HAZOP

Hazard & Operability

studies
What is HAZOP? (Hazard & Operability)
A systematic review of the design & operation of a system
to identify the potential for accidental releases of hazardous
material, or operability problems.(Potential accident
scenarios)
Based on the premise that :
 A hazard is not realized if the process is always operated
within its design intent
 Creative input of a team is better than of an individual
 Item can be applied, independent of process technologies
Courtesy Mitsui Sumitomo Group
When HAZOP Should
Be Done?
• Drawing board
• Construction
• Only during process modifications
• Whenever accident occurs

Courtesy Mitsui Sumitomo Group

P&ID No.Of No.Of Pipe No.of
Classification Equipemnets lines Interlocks

Simple 1 to 4 1 to 9 <2

Standard 5 to 6 10 to 20 2 to 4

Complex >6 >30 >10

Very Complex >6 >30 >10

Courtesy Mitsui Sumitomo Group

 Creative Hazard Identification Techniques

Brainstorming

• An unstructured technique used

by a team to gather all ideas
about a topic, without specific
analysis of those ideas.
– The scribe will typically write
down all that is said by the
team members for later
analysis. (Flip Chart)
• May be leader or checklist
driven:
“How can the pump fail?”
• Common method within a PHA
team
• The classic method encourages
free thinking and creativity, no idea
is turned away.
• Only after the team’s brainstorming
has reached a logical end, are
documented ideas analyzed, and
possibly discarded.
• Brainstorming can be a good way of
encouraging team participation.

Courtesy SS Pipara - AVIARRE

HAZOP - HAZard & OPerability

• First developed at ICI in the

UK in 1964 this method is a
natural extension of
standardized checklists.
• Where checklists count on
past experience, HAZOPs
develops ‘synthetic
experience’ by hypothesizing
deviations from desired
performance.
• Most applicable to new and
novel processes where
experience is lacking.

Courtesy SS Pipara - AVIARRE

HAZOP - HAZard & OPerability
• The basic premise of HAZOPS is:
All hazardous material incidents
are instigated by a deviation from
the desired operating state or
condition.
• If we can predict all deviations and
analyze them before we operate a
new process then we can head off
the undesired consequences.

Forewarned is Forearmed

Courtesy SS Pipara - AVIARRE

 HAZOP Process
Begin study
Select a node
Define the design intention
Select a parameter
Specify the intention
Select a guideword
Develop deviation
Identify credible causes
Note significant consequences for each cause
Note existing safeguards
Document recommendations, if any
Assign responsibility for recommendation
Any other deviation? (yes)
Any other guide word? (yes)
Any other parameter? (yes)
Any other node? (yes)
Study Complete

Courtesy Mitsui Sumitomo Group

Node
A node is a location on a process diagram (usually P&ID’s)
at which process parameters are investigated for deviations.
Nodes are points where the process parameters have an
identified design intent.

Nodes are usually pipe sections or vessels.

Plant components (e.g..., pumps, compressors, exchangers)
are found within nodes

Courtesy Mitsui Sumitomo Group

HAZOP Approach

Define Intended Process

Parameter
Deviation
+ Guided Consequence Safeguard Action
Cause
words

Repeat

Courtesy SS Pipara - AVIARRE

HAZOP APPROACH
Intention:
• The Intention defines, How the selected section/unit is expected to
operate
Parameters:
• Aspects of a process that describe it physically or in terms of what
is happening
Some Parameters:
• Flow
• Pressure
• Temperature
• Level
• Phase
• Viscosity
• Concentration

Courtesy SS Pipara - AVIARRE

HAZOP APPROACH
Guidewords:
• These are simple words, which are used to qualify the intentions
in order to guide and stimulate the thinking process and so
discover deviations.
Some Guidewords:
• No/None
• More
• Less
• Reverse
• Other than
• As well as
• Part of

Courtesy SS Pipara - AVIARRE

HAZOP APPROACH
Guideword Meanings
Guideword Meaning Example
Parameter: Flow
No/None None of design intent is achieved No Flow

