16.4 The Costs of Bankruptcy and Financial Distress 16.5 Optimal Capital Structure: The Trade-off Theory 16.6 Additional Consequences of Leverage: Agency Costs and Information 16.7 Capital Structure: Putting It All Together
16.3 Debt and Taxes (1 of 10) • Market imperfections can create a role for the capital structure. – Corporate taxes: ▪ Corporations can deduct interest expenses. ▪ Reduces taxes paid – Increases amount available to pay investors. – Increases value of the corporation.
16.3 Debt and Taxes (2 of 10) • Consider the impact of interest expenses on taxes paid by Loblaw, Inc. – In 2020, Loblaw had earnings before interest and taxes of $2.365 billion – Interest expenses of $742 million and corporate tax rate of 26% – We can compare Loblaw’s actual net income with what it would have been without debt
Example 16.3: Computing the Interest Tax Shield (1 of 5) • Shown below is the income statement for Delta Farm Buildings (DFB). Given its marginal corporate tax rate of 35%, what is the amount of the interest tax shield for DFB in years 2020 through 2023?
Example 16.3: Computing the Interest Tax Shield (3 of 5) • From Eq. 16.4, the interest tax shield is the tax rate of 35% multiplied by the interest payments in each year.
Example 16.3: Computing the Interest Tax Shield: Evaluate (5 of 5) • By using debt, DFB is able to reduce its taxable income and therefore decrease its total tax payments by $115.5 million over the four-year period. Thus, the total amount of cash flows available to all investors (debt holders and equity holders) is $115.5 million higher over the four-year period.
16.3 Debt and Taxes (4 of 10) • When a firm uses debt, the interest tax shield provides a corporate tax benefit each year. • To determine the benefit, compute the present value of the stream of future interest tax shields.
16.3 Debt and Taxes (5 of 10) • By increasing the cash flows paid to debt holders through interest payments, a firm reduces the amount paid in taxes. • The increase in total cash flows paid to investors is the interest tax shield.
16.3 Debt and Taxes (6 of 10) • Value of the Interest Tax Shield – Cash flows of the levered firm are equal to the sum of the cash flows from the unlevered firm plus the interest tax shield. – By the Valuation Principle the same must be true for the present values of these cash flows.
16.3 Debt and Taxes (7 of 10) • Value of the Interest Tax Shield – MM Proposition I with taxes: The total value of the levered firm exceeds the value of the firm without leverage due to the present value of the tax savings from debt:
Example 16.4: Recapitalizing to Capture the Tax Shield Problem • Smart Industries has 210 million shares outstanding with a market price of $23 per share and no debt. Smart generates stable profits and pays a 25% tax rate. Management plans to borrow $80 million on a permanent basis and use the borrowed funds to repurchase $80 million worth of their outstanding shares. Their expectation is that the tax savings from this transaction will benefit shareholders. Is this expectation realistic?
Example 16.4: Recapitalizing to Capture the Tax Shield: Plan • In this case, the debt is permanent so we can use Equation 16.7 to value the interest tax shields. The value of the levered firm is the value of the unlevered company plus the present value of the tax shields, and the value of equity equals the value of the levered firm minus the company’s debt.
Example 16.4: Recapitalizing to Capture the Tax Shield: Execute (1 of 2) • Without leverage, Smart total market value is the value of its unlevered equity, which is the total value of all 20 million shares:
• With leverage, Smart will reduce its annual tax
payments. If Smart borrows $80 million using permanent debt, the present value of the firm’s future tax savings is
Example 16.4: Recapitalizing to Capture the Tax Shield: Evaluate • While total firm value has increased, the value of equity dropped after the recap. How do hare holders benefit from this transaction? In addition to holding $170 million worth of shares, shareholders will also receive $80 million cash that Smart will pay out through the share repurchase. In total, they will receive $250 million, a gain of $20 million over the value of their shares without leverage.
16.3 Debt and Taxes (8 of 10) • Interest Tax Shield with Permanent Debt – The level of future interest payments varies due to: ▪ Changes in the amount of debt outstanding, ▪ Changes in the interest rate on that debt, ▪ Changes in the firm’s marginal tax rate, and ▪ The risk that the firm may default and fail to make an interest payment.
16.3 Debt and Taxes (9 of 10) • Leverage and the WACC with Taxes – Another way to incorporate the benefit of the firm’s future interest tax shield – Weighted Average Cost of Capital with Taxes
16.3 Debt and Taxes (10 of 10) • The reduction in the WACC increases with the amount of debt financing. • The higher the firm’s leverage, the more the firm exploits the tax advantage of debt, and the lower its WACC.
16.4 The Costs of Bankruptcy and Financial Distress (1 of 7) • If increasing debt increases the value of the firm, why not shift to 100% debt? • With more debt, there is a greater chance that the firm will default on its debt obligations. • A firm that has trouble meeting its debt obligations is in financial distress.
