NASA Saturn V Rocket Structural Elements - 1968

APOLLO/SATURN V
SPACE VEH I CLE SELECTED .

STRUCTURAL ELEIIEIIT
REVIEW REPORT, AS-503
COMPANY - SPACE DlVlSlON

DOCUMENT NO. D5-15782
APOLLO/SATURN V SPACE VEHICLE SELECTED

TITLE
STRUCTURAL ELEMENT REVIEW REPORT, AS-503
MODEL NO. APOLLO/ CONTRACTNO. NAS8-5608, SCHEDULE IV

SATURN V PART IV, TASK 1.0
CHANGE ORDER MSFC IV-2
ORIGINA[. RELEASE - NOVEMBER 25, 1968
,ssoE
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ISSUED TO ._._ -_ _ -. }
,t / s ,'7", _.,._ _ " . "J _,C
THE _ItU_J_I_G COMPANY SPACE DIVISION LAUNCH SYSTEMS BRANCH

D5-15782
REV i S IONS
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D5-15782
CONTENTS (CONT'D)
Paragraph Page
3.4 MRB ACTIONS 3-14
3.5 HISTORY OF ELEMENT 3-15
3.6 ON-SITE REVIEW SUMMARY 3-16
SECTION 4 - S-II-3 FORWARD LH 2 4-I

BULKHEAD
4.0 SUMMARY 4-2

4.1 DESCRIPTION 4-3
4.2 MANUFACTURING 4-5
4.3 QUALITY AND RELIABILITY ASSURANCE 4-12
4.4 MRB ACTIONS 4-13
SECTION 5 - S-II-3 FORWARD SKIRT 5-I
5.0 SUMMARY 5-2

5.1 DESCRIPTION 5-3
5.3 QUALITY AND RELIABILITY ASSURANCE 5-8
5.4 MRB ACTIONS 5-9
SECTION 6 - S-IVB-503 COMMON 6-I

BULKHEAD/AFT BULKHEAD-
AFT BULKHEAD/THRUST
STRUCTURE JOINTS
6.0 SUMMARY 6-2

6.1 DESCRIPTION 6-3
6_3 QUALITY AND RELIABILITY ASSURANCE 6-16
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D5-15782
SECTION 1
S-IC-3 LOX TANK LOWER BULKHEAD
SELECTED ELEMENT REPORT
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D5-15782
UPPER
SKIN BULKHEAD
SECTIONS-_x, x
VEHICLE
STATION
ANTI-SLOSH
BAFFLES
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772 ---
M POS I ]
POS I PUS llI
POS IV
LOWER LOX BULKHEAD
FIGURE l-I S-IC LOWER LOX BULKHEAD
I-4
D5-1 5782
1.2 MANUFACTURING
1.2.1 Fabrication
The apex and base gores were fabricated in Wichita from

2219-T37 aluminum sheets purchased per BMS 7-I05Co The seg-
ments were sculptured and machine milled in the flat condi-
tion. The milling provided a light structure with weld
lands at the edges and integral membrane and stiffener con-
figuration in the base gore segment to carry hoop compres-
sion stresses.
Following the milling operation, the segments were rough

rolled to the approximate desired contour. The segments
were then hydraulically bulge formed to the finish contour,
rough trimmed, cleaned, and heat treated to the T87 condi-
tion.
The polar cap was machined from 2219 aluminum.
The Y-ring was made at Michoud from 2219-T351 aluminum

billets which were rolled to a radius of sixteen and a
half feet and then oven aged to T851 hardness. The three
billets were then butt welded to form a ring° The MIG
welding was performed from both sides of the joints simul-
taneously (each joint required approximately 112 welding
passes). The completed 19,000 pound billet ring was then
placed on a boring mill and turned to the finished Y-ring
configuration, having a thirty-three foot diameter which
weighed approximately 3500 pounds.
1.2.2 Assembly
Following receipt of the apex and base gore segments from
Wichita, the edges of the segments were prepared for join-
ing by trimming and fitting. The appropriate apex and base
gores were joined using the TIG welding process. The eight
assembled gores were joined by the same process to form the
gore to gore assembly. Subsequently, the Y-ring was welded
to this gore assembly utilizing the TIG welding process.
The final step was the TIG welding of the 54 inch polar
cap into position to complete the ellipsoidal shaped bulk-
head. See Figures I-2 thru I-5. The following MORTP's
detail the operations on the foregoing steps of assembly:
60B12200-I-904 thru 907, 949, 950, 960 and 970.
In conjunction with the Y-ring to bulkhead weld, a certi-

fication weld (per MORTPWC60BI2200-IB-970) of a partial
Y-ring to a partial base gore was made under the surveil-
lance of the Boeing Welding Engineer and the NASA Certify-
ing officer. This was for the purpose of certifying the
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GORE TRIM MERIDIAN WELD BULKHEAD TRIM
FIGURE I-4 S-IC BULKHEAD ASSEMBLY, MICHOUD

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D5-1 5782
1.3 QUALITY AND RELIABILITY ASSURANCE
1.3.1 Receiving Inspection (Raw Material)
The incoming raw material from Wichita was thoroughly in-

spected for damage, and the identifying numbers were veri-
fied and recorded. The VSD's which were received with the
raw material were carefully reviewed to verify compliance
of the material with the mechanical, chemical, dimensional,
and configuration requirements. The VSD's included:
Shipping Documents, Data Transfer and Certification Re-
cord, Certified Inspection Report and Test Results (Alcoa-
mechanical properties, chemical properties, and ultrasonic
gird chart results), contour maps, and thickness maps.
Following the visual inspection for damage, the material
was cleaned, dye penetrant inspected, cleaned again, then
protectively wrapped and/or stored in a controlled atmos-
phere area till ready for assembly.
1.3.2 In-Process Inspection
The following brief outline depicts the types of inspec-

tion performed on the various bulkhead assembly operations,
and is indicative of the thoroughness of the quality control
measures utilized:
Instl. of
Y-Ring Assy. of Fittings Fittings ....
Non-Destructive Non-Destructive Non-Destructi ve

X-ray
X-ra_enetrant X-ra_enetran
Dye t Dye Penetrant
Dye
Dimensional Dimensional Dimensional
Optical Mechanical Mechanical
Mechanical
Visual Visual Visual
Miscellaneous Miscellaneous Miscellaneous
Apex to
Base Assy. Bhd L. Assy. Y-Ring to Bhd.
Non-Destructive Non-Destructive Non-Destructive

X-ray X-ray X-ray
Dye Penetrant Dye Penetrant Dye Penetrant
Dimensional Dimensional Dimensional
Mechanical Mechanical Mechanical
Visual Visual Visual
Miscellaneous Miscellaneous Miscellaneous
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1.6 ON-SITE REVIEW SUMMARY
1.6.1 General
The on-site, selected element review was conducted during

the period September 3-6 as a part of the JSAT effort, by
a group of materials and stress engineers selected to re-
view the AS-503 aft LOX bulkhead history, in regard to
manufacturing techniques and quality control procedures.
This review encompassed a study of: manufacturing se-
quences and processes; MRB actions; handling and storage
techniques; quality control procedures and results; manu-
facturing drawings; and engineering planning documentation.
The actual hardware being manufactured at the time, was

for a much later flight effectivity. The differences
between the current methods of manufacturing and quality
control, and the methods employed during the construction
of the AS-503 bulkhead were determined and noted. The
major differences noted between the current and the 503
effectivity methods of manufacture are as follows:
The AS-503 vehicle had the solid Y-ring. At a later

date tee stiffeners were machined into the Y-ring
as an integral part of the base of the Y.
The TIG welding process was utilized on the bulkhead-

to-Y-ring weld during assembly of AS-503. The MIG
welding process is currently employed on this operation.
This process utilizes a much faster torch speed, thus
lessening the heat buildup and thereby reducing dis-
tortion of the bulkhead.
On the AS-503 aft LOX bulkhead assembly, the polar

