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IO CAT L4 Oligopoli Exclase
IO CAT L4 Oligopoli Exclase
𝑎 Q
𝑏
4. Oferta i costs
p Oferta
CMa CMa CMa
= + + +…
q
Cost Variable
Cost Fixe
Cost Total
❑ 2 3
𝐶𝑇 ( 𝑄 𝑖 ) = 𝑓 +𝑔 𝑄 𝑖 − h 𝑄𝑖 +𝑘 𝑄𝑖
𝑑𝑇𝐶 ( 𝑄𝑖 ) ❑ 2
Cost Marginal:
𝐶𝑀𝑎 ( 𝑄 𝑖 ) = =𝑔 −2 h 𝑄 +3 𝑘 𝑄 𝑖 𝑖 costd arrera
𝑑 𝑄𝑖 unitat
𝑇𝐶 ( 𝑄𝑖 ) 𝑓 ❑ 2 Cost Mig:
𝐶𝑀𝑖 ( 𝑄𝑖 )= = +𝑔 − h 𝑄𝑖 +𝑘 𝑄𝑖 cost per unitat
𝑄𝑖 𝑄𝑖
𝑁
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝑀𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑎𝑡 :𝑄=∑ 𝑄 𝑖
𝑖=1
4. Funcions de cost: cada planta/empresa
Cost Fixe(CF) €
𝐶𝑀𝑎 (𝑄𝑖 )
+ Cost Variable (C-V)
• Cost Total (CT) )
€
Rendes de monopoli en equilibri
CMi(Q*) CMi(Q)
P1 CMa(Q)
*
Qe Q1* Q
D(Q)=UMa(Q)=P(Q)
IMa(Q)
Òptim de primer i segon ordre
Primer ordre (P=CMa) Segon ordre (P=CMi)
P2 *
CMi(Q)
P1 * CMa (Q)
Q2* Q1* Q
D(Q)=UMa(Q)=P(Q)
OLIGOPOLI: 3 EMPRESES
𝐷 : 𝑃 (𝑄)
€ 𝐶𝑀𝑎 2 (𝑄2 )
𝐶𝑀𝑖1 (𝑄 1) 𝐶𝑀𝑖2 (𝑄 2) 𝐶𝑀𝑎 3 (𝑄 3)
𝐶𝑀𝑎 1( 𝑄1) 𝐶𝑀𝑖3 (𝑄 3 )
15
TEORIA DE JOCS- INTRODUCCIÓ
1 2 Competir Cooperar
Competir 350, 350 450,300
Cooperar 300,450 400,400
1 2 Competir Cooperar
Competir COURNOT
700 Traiciona
750 1
Cooperar Traiciona
750 2 CÁRTEL
800
MODELS D’OLIGOPOLI
1. Producte homogeni
CMa
a-bQ
Pm 2e
P1e Pcournote
Q1 e Qm Q1e +Q2e
Pérdida bienestar
Perdida bienestar
PRODUCTE HOMOGENI - COMPETENCIA COURNOT
(NASH EN QUANTITATS)
IMa - CMa = 0
IMai = CMai
Funcionsde reacció
The production
𝑄1 decisions should
)
satisfy the following
condition:
Nash Equilibrium
𝑒
𝑄1
This combination of
) production levels is
called Cournot
𝑄 𝑒2 𝑄2 equilibrium.
