Fire Technology and Safety Engineering Nuclear Safety and Radioactive Materials Kamal Shukla

FIRE TECHNOLOGY AND SAFETY ENGINEERING
NUCLEAR SAFETY AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
KAMAL SHUKLA
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
UNIT 1
RADIATION AND RADIOACTIVITY
What is radiation?
• In physics, radiation is the emission or transmission
of energy in the form of waves or particles through space or
through a material medium. This includes:
• electromagnetic radiation, such as radio
waves, microwaves, infrared, visible light, ultraviolet, x-rays,
and gamma radiation (γ)
• particle radiation, such as alpha radiation (α), beta radiation
(β), and neutron radiation (particles of non-zero rest energy)
• acoustic radiation, such as ultrasound, sound, and seismic
waves (dependent on a physical transmission medium).
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
TYPES OF RADIATION
1. Ionizing radiation-Ionizing radiation is radiation with
enough energy so that during an interaction with an atom, it
can remove tightly bound electrons from the orbit of an
atom, causing the atom to become charged or ionized.
2. Non ionizing radiation- It is a radiation in the part of
electromagnetic spectrum are insufficient energy to cause
ionization.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
RADIOACTIVITY
Radioactivity, property exhibited by certain types of matter of
emitting energy and subatomic particles spontaneously. It is, in
essence, an attribute of individual atomic nuclei. An unstable nucleus
will decompose spontaneously, or decay, into a more stable
configuration but will do so only in a few specific ways by emitting
certain particles or certain forms of electromagnetic energy.
Radioactive decay is a property of several naturally occurring

elements as well as of artificially produced isotopes of the elements.
The decay in alpha particles, beta particles and gamma radiation .
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
TYPES OF DECAY PARTICLES
1. Alpha particles- Alpha particles are helium-4 nuclei (two
protons and two neutrons). They interact with matter
strongly due to their charges and combined mass, and at
their usual velocities only penetrate a few centimetres of air,
or a few millimetres of low density material.
2. Beta radiation- These are high energy and speed electrons
emitted from radioactive materials such as k-40. r=Radiation
consists of an energetic electron. It is more penetrating than
alpha radiation, but less than gamma.
3. Gamma radiation- Gamma radiation, however, is composed
of photons, which have neither mass nor electric charge and,
as a result, penetrates much further through matter than
either alpha or beta radiation.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
IONIZING EFFECT
• Non-stochastic effect- These are caused by significant

cell damage health, the physical effect will occur when the
cell death burden is very large enough to cause obvious
functional impairment of tissue or organ. The diseases are
skin erythema, contract of eyes cells, sterility effect, radiation
sickness, etc.
• Stochastic effect- it is occur due to ionizing radiation

effect of symmetrical translocation tracking place during cell
divison, heredity.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
RADIATION EXPOSURE
• Internal exposure-Internal radiation exposure hazards result
from radioactive material that gets inside the body when you breathe it or
eat it or when it passes through your skin. Internal radioactive materials
produce radiation exposure the entire time they are in the body until the
material is no longer radioactive (it decays) or is removed naturally by the
body.
• External exposure-External exposure is radiation that comes from
somewhere outside the body and interacts with us. The exposure occurs
when the radiation from these sources interacts with our body and
the dose occurs when the radiation leaves some of the energy in our body.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF RADIATIONS
The ionisation provoked in cells all along the radiation
pathway can lead to modifications in the chemical structure
of simple molecules such as water as well as the more
complex, indispensable molecules of DNA. Radiation can
weaken a body genetic material by either ripping holes in the
DNA structure or changing the chemical bases it uses.
At higher intensities, radiation can affect ordinary (somatic)
cells or those which play a role in reproduction. In the former
case the consequences can lead to the appearance of
cancers, while damage inflicted to seminal cells can cause a
reduction in fertility or even mutation.
A dose absorbed in a given length of time is more toxic than
the same dose absorbed over longer periods.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
RADIATION PROTECTION
Radiation protection, also known as radiological protection, is
defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as
"The protection of people from harmful effects of exposure
to ionizing radiation, and the means for achieving this".
Fundamental to radiation protection is the avoidance or
reduction of dose using the simple protective measures of
time, distance and shielding. The duration of exposure should
be limited to that necessary, the distance from the source of
radiation should be maximised, and the source shielded
wherever possible.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
FACTORS
1. Time-
• Exposure from radiation source is directly proportional to time
• Reduce period of exposure to radiation to reduce the dose received
from source.
2. Distance-
• Increase distance from source to decrease exposure rate.
• I1 d12 = I2 d 22 (Inverse square law)
• Double the distance from the source; dose-rate falls to ¼ the
original value.
• Halve the distance from the source; dose-rate increase to 4 times
the original value.
• More the distance from source -Lesser the radiation
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
3. Shielding-
• Use an appropriate shielding material or protection devices
• Shielding reduces exposure rate:
I = I 0 e - µt
µ- linear attenuation coefficient of shielding material
t – Thickness of shielding material
I0 – Initial exposure rate
I – Exposure rate after transmission from shielding
• Use large shielding thickness (High Z materials eg Lead, Steel, Concrete,
etc) - reduce the exposure rate of gamma/X-ray radiation.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES
These are classified on basis of their potential or as acute or
chronic . The type of substance whether solid, liquid, or gas, it
may cause harm your health or property damage.
According to DOT( Department of Transportation) regulation into
9 types of substances-
1. Explosive
2. Gaseous
3. Flammable liquid
4. Flammable solid
5. Oxidizer
6. Poison
7. Radioactive
8. Corrosive
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
9. Miscellaneous
PLACARDS AND LABELS
Placards and labels use as the function primary as an

information system designed to alert you to a material
assigned to a hazard class. A material which allow you to
research with specific information for that materials. Now a
hazard class will still enable you to make better inform
decision curing the early state go a transportation os mishap.
The label and placard information system generally include
following components-
• Background color
• Hazard class name( display in centre)
• Hazard class number(display in lower corner)
• Symbol(upper corner)
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Background color, hazard class number, symbol usually
depends upon the materials primary hazard class. Placards
and labels with a white background color usually indentify
material as poisonous primary hazard class and red
background represent flammable material primary hazard
class. Materials in flammable( solid, liquid, and gas) primary
hazard class are usually identify by flame symbol.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
ON ROADWAYS
• Hazardous materials transported on roadways must carry a
Department of Transportation (DOT) warning label on the
package. Vehicles transporting quantities of hazardous
materials must have DOT placards affixed to all sides of the
vehicle. Bulk shipments, such as in gasoline tanker trucks, will
have a four digit numeric code instead of the hazard class in
the centre of the placard. This number can be referenced in
the DOTs "Emergency Response Guide Book" to determine
the identity and the emergency handling for the chemical
involved.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Difference between Placard and Label
Label and a placard: big difference is whether something has a way of
moving down the rail or the road. So, a label goes on what we call a
small means of containment that less than 450-liter package, which
would be your typical box or something that gets loaded onto a truck.
That gets a label.
The truck that the package gets loaded onto gets placards. So, placards,
there's Tracey showing a picture of placard there. Placards get put on
something that's moving down the road or the rail for example.
Labels and placards are two different kinds of safety marks. Labels get
put on small means of containment; placards get put on vehicles or
large means of containment
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
RADIOACTIVE PLACARDS AND LABELS
1. White 1- The lowest level of label is a White 1. If the
radiation level at the surface of the package is less
than 0.5 mR/hr then it can be labelled with the
White 1 label. White 1 packages don’t have a
Transport Index – by the time you get to a distance
of a meter there won’t be anything that you can
measure.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
2. Yellow 2- You will use a Yellow 2 label for packages with
surface radiation dose rates of up to 50 mR/hr and that are
less than 1 mR/hr (TI < 1) at a distance of 1 meter.
3. Yellow 3- These are used to label any packages with surface

radiation dose rates in excess of 50 mR/hr OR for any
packages with a TI greater than 1 (that is, where dose rate is
higher than 1 mR/hr at a distance of 1 meter from the
package)
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
RADIATION MONITORING
Radiation monitoring involves the measurement of radiation dose or
radionuclide contamination for reasons related to the assessment or
control of exposure to radiation or radioactive substances, and the
interpretation of the results.
Radiation monitoring is carried out:
— To assess workplace conditions and individual exposures;
—To ensure acceptably safe and satisfactory radiological conditions in the
workplace;
— To keep records of monitoring, over a long period of time, for the
purposes of regulation or good practice.
Radiation monitoring instruments are used both for area monitoring
and for individual monitoring. The instruments used for measuring
radiation levels are referred to as area survey meters (or area monitors)
and the instruments used for recording the equivalent doses received by
individuals working with radiation are referred to as personal dosimeters
(or individual dosimeters). BY KAMAL SHUKLA
EQUIPMENTS
1. Geiger- Muller Counter-Geiger counter is a device which is
used to detect and measure particles in the ionized gases. It is
widely used in applications like radiological protection, radiation
dosimetry, and experimental physics. It is made up of the metallic
tube, filled with gas and a high voltage range of multiples of 100V is
applied to this gas. It detects alpha, beta, and gamma particles.
When radioactive isotopes are used in medical research work on
humans, it is important to make sure that the amount of
radioactive material administered to human subjects is as little as
possible. In order to achieve this, a very sensitive instrument is
necessary to measure the radioactivity of materials. A ‘particle
detector’ to measure the ionizing radiation was developed by
Geiger and Muller in the year 1928 and they called it a ‘Geiger
Muller Counter’ which in short is known as the ‘GM counter.’
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Principle of GM Counter-When an ionizing particle passes
through the gas in an ionizing chamber, it produces a few ions. If
the applied potential difference is strong enough, these ions will
produce a secondary ion avalanche whose total effect will be
proportional to the energy associated with the primary ionizing
event.
A high energy particle entering through the mica window will

cause one or more of the argon atoms to ionize. The electrons
and ions of argon thus produced cause other argon atoms to
ionize in a cascade effect. The result of this one event is sudden,
massive electrical discharge that causes a current pulse. The
current through R produces a voltage pulse of the order of 10μV.
An electron pulse amplifier accepts the small pulse voltage and
amplifies them to about 5 to 50 V. The amplified output is then
applied to a counter. As each incoming particle produces a pulse,
the number of incoming particles can be counted.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Working of GM Counter- The tube is filled with Argon gas,
and around voltage of +400 Volts is applied to the thin wire in
the middle. When a particle arrives into the tube, it takes an
electron from Argon atom. The electron is attracted to the
central wire and as it rushes towards the wire, the electron
will knock other electrons from Argon atoms, causing an
"avalanche". Thus one single incoming particle will cause
many electrons to arrive at the wire, creating a pulse which
can be amplified and counted. This gives us a very sensitive
detector.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
2.Pocket Chamber Dosimeters- Pocket dosimeters are
used to provide the wearer with an immediate reading of his
or her exposure to x-rays and gamma rays. As the name
implies, they are commonly worn in the pocket. The two types
commonly used in industrial radiography are the Direct Read
Pocket Dosimeter and the Digital Electronic Dosimeter.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Types of Dosimeters
• Direct Read Pocket Dosimeter- The dosimeter contains a
small ionization chamber with a volume of approximately
two milliliters. Inside the ionization chamber is a central wire
anode, and attached to this wire anode is a metal coated
quartz fiber. When the anode is charged to a positive
potential, the charge is distributed between the wire anode
and quartz fiber. Electrostatic repulsion deflects the quartz
fiber, and the greater the charge, the greater the deflection
of the quartz fiber. The electrons produced by ionization are
attracted to, and collected by, the positively charged central
anode. This collection of electrons reduces the net positive
charge and allows the quartz fiber to return in the direction
of the original position. The amount of movement is directly
proportional to the amount of ionization which occurs.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
By pointing the instrument at a light source, the position of
the fiber may be observed through a system of built-in lenses.
The fiber is viewed on a translucent scale which is graduated
in units of exposure.
The principal advantage of a pocket dosimeter is its ability to
provide the wearer an immediate reading of his or her
radiation exposure.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
• Digital Electronic Dosimeter- These dosimeters record
dose information and dose rate. These dosimeters most often
use Geiger-Muller counters. The output of the radiation
detector is collected and, when a predetermined exposure
has been reached, the collected charge is discharged to
trigger an electronic counter. The counter then displays the
accumulated exposure and dose rate in digital form.
Some models can also be set to provide a continuous audible
signal when a preset exposure has been reached.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
IONIZATION CHAMBER
The ionization chamber is the simplest of all gas-filled radiation
detectors, and is widely used for the detection and
measurement of certain types of ionizing radiation; X-
rays, gamma rays, and beta particles. Conventionally, the term
"ionization chamber" is used exclusively to describe those
detectors which collect all the charges created by direct
ionization within the gas through the application of an electric
field.
An ionization chamber measures the charge from the number
of ion pairs created within a gas caused by incident radiation. It
consists of a gas-filled chamber with two electrodes; known
as anode and cathode. The electrodes may be in the form of
parallel plates (Parallel Plate Ionization Chambers: PPIC), or a
cylinder arrangement with a coaxially located internal anode
wire. BY KAMAL SHUKLA
A voltage potential is applied between the electrodes to create an
electric field in the fill gas. When gas between the electrodes is
ionized by incident ionizing radiation, ion-pairs are created and the
resultant positive ions and dissociated electrons move to the
electrodes of the opposite polarity under the influence of the
electric field. This generates an ionization current which is
measured by an electrometer circuit. The electrometer must be
capable of measuring the very small output current which is in the
region of femtoamperes to picoampzere, depending on the
chamber design, radiation dose and applied voltage.
Each ion pair created deposits or removes a small electric charge
to or from an electrode, such that the accumulated charge is
proportional to the number of ion pairs created, and hence the
radiation dose. This continual generation of charge produces an
ionization current, which is a measure of the total ionizing dose
entering the chamber
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
SCINTILLATION COUNTER
A scintillation counter is an instrument for detecting and
measuring ionizing radiation by using the excitation effect of
incident radiation on a scintillating material, and detecting the
resultant light pulses.
It consists of a scintillator which generates photons in response
to incident radiation, a sensitive photo detector (usually
a photomultiplier tube (PMT), a charge-coupled device (CCD)
camera, or a photodiode), which converts the light to an
electrical signal and electronics to process this signal.
When an ionizing particle passes into the scintillator material,
atoms are excited along a track. For charged particles the track
is the path of the particle itself. For gamma rays (uncharged),
their energy is converted to an energetic electron via either
the photoelectric effect, Compton scattering or pair production.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
The quantity is proportional to the energy deposited by the
ionizing particle. These can be directed to the photocathode of
a photomultiplier tube which emits at most one electron for
each arriving photon due to the photoelectric effect. This group
of primary electrons is electrostatically accelerated and focused
by an electrical potential so that they strike the first dynode of
the tube. The impact of a single electron on the dynode
releases a number of secondary electrons which are in turn
accelerated to strike the second dynode. Each subsequent
dynode impact releases further electrons, and so there is a
current amplifying effect at each dynode stage. Each stage is at
a higher potential than the previous to provide the accelerating
field.
The resultant output signal at the anode is a measurable pulse
for each group of photons from an original ionizing event in the
scintillator that arrived at the photocathode and carries
information about the energy of the original incident radiation.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
When it is fed to a charge amplifier which integrates the
energy information, an output pulse is obtained which is
proportional to the energy of the particle exciting the
scintillator.
The number of such pulses per unit time also gives

information about the intensity of the radiation. In some
applications individual pulses are not counted, but rather only
the average current at the anode is used as a measure of
radiation intensity.
The scintillator consists of a transparent crystal, usually a

phosphor, plastic (usually containing anthracene) or organic
liquid (see liquid scintillation counting) that fluoresces when
struck by ionizing radiation.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
UNIT 2
RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS

"Special nuclear material" (SNM) is defined by Title I
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954as plutonium,
uranium-233, or uranium enriched in the isotopes
uranium-233 or uranium-235, but does not include
source material. The definition includes any other
material that the Commission determines to be
special nuclear material. The NRC has not declared
any other material as special nuclear material.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL COME FROM?
Uranium-233 and plutonium do not occur naturally but

are produced by the irradiation of source material or
special nuclear material in nuclear reactors and could be
extracted from used fuel or targets by chemical
separation. Extracting SNM from used fuel is called
reprocessing. Plutonium is produced in reactors that use
uranium as fuel or targets. Uranium-233 is produced in
reactors that use thorium as fuel or targets. No U.S.
commercial reprocessing plant is currently licensed by
the NRC for operation. Uranium enriched in uranium-235
is created by an enrichment facility (see Uranium
Enrichment).
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CATEGORIES
1. Category I -
• Uranium-235 (contained in highly enriched uranium: >20% or
more 235U),
• Uranium-233, or
• Plutonium-239.
• Category I, SSNM means SSNM in any combination in a quantity of
• 2 kilograms (4.4 pounds) or more of Pu-239; or
• 5 kilograms or more of U-235 (11 pounds; contained in uranium
enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope); or
• 2 kilograms (4.4 pounds) or more of U-233; or
• 5 kilograms (11 pounds) or more in any combination computed by
the equation grams = (grams contained U-235) + 2.5 (grams U-233
+ grams Pu-239).
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
2. Category II -Category II is special nuclear material of
moderate strategic significance.
• Less than a formula quantity of strategic special nuclear
material but more than 1,000 grams of uranium-235
(contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the
U-235 isotope) or more than 500 grams of uranium-233 or
plutonium-239, or in a combined quantity of more than
1,000 grams (2.2 pounds) when computed by the equation
grams = (grams contained U-235) + 2 (grams U-233 + grams
Pu-239); or
• 10,000 grams (22 pounds) or more of uranium-235 (contained
in uranium enriched to 10 percent or more but less than 20
percent in the U-235 isotope).
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
3. Category III - Category III is special nuclear material of low
strategic significance.
• Less than an amount of special nuclear material of moderate
strategic significance (see category II above) but more than
15 grams (0.5 oz) of uranium-235 (contained in uranium
enriched to 20 percent or more in U-235 isotope) or 15 grams of
uranium-233 or 15 grams of plutonium-239 or the combination
of 15 grams when computed by the equation grams = (grams
contained U-235) + (grams Pu-239) + (grams U-233); or
• Less than 10,000 grams but more than 1,000 grams of uranium-
235 (contained in uranium enriched to 10 percent or more but
less than 20 percent in the U-235 isotope); or
• 10,000 grams or more of uranium-235 (contained in uranium
enriched above natural but less than 10 percent in the U-235
isotope)
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
PYROPHORIC METALS
A pyrophoric substance is a substance that ignites
spontaneously in air at or below 54 °C (129 °F) (for gases) or
within 5 minutes after coming into contact with air (for liquids
and solids). Examples are iron sulphide and many
reactive metals including plutonium and uranium, when
powdered or thinly sliced.
Pyrophoric materials are often water-reactive as well and will
ignite when they contact water or humid air. They can be
handled safely in atmospheres of argon or (with a few
exceptions) nitrogen. Most pyrophoric fires should be
extinguished with a Class D fire extinguisher for burning
metals.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
USES
• The creation of sparks from metals is based on the

pyrophoricity of small metal particles, and pyrophoric alloys
are made for this purpose. This has certain uses: the sparking
mechanisms in lighters and various toys, using ferrocerium;
starting fires without matches, using a firesteel;
the flintlock mechanism in firearms; and spark-testing ferrous
metals.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
HANDLING
Small amounts of pyrophoric liquids are often supplied in a
glass bottle with a PTFE (Teflon)-lined septum. Larger amounts
are supplied in metal tanks similar to gas cylinders, designed so
a needle can fit through the valve opening. A syringe, carefully
dried and flushed of air with an inert gas, is used to extract the
liquid from its container.
Pyrophoric solids require the use of a sealed glove box flushed
with inert gas. Glove boxes are expensive and require
maintenance. Thus, many pyrophoric solids are sold as
solutions, or dispersions in mineral oil or lighter hydrocarbon
solvents. Mildly pyrophoric solids (such as lithium
tetrahydridoaluminate (lithium aluminium hydride) and sodium
hydride) can be handled in the air for brief periods of time, but
the containers must be flushed with inert gas before storage.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMETS
Eye Protection:
Chemical splash goggles or safety glasses must be worn
whenever handing pyrophoric chemicals. Ordinary
prescription glasses will not provide adequate protection.
A face shield is required any time there is a risk of explosion,
large splash hazard or a highly exothermic reaction. Portable
shields are also acceptable.
Skin Protection:
Gloves must be worn when handling pyrophoric chemicals.
Nitrile gloves should be adequate for handling most of these
in general laboratory settings but they are combustible. Be
sure to use adequate protection to prevent skin exposure.
Sigma-Aldrich recommends the use of nitrile gloves
underneath neoprene gloves.BY KAMAL SHUKLA
STORAGE
• Use and store minimal amounts of pyrophoric chemicals. Do
not store pyrophoric chemicals with flammable materials or in
a flammable cabinet.
• Store reactive materials as recommended in the MSDS. An
inert gas-filled desiccator or glove box may be suitable storage
locations for most materials.
• Pyrophoric chemicals should be stored under an atmosphere
of inert gas or under kerosene as recommended in the MSDS.
• Avoid areas with heat/flames, oxidizers, and water sources.
• Ensure that sufficient protective solvent remains in the
container while in storage.
• Never return excess chemical to the original container. Small
amounts of impurities introduced into the container may
cause a fire or explosion. BY KAMAL SHUKLA
EMERGENCY PROCEDURES
Keep material within arm’s length to absorb spills. Powdered
lime, dry sand, Celite® (diatomaceous earth), or clay based
kitty litter should b used to completely smother and cover any
spill that occurs.
If a person is exposed, or on fire, the use of the stop, drop,
and roll method, safety shower, a fire blanket, or fire
extinguisher are the most effective means of controlling
clothing on fire.
If a safety shower is available, keep the person under the
shower for at least 15-20 minutes to ensure all chemicals are
washed away.
The recommended fire extinguisher is a standard dry powder
(ABC) type. Class D extinguishers are recommended for
combustible solid metal fires (such as sodium), but not for
organolithium reagents. BY KAMAL SHUKLA
URANIUM
Uranium is a natural occur radioactive element. Found in

isotopic form including uranium U-238, U-235, U-234, and U-
233. These isotopes primary emit alpha radiation and
occasionally some gamma and beta rays. Uranium may ignite
spontaneously at temperature less the 542 F. It can be stored
in inert atmosphere such as helium.
Nonenriched uranium is a radioactive metal that is also
combustible. Its radioactivity does not affect its
combustibility, but can have a bearing on the amount of fire
loss. Most metallic uranium is handled in massive forms that
do not present a significant fire risk unless exposed to a
severe and prolonged external fire.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Nonenriched uranium is a radioactive metal that is also
combustible. Its radioactivity does not affect its
combustibility, but can have a bearing on the amount of fire
loss. Most metallic uranium is handled in massive forms that
do not present a significant fire risk unless exposed to a
severe and prolonged external fire.
The pyrophoric characteristics of uranium are similar to those of
plutonium except that uranium forms do not ignite as easily
as those of plutonium. Both form pyrophoric oxides and
hydrides. Both react violently with water and are best stored
in their oxide form (UO{sub 2}, PuO{sub 2}) in dry, inert
atmospheres. Uranium metal (U) releases hydrogen gas
(H{sub 2}) when allowed to react with water. The hydrogen
may then react with the metal to form uranium hydride
(UH{sub 3}) which may in turn react with oxygen in the air to
form stable uranium oxide (UO{sub 2}) and hydrogen gas
(H{sub 2}). BY KAMAL SHUKLA
URANIUM EXTINGUISHING GUIDELINES
• Fires resulting are extremely difficult to extinguish
using such convential fire extinguishing agents as CO2,
foam, and dry chemical.
• Water, if used in very large volumes or by total
immersion can be effective.
• Water used as a fine spray, however, can be extremely
dangerous, actually causing a more violent reaction
due to the radiolytic breakdown of the water from the
extremely high temperatures.
• Further, such fires also create an inhalation hazard due
to the dispersion of airborne uranium as particulate
matter. BY KAMAL SHUKLA
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
PLUTONIUM
Plutonium is one of the most widely used pyrophoric
materials in the DOE Complex. Some of the most serious fires
occurring within the Complex are caused by the ignition of
finely divided plutonium particles. Several plutonium
compounds are pyrophoric. The radioactive decay of
plutonium creates additional concerns such as dispersal of
particles in a fire, pressurization of storage containers, and the
production of hydrogen gas during decomposition of
absorbed water.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
PROPERTIES
• Metal, oxides and oxidation- Large pieces of plutonium metal
react slowly with the oxygen in air at room temperature to form
plutonium oxides. The rate of oxidation is dependent on a number of
factors. These include
(a) temperature,
(b) surface area of the reacting metal,
(c) oxygen concentration,
(d) concentration of moisture and other vapours in the air,
(e) the type and extent of alloying, and
(f) the presence of a protective oxide layer on the metal surface. The
rate of oxidation increases with increases in the first four factors and
decreases with the last. Alloying can either increase or decrease the
oxidation rate, depending on the alloying metal. Of all these factors,
moisture has a large effect on the oxidation rate and is especially
significant in evaluating conditions for storing plutonium metal and
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
oxide.
• Hydride- Plutonium hydride (PuH{sub x}, 2 < x < 3) forms
during corrosion of plutonium metal by hydrogen from water,
organic materials, and other sources. Hydride is rapidly
oxidized by dry air at room temperature to produce PuO{sub
2} and H{sub 2} and reacts with nitrogen at 250 degrees C to
form plutonium nitride (PuN).
The quality of hydride produced depends on the rate of
hydrogen formation and on the magnitude of the hydrogen-
containing source. The reactivity of plutonium hydride in air
depends on factors such as particle size, presence/absence of
protective oxide layer, and the hydrogen:plutonium ratio, x.
Finely divided hydride is pyrophoric in air at room
temperature. Thus, the only safe practice is to handle and
store hydride in a dry, oxygen-free atmosphere.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
• Carbides and Nitrides- Plutonium carbides, oxycarbides,
and nitride are reactive and potentially pyrophoric materials
that could pose handling problems if exposed to air or
oxygen-containing atmospheres.
These compounds react readily with moisture to form

gaseous products such as methane, acetylene, and ammonia.
Because plutonium compounds of this type have been

prepared at several sites and may have been "temporarily"
stored under special conditions (hermetically sealed within an
inert atmosphere) without first oxidizing them, caution should
be exercised in opening cans that might contain such
materials.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
REACTIONS INVOLVING WATER
• Water vapour accelerates the oxidation of plutonium by
oxygen and reacts directly with the metal. Oxidation is about
ten times higher in humid air than in dry air at room
temperature. For this reason, plutonium metal has routinely
been handled in a very dry atmosphere such as one with a -40
degrees C dew point.
• Inerting of glove boxes and enclosures for handling plutonium
with nitrogen or argon is effective in reducing metal oxidation
only if it also excludes water vapour. Rapid oxidation does not
occur if oxygen is present at a level of 5% in nitrogen or argon.
However, if 1.3% moisture (50% relative humidity)
accompanies the oxygen, then rapid metal oxidation can be
anticipated.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CONTD.
• Plutonium dioxide can adsorb up to 8% of its weight as water

on the surface. The quantity absorbed is a direct function of
the surface area of the oxide. The principal hazard associated
with absorbed water is pressurization of a sealed oxide
container through any of several separate processes including
evaporation of water, radiolysis to form oxygen and hydrogen,
or direct reaction with the oxide to form a higher oxide and
hydrogen gas.
• Pressurization of oxide containers can be prevented by use of
sealed containers fitted with durable, high-efficiency metal
filters. Although gases can escape without release of
plutonium-containing particles, air (possibly moist) is able to
enter the container.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
PYROPHORICITY
• When heated to its ignition temperature, plutonium reacts at
an accelerated oxidation rate, which sustains continued
oxidation. The burning temperature depends on the rate of
heat dissipation to the surroundings and the rate of heat
generation, which is dependent on the surface area of oxidizing
metal. Temperatures of plutonium fires usually exceed the
melting temperature of plutonium metal (640 degrees C) which
causes the material to consolidate into a molten configuration.
As such, finely divided metal, turnings, and casting skulls tend
to ignite readily and achieve a high initial temperature which
lasts until melting occurs and the surface area is reduced.
• The oxide layer that forms during burning limits the oxidation
rate of plutonium. The burning process is similar to that of a
charcoal briquette.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
•The ignition temperature of plutonium metal depends on the factors that
increase the oxidation rate. Finely divided plutonium metal, such as metal
powder of fine machine turnings, ignites near 150 degrees C. This
temperature is easily reached if a coexisting pyrophoric material such as a
hydride spontaneously ignites at room temperature. Bulk or massive
plutonium characterized as having a specific surface area less than 10
cm{sup 2}/g requires temperatures in excess of 400 degrees C to ignite.
Many plutonium fires have occurred because samples containing finely
divided metal have spontaneously ignited. Fires have not occurred with well-
characterized metal existing in large pieces that have higher ignition
temperatures. Thus, massive plutonium is not considered pyrophoric or
capable of self-ignition
• An investigation of two instances in which kilogram-sized plutonium pieces
were observed to "spontaneously ignite" in air at room temperature showed
that they had been exposed to unlimited sources of hydrogen for extended
periods, and that the samples were thermally insulated when ignition
occurred.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
STORAGE AND HANDLING
• Plutonium should be stored as pure metal (Pu) or in its dioxide
(PuO{sub 2}) form in a dry, inert or slightly oxidizing atmosphere. The
formation of oxide from metal is accompanied by a large volume
expansion (up to 70%) which may bulge or breach the primary
container. Case studies show that mechanical wedging resulting from
this expansion can even breach a second metal container, resulting in
localized contamination release and possible exposure of personnel.
Oxidation of the metal and rupture of the container by mechanical
wedging are prevented if the storage container is hermetically
sealed. Plutonium radioactively decays producing alpha particles and
helium molecules. Over long-term storage, helium buildup can
contribute to the pressurization of containers.
• Plutonium sesquioxide and hydride should be converted to
plutonium dioxide before storage. Primary and secondary containers
should be hermetically sealed and contain no plastics or other
materials that decompose asBYaKAMAL
result of radiation exposure.
SHUKLA
EXTINGUISHING GUIDELINES
• Plutonium fires should not be approached without protective
clothing and respirators unless the fire is enclosed in a glove
box. The most effective agent for extinguishing plutonium
fires has been found to be magnesium oxide sand. Glove
boxes which contain pyrophoric forms of plutonium should
also contain an amount of magnesium oxide adequate for
extinguishment. The burning plutonium should be completely
covered with the sand to as great a depth as possible. The
magnesium oxide extinguishes the fire by providing a heat
sink which cools the plutonium and by providing a barrier
which limits the availability of oxygen.
• Argon is a very effective extinguishing agent, providing the
oxygen content in the atmosphere is maintained at 4% or less.
Above 4% oxygen, flooding with argon will not extinguish a
plutonium fire. BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CONTD.
• This is an important point, since it is nearly impossible to
reduce the oxygen content to 4% or less during argon flooding
in most fume hoods. Argon may be used effectively to cool
the burning plutonium prior to application of the magnesium
oxide sand.
• Other agents have been tested for use on plutonium fires;
however, none have proven to be as effective as magnesium
oxide. Typical foam or dry chemical agents are not effective
extinguishing agents. Fusible salt agents have been shown to
be effective on small-scale plutonium fires. However, the
expansion which accompanies the oxidation of plutonium has
caused the fusible salt coating to crack, allowing the
plutonium to re-ignite.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CONTD.
• Water is generally acceptable for use as an extinguishing

agent for fires involving plutonium. In rare cases where
criticality safety considerations preclude the introduction of
moderators such as water, suitable alternative fire protection
measures need to be incorporated into the facility design.
Proper housekeeping which includes removal of combustibles
from pyrophoric forms of plutonium is the most important
aspect of fire loss minimization.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
THORIUM
Thorium is a natural occuring radioactive material. Th-232 is common
isotope. It primarily emit alpha and gamma radiation. The pyrophoric
properties are same as uranium. The danger of thorium and other
radioactive material is the possibility of internal radiation due to
inhalation, ingestion or skin adsorption. Its melting point is 3353 F. As
a dry powder it has a low ignition temperature.
It decays very slowly via alpha decay, starting a decay chain named
the thorium series that ends at stable 208Pb. On Earth,
thorium, bismuth, and uranium are the only three radioactive
elements that still occur naturally in large quantities as primordial
elements.
It was also material in high-end optics and scientific instrumentation,
and as the light source in gas mantles, but these uses have become
marginal. It has been suggested as a replacement for uranium as
nuclear fuel in nuclear reactors, and several thorium reactors have
been built. BY KAMAL SHUKLA
HAZARDS OF POWDER FORM
The handling of special metal powders such as thorium