cap was installed by welding the polar cap to the
assembled bulkhead (gores and Y-ring) with the Y-ring,
supporting the weight of the assembly. At a later
date this operation was accomplished by draping the
gore/Y-ring assembly over a center support thereby
stretching the bulkhead by its own weight. This method
minimized distortion in the bulkhead following the
polar cap weld. At a still later point in time the
currently used method was evolved. That is - the gore/
Y-ring assembly is placed over a central support and
stretched in a positive manner by pulling the Y-ring
towards the floor, utilizing turnbuckles, prior to
installing the polar cap.
All of the fittings on the AS-503 aft LOX bulkhead

were welded on the bulkhead. Beginning with the AS-504,
1-16
D5-15782
the fittings were machined as an integral part of the

bulkhead segments except for the four (4) outboard LOX
suction fittings. The configuration of these fittings
is such that it is impractical to make them an integral
portion of the gore segments, therefore, they are still
being welded to the segments.
Deviations in contour on gore segments were often corrected

by aging the part within a restrained aging fixture.
During construction of the AS-503, manufacturing was still

in the process of developing fabrication and assembly pro-
cesses that would eliminate or minimize problems that had
caused particular difficulty to that point. It was clearly
evident from observation of defect charts posted at the
various weld operation stations that considerable progress
had been made by the time the AS-503 was built and that
progress has continued to this date.
A number of X-ray films were reviewed by the group. The

particular films selected were chosen so that a detailed
analysis could be made of certain UER's. These films were
of gore-to-gore welds, apex-to-base welds, Y-ring-to-bulk-
head welds and tee stiffener welds.
1.6.2 Documentation Reviewed
The documents of prime concern to the investigating group

were those involving manufacturing, inspection, and Material
Review Board actions. The principal document developed
for governing the former two items was the MORTP (Manu-
facturing or Testing Procedure) which spells out in detail
the manufacturing and testing procedures used in fabricating
and inspecting the individual parts. Additional documen-
tation reviewed, which was utilized in the manufacturing and
inspecting operations, was as follows: engineering drawings;
welding specs (ABMA-PD-W-45A, ABMA-PD-R-27A, 60B32032,
60B32004, 60B32009, MSFC Spec 135, BAC 8401, MSFC Spec
130, MIL-T-5021C, 60B32514); cleaning specs (60B32002A,
BAC 5749, BAC 5750, BAC 5765, BAC 5786, BAC 5745, BAC 5744,
MSFC Spec 164); protective and wrapping specs (BAC 5034,
BAC 5703, MIL-C-5541); identification specs (BAC 5307,
60B00015, 60B32059); penetrant inspection (BAC 5423); heat
treat (BAC 5602); forming, straightening, and fitting
(BAC 5300); and VSD'So A substantial number of UER's,
UER summaries, and UER data printouts were also reviewed.
The UER is the primary document of TBC/MICH dealing with
MRB actions. The group also examined the S-IC AS-503 De-
sign Certification Review and the Manufacturing Plan.
1.6.3 Conclusions
1-17
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D5-15782
SKIRT
VEHICLE
STATION
1541 --
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FIGURE 2-I. S-IC FORWARD SKIRT
2-4
D5-1 5782
INTERMEDIATE
RING FRAME
INTERFACE RING
TUBUL# FRAME
STRUT
INTERMEDIATE
RING FRAME INTERCOSTAL
HAT SECTION ACCESS & UMBILICAL DOOR

STRINGERS SKIN SEGMENT ASSY.
FIGURE 2-2 S-IC FORWARD SKIRT
2-5
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D5-15782
The following MORTP's detail the assembly and inspection

operations performed on the foregoing steps of assembly:
60BI4009-1A-910, thru 922, 924, 925, 952; 60BI4200-IA-900;

60B14220-I; 60B14325-I; 60BI4400-IA-900; 901; 60BI4400-3A-
900, 901, 902, 903; 60BI4600-IA-900 thru 905; 60BI4009-1A-
990, 950, 951, 954, 955, 956; 60BI4600-IA-950.
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D5-15782
2.5.1 General
The on-site selected element review was conducted during

the period September 3-6 as a part of the JSAT effort, by
a group of materials and stress engineers selected to re-
view the AS-503 Forward Skirt history, in regard to manu-
facturing and quality control procedures. The review
covered: manufacturing sequences and operations; MRB
actions; handling and storage techniques; quality control
procedures and test results; engineering drawings; and
engineering planning documentation.
The actual hardware being manufactured at the time of the

review, was for a later flight effectivity. The differences
between the current methods of manufacturing and quality
control, and the methods employed during the construction
of the S-IC-503 forward skirt were determined and noted.
The major differences noted were:
a •
Difficulties experienced on the AS-501 and
AS-502 flights, with the umbilical door,
necessitated a change in the design of
the closing mechanism and latch assembly.
The door interfered with the umbilical
lanyard cable as the umbilical disconnected,
and remained open during flight. The im-
proved design was satisfactorily tested,
Reference 2.1, and a decision was made to
incorporate the change in design on AS-504
rather than AS-503 slnce time was a factor
and the problem presented an acceptable
risk.
b .
Titanium fasteners currently used, were
installed on S-IC-AS-504 and on.
Documents of primary concern to the investigative group

were those dealing with manufacturing, inspection, and Ma-
terial Review Board actions. The principal document generat-
ed for controlling the first two items was the MORTP (Manu-
facturing or Testing Procedure) which details in step-by-
step fashion the manufacturing and testing procedures utilized
in fabrication and assembly of the individual components.
Other documents which were reviewed and which were used in
conjunction with manufacturing and inspection were: engineer-
ing drawings; identification requirement specs (BAC 5307,
60B-32059); protective covering and storage (BAC 5034);
2-10
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D5-1 5782
3.1 DESCRIPTION
The LOX tank girth weld is the circumferential weld that

joins the common bulkhead to the aft LOX bulkhead, as
shown in Figure 3-I. The gore segments of the aft LOX
bulkhead and facing sheets of the common bulkhead are 2014-
T6 aluminum alloy. The bulkhead shells are fabricated from
12 gore segments, and fusion welded by the TIG process using
2319 aluminum alloy filler wire. The common bulkhead is
an adhesive-bonded sandwich assembly which employs a fiber-
glass/phenolic honeycomb core. Figure 3-2 shows the
physical relationship of the LOX tank, bolting ring, aft
skirt, and lower LH 2 tank cylinder.
3-3
D5-15782
BULKHEAD
GIRTH WELD
AFT LOX BULKHEAD
FIGURE 3-I S-II LOX TANK GIRTH WELD
3.-4
STATION
.m.---
1863
FORWARD FACING SHEET
1:110COMMON
BU LKH EAD - INSULATION
AFT FACING SHEET
::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
..... HEAYY GORE SEGMENTS
.-.-.-.>:.:..
ISIN
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STATION
1841
FIGURE 3-2 S-II LOX TANK, AFT SKIRT

AND LH 2 TANK CONNECTION
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CQMMON
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WITH FIBERGLASS PHENOLIC
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FIGURE 3-3 S-II COMMON BULKHEAD CONSTRUCTION

2014-T6 ALUMINUM ALLOY
EXPLOSIVE FORMED AND
WELDED __ __;_< :_ i
AFT LOX BULKHEAD

12 GORE SEGMENTS
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12 SEGMENTS
FIGURE 3-4 S-II AFT LOX BULKHEAD

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D5-15782
FIGURE 3-5 COLLAPSIBLE WORK PLATFORM AND SKATE SAW
3-10
D5-15782
/- VACUUM CUPS
C.L. OF
WELD
FIGURE 3-6 BACKUP BAR AND OFFSET TOOL
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D5-1 5782
FIGURE 4-I S-II FORWARD LH 2 BULKHEAD
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D5-15782
(i) POSITIONLH2 BHD IN SADDLESPACERS

• ALIGN CYL. POSITION I TO LH 2 BHD POSITION I
• LEVEL BHD FOR TRIM-INSPECT PER ITI
• INSTALL UPPER VACUUM DETAILS - WELD
BACKUP BAR & APPLY INITIAL PRESSURE
S TON HOOK II!

i
FWD LH2 BH
#6 CYLINDER---_
FWD LH 2
LH 2 CYLINDER #6 J
FIGURE 4-2 POSITION LH 2 BULKHEAD IN SADDLE SPACERS
4-6
D5-15782
Q_TRIM OPERATIONLH2 BHD,

• POSITION SKATE SAW - MAKE
• ROUGH TRIM
• VACUUM CHIPS
• CHECK FOR PLANE
• MAKE NET TRIM
• INSPECT TRIM
Yi
SKATE TRACK -_
T-7200039
FIGURE 4-3 TRIM OPERATION LH 2 BULKHEAD
4-7
D5-15782
Q WELD PREPARATION
• DROP BACKUP BAR PRESSURE
• RAISE BULKHEAD USING VACUUM DETAILS
• RETRACT BACKUP BAR
• CLEAN & INSPECT
FWD LH 2 BHD.
FIGURE 4-4 WELD PREPARATION
4-8
D5-15782
(i) WELD 0PERATION

• REINSTALL BACKUP BAR
• ALIGN TO WELD
• POSITION BHD: FOR DRAW FILING
• VACUUM & INSPECT
• POSITION BHD. FOR WELDING
• IT] INSPECT, NASA INSPECT
• APPLY BACKUP BAR PRESS 6,000 LBS.