16.4 The Costs of Bankruptcy and Financial Distress (2 of 7) • Direct Costs of Bankruptcy – Each country has a bankruptcy code designed to provide an orderly process for settling a firm’s debts. ▪ However, the process is still complex, time-consuming, and costly. ▪ Outside professionals are generally hired. ▪ The creditors may also incur costs during the process. They often wait several years to receive payment.
16.4 The Costs of Bankruptcy and Financial Distress (3 of 7) • Direct Costs of Bankruptcy – Average direct costs are 3% to 4% of the pre- bankruptcy market value of total assets. ▪ Likely to be higher for firms with more complicated business operations and for firms with larger numbers of creditors.
16.4 The Costs of Bankruptcy and Financial Distress (4 of 7) • Indirect Costs of Financial Distress – Difficult to measure accurately, and often much larger than the direct costs of bankruptcy. ▪ Often occur because the firm may renege on both implicit and explicit commitments and contracts.
16.4 The Costs of Bankruptcy and Financial Distress (5 of 7) – Estimated potential loss of 10% to 20% of value – Many indirect costs may be incurred even if the firm is not yet in financial distress, but simply faces a significant possibility that it may occur in the future.
16.4 The Costs of Bankruptcy and Financial Distress (6 of 7) • Examples: – Loss of customers: ▪ Customers may be unwilling to purchase products whose value depends on future support or service from the firm. – Loss of suppliers: ▪ Suppliers may be unwilling to provide a firm with inventory if they fear they will not be paid
16.4 The Costs of Bankruptcy and Financial Distress (7 of 7) • Examples: – Cost to employees: ▪ Most firms offer their employees explicit long-term employment contracts. ▪ During bankruptcy these contracts and commitments are often ignored and employees can be laid off – Fire Sales of Assets: ▪ Companies in distress may be forced to sell assets quickly.
16.5 Optimal Capital Structure: The trade-off Theory (1 of 7) • trade-off Theory: – Total value of a levered firm equals the value of the firm without leverage plus the present value of the tax savings from debt, less the present value of financial distress costs:
16.5 Optimal Capital Structure: The trade-off Theory (2 of 7) • Key factors determine the present value of financial distress costs: 1) The probability of financial distress ▪ Depends on the likelihood that a firm will default. ▪ Increases with the amount of a firm’s liabilities (relative to its assets). ▪ Increases with the volatility of a firm’s cash flows and asset values.
16.5 Optimal Capital Structure: The trade-off Theory (3 of 7) • Key factors determine the present value of financial distress costs: 2) The magnitude of the direct and indirect costs related to financial distress that the firm will incur. ▪ Depend on the relative importance of the sources of these costs and likely to vary by industry.
16.5 Optimal Capital Structure: The trade-off Theory (4 of 7) • As debt increases, tax benefits of debt increase until interest expense exceeds EBIT. • Probability of default, and hence present value of financial distress costs, also increases. • The optimal level of debt, D*, occurs when these the value of the levered firm is maximized. • D* will be lower for firms with higher costs of financial distress.
16.5 Optimal Capital Structure: The trade-off Theory (5 of 7) • Costs of financial distress reduce the value of the levered firm. – Amount of the reduction increases with probability of default, which increases with debt level.
16.5 Optimal Capital Structure: The trade-off Theory (6 of 7) • Trade-off Theory: – Firms should increase their leverage until it reaches the maximizing level. – The tax savings that result from increasing leverage are just offset by the increased probability of incurring the costs of financial distress. – With higher costs of financial distress, it is optimal for the firm to choose lower leverage.
16.5 Optimal Capital Structure: The trade-off Theory (7 of 7) • The trade-off theory helps to resolve two important facts about leverage: – The presence of financial distress costs can explain why firms choose debt levels that are too low to fully exploit the interest tax shield. – Differences in the magnitude of financial distress costs and the volatility of cash flows can explain the differences in the use of leverage across industries.
16.6 Additional Consequences of Leverage: Agency Costs and Information (1 of 11) • Agency costs: – Costs that arise when there are conflicts of interest between stakeholders. • Managerial Entrenchment: – Managers often own shares of the firm, but usually own only a very small fraction of the outstanding shares. – Shareholders have the power to fire managers. ▪ In practice, they rarely do so.
16.6 Additional Consequences of Leverage: Agency Costs and Information (2 of 11) • Separation of ownership and control creates the possibility of management entrenchment – Managers may make decisions that: ▪ Benefit themselves at investors’ expense ▪ Reduce their effort ▪ Spend excessively on perks ▪ Engage in “empire building”
16.6 Additional Consequences of Leverage: Agency Costs and Information (3 of 11) • If these decisions have negative NPV for the firm, they are a form of agency cost. – Debt provides incentives for managers to run the firm efficiently: ▪ Ownership may remain more concentrated, improving monitoring of management. ▪ Since interest and principal payments are required, debt reduces the funds available at management’s discretion to use wastefully.
