
after the commission of the crime is highly
evidentiary of guilt, and incompatible with
self-defense
Article 11 Par. 2 – Justifying Circumstance
aka Defense of Relative
2. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or rights of his spouse,
ascendants, descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters,
or his relatives by affinity in the same degrees and those consanguinity
within the fourth civil degree, provided that the first and second requisites
prescribed in the next preceding circumstance are present, and the further
requisite, in case the revocation was given by the person attacked, that the
one making defense had no part therein.
Relatives that can be defended:
1. Spouse
2. Ascendants
3. Descendants
4. Legitimate, natural or adopted
brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity in the same
degrees
5. Relatives by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree
Relatives that can be defended:
6. Relatives by affinity, because of marriage, are parents-in-law, son or
daughter-in-law, and brother or sister-in-law.
Basis of Justification
The justification of defense of relatives by reason of which the defender is
not criminally liable, is founded not only upon a humanitarian sentiment, but
also upon the impulse of blood which impels men to rush, on the occasion of
great perils, to the rescue of those close to them by ties of blood.
Requisites:
1. Unlawful aggression
- Of the three requisites of defense of relatives, unlawful aggression is the most
essential and primary, without which any defense is not possible or justified.
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it
3. In case the provocation was given by the person attacked, the one making a defense
had no part therein.
- The fact that the relative defended gave provocation is immaterial
Article 11 Par. 2 – Unlawful Aggression
Of the three (3) requisites of defense of relatives, unlawful aggression is a
condition sine qua non, for without it any defense is not possible or justified. In
order to consider that an unlawful aggression was actually committed, it is
necessary that an attack or material aggression, an offensive act positively
determining the intent of the aggressor to cause an injury shall have been made;
a mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient to justify the
commission of an act which is punishable per se, and allow a claim of exemption
from liability on the ground that it was committed in self-defense or defense of a
relative. (Balunueco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126968, April 9, 2003)
Of the three (3) requisites of defense of relatives, unlawful aggression is a condition sine
qua non, for without it any defense is not possible or justified. In order to consider that an
unlawful aggression was actually committed, it is necessary that an attack or material
aggression, an offensive act positively determining the intent of the aggressor to cause an
injury shall have been made.
A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient to justify the commission of an

