Process for Development of SAM Strategies

R. Prior
Nuclear Consultants International - Cape Town
Regional Workshop on Evaluation of Specific Preventive and Mitigative
Accident Management Strategies
Volgodonsk, September 2004

- Overall process for developing strategies

- Challenges to the ultimate fission product barrier
- Identifying high level mitigative strategies – challenge/strategy
matrix
- Principles for implementing detailed strategy guidance

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 Process for Development of SAM Strategies

Mitigative accident management places priority on minimising fission

product releases and protecting the final barrier to release to the
environment

Development of mitigative strategies is one element of developing

sound SAM guidance.

Strategies can be developed by identification of potential challenges

to the final barrier, and of actions to mitigate those challenges:

Step 1: Identify applicable challenges and relative timing

Step 2: Identify applicable high level strategies (=CHLAs)
Step 3: Incorporate strategies into overall SAM guidance structure
Step 4: Develop detailed guidance, and where necessary validate
detailed strategies

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 Process for Development of SAM Strategies

Ultimate barrier to fission product release:

 Containment

 Extensions of the containment boundary:

 Isolation system for systems penetrating

boundary
 Steam generator tubes

 Challenge mechanisms either directly threaten

containment integrity, or they lead to bypass of

containment function
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Process for Development of SAM Strategies

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 Process for Development of SAM Strategies

Challenge mechanisms in a large dry containment:

“Early” challenges:
 Bypass initiator (eg SG tube rupture, LOCA in

interfacing system)
 Induced bypass (eg induced SG tube failure)

 Direct challenges at vessel failure (eg phenomena

associated with high pressure vessel failure, in- or ex-

vessel steam explosions)
“Late” challenges:
 Hydrogen combustion

 Overpressurisation

 Basemat penetration

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 Process for Development of SAM Strategies

Identification of plant specific challenges:

 Use level 2 PSA

 If PSA2 not available, perform best

estimate severe accident analysis (refer to

another presentation in this workshop)

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Koeberg NPP Containment

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 Koeberg PSA Level 2 Results for Plant “As-is”

RC RC description (Challenge to Frequency / %CDF Fragility Filtered vent Recombiners Pit Flood
containment) ryr important? effective? effective? effective?
1 Containment integrity 2.68 10-5 68.2
maintained
2 Containment not isolated 1.35 10-7 0.3 no no no no

3 Containment bypassed 3.96 10-7 1.0 no no no no

4 Early containment failure 1.13 10-7 0.3 yes no no yes

5 Late failure with sprays 6.93 10-6 17.6 yes no yes yes

6 Late failure w/o sprays 9.60 10-7 2.4 yes no yes yes

7 Basemat failure with sprays 3.50 10-6 8.9 no no no yes

8 Basemat failure w/o sprays 4.56 10-7 1.2 no no no yes

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Accident Progression and Containment Challenge - Example
Koeberg-MAAP404-RCP seal LOCA no SI or EAS-Inpact of Concrete Composit ion

Containment pressure (Pa)

0.110E+07
median failure pressure: 1.22 e+06 Pa
5percentile failure pressure: 0.9e+06 Pa
0.900E+06

Koeberg – case with plant as designed basemat penetration

9 days

(no pit flooding). Seal LOCA with

0.700E+06

failure of SI and containment heat

new concrete only shown
0.500E+06

removal - long term response. 0.300E+06

0.100E+06

With a dry pit, long term concrete attack 0.000E+00 0.200E+06 0.400E+06 0.600E+06 0.800E+06 0.100E+07

occurs. The basemat composition is such TIME(sec)

that basemat penetration will occur before

any overpressure challenge, limiting the
benefit of filtered venting. However, this
process generates very large quantities of
Koeberg-MAAP404-RCP seal LOCA no SI or EAS-Impact of Concrete Composition

hydrogen. Without pit flooding then, the 0.100E+02

Basemat concrete ablation depth (m)

challenges are from basemat penetration

or hydrogen combustion, not
0.800E+01

overpressure.(Plant specific) 0.600E+01

0.400E+01
Basemat penetration
9 days
0.200E+01

0.000E+00

0.000E+00 0.200E+06 0.400E+06 0.600E+06 0.800E+06 0.100E+07

TIME(sec)

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 Process for Development of SAM Strategies

 Once challenges are identified, appropriate

high level strategies can be identified which
may be able to mitigate the challenge.