requires special technique because of the low temperature of
ignition. shipped dry in special containers filled with helium or
argon. necessary to eliminate the possibility of accidental
oxidation or even combustion during transportation or.
storage. in transferring this metal powder from the container
into other vessels. '-' The dry metal powder should not be
poured through the air in a continuous stream. The friction of
the particles falling through the air or against the Thorium is
This is Great care should be exercised - 11 - Q edge of a glass
vessel may be sufficient to produce electrostatic sparks and
ignite the powder.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
FIRE CONTROL
Small fires involving plutonium, uranium, or thorium may be
controlled with dry powdered graphite or G-1 powder, by the
technique of excluding air from the burning metal with the
powder.
Water should be prohibited from direct fighting of such metal
fires, and should be used only for salvage and control
operations on supplementary fires that may be started from
the heat of the burning metals.
Water only adds to the intensity of the metal fire, and greatly
increases the contamination-cleanup required after a fire.
In some cases it may be desirable to control such a fire with
graphite or G-1 powder and allow it to burn itself out.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CONTD.
• It is recommended that Fire Department personnel

for such metal handling areas be thoroughly
acquainted with proper fire fighting procedures, and
with the locations of the processing equipment,
buildings, etc .
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL
EMERGENCIES
• For the purposes of this plan, a nuclear emergency occurs
when there is an actual or potential hazard to public health
and property or the environment from ionizing radiation
whose source is a reactor facility within or immediately
adjacent to Ontario. Such a hazard may be caused by an
accident, malfunction, or loss of control involving radioactive
material.
• For the purposes of this plan, a radiological emergency occurs
when there is an actual or potential hazard to public health,
property or the environment from ionizing radiation resulting
from sources other than a reactor facility. Such a hazard may
be caused by an accident, malfunction, or loss of control
involving radioactive material.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CONTD.
• Where a radiological emergency (as defined in 1.4.2 above) arises on-

site at a reactor facility, the response shall be undertaken pursuant to
the site-specific implementing plan for that reactor facility.
• Nuclear and radiological emergencies may arise in Ontario under the
following circumstances, among others (though not all such events
would necessarily lead to such an emergency):
–accidents or occurrences at reactor facilities, including some outside
Ontario
–accidents or occurrences at nuclear establishments
–accidents or occurrences during the transportation of radioactive
material
–Radiological Dispersal Devices (RDD)/Radiological Exposure Devices
(REDs)
–Radiological Device (RD)
–lost/stolen/orphan sources
–satellite re-entry
–nuclear weapon detonation BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CONTD
• Once a reactor facility has been shut down and defueled, an
assessment shall be undertaken by the province, in cooperation with
additional authorities having jurisdiction, to determine the risks it may
represent to the surrounding, off-site population. If it is determined that
the reactor’s new status poses no off-site hazard, this PNERP shall no
longer apply to events originating from this reactor.
• The following nuclear and radiological incidents would normally not
need to be addressed by (fully or partially) activating the PEOC under
the PNERP:
– A nuclear accident in which the effects, both actual and potential, are
expected to be confined within the boundaries of the reactor facility.
– A radiological accident in which the effects are so localized that their
impact can be satisfactorily dealt with by local
emergency response personnel (police, fire, etc.) with possibly some
outside technical assistance.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CONTD.
• The province, through the Provincial Emergency Operations
Centre (PEOC), may undertake certain measures, pursuant to
this plan, before or in the absence of an emergency
declaration made by the Lieutenant Governor in Council, or
the Premier.
• The province may issue operational directives for certain
measures that are to be implemented, pursuant to the policy
and guidance provided in this plan. This may include
protective actions such as sheltering-in-place and evacuation,
or operational measures such as ground and aerial
monitoring. These actions shall be taken as necessary in order
to protect public health and safety and the environment
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CONTD.
• If the Lieutenant Governor in Council (LGIC) or the Premier
declares an emergency , the province may issue emergency
orders pursuant to Section 7.0.2 of the EMCPA that address
the subject of operational directives that may have already
been issued.
• The LGIC or Premier may authorize operational or protective
measure deviations from the PNERP if deemed appropriate.
Additionally, the LGIC or Premier may authorize the necessary
resources (human, physical, informational and financial)
required to support the proposed deviation.
• EMERGENCY
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
LOW LEVEL RADIATION
POTENTIAL HAZARDS
• Health-
o Radiation presents minimal risk to transport workers, emergency
response personnel and the public during transportation
accidents. Packaging durability increases as potential hazard of
radioactive content increases.
o Very low levels of contained radioactive materials and low
radiation levels outside packages result in low risks to people.
Damaged packages may release measurable amounts of
radioactive material, but the resulting risks are expected to be low.
o Some radioactive materials cannot be detected by commonly
available instruments.
o Packages do not have RADIOACTIVE I, II, or III labels. Some may
have EMPTY labels or may have the word “Radioactive” in the
package marking.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CONTD.
• FIRE OR EXPLOSION-
• Some of these materials may burn, but most do not ignite
readily.
• Many have cardboard outer packaging; content (physically
large or small) can be of many different physical forms.
• Radioactivity does not change flammability or other
properties of materials.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
PUBLIC SAFETY
• Priorities for rescue, life-saving, first aid, fire control and other
hazards are higher than the priority for measuring radiation
levels.
• Radiation Authority must be notified of accident conditions.
Radiation Authority is usually responsible for decisions about
radiological consequences and closure of emergencies.
• As an immediate precautionary measure, isolate spill or leak area
for at least 25 meters (75 feet) in all directions. Stay upwind,
uphill and/or upstream.
• Keep unauthorized personnel away.
• Detain or isolate uninjured persons or equipment suspected to be
contaminated; delay decontamination and cleanup until
instructions are received from Radiation Authority.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
• FIRE-
• Presence of radioactive material will not influence the fire
control processes and should not influence selection of
techniques.
• Move containers from fire area if you can do it without risk.
• Do not move damaged packages; move undamaged packages
out of fire zone.
Small Fire-
• Dry chemical, CO2 , water spray or regular foam.
Large Fire –
• Water spray, fog (flooding amounts).
• Dike fire-control water for later disposal.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
• SPILL OR LEAK-
• Do not touch damaged packages or spilled material.
• Cover liquid spill with sand, earth or other non-
combustible absorbent material.
• Dike to collect large liquid spills.
• Cover powder spill with plastic sheet or tarp to
minimize spreading.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
FIRST AID
• Medical problems take priority over radiological concerns.
• Use first aid treatment according to the nature of the injury.
• Do not delay care and transport of a seriously injured
person.
• Give artificial respiration if victim is not breathing.
• Administer oxygen if breathing is difficult.
• In case of contact with substance, wipe from skin
immediately; flush skin or eyes with running water for at
least 20 minutes.
• Injured persons contaminated by contact with released
material are not a serious hazard to health care personnel,
equipment or facilities.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
LOW TO HIGH LEVEL RADIATION
POTENTIAL HAZARDS
• Health-
• Radiation presents minimal risk to transport workers,
emergency response personnel and the public during
transportation accidents. Packaging durability increases as
potential hazard of radioactive content increases.
• Undamaged packages are safe. Contents of damaged
packages may cause higher external radiation exposure, or
both external and internal radiation exposure if contents are
released.
• Radioactive White-I labels indicate radiation levels outside
single, isolated, undamaged packages are very low (less than
0.005 mSv/h (0.5 mrem/h)).
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Contd.
• Radioactive Yellow-II and Yellow-III labeled packages have

higher radiation levels. The transport index (TI) on the label
identifies the maximum radiation level in mrem/h one meter
from a single, isolated, undamaged package.
• Fire or Explosion-
• Some of these materials may burn, but most do not ignite
readily.
• Type B packages are designed and evaluated to withstand
total engulfment in flames at temperatures of 800°C (1475°F)
for a period of 30 minutes.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
PUBLIC SAFETY
• As an immediate precautionary measure, isolate spill or leak
area for at least 25 meters (75 feet) in all directions.
• Stay upwind, uphill and/or upstream.
• Detain or isolate uninjured persons or equipment suspected to
be contaminated; delay decontamination and cleanup until
• Protective clothing- Positive pressure self-contained breathing
apparatus (SCBA) and structural firefighters’ protective clothing
will provide adequate protection against internal radiation
exposure, but not external radiation exposure
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Contd
• Evacuation-
Large Spill-
• Consider initial downwind evacuation for at least 100
meters (330 feet).
Fire –
• When a large quantity of this material is involved in a
major fire, consider an initial evacuation distance of
300 meters (1000 feet) in all directions.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
• FIRE-
techniques.
• Do not move damaged packages; move undamaged
packages out of fire zone.
Small Fire-
Large Fire-
• Dike fire-control water for later disposal
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CONTD.
• SPILL OR LEAK-

• Damp surfaces on undamaged or slightly damaged
packages are seldom an indication of packaging
failure.
• Most packaging for liquid content have inner
containers and/or inner absorbent materials.
• Cover liquid spill with sand, earth or other non-
combustible absorbent material.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
FIRST AID

• Do not delay care and transport of a seriously injured person.
• In case of contact with substance, immediately flush skin or
eyes with running water for at least 20 minutes.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
LOW TO HIGH LEVEL EXTERNAL RADIATION
POTENTIAL HAZARDS
• Health-
potential hazard of radioactive content increases.
• Undamaged packages are safe; contents of damaged packages
may cause external radiation exposure, and much higher
external exposure if contents (source capsules) are released.
• Contamination and internal radiation hazards are not
expected, but not impossible .
• Radioactive White-I labels indicate radiation levels outside
single, isolated, undamaged packages are very low (less than
0.005 mSv/h (0.5 mrem/h)).BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Contd
• Radioactive Yellow-II and Yellow-III labeled packages have
higher radiation levels. The transport index (TI) on the label
identifies the maximum radiation level in mrem/h one meter
from a single, isolated, undamaged package.
• Fire or explosion-
• Packagings can burn completely without risk of content loss
from sealed source capsule.
• Radioactive source capsules and Type B packages are
designed and evaluated to withstand total engulfment in
flames at temperatures of 800°C (1475°F) for a period of 30
minutes.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
PUBLIC SAFETY
• Delay final cleanup until instructions or advice is received from
Radiation Authority.
• Protective Clothing- Positive pressure self-contained
breathing apparatus (SCBA) and structural firefighters’
protective clothing will provide adequate protection against
internal radiation exposure, but not external radiation
exposure. BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Contd.
• Evacuation-
Large Spill-
• Consider initial downwind evacuation for at least 100 meters
(330 feet).
Fire-
• When a large quantity of this material is involved in a major
fire, consider an initial evacuation distance of 300 meters
(1000 feet) in all directions.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
• FIRE-
techniques.
• Do not move damaged packages; move undamaged
packages out of fire zone.
Small Fire-
Large Fire -
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CONTD.
• SPILL OR LEAK-
• Damp surfaces on undamaged or slightly damaged
packages are seldom an indication of packaging
failure. Contents are seldom liquid. Content is
usually a metal capsule, easily seen if released from
package.
• If source capsule is identified as being out of
package, DO NOT TOUCH. Stay away and await
advice from Radiation Authority.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
FIRST AID
• Persons exposed to special form sources are not likely to be
contaminated with radioactive material.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
FISSILE/LOW TO HIGH LEVEL RADIATION
POTENTIAL HAZARDS
• Health-
potential radiation and criticality hazards of the content
increase.
• Undamaged packages are safe.Contents of damaged packages
may cause higher external radiation exposure, or both external
and internal radiation exposure if contents are released.
• The rarely occurring "Special Arrangement" shipments may be
of Type AF, BF or CF packages. Package type will be marked on
packages, and shipment details will be on shipping papers.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CONTD
• Some radioactive materials cannot be detected by

commonly available instruments.
• Water from cargo fire control is not expected to cause
pollution.
• Fire or explosion-
• These materials are seldom flammable. Packages are
designed to withstand fires without damage to contents.
• Type AF, IF, B(U)F, B(M)F and CF packages are designed and
evaluated to withstand total engulfment in flames at
temperatures of 800°C (1475°F) for a period of 30 minutes.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
PUBLIC SAFETY
• Radiation Authority must be notified of accident

conditions.Radiation Authority is usually responsible for
decisions about radiological consequences and closure of
emergencies.
• Detain or isolate uninjured persons or equipment suspected
to be contaminated; delay decontamination and cleanup until
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CONTD
• Positive pressure self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)

and structural firefighters’ protective clothing will provide
adequate protection against internal radiation exposure, but
not external radiation exposure.
• Evacuation-
Large Spill –
• Consider initial downwind evacuation for at least 100 meters
(330 feet).
Fire-
• When a large quantity of this material is involved in a major
fire, consider an initial evacuation distance of 300 meters
(1000 feet) in all directions.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
• FIRE-
• Presence of radioactive material will not influence the fire control
processes and should not influence selection of techniques.
• Do not move damaged packages; move undamaged packages out
of fire zone.
Small Fire-
Large Fire-
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CONTD.
• SPILL OR LEAK-
• Damp surfaces on undamaged or slightly damaged packages
are seldom an indication of packaging failure. Most packaging
for liquid content have inner containers and/or inner
absorbent materials.
Liquid Spill-
• Package contents are seldom liquid. If any radioactive
contamination resulting from a liquid release is present, it
probably will be low-level
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
FIRST AID

BY KAMAL SHUKLA
URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE
POTENTIAL HAZARD
• Health-
• Chemical hazard greatly exceeds radiation hazard.
• Substance reacts with water and water vapor in air to form toxic
and corrosive hydrogen fluoride gas and an extremely irritating
and corrosive, white-colored, water-soluble residue.
• If inhaled, may be fatal.
• Direct contact causes burns to skin, eyes, and respiratory tract.
• Low-level radioactive material; very low radiation hazard to
people.
• Runoff from control of cargo fire may cause low-level pollution.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CONTD.
• Fire and explosion-
• Substance does not burn.
• The material may react violently with fuels.
• They are designed and evaluated to withstand severe
conditions including total engulfment in flames at
temperatures of 800°C (1475°F) for a period of 30 minutes.
• Bare filled cylinders, identified with UN2978 as part of the
marking (may also be marked H(U) or H(M)), may rupture in
heat of engulfing fire; bare empty (except for residue)
cylinders will not rupture in fires.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
PUBLIC SAFETY
• Priorities for rescue, life-saving, first aid, fire control and other
hazards are higher than the priority for measuring radiation
levels.
• Detain or isolate uninjured persons or equipment suspected
to be contaminated; delay decontamination and cleanup until
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CONTD.
• Protective clothing-
• Wear positive pressure self-contained breathing apparatus
(SCBA).
• Wear chemical protective clothing that is specifically
recommended by the manufacturer. It may provide little or no
thermal protection.
• Structural firefighters' protective clothing provides limited
protection in fire situations ONLY; it is not effective in spill
situations where direct contact with the substance is possible.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
• FIRE-
• DO NOT USE WATER OR FOAM ON MATERIAL ITSELF.
Small Fire-
• Dry chemical or CO2 .
Large Fire-
• Water spray, fog or regular foam.
• Cool containers with flooding quantities of water until well
after fire is out.
• If this is impossible, withdraw from area and let fire burn.
• ALWAYS stay away from tanks engulfed in fire.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CONTD.
• SPILL OR LEAK-
• DO NOT GET WATER INSIDE CONTAINERS.
• Without fire or smoke, leak will be evident by visible and
irritating vapors and residue forming at the point of release.
• Use fine water spray to reduce vapors; do not put water
directly on point of material release from container.
• Residue buildup may self-seal small leaks.
• Dike far ahead of spill to collect runoff water.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
FIRST AID
• In case of contact with Hydrofluoric acid (UN1790), flush with
large amounts of water. For skin contact, if calcium gluconate
gel is available, rinse 5 minutes, then apply gel. Otherwise,
continue rinsing until medical treatment is available. For eyes,
flush with water or a saline solution for 15 minutes.
• Effects of exposure (inhalation, ingestion or skin contact) to
substance may be delayed.
• Keep victim calm and warm.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
HANDLING ACCIDENT EMERGENCY
• Handling of radiation accidents are similar to
• conventional accidents and follows strategy HAZ-MAT
• – Hazard identification: of area/vehicle, approx. radiation
intensity
• – Action Plan: monitor, isolation, distance+shield+low time,
upwind
• – Zoning: 100 to 150 meter such that exposure < 2mREM /Hr
• – Manage the Incident: preplan drill, simulate, rescue
• – Assistance: call specialists, inform Police/ law
• – Termination: decontaminate, risk audit
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
HAZMAT
• Just like fire and other safety incidences, radiation
• emergencies may happen in nuclear plants, labs, transits
• The safety and health-physics departments must train
• personnel for work in radioactive areas, have detail plans
• for all possible incidences and do periodic drills
• Fast evacuation and control of eatables may be required
• for severe incidences, so remote locations are preferred
• Coordination with local administration is necessary
• One of the emergency may be caused due to release of
• radioiodine (fission product) to air, nearby plants, animals,
• milk and finally to human. Stop milk/meat, give iodine tab
• Other cases will be dealt with nuclear plant accidents.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
UNIT 3
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
Energy Released = Δmc2 , Δm = mass defect, c