HYDRAULIC PRESSURE
• SCREW JACKS IN EXCESSIVE OFF SET AREAS

& START INTERMITTANT TACK WELD
• REMOVE SCREW JACKS
• PENETRATION PASS
• REMOVE BACKUP BAR
• SHAVE INTERNAL WELD BEAD

• MAKE CONTINUOUS TACK PASS
nil ._
FWD LH 2 BHD.,,..._w./
#6 CYL INDER_._
FIGURE 4-5 WELD OPERATION
4-9
WELD COVERPASS OPERATION
• MAKE IN-PROCESS REPAIRS AS REQUIRED
• CLEAN-UP SHARP EDGES OF PENETRATION PASS
, X-RAY & INSPECT - REPAIR AS REQUIRED
• INSTALL BACKUP BARS,
APPLY 5000 LBS. HYDRAULIC PRESSURE
• RUN COVER PASS
• MILL COVER PASS, BEAR-TEX & CLEAN-UP AREA

• DYE PENETRANT, INSPECT ALL ACCEPTED X-RAY
VIEWS & CHEM FILM
INSPECT, CLOSE FAIR BOOK
WELD SKATE-----'-Z
T-7200040 /
SKATE TRACK
T-7200039 I
FIGURE 4-6 WELD COVER PASS OPERATION
4-10
/ " " _\ _HD "_ _ /TAPED VINYL (TWO PLY
LH 2 FWD.BHD.
/ / _ NER" I _ BAGsAL_LA_OUNDA Vll
_A
_A J_ RETAI I _ "
.RAISE BHD AFTER CUT
, TOOL _ .VACUUM
|, - STANDARDSKATE - -- i 1%
I TRACK & SAW SETUP I _
CYLo #6 '-_ / _.SAW
DRILL JI .
SECTION A-A
STEP STEP
! 6-WAY-,
®
SPREADER i CYLINDER #6
BAR
FWD.BHD.
ROUTER SKATE
NYLON '
CYL #6
_ STRAPS
_ _TWO-PLY
R -/_I VINYL
J/ll ;_, PROTECTIVE
BAG ,
CYLINDER #6
FIGURE 4-7 SEQUENCE OF OPERATIONS FOR

REMOVAL OF DAMAGED BULKHEAD
%
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D5-1 5782
RING FRAMES
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FIGURE 5-2 S-II FORWARD SKIRT

FABRICATION SEQUENCE
D5-15782
T',,,
FRAME SUBASSEMBLY
SKIN SUBASSEMBLY AND

FRAME ASSEMBLY
COMPLETE FORWARD SKIRT ASSEMBLY
FIGURE 5-3 S-ll FORWARD SKIRT ASSEMBLY
5-7
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D5-15782
5.6.3 Conclusions - continued
a •
It was found that traceability is excellent in regard
to Manufacturing, Quality Control and MR action re-
lated to the S-II-3 Forward Skirt.
b ,
Assurance is provided that the fabricated elements
represent their design to an adequate degree, and the
quality of the end item does not impair the structural
integrity of that design.
5-12
D5-15782
SECTION 6
S-IVB-503 COMMONBULKHEAD/AFT BULKHEAD-
AFT BULKHEAD/THRUSTSTRUCTUREJOINTS
SELECTEDELEMENT REPORT
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D5-15782
FORWARD
SKIRT
LH 2 TANK
LH TANK
CYLINDER
COMMON
BHD
AFT
SKIRT
LOX DOME
FILLET WELD*
THRUST STRUCTURE/
AFT DOME JOINT*
INTERSTAGE
THRUST
STRUCTURE
* STRUCTURAL JOINTS REVIEWED
FIGURE 6-I S-IVB
6-4
D5-15782
6.2 MANUFACTURING
In order to appreciate the complexities of the two joints

in question, a description of the manufacture of the three
components involved is outlined.
6.2oi Fabrication
6.2.1.I Common Bulkhead
The common bulkhead assembly is a two inch thick sandwich

honeycomb structure, Reference 6_I. It consists of a fiber-
glass reinforced phenolic honeycomb core adhesively bonded
between two hemispherically shaped domes per DPS 31150-I.
The forward and aft dome assemblies are produced from 2014
aluminum material. Each assembly is fusion welded (MIG
process, DPS 14052) and consists of a contoured center
plate, nine gore segments, and a circumferential ring
assembly. Figure 6-2 shows the common bulkhead and a
close-up of the common bulkhead/aft dome joint.
The ring assembly is composed of three identical ring

segments fabricated from an extruded angle, formed on a
stretch die, and heat treated by aging to T6 condition.
The three segments are joined by fusion welding in a weld
fixture, then machined in a large boring mill.
The forward dome segments and center plate are fabricated

from 0.125 inch thick sheet aluminum, and the aft dome
segments and center plate from 0.133 inch thick sheet
aluminum. Figure 6-3 shows the manufacturing sequence
for the common bulkhead.
The adhesive bonding sequence subjects the entire assembly

of aft dome, honeycomb and bonding tool to a vacuum of
25" Hg. and the bond is cured with heat (330°F) and pres-
sure (I0 psi) in a large autoclave. When cure is com-
plete, the forward surface of the honeycomb is carefully
fitted to the contour of the aft face of the forward dome°
The bonding sequence is repeated, with vacuum, heat and
pressure to achieve final cure° The seal weld completes
closure of the common bulkhead, and the final finish steps
are taken as shown in Figure 6-3.
6.2oi.2 Aft Bulkhead
The aft bulkhead of the LOX tank is a hemispherically

shaped aluminum structure consisting of nine gore seg-
ments, and various flanges, fittings and elbow assemblies°
The nine gore segments are fabricated from 0.280 inch
thick 2014 sheet aluminum. Forming of individual segments
6-5
HEAT RESISTANT
PHENOLIC
HONEYCOMB-- UPPER DOME
CONTOURED
CENTERPLATE SEAL WELD
LOWERDOME
SEAL WELD
BLIND !
I
BOLT
LOX TANK O0
SEAL WELD HUCK BOLT
AFT DOME
STRUCTURE
GORE SEGMENTS ATTACH
(9 PLACES) ANGLE
FIGURE 6-2 S-IVB COMMON BULKHEAD AND

COMMON BULKHEAD/AFT BULKHEAD JOINT
RECEIVE FORM DOME HEAT TREAT FINAL ROUGH
AGE
SHEET STOCK SEGMENTS TO A.Q. STRETCH TRIM
"O'" FOR TO T6
STRETCHING.
"'T3" FOR
BULGE
FORM ING
_. _ ___ IWEIGH!
_.._._
WELD SEAMS. TRIM DEEP. ETCH
TRIM STATION SEGMENTS MILL
PLANE, X-RAY
E_
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(J1
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" WELD DOMES MACHINE RINGS STRAIGHTEN SEGMENTS r,o
TO RINGS, X-RAY SEGMENTS SEGMENTS
MACHINE CENTER X-RAY CHECK HONEYCOMB. SEAL WELD