 This process can be performed in a

systematic manner - see the following
example from Koeberg NPP.

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 Challenge / Failure Mode:Late Phenomena AM Strategy
overpressure failure of containment Late H2 Prevent Vessel Failure thus prevent
(after vessel failure) burns ex-vessel H2 generation - Flood
(20.0% of CDF – see note) Reactor Pit

Note: Almost all late failures are due to hydrogen burn Prevent ex-vessel H2 generation by
Cooling Debris - Flood
Reactor Pit before
Vessel Failure
Control H2 - Use Available Means
(deliberate ignition, steam inerting,
attempted use of thermal
recombiners
Prolonged Prevent Vessel Failure - Flood
MCCI: Non- Reactor Pit before Vessel Failure
Condensible
Prevent Basemat Attack by Cooling
Gas
Debris - Flood Reactor Pit
Build-up
before Vessel Failure
High Level Strategies to Address
Challenges to Containment and Attempt to Arrest MCCI - Flood
Fission Product Barrier - Containment to Loop Level for
Spillage into Reactor Pit
Example from Koeberg NPP
Depressurise Containment - Use
Note: Quantitative results presented should be considered only Available Means (ETY)
as examples. The level 2 has been significantly updated since
these values were calculated. Cool Debris/Scrub Fission Products
-
Inject into Containment
Steam Over- Control Containment Conditions
Pressure
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 High Level Strategies to Address Challenges to Containment and Fission
Product Barriers - Example from Koeberg NPP (contd.)

Challenge / Failure Mode: Phenomena AM Strategy

Basemat / Raft Penetration Prolonged Prevent Vessel Failure - Flood

MCCI Reactor Pit before Vessel Failure
10.1% of CDF (see note)
In the Event of Vessel Failure,
Prevent Basemat Attack by
Cooling
Debris - Flood Reactor Pit
before Vessel Failure
Attempt to Arrest MCCI - Flood
Containment to Loop Level for
Spillage into Reactor Pit
Minimize Fission Product Release -
Flood Raft Area

Challenge / Failure Mode: Unisolated Prevent Creep Rupture - Inject

or Induced to SGs and Depressurise RCP
Containment Bypass SGTR
Minimize Fission Product Release
1.3% of CDF (see note) -
Inject to SGs
Containmen Verify/Perform
t Containment Isolation
Isolation
Minimize Fission Product Release
System
Failures
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 High Level Strategies to Address Challenges to Containment and
Fission Product Barrier - Example from Koeberg NPP (contd.)

Challenge / Failure Mode: Phenomena AM Strategy

Early Overpressure (before/at vessel Early H2 Control Containment Conditions
failure) burns including Containment H2
(0.3% of CDF)
DCH/ Prevent Vessel Failure - Flood
HPME Reactor Pit before Vessel Failure
Prevent High RCP Pressure -
Depressurise RCP before
Vessel Failure
In-vessel Exclude as residual risk
steam
explosion
Ex-vessel Confirm ex-vessel steam
steam explosions
explosion are unlikely; but if occur,
consequences acceptable
Prevent Vessel Failure - Flood
Reactor Pit before Vessel Failure

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 Process for Development of SAM Strategies

 The high level strategies identified must be

incorporated into the chosen SAMG structure
 Structure must consider other aspects such as
monitoring, prioritization, choice of symptoms, etc
(not covered here)
 A generic structure will often be suitable, but the
process of identifying challenges and strategies
must be performed on a plant specific basis