= velocity of light For U-235,
Δmc2 ≈ 200 MeV per fission
1011 J/g of U-235 ~ 1000 tonnes of coal
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
What is Moderation of neutrons
• The fast neutrons have a low probability of inducing further
fissions (but used as such in fast reactors). This results in
reduced fission reactions and reduced availability of more
neutrons for further fissions for a chain reaction.
• So in thermal reactors, we need to slow down the neutrons

(i.e., thermalise or moderate them), which we do by using a
moderator such as water (Heavy/ Light water) or graphite .
Apart from moderation of neutron, light water is also good
absorber, but heavy water is excellent moderator as well
low absorber facilitating use of natural U as fuel in Reactor
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Four Factor Formula & Criticality
For a finite system, Reactivity
keff = k P
k = p f (For an infinite system)
= neutrons in one generation /
neutrons in previous generation
and P is the non-leakage probability
For sustaining a nuclear chain reaction,
Keff = 1, Critical
Keff > 1, Super Critical
Keff < 1, Sub-Critical
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
BOILING WATER REACTOR(BWR)
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
• Boiling water reactors (BWR) are a type of nuclear
reactor that use light water (ordinary water, as opposed
to heavy water) as their coolant and neutron moderator.
They are the second most used reactor for nuclear
power generation in the world, next to the pressurized water
reactor (PWR)—with 75 in operation as of 2018.Figure 2
graphs the percentage of various types of reactors
worldwide and the chart details the number of each.
• With maximum operating temperatures of around 285oC,
the Carnot efficiency (maximum efficiency) of boiling water
reactors in the production of power is 46%.However, the
realistic efficiency of these reactors in power production is
around 33-34%.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
WORKING
• The boiling water reactor uses a single light water cooling
circuit (it is tap water, in nuclear engineering the tap water is
called light water). The light water circulates through the core
of the reactor, enters boiling and a part of it turns into vapor.
• The steam generated in the reactor core comes out from the
top and goes directly to the turbines. The steam leaving the
reactor is treated by steam driers and water separators before
entering the turbines. The turbines will be responsible for
operating the electric generator and generating electricity.
• Next, the steam passes through a condenser to turn it into
liquid water again and start the cycle again.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CHARACTERISTICS OF BWR
• It uses a single cooling circuit, so that the steam that
moves the turbine is formed by water that has
passed through the interior of the reactor. For this
reason, the turbine building must be protected to
avoid radioactive emissions.
• On the other hand, the need for more space for
steam dryers and separators in the reactor vessel
forces the control rods to enter the lower part of the
reactor, so auxiliary energy is needed to raise them
and stop the reactor in case of emergency.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
DISTINCTIVE FEATURE OF BWR
• In nuclear power plants with reactors that are not boiling,
the temperature of the water in the primary circuit is below the
boiling point. At temperatures necessary to obtain an acceptable
efficiency (above 300°C), this is possible only at high pressures,
which requires the creation of a high strength housing.
• In the secondary circuit, saturated steam is produced at a pressure
of 12 to 60 atm at temperatures of up to 330°C. In the boiling
reactors, a mixture of steam and water is produced in the core. The
water pressure in the primary circuit is approximately 70 atm. At
this pressure, water boils in the core volume at a temperature of
280°C. Boiling water reactors have a number of advantages
compared to non-boilers. In boiling reactors, the casing operates at
a lower pressure, in the nuclear center circuit there is no
steam generator.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
FUEL
• Boiling water reactors must use enriched uranium as
their nuclear fuel, due to their use of light water. This is
because light water absorbs too many neutrons to be used
with natural uranium, so the fuel content of fissile Uranium-
235 must be increased. This is done through uranium
enrichment—which increases the concentration of
Uranium-235 from 0.7% to around 4%.
• The enriched uranium is packed into fuel rods, which are
assembled into a fuel bundle, as seen in Figure 3. There are
about 90-100 rods in each bundle, with up to 750 bundles in
a reactor.This corresponds to nearly 140 tonnes of uranium!
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
COOLANT AND MODERATOR
• The use of light water as a coolant is beneficial as it can cool down
the fuel at the same time as it heats up to steam. The steam moves
through the turbines which spin a generator to generate electricity.
This simplifies the design of boiling water reactors, as there is only
one primary loop (see Figure 4) needed which results in a lower
cost of development.
• Light water does not make as good of a moderator as heavy water
or graphite due to its relatively high absorption of neutrons.
However, its use as a moderator makes for an interesting and
important safety feature; if there is a "loss of coolant accident:
(LOCA), the moderator will also decline, causing the nuclear chain
reaction to stop. In addition, if the moderating water overheats and
turns to steam inside the bottom reactor core, there will be less
moderator and therefore the chain reaction will stop
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
WATER FLOW
• Less water needs to flow through a BWR than through a PWR,
however, there are complications because the water
becomes radioactive in its circulation. This means that there must
be extra shielding in the non-reactor parts of the power plant.
• Control rods are placed in the bottom of the reactor, rather than
the top as in PWRs. This is because in a boiling water reactor
there is more steam at the top (visible in Figure 4 below), and
placement of control rods in the steam portion would have a
lesser effect than their placement in the water portion of the
reactor. There is higher reactivity of the fuel in the water portion
due to its moderation, so the control rods are needed to change
the reactivity as deemed fit by the operators
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
ADVANTAGES
• The nuclear fuel used by the nuclear
reactor is enriched uranium oxides between 2%
and 4%.
• The boiling water reactor does not use steam
generators or pressure compensators.
• The first reactor circuit operates at a pressure of
70 atmospheres against 160 atomospheres using
the nuclear pressurized water reactor (PWR)
• Lower operating temperatures, even in the fuel
rods.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
DISADVANTAGES
• Impossibility of recharging nuclear fuel without stopping
the nuclear reactor.
• More complicated management, the presence of prohibited modes
in the power / flow capacity of the heat carrier, the need for a
greater number of feedback sensors.
• A reactor vessel about 2 times more in volume than a comparable
power PWR is needed.
• Although designed for lower pressure, it is more difficult to
manufacture and transport.
• Turbine contamination with water activation products: N-17 with
short life and traces of tritium. This complicates maintenance work
a lot. In addition, the traps must be configured to
extract radioactive corrosion products from the steam loops.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
PRESSURIZED WATER REACTOR(PWR)
• The pressurized water reactor (PWR) is a type of nuclear
reactor used to the generate electricity and propel nuclear
submarines and naval vessels. They make use of light
water (ordinary water, as opposed to heavy water) as their coolant
and neutron moderator. It is one of three types of light water
reactors, with the others being the boiling water reactor and
the supercritical water cooled reactor.
• Their use on naval vessels and nuclear ships are of extreme
importance to various militaries around the world. Nuclear
power has a huge advantage over fuels like gasoline or diesel as it
allows ships to run for very long periods without the need to refuel.
PWRs make a good reactor for these ships since they have a
high specific power (high power for their mass) due to their use of
high pressure. This allows the reactors to be fairly compact,
especially with the use of highly enriched uranium.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
OPERATION
The operation of pressurized water nuclear reactors (PWR)
can be divided into 4 main steps.
• The core of the reactor inside the reactor vessel generates
heat.
• High pressure water from the primary circuit transports
this thermal energy to a steam generator.
• Inside the steam generator, the heat coming from the primary
circuit turns the water in the secondary circuit into steam.
• Generated steam drives a turbine that produces electricity.
During these four points, the pressurized water nuclear
reactor has turned the nuclear energy of the nuclear
fuel into electrical energy.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
• From here, the cycle begins again: the residual vapor is converted
back into liquid water through a condenser. This capacitor puts the
secondary circuit in thermal contact with a tertiary circuit through
which cold water flows from the outside (sea water, rivers, lakes,
etc.). Once converted to liquid water it returns to the
steam generator driven by a series of water pumps.
• The reactor core contains nuclear fuel rods that must be
refrigerated. Cooling of the reactor core is done by water circulating
through a set of water pumps. The water pumps in charge of cooling
the core of the nuclear reactor run on mains electricity. In the event
of a power failure, an alternative mechanism is activated to be fed by
diesel heat engines, diesel generators.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
FUEL
• Pressurized water reactors must use enriched uranium as
their nuclear fuel, because of their use of light water. This is
because light water would absorb too many neutrons if
natural uranium was used, so the fuel content
of fissile Uranium-235 must be increased. This is done through
a uranium enrichment process, in which the concentration of
Uranium-235 is increased from 0.7% to around 4%.
• The enriched uranium is packed into fuel rods which are
assembled into a fuel bundle, as seen in Figure 3. There are
about 200-300 rods in each bundle for a PWR, with a large
reactor containing 150-250 bundles in their core.This
corresponds to about five cubic meters of uranium, or 80-
100 tonnes of uranium.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
COOLANT AND MODERATOR
• As mentioned before, light water is used as the coolant and
moderator for a pressurized water reactor. Light water
is much more abundant than heavy water, as it makes up 99.99%
of natural water.
• Light water does not make as good of a moderator as heavy
water or graphite as a result of its relatively high absorption of
neutrons. However, its use as a moderator makes for an
important safety feature; if there is a loss of coolant accident
(LOCA), there will also be a loss of moderator causing the nuclear
chain reaction to stop. Also if the moderating water overheats
and becomes steam inside the bottom reactor core, there will be
less moderator and therefore the chain reaction will stop.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Pressure, Temperatures and Water flow
As the name implies, the water in the reactor is pressurized. This is

due to the fact that as the pressure gets higher, the boiling point of
water increases with it. This means that at high pressures the water
can operate at extremely high temperatures without boiling
to steam. This is important for the reactor as higher pressures allow
for greater power output and higher thermal efficiency. The
pressure is maintained by the "pressurizer" (Figure 4), which acts to
stabilize pressure changes caused by changes in electrical load.
Water enters the reactor at 290°C, and by the time it exits it is at
around 325°C.In order for it to remain a liquid at these
temperatures, the pressure must be 15 MPa, or about 150
times atmospheric pressure.By keeping the water in liquid form,
the control rod system is simplified as they are able to be placed in
from the top, rather than from the bottom like in a boiling water
reactor.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
The hot water flowing from the reactor flows through
inverted U-tubes (Figure 4) which acts as a heat exchanger,
heating up a secondary loop of water in what is called a
"steam generator". This secondary loop is at a lower pressure
so it is able to boil to steam, which then passes
through turbines in order to generate electricity. Large
reactors have up to 4 steam generators, each of which may
be larger than the reactor itself.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
PRESSURIZED HEAVY WATER REACTOR-
CANDU
The CANDU reactor design (or PHWR – Pressurized Heavy Water
Reactor) has been developed since the 1950s in Canada, and more
recently also in India. These reactors are heavy water cooled and
moderated pressurized water reactors. Instead of using a single
large reactor vessel as in a PWR or BWR, the nuclear core is
contained in hundreds of pressure tubes. PHWRs generally use
natural uranium (0.7% U-235) oxide as fuel, hence needs a more
efficient moderator, in this case heavy water (D2O).
There have been two major types of CANDU reactors, the original
design of around 500 MWe that was intended to be used in multi-
reactor installations in large plants, and the rationalized CANDU 6 in
the 600 MWe class that is designed to be used in single stand-alone
units or in small multi-unit plants.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
DESIGN AND OPERATION
The basic operation of the CANDU design is similar to other
nuclear reactors. Fission reactions in the reactor core heat
pressurized water in a primary cooling loop. A heat exchanger,
also known as a steam generator, transfers the heat to
a secondary cooling loop, which powers a steam turbine with
an electric generator attached to it (for a typical Rankine
thermodynamic cycle). The exhaust steam from the turbines
is then cooled, condensed and returned as feedwater to the
steam generator. The final cooling often uses cooling water
from a nearby source, such as a lake, river, or ocean.
Most reactors use some form of neutron moderator to lower
the energy of the neutrons, or "thermalize" them, which
makes the reaction more efficient. The energy lost by the
neutrons heats the moderator and is extracted for power.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Most commercial reactor designs use normal water as the moderator.
Water absorbs some of the neutrons, enough that it is not possible to
keep the reaction going in natural uranium. CANDU replaces this "light"
water with heavy water. Heavy water's extra neutron decreases its ability
to absorb excess neutrons, resulting in a better neutron economy. This
allows CANDU to run on unenriched natural uranium, or uranium mixed
with a wide variety of other materials such as plutonium and thorium. This
was a major goal of the CANDU design; by operating on natural uranium
the cost of enrichment is removed.
The reactor core is in a large tank called a calandria. There is a heavy
water as the moderator in this tank. The calandria is penetrated by several
hundred horizontal pressure tubes. These tubes form channels for the
fuel. The fuel is cooled by a flow of heavy water under high pressure in the
primary cooling circuit, reaching 290°C. The moderator in the tank and the
coolant in the channels are separated. The hot coolant that leaves the
channels goes to a steam generator, which in turn heats a secondary loop
of water to steam that can run turbines and generator (as in the PWR).
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
ADVANTAGES
• The PHWRs can be refueled while at full power, which makes
them very efficient in their use of uranium (it allows for
precise flux control in the core).
• The PHWRs use a natural uranium as fuel (in the form of
ceramic UO2).
• The PHWRs produce more energy per kilogram of mined
uranium than other designs, but also produces a much larger
amount of used fuel per unit output.
• The PHWRs produce a much larger amount of used fuel per
unit output. (due to low fuel burnup)
• Heavy water generally costs hundreds of dollars per kilogram,
though this is a trade-off against reduced fuel costs.
• Since the unenriched spent fuel generated less decay
heat, the spent fuel can be stored much more compactly.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
COMPONENTS OF REACTORS
1. Fuel. Uranium is the basic fuel. Usually pellets of uranium
oxide (UO2) are arranged in tubes to form fuel rods. The rods
are arranged into fuel assemblies in the reactor core.* In a
1000 MWe class PWR there might be 51,000 fuel rods with
over 18 million pellets.
In a new reactor with new fuel a neutron source is needed to
get the reaction going. Usually this is beryllium mixed with
polonium, radium or other alpha-emitter. Alpha particles from
the decay cause a release of neutrons from the beryllium as it
turns to carbon-12. Restarting a reactor with some used fuel
may not require this, as there may be enough neutrons to
achieve criticality when control rods are removed.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
2.Moderator. Material in the core which slows down the
neutrons released from fission so that they cause more fission. It
is usually water, but may be heavy water or graphite.
3. Control rods. These are made with neutron-absorbing material
such as cadmium, hafnium or boron, and are inserted or
withdrawn from the core to control the rate of reaction, or to halt
it.* In some PWR reactors, special control rods are used to enable
the core to sustain a low level of power efficiently. (Secondary
control systems involve other neutron absorbers, usually boron in
the coolant – its concentration can be adjusted over time as the
fuel burns up.) PWR control rods are inserted from the top, BWR
cruciform blades from the bottom of the core.
* In fission, most of the neutrons are released promptly, but some
are delayed. These are crucial in enabling a chain reacting system
(or reactor) to be controllable and to be able to be held precisely
critical.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
4.Coolant. A fluid circulating through the core so as to
transfer the heat from it. In light water reactors the water
moderator functions also as primary coolant. Except in BWRs,
there is secondary coolant circuit where the water becomes
steam. (See also later section on primary coolant
characteristics.) A PWR has two to four primary coolant loops
with pumps, driven either by steam or electricity – China’s
Hualong One design has three, each driven by a 6.6 MW
electric motor, with each pump set weighing 110 tonnes.
5. Pressure vessel or pressure tubes. Usually a
robust steel vessel containing the reactor core and
moderator/coolant, but it may be a series of tubes holding the
fuel and conveying the coolant through the surrounding
moderator.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
• 6. Steam generator. Part of the cooling system of pressurised water reactors
(PWR & PHWR) where the high-pressure primary coolant bringing heat
from the reactor is used to make steam for the turbine, in a secondary
circuit. Essentially a heat exchanger like a motor car radiator.* Reactors
have up to six 'loops', each with a steam generator. Since 1980 over 110
PWR reactors have had their steam generators replaced after 20-30 years
service, 57 of these in USA.
• * These are large heat exchangers for transferring heat from one fluid to
another – here from high-pressure primary circuit in PWR to secondary
circuit where water turns to steam. Each structure weighs up to 800
tonnes and contains from 300 to 16,000 tubes about 2 cm diameter for the
primary coolant, which is radioactive due to nitrogen-16 (N-16, formed by
neutron bombardment of oxygen, with half-life of 7 seconds). The
secondary water must flow through the support structures for the tubes.
The whole thing needs to be designed so that the tubes don't vibrate and
fret, operated so that deposits do not build up to impede the flow, and
maintained chemically to avoid corrosion. Tubes which fail and leak are
plugged, and surplus capacity is designed to allow for this. Leaks can be
detected by monitoring N-16 levels inSHUKLA
BY KAMAL the steam as it leaves the steam
7. Containment. The structure around the reactor
and associated steam generators which is designed
to protect it from outside intrusion and to protect
those outside from the effects of radiation in case of
any serious malfunction inside. It is typically a metre-
thick concrete and steel structure.
Newer Russian and some other reactors install core
melt localisation devices or 'core catchers' under the
pressure vessel to catch any melted core material in
the event of a major accident.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Reactor type Main countries Number GWe Fuel Coolant Moderator
Pressurised water reactor US, France, Japan, Russia, enriched UO2