COURNOT EQUILIBRIUM –
GEOMETRICAL DERIVATION
𝑃 ( 𝑄 )=𝑎 − 𝑏𝑄 𝑄=𝑄1 +𝑄 2
𝑎=100
b=1
)
𝑃 ( 𝑄1 , 𝑄2 ) =100 −𝑄 1 −𝑄 2=(100 −𝑄 2) −𝑄 1
𝜕 𝜋1 1
Q1 (Q2 ) 45 Q2
=90− 2𝑄 1 −𝑄 2=0 2
𝜕𝑄1
COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM
1
Q e1 Q1 (Q e 2 ) 45 Q2e
2 1 1
Q e1 45 45 Q e1
1 e 2 2
Q 2 Q2 (Q ) 45 Q1
e e
1
2
1 1
Q e1 45 45 Q e1
2 4
3 e 1
Q 1 45 45
4 2
4 14 4 2 2 e
Q 45
e
1 45 45 45 45 30 Q 1 COMP 30
3 23 3 3 3
P e (Q1e , Q2e ) 100 Q1e Q2e 100 30 30 40
𝑒
𝑃 =100 − 𝑄1 −𝑄2 =100 −30 − 30=40
e
PCOMP 40
𝑒
𝜋 𝐶𝑂𝑀𝑃 =900
T W O F I R M C O U R N O T O L I G O P O LY:
SYMMETRIC IN COSTS
𝑒 𝑒
𝑄1 =𝑄 2
𝑒 𝑒
𝑠1 =𝑠 2
€ €
𝑎 𝑎
𝑎 − 𝑏 𝑄2 𝑎 − 𝑏 𝑄1
𝑀𝐶(𝑄 1) 𝑀𝐶(𝑄 2 )
𝑃𝑒 𝑃
𝑒
𝑀𝑅 (𝑄1 ) 𝑃 ( 𝑄1 ) =𝑎 −𝑏 𝑄2 −𝑏 𝑄 1 𝑀𝑅 (𝑄 2) 𝑃 ( 𝑄 2) = 𝑎 −𝑏 𝑄1 −𝑏 𝑄 2
𝑒
𝑄1 𝑎 𝑎 𝑄2
𝑒
𝑎 𝑎
−𝑄 2 −𝑄 1
𝑏 𝑏 𝑏 𝑏
𝑄=𝑄1 +𝑄 2
T W O F I R M C O U R N O T O L I G O P O LY: A S Y M M E T R I C I N C O S T S
𝑒 𝑒
𝑄1 > 𝑄2
𝑒 𝑒
𝑠1 > 𝑠2
€ €
𝑎 𝑎
𝑎 − 𝑏 𝑄2
𝑎 − 𝑏 𝑄1 𝑀𝐶(𝑄 2 )
𝑃𝑒 𝑃𝑒
𝑀𝐶(𝑄 1) 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘 −𝑢𝑝
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘 −𝑢𝑝
𝑃 ( 𝑄 )=𝑎 − 𝑏𝑄 𝑃 ( 𝑄 )=𝑎 − 𝑏𝑄
𝑀𝑅 (𝑄1 ) 𝑃 ( 𝑄1 ) =𝑎 −𝑏 𝑄2 −𝑏 𝑄 1 𝑀𝑅 (𝑄 2)
𝑃 ( 𝑄 2) = 𝑎 −𝑏 𝑄1 −𝑏 𝑄 2
𝑄1
𝑒 𝑎 𝑎 𝑒
𝑄2 𝑎 𝑎
−𝑄 2 −𝑄 1
𝑏 𝑏 𝑏 𝑏
𝑒 𝑒 𝑒
𝑄 =𝑄1 +𝑄 2
M O D E L M AT H S
𝑃 ( 𝑄 )=𝑎 − 𝑏𝑄 𝑇𝐶 1 ( 𝑄 1 )= 𝑐1 𝑄1
𝑇𝐶 2 ( 𝑄2 ) =𝑐 2 𝑄 2
𝑃 1 ( 𝑄1 ,𝑄 2 ) =𝑎 − 𝑏 𝑄2 − 𝑏 𝑄1
𝑃 2 ( 𝑄1 , 𝑄2 ) =𝑎 − 𝑏 𝑄1 −𝑏 𝑄2
2
max 𝜋 1=¿ ( 𝑎 − 𝑏 𝑄2 −𝑏 𝑄1 ) 𝑄 1 −𝑐 1 𝑄 1=𝑎 𝑄1 −𝑏 𝑄2 𝑄1 −𝑏 𝑄1 −𝑐 1 𝑄1 ¿
𝑄1
𝑑 𝜋1
=0=𝑎 −𝑏 𝑄2 −2 𝑏 𝑄1 −𝑐 1=0
𝑑 𝑄1
REACTION FUNCTIONS
𝑄1
𝑎 − 𝑐2
𝑏
𝑄 2 (𝑄1 )
𝑎 − 𝑐1
2𝑏
𝑎 − 𝑐2 𝑎 − 𝑐1 𝑄2
2𝑏 𝑏
S O LV E F O R T H E E Q U I L I B R I U M P R I C I N G A N D
QUANTITIES
𝑎 − 𝑐1
𝑒 1
𝑄 = 1 − 𝑄2
2𝑏 2
𝑎 − 𝑐2 𝑎 −𝑐 1 1 𝑒
𝑒
𝑄 = 2 − + 𝑄2
2𝑏 4𝑏 4
1𝑒𝑒 3 𝑒 𝑎 − 𝑐2 𝑎 − 𝑐1
𝑄 − 𝑄2 = 𝑄2 =
2 −
4 4 2𝑏 4𝑏
𝑒 2(𝑎 − 𝑐 2) (𝑎 − 𝑐1 ) 𝑒 2(𝑎 − 𝑐 1) (𝑎 − 𝑐2 )
𝑄2 = − 𝑄1 = −
3𝑏 3𝑏 3𝑏 3𝑏
(
PRICE EQUILIBRIUM
𝑒
2 (𝑎 − 𝑐2) ( 𝑎 −𝑐1) 2( 𝑎 −𝑐1) (𝑎 − 𝑐2)
𝑃 =𝑎− + − +
3 3 3 3
𝑒 ( 𝑎 −𝑐2) ( 𝑎 − 𝑐1 )
𝑃 =𝑎− −
3 3
𝑒 𝑎 𝑐2 𝑐1 1
𝑃 = + + = (𝑎 +𝑐 1+ 𝑐 2)
3 3 3 3
3c. Bertrand model or Nash in prices eq.