act which is punishable per se, and allow a claim of exemption from liability on the ground
that it was committed in self-defense or defense of a relative. (Balunueco vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 126968, April 9, 2003)
Unlawful aggression may exist as a matter of fact or
can be made to depend upon the honest belief of the
one making a defense.
A attacked and wounded B with a dagger, causing the B
C
latter to fall down, but B immediately stood up and
defended himself by striking A with a bolo and as a A
result, A was seriously wounded and fell in the mud
with B standing in front of A in a position as if to strike
again in case A would stand up. There is no doubt that A
was the unlawful aggressor. But when the son of A
came, what he saw was that his father was lying in the
mud wounded.
Article 11 Par. 2 – Reasonable Necessity of
the Means Employed
The gauge of reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the
aggression as against one's self or in defense of a relative is to be found in
the situation as it appears to the person repelling the aggression.
It has been held time and again that the reasonableness of the means adopted
is not one of mathematical calculation or "material commensurability
between the means of attack and defense" but the imminent danger against
the subject of the attack as perceived by the defender and the instinct more
than reason that moves the defender to repel the attack.
Article 11 Par. 2 – 3rd Requisite
The clause, "in case the provocation was given by the person attacked,"
- does not mean that the relative defended should give provocation to the
aggressor. The clause merely states an event which may or may not take place.
The phrase "in case" means "in the event that."
There is still a legitimate defense of relative even if the relative being
defended has given provocation, provided that the one defending such relative
has no part in the provocation.
Article 11 Par. 2 – 3rd Requisite
A was previously shot by the brother of C, D. B, the brother of A, after 2
weeks saw C and D. He deliberately shot the 2. Can B invoke the self-
defense under Par. 2 of Art. 11?
No. It cannot be said, therefore, that in attacking the victim, the accused was
impelled by pure compassion or beneficence or the lawful desire to avenge
the immediate wrong inflicted on his cousin. Rather, he was motivated by
revenge, resentment or evil motive because of a running feud between them.
aka Defense of Stranger
3. Anyone who acts in defense of the person or
rights of a stranger, provided that the first and
second requisites mentioned in the first
circumstance of this Art. are present and that the
person defending be not induced by revenge,
resentment, or other evil motive.
Requisites:
1. Unlawful Aggression
2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel or prevent it.
3. The person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil
motive.
- requires that the defense of a stranger be actuated by a disinterested or generous
motive, when it puts down "revenge, resentment, or other evil motive" as
illegitimate.
Basis of Defense of Stranger
What one may do in his defense, another may do for him. Persons acting in
defense of others are in the same condition and upon the same plane as those
who act in defense of themselves. The ordinary man would not stand idly by
and see his companion killed without attempting to save his life (U.S. vs.
Aviado, 38 Phil. 10, 13).
Who are deemed strangers?
Any person not included in the enumeration of relatives mentioned in
paragraph 2 of Article 11 (aka Defense of Relative), is considered stranger
for the purpose of paragraph 3. Hence, even a close friend or a distant
relative is a stranger within the meaning of paragraph 3.
Paragraph 3 of Art. 11 uses the phrase "be not induced." Hence, even if a
person has a standing grudge against the assailant, if he enters upon the
defense of a stranger out of generous motive to save the stranger from
serious bodily harm or possible death, the third requisite of defense of
stranger still exists. The third requisite would be lacking if such person was
prompted by his grudge against the assailant, because the alleged defense of
the stranger would be only a pretext.
Furnishing a weapon to one in serious danger of being throttled is defense of
stranger.
A Japanese hit an old man 78 years of age on the face, shoved him to the
ground and attempted to choke him. The accused furnished the old man with
a small gaff, used by game cocks, with which the old man killed his
assailant. The accused was justified in furnishing the old man with the gaff,
it being in defense of stranger.
Article 11 Par. 4 – Justifying Circumstance aka
Avoidance of Greater Evil or Injury
4. Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or injury, does act
act which causes damage to another, provided that the
following requisites are present;
First. That the evil sought to be avoided
actually exists;
Second. That the injury feared be greater than that done to
avoid it;
Third. That there be no other practical and less harmful means
of preventing it.
Article 11 Par. 4 – “Damage to another”
This term covers injury to persons and damage to property.
The Court of Appeals applied paragraph 4 of Art. 11 in a case of slander by deed,
a crime against honor, where the accused (a woman) who was about to be married
to the offended party eloped with another man, after the offended partly had made
preparations for the wedding, the Court holding that there was a necessity on the
part of the accused of avoiding a loveless marriage with the offended party, and
that her refusal to marry him and her eloping with the man whom she loved were
justified and did not amount to the crime of slander by deed.
Requisites:
1. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists.
- The evil must actually exist. If the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or
anticipated or may happen in the future, paragraph 4 of Art. 11 is not applicable.
- The greater evil should not be brought about by the negligence or imprudence of the actor.
- The evil which brought about the greater evil must not result from a violation of law by the
actor.
- When the accused was not avoiding any evil, he cannot invoke the justifying circumstance
of avoidance of a greater evil or injury.
Requisites:
2. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it
- Instinct of self-preservation will always make one feel that his own safety
is of greater importance than that of another .
- When the accused was not avoiding any evil, he cannot invoke the
justifying circumstance of avoidance of a greater evil or injury.
Requisites:
3. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.
- meaning, the accused was stuck in a particular situation wherein he has no
other choice but to deliberately act in order to avoid an evil or injury and in
doing so caused damage to another, and that there’s no other less harmful or
practical way during that particular instance than that he committed.
Illustration:
A (car driver) was forced to
choose between losing his life in
the cliff or sacrificing the life of
the innocent bystander. He chose
the latter, swerved his car to the
right, ran over and killed the
passer-by.
Article 11 Par. 4 – “Civil Liability”
Civil Liability
Although, as a rule there is no civil liability in justifying circumstances, it is
only in paragraph 4 of Art. 11 where there is civil liability, but the civil
liability is borne by the persons benefited.
In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11, the persons for whose
benefit the harm has been prevented, shall be civilly liable in proportion to
the benefit which they may have received. (Art. 101)
Article 11 Par. 4 – “Civil Liability”
Another Illustration:
Where a truck of the Standard Vacuum Oil Co. delivering gasoline at a gas
station caught fire and, in order to prevent the burning of the station, the
truck was driven to the middle ofthe street and there abandoned, but it