292 275 water water
(PWR) China
Boiling water reactor (BWR) US, Japan, Sweden 75 73 enriched UO2 water water
Pressurised heavy water natural UO2

Canada, India 49 25 heavy water heavy water
reactor (PHWR)
Gas-cooled reactor (AGR & natural U (metal),

UK 14 8 CO2 graphite
Magnox) enriched UO2
Light water graphite reactor enriched UO2

Russia 11 + 4 10 water graphite
(RBMK & EGP)
Fast neutron reactor (FBR) Russia 3 1.4 PuO2 and UO2 liquid sodium none
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
TOTAL 448 392
Control Building
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Containment Building
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
TURBINE BUILDING
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Pressurised water reactor (PWR)
PWRs use ordinary water as both coolant and moderator. The design is
distinguished by having a primary cooling circuit which flows through the core of
the reactor under very high pressure, and a secondary circuit in which steam is
generated to drive the turbine. In Russia these are known as VVER types – water-
moderated and -cooled.
A PWR has fuel assemblies of 200-300 rods each, arranged vertically in the core,
and a large reactor would have about 150-250 fuel assemblies with 80-100 tonnes
of uranium.
Water in the reactor core reaches about 325°C, hence it must be kept under
about 150 times atmospheric pressure to prevent it boiling. Pressure is maintained
by steam in a pressuriser (see diagram). In the primary cooling circuit the water is
also the moderator, and if any of it turned to steam the fission reaction would slow
down. This negative feedback effect is one of the safety features of the type. The
secondary shutdown system involves adding boron to the primary circuit.
The secondary circuit is under less pressure and the water here boils in the heat
exchangers which are thus steam generators. The steam drives the turbine to
produce electricity, and is then condensed and returned to the heat exchangers in
contact with the primary circuit.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Boiling water reactor (BWR)
This design has many similarities to the PWR, except that there is only a single
circuit in which the water is at lower pressure (about 75 times atmospheric
pressure) so that it boils in the core at about 285°C. The reactor is designed to
operate with 12-15% of the water in the top part of the core as steam, and hence
with less moderating effect and thus efficiency there. BWR units can operate in
load-following mode more readily then PWRs.
The steam passes through drier plates (steam separators) above the core and then
directly to the turbines, which are thus part of the reactor circuit. Since the water
around the core of a reactor is always contaminated with traces of radionuclides, it
means that the turbine must be shielded and radiological protection provided
during maintenance. The cost of this tends to balance the savings due to the
simpler design. Most of the radioactivity in the water is very short-lived*, so the
turbine hall can be entered soon after the reactor is shut down.
* mostly N-16, with a 7 second half-life
A BWR fuel assembly comprises 90-100 fuel rods, and there are up to 750
assemblies in a reactor core, holding up to 140 tonnes of uranium. The secondary
control system involves restricting water flow through the core so that more steam
in the top part reduces moderation.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Pressurised heavy water reactor (PHWR)
The PHWR reactor design has been developed since the 1950s in Canada as the
CANDU, and from 1980s also in India. PHWRs generally use natural uranium (0.7%
U-235) oxide as fuel, hence needs a more efficient moderator, in this case heavy
water (D2O).** The PHWR produces more energy per kilogram of mined uranium
than other designs, but also produces a much larger amount of used fuel per unit
output.
** with the CANDU system, the moderator is enriched (i.e. water) rather than
the fuel – a cost trade-off.
The moderator is in a large tank called a calandria, penetrated by several
hundred horizontal pressure tubes which form channels for the fuel, cooled by a
flow of heavy water under high pressure (about 100 times atmospheric pressure)
in the primary cooling circuit, typically reaching 290°C. As in the PWR, the primary
coolant generates steam in a secondary circuit to drive the turbines. The pressure
tube design means that the reactor can be refuelled progressively without
shutting down, by isolating individual pressure tubes from the cooling circuit. It is
also less costly to build than designs with a large pressure vessel, but the tubes
have not proved as durable.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Advanced gas-cooled reactor (AGR)
These are the second generation of British gas-cooled reactors,
using graphite moderator and carbon dioxide as primary coolant.
The fuel is uranium oxide pellets, enriched to 2.5-3.5%, in
stainless steel tubes. The carbon dioxide circulates through the
core, reaching 650°C and then past steam generator tubes
outside it, but still inside the concrete and steel pressure vessel
(hence 'integral' design). Control rods penetrate the moderator
and a secondary shutdown system involves injecting nitrogen to
the coolant.
The AGR was developed from the Magnox reactor. Magnox
reactors were also graphite moderated and CO2 cooled, used
natural uranium fuel in metal form, and water as secondary
coolant. The UK's last Magnox reactor closed at the end of 2015.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Light water graphite-moderated reactor (RBMK)
This is a Soviet design, developed from plutonium production

reactors. It employs long (7 metre) vertical pressure tubes
running through graphite moderator, and is cooled by water,
which is allowed to boil in the core at 290°C, at about 6.9
MPa, much as in a BWR. Fuel is low-enriched uranium oxide
made up into fuel assemblies 3.5 metres long. With
moderation largely due to the fixed graphite, excess boiling
simply reduces the cooling and neutron absorbtion without
inhibiting the fission reaction, and a positive feedback
problem can arise, which is why they have never been built
outside the Soviet Union. See appendix on RBMK Reactors for
more detail.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Fast neutron reactors (FNR)
• Some reactors (only one in commercial service) do not have a
moderator and utilise fast neutrons, generating power from
plutonium while making more of it from the U-238 isotope in
or around the fuel. While they get more than 60 times as
much energy from the original uranium compared with the
normal reactors, they are expensive to build. Further
development of them is likely in the next decade, and the
main designs expected to be built in two decades are FNRs. If
they are configured to produce more fissile material
(plutonium) than they consume they are called fast breeder
reactors (FBR). See also Fast Neutron Reactors and Small
Reactors papers.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Lifetime of nuclear reactors
Some components simply wear out, corrode or degrade to a low level
of efficiency. These need to be replaced. Steam generators are the most
prominent and expensive of these, and many have been replaced after
about 30 years where the reactor otherwise has the prospect of running
for 60 years. This is essentially an economic decision. Lesser
components are more straightforward to replace as they age. In Candu
reactors, pressure tube replacement has been undertaken on some
plants after about 30 years operation.
A second issue is that of obsolescence. For instance, older reactors
have analogue instrument and control systems. Thirdly, the properties
of materials may degrade with age, particularly with heat and neutron
irradiation. In respect to all these aspects, investment is needed to
maintain reliability and safety. Also, periodic safety reviews are
undertaken on older plants in line with international safety conventions
and principles to ensure that safety margins are maintained.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CONTD.
Another important issue is knowledge management over the full
lifecycle from design, through construction and operation to
decommissioning for reactors and other facilities. This may span a
century and involve several countries, and involve a succession of
companies. The plant lifespan will cover several generations of
engineers. Data needs to be transferable across several generations
of software and IT hardware, as well as being shared with other
operators of similar plants.
* Significant modifications may be made to the design over the life
of the plant, so original documentation is not sufficient, and loss of
design base knowledge can have huge implications (e.g. Pickering A
and Bruce A in Ontario). Knowledge management is often a shared
responsibility and is essential for effective decision-making and the
achievement of plant safety and economics.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
PRIMARY COOLANTS
Water or heavy water must be maintained at very high
pressure (1000-2200 psi, 7-15 MPa, 150 atmospheres) to
enable it to function well above 100°C, up to 345°C, as in
present reactors. This has a major influence on reactor
engineering. However, supercritical water around 25 MPa can
give 45% thermal efficiency – as at some fossil-fuel power
plants today with outlet temperatures of 600°C, and at ultra
supercritical levels (30+ MPa) 50% may be attained.
Water cooling of steam condensers is fairly standard in all
power plants, because it works very well, it is relatively
inexpensive, and there is a huge experience base. Water (at 75
atm pressure) has good heat capacity – about 4000 kJ/m3 – so
is a lot more effective than gas for removing heat, though its
thermal conductivity is less than liquid alternatives.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Helium must be used at similar pressure (1000-2000 psi, 7-14
MPa) to maintain sufficient density for efficient operation.
However, even at 75 atm pressure its heat capacity is only about
20 kJ/m3. Again, there are engineering implications from the
high pressure required, but it can be used in the Brayton cycle to
drive a turbine directly.
Carbon dioxide was used in early British reactors, and their

current AGRs which operate at much higher temperatures than
light water reactors. It is denser than helium and thus likely to
give better thermal conversion efficiency. It also leaks less
readily than helium. There is now interest in supercritical CO2 for
the Brayton cycle.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CONTD.
Sodium, as normally used in fast neutron reactors at around 550ºC, melts at
98°C and boils at 883°C at atmospheric pressure, so despite the need to keep it
dry the engineering required to contain it is relatively modest. It has high
thermal conductivity and high heat capacity – about 1000 kJ/m 3 at 2 atm
pressure. However, normally water/steam is used in the secondary circuit to
drive a turbine (Rankine cycle) at lower thermal efficiency than the Brayton
cycle. In some designs sodium is in a secondary circuit to steam generators.
Sodium does not corrode the metals used in the fuel cladding or primary circuit,
nor the fuel itself if there is cladding damage, but it is very reactive generally. In
particular it reacts exothermically with water or steam to liberate hydrogen. It
burns in air, but much less vigorously. Sodium has a low neutron capture cross-
section, but it is enough for some Na-23 to become Na-24, which is a beta-
emitter and very gamma-active with 15-hour half-life, so some shielding is
required. In a large reactor, with about 5000 t sodium per GWe, Na-24 activity
reaches an equilibrium level of nearly 1 TBq/kg – a large radioactive inventory. If
a reactor needs to be shut down frequently, NaK eutectic which is liquid at room
temperature (about 13°C) may be used as coolant, but the potassium is
pyrophoric, which increases the hazard. Sodium is about six times more
transparent to neutrons than lead.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CONTD.
Lead or lead-bismuth eutectic in fast neutron reactors are capable

of higher temperature operation at atmospheric pressure. They are
transparent to neutrons, aiding efficiency due to greater spacing
between fuel pins which then allows coolant flow by convection for
decay heat removal, and since they do not react with water the
heat exchanger interface is safer. They do not burn when exposed
to air. However, they are corrosive of fuel cladding and steels, which
originally limited temperatures to 550°C. With today's materials
650°C can be reached, and in future 800°C is envisaged with the
second stage of Generation IV development, using oxide dispersion-
strengthened steels. Lead and Pb-Bi have much higher thermal
conductivity than water, but lower than sodium. Westinghouse is
developing a lead-cooled fast reactor concept and LeadCold in
Canada is developing one also, using novel aluminium-steel alloys
that are highly corrosion-resistant to 450°C. The compound
Ti3SiC2 (titanium silicon carbide) is suggested for primary circuits,
resisting corrosion. BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CONTD.
SALT: Fluoride salts boil at around 1400°C at atmospheric

pressure, so allow several options for use of the heat, including
using helium in a secondary Brayton cycle circuit with thermal
efficiencies of 48% at 750°C to 59% at 1000°C, for manufacture
of hydrogen. Fluoride salts have a very high boiling temperature,
very low vapour pressure even at red heat, very high volumetric
heat capacity (4670 kJ/m3 for FLiBe, higher than water at 75 atm
pressure), good heat transfer properties, low neutron
absorbtion, good neutron moderation capability, are not
damaged by radiation, are chemically very stable so absorb all
fission products well and do not react violently with air or water,
are compatible with graphite, and some are also inert to some
common structural metals. Some gamma-active F-20 is formed
by neutron capture, but has very short half-life (11 seconds).
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CONTD
Chloride salts have advantages in fast-spectrum molten salt reactors,
having higher solubility for actinides than fluorides. While NaCl has
good nuclear, chemical and physical properties its high melting point
means it needs to be blended with MgCl2 or CaCl2, the former being
preferred in eutectic, and allowing the addition of actinide trichlorides.
The major isotope of chlorine, Cl-35 gives rise to Cl-36 as an activation
product – a long-lived energetic beta source, so Cl-37 is much
preferable in a reactor. In thermal reactors, chlorides are only
candidates for secondary cooling loops.
All low-pressure liquid coolants allow all their heat to be delivered at
high temperatures, since the temperature drop in heat exchangers is
less than with gas coolants. Also, with a good margin between
operating and boiling temperatures, passive cooling for decay heat is
readily achieved. Since heat exchangers do leak to some small extent,
having incompatible primary and secondary coolants can be a problem.
The less pressure difference across the heat exchanger, the less is the
problem.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CONTD.
The removal of passive decay heat is a vital feature of primary

cooling systems, beyond heat transfer to do work. When the
fission process stops, fission product decay continues and a
substantial amount of heat is added to the core. At the
moment of shutdown, this is about 6.5% of the full power
level, but after an hour it drops to about 1.5% as the short-
lived fission products decay. After a day, the decay heat falls to
0.4%, and after a week it will be only 0.2%. This heat could
melt the core of a light water reactor unless it is reliably
dissipated, as shown in 2011 at Fukushima, where about 1.5%
of the heat was being generated when the tsunami disabled
the cooling. In passive systems, some kind of convection flow
is relied upon.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES
Incorporation of passive safety systems in reactor
design---
Passive safety systems operate based on natural physical laws
such as gravity, buoyancy, etc. and derive their energy for
operation from the system itself, thus they do not require
external source of energy or operator actuation, bringing the
reactor to safe condition by passive means. Some potential
causes of failure of active systems, such as lack of human
action or power failure, do not exist when passive safety is
provided. Some of the examples of application of passive
safety systems in future designs which can avoid occurrence of
severe accident are described below.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Passive shutdown systems
Safe shut down of the reactor is important safety function which must
be ensured to avoid and mitigate accidents of severe nature. Most of the
shutdown systems rely on active components like instrumentation signals
and power signals although made fail safe and partially passive. For
shutdown of reactor under operating transients and DBAs, shutdown
philosophy in line with defense-in-depth concept is widely used in almost
all recent reactors, and shall remain in application in advanced reactors.
This design includes at least two separate, independent, and diverse
means of shutting down the reactor. At least one means of shutdown is
independently capable of rendering the reactor subcritical from normal
operation, and in DBAs, and maintaining the reactor subcritical by an
adequate margin and with high reliability for even the most reactive
conditions of the core. To improve reliability, stored energy is used in
shutdown actuation. However, wired systems are vulnerable to insider
threats. Passive means of reactor shutdown including instrumentation
and actuation of such system will be important to combat insider threat.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CONTD.
Insider threat is a real possibility in these days due to the immense