• Simulateneous game of two firms that compete in pricing
7.99€
7.99€
• Interdependency when setting prices: residual demand depends on each
firm own pricing and the competidor(s) pricing
• Homogenous goods & simultaneous decision
• example:
Total Demand: Q( p)
Q( p1 ) if p1 p2
Demand firm 1:
Q1 ( p1 , p2 ) (1 / 2)Q( p1 ) if p1 p2
0 if p1 p2
MC symmetric: c1 c2 c
P2
P1
P2>P1?
P1>P2?
MC 𝑃 1= 𝑃 2 = 𝑀𝐶
BERTRAND EQUILIBRIUM: SYMETRIC COSTS
Price= MC!!
No welfare loss
Q1e +Q2e
• Bertrand trap π=0
• Bertrand Paradox p=MC with only N=2
P1
P2
P2>P1?
P1>P2? MC2
MC1
BERTRAND EQUILIBRIUM: ASSYMETRIC
COSTS
Pe = P 1 e MC2= c2
MC1= c1
D= P(Q)
Qe=Q1e
BERTRAND PARADOX: ASSYMETRIC
EQUILIBRIUM
Two firms are the only competitors in the market of café capsule for compatible
machines
Calculate:
(1) the Nash equilibrium price under Bertrand model;
(2) the quantity sold by each firm in that equilibrium;
(3) the profits for each firm in that equilibrium;
(4) the total demand in that equilibrium.
Calculate also the monopoly equilibrium:
(7) the equilibrium price that a monopolist wants to determine if
he doesn’t fear that it could appear a second firm in the market.
(8) the equilibrium quantity sold by this firm in monopoly if he
doesn’t fear that it could appear a second firm in the market
(9) the monopoly’s profits in equilibrium.
Teamwork in Collaborate
C L A S S E X E R C I S E # 5 : B E R T R A N D S Y M E T R I C
Q( p1 ) if p1 p2
Demand firm 1: Q1 ( p1 , p2 )
(1 / 2)Q( p1 ) if p1 p2
0 if p1 p2
Profits firm 1:
{
𝑐1 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 2 ≤ 𝑐 1
𝑀
𝑝 1 (𝑝 2)= 𝑝 2 𝑖𝑓 𝑐 1 <𝑝 2 <𝑝 1
𝑀 𝑀
𝑝1 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 2 >𝑝 1
{
𝑐2 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 1 ≤ 𝑐 2
𝑝 2 (𝑝 1)= 𝑝 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑐 2 <𝑝 1 <𝑝 𝑀2
𝑀
𝑝2 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 1 >𝑝 𝑀2
SEARCHING FOR THE EQUILIBRIUM
P2
P1
P2>P1?
P1>P2?