16.6 Additional Consequences of Leverage: Agency Costs and Information (4 of 11) • Equity-Debt Holder Conflicts – A conflict of interest exists if investment decisions have different consequences for the value of equity and the value of debt. ▪ Most likely to occur when the risk of financial distress is high ▪ Managers may take actions that benefit shareholders but harm creditors and lower the total value of the firm
16.6 Additional Consequences of Leverage: Agency Costs and Information (5 of 11) • Agency costs for a company in distress that will likely default: – Excessive risk-taking ▪ A risky project could save the firm even if the expected outcome is so poor that it would normally be rejected. – Under-investment problem ▪ Shareholders could decline new projects. ▪ Management could distribute as much as possible to the shareholders before the bondholders take over.
16.6 Additional Consequences of Leverage: Agency Costs and Information (6 of 11) • As debt increases, firm value increases – Interest tax shield (TCD) – Improvements in managerial incentives. • If leverage is too high, firm value is reduced by – Present value of financial distress costs – Agency costs • The optimal level of debt, D*, balances these benefits and costs of leverage.
16.6 Additional Consequences of Leverage: Agency Costs and Information (7 of 11) • Asymmetric information – Managers’ information about the firm and its future cash flows is likely to be superior to that of outside investors. – This may motivate managers to alter a firm’s capital structure.
16.6 Additional Consequences of Leverage: Agency Costs and Information (8 of 11) • Leverage as a Credible Signal – Managers use leverage to convince investors that the firm will grow, even if they cannot provide verifiable details. – The use of leverage as a way to signal good information is known as the signalling theory of debt.
16.6 Additional Consequences of Leverage: Agency Costs and Information (9 of 11) • Market Timing – Managers sell new shares when they believe the stock is overvalued, and rely on debt and retained earnings if they believe the stock is undervalued.
16.6 Additional Consequences of Leverage: Agency Costs and Information (10 of 11) • Adverse Selection and the Pecking Order Hypothesis – Suppose managers issue equity when it is overpriced. – Knowing this, investors will discount the price they are willing to pay for the stock. – Managers do not want to sell equity at a discount so they may seek other forms of financing.
16.6 Additional Consequences of Leverage: Agency Costs and Information (11 of 11) • The pecking order hypothesis states: – Managers have a preference to fund investment using retained earnings, followed by debt, and will only choose to issue equity as a last resort.
Example 16.5: The Pecking Order of Financing Alternatives Axon Industries needs to raise $9.5 million for a new investment project. If the firm issues one-year debt, it may have to pay an interest rate of 8%, although Axon’s managers believe that 6% would be a fair rate given the level of risk. However, if the firm issues equity, they believe the equity may be underpriced by 5%. What is the cost to current shareholders of financing the project out of retained earnings, debt, and equity?
Example 16.5: The Pecking Order of Financing Alternatives: Plan We can evaluate the financing alternatives by comparing what the firm would have to pay to get the financing versus what its managers believe it should pay if the market had the same information they do.
Example 16.5: The Pecking Order of Financing Alternatives: Execute (1 of 2) If the firm spends $9.5 million out of retained earnings, rather than paying that money out to shareholders as a dividend, the cost of financing the project is $9.5 million. Using one-year debt costs the firm $9.5 × (1.08) = $10.26 million in one year, which has a present value based on management’s view of the firm’s risk of $10.26 ÷ (1.06) = $9.68 million.
Example 16.5: The Pecking Order of Financing Alternatives: Execute (2 of 2) If equity is underpriced by 5%, then to raise $9.5 million the firm will need to issue shares that are actually worth $10 million. (For example, if the firm’s shares are each worth $50, but it sells them for 0.95 × $50 = $47.50 per share, it will need to sell $9.5 million ÷ $47.50/share = 200,000 shares. These shares have a true value of 200,000 shares × $50/share = $10 million.) Thus, the cost of financing the project with equity will be $10 million.
Example 16.5: The Pecking Order of Financing Alternatives: Evaluate Comparing the three options, retained earnings are the cheapest source of funds, followed by debt, and finally by equity. The ranking reflects the effect of differences in information between managers and investors that result in a lemons problem when they issue new securities, particularly when issuing new equity.
15.7 Capital Structure: Putting It All Together (1 of 2) • Use the interest tax shield if your firm has consistent taxable income • Balance tax benefits of debt against costs of financial distress • Consider short-term debt for external financing when agency costs are significant. • Increase leverage to signal confidence in the firm’s ability to meet its debt obligations.
15.7 Capital Structure: Putting It All Together (2 of 2) • Be mindful that investors are aware that you have an incentive to issue securities that you know are overpriced • Rely first on retained earnings, then debt, and finally equity • Do not change the firm’s capital structure unless it departs significantly from the optimal level.