potential of terrorist threat, in which an insider with highly
sophisticated knowledge of plant dynamics may purposefully
create scenarios leading to severe accidents by compromising
safety systems. In the case of malevolent acts by an insider which
can be purposefully detrimental to safety of reactor and inability of
plant operators to manage the events and their consequences, for
a significantly long time, reactor should be capable of passively
shutting down itself and maintaining coolability without regard to
operator action. Examples of such systems are the density lock
concept in the Process Inherent Ultimate Safety (PIUS) reactor
(Boyack et al 1995) and Passive Poison Injection System (PPIS) in
Advanced Heavy Water Reactor (AHWR) which can passively shut
down the reactor even with failure of wired shutdown systems.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Passive decay heat removal
For any NPP, the main objective of safety is to provide assured
removal of decay heat to an ultimate heat sink after safe
shutdown of the reactor. The conventional decay heat
removal systems using water or air as cooling medium are
essentially active systems whose availability cannot be
ensured in the event of a Fukushima type long term Station
Black Out (SBO) i.e., loss of offsite, onsite and emergency
power supply. Passive decay heat removal for extended
periods of SBO is essential feature for ensuring safety of
reactor.
Present reactor designs qualify for core coolability for finite
period of time in the event of a Station Black Out (SBO)
depending on design feature and regulatory requirements.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CONTD.
The first generation of LWRs provided emergency coolant injection
and decay heat removal by active means, while advanced LWR
concepts use passive means to accomplish these functions. The
proposed passive systems for advanced reactors generally use a
pool with immersed heat exchangers. Such systems can either be on
the steam generator side or on the reactor side as shown in figure
2. They all employ natural circulation for transport of decay heat
from core to pool.
However, these systems can sustain decay heat removal for finite
time depending on the inventory of water in the pool making them
unsuitable for extended SBOs. Another limitation is that the water
can leak out in case of failure on the pool side. Therefore, ultimate
heat sink which cannot be lost will be an important design feature
to eliminate emergency planning in public domain. Air is an ideal
infinite heat sink for decay heat removal which can ensure core
coolability for infinite time as it cannot be lost unlike stored water.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Passive emergency core cooling system (ECCS)
To mitigate the consequences of a LOCA, a passive Emergency

Core Cooling System (ECCS) is provided in AHWR. ECCS injects
water to Main Heat Transport system and removes heat from
the fuel. It consists of passive High Pressure (HP) Injection
from accumulators, passive Low Pressure (LP) Injection from
GDWP and active Long Term re-circulation. To achieve
complete passive operation, One Way Rupture Discs (OWRD)
have been incorporated downstream of accumulators and
GDWP. The OWRD fails at low differential pressure in the
forward direction, but withstand the high differential pressure
in the reverse direction. Direct injection of emergency coolant
into the fuel bundle is another feature of AHWR, which
ensures cooling water injection where it is most needed with
least time delay. BY KAMAL SHUKLA
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Passive containment cooling
In case of accidents leading to release of heat into the
containment, cooling of containment is imperative to prevent
pressurization of containment and to prevent escalation of
accident and release of radioactivity into the atmosphere.
This is achieved passively in AHWR by incorporating a passive
containment cooling system. It consists of a set of heat
exchangers located underneath the GDWP. The steam-air
mixture rejects heat to the GDWP water through the heat
exchangers. The water circulation in the tubes is by natural
circulation. GDWP with its eight compartments provides
redundancy in case of leakage from one compartment due to
any unforeseen reason.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Hydrogen management
A significant amount of hydrogen is rapidly produced in the oxidation process of
fuel clad zircaloy in a severe accident involving core melt. This hydrogen would then
be released to the reactor containment through a pipe break or a reactor vessel
rupture. Without counter measures, the hydrogen may as well prompt deflagration
and detonation possibly leading to early containment failure in light water reactors
as happened at Fukushima. The hydrogen risk in a nuclear power plant may be
defined as the risk of hydrogen combustion in the containment building that
represents a threat to the integrity of the containment due to pressure and
temperature. In case of nuclear reactor accident, the hydrogen sources are the
zirconium–steam reaction, the boron carbide–steam reaction, the uranium–steam
reaction, the steel–steam reaction, the late zirconium–steam reaction (re-flood of
an overheated core), the relocation of zirconium-rich mixtures, the molten core–
concrete interaction, the radiolytic decomposition of the primary water, and the
corrosion of metallic compounds like zinc, aluminium or iron. In DBA, the hydrogen
generation is a slow process. However, in Severe Accidents, the hydrogen
production is a fast process. Precise estimation of hydrogen generation rates and
total quantity is therefore essential to assess hydrogen risk.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Station blackout
Extended SBO with loss of infrastructure in and around NPP will be
a design issue for future reactors. Developing systems in NPPs which
can rely on providing cooling capabilities for infinite time in case of
extreme natural events with the help of ultimate heat sink that
cannot be lost would be essential. The following mitigation
capabilities are required for extended SBO situations:
• Maintaining highly reliable onsite electric power
systems/instrumentation.
• Additional sources of coolant water for the reactor and steam
generators.
• Passive methods of depressurization of primary system and feed
water system.
• Passive methods to cool the reactor core and minimize releases of
radioactive materials from containment.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Hydrogen management
Assessing and addressing hydrogen risk of the plant will
require study of advanced NPP designs and their
characteristics, selection of accident sequences, assessment of
the hydrogen sources as well as the steam sources, follow-up
and modelling of the hydrogen/oxygen/inert gas distribution,
and evaluation of the hydrogen combustion risk based on
factors like response of venting and inerting systems.
Scrubbing or filtration systems would be needed to reduce
release of activity in case of venting. Development of effective
PAR systems can greatly reduce hydrogen risk, however
analyses of different accident progression scenarios is
required.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Fuel cladding development
There are many practical issues associated with
introducing SiC based fuel cladding today. These include
manufacturing technology, large-scale manufacturing
costs, fundamental understanding of the composite
technology, and licensing. Though monolithic SiC tubes
are very strong, they are brittle. A cost-effective large-
scale manufacturing technique for SiC precursors, fibres
and composite structures is also challenging. Performing
the testing and in-reactor verification required to assure
regulators and commercial operators of the safety and
efficacy of the SiC clad
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Containment design
The ability of the containment system to withstand loads
associated with severe accidents need to be assessed like
various heat sources, including residual heat, metal–water
reactions, combustion of gases, gaseous release control,
pressure and temperature variations and effects of the
accident on the integrity and functionality of internal
structures.
Containments may provide ultimate barrier to terrorist
attacks. The advancements in civil design, layout optimization
and incorporation of inherent and passive safety systems with
redundant and diverse service trains would be important.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Core catcher design
Major core catcher design challenges arise from the fact that
response of core catcher is unique to various accident scenarios and
reactor core design. Effective core catcher design will involve
understanding of various material and neutronic properties with
different material combinations apart from understanding the
nature of corium mix. To evaluate criticality in the core catcher, the
conditions of the corium and the core catcher after accident
sequence must be determined. Various physical phenomenon like
changes in the corium mass and material composition, porosity due
to water vapor, layer separation, shape of corium mix, impact on
structural and containment materials in contact with corium and
their combined effect on criticality analysis would be important
features of future research in core meltdown accidents.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
ACCIDENT CLASSIFICATION AS PER CODE OF
FEDERAL REGULATION
Federal Code Regulation Title10 CFR 50 classify accidents
Class1: trivial incident, routine inside release of radioactivity
C2: small release outside containment, steam PRV
C3; waste system failure, outside liquid/ gas release
C4: Fuel cladding failure, releasing fission products to PHT
C5: Steam generator fail releasing FP to PHT, secondary S
C6:Refueling accidents, fuel bundle heavy object drop
C7: Spent Fuel accidents
C8: DBA accidents, LOCA, steam line, ATWS
Class 9: Hypothetial accidents more severe than Class8
CHECK NOTES BELOW FOR FURTHER INFO.

BY KAMAL SHUKLA
LOSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT (LOCA)
A loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) is a mode of failure for
a nuclear reactor; if not managed effectively, the results of a LOCA
could result in reactor core damage. Each nuclear
plant's emergency core cooling system (ECCS) exists specifically to
deal with a LOCA.
Nuclear reactors generate heat internally; to remove this heat
and convert it into useful electrical power, a coolant system is
used. If this coolant flow is reduced, or lost altogether, the nuclear
reactor's emergency shutdown system is designed to stop
the fission chain reaction. However, due to radioactive decay the
nuclear fuel will continue to generate a significant amount of heat.
The decay heat produced by a reactor shutdown from full power is
initially equivalent to about 5 to 6% of the thermal rating of the
reactor.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
If all of the independent cooling trains of the ECCS fail to operate as
designed, this heat can increase the fuel temperature to the point of
damaging the reactor.
• If water is present, it may boil, bursting out of its pipes. (For this
reason, nuclear power plants are equipped with pressure-
operated relief valves and backup supplies of cooling water.)
• If graphite and air are present, the graphite may catch fire,
spreading radioactive contamination. This situation exists only
in AGRs, RBMKs, Magnox and weapons-production reactors, which
use graphite as a neutron moderator.
• The fuel and reactor internals may melt; if the melted configuration
remains critical, the molten mass will continue to generate heat,
possibly melting its way down through the bottom of the reactor.
Such an event is called a nuclear meltdown and can have severe
consequences.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Progression after loss-of-coolant
A great deal of work goes into the prevention of a serious core
event. If such an event were to occur, three different physical
processes are expected to increase the time between the start of
the accident and the time when a large release of radioactivity
could occur. These three factors would provide additional time to
the plant operators in order to mitigate the result of the event:
1. The time required for the water to boil away (coolant,

moderator). Assuming that at the moment that the accident
occurs the reactor will be SCRAMed (immediate and full insertion
of all control rods), so reducing the thermal power input and
further delaying the boiling
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
2. The time required for the fuel to melt. After the water has boiled,
then the time required for the fuel to reach its melting point will be
dictated by the heat input due to decay of fission products, the
heat capacity of the fuel and the melting point of the fuel.
3. The time required for the molten fuel to breach the primary
pressure boundary. The time required for the molten metal of the
core to breach the primary pressure boundary (in light water
reactors this is the pressure vessel; in CANDU and RBMK reactors
this is the array of pressurized fuel channels; in PHWR reactors
like Atucha I, it will be a double barrier of channels and the
pressure vessel) will depend on temperatures and boundary
materials. Whether or not the fuel remains critical in the conditions
inside the damaged core or beyond will play a significant role
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
LARGE BREAK LOCA(LBLOCA)
A large break LOCA involves a break in the heat transport system pressure
boundary of sufficient magnitude that the reactor regulating system (RRS) is
incapable of maintaining reactivity balance. As the pressure tubes and
feeder pipes are of relatively small diameter this type of LOCA can only be
due to a break in the larger headers above the reactor core.
The initial phase of the accident (0-5 s) is characterised by a short power
transient, which is terminated by either a neutron or process trip. The main
safety concern for this short period prior to reactor trip is that the fuel
temperature might rise sufficiently high for the formation of molten UO2,
which could potentially cause pressure tube rupture. In turn the resulting
hot spots in the pressure tube could result in localised straining and possible
failure of the pressure tube. In practice, this safety concern is not realised as
the fuel is cooled by the flow of coolant resulting from the blowdown.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CONTD.
The second phase of the accident (5-30 s) is characterised by

the blowdown and depressurisation of the fuel channel prior
to ECC injection. Despite the reactor shutdown, fuel
temperatures may remain high due to the degradation in
cooling, decay heat and oxidation of the fuel sheath. The fuel
sheath may undergo significant deformation and may fail
releasing fission products to the fuel channel and
subsequently to containment. During this phase, the
temperature of the pressure tube also rises and the pressure
tube deforms into contact with the calandria. Once the
pressure tube is in contact with the calandria tube, the
moderator acts as a heat sink, cooling the pressure tube and
preventing failure of the fuel channel.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CONTD.
The third phase of the accident (30-200 s) is characterised by

the initiation of ECC. During this period, ECC is being injected
into the primary heat transport system, but has not yet
reached sufficient levels to effectively cool the fuel.
Depressurisation of the heat transport system continues and
stored heat and decay heat from the fuel is radially removed
to the moderator through the pressure tube and calandria
tube. Fuel failures are likely during this stage of the accident.
During the fourth and final phase of the accident (>200 s) the
injection of ECC has reached a level where it can effectively
cool the fuel. The heat transport system pumps have tripped,
refill of the channels in the core proceeds and a quasi-steady
state is attained.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
UNIT 4
DISPERSION AND RELEASE FROM NPP
Radioactive materials discharged from a nuclear
power plant might reach the public and might
contaminate the environment in the region by way
of both direct and indirect pathways. The objective
of this Safety Guide is to provide guidance on the
studies and investigations necessary for assessing
the impact of a nuclear power plant on humans and
the environment. It also provides guidance on the
feasibility of an effective emergency response plan,
in consideration of all the relevant site features.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
The following properties and parameters should be estimated
for radioactive sources:
(a) Radioactivity: — the rate of discharge of each important nuclide
and the total activity of each important nuclide released in a
specified period; — variation of the rate of discharge of each
important nuclide;
(b) Chemical characteristics of the material released;
(c) Physical properties of the material released;
(d) Geometry and mechanics of the discharge.
Information should be collected on the background levels of

activity in air due to natural and artificial sources.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
DISPERSION MODEL
Besides the presentation of the measured data, the system
calculates the dispersion of the radionuclides in the 30 km
vicinity of the NPP in normal and accidental situations, too.
The dispersion of the radionuclides released by the NPP is a
sophisticated phenomenon. There are four parallel processes to
be modeled continuously in time and space:
• the release of radioactive gases and aerosols: the volume of the
outflow from the stack, and the initial isotope concentration of it
is measured continuously;
• to calculate the dispersion of the released radioactive noble
gases, aerosols and elementary iodine we have to take into
account the actual meteorological conditions (e.g. wind direction,
wind speed and turbulence as function of space and time);
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
• as time passes the isotope concentration of the radioactive materials
changes continuously due the chains of radio-active decay; and dry
(and wet) deposition;
• the radiation in any point on the ground level around the NPP must
be calculated as an integral of distance taken over the (ever changing)
air isotope concentration in the vicinity of that point, as well as the
radiation of the fall-out accumulated around on the soil surface so far.
All these phenomena are calculated using the three-dimensional
Gaussian puff models. The basic ideas are shown in [1] and [2], some
details concerning calculations in [3]. According this method the
process of continuous release is approximated by the finite sequence
of so called 'puffs', each corresponding to a 10-minute release. Each
puff contains a given amount of different radioactive materials,
determined by the intensity of the release and of the actual time
period of the sequence after the release.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
The central point of the puffs is moving according to the actual
wind vectors and the dilution of the puffs is determined by the
actual air turbulence, described in our case by the discrete
Pasquill stability classes. The continuous drifting and dispersion
are approximated by the sequence of discrete steps. The time
base is 10 minutes, therefore the model releases a new puff in
each 10 minutes.
Due to the reflection from ground surface and to the
temperature inversions the vertical Gaussian distribution of the
puffs may be modified. The height of the barrier layer of the
inversion at each Pasquill stability class is taken from the
literature.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Atmospheric Dispersion
The iodine and cesium radionuclides are emitted as gases and
partition into ambient aerosol particles at the relatively low
temperatures in the ambient atmosphere, depending on the volatility
of the gases.
The low solubility of iodine is based on publicly-available reported
measurements . Thus, 131I (half life: 8.025 ± 0.002 days) is treated as
being purely in the gas phase in our model and is largely removed
from the atmosphere via radioactive decay. This allows for the
reduction of computational complexity and for the direct comparison
of gaseous and aerosol components of radioisotopes and is a valid
approximation, as the atmospheric gaseous to particulate fraction is
estimated to be close to a factor of four by a number of relevant
measurements: the RadNet station network, operated by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), finds 81% of the ambient 131I
in the gas phase and 19% in the particulate phase.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CONTD.
The informal network of European national authorities, known as