continued to move and thereafter crashed against and burned a house on the
other side of the street, the owner of the house had a cause of action against
the owner of the gas station under paragraph 2 of Art. 101, in relation to
paragraph 4 of Art. 11. (Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., 91 Phil. 672)
Article 101 in relation to Art. 4 Par. 4 – “Civil
Liability”
Article 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. - The exemption from criminal liability
established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this Code
does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following rules:
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11, the persons for whose benefit the harm has
been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have received.
The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall be
liable.
When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability
also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events,
whenever the damages have been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents,
indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.
Article 11 Par. 5 – FULFILLMENT OF DUTY OR
LAWFUL EXERCISE OF RIGHT OR OFFICE.
5. Any person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the
lawful exercise of a right or office.
Requisites:
1. That the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in
the lawful exercise of a right or office
- Legitimate performance of duty NOT Illegal performance
of duty.
2. That the injury caused or the offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or
the lawful exercise of such right or office.
Case: People vs. Felipe Delima (G.R. No. L-18660 | December 22, 1922)
Facts: Lorenzo Napilon escaped from the jail where he was serving sentence.
Some days afterwards the policeman, Felipe Delima, who was looking for him, found him in the house of Jorge Alegria,
armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of a lance, and demanded his surrender. The fugitive answered with a
stroke of his lance. The policeman dodged it, and to impose his authority fired his revolver, but the bullet did not hit him.
The criminal ran away, without parting with his weapon. The peace officer went after him and fired again his revolver, this
time hitting and killing him.
The policeman was tried and convicted by the Court of First Instance of homicide and sentenced to reclusion temporal and
the accessory penalties.
Held: The killing was done in the performance of a duty. The deceased was under the obligation to surrender, and had no
right, after evading service of his sentence, to commit assault and disobedience with a weapon in his hand, which compelled
the policeman to resort to such an extreme means, which, although it proved to be fatal, was justified by the circumstances.
Vs People v Oanis (G.R. No. L-47722 | July 27, 1943)
In the case of People vs. Oanis, supra, it was held that although an officer in making a lawful
arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the
offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect
himself from bodily harm, yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or in
treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest
could be effected otherwise.
The doctrine is restated in the Rules of Court thus: "No violence or unnecessary force shall be
used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint
than is necessary for his detention." (Rule 113, Sec. 2, par. 2)
Article 11 Par. 5 – Distinguished from self-defense
and from consequence of felonious act.
Fulfillment of duty to prevent the escape of a prisoner is different from self-defense,
because they are based on different principles.
Fulfillment of Duty = the person fulfilling such duty is cloaked with authority to
discharge such duty either by right or by office.
e.g. The executioner of the Bilibid Prison cannot be held liable for murder for the
execution performed by him because he was merely acting in the lawful exercise of his
office.
A surgeon who amputated the leg of a patient to save him from gangrene is not liable for
the crime of mutilation, because he was acting in the lawful exercise of his office.
Article 11 Par. 5 – Lawful Exercise of a Right vis-
à-vis Doctrine of Self-help
Lawful exercise of right
Under the Civil Code (Art. 429), the owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any
person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use such force as may be
reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation
of his property.
If in protecting his possession of the property he injured (not seriously) the one trying to get it from him,
he is justified under this paragraph.
Under this paragraph (lawful exercise of a right), it is not necessary that there be unlawful aggression
against the person charged with the protection of the property. If there is unlawful aggression against the
person charged with the protection of the property, then paragraph 1 of Art. 11 applies, it being a defense
of right to property.
Article 11 Par. 6 – Obedience to an Order Issued
For Some Lawful Purpose
Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose.
Requisites:
1. That an order has been issued by a superior.
2. That such order must be for some lawful purpose.
3. That the means used by the subordinate to carry out said
order is lawful.
- Both the person who gives the order and the person who executes it, must be acting within
the limitations prescribed by law. (People vs. Wilson and Dolores, 52 Phil. 919)
Illustration:
Example of absence of the third requisite.
The court ordered that the convict should be executed on
a certain date. The executioner put him to death on a day
earlier than the date fixed by the court.
The execution of the convict, although by virtue of a
lawful order of the court, was carried out against the
provision of Art. 82. The executioner is guilty of murder.
Art. 82. Notification and execution of the sentence and assistance to the culprit. — The
court shall designate a working day for the execution but not the hour thereof; and such
designation shall not be communicated to the offender before sunrise of said day, and
the execution shall not take place until after the expiration of at least eight hours
following the notification, but before sunset. During the interval between the
notification and the execution, the culprit shall, in so far as possible, be furnished such
assistance as he may request in order to be attended in his last moments by priests or
ministers of the religion he professes and to consult lawyers, as well as in order to make
a will and confer with members of his family or persons in charge of the management of
his business, of the administration of his property, or of the care of his descendants.
Points to Consider:
1. When the order is not for a lawful purpose, the subordinate who obeyed it is criminally
liable.
e.g.
(2) A soldier who, in obedience to the order of his sergeant, tortured to death the deceased
for bringing a kind of fish different from that he had been asked to furnish a constabulary
detachment, is criminally liable. Obedience to an order of a superior is justified only
when the order is for some lawful purpose. The order to torture the deceased was illegal,
and the accused was not bound to obey it. (People vs. Margen, et al., 85 Phil. 839)
Points to Consider:
2. The subordinate is not liable for carrying out an illegal order of his superior,
if he is not aware of the illegality of the order and he is not negligent.
e.g. When the accused acted upon orders of superior officers, which he, as
military subordinate, could not question, and obeyed the orders in good faith,
without being aware of their illegality, without any fault or negligence on his
part, he is not liable because he had no criminal intent and he was not
negligent. (People vs. Beronilla, 96 Phil. 566)
Part 2: Article 12
Exempting Circumstances
Sources:
By Luis B. Reyes
Andrei Dave Nebril