{
𝑐1 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 2 ≤ 0 .33
𝑝 1 (𝑝 2)= 𝑝 2 𝑖𝑓 𝑐 1 <𝑝 2 <𝑝 𝑀
1
𝑀 𝑀 Nash Equilibrium:
𝑝1 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 2 >𝑝 1
Nash Equilibrium:
𝑝1
𝑀
𝑝1
{
𝑐2 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 1 ≤ 0 .33
𝑝 2 (𝑝 1)= 𝑝 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑐 2 <𝑝 1 <𝑝 𝑀
2
𝑀
𝑝2 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 1 >𝑝 𝑀2
𝑐 1=0.33
𝑐 2=0.33 𝑝2
𝑀 𝑝2
Nash Equilibrium:
𝑝 1=𝑝 2 =𝑝=𝑐=0.33
Market demand at the equilibrium price:
1 1 1 1 1
𝑄1 ( 𝑝=0.33)= 𝑄 ( 𝑝=0.33 )= ( 101−3𝑝 ) = ( 101−3·0.33)= (101−1) = 100=50
2 2 𝑄 ( 𝑝=2 0.33 ) = 1 𝑄2( 𝑝=0.332)=50
2
2
Each firm profits at the equilibrium price:
Price= MC!!
No welfare loss
Q1e +Q2e=50+50=100
Calculate also the monopoly equilibrium:
(7) the equilibrium price that a monopolist wants to determine if
he doesn’t fear that it could appear a second firm in the market.
(8) the equilibrium quantity sold by this firm in monopoly if he
doesn’t fear that it could appear a second firm in the market
(9) the monopoly’s profits in equilibrium.
Demand: Inverted Demand:
𝑄 ( 𝑝 )=101− 3 𝑝 101 1
𝑝 (𝑄 )= − 𝑄
3 3
𝑀𝑅 ( 𝑝, 𝑄 ) − 𝑀 𝐶 ( 𝑄 )=0
(
𝑇𝑅 ( 𝑝 ,𝑄 )=𝑝 ( 𝑄 ) ·𝑄=
101 1
3 )
− 𝑄 𝑄=
3
101
3
1 2
𝑄− 𝑄
3
101 2
𝑀𝑅 (𝑄 )= − 𝑄=0.33= 𝑀𝐶 (𝑄 )
3 3
2 101
− 𝑄=0.33 −
3 3
𝑒 3 101 3
𝑄 =− 0.33+
𝑀 =50.5 −0.5=50
2 3 2
REACTION FUNCTIONS
{
𝑐1 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 2 ≤ 0 .33
𝑝 1 (𝑝 2)= 𝑝 2 𝑖𝑓 𝑐 1 <𝑝 2 <𝑝 𝑀
1
𝑀 Nash Equilibrium:
𝑝1 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 2 >17
Nash Equilibrium:
𝑝1
𝑀
𝑝 1 =17
{
𝑐2 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 1 ≤ 0 .33
𝑝 2 (𝑝 1)= 𝑝 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑐 2 <𝑝 1 <𝑝 𝑀
2
𝑀
𝑝2 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 1 >17
𝑒
𝑝 =𝑐 1=0.33
𝐵
𝑒 𝑀
𝑝 2 =17 𝑝2
𝑝 =𝑐2=0.33
𝐵
C L A S S E X E R C I S E # 5 : B E R T R A N D A S S Y M E T R I C
Two petrol stations are the only competitors in the gasoline distribution market
in a road away of the rest in a country without fuels taxes
Asymmetric MC:
Calculate: Homework
(1) the Nash equilibrium price under Bertrand model;
(2) the quantity sold by each firm in that equilibrium;
(3) the profits for each firm in that equilibrium;
(4) the total demand in that equilibrium.
Calculate also the monopoly equilibrium:
(7) the equilibrium price that a monopolist wants to determine if
he doesn’t fear that it could appear a second firm in the market.
(8) the equilibrium quantity sold by this firm in monopoly if he
doesn’t fear that it could appear a second firm in the market
(9) the monopoly’s profits in equilibrium.
