Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1. K.M. Mamun
2. Md. Nur -E- Alam Siddiquee
3. Md. Zulfikar Ali Sabuj
4. Salma Akter Shumi
5. Md. Galib Hasan
12/13/2023 1
CONTENTS
Nuclear Accidents
Windscale Fire
Three Mile Island Accident
Chernobyl-4 Disaster
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Disaster
01/20/2024 2
NUCLEAR ACCIDENTS
01/20/2024 4
Windscale Reactors
• The Windscale facility consisted of two reactors (Piles) that produced
weapons-grade plutonium during the Cold War
• Reactor Pile 1 was operational at the time of the fire.
01/20/2024 5
CAUSES
• The fire was caused by a combination of factors, including a cooling
malfunction and a graphite moderator core.
• The reactor was being pushed to its limits to meet military demands,
increasing the likelihood of accidents.
• The local environment, including soil and water sources, was affected.
01/20/2024 7
LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES
• particularly thyroid cancers, were noted in the years following the incident.
01/20/2024 8
LESSONS LEARNED AND IMPACT
01/20/2024 9
The Three Mile Island (TMI-2) Accident: The Power Plant (1/10)
01/20/2024 10
The Three Mile Island (TMI-2) Accident: The Accident –
what happened? (2/10)
01/20/2024 13
The Three Mile Island (TMI-2) Accident:
Response and emergency measures (5/10)
• Emergency declaration by the station manager (After 3 hours)
• Difficulty in getting clear information on plant status and fail in quickly providing information and giving
instructions to the public
• NRC issued advise "Evacuation for ~16km" based on a misunderstood monitoring results … interrupted,
canceled later
• State gov. advice "Staying indoor, ~16km", "Evacuation of pregnant women and infants, ~8km", schools
closed → ~140,000 people actually left the area
• Rumors caused fear & confusion among residents (hydrogen explosion, etc.)
01/20/2024 14
The Three Mile Island (TMI-2)Accident:
Impact of the accident (6/10)
• No injuries or deaths. Small radiation - no direct health effects to the
population in the vicinity of the plant.
• Plant was not reopening until 1985, took 12 years to cleanup and cost
approximately $973 million
• Public fear and distrust increased, NRC’s regulations and oversight
became broader and more robust.
• Public confidence in nuclear energy, particularly in the USA, declined
sharply and the number of reactors under construction in the U.S.
declined from 1980 to 1998.
01/20/2024 15
The Three Mile Island (TMI-2)Accident:
Investigations and Findings - Precursors (7/10)
There had been warning events at other plants and warning research
reports, but not reflected on the operation e.g.
• On June 13, 1975, Oconee-3 (a Babcock & Wilcox reactor) had a loss of
feedwater - The NRC reviewed this event but did not determine any
generic safety significance and did not further notify other licensees
• On September 24, 1977, Davis-Besse-1 (a B&W reactor) had a loss of
feedwater - no action was taken except to report the event, Neither the
NRC nor B&W notified other utilities
• Carlyle Michelson (1977) - importance of small break LOCA - B&W did
not inform its plant owners
01/20/2024 16
The Three Mile Island (TMI-2)Accident:
Investigations and Findings - Causes (8/10)
• Component failure: The pilot-operated relief valve should have closed when the pressure fell to proper
levels, but it became stuck open in this case.
• Human factor: Operator misunderstanding of the plant condition, Unaware of LOCA for long time (man-
machine interface: "close" indication of PORV), Misinterpretation of the RV water level
(training/instruction)
• Poor quality assurance: Mistakes in maintenance (backup feed pump left closed - violation of a key NRC
rule), Operation with troubles (valve leak) left unresolved
• Didn't "learn from lessons": Precursor events and warning research reports not reflected on the operation
• Poor emergency planning: Communication trouble (site-local gov.-NRC-public), Failed to give clear and
quick instruction to the site and public, Information confusion => panic
01/20/2024 17
The Three Mile Island (TMI-2)Accident:
Changes in nuclear regulations (lessons!) (9/10)
• People’s awareness of Nuclear Safety Culture.
• Changes involving emergency response planning, reactor operator training,
human factors engineering, radiation protection
• The industry established the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)
to promote excellence in training, plant management and operations.
• Upgrading and strengthening of plant design and equipment requirements.
• Installing additional equipment by licensees to mitigate accident conditions.
• Enhancing emergency preparedness.