the Ring of Five (Ro5), comprising more than 150 high volume
sampling systems, measures an average ratio of gaseous/total 131I
of 77.2% ± 13.6%. Both of these values are in agreement with the
average values reported for the Chernobyl accident and for the
Fukushima site during the period spanning from March 22 to April
4, 2011 (ratio of 71% ± 11%). Therefore, a factor of 4 gaseous to
particle phase partitioning would be appropriate. Dry deposition
and particle sedimentation remove only up to 5%–10% of the
emissions. We are not taking into account particle resuspension,
expected to affect a negligible fraction of the deposited and
sedimented quantities considered here.
The low-volatile 137Cs (half-life: 30.17 ± 0.03 years) is modeled as a
water-soluble aerosol with a standard lognormal distribution of
mean radius 0.25 µm, Henry’s coefficient of 1.0 mol L−1 atm−1 and
a density of 1,000.0 kg m−3 .
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CONTD.
The mean radius used is representative of the distribution of

atmospheric aerosol in the accumulation mode size and most
influenced by washout and rainout effects. It is consistent with the
measurements of radioactivity after Chernobyl. 137Cs is removed
from the atmosphere predominantly through small-scale
convective and large-scale stratiform precipitation (90%–95%
combined) and through dry deposition and sedimentation (5%–
10% combined). The removal of accumulation mode particles by
wet and, to a much lesser extent, by dry deposition is not sensitive
to the assumed mean radius, as the scavenging efficiency of the
accumulation mode particles in our model is not size dependent.
The radioactive decay of 137Cs is not taken into account in the
simulation due to the long half-life of 137Cs compared to the
atmospheric residence time.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Results
Our study uses a constant emission rate for the simulations, so
that we obtain representative concentrations for all meteorological
conditions, over which we subsequently average to derive the
integral risks. Our results do not realistically represent the impact
of any individual NPP accident under specific meteorological
conditions , which would require a deterministic approach to
represent an actual accident , but rather, aim to estimate the risk
associated with all possible atmospheric states. It is noted that, for
the purposes of our study, the overall concentration and deposition
magnitudes are renormalized, so that in each case, the highest risk
corresponds to unity (arbitrary scale), i.e., the relative geographical
risk and equivalent dose are displayed
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CONTD.
The peak levels of deposition and, hence, the highest risk of ground
contamination and population doses are expected in the eastern
and central United States, across the European continent and along
the Pacific coast of China, where most of the NPPs are located. The
high rates of precipitation in the moist tropics result in enhanced
risk due to wet deposition processes. This explains the relatively
high risks in central Africa and southeastern Asia, where no or few
NPPs are located, being downwind of NPPs in the EMME and
western Asia, respectively.
Results for the relative concentration, deposition and equivalent
human population dose at the individual country level are provided
in and the accompanying supplement. The geographical distribution
of the human population is also taken into account by defining a
risk index as the relative risk in our model (from concentration and
deposition separately) times the density of the population that can
potentially be exposed for each country.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CONTD.
The surface level concentrations in the summer tend to be more

localized in the emission region, whereas dilution by turbulent
mixing and vertical transport by deep convective clouds is more
efficient. This is in line with our previous work examining the
global combined total seasonal variation for all stations, where
the aerosol radionuclide deposition was also assessed. The total
mass of aerosol 137Cs in the atmosphere was similarly found to
be lower in winter and higher during summer, due to more
efficient removal by wet deposition processes.
Signifying adequate coverage for our analysis sample size and
appropriate representation of the temporal circulation variability
effects, especially considering the associated uncertainties of the
global representation of modeled processes.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
PLUME
Once a radioactive gas or aerosol becomes airborne, it travels
and disperses in a manner governed by its own physical
properties and those of the ambient atmosphere into which
it is discharged. The effluent enters the atmosphere with a
certain velocity and temperature which are generally
different from those of the ambient atmosphere. The effluent
motion has a vertical component owing to the effects of
vertical velocity and differences in temperature, as long as
these continue. This upward rise of the effluent, termed
‘plume rise’, changes the effective height of the discharge
point. The path of the effluent is affected by flow
modifications near obstacles such as buildings and structures.
The model(s) employed should account for these effects.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CONTD.
The dispersion of plume which is emitted from a chimney is

governed by many of factors: wind speed, wind direction, local
terrain, turbulence intensity of atmosphere, temperature, etc. In
this study, we numerically investigate the plume dispersions for
various altitudinal temperature variations. The normal atmosphere
has a temperature decrease of −0.6°C/100 m, however, the real
atmosphere has various altitudinal temperature profiles
(−1.5 ∼ 1.0°C/100 m) according to meteorological factors. Air can
occasionally make very strong upward/downward wind current or
flow fluctuation due to buoyancy force. In this study, the results of
the plume dispersion are introduced along the altitudinal
temperature variation. The developing processes of the plume after
being discharged from a stack and the ground level concentrations
at various positions, are compared under various altitudinal
temperature conditions.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
CONTD.
The effluent, while undergoing plume rise, transport and diffusion, may also be
subject to processes such as the following:
(a) radioactive decay and buildup of daughter products;
(b) wet deposition:
— rainout and/or snowout (in which vapour or aerosol is scavenged by water
droplets or snowflakes in cloud and falls out as precipitation);
— washout (in which vapour or aerosol is scavenged below the rain cloud by
falling precipitation);
— fogging (in which vapour or aerosol is scavenged by water droplets in fog);
(c) dry deposition:
— sedimentation of aerosols or gravitational settling (for particulate diameters
larger than about 10 µm);
— impaction of aerosols and adsorption of vapours and gases onto obstacles in
the path of the wind;
(d) formation and coalescence of aerosols; and
(e) resuspension of materials deposited on surfaces.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Altitude Temperature Inversion
Temperature changes with Red is normal adiabatic

altitude due to low air pressure
And adiabatic expansion of air
Bubble.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Illustration of inversion
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Inversion in environment
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
EVALUATION TECHNIQUES
We use the following algorithm to determine the places and the
equivalent elevations of the releases:
1. We measure the releases made through the ventilation stacks of the NPP
and the SFIS. These are direct measurements which are accepted
unconditionally.
2. Using the measured releases in the stacks and the measured actual
meteorological conditions we simulate the dispersion process and calculate
the expected gamma dose at the A-type stations and G-type posts.
3. If the radiation levels measured by the A-type stations and G-type posts
are significantly higher than the calculated values, we take the decision
that the containment is leaking somewhere and there are releases
bypassing the stacks.
4. The excess amount of the activity is re-calculated back to the release
point assuming the height of the release as 25 m (half of the height of the
containment).
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
In steps 1 and 2 we perform a simplified calculation,
determining only the gamma dose caused by the puffs for
20 points (9 A-type and 11 G-type measurement points).
We are taking into account the fall-outs accumulated on
the soil surface so far, too.
Now, after step 4, using the new source terms (stack
and/or containment) we re-calculate the dispersion process
- this time not only for the A and G type measurement
posts but in the whole vicinity of the power plant; and not
only the external gamma doses but the doses caused by
inhalation and via food-chain are also calculated.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
It is very important to have a good estimate of the initial isotope
composition for calculating the environmental dose burden from
leakage via the reactor building. Basically there are four types of
isotope composition:
Successful LOCA (Loss of coolant accident) - only some fuel rod
claddings are ruptured;
• Unsuccessful LOCA - the core is melted but the debris remains inside
the reactor vessel;
• Unsuccessful LOCA - the debris of the melted core penetrates the
reactor vessel;
• PRISE - water from the primary circuit penetrates to the secondary
circuit and the release comes from there
The first three cases start with the gap activity (gap on the cladding
of the fuel rod) and the fourth with water activity. These are the two
initial isotope compositions for theSHUKLA
BY KAMAL very beginning of the calculations.
The dose for different nodal (grid) points inside the vicinity of the
plant can be calculated inserting
a) the source term estimated,
b) the isotope composition accepted and
c) the meteorological data measured
as inputs for the dispersion model described above. As far as the
source term cannot be predicted for a longer period of time, we cannot
make reliable estimations for longer period than 2-6 hours even if we
assume that the meteorological and release conditions do not change.
There are two types of doses calculated to all nodal (grid) points:
• Effective gamma dose increment from external radiation. This value is
calculated adding up the radiation coming from the clouds and
radiation coming from the fall-out on the soil.
• Inhaled iodine radiation dose increment of the thyroid glands of the
children.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
IODINE
Iodine 131 is a radioisotope with a very short half-life of 8.02 days,
making it highly radioactive. Frequently used in small doses in
thyroid cancers therapies, it is also one of the most feared fission
products when accidentally released into the environment.
In medicine, iodine 131 is primarily used to study the functionning
of the thyroid though it can also be employed in the treatment of
hyperthyroidism as well as thyroid cancer. The first production of
iodine 131 in France took place in 1949 at the Fort de Chatillon, the
site of the first Zoe atomic reactor, before manufacture was
transferred to the nuclear research centre at Saclay. The isotope
had been used since 1942, however, in the treatment of thyroid
cancer.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Though used in low doses for medical examinations, iodine 131 is an
ideal tracer for use in humans. Only a few radioactive atoms need to be
inserted into the bloodstream for the iodine path to be accurately
monitored. The atoms integrate into molecules that eventually transform
into thyroid hormones; this is particularly interesting, given that iodine
attaches itself exclusively to the thyroid gland. Gamma ray scintigraphy
scans can thus monitor the thyroid activity and flag up the appearance of
any anomalies. In recent years, iodine 131 has been abandoned in favour
of another isotope, iodine 132 – a gamma emitter with a half-life of only
13.2 hours.
Stronger doses of iodine 131 are also used in radioactive therapies
aimed at dealing with thyroid cancers. Iodine is inserted into the
bloodstream in the same manner, and the short trajectory of the emitted
beta particles guarantees that the radiation only affects a comparatively
small part of the body.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Iodine 131 is also a feared fission product, posing as it does the
principal risk for short-term contamination in the event of
accidental waste release. From a chemical point of view, iodine is a
halogen (similar in structure to chlorine and fluorine) and its high
volatility means that it easily transforms into a purple vapour.
Volatile and highly mobile in the environment as volatile,
radioactive iodine isotopes follow the usual transfer processes to
the food chain : dispersion, deposits, uptake by plant leaves, root
absorption, ingestion by animals and humans. Ingested by animals
during lactation, iodine deposited on the grass finds its way in milk
a few hours after ingestion, the maximum appearing after three
days.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
After a nuclear or radioactivity accident, the iodine-131
should be monitored in the food chain forseveral weeks, until
it disappearsradionuclide, specially in milk and vegetables,
especially and large leaves vegetables like spinach and lettuce.
Water should also be monitored.
In any case, the high radioactivity of iodine 131 is somewhat
offset by its high decay rate, with the level of activity dropping
by a factor of 1000 every eighty days. There are also
procedures for us to protect ourselves from it before it
decays.
Other radioactive isotopes of iodine have very short lifetimes
such as iodine-132 and iodine-133 whose periods are 20.8
and 2.3 hours. These isotopes deliver almost their
radiatioactivity in the early days after a reactor is shutdown.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
BIOLOGICAL ABSORPTION
The greenhouse gas emissions fromnuclear fission power are much
smaller than those associated with coal, oil and gas, and the routine
health risks are much smaller than those associated with coal.
However, there is a "catastrophic risk" potential if containment fails,
which in nuclear reactors can be brought about by overheated fuels
melting and releasing large quantities of fission products into the
environment. This potential risk could wipe out the benefits.
Such studies have looked for excess cancers in both plant workers
and surrounding populations due to releases during normal
operations of nuclear plants and other parts of the nuclear power
industry, as well as excess cancers in workers and the public due to
accidental releases. There is agreement that excess cancers in both
plant workers and the surrounding public have been caused by
accidental releases such as the Chernobyl accident.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Water is often drawn through screens to minimise to entry of
debris. The problem is that many aquatic organisms are
trapped and killed against the screens, through a process
known as impingement. Aquatic organisms small enough to
pass through the screens are subject to toxic stress in a
process known as entrainment. Billions of marine organisms
are sucked into the cooling systems and destroyed.
Large amounts of radioactive contamination were spread
across Europe due to the Chernobyl disaster, and cesium and
strontium contaminated many agricultural products, livestock
and soil.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Due to the bioaccumulation of cesium- 137, some mushrooms
as well as wild animals which eat them, e.g. wild boars hunted
in Germany and deer in Austria, may have levels which are
not considered safe for human consumption.
With many species of animals experiencing a population
increase since human influence has largely left the region,
including an increase in moose, bison and wolf numbers.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
REMEDIAL PLANS
Controlling airborne releases during normal operation-
During normal operation, nuclear power plants (NPPs) can release
minute amounts of radiation into the air. These releases originate as
fission and activation products generated by nuclear reactions in the
reactor and by the decay of these products through ventilation
systems within the plant. The radioactive material is collected by the
ventilation systems into gaseous waste streams where they pass
through various activity monitors and undergo treatment before being
released into the atmosphere. If too much radiation is detected, the
system will automatically stop the air from being released. These
releases are very small, and are monitored and controlled by the plant
operator, and reported to the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
(CNSC). They are well below regulatory limits and do not pose any risk
to the health and safety of persons or the environment.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Controlling waterborne radioactive releases
during normal operation
Releases of radiation into a natural body of water may occur at
nuclear power plants during normal operation. Radioactive liquid
waste is generated from various sources within a NPP, including wash
water used to clean surfaces and floors, laundry wash, showers and
sinks. The waste is managed by an active plant drainage system that
collects liquid wastes and separates them into special tanks, where
they are treated. The treatment methods depend on the activity and
chemical concentration, and may use different methods, including
filtration and solidification.
After treatment, the liquid waste passes through a discharge line,
which is continuously monitored for radiation with real-time
detection equipment before being released to the environment. If too
much radiation is detected, these systems will stop automatically, and
the liquid waste is retreated.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Managing releases during an emergency
In the unlikely event of an emergency, single and multi-unit