Homework
C L A S S E X E R C IS E # 5 :B E R T R A N D A S Y M M E T R IC
Q( p1 ) if p1 p2
Demand firm 1: Q1 ( p1 , p2 )
(1 / 2)Q( p1 ) if p1 p2
0 if p1 p2
Profits firm 1:
{
𝑐1 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 2 ≤ 𝑐 1
𝑀
𝑝 1 (𝑝 2)= 𝑝 2 𝑖𝑓 𝑐 1 <𝑝 2 <𝑝 1
𝑀 𝑀
𝑝1 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 2 >𝑝 1
{
𝑐2 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 1 ≤ 𝑐 2
𝑝 2 (𝑝 1)= 𝑝 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑐 2 <𝑝 1 <𝑝 𝑀2
𝑀
𝑝2 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 1 >𝑝 𝑀2
COST EFFICIENCIES: ASSIMETRIC EQUILIBRIUM
P1
P2
P2>P1?
P1>P2? MC2=0.71
MC1=0.55
REACTION FUNCTIONS
{
𝑐1 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 2 ≤ 0 .55
𝑝 1 (𝑝 2)= 𝑝 2 𝑖𝑓 𝑐 1 <𝑝 2 <𝑝 𝑀
1
𝑀 𝑀 Nash Equilibrium:
𝑝1 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 2 >𝑝 1
Firm 2 excluded from the market
𝑝1
𝑀
𝑝1
{
𝑐2 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 1 ≤ 0 .71
𝑝 2 (𝑝 1)= 𝑝 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑐 2 <𝑝 1 <𝑝 𝑀
2
𝑀
=0.70 𝑝2 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 1 >𝑝 𝑀2
𝑐 1=0.55
𝑐 2=0.71 𝑀 𝑝2
𝑝 2
Nash Equilibrium:
smallest price cut that drives the
𝑝 1=𝑝 2 − 𝜀=0.70 competitor out of the market
Market demand at the equilibrium price:
𝑄 (𝑝=0.70)=1000−100𝑝=1000−(100·0.70)=1000−70=930
Each firm demand at the equilibrium price:
D= P(Q)
Qe=Q1e=930
Demand: Inverted Demand:
𝑄 ( 𝑝 )=1000− 100 𝑝 1
𝑝 (𝑄 ) = 10− 𝑄
100
𝑀𝑅 ( 𝑝, 𝑄 ) − 𝑀 𝐶 ( 𝑄 )=0
Firm 1 potential monopoly:
(
𝑇𝑅 ( 𝑝 ,𝑄 )=𝑝 ( 𝑄 ) ·𝑄= 10 −
1
100)𝑄 𝑄=10 · 𝑄 −
1 2
100
𝑄
2
𝑀𝑅 (𝑄 )=10 − 𝑄=0.55=𝑀𝐶 (𝑄 )
100
2
− 𝑄=0.55 −10
100
𝑒 100 1000 1000 −55 945
𝑄 =−
𝑀 · 0.55+ = = =472.5
2 2 2 2
per day
Firm 2 potential monopoly:
(
𝑇𝑅 ( 𝑝 ,𝑄 )=𝑝 ( 𝑄 ) ·𝑄= 10 −
1
100 )
𝑄 𝑄=10 · 𝑄 −
1 2
100
𝑄
2
𝑀𝑅 (𝑄 )=10 − 𝑄=0.71=𝑀𝐶 (𝑄)
100
2
− 𝑄=0.71− 10
100
𝑒 100 1000 1000 − 71 929
𝑄 =−
𝑀 · 0.71+ = = =464 , 5
2 2 2 2
per day
REACTION FUNCTIONS
{
𝑐1 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 2 ≤ 0 .55
𝑝 1 (𝑝 2)= 𝑝 2 𝑖𝑓 𝑐 1 <𝑝 2 <𝑝 𝑀
1
𝑀 𝑀 Nash Equilibrium:
𝑝1 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 2 >𝑝 1
Firm 2 excluded from the market
𝑝1
𝑀
𝑝 1 =5.275
{
𝑐2 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 1 ≤ 0 .71
𝑝 2 (𝑝 1)= 𝑝 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑐 2 <𝑝 1 <𝑝 𝑀
2
𝑀
𝑝 𝑒1 0.70 𝑝2 𝑖𝑓 𝑝 1 >𝑝 𝑀2
𝑐 1=0.50
𝑐 2=0.71 𝑀 𝑝2
𝑝 2 =5.355