HAZOP

Session 10
Hazard and Operability Studies – Overview
Originated as a hazard identification technique for
process plants – developed by ICI in mid 1960s
also commonly applied in petrochemical, nuclear and food
processing industries

Described as a system of imaginative anticipation of

hazards

Differs from Functional Failure Analysis in 4 key ways:

always a team activity
concentrates on deviations in flows between components
uses well-defined guide words to steer analysis
considers both plausible causes and possible consequences of
deviations

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 HAZOP – technical approach
In the process industries, HAZOP is normally applied once the
piping and instrumentation (P&I) diagram has been produced
Scope of study explicitly extends to cover unusual
circumstances such as startup, shutdown and plant
maintenance
Scope of study does not include making detailed design
changes, although recommendations and follow-up questions
should be produced
As with FHA, results are recorded in a tabular format

No reason why HAZOP cannot be applied to any system in

which flows can be identified – including information flow in
software

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 HAZOP procedure
Start Finish
YES
Select a component NO All components analysed?
YES
NO
Select a flow All flows analysed?
YES
Suggest a deviation NO
All guide words considered?
using a guide word

Record as non-hazardous Record as hazard. Make

Investigate and
deviation, with a recommendations for
document causes
justification action if necessary

Investigate and
Does deviation have plausible
document effects
NO causes and hazardous effects? YES

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 HAZOP Team Members 1
Leader
planning and preparation
act as chairman for meeting
sign off documentation
ensure follow-up work is
completed
Recorder
participant in study (?)
document the analysis
Designer(s), process / project
engineers
understand and explain the
plant design
answer questions about the
plant and process
Team may recruit extra members (technical specialists) if required
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User(s)
may be site representative,
operator, maintenance crew
supply information about the
context in which the system
will be used, e.g. site facilities
ask questions, and help decide
which issues affect safety
Expert(s)
key function is to explore
ask questions
suggest deviations / causes /
effects
need good knowledge of
process chemistry, or
experience of similar plant
 HAZOP Team Members 2
Team may recruit additional members when required
Typically to answer specific questions, e.g.
control engineer
mechanical engineer
occupational health / hygienist
environmental specialists

Different teams often appropriate for different stages of

the lifecycle, but continuity (e.g. same leader) usually
recommended

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 HAZOP – guide words
Guide Word Deviation
NO or NONE No part of the intention is achieved
MORE Quantitative increase in a physical
property (rate or total quantity)
LESS Quantitative decrease in a physical
property (rate or total quantity)
MORE THAN All intentions achieved, but with
or AS WELL AS additional effects (qualitative
increase)
PART OF Only some of the intention is
achieved (qualitative decrease)
OTHER THAN A result other than the intention is
achieved
REVERSE The exact opposite of the intention
is achieved
Physical properties
 Temperature  Flow rate
 Viscosity
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Example Interpretation
No forward flow when there should be.
Higher pressure, flow rate, temperature...
Quantity of material is too large.
Lower pressure, flow rate, temperature...
Quantity of material is too small.
Impurities in flow (air, water, oil...)
Chemicals present in more than one phase
(vapour, solid)
One or more components of mixture
missing, or ratio of components is incorrect
Unusual circumstances etc... see next slide
Reverse flow.
 Pressure  Reaction rate
 HAZOP – guide words 2
Guide word “Other Than” has many interpretations
this word particularly is often defined specifically for
particular study
examples include
plant operation phases
startup, shutdown, maintenance, sampling and inspection
instrumentation
control philosophy, location of instruments, alarms and trips
failure of plant services
cooling water, fuels, power supplies
other external factors
weather
spare / non-installed / portable equipment
safety
fire and leak detection, emergency planning

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 HAZOP example – a bit of P&I
Valve (normally closed during
Manually operated valve Pump
operation of the plant)

Valve (normally open during Automation (level

operation of the plant)
Non-return valve LC controller)

LC
Hydrocarbon PG
from storage

Drain PG

Settling tank

Transfer pumps To reactor

Drain (one working, one spare) Drain

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 HAZOP example – output
Guide Word Deviation Possible Causes Consequences Action Required
NONE No flow No hydrocarbon Loss of feed to reactor. 1) Ensure good communication
available from storage Polymer formed in with storage area
heat exchanger 2) Install low level alarm on
settling tank
Transfer pump fails As above Covered by 2)
(motor fault, loss of
power, impeller
corroded etc.)
MORE More flow Level control valve Settling tank overfills 3) Install high level alarm
fails to open, or LCV 4) Check size of overflow
bypassed in error 5) Establish locking-off procedure
for LCV bypass when not in use
More Isolation valve or LCV Line subjected to full 6) Install kickback on pumps
pressure closed when pump pump pressure
running
More High intermediate Higher pressure in 7) Install warning of high
temperature storage temperature transfer line and temperature at intermediate
settling tank storage

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 Hazard Study Phasing 1
1 2 3 4 5 6

Research and Process

Developm ent

Process and Project

Definition

Project Design

Procurem ent and

Construction

Com m issioning

O peration

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 Hazard Study Phasing 2
1 - Concept Study
PHI, checklist, materials and reagents study, first outline HAZOP
2 - Process Flow Study
HAZOP
3 - Detailed Design (P&I) Study
HAZOP
4 - Detailed Design (Physical) Study
HAZOP update, Sneak, Fault Trees, FMEA
5 - Audit of installed plant against design
Checklist, review of HAZOP actions, inspections
6 - Audit / review of process
Final review of evidence, completeness of HAZOP actions

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 HAZOP – Pros and Cons
Advantages
very methodical. Use of guide words can give confidence
in completeness of analysis.
has both inductive and deductive phases
team conclusions may carry more weight than those
reached by individual analysts
Disadvantages
can produce lots of output. Structure is only obtained by
reference back to P&I diagrams
team approach is expensive – must be shown to be
cost-effective

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 ICI Experience
More operability problems than hazards are usually found
though difference is smaller with existing plants

Number of post-commissioning modifications to plant is

reduced
Time to achieve intended production rates is reduced
For major plant, cost is typically about 1% of design cost
0.1 - 0.2% of total plant cost

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