Sam Portes
Art. 12: Exempting Circumstances
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability — The following are exempt from criminal liability:
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito), the court
shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall
not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.
2. A person under nine years of age –
- Modified by RA 9344 Sec. 6. Minimum age of responsibility is now 15 years or under. A child fifteen years of age
or under is exempt from criminal liability under Rep. Act No. 9344 (Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006).
3. A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with discernment, in which case, such
minor shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Article 80 of this Code.
- Modified by RA 9344 Sec. 6. Where the age is now 15 years but below 18 years of age. The child shall now be
subject to an intervention program.
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an
injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it.
5. Any person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force.
6. Any person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an
equal or greater injury.
7. Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when prevented
by some lawful or insuperable cause.
1. Definition
Exempting circumstances (non-
imputability) are those grounds for
exemption from punishment because
there is wanting in the agent of the
crime any of the conditions which
make the act voluntary or negligent.
2. Basis
The exemption from punishment is based on the complete absence of
intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on
the part of the accused.
Under the Revised Penal Code, a person must act with malice or negligence
to be criminally liable. One who acts without intelligence, freedom of action
or intent does not act with malice. On the other hand, one who acts without
intelligence, freedom of action or fault does not act with negligence.
Article 12 – Exempting Circumstance
Prosecution
Proof
Art. 12 Par. 1
- Imbecile and Insanity
Imbecile Insane
The following are
An imbecile is one who, while During lucid interval, the insane acts
exempt from criminal advanced in age, has a mental with intelligence.
liability: development comparable to that of
children between two and seven
Par. 1 — An imbecile years of age.
or an insane person, One who is deprived completely of mere abnormality of mental faculties
reason or discernment and freedom is not enough, especially if the
unless the latter has of the will at the time of committing offender has not lost consciousness
acted during a lucid the crime. of his acts
interval. exempt in all cases from criminal not so exempt if it can be shown that
liability he acted during a lucid interval
Art. 12 Par. 1
To constitute insanity, there must be complete deprivation of intelligence or
that there be a total deprivation of the freedom of the will.
Insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act, that is, the accused is deprived of reason, he acts without
the least discernment, because there is a complete absence of the power to
discern, or that there is a total deprivation of freedom of the will.
The exempting circumstance of insanity or imbecility is based on the
complete absence of intelligence, an element of voluntariness.
Art. 12 Par. 1
Procedure when the imbecile or the insane committed a felony:
The court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums
established for persons afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave
without first obtaining the permission of the court.
Note: A court has no power to permit the insane person to leave the asylum
without first obtaining the opinion of the Director of Health that he may be
released without danger. (Chin Ah Foo vs. Conception, 54 Phil. 775)
Art. 12 Par. 1
As a defense vis-à-vis burden of proof
The defense must prove that the accused was insane at the time of the
commission of the crime, because the presumption is always in favor of sanity.
(People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204, 206)
Sanity being the normal condition of the human mind, the prosecution may
proceed upon the presumption that the accused was sane and responsible when
the act was committed. The presumption is always in favor of sanity and the
burden of proof of insanity is on the defense. (People vs. Aquino, G.R. No.
87084, June 27, 1990, 186 SCRA 851, 858, citing cases)
Art. 12 Par. 1
Q: How much evidence is necessary to overthrow the presumption of sanity?
A: To prove insanity, therefore, circumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing, will suffice. (People vs.
Bonoan, 64 Phil. 93)
- Evidence of the condition of his mind during a reasonable period both before and after that time.
- Direct testimony is not required, nor are specific acts of derangement essential to establish insanity as a
defense. Mind can be known only by outward acts. Thereby, we read the thoughts, the motives and emotions
of a person and come to determine whether his acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind.
Evidence of insanity
- The evidence of insanity must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment
of its execution. If the evidence points to insanity subsequent to the commission of the crime, the accused
cannot be acquitted. He is presumed to be sane when he committed it.
Art. 12 Par. 1
What are covered by the term insanity?
• Dementia praecox or Schizophrenia
• A severe mental health disorder, this condition can lead to a warped interpretation of reality,
and can significantly impact the person living with it, as well as those closest to them.
• Kleptomania
• Irresistible impulse to steal is irresistible. If the mental disease or mental defect of the
accused only diminishes the exercise of his will power and did not deprive him of the
consciousness of his acts, then kleptomania, if it be the result of his mental disease or
mental defect, is only a mitigating circumstance.
Art. 12 Par. 1
• Epilepsy
• a chronic nervous disease characterized by fits, occurring at intervals, attended by
convulsive motions of the muscles and loss of consciousness.
Art. 12 Par. 1
What are NOT covered by the term insanity?
• Feeblemindedness
• Unable to make intelligent decisions or judgments. No longer classified as a medical
illness.
• Pedophilia
• a sexual disorder wherein the subject has strong, recurrent and uncontrollable sexual
and physical fantasies about children which he tries to fulfill, especially when there
are no people around.
Art. 12 Par. 1
• Amnesia
• refers to the loss of memories, such as facts, information and experiences.
• Amnesia, in and of itself, is no defense to a criminal charge unless it is shown by
competent proof that the accused did not know the nature and quality of his action
and that it was wrong.
Art. 12 Par. 1
Other cases of lack of intelligence
1. Committing a crime while in a dream