More Quantitative increase in a parameter More Flow

Less Quantitative decrease in a parameter Less Flow

Reverse Logical opposite of the design intent Reverse Flow

occurs
Other than Complete substitution – another Boiling
activity takes place
As well as An additional activity occurs Chemical
Reaction
Part of Only some of the design intent is -----
achieved

Courtesy SS Pipara - AVIARRE

HAZOP APPROACH

Deviations:
• Deviation means departure from the design intent
These are discovered by systematically applying the guidewords
Causes:
• Reasons for deviations
Consequences:
• Results of deviations

Courtesy SS Pipara - AVIARRE

HAZOP APPROACH

Safeguards:
• Procedures or devices exists to control causes or mitigate
consequences
– Prevention measures or
– Mitigation measures or
– Combination of both

Courtesy SS Pipara - AVIARRE

HAZOP APPROACH
SUMMARY
• HAZOPS uses a standard list of “Guidewords”
as modifiers to process Parameters to
hypothesize Deviations from the desired intent.
Deviation = Guideword + Parameter

• The Deviations are analyzed by the team to

determine if a hazardous condition would occur,
or if an important operating upset is discovered.

Courtesy SS Pipara - AVIARRE

HAZOP APPROACH
SUMMARY

Courtesy SS Pipara - AVIARRE

 HAZOP - Model Worksheet
Name of the company :
Node :
Parameter : Intention :

Guide Deviation Causes Probability Hazards Operability Recommendations

word Problems

Courtesy Mitsui Sumitomo Group

HAZOP - Hazard Vs Operability
Relative Percentage : Operability to Hazard
Status Operability Hazards
of Plant Problem Identified
Identified
(%) (%)

New 60 40
Existing 70 30
Courtesy Mitsui Sumitomo Group
HAZOP DISPLAY

Guide Word Deviation Possible Causes Consequences Action Required

No No Flow Pump Fail System Over- Shutdown
Heated System
Line Blockage
Operator
Stops Pump
More More Excessive Over-Cooled Product
Flow Pump Speed Product Unacceptable;
(Control System) (Incomplete Dump
Reaction)
EXAMPLE
An alkene/alkane fraction containing small amounts of
suspended water is continuously pumped from a bulk
intermediate storage tank via a half-mile pipeline into a
buffer/settling tank where the residual water is settled out
prior to passing via a feed/product heat exchanger and
preheater to the reaction, is run off manually from the
settling tank at intervals. Residence time in the reaction
section must be held within closely defined limits to ensure
adequate conversion of the
alkene and to avoid excessive formation of polymer.
Results of hazard and operability study of proposed olefine
dimerization unit: results for line section from intermediate storage to buffer/settling
tank
Guide word Deviation Possible causes Consequences Action required
NONE No flow (1)No hydrocarbon available Loss of feed to reaction section (a)Ensure good
at intermediate storage. and reduced output. communications with
Polymer formed in heat exchanger intermediate storage
under no flow conditions. operator
(b)Install low level alarm
on settling tank LIC.
(2)J1 pump fails (motor As for (1) Covered by (b)
fault, loss of drive,
impeller corroded away
etc.)
(3)Line blockage, isolation As for (1) Covered by (b)
valve closed in error, or J1 pump overheats. (c)Install kickback on J1
LCV fails shut. pump.
(d)Check design of J1
pump strainers.
(4)Line fracture As for (1) Covered by (b)
Hydrocarbon discharged into (e)Institute regular
area adjacent to public highway. patrolling & inspection
of transfer line.