PLATE OPENING.
WELD CENTER PLATE
MOVE TO II'WEIGHL _F_--- IP'-_,._ - BOND BETWEEN RINGS
ASSEMBLY
LOX TANK 4 I _i1"_---" _ i--'_
AREA LEAK CHECK
MACHINE RINGS
FIGURE 6-3 S-lVB COMMON BULKHEAD
MANUFACTURING SEQUENCE
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STRETCH FORM CON DITION TO ""A Q'" FINAL STRETCH
RECEIVE SHEET
9 SEGMENTS
STOCK C'O'" FOR
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SPRAY MASK AGE TO T6

ANODIZE ETCH MILL STENCIL CUT CURE MASK
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MERIDIAN EDGES
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ONE SIDE OTHER SIDE TRIM STATION PLANE
AT EQUATOR
.ov
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WELD JAMB
STU DS. CLIPS
FIGURE 6-4 S-IVB LOX TANK AFT

BULKHEAD MANUFACTURING SEQUENCE
ELDING HEAD
BAR IN
WELDING POSITION
CROSS SECTION SHOWING

WELDING OPERATION
DOME
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FIGURE 6-5 S-IVB WELDING GORE SEGMENTS

AFT AND COMMON BULKHEADS
E_
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_ HANDLING
FABRICATE DETAILS
AT SANTA MONICA
,-
DELIVER TO TOWER COMPLEX PLACE ON HANDLING
AND STORAGE DOLLY
FIGURE 6-6 S-IVB THRUST STRUCTURE

MANUFACTURING SEQUENCE
.-...-..-_
LOAD AFT DOME LOCATE & HUCKBOLT AI-rACH ANGLE. WELD AFT COMMON
INTO WELD FIXTURE INSTALL BAFFLE. LOAD COMMON BULKHEAD. BULKHEAD RING E_
C,-I
DRILL HOLES & HUCKBOLT COMMON BULKHEAD TO AFT DOME I
.-..i
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ASSEMBLY, WEIGH & SHIP TO
X-RAY WELDS WELD FORWARD COMMON
BULKHEAD RING TO
SPACE SYSTEMS CENTER AFT DOME
FIGURE 6-7 S-IVB LOX TANK

ASSEMBLY SEQUENCE
e
O O
WELDING TORCH
TANK
WELD FIXTURE
AFT DoME
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SPECIAL FIXTURE
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INSIDE WELD
LOX TANK
/"
FIGURE 6-8 S-IVB LOX TANK-JOINING COMMON

BULKHEAD AND AFT BULKHEAD
YELDING TORCH
TORCH POSITIONER
COMMON
AFT DOME
BULKHEAD
!
...a
!
CROSS SECTION:
SHOWING FORWARD co
WELD . FIXTURE IN P_
HORIZONTAL POSITION
AS SHOWN
LOX TANK
WELD FIXTURE
FIGURE 6-9 S-IVB JOINING LOX TANK ASSEMBLY

COMMON BULKHEAD AND AFT BULKHEAD
_--..._l_JN _
! FIXTURE ON LOW _ _ _-_J_t fl'__-_, -'
LOADTRAILER
BED TRANSPORTATIO !,___ llL_ ___/ _ "| I _F |_-'_T_
j 7t
(_ TRANSPORT TO SSC
FIGURE 6-10 S-IVB SHIPPING LOX TANK

TO SPACE SYSTEMS CE_ITER
D5-15782
"Quality Control shall be in accordance with NASA NPC

200-3 and applicable portions of NASA NPC 200-2 as defined
in the Douglas Reliability Control Specification," Ref-
erence 6.2.
6o3.1 Receiving Inspection (Raw Materials)
Raw materials are inspected for identification, damage,

dimensional characteristics and evidence of non-destructive
tests. All receiving paper is reviewed for the suppliers
chemical and/or physical test reports, test certification,
material certification, etc., to the applicable specifica-
tions noted on the purchase order. In the absence of
acceptable suppliers test data, MDC tests as required by
the applicable specifications° In addition to the fore-
going testing, periodic testing is performed by Q&RA per-
sonnel on a prescribed random basis to assure accuracy of
suppliers' test results°
All raw materials requiring test are withheld pending com-

pletion of these tests. Reliability assurance verifies
that the requirements of the specifications are met.
6°3°2 In-Process Inspection
Inspection procedures for fabrication, assembly and test

operations are an integral part of the detail manufacturing
documents (A.Oo'S). Both standard and special inspection
procedures are issued and controlled by the Reliability
Assurance Department.
All tooling is optically inspected at regular intervals,

and realigned as required.
Etch baths, chem-mill solutions and anodizing solutions

have their composition and concentration verified before
use.
Welding personnel are certified and must be recertified

at regular intervals. All welding is done under rigid clean
room conditions, under personal supervision of a welding
engineer, per DPS 41006. Every step of the welding proce-
dure must be signed off by Q&RA inspectors.
Bonding technicians undergo intensive training before

being allowed to work on the common bulkhead. Refresher
training courses are also required. Adhesive bonding is
carried out under rigid clean room procedures. Adhesive
batches are checked before use to verify age and bond
6-16
D5-15782
strength, per DPS 31150-I. All temperatures, pressures

and vacuums are recorded and monitored.
As indicated in Figure 6-3, 6-5, and 6-7, 100% x-ray in-.

spection is carried out on all welds as standard procedure
(DPS 15200, QCM 0008). In addition, all welds are examined
visually under white light, black light and by penetrant
techniques (DPS 15101, DPS 15105). Weld settings are
determined in advance of production welding by running pre-
production sample welds on production weight metal. Pre-
production weld samples are subjected to full inspection
and tensile testing before production welding may proceed
(DPS 14052).
After welding, but before final bolting of the common

bulkhead/aft bulkhead joint, the assembly is leak tested
by pressurizing the area between the two welds.
6.3.3 Final Checkout and Inspection
Final assembly of the tanks of the S-IVB is accomplished

in the Tooling Tower complex at the Huntington Beach
facility. The assembled tank is proof-pressure tested
hydrostatically in this building (Figure 6-II) then all
welds are again checked by dye penetrant techniques, per
References 6-3 and 6-4.
Following insulation of the LH2 tank interior, the tank

assembly is returned to the Tooling Tower complex for
attachment of skirts, thrust structure, J-2 engine, elec-
trical and hydraulic systems. The procedures followed,
with checkout points noted, are shown in Figure 6-12o
6-17
D5-1 5782
BRIDGE CRANE,
WORK PLATFORM_
WORK LEVEL
WATER TANK
TANK ASSEMBLY --
FIGURE 6-11 S.IVB HYDROSTATIC TESTING
6-18
1. LOCATE THRUST STRUCTURE 1. LOWER TANK ASSEMBLY ()N I. LOCATE ASSEMBLY IN TOWER 1. REMOVE FROM TOWER
1. DETERGENT CLEAN
HYDROGEN TANK 2. LOCATE AFT SKIRT AFT SKIRT AND ATTACH AND ATTACH AFT HOIST RING 2. LOCATE ON TOOLING DOLLY
2. RAISE THRUST STRUCTURE 2. INSTALL ENGINE VERTICALLY _FORWARD AND AFT HFH'S ARE
2. LOCATE PROBES
AND ATTACH TO LOX TANK THROUGH BASE ALSO ROLL RINGS FOR PAINT
3. SEAL
3. LOCATE AND ATTACH 3. COMPLETE INSTALLATIONS POSmON)
FORWARD SKIRT BETWEEN ENGINE AND .VEHICLE
4. CHECK TARGET ALIGNMENT 4. INSTALL AUXILIARY PROPULSION

5. COMPLETE INSTALLATIONS MODULES C.,-I
I
5. CHECKOUT
I
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DO
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INSTALL PROTECTIVE LOAD ON REMOVE WEIGHING J/b,CK UP ASSEMBLY, !.- LIFT FROM DOLLY. PAINT
COVER AND SHIP TRANSPORTER ROLL RINGS AND LOWER ON LOAD 2. INSERT CRADLE.
INSTALL G.S.E. ROLL CELLS. WEIGH 3. LOWER VEHICLE
RINGS 4. INSTALL WEIGHING
ROLL RINGS
'FIGURE 6-,]12 S-,1WB..FINAL ASSEMBLY