- Somnambulism or sleepwalking
2. Committing a crime while suffering from malignant malaria
- such illness affects the nervous system and causes among others such
complication as acute melancholia and insanity at times.
Art. 12 Par. 2
- A person under 15 years of age
Age of absolute irresponsibility raised to fifteen years of age.
Republic Act No. 9344 otherwise known as "Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Act of 2006" raised the age of absolute irresponsibility from nine (9) to
fifteen (15) years of age.
Under Section 6 of the said law, a child fifteen (15) years of age or under at
the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability. However, the child shall be subject to an intervention program as
provided under Section 20 of the same law.
Art. 12 Par. 2
- A person under 15 years of age
Art. 12 Par. 3
- A person above 15 years but below 18
Par. 3. — A person over nine years of age and under fifteen, unless he has acted with
discernment, in which case, such minor shall be proceeded against in accordance with the
provisions of Article 80 of this Code.
As amended by RA 9344:
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be
exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she
has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subject to the
appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from
civil liability, which shall be enforce in accordance with existing laws.
Art. 12 Par. 3
Children above fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) years of age who acted without
discernment exempt from criminal liability
GR: The minor is presumed to have acted without discernment.
XPTN: "unless he/she acted with discernment" - indicates an exception to the general
rule that a minor under 18 but above 15 has acted without discernment.
A minor under eighteen (18) but above fifteen (15) must have acted with
discernment to incur criminal liability. Thus, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to
prove that a minor who is over 15 but under 18 years of age has acted with
discernment, in order for the minor not to be entitled to this exempting circumstance.
Art. 12 Par. 3
What is Discernment?
is a mental capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong,
and such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each
case, the very appearance, the very attitude, the very comportment and
behavior of said minor, not only before and during the commission of the
act, but also after and even during the trial.
Art. 12 Par. 3
As compared to intent
Both are products of the mental processes within a person. But:
- "intent" refers to the desired act of the person or the purpose to use a
particular means to effect such result
- "discernment" relates to the moral significance that a person ascribes to the
said act. Hence, a person may not intend to shoot another but may be aware
of the consequences of his negligent act which may cause injury to the same
person in negligently handling an air rifle.
Art. 12 Par. 3
Discernment may be shown by:
(1) the manner the crime was committed, or
(2) the conduct of the offender after its commission.
Art. 12
Periods of criminal responsibility
(1) The age of absolute irresponsibility — 15 years and below (infancy).
(2) The age of conditional responsibility — 15 years and 1 day to 18 years.
(3) The age of full responsibility — 18 or over (adolescence) to 70 (maturity).
(4) The age of mitigated responsibility — over 9 and under 15, offender acting
with discernment; 15 or over but less than 18; over 70 years of age.
Hence, senility which is the age over 70 years, although said to be the second
childhood, is only a mitigated responsibility. It cannot be considered as similar
to infancy which is exempting.
Art. 12 Par. 3
- Determination of Age
The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority.
S/he shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with the law until he/she
is proven to be eighteen (18) years old or older. The age of a child may be
determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any
other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be
based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of other
persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In
case of doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor.
Art. 12 Par. 3
- Determination of Age
Any person contesting the age of the child in conflict with the law prior to the filing of the
information in any appropriate court may file a case in a summary proceeding for the
determination of age before the Family Court which shall decide the case within twenty-four
(24) hours from receipt of the appropriate pleadings of all interested parties.
If a case has been filed against the child in conflict with the law and is pending in the
appropriate court, the person shall file a motion to determine the age of the child in the same
court where the case is pending. Pending hearing on the said motion, proceedings on the main
case shall be suspended.
In all proceedings, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges and other government
officials concerned shall exert all efforts at determining the age of the child in conflict with the
law. (Sec. 7, Rep. Act No. 9344)
Article 12 Par. 4
- Injury by Accident
Par. 4. — Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury
by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it.
Elements:
1. A person is performing a lawful act;
- e.g. Striking another with a gun in self-defense, even if it fired and seriously injured the
assailant, is a lawful act.
2. With due care;
- The person performing a lawful act must do so with due care, without fault or
negligence.
Article 12 Par. 4
Elements:
3. He causes an injury to another by mere accident;
- An accident is something that happens outside the sway of our will, and although it
comes about through some act of our will, lies beyond the bounds of humanly
foreseeable consequences.
- On the other hand, negligence, on the other hand, is the failure to observe, for the
protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance
which the circumstances justly demand without which such other person suffers injury.
Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the other.
Article 12 Par. 4
4. Without fault or intention of causing it. (See People vs. Vitug, 8 CAR [2s] 905, 909)
- the act should’ve happened by accident not through negligence
Basis of Paragraph 4
The exempting circumstance in paragraph 4 of Art. 12 is based on lack of negligence and intent.
Under this circumstance, a person does not commit either an intentional felony or a culpable felony.
The exempting circumstance of Art. 12(4) of the Revised Penal Code refers to purely accidental
cases where there was absolutely no intention to commit the wrong done. It contemplates a
situation where a person is in the act of doing something legal, exercising due care, diligence and
prudence but in the process, produces harm or injury to someone or something not in the least in the
mind of the actor — an accidental result flowing out of a legal act.
Article 12 Par. 4 vis-à-vis Article 101
Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption
from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article
12 and in subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this Code does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the
following rules…
Hence, there’s no criminal liability as well as civil liability in Article 4.

