◼ Here loss represents the financial loss associated

with an accident.
◼Loss
-cost of repairing or replacing the damaged facility
-taking care of all damage claims
-loss of earnings from lost production during the repair
period and
-any associated lost sales opportunities.
 Loss prevention
- Identification and assessment of the major hazards
- Control of the hazards (e.g. containment, substitution,
improved maintenance, etc.)
- Control of the process (prevention of hazardous
conditions in process)
- Limitation of the loss when an incident occurs
 hazard and operability (HAZOP) study

 fault-tree analysis (FTA)

 failure mode and- effect analysis (FMEA)

 safety indexes

 safety audits
Hazard and Operability
(HAZOP) study
Principle:

“team approach to hazard analysis will

identify more problems than when individuals working
separately combine results”
 Hazard
“any operation that could possibly cause a catastrophic
release of toxic, flammable or explosive chemicals or
any action that could result in injury to personnel”

 Operability
“any operation inside the design envelope that would
cause a shutdown that could possibly lead to a violation
of environmental, health or safety regulations or
negatively impact profitability”
 Brainstorming, Multidisciplinary Team Approach

 Structured Using Guide Words

 Problem Identifying

 Cost Effective
Types:
The results are the team findings. Which include:
(1) identification of hazards and operating problems,
(2) recommended changes in design, procedure, etc., to
improve safety; and
(3) recommendations for follow-on studies where no
conclusion was possible due to lack of information.

Nature: Qualitative.
Data: The HazOp requires detailed plant descriptions,
such as drawings, procedures, and flow charts. A
HazOp also requires considerable knowledge of the
process, instrumentation, and operation, and this
information is usually provided by team members
who are experts in these areas.

Staff: The HazOp team is ideally made up of 5 to 7

professionals, with support for recording and
reporting. For a small plant, a team as small as two or
three could be effective.
 HAZOP STUDY - TEAM COMPOSITION
A Team Leader, an expert in the HAZOP Technique
Technical Members, for example

New Design Existing Plant

Design or Project Engineer
Process Engineer
Commissioning Manager
Instrument Design Engineer
Chemist
Plant Superintendent
Process Supervisor (Foreman)
Maintenance Engineer
Instrument Engineer
Technical Engineer
 The hazard and operability study (HAZOP study), is a
systematic technique for identifying all plant or
equipment hazards and operability problems.

 In this technique, each segment (pipeline, piece of

equipment, instrument, etc.) is carefully examined, and
all possible deviations from normal operating
conditions are identified.
 Select process
 Select specific portion
 Identify process parameter, possible deviations in it and
apply guide word
 List out all the possible causes
 List out consequences
 Control and recommendations
 This is accomplished by fully defining the intent of each
segment and then applying guide words to each segment as
follows:
Sr. Guide Meaning
No. Word
1 No or not No part of the intent is achieved, and nothing
else occurs (e.g., no flow).
2 More Quantitative increase (e.g., higher
temperature).
3 Less Quantitative decrease (e.g., lower pressure).
4 As well as Qualitative increase (e.g., an impurity).
5 Part of Qualitative decrease (e.g., only one of two
components in a mixture).`
6 Reverse Opposite (e.g., backflow).
7 Other No part of the intent is achieved, and
than something completely different occurs (e.g.,
flow of wrong material).
Optimal from a cost viewpoint
1. when applied to new plants at the point where the
design is nearly firm and documented or
2. to existing plants where a major redesign is planned.

It can also be used for existing facilities.

The time and cost of a HazOp are directly related to the
size and complexity of the plant being analyzed. In
general, the team must spend about three hours for
each major hardware item. Where the system
analyzed is similar to one investigated previously, the
time is usually small. Additional time must be
allowed for planning, team coordination, and
documentation. This additional time can be as much
as two three times the team effort as estimated above
A block flow diagram of the HAZOP process is given below
 HAZOP procedure
Start Finish
YES
Select a component NO All components analysed?
YES
NO
Select a flow All flows analysed?
YES
Suggest a deviation NO
All guide words considered?
using a guide word

Record as non-hazardous Record as hazard. Make

Investigate and
deviation, with a recommendations for
document causes
justification action if necessary

Investigate and
Does deviation have plausible
document effects
NO causes and hazardous effects? YES
 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
3. HAZOP - Hazard and operability

Fired heaters are used in process plants and have many potential hazards.
Let’s perform a HAZOP study!

feed When do we use

a fired heater in
a process plant?

product

air
When we need to raise the
temperature of a fluid higher than
fuel
available using steam.
 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
3. HAZOP - Hazard and operability

Class Example: Fired Heater

1. Discuss the first entry in the HAZOP form

2. Complete an entry for another guide word
for the parameter
3. Complete an entry for a different feed

parameter for the same node

4. Complete an entry for a different node/
parameter/guide word
product

air

fuel
 HAZOP FORM

Unit: Fired Heater

feed

Node: Feed pipe Parameter: Flow

(after feed valve, before split)

product

Location (line or vessel) Process variables

or procedure (start up) air

fuel

Guide Word Deviation Cause Consequence Action

Select from applying guide process process preliminary result

official list of word to this engineering engineering which should be
words to ensure parameter reconsidered when
systematic time is available
consideration of
possibilities
no no feed flow 1. feed pump stops damage to pipes in 1. automatic
radiant section, startup of backup
possible pipe pump on low feed
failure pressure
Include existing “safeguards”
2. feed valve
closed
3. feed flow meter
indicates false high
flow (controller
closes valve)
4. pipe blockage
“ 2. fail open valve
“ 3. redundant flow
meters
“ 4. a) test flow
before startup

4. b) place filter in
pipe
5. Catastrophic 5.a) damage to Install remotely
failure of pipe pipes in radiant activated block
section valves at feed
tanks to allow
b) pollution and operators to stop
hazard for oil flow
release to plant
environment
For 1-5, SIS to
stop fuel flow on
low feed flow,
using separate feed
flow sensor
 HAZOP - Hazard and operability

HAZOP keeps all team

members focused on the
same topic and enables
them to work as a team
1+1=3

NODE: Concentrate on one location in the process

PARAMETER: Consider each process variable individually

(F, T, L, P, composition, operator action, corrosion, etc.)

GUIDE WORD: Pose a series of standard questions about deviations

from normal conditions. We assume that we know a safe “normal”
operation. 22
 HAZOP - Hazard and operability

NODE: Pipe after pump and splitter

PARAMETER*: Flow rate

GUIDE WORD*: Less (less than normal value)

• DEVIATION: less flow than normal
A group
• CAUSE: of deviation, can be more than one members focus
on the same
• CONSEQUENCE: of the deviation/cause issue
simultaneously
• ACTION: initial idea for correction/
prevention/mitigation
23
 …Continue the PHA

Continue the PHA Process

UNTIL…
…Continue the PHA

All Events
…Continue the PHA

All Deviations
…Continue the PHA

All Causes
…Continue the PHA

All Consequences
…Continue the PHA

All Safeguards
…Continue the PHA

All Risk Levels

…Continue the PHA

All Recommendations
…Continue the PHA

Are Completed for

1. Every Element of…
2. Every P&ID of…
3. Every Block Diagram Section…
4. Of the Entire Covered Process
5. Is Complete