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D5-15782
6°5 HISTORY OF ELEMENT
Actual manufacture of the common bulkhead and aft bulk-

head of AS-503/S-IVB was performed at the Santa Monica
facility of McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company during
the period from October, 1965 to May, 1966o The assembly
of the two components was delivered at the Huntington
Beach facility, May II, 1966o Tank assembly was completed
and the tank was hydrostatic proof tested on June 25, 1966,
Reference 6.5. Skirts, thrust structure, insulation,
electrical components and the J-2 engine were added and
checked out by December, 1966, and the stage was shipped
to Sacramento Test Center on January 25, 1967, via the
Super Guppy airplane. Acceptance firing was accomplished
May 3, 1967. The stage was then placed in the Vehicle
Checkout Lab at Sacramento for final check and refurbishing.
The stage was turned over to NASA and made ready for shipp-
ing to Cape Kennedy Spaceflight Center on July 29, 1967,
again via Super Guppy. It has been stored since that time
in the VAB at KSC.
6-21
D5-1 5782
6.6.1 General
An on-site review was carried out at the Huntington Beach
facility of McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company. In-
spection of the manufacturing and test facilities was made
at both Santa Monica and Huntington Beach plants. A special
effort was made to observe in detail the manufacturing and
quality control procedures employed in the fabrication
and assembly of the common bulkhead, aft bulkhead, and thrust
structure.
Of primary concern was the documentation dealing with

Material Review Board action taken during the various
phases of manufacture, inspection, assembly and test.
The particular paper developed by MDC to record this acti-
vity is the Failure and Rejection Report (FARR) which
identifies the defective part or process, with details of
the problem found. Engineering issues specific instruc-
tions in repair procedures to be followed, including final
acceptance inspections required° All steps must be fol-
lowed before final closing of the FARR and sign-off by
MDC and NASA quality.
Other documentation examined included the Assembly Outline
_(AoO.). This document is the end product of the work done
by Design Engineering and Manufacturing Planning, and
gives step-wise instructions on every phase of manufac-
ture, assembly and inspection. Rework resulting from
FARR's also may be described in an appropriate A.O..
Also examined was a group of Douglas Process Standards,
to which reference was made in appropriate places in this
report. They dealt with welding preparation of aluminum
alloys (DPS 41006), mechanized welding of aluminum (DPS
14052), dye penetrant inspection (DPS 15101, DPS 15105),
radiographic inspection (DPS 15200, QCMO008), and bonding
of the common bulkhead (DPS 31150-I).
6.6.3 Conclusions
lo Documentation examined gives excellent visibility

to manufacturing processes, quality control and
repair procedures. Traceability is good.
o There are no open items of a structural nature

related to the common bulkhead/aft bulkhead-aft
6-22
D5-15782
bulkhead/thrust structure joints, Reference

6-6.
3. The foregoing facts together with the on-site

inspection of manufacturing processes and
quality control provided a high degree of con-
fidence in the structural integrity of this
complex joint.
6-23
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D5-15782
SECTION 7
S-IVB-503 FORWARD SKIRT
7-I
D5-15782
7°0 SUMMARY
The purpose of this review was to evaluate the manufacturing

and quality control procedures used in the assembly of the
S-IVB-503 Forward Skirt, to determine if the "as-built"
configuration structural integrity is assured.
The conclusions of this report are based on information

obtained at MDC from:
a • Inspection of manufacturing and quality

control facilities and activities at Hunting-
ton Beach and Santa Monicao
b • Discussions with Engineering, Manufacturing

and Quality Control personnel concerning
fabrication of the subject element•
C • Review of applicable documentation including,

but not limited to: manufacturing plans and
specifications, engineering drawings, MRB
actions and design certification reviews.
The investigating team concludes that the methods exercised

and results achieved do assure the structural integrity
of this selected element•
7-2
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D5-15782
7.2 MANUFACTURING
7.2.1 Fabrication
All skirt structure components, including skins, hat sec-

tion stringers, intercostals, frames, and forward and aft
attach angles, are fabricated at the Santa Monica location
then shipped to the Space Systems Center (Huntington Beach)
for assembly per Reference 7.1. The fabrication and as-
sembly sequence is depicted in Figure 7-2.
Skin sections are fabricated from 7075-T6 aluminum sheet.

They are sheared to size, cutouts routed, and edges de-
burred. External hat stringers are fabricated from 7075-
T6 aluminum extrusions° Extruded stock is cut to length
on a table saw. Tack rivet holes for subsequent automatic
riveting are drilled using hand drill motors and a drill
template°
One interior ring frame (hat section) is fabricated from

7075-0 extruded aluminum° It is stretch formed to contour,
then heat treated to the T6 condition.
Other ring frame sections are fabricated from 0.063" thick

7075-0 aluminum sheet. The sheet is sheared, then routed
to size. Segments are formed to contour on a form block.
Lightening holes are cut and the segments are heat treated
to the T4 condition.
Following inspection, the segments are heat treat aged

to T6 condition.
The forward and aft attach angles are made from 7075-0
aluminum extrusions. After cutting to length, tooling
holes are drilled with the aid of a layout template°
The tooling holes are used to index parts during assembly.
The angles are formed to contour on a stretch press,
heat treated to "AQ" condition, stretched further to re-
move warpage, then aged to the T6 condition°
Intercostals are fabricated from 7075-0 aluminum sheet.

After routing the periphery and lightening holes, finish
forming is by hydropress. Heat treatment to the T6 con-
dition, and inspection complete fabrication.
7°2.2 Assembly
At the Space Systems Center, Huntington Beach facility,

panel subassemblies, a skin and five stringers, are pro-
duced in an assembly jig. Parts are located in the jig
by butt stops and joined by tack rivets. After removal
7-5
O FAB FORWARD
AFT ATTACH
AND
ANGLES FAB STRINGERS

PANELS i
FRAMES
FAB FINISH RIVETING
,,,,,,.j
I
CO
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PLACE ON DOLLY
AND TRANSPORT TO INSTALLATIONS INVERT ASS EM BLE PAN E LS
TOWER COMPLEX
FIGURE 7-2 S-IVB FORWARD SKIRT FABRICATION

AND ASSEMBLY SEQUENCE
D5-15782
of the jig, the assembly is automatically riveted. The

tack rivets serve as indexing points for the automatic
riveting. The completed panel subassembly is then in-
spected, weighed, and transported to the final assembly
area o
During final assembly, as shown in Figure 7-2, the panel

assemblies, sheet metal sections, intercostals, splices,
doublers, and other details are jig located, then joined
with rivets and huck bolts° Attach holes in the forward
and aft angles are also drilled to size in this assembly
jig.
Installation and checkout of the remainder of the electronic

and mechanical components is made after inverting the as-
sembly and placing it in a pickup fixture. When this is
complete, the forward skirt assembly is placed on a dolly
and transported to the tooling tower complex for joining
to the vehicle.
D5-15782
Quality control is in accordance with NASA document NPC

200-3 and the applicable portion of NASA 200-2 as defined
by the Douglas Reliability Control Specification, Reference
6o2 by the Douglas Reliability Control Specification.
7.3.1 Receiving Inspection (Raw Materials)
Incoming material is checked by Quality Control for damage

in shipping, dimensional compliance, and material certifi-
cation papers for chemical and physical tests performed
by the vendor° In the absence of acceptable supplier test
data, MDC will perform physical, electrical, or chemical
analyses in accordance with applicable specifications which
define those materials requiring test, the characteristics
to be tested, the frequency of testing, acceptance, and
rejection criteria. All raw material requiring chemical
and/or physical tests is held pending completion of
these tests. Reliability Assurance verifies that the
requirements are met.
7°3°2 In-Process Inspection
The in-process inspection is an integral part of the detail

manufacturing documents, Assembly Outlines (A 0 's) and
Fabrication Outlines (F 0 's). Reliability Assurance
reviews manufacturing documents prior to implementation
and controls changes to these inspection procedures by a
review of new or changed drawings, EO's, AO's, and FO's.
Special inspection procedures, Inspection Operation Sheets