Article 12 Par. 4 Illustrative Case
Scenario: A and B got into an altercation on a town square during a festive
day. A drew a .45 caliber pistol and shot twice in the air. The bout continued,
however, so he fired another shot at the ground. Unfortunately, the bullet
ricocheted and hit C, an innocent bystander, who died thereafter.
Held: The mishap should be classed as homicide through reckless
imprudence. It is apparent the defendant willfully discharged his gun,
without taking the precautions demanded by the circumstances that the
district was populated, and the likelihood that his bullet would glance over
the hard pavement of the thoroughfare.
Scenario: A while driving his automobile on the proper side of the road at a
moderate speed and with due diligence, suddenly and unexpectedly saw a
man in front of his vehicle coming from the sidewalk and crossing the street
without any warning that he would do so. Because it was not physically
possible to avoid hitting him, the said chauffeur ran over the man with his
car.
Held: A is not criminally liable, it being a mere accident.
Article 12 Par. 5 – Person acting under
the compulsion of an irresistible force
Par. 5. — Any person who acts under the compulsion of
an irresistible force.
Elements:
1. That the compulsion is by means of physical force.
- Before a force can be considered to be an irresistible
one, it must produce such an effect upon the individual
that, in spite of all resistance, it reduces him to a mere
instrument and, as such, incapable of committing a crime.
Elements:
2. That the physical force must be irresistible.
- It must be such that, in spite of the resistance of the person on whom it operates, it
compels his members to act and his mind to obey.
- The force must be irresistible to reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts not only
without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present,
imminent and impending and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension
of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A threat of future injury is not
enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to the
accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat.
Elements:
3. That the physical force must come from a third person.
- Such a force can never consist in anything which springs primarily from the
man himself; it must be a force which acts upon him from the outside and by a
third person.
- The irresistible force can never consist in an impulse or
passion, o r obfuscation.
coming from a third person.
Article 12 Par. 5 – Illustrative Case
Scenario: On a Thursday morning at 2am, A, B and C stopped a truck
traversing along a deserted, damaged portion of the Maharlika Highway in
Albay. They got into the truck, declared hold-up, took all the money and
other belongings of its 3 passengers. A then shot the driver and his fellow
driver. B asked the remaining passenger (D) to drive the truck to a nearby
unfinished farm-to-market road. Striking him with the butts of their guns,
they compelled him to bury the bodies.
Can D be held criminally liable as an accessory to the crim?
Art. 19. Accessories. — Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the
commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as
principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of
the following manners:
xxxx
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime or the effects or
instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery.
Held: D cannot be held criminally liable as accessory for concealing the
body of the crime of murder committed by the A, B and C, because D acted
under the compulsion of an irresistible force.
Basis of Paragraph 5:
The exempting circumstance in paragraph 5 of Art. 12 is based on the
complete absence of freedom, an element of voluntariness.
A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one
who acts under the impulse of uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury,
is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with freedom
(People vs. Loreno, No. L-54414, July 9, 1984, 130 SCRA 311, 321).
an impulse of an uncontrollable fear
Par. 6. — Any person who acts under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.
Elements:
1. That the threat which causes the fear is of an evil
greater than or at least equal to, that which he is
required to commit;
2. That it promises an evil of such gravity and
imminence that the ordinary man would have
succumbed to it.
Article 12 Par. 6 – Person acting under an impulse of
an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.
For the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear to be invoked