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 Strategies (Actions) Contained in the Generic WOG SAMG
(previously published at SAM’99 Meeting, Obninsk, Russia, October 1999)
Guideline
SAG-1 Inject into Steam Generators
SAG-2 Depressurize the Reactor System
SAG-3 Inject into Reactor System
SAG-4 Inject into Containment
SAG-5 Reduce Fission Product Releases
Strategies
Inject using high pressure feed path (motor driven auxiliary feedwater,
turbine driven auxiliary feedwater, main feedwater, startup feedwater,…)
Depressurize the SGs (SG relief valve or steam dump), and inject using
low pressure feed path (condensate pumps, firewater pumps, service water
pumps
Direct depressurization (pressurizer releief valves, auxiliary spray)
Depressurize the steam generators (SG relief valve or steam dump)
Use alternate means (e.g. vessel head vent, letdown,..)
Charging pumps, safety injection pumps, low head or RHR pumps, using a
variety of flowpath line-ups from the Refueling Water Storage Tank,
containment sumps, chemical and volume control system,..
Inject using containment spray pumps, or gravity drain of Refueling Water
Storage Tank, using a variety of flowpaths from the Refueling Water Storage
Tank
Containment releases:
oDepressurize using fan coolers or sprays
SG releases:
oDump steam from affected SG(s) through condenser
oUse steam dumps
Auxiliary building:
oReduce injection to reactor system
oUse external injection source rather than recirculation
oEvaluate using fan coolers instead of sprays
oControl of containment spray to prevent containment pressurization
oStart auxiliary building ventilation
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 Strategies (Actions) Contained in the Generic WOG SAMG (contd.)
(previously published at SAM’99 Meeting, Obninsk, Russia, October 1999)
Guideline
SAG-6 Control Containment Conditions
SAG-7 Reduce Containment Hydrogen
SAG-8 Flood Containment
SCG-1 Mitigate Fission Prodcut Releases
SCG-2 Depressurize Containment
SCG-3 Control Containment Flammability
SCG-4 Control Containment Vacuum
Strategies
Operate containment heat sinks (fan coolers or containment sprays)
Control hydrogen:
oIntentionally burn hydrogen
oInert the containment
oUse recombiners
Same strategies as SAG-4 (Inject into Containment)
Same strategies as SAG-5 (Reduce Fission Product Releases), with the
addition of:
oStop injection flow or containment spray to mitigate auxiliary building
releases
Use containment fan coolers
Use containment sprays
Vent containment (mini-purge system, hydrogen purge system,
containment atmosphere monitor, or hydrogen control system)
Stop containment heat sinks
Isolate ignition sources
Vent containment
Stop containment heat sinks
Open pressurizer relief valves
Add instrument air to containment
Add nitrogen to accumulators/containment
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 Process for Development of SAM Strategies

Principles for Implementing Strategies into the SAMG - Example: WOG SAMG

 All possible challenges are addressed in SAMG, regardless of their

probability/likelihood of occurrence (exception in WOG – in-vessel steam explosion)

 All possible challenges are addressed, even if success of a strategy will effectively
eliminate a challenge

 A strategy is included even if it is not guaranteed to be successful – positive effects

should outweigh negative effects.

 Different strategies available to address the same challenge are prioritized, based on
likely effectiveness and potential for negative impacts. The prioritization of challenges
and strategies forms a fundamental part of SAMG structure.

 All possible available means to implement a strategy are included. This can include
attempting to use equipment outside its design basis or in unconventional lineups.
These are also prioritized.

 SAMG should be implemented, based on these principles, regardless and

independently of any decision on mitigation system hardware upgrades. (Though
obviously, any chosen upgrade must be reflected in the SAMG). The SAMG do not in
general generate requirements for hardware changes. (The level 2 PSA is a better
tool for this.)

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 Process for Development of SAM Strategies - Summary

 Appropriate SAM strategies can be identified by understanding the

mechanisms and phenomena that can challenge the ultimate barrier to fission
product release to the environment
 A level 2 PSA provides this type of information.
 Once challenges are understood, high level strategies to mitigate those
challenges can be identified.
 High level strategies must be incorporated into an overall SAMG structure
which considers other aspects such as plant state diagnosis, prioritization of
actions and monitoring / symptom definition
 High level strategies should be further developed to provide detailed guidance,
considering potential equipment, its likely survivability, and its effectiveness to
successfully implement the strategy.
 Any equipment potentially able to perform the strategy should be considered
and included in the guidance. Prioritization may be used to ensure that use of
“preferred” equipment is attempted first.
 Analysis provides important support to these activities, but does not “drive” the
process.

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