CANDU (CANada Deuterium Uranium) reactors are designed to
contain radiation within their respective buildings to minimize releases
to the environment.
For single-unit reactor buildings, during the onset of the emergency,
there would be a quick release of radiation into the atmosphere.
Emergency shutdown systems would then activate in order to shut the
reactor down, ending the fission reaction and reducing releases to the
reactor building (which acts as a containment for radioactive gases),
and then to the environment. Immediately after, the reactor building
would seal or "box-up", preventing any further immediate releases.
The Point Lepreau NPP also has an emergency containment filtered
ventilation (ECFV) system (see Figure 1) to limit the release of
radioactive material.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Multi-unit CANDU reactors (i.e., Bruce A & B, Pickering Units 1 to 8,
and Darlington) have a negative pressure design achieved by a large
vacuum building (see Figure 2). This type of design is effective in
both containing radioactive material to allow for decay and limiting
the release of radioactive material in the event of an emergency.
During the ongoing emergency, NPP operators may have to vent
the containment building in order to protect it from overpressure
and maintain its ability to isolate the reactor. The air that must be
vented out may contain fission products, such as Iodine-131 and
Cesium-137.
The operator of the nuclear power plant, in consultation with the
CNSC and public health authorities, including the province, Health
Canada and other responsible parties, would wait for suitable
weather conditions to vent the radiation in a direction away from
populated areas.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
While waiting to vent, the nuclear power plant operator can spray water inside the
containment in order to reduce internal pressure by condensing the steam and
cooling the air. This also allows for longer containment and decay before venting
would be required. These spraying systems, also called dousing systems, operate
automatically without the need for power, and the dousing water recovered from
the vacuum structure floor can be recirculated to the storage tanks.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Plume dispersion and dose modeling
A plume is a cloud that results from a continuing

release of radioactive gases or particles.
In case of an accident, NPP operators, the provinces as
well as the CNSC have modeling capabilities that can
predict the behavior of the plume and where the
radiation releases may spread.
Based on projected and actual data about the
releases, health and radiation specialists can estimate
the dose of radiation to which the public may be
exposed and recommend protective measures.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Field radiation monitoring
In an emergency situation, teams made up of

members from federal, provincial, nuclear
operators and private sector organizations
would be assembled to carry out
environmental radiation monitoring activities.
Field radiation monitoring results would be
sent to the provincial authorities, as well as the
CNSC, to determine what protective measures
should be recommended for the public.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Sources of radioactive wastes
Radiation wastes are increasing due to wide-spread use of nuclear
power, man-made radioactive isotopes used in medical
investigation/ treatment, laboratories, Industries.
• Radiation wastes can be in solid/ liquid or gas forms
• Because radionuclide are very fine in size, majority of materials
show radiation due to particle contamination
Principles of radioactive waste management are:
– Dilute and disperse, disposal
– Concentrate and store
Normally natural radioactive isotopes have long half-life and man-
made radioactive isotopes are comparatively short half-life, after
sufficient no of half-lives, radiation decrease
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Solid radioactive waste treatment
At design stage the used materials should be nonporous,
smooth, easily washable and de-contaminable. Treatment
processes:
– Fragmentation to separate parts with different contamination
– Compacting of soft low level wastes
– Melting of metal wastes, radiation separates as sludge/glass
– Incineration, reduces size but ash/gases must be monitored
– Fixation, Cementing, Bituminization
• Solids can be disposed in sea or burial at no-men leftover
mines or unprotected grounds or protected trenches
• Salt deposits are another good places for solid and liquid
wastes due to huge deposits, less water circulation, good
shielding properties comparable to cementing.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Liquid/gas radioactive waste treatment
If liquid wastes have low radiation levels, it can be treated and
disposed in low use water bodies including sea
• The radio active liquid treatment may include:
– Evaporation, solar, mechanical
– Ion-exchange
– Chemical methods to change to concentrated insoluble sludge
– Biological methods for toxic free liquids to remove organics
– Electrolysis methods using membranes. Have high efficiencies
• Radioactive Gaseous treatments include:
– Pre-filter, absolute filters with 99.97 efficiency for micro-particles
– Adsorption on charcoal, molecular sheaves and solvents
– Liquefaction and separation
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
UNIT 5
CASE STUDY OF ACCIDENTS
The nuclear industry thought the fourfold increase in crude oil prises in1970’s
would make nuclear more economic than fossils. But following accidents
resulted in decline in nuclear energy:
- The Three Mile Island TMI-2 (800MW, PWR), Pa, USA on 28th March 1979
(International Nuclear Event Scale, INES-5) At 4.00 am feed-pump, turbine,
reactor trip, 4.36 am PRV stuck open, LOCA
- Chernobyl-R4 Ukraine, USSR (RBMK-1000 graphite pressure tube BWR), on
26th April 1986 (INES-7) at 01.23 am test start, 01.23.40 SCRAM, reactivity
increased and power increased from 500 to 32000MWTh(x62), faulty design
- Fukushima Daichi 1,2,3,4 Japan on 11th March 2011 at 15 40 (INES-7). It
suffered maximum units loss, though natural, but un-thoughtful layout of
emergency power.
• No accident when the plant is in full operation. TMI and Fukushima gone
through core melt down by decay heat, loss of coolant, LOCA
• Chernobyl is the most serious due to uncontrolled super-criticality
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Three Mile Island, core meltdown
The Three Mile Island power station is near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania in
USA. It had two pressurized water reactors. Unit 2 was of 880 MWe net,
almost brand new, before the accident at 4:37 am EST on March 28,
1979.
The Three Mile Island, TMI-2 accident was a partial coremeltdown,
followed by hydrogen-bubble. It was the worst accident in U.S.
commercial nuclear power plant history. The accident was rated later, a
five on the seven-point INES.
The accident began with failures in the non-nuclear secondary system,
followed by a stuck-open Pilot Operated Pressure Relief Valve in the
primary system, which allowed large amounts of primary coolant to
escape. The mechanical failures were compounded by the initial failure of
plant operators to recognize the situation as a Loss Of CoolantAccident,
LOCA due to inadequate instruments and training.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
TMI-2 schematic
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Started with water in instrument air
About 11 hours earlier, blockage in condensate polisher (resin filter)
by usual method of forcing the stuck resin out withcompressed air did
not succeed. The operators decided to blow the compressed air into
the water and let the force of the water clear the resin. When they
forced the resin out, a small amount of water forced its way past a
stuck-open check valve and found its way into an instrument air line.
This would eventually cause the feed water pumps, and condensate
pumps to turn off around 4:00 am, which would in turn cause a
turbine trip, leading to Reactor trip. Secondary steam should have
been vented out to remove core heat, but due to non removal of
delay heat from primary coolant circuit a POPRV stuck opened,
releasing primary coolant. Secondary makeup water pumps started
but all the valves were in routine maintenance, a key failure and
violation of NRC administrative controls. Later valves should be
opened after some time delay.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
After the TMI-2 accident
• The accident was accompanied by communications problems that led to
conflicting (media democracy) information and public's fears. A nuclear
supporter got heart attack(“ I’m only victim of TMI”)
• A few weeks earlier, film "China Syndrome“ about nuclear plant and
containment break was released.
• A small amount of radiation was released from the plant. There were no
injuries or detectable health impacts from the accident, beyond initial
stress.
• The containment building worked as designed. Despite melting of about
one-third of the fuel core, the reactor vessel itself maintained its integrity.
• Applying the accident's lessons produced important, continuing
improvement in the performance of all nuclear power plants. TMI-1 set
world record of >610 days continuous operation, longest not only nuclear
but any steam power.
• Public confidence in nuclear energy, particularly in USA, declined sharply
following the Three Mile IslandBY accident.
KAMAL SHUKLA
It was a major cause of the
decline in nuclear construction through the 1980-90
CHERNOBYL
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Where is Chernobyl?
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Summary of Facts
April 26, 1986 @ 01.23.40:
• Chernobyl nuclear power plant unit-4(about 3-4Yr old)
– Operator errors and design fault cause a reactor explosion
– Explosion releases 190 tons of radioactive gasses into the atmosphere
– Fire starts that lasts 10 days
• People:
– 2 persons died less than 24 hrs, 24 died of acute radiation/ beta burn,
15 died of thyroid cancer within 3 months out of 237 persons
identified to have acute radiation sickness (ARS) mostly the
rescue/liquidator worker
– Estimated 4000 cancer deaths in 5 M population by the Chernobyl
accident
- 7 million lived in contaminated areas; 3 million were children
• Wind:
– Carries radiation far distances
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Chronology of the disaster, 1
On 26th April 1986 @ 1.23 am, power was cut to the unit-4 to simulate a
power failure. Emergency generators did power up with a delay to
continue the flow of cold water to keep the nuclear fuel cool. However,
because of 24 hrs delay in test and
- attempts to keep one third power before cutoff despite poison out effect,
- positive void coefficient and faulty control rod design, graphite spacers,
- Uncontrolled super-criticality, thermal power 500 to 32000 MW
- overheating occurred leading to a series of explosions in unit R4 and
releasing radioactive materials U, P, I, Xe, Kr into the atmosphere.
• The radiation levels in the worst hit areas of the reactor building were
estimated to be 5.6 roentgens per second, which is the equivalent to more
than 20,000 roentgens/ hour. A lethal dose of radiation is around 500
roentgens over 5 hours, so in some areas workers received lethal doses in
minutes.
• External fires around the plant were extinguished within 5 hours, but fires
within the reactor continued until 10th
BY KAMAL May 1986.
SHUKLA
Chronology of the disaster, 2
Helicopters were used to drop sand, clay and lead onto the reactor, but
firefighters on the ground were also used. The firefighters were not warned
about the dangers of radiation and most of them died later because of
radiation poisoning.
• Despite the massive radiation leak the nearby town of Pripyat was not
evacuated for over 36 hours. The town had a population of around 50,000
at the time of the accident. When the evacuation warning eventually came,
people were told that it would only be temporary and that they should
leave all their belongings behind. However, a 30km exclusion zone still exists
around the town, but some older residents have now chosen to move back.
• Causing a massive radiation leak around the plant, a radioactive cloud was
also released into the atmosphere. The USSR authorities did not notify the
world straight away of the accident and it was actually another power
station 1000 km away in Sweden that first detected the cloud. The cloud
contained 400 times more radioactive material than the Hiroshima bomb
that hit Japan. All of Europe received fallout from the cloud, although it is
estimate that up to 50% fell on Russia, Belarus and the Ukraine.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Some reasons of Chernobyl disaster
• The accident occurred in transient time (risky) at a testing
• Control system not fully automatic, manual control rods
• Faulty control rod design with graphite spacers
• Poison out period of reactor was not fully understood
• Scheduled test was delayed by 24 hrs due to other grid
• The test was progressing during changeover of shift
persons, leading to hasty, miss communicated operation
• It was due to faulty design of control rod (graphite
spacer) and a series of wrong decisions and misfortunes.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Radioactive fallout
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Direct Casualties
5.5 million people still live in
contaminated areas
• 31 people died in 3 months of
radiation poisoning
• 134 emergency workers
suffered from acute radiation
sickness. 24 died in 3-4 months,
28 till 2004
• 25,000 rescue workers died
since then of diseases caused
by radiation
• Cancer afflicts many others
• Increased birth defects,
miscarriages, and stillbirths
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Indirect Casualties
• By the year 2000 there
were 1800 case of
thyroid cancer in children
and adolescent
• High number of suicide
and violent death among
Firemen, policemen, and
other recovery workers
• The abandoned city
of Pripyat with
Chernobyl plant in the
distance
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Problems Today
The Sarcophagus
– After the disaster, a huge
cement box was built around
the radioactive material
– It is falling apart!
– According to a 2003 report by
the Russian Atomic Energy
Minister, Alexander
Rumyantsev, "the concrete shell
surrounding the Chernobyl
nuclear reactor is in real danger
of collapsing at any time."
– A new Sarcophagus is
scheduled to be completed in
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
2009
New Nuclear Build since Chernobyl: Possibilities
and Challenges
1. The realisation of the scale of projected increased demand
for electricity worldwide, particularly in developing countries.
2. A growing awareness of the importance of energy security
and
3. The urgent need to encourage low carbon energy generation
technologies to help mitigate the threat of dangerous climate
change.
‘‘the life cycle GHG (Green House Gas) emissions per kWh
from nuclear power plants are two orders of magnitude lower
than fossil-fuelled electricity generation and comparable to
most renewable’’. (IPCC)
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
FUKUSHIMA
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Fukushima nuclear accident
The Fukushima Daiichi (40 Yr old) nuclear disaster was initiated
primarily by the tsunami following the 9.0 db Tohoku
earthquake on 11 March 2011 @ 14.46
• Immediately after earthquake, the active reactors 1,2,3
automatically shutdown sustained fission. 4,5,6 under refuel
• However, the tsunami destroyed the emergency generators
(on low ground level) which cool the reactors decay heat
• The insufficient cooling led to nuclear core meltdown of unit
1,2,3 and damage to unit 4 spent fuel bay
• 3-4 hydrogen explosions occurred between 12 March and 15
March damaging reactor building 1,3, 4 and dry well 2.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Fukushima map, layout
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Japan Coastal Nuclear plants
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Fukushima BWR schematic
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Fukushima BWR
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Safety compromised to cut cost
In 2002, the company predicted that all of its seventeen plants might
have to be shut down for inspection and repairs, because of falsified
inspections and concealment of faults found in inspections that the
government ordered; some of the faults were potentially catastrophic’.
• As a result a top company official was charged with giving specific
orders to hide large cracks in the “shrouds,” or steel casings around the
reactor core, in two of the thirteen reactors at which false inspection
reports had been filed.
• The company ‘repeatedly missed safety checks over a 10-year period
up to Two weeks before the 11 March disaster, and allowed uranium fuel
rods to pile up inside the 40-year-old facility.
• This exposes the problem of cost cutting initiated by the chief executive
Masataka Shimizu, in that the company opted to save money by storing
the spent fuel on site rather than invest in safer storage options.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Fukushima: Consequences
• Germany will phase out its nuclear plants by 2020
• Italy has imposed a one year moratorium on the
construction of nuclear power plants.
• A small number content to proceed with new build
proposals such as Slovakia with China announcing a
pared back nuclear expansion programme.
• A report from UBS suggests that at the very least
around 30 nuclear plants may have to close as a result
of Fukushima, in particular those in seismic zones or
close to national boundaries
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
Experience from nuclear accidents
• Three mile accident did not result in any major radiation hazard. The fuel in
the core of the reactor vessel was melted but integrity of the reactor
pressure vessel was maintained, some hydrogen was formed by reaction of
hot zirconium fuel cladding with steam, but it was carefully replaced by
Nitrogen.
• Chernobyl resulted in record very high radiation exposure to workers,
firefighters and public. Even today disposal of radiowasteis problem.
Concrete sarcophagus
• Fukushima though shutdown safely by earthquake, cooled for50 minutes
before tsunami, but power failure resulted in total blackout, due to
basement location of emergency diesel generators, failure of gravity
cooling design and testing. It suffered maximum loss of 4 reactor core
meltdown and reactor bldg damages by hydrogen explosions. Evacuation
caused more fatalities than the low risk of radiation fatalities.
BY KAMAL SHUKLA
THANK YOU
BY KAMAL SHUKLA

Fire Technology and Safety Engineering Nuclear Safety and Radioactive Materials Kamal Shukla

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FIRE TECHNOLOGY AND SAFETY ENGINEERING

NUCLEAR SAFETY AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS

Radioactive decay is a property of several naturally occurring

The decay in alpha particles, beta particles and gamma radiation .

• Non-stochastic effect- These are caused by significant

• Stochastic effect- it is occur due to ionizing radiation

Placards and labels use as the function primary as an

3. Yellow 3- These are used to label any packages with surface

A high energy particle entering through the mica window will

The number of such pulses per unit time also gives

The scintillator consists of a transparent crystal, usually a

SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS

Uranium-233 and plutonium do not occur naturally but

• The creation of sparks from metals is based on the

Uranium is a natural occur radioactive element. Found in

These compounds react readily with moisture to form

Because plutonium compounds of this type have been

• Plutonium dioxide can adsorb up to 8% of its weight as water

• Water is generally acceptable for use as an extinguishing

The handling of special metal powders such as thorium

• It is recommended that Fire Department personnel

• Where a radiological emergency (as defined in 1.4.2 above) arises on-

• Radioactive Yellow-II and Yellow-III labeled packages have

• Do not touch damaged packages or spilled material.

• Medical problems take priority over radiological concerns.

• Some radioactive materials cannot be detected by

• Radiation Authority must be notified of accident

• Positive pressure self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)

• Medical problems take priority over radiological concerns.

Energy Released = Δmc2 , Δm = mass defect, c

• So in thermal reactors, we need to slow down the neutrons

As the name implies, the water in the reactor is pressurized. This is

Pressurised water reactor US, France, Japan, Russia, enriched UO2

Pressurised heavy water natural UO2

Gas-cooled reactor (AGR & natural U (metal),

Light water graphite reactor enriched UO2

This is a Soviet design, developed from plutonium production

Carbon dioxide was used in early British reactors, and their

Lead or lead-bismuth eutectic in fast neutron reactors are capable

SALT: Fluoride salts boil at around 1400°C at atmospheric

The removal of passive decay heat is a vital feature of primary

Insider threat is a real possibility in these days due to the immense

To mitigate the consequences of a LOCA, a passive Emergency

CHECK NOTES BELOW FOR FURTHER INFO.

1. The time required for the water to boil away (coolant,

The second phase of the accident (5-30 s) is characterised by

The third phase of the accident (30-200 s) is characterised by

Information should be collected on the background levels of

The informal network of European national authorities, known as

The mean radius used is representative of the distribution of

The surface level concentrations in the summer tend to be more

The dispersion of plume which is emitted from a chimney is

Temperature changes with Red is normal adiabatic

In the unlikely event of an emergency, single and multi-unit

A plume is a cloud that results from a continuing

In an emergency situation, teams made up of

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