successfully, the following requisites must concur:
(a) existence of an uncontrollable fear;
(b) the fear must be real and imminent; and
(c) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed.
Article 12 Par. 6 – Person acting under an impulse of
an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury.
Points to Consider:
• Duress as a valid defense should be based on real, imminent, or reasonable fear
for one's life or limb and should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote fear.
• The accused must not have opportunity for escape or self-defense.
• A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a
character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape or self-defense in
equal combat.
• Speculative, fanciful and remote fear is not uncontrollable fear.
Article 12 Par. 5 and 6
Distinction between irresistible force (Par. 5) and uncontrollable fear (Par.
6):
In irresistible force (par. 5), the offender uses violence or physical force to
compel another person to commit a crime; in uncontrollable fear (par. 6), the
offender employs intimidation or threat in compelling another to commit a
crime.
Five robbers entered a bank and they told the employees to lie on the floor. One
of the bank robbers was guarding the employees. Then a robber took hold of an
employee and placed him before the bank manager. He threated the general
manager that he will shoot the employee if he does not open the vault. Only the
manager knew the combination of the said vault. The manager did not believe so
he did not open the vault. A who was true to his word shot the employee who
immediately died. He then pointed the gun to the manager and said that if he did
not open the vault, the next bullet would be on his head. Afraid, the manger
opened the said vault and the robbers were able to take all the money. The robbers
escaped but were later apprehended.
The manager was arrested and charged as a principal by indispensable
cooperation (Art. 17). Manager however said that he acted based on
uncontrollable fear and irresistible force.
- Will he be exempted?
- Was there a physical force employed on him?
- Was the physical force irresistible and did it come from a third person?
Art. 17. Principals – The following are considered principals:
xxx
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act
without which it would not have been accomplished.
The said physical force was irresistible that he would be killed is irresistible.
He knew that the employee was shot and he too can be shot. And it comes
from a third person.
Likewise, there was uncontrollable fear. All the elements were present. The
bank robber already shot the employee and he too could be shot. The fear is
real and imminent and it is not in the future, it is in the present. It is about to
happen. And the fear for his life is greater than all the money in that vault.
Therefore, he is exempt.
Ty v. People, G.R. No. 149275, 27 September 2004
Facts: Seven informations for violation of BP 22 were filed against
petitioner Vicky Ty before the RTC of Manila. The prosecution alleged that
the mother and sister of Ty were patients of the Manila Doctor’s Hospital. Ty
executed a promissory note secured by 7 postdated checks payable to the
hospital. They were all dishonored due to insufficiency of funds, prompting
the Hospital to send demand letters to Ty but the letters went unheeded.
Ty claimed that she issued the checks because of an uncontrollable fear of a greater
injury. She was forced to do so to obtain the release of her mother whom the
hospital would not discharge unless the hospital bills are paid. The “debasing
treatment” was so severe that her mother contemplated suicide if she would not be
discharged from the hospital.
The RTC convicted Ty as charged, giving full credence to the prosecution evidence
and disregarded Ty’s defense. On appeal, Ty reiterated that she acted under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear, and claimed the absence of valuable consideration
for the issuance of the checks, and that the hospital had knowledge that her bank
account lacked funds, but the CA rejected all her defenses.
Issue: Whether Ty was acting under the impulse of an incontrollable fear of
a greater injury when she issued the 7 checks.
Ruling: Petition DENIED.
The Court finds the petition to be without merit and accordingly sustain Ty’s
conviction.
Ratio:
In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and
imminent. Ty claims that she was compelled to issue the checks—a
condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother could be
discharged—for fear that her mother’s health might deteriorate further due
to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her mother might
commit suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the uncontrollable fear
contemplated by law.
Ratio:
Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no choice but
to commit a crime. She did not take advantage of the many opportunities
available to her to avoid committing one. By her very own words, she
admitted that the collateral or security the hospital required prior to the
discharge of her mother may be in the form of postdated checks or jewelry.
And if indeed she was coerced to open an account with the bank and issue
the checks, she had all the opportunity to leave the scene to avoid
involvement.
Article 12 Par. 6
Basis of paragraph 6:
The exempting circumstance in paragraph 6 of Art. 12 is also based on the
complete absence of freedom.
“Actus me invito factus non est meus actus.”
(An act done by me against my will is not my act)
Article 12 Par. 7
Par. 7. — Any person who fails to perform an act required by law, when
prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause.
Elements:
1. That an act is required by law to be done;
2. That a person fails to perform such act;
3. That his failure to perform such act was due to some lawful or insuperable
cause.
- impossible to overcome.
Article 12 Par. 7
The law requires the person to require a lawful act, but was prevented because of
an insuperable cause. This is based on omission. Here the offender is required by
law to perform an act but was prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause.
Here, there is both no criminal and civil liability as contemplated in Article 101
of the RPC.
Note that it is one of the instances in exempting circumstances that the actor is
exempt from both criminal and civil liability. It is akin to a justifying
circumstance because what prevented the offender from performing a lawful act
is a lawful cause.
Article 12 Par. 7 vis-à-vis Article 101
Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption
from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article
12 and in subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this Code does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the
following rules…
(lawful cause)
There is a war in which the Philippines is involved. A,
B, and C conspired to commit treason against the
government. A, one of the conspirators went to the
priest and confided to the priest that there was
conspiracy between B and C to commit treason
against the government. Despite knowledge on the
conspiracy to commit treason, the priest did not
immediately divulge it to the police.
Art. 116. Misprision of treason. — Every person owing allegiance to the
Government of the Philippine Islands, without being a foreigner, and having
knowledge of any conspiracy against them, conceals or does not disclose
and make known the same, as soon as possible to the governor or fiscal of
the province, or the mayor or fiscal of the city in which he resides, as the
case may be, shall be punished as an accessory to the crime of treason.
Under Art 116, the priest is criminally liable for misprision of treason, for
not divulging the conspiracy to commit treason. However, the priest failed
to perform such act due to a lawful cause. Under your rules on evidence, a
confession made to a priest is considered as a privileged communication.
Therefore the priest does not incur any criminal liability (Sec. 24[d], Rule
130, Rules of Court).
Rule 130
(Rules of Admissibility of the Rules on Evidence)
Section 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. — The
following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the
following cases:
xxx
(d) A minister or priest cannot, without the consent of the person making the
confession, be examined as to any confession made to or any advice given
by him in his professional character in the course of discipline enjoined by
the church to which the minister or priest belongs;
(insuperable cause)
A, the municipal president detained B, the offended party, for
three days because to take him to the nearest justice of the
peace required a journey for three days by boat as there was
no other means of transportation.
Under the law, the person arrested must be delivered to the
nearest judicial authority at most within thirty-six hours (Art.
125 RPC); otherwise, the public officer will be liable for
arbitrary detention. The distance which required a journey for
three days was considered an insuperable cause. Hence, it
was held that the accused was exempt from criminal liability.
(insuperable cause)
Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial
authorities. — The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be
imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for
some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial
authorities within the period of; twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses
punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for
crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent
and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes, or offenses punishable by afflictive or
capital penalties, or their equivalent.
Article 12 Par. 7
Basis of paragraph 7:
The circumstance in paragraph 7 of Art. 12 exempts the accused from
criminal liability, because he acts without intent, the third condition of
voluntariness in intentional felony.
Exempting Circumstance
In all the exempting circumstances, intent is wanting in the agent of the crime.
Intent presupposes the exercise of freedom and the use of intelligence.
Hence, in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Art. 12, the imbecile, insane, or minor, not
having intelligence, does not act with intent. The person acting under any of
the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 5 and 6 of Art. 12, not having
freedom of action, does not act with intent. In paragraph 4 of Art. 12, it is
specifically stated that the actor causes an injury by mere accident without
intention of causing it.
Justifying vs Exempting Circumstances
(1) A person who acts by virtue of a justifying circumstance does not transgress the law, that is,
he does not commit any crime in the eyes of the law, because there is nothing unlawful in the act
as well as in the intention of the actor. The act of such person is in itself both just and lawful.
In justifying circumstances, there is neither a crime nor a criminal. No civil liability, except in
par. 4 (causing damage to another in state of necessity).
(2) In exempting circumstances, there is a crime but no criminal liability. The act is not justified,
but the actor is not criminally liable. There is civil liability, except in pars. 4 and 7 (causing an
injury by mere accident; failing to perform an act required by law when prevented by some
lawful or insuperable cause) of Art. 12. (See Art. 101 which does not mention pars. 4 and 7 of
Art. 12)
Justifying vs Exempting Circumstances
Justifying Circumstances Exempting Circumstances
Source: Article 11 Source: Article 12
Act is justified. Hence, lawful. No crime. The act is not justified, but the actor is not
criminally liable by virtue of exemption due to
lack of intent and voluntariness.
Gen. rule: No criminal liability. No Civil liability. Gen. Rule: No criminal liability BUT with Civil
- XPTN in terms of Civil liability: Par. 4 (causing liability.
damage to another in state of necessity) - XPTN from Civil liability: Par. 4 (causing an
injury by mere accident) and 7 (failing to perform
an act required by law when prevented by some
lawful or insuperable cause)

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CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH

AFFECT CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Andrei Dave Nebril

A. Justifying Circumstances (Art. 11)

Andrei Dave Nebril

In stating that the persons mentioned therein "do not

2. Imminent — that the danger is on the point of happening. It is not

SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION - adequate to stir a person to do the

Sec. 26. Battered Women Syndrome as a Defense. — Victim- survivors who

A battered woman has been defined as a woman "who is

Flight, incompatible with self-defense

A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient to justify the commission of an

Andrei Dave Nebril

1. Committing a crime while in a dream

Hence, there’s no criminal liability as well as civil liability in Article 4.

For the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear to be invoked

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