(IOS's) are issued and controlled by Reliability Assurance°
Test procedures are written by Manufacturing Engineering

and Development Engineering, Reference 6°3. Manufacturing
Engineering is responsible for issuing FO's and AO's as
applicable, for the performance of a required acceptance
test in accordance with applicable test procedures. Re-
liability Assurance is responsible for assuring conformance
of product acceptance tests with all requirements.
The primary inspection procedures for the forward skirt
concern
fastener dimensional
installation, tolerances of
and coating the components
application (DP _roper
42000,
A 9708926).
Final inspection of the forward skirt structure is made

after the forward and aft attach angles are installed per
applicable AO's and DPS's. The skirt is then transferred
to the instrumentation installation area.
7-8
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D5-15782
7.6.1 General
The on-site visit to the McDonnell-Douglas facilities at

Huntington Beach and Santa Monica gave a very good overall
picture of manufacturing processes and quality control
measures employed in the production of all elements of the
S-IVB-503. Documentation utilized was explained by
McDonnell-Douglas personnel° This, along with the plant
visits, illustrated the easy traceability of all items
through assembly to the end product.
All documents relating to the selected element were re-

viewed. These included AO's and FO's, as well as FARR's
calling for MRB action. FARR's and the MRB dispositions
are easily traceable. An MRB map of the forward skirt area
was provided by the contractor. Specifications relating
to the organic insulation applied to the exterior of the
forward skirt (DPS 42000, A9708926) were also reviewed.
7.6.3 Conclusions
a • Documentation examined gives excellent visibility

into manufacturing processes, quality control
techniques, and repair procedures. Traceability
is good.
b • There are no open items of a structural nature

related to the forward skirt, Reference 6.6.
C . The review of this element revealed that the

manufacturing and quality control methods em-
ployed adequately assure the integrity of this
element°
7-11
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D5-15782
SECTION 8
IU-503 SHELL
8-I
D5-15782
8•0 SUMMARY
The purpose of this review was to evaluate the manufacturing

and quality control procedures employed during fabrication
and assembly of the IU-503 and thus determine the structural
integrity of the "as-built" configuration. The data and
information upon which this report is founded included:
a • The inspection of manufacturing, and quality

control facilities and activities.
b • Detailed discussions with the Engineering,

Manufacturing, and Quality Control personnel
concerning fabrication of the subject element.
C • The review of pertinent documentation in-

cluding, but not limited to: manufacturing
plans and specifications, engineering draw-
ings, MRB actions, and Design Certification
Review•
It is concluded that the methods employed and results achiev-

ed offer assurance that this selected element conforms
with the design objectives.
8-2
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FIGURE 8-I INSTRUMENT UNIT

D5-15782
8.2 MANUFACTURING
8.2,1 Fabrication
The IU structure is assembled at IBM, Huntsville from three,

mated, 120 ° honeycomb sandwich panels manufactured at NR,
Tulsa, Reference 8.1. Figure 8-2 shows typical honeycomb
construction.
Design requirements include specifications which demand

stringent manufacturing processes and assembly controls.
Quality assurance is verified by thorough qualification,
in-process, and final acceptance testing.
Cleaning of the component parts of the panels (face sheets,

core, doublers and mounting rings), is governed by IBM
Specification 6009029. This document specifies solutions,
controls, and procedures prepatory to adhesive bonding.
The tooling employed in the fabrication of the IU segments

is equipped with thermocouples to monitor temperature
distribution during the bonding cycle. The autoclave used
for bond curing meets the adhesive polymerization cycle
requirements and has the necessary monitoring instrumentation.
8.2.2 Assembly
Assembly and bonding of the panels is controlled by SlD-

65T-217, Sat IB and V, Instrument Unit Bonding Manual and
Manufacturing Instructions.
Assembly of a panel commences with the positioning of an

outer face sheet on the bonding tool. The pre-cut core
and closure rings are positioned, by template, on the face
sheet to establish proper fit. The inner face sheet is
positioned on the assembly and clamped. A template is
then placed on the assembly to locate the position of
brackets and inserts. After locating these positions on
the inner face sheet, and assuring proper fit of all com-
ponents, the panel is disassembled. Figure 8-3 shows de-
tails of panel construction. A layer of NARMCO 329 ad-
hesive film is then positioned on the outer face sheet,
followed by the mounting rings and the pre-cut core. Core
splice adhesive (Epocast H-1310) is extruded between the
core segments. Thermocouples and leads are installed,
and a layer of adhesive film (NARMCO 329) is placed over
the honeycomb, followed by the inner face sheet. Brackets
and film adhesive (NARMCO 329) are next positioned on the
inner face sheet and the whole assembly is vacuum bagged
and tested for leakage. The panel and tool are then placed
in the autoclave for adhesive bond curing.
8-5
D5-1 5782
ACE SHEET
EXPANDED CORE
ADHESIVE- -"_ |l II ....
's_PRE Gyy TED "_1 li I l_llll| III Ill
_/ "FACE SHEET
//7'
FABRICA
SANDWICH / _"'ii, ll II III I t II IIII_
PANEL
FIGURE 8-2 TYPICAL HONEYCOMB SANDWICH

CONSTRUCTION
8-6
SLA INTERFACE
.030 INCH SKIN_ MOUNTING

T _ UPPER
xx RING
0.200
IN.
CHANNEL_ HIGH DENSITY

CORE
CO
!
36 IN.
"-.4 "-,4
LOW DENSITY CO
CORE f_
0.030 ALUM
7075-T6
OUTER SKIN
O.O2O ALUM
CHANNEL_
ALLOY
7075-T6
INNER SKIN
LOitER
TOTAL WALL THICKNESS = .95 INCHES
MOUNTING
RING
S-IVB INTERFACE
TYPICAL SECTIONAL VIEW
FIGURE 8-3 IU PANEL CONSTRUCTION DETAILS

D5-15782
8.2.2 Continued
Cleaning, layup, and curing is controlled by NR specification

SID-65T-217 and IBM spec 6009029. Inspection sign off is
mandatory for each step.
When the curing cycle is complete and the panel has cooled,
it is removed from the tool and the ends are sealed with
epoxy potting compound (Shell 934). The panels are then
completely inspected by ultrasonics.
Plastic inserts are installed according to need, and potted

in place (Shell 934). These inserts are of two types,
"blind", which are accessible only from one end, and "pass-
through," which allow bolts to pass completely through the
shell (see Figure 8-4). Both types are used to mount
brackets and other hardware which is required to be carried
by the Instrument Unit. Following potting, 100% radio-
graphic inspection is carried out to verify integrity of
potting and core splices. All discrepancies located by
X-ray or ultrasonic techniques are dispositioned as required,
and reinspected after repair.
The completed panels are then wrapped, crated, and shipped

to IBM Huntsville.
Following inspection of the panels received from Tulsa,

the panels are fitted together on a structural assembly
stand. Panel splicing is depicted in Figure 8-4. The
panels are optically aligned and spliced per MEI No. 5140080
to complete the IU shell, Reference 8.2 and 8.3.
After the interface (S-IVB and SLA) assembly bolt holes

through the upper and lower mounting rings have been dril-
led and sealed, the IU shell is bolted to the forward and
aft protective rings. These rings remain on the unit
until the unit is stacked at KSC.
Assembly of equipment mounting plates, damping channels,

harness brackets, etc., subsequently mounted to the shell,
is carefully controlled to prevent pre-stressing of the
shell.
8-8
D5-15782
II
HORIZONTAL
SPLICE PLATE /_
©
TYPICAL SPLICE PLATE
AI-rACHMENT
CABLE
TRAY
SUPPORTS .m
H _
EQUIPMENT
MOUNTING
PADS_
COLD PLATE
<
J=1 !_
•- - v v"
w . ',
_--_.
-. C."<
Y_ ××!
FIGURE 8-.4 IU PANEL SPLICING AND BRACKET MOUNTING
8-9
D5_15782
An on-site assessment of the manufacturing and inspection

methods, procedures, and relevant engineering documents
disclosed that manufacturing procedures are well covered
by specifications and that the quality procedures provide
adequate control.
8.3.1 Receiving Inspection (Raw Materials)
Specifications controlling procurement of raw materials

are industry standards. Compliance with these requirements
is verified by test.
8.3.2 In-Process Inspection
The quality control procedures governing the fabrication

of the IU are comprehensive and follow sound practices.
IBM Resident Engineers at NR Tulsa monitored fabrication
of the panels. A review and sign-off, by IBM Quality,
of all discrepancies and repair activities prior to ac-
ceptance and shipping of the panels is standard procedure.
NR, Tulsa is required by contract to produce a test tab

of similar construction with each panel manufactured (same
materials, same cure cycle), plus an extra complete panel
with each group of 15 panels manufactured, Reference 8-4.
Test tabs are subjected to destructive testing (lap shear,
flatwise tensile, and Porta-shear) to verify the adhesive
bonding process. Test panels are subjected to these tests,
plus bracket insert proof loading, sandwich beam shear,
composite edge compression and tension, and sandwich peel
testing. These tests verify the quality of the adhesive
bond and also the load-bearing capacity of the structure.
Assembly of the panels, at IBM, Huntsville, is closely

controlled by a detailed manufacturing plan and inspection
of each significant operation.
During assembly of the panels, all precautions (including

the use of protective devices) are exercised to prevent
damage. All discrepancies are subject to MRB action.
Final inspection and checkout is performed at KSC in the

