A B A K A D A G U R O PA R T Y L I S T

( F O R M E R LY A A S J S ) 1
OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S.
A L C A N TA R A , E D V I N C E N T S .
ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE
B. GOROSPE AND EDWIN R.
S A N D O VA L , P E T I T I O N E R S ,

VS.

H O N . C E S A R V. P U R I S I M A , I N H I S
C A PA C I T Y A S S E C R E TA RY O F
FINANCE, HON. GUILLERMO L.
PA R AY N O , J R . , I N H I S C A PA C I T Y A S
COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, AND HON.
A L B E R TO D . L I N A , I N H I S C A PA C I T Y
AS COMMISSIONER OF BUREAU OF Republic of the Philippines EN BANC
SUPREME COURT G.R. No. 166715
C U S TO M S , R E S P O N D E N T S . Manila August 14, 2008
FACTS OF THE CASE
A petition was filed regarding the implementation of RA 9335 (Attrition
Act of 2005), where a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee is, under
section 12, appointed to be an approving authority of the implementing
rules and regulations (IRR) that the agency delegated must produce.
SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. – There is hereby
created a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee composed of seven
Members from the Senate and seven Members from the House of
Representatives. The Members from the Senate shall be appointed by the
Senate President, with at least two senators representing the minority. The
Members from the House of Representatives shall be appointed by the
Speaker with at least two members representing the minority. After the
Oversight Committee will have approved the implementing rules and
regulations (IRR) it shall thereafter become functus officio and therefore
cease to exist.
 The petitioners claim that the congressional oversight committee
violates the doctrine of separation of powers since the legislative
function is deemed accomplished and completed upon enactment and
approval of the law. The said committee permits legislative
participation in the implementation and enforcement thereof.

The respondents, however, acknowledge the creation of such a

committee as an enhancement, rather than a violation of the separation
of powers. It ensures that there is no over-accumulation of power on the
part of the implementing agencies.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CREATION
OF THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE IS
CONSTITUTIONAL?
RULING
NO. The creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee is
Unconstitutional.

The SC held that the practice of legislative supervision, also known as

the legislative veto, of Congress through the approval of the IRR
presented by the implementing agency (DOF) in RA 9335 is an
encroachment on the executive power.
 “A legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight
committee is in the form of an inward-turning delegation designed
to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and
investigation) to an agency to which Congress has by law initially
delegated broad powers. It radically changes the design or
structure of the Constitution’s diagram of power as it entrusts to
Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or implementing its
own laws.”
 “Congress, in the guise of assuming the role of an overseer,
may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its stamp
of approval without disturbing the calculated balance of powers
established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion to
approve or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of
whether or not they conformed with the provisions of RA 9335,
Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively
vested in this Court by the Constitution.”
 CONSIDERED OPINION OF
MR. JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA
CONSIDERED OPINION OF
MR. JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA

“From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision

of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to
play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the
law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional.”