(1)
 Results of hazard and operability study of proposed olefine
dimerization unit: results for line section from intermediate storage to buffer/settling tank
Guide word Deviation Possible causes
MORE OF More flow (5)LCV fails open or LCV
bypass open in error.
More pressure (6)Isolation valve closed in
error or LCV closes, with
J1 pump running.
(7)Thermal expansion in an
isolated valved section due
to fire or strong sunlight.
More (8)High intermediate storage
temperature temperature.
Consequences
Settling tank overfills.
Incomplete separation of water
phase in tank, leading to
problems on reaction section.
Transfer line subjected to full
pump delivery or surge pressure.
Line fracture or flange leak.
Higher pressure in transfer line
and settling tank.
(2)
Action required
(f)Install high level alarm
on LIC and check
sizing of relief opposite
liquid overfilling.
(g)Institute locking off
procedure for LCV
bypass when not in use.
(h)Extend J2 pump suction
line to 12’’ above tank
base.
(j)Covered by (c) except
when kickback blocked
or isolated. Check line.
FQ and flange ratings
and reduce stroking
speed of LCV if
necessary. Install a PG
upstream of LCV and
an independent PG on
settling tank.
(k)Install thermal expansion
relief on valved section
(relief discharge route to
be decided later in study).
(l)Check whether there is
adequate warning of
high temperature at
intermediate storage. If
not, install.
 Results of hazard and operability atudy of proposed olefine
dimerization unit: results for line section from intermediate storage to buffer/settling tank
Guide word Deviation Possible causes Consequences Action required
LESS OF Less flow (9)Leaking flange of valved Material loss adjacent to public Covered by (e) and the
stub not blanked and highway. checks in (j).
leaking.
Less (10)Winter conditions. Water sump and drain line (m)Lag water sump down
temperature freeze up. to drain valve and steam
trace drain valve and
drain line downstream.
PART OF High water (11)High water level in Water sump fills up more quickly. (n)Arrange for more frequent
concentration intermediate storage Increased chance of water phase draining off of water from
in stream. tank. passing to reaction section. intermediate storage tank.
Install high interface level
alarm on sump.
High concen- (12)Disturbance on distillation Higher system pressure. (p)Check that design of
tration of lower columns upstream of settling tank and associated
alkanes or intermediate storage. pipework, including relief
alkenes in stream. valve sizing, will cope with
sudden ingress of more
volatile hydrocarbons.
MORE Organic acids (13)As for (12) Increased rate of corrosion of (q)Check suitability of
THAN present tank base, sump and drain line. materials of construction.
OTHER Maintenance (14)Equipment failure, flange Line cannot be completely (r)Install low-point drain and
leak, etc. drained or purged. N2 purge point down-
Stream of LCV. Also
N2 vent on settling tank.

(3)
 Team Composition
Team Leader
Team Members
Engineers
Scientists
Operators
Project Engineering
Process
Control
Corrosion
Courtesy Mitsui Sumitomo Group
 HAZOP Summary
(a) Prior screening of units using available
quantification technique
(b) Inclusion of probability factors into the selection of
nodes
(c) Focusing on critical parameters to identify
hazardous outcome
(d) Separation of Hazard and Operability problems
(e) Realistic assessment of time factor in the HAZOP
study
(f) To draw up a practical follow-up action plan
Courtesy Mitsui Sumitomo Group
HAZOP-Limitations
• Failure of a cooling pump causes
-Temperature to raise in a reactor.
• HAZOP-Safeguards-Backup pump, quench,
rupture disk etc.
• It stops there-What if Rupture disk works-
Contents released into atmosphere
• Quenching works-loss of material-Cleanup
cost
Courtesy Mitsui Sumitomo Group
HAZOP-LIMITATIONS
• Backup pump works- Repair cost of primary
pump?
• Batch operations-Change of Sequence
Suitable for automated or semi automated
• Application Stage
• Accuracy of P&I Diagrams
• A component in Risk Analysis Technique
Semi-Quantification Technique

Courtesy Mitsui Sumitomo Group

 Should be combined with other Quantification
Techniques like FTA, and Consequence
Analysis to complete risk assessment.
• Hazard vs. Operability problems
• Team Composition
• Probability and likelihood of hazards
• Time factor
• Management Response to
recommendations/Follow up
Courtesy Mitsui Sumitomo Group