VAB. Instrumentation records describing in-transit en-
vironmental conditions (shock, vibration, temperature, etc.)
are reviewed to assess any adverse condition which could
affect the function or reliability of the IU. Disposition
of discrepancies is controlled by MRB action.
8-10
D5-15782
8.4 MRB ACTIONS
A total of 31 MR actions are recorded against the IU-503o

None of these actions were classified as "Major." Thirteen
(13) actions occurred at NR, Tulsa, twelve (12) at IBMH,
and six (6) at KSC, Reference 8.5.
Four (4) MR's were identified as minor structural defects.

Of these, one was given a stress analysis since the repair
had not been qualified by test. A stress analysis was
performed on this MR and it was concluded that the action
taken was adequate regarding the structural integrity of
the element, Reference 1.4.
See Appendix A for details of the MRB review.
8-11
D5-1 5782
8.5 HISTORY OF ELEMENT
The IU-503 panels were manufactured at NR, Tulsa. The I01,

102 and 103 panels (comprising the shell) were completed
on 3-31-66, 4-14-66 and 4-23-66 respectively. They were
assembled, bonded, inspected and tested without any major
or significant discrepancies. Confirmation Test 2 (SID-
65T-83-2, Jan., 1966) and test specimens accompanying the
panels, validated the structural integrity.
Assembly of the IU-503 shell commenced at IBMH on 6-22-66

and was completed 8-8-66. Instrumentation assembly and
final check out was completed 7-7-67. The unit was de-
livered to KSC I-4-68, staged on 2-I-68, and de-staged
on 4-27-68, with final staging on 8-14-68.
8-12
D5-15782
8.6.1 General
An on-site assessment of the IU-503 was conducted at IBMH.

Since the panels are assembled and bonded at NR, Tulsa,
this review was limited to the assembly of the IU, and to
inspection procedures and controls governing the overall
manufacture, testing, shipping and storage of the units.
Specific assessments included:
a. Inspection and MRB, procedures and techniques.
b. Repair procedures.
c. Manufacturing plans.
d. Assembly and bonding, specifications and

procedures.
e. Testing procedures and methods.
f. Handling, protection, transportation, and

storage methods and procedures.
The documents reviewed during the assessment included

drawings, MR's, manufacturing plans and instructions, test-
ing methods and procedures, and materials and process
specifications.
8°6.3 Conclusions
Documentation examined gives excellent visibility into

manufacturing processes, quality control, and repair pro-
cedures. Traceability is good.
There are no open items of a structural nature related to

the IU shell, Reference 8.6.
A high degree of confidence in the structural integrity

of this element is provided by the foregoing factS, and the
on-site inspection of the manufacturing processes and
quality control procedures employed in the production of
the IU-503.
8-13
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D5-15782
SECTION 9
MATERIALS ENGINEERING
9-I
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D5-15782
9.3.1 Continued
Detailed data are tabulated in Appendix D.
This reassessment indicated that three propellant tanks of

the AS-503 Launch Vehicle and one J-2 engine start bottle
were the only apparent areas of concern. Adequacy of these
areas were verified by analyses and NDT inspection.
The four main propellant tanks in the CSM-I03 SM/SPS were

evaluated and considered adequate. Results of this assess-
ment are tabulated in Appendix D.
9.3.2 Conclusions
All propellant tanks and auxiliary pressure vessels are

within their minimum guaranteed life for C prime mission
except one J-2 start bottle on the S-II stage which was
considered an acceptable risk by the DCR board. No new
evidence has been uncovered by JSAT which refutes this
conclusion.
9.4 HONEYCOMB
9.4.1 Summary
Because of suspected damage to the SLA honeycomb structure

as a result of the AS-502 anomalies, a detailed investiga-
tion was carried out on the honeycomb structures employed
on AS-503. Examined in depth were adhesive bonding systems,
pressure buildup within bonded structures, need for ex-
terior insulation and interior venting of shells, and
destructive and non-destructive testing. Appendix E re-
veals the results of this investigation.
9.4.2 Conclusion
The honeycomb structures making up the Instrument Unit (IU),

the Command Module, the Spacecraft Lunar Module Adapter (SLA)
and the Service Module (SM) were investigated. Anticipated
flight temperatures and pressures are within the structural
capabilities of these elements. Therefore, as presently
designed, these elements are considered adequate for their
assigned mission on AS-503.
9-4
D5-15782
9.5 MATERIALS ALLOWABLES
9.5.1 Summary
The various selected elements of the AS-503 Launch Vehicle

have been reviewed from the standpoint of the material,
sandwich (honeycomb) and weld design allowables employed.
The review involved: identifying the materials in each of
the critical elements, determining the design allowables
for each material or welded joint and comparing these
design allowables to those used in the original design°
It was found that most of the allowables used are equiva-
lent to or conservative as compared to those recommended
and presented by JSAT in Appendix F.
9.5.2 Conclusions
The nonconservative design allowable discrepancies were

investigated as to their impact on margins of safety.
It was found that in no case did the employment of the
nonconservative value result in a negative or zero margin
of safety. It is therefore concluded that the material,
sandwich and weld design allowables employed by the stage
contractors in the design of the identified critical
elements, are satisfactory.
9-5
D5-15782
9-6
D5-15782
SECTION I0
SPACECRAFTSELECTED ELEMENTREPORT
I0-I
D5-15782
I0.0 SUMMARY
This section covers the detailed review of the fifteen (15)
JSAT selected structural elements on the AS-503 Spacecraft.
The detailed review includes: stress analyses, design

adequacy review, manufacturing and quality assurance
information, MRB disposition reviews, and reference to
material design allowables.
A materials evaluation study was also conducted with
emphasis on stress corrosion, hydrogen embrittlement,
and adhesive bonding. The structural adequacy of these
elements for the AS-503 C prime mission is noted in the
conclusion for each element.
The SPS tanks were reviewed for a fracture mechanics

assessment. This element review is reported in D5-15780,
Appendix D,
10-2
D5-15782
I0.I GENERAL
During the course of the assessment, a number of elements

were identified as being of concern, either by reason of
shortcoming in analysis, inadequacy of test, indicated
lack of structural integrity, association with "popular
problems", or the presence of MR's which could not be
cleared by cursory examination. In addition, the SPS
propellant tanks presented a special case by virtue of
their requirement for a fracture mechanics investigation.
The elements so identified are listed in Figure I0-I, in
conjunction with their associated reasons for concern.
These elements were subjected to a detailed stress review.

