HAZOP

SUBMITTED BY:
ASHISH KUMAR SINGH
ENR NO. 0901CM153D01
 HAZARD AND
OPERABILITY STUDY

• Brainstorming, Multidisciplinary Team Approach

• Structured Using Guide Words
• Problem Identifying
• Cost Effective
 When to Use?
Optimal from a cost viewpoint
1.when applied to new plants at the point where
the design is nearly firm and documented or
2.to existing plants where a major redesign is
planned.

It can also be used for existing facilities.

 Requirements
Data: The Hazop requires detailed plant descriptions,
such as drawings, procedures, and flow charts. A
Hazop also requires considerable knowledge of the
process, instrumentation, and operation, and this
information is usually provided by team members who
are experts in these areas.
Staff: The HazOp team is ideally made up of 5 to 7
professionals, with support for recording and reporting.
For a small plant, a team as small as two or three could
be effective.
 Time and Cost
The time and cost of a HazOp are directly related to the
size and complexity of the plant being analyzed. In
general, the team must spend about three hours for
each major hardware item. Where the system
analyzed is similar to one investigated previously,
the time is usually small. Additional time must be
allowed for planning, team coordination, and
documentation. This additional time can be as much
as two three times the team effort as estimated above
 HAZOP STUDY - TEAM COMPOSITION
A Team Leader, an expert in the HAZOP Technique
Technical Members, for example

New Design Existing Plant

Design or Project Engineer
Process Engineer
Commissioning Manager
Instrument Design Engineer
Chemist
Plant Superintendent
Process Supervisor (Foreman)
Maintenance Engineer
Instrument Engineer
Technical Engineer
 Principles of HAZOP
Concept
•Systems work well when operating under design conditions.
•Problems arise when deviations from design conditions occur.

Basis
•a word model, a process flow sheet (PFD) or a piping and
instrumentation diagram (P&ID)

Method
• use guide words to question every part of process to discover what deviations
from the intention of design can occur and what are their causes and
consequences may be.
 PRINCIPLES OF HAZOPS
GUIDE WORDS*
NONE
MORE OF
LESS OF
PART OF
MORE THAN
OTHER

CAUSE DEVIATION CONSEQUENCES

(from standard (trivial, important,
condition catastrophic)
or intention) -hazard
difficulties -operating
*COVERING EVERY PARAMETER RELEVANT TO THE SYSTEM
UNDER REVIEW:
i.e. Flow Rate. Flow Quantity, Pressure, Temperature, Viscosity, Components
STUDY NODES
The locations (on P&ID or procedures) at which the process parameters are investigated
for deviations. These nodes are points where the process parameters (P, T, F etc.) have
an identified design intent.

INTENTION
The intention defines how the plant is expected to operate in the absence of deviations
at the study nodes.

DEVIATIONS
These are departures from the intension which can be discovered by systematically
applying the guide words.

•Process conditions
•activities
•substances
•time
•place
Deviations Generated by Each Guide Word
Guide word Deviations

NONE No forward flow when there should be, i.e. no flow.

More of any relevant physical property than there should
be, e.g. higher flow (rate or total quantity), higher
MORE OF temperature, higher pressure, higher viscosity, etc.
LESS OF Less of any relevant physical property than there should be,
e.g. lower flow (rate or total quantity), lower temperature,
lower pressure, etc.
PART OF Composition of system different from what it should be,
e.g. change in ratio of components, component missing, ect.
MORE THAN More components present in the system than there should
be, e.g. extra phase present (vapour, solid), impurities (air.
Water, acids, corrosion products), etc.
OTHER THAN What else can happen apart from normal operation, e.g.
start-up, shutdown, uprating, low rate running, alternative
operation mode, failure of plant services, maintenance,
catalyst change, etc.

REVERSE: reverse flow

 HAZOP DISPLAY

Guide Word Deviation Possible Causes Consequences Action Required

No No Flow Pump Fail System Over- Shutdown
Heated System
Line Blockage
Operator
Stops Pump
More More Excessive Over-Cooled Product
Flow Pump Speed Product Unacceptable;
(Control System) (Incomplete Dump
Reaction)
HAZOP PREPLANNING ISSUES
Preplanning issues addressed in a typical refinery unit HAZOP include
the following:
• Verification of as-built conditions shown on the P&IDs
• Line segment boundaries set; markup of P&IDs
• List of support documents compiled
• P&IDs (base study document)
• Process flow diagrams (PFDs)
• Process description
• Operating manuals/procedures
• Processing materials information
• Equipment and material specifications
• Tentative schedules of time to be spent per P&IDs sheet
• Recording technique (computer program or data sheet) determination
• List of standard abbreviations and acronyms compiled
• Criticality rankings devised
• HAZOP training given to all team members (one day)
• Arrange for system or process briefings for team before work begins.
 HAZOP STUDY LOGISTICS

Logistical development of this refinery unit HAZOP included the

following:
• Preplanning issues were addressed the prior week.
• The team include three core team members and four part-time members.
• The study included 16 moderately busy P&Ids.
• The study took three and one-half weeks.
• The team met 4 hours per day in morning review sessions and spent 2 hours per day on
individual efforts for reviews, follow-ups, and field checks.
• Dedicated space was required for storing the large number of documents.
• The study resulted in 170 data sheets.
• The team recorder used a personal computer to record, sort, and retrieve data. The Stone
& Webster proprietary program PCHAZOPa was used.
• The plant operator was the key contribution plant member of the team.
• Key operating procedures were reviewed relative to the P&Ids and safe engineering
practices.
 Results
Types: The results are the team findings.
Which include: (1) identification of hazards
and operating problems, (2) recommended
changes in design, procedure, etc., to
improve safety; and (3) recommendations
for follow-on studies where no conclusion
was possible due to lack of information.
Nature: Qualitative.