• Expanding NRC’s international activities to share enhanced knowledge of
nuclear safety
01/20/2024 18
The Three Mile Island (TMI-2)Accident:
References and Image Credits (10/10)
• 1.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_Mile_Island_Nuclear_Generating_Station
• 2. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_Mile_Island_accident
• 3. https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/3mile-isle.html
• 4.
https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/safety-and-security/safety-of-pla
nts/three-mile-island-accident.aspx
• 5. https://u.osu.edu/engr2367nuclearpower/three-mile-island/
• 6.
https://www.nei.org/resources/fact-sheets/lessons-from-1979-accident-at-thre
01/20/2024 19
e-mile-island
CHERNOBYL NPP
01/20/2024 20
WHAT HAPPENED AT CHERNOBYL
1/4
Plan of the day was maintenance shutdown scheduled on Apr. 25 test on
transient power supply for circulation/feed pumps by the inertia of the turbine
generator (to fill the gap till diesel generator comes up in case of external power
loss), at 20~30% power, during the shutdown.
The power reduction resumed; ~19h of low power operation caused 135Xe
override, difficulty in stable control, special team for the test (electrical engineers)
must be tired; night shift did not know about the test.
At 16% power, switching of automatic control rods for low power range; power
dropped to 30MWt (~0 power) by unknown reason => strong 135Xe poisoning
Stabilized at ~6% power (200MWt), much lower than specification >20%; decision
of executing the test
Activation of pumps (as a part of the test) → void reduction in the core => power
decrease => automatic & manual withdrawal of control rods to maintain the
power; "ORM"~ 8 (30 required by regulation) = extremely unstable condition (In
spite of its importance, ORM was only known to operators by reading computer
print-out, not connected to the safety system)
01/20/2024 23
WHAT HAPPENED AT CHERNOBYL
4/4
Test start (turbine steam shut-off) => turbine/pumps coast down => core void
increase => power increase
Manual scram ("AZ-5" switch to insert all control rods) (the reason is unkown: end
of the test? recognized the danger?)the power excursion (~normal x100) => core
melt.
At least twice of explosive events (rapid steam generation by the contact of core
melt and water, explosion of hydrogen produced by Zr oxidation) Distraction of
reactor/building; carbon fire; scattering of radioactive material
01/20/2024 24
CONSEQUENCES OF CHERNOBYL-4
DISASTER
• 2 workers died on the night of the accident
• 28 people died within a few weeks
• Radiation injuries to over a hundred
• 115,000 people evacuated
• 220,000 people relocated
• 6,000 cases of thyroid cancer
• Large areas were contaminated
01/20/2024 25
FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NUCLEAR DISASTER
Unraveling a Catastrophe
Date: March 11, 2011
Location: Fukushima, Japan
01/20/2024 26
INTRODUCTION
• Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant operated by Tokyo Electric
Power Company (TEPCO)
• Situated on the east coast of Japan
• Contributed to Japan's energy infrastructure, playing a crucial role in
the nation's power generation
• Six separate boiling water reactors (BWRs), each with its own
generating capacity
• Unit 1: 460 MW
• Unit 2,3,4 & 5: 784 MW
• Unit 6: 1,100 MW
01/20/2024 27
CHAIN OF EVENTS
• Earthquake: A magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck off the northeastern coast of
Japan
• Tsunami: The earthquake generated a massive tsunami with waves reaching up
to 15 meters (49 feet)
• Loss of Power: The tsunami caused the inundation of critical infrastructure,
leading to the loss of electrical power at the Fukushima Daiichi plant
• Failure of Cooling Systems: With the loss of power, the cooling systems for the
nuclear reactors became inoperable.
01/20/2024 28
CHAIN OF EVENTS
• Meltdown: Due to the inability to cool the reactor cores, a partial meltdown
occurred in three of the plant's six reactors (Units 1, 2, and 3)
• Hydrogen Explosions: The buildup of hydrogen gas within the reactor buildings
led to a series of explosions
Zr+2H2O→ZrO2+2H2
• Release of Radioactive Materials: As a consequence of the explosions and
damage to the reactor containment structures, radioactive materials were
released into the atmosphere and nearby water sources
• Evacuation: In response to the escalating crisis, the Japanese government
ordered the evacuation of residents within a 20-kilometer radius of the
Fukushima Daiichi plant.
01/20/2024 29
SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF FAILURE
01/20/2024 30
CONSEQUENCES
• The disaster resulted in the release of radioactive materials into the atmosphere
and the Pacific Ocean
• Contaminated air, soil, and water sources in the surrounding areas
• Long-term health effects, including an elevated risk of certain cancers
• Ongoing challenges in decontaminating the affected areas and managing
radioactive waste.
01/20/2024 31
LESSON AND CONCLUSION
• Reevaluation of nuclear safety standards and regulations
• Global reexamination of nuclear power plant design and disaster preparedness
• The disaster served as a catalyst for improvements in emergency preparedness
and response for nuclear facilities.
• Highlighted the importance of considering natural disaster risks in the design and
location of nuclear power plants.
• Shift towards renewable energy sources and increased focus on energy resilience
01/20/2024 32
Thank You
for
Your Patience
01/20/2024 33