In addition, a general review was made of their associated
manufacturing, quality control procedures, and, by inclusion
in the overall review of manufacturing discrepancies,
their outstanding MR's and module histories.
Stress Review
In the following sections, the reason for selecting the

element is discussed in detail. The results of JSAT
analyses are compared to those obtained by the contractor,
and the JSAT assessment of the element is given. A summary
form is presented for each element which was reviewed
showing significant data comparisons. These summary forms
show that no significant areas of concern exist for the
selected spacecraft elements. With the exception of the XA
I010 Interface, adequate factors of safety are indicated
by test and analysis for all elements. The X I010 Inter-
face has shown positive margins by analysis, _nd awaits only
the engine-out test to show adequate margins by test demon-
stration.
Manufacturii_n_.q_
This section describes the assessment of the materials and

Processes that were used in manufacturing the structure that
is associated with the critical elements. As is shown
in the previous section, the majority of the critical elements
are, in fact, interfaces between spacecraft modules. There
are critical elements identified in each of the spacecraft
modules. Accordingly, discussions of the manufacture of
the LES, CM, SM, and SLA are each described in the approp-
riate sections.
The manufacture of each of the spacecraft modules is assessed

to be adequate. However, the following three areas of concern
have been identified because of their potential influence
on the behavior of the critical elements:
10-3
k
HODULE ELE_,_ENI RE_,_SO._:

FOR CONCERN
LES • LES/CM i_,'-ERFACE INADEQUATE TEST, CRITICALITY FOR LIFTOFF AND ENGINE-OUT LOADS
CH FORWARD
BUL EAD SIGNIFICANT MR
CH LONGERONS ANALYSIS SHORTCOMING, CRITICALITY FOR. LIFTOFF AND ENGINE-Obq" LOADS
CM/_ I_'TERFACE . LOW FACTOR OF SAFETY FOR NOMINAL FLIGHI', CRIT!CALIIY FOR LIFTOFF
AND ENGINE-OUT LOADS
SM SHELL SIGNIFICANT NR
SM SPS FWD TAffK SUPPORTS THRUST-OSCILLATION INDUCED l-_!iC.

VIBRATIONS
(,71
SM SPS TANK SKIRTS Cr',_NF!GURATIONDIFFEKF.NCES, END-BOOST LOADIN_ !
' C)
C_
SM SPS TANKS REQUI RE FRACTURE ,";EC}_.NICS
A_.LYSIS
O0
SM AFT BULKHEAD CONFIGURATION DIFFERENCES, END-BOOST LOADING, SIGNIFICA_R f,_R'S
SLA _,I/SLA I_|TERFACE INADEQUATE TEST DATA, SIGNIF!CART MR'S
SLA SHELL AS-502 A,_Or,_,ALY,

SIGiiIFICANT fIR'S
SLA XA 709.9 SPLICE AS-502 ANO_.t_LY,SIGNIFICA_R MR'S
SLA XA 5°5 jO,.'NT AS-502 ANOFtALY, SIGNIFICA_IT NR'S
Sb% SLA/LM INTERFACE I_ICOMPLETE ANALYSIS, SIGNIFICANT MR'S
SEA CRITIC._ INTERFACE, AS-502 ANOMALY, II_DEQUACY OF ANALYSIS,

XA 502 INTERFACE
SIGR!FICANT MR'S
FIGURE 10-1 SELECTED CRITICAL ELEMENTS

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D5-15782
I0.I GENERAL - Continued
for most of the non-structural parts. A few vendor

supplied non-structural items have not been reviewed
due to delays in obtaining drawings•
b • Twenty structural parts have been categorized as

"Stress Corrosion possible" or "Stress Corrosion
improbable (but possible)" based on maximum adverse
conditions of manufacture, assembly, and environment
that could be expected. These are presented in tabular
form (in the final report) together with a listing of
examination which has been made of these parts on
various spacecraft s.
C • No evidence of stress corrosion has been found in any

item examined. A report (SD6B-740) is currently in
process of publication covering the details of the
survey including a list of the 1501 drawings reviewed.
quality Control Procedures
The quality control procedures that were stipulated for the

manfuacture of AS-503 hardware were assessed and found
adequate• Quality control requirements are incorporated
in all manufacturing specifications. This includes the
various aspects of fabrication and assembly from the procure-
ment of raw material to the final inspection of flight hard-
ware. Evidence that the quality control requirements
have been met is found in the NR Fabrication and Inspection
Records (FAIR Books), wherein the disposition of discrepan-
cies in the structure is described. These discrepancy
dispositions are the result of Materials Review (MR)
actions which are described below. Provisions for AS-503
quality assurance are typified in the descriptions of quality
assurance provisions for the CM and the SLA, presented in the
appropriate sections which follow•
The assessment of the impact of Material Review Board (MRB)

action on the selected critical elements is described in
the JSAT Spacecraft As-Built Capability Document, D5-15781.
A report of a complete review of MR's that pertain to the
AS-503 spacecraft structure is contained in Boeing/Houston
Document D2-I18158-I, "AS-503 jSAT/ASSAT Spacecraft
Material Review Assessment". This latter document is the
record of the Joint Structural Assessment Team (JSAT) and
Apollo Spacecraft Structural Assessment Team (ASSAT) review
of the North American Rockwell Company (NR) Material Review
(MR) documents that describe dispositions of discrepancies
that were found in the AS-503 spacecraft structure•
10-6
D5-15782
I0.I GENERAL- Continued
Approximately 2500 MR dispositions were contained in the

787 MR documents that were reviewed. After assessing and
evaluating each disposition, 2404 were determined to be
adequate and 96 were determined to be questionable. These
96 dispositions were referred to JSAT stress for in-depth
analysis and resolution. The stress analysis verified the
adequacy of the 96 questionable dispositions. Thus, the
2500 MR dispositions that were reviewed were all finally
assessed to be adequate.
These MR review results were used by JSAT in the final assess-
ment of the flight readiness of the AS-503 Spacecraft.
The purpose of the review was to verify the adequacy of the

dispositions of structural discrepancies that are described
in the MR documents. At the outset the intent was to
assess only those MR's that pertained to primary structure.
However, the review encompassed not only all of the pri-
mary structure MR's but virtually all of the secondary
structure MR's as well. Particular attention was given
to the potential impact of MR's on previously identified
selected critical elements.
The objective of the review was to assess the impact of the

MR dispositions on the strength of the Spacecraft structure.
The original configuration of the AS-503 spacecraft structure

was composed of five modules that included a Spacecraft
Lunar Module Adapter (SLA-II), a Service Module (SM-I03),
a CommandModule (CM-I03), a Launch Escape System (LES),
and a Lunar Module (LM-3). The plan was to assess the
MR's that pertain to each of the above modules. Coincident
with a change in the mission requirements for AS-503,
a structure (LTA-B) which simulates the mass of a Lunar
Module was substituted for LM-3. The flight worthiness
of LTA-B was assessed to be adequate by inspection methods.
There are no MR documents pertaining to this simulated
spacecraft module. With the elimination of the require-
ment to assess the LM, this AS-503 ASSAT/JSAT Spacecraft
Material Review assessment was accordingly limited to the
SLA, SM, CM, and LES.
The MR review was conducted in three phases, as follows:
Phase S/C Module Location Dates

I SM Downey, California Sept. 3 - Oct. 4, 1968
II CM/LES Downey, California Oct. 15 - Oct. 18, 1968
III SLA Houston, Texas Oct. 22 - Oct. 26, 1968
10-7
_J
r_
CO
I
T 0
r--
r_
CO
G# 0"_
oi-- I
> 0
m-.-
1.0
<
rF U
Z cr
O0
0 c-
r-- ID_
ILl CD
o o
ITEM OF COMPARISON CONTRACTOR JSAT
ENVIRONMENT Tension: (1) Atmospheric Abort SA_
(2) 125 ° F.
Compression: (I) Lift-off

(2) 70 ° F.
LOADS @ Tens ion: SN.IE
O
XA = I083 Interface SX = 128,000 lb. !
I (Limit Loads) SZ = -9,000 lb.

-,,j
0 My = 1,110,000 in-lb. CO
Compress ion:
SX = -12,200 lb.
SZ = 10,300 lb.
My = 2,630,000 in-lb.
ALLOH,ABLE Tension: P = 100,000 lb. Tension: Same

AS _ I"' _-r T ._ll'
("
Compression: Fcu = 75,000 psi Co_._pression: [cu : 52,5C_ psi
The stud is assumed fixed SP3._E
at _e nut.
MiNIM_ FACTOR OF SAFETY Tension: 2.00 Tension: Same

Cc_pression: 1.62 Compression: Requires
demonstration in the engine-
out test
FAILURE _DE Tension: Frangible nut cracking SAME

Cofapressien: Pedestal crushing
FIGURE 10-2 SELECTED ELE_;EI_TREVIEI_ DATA CO_,_ARISON - LES/C.N XA 1083 I_TERFACF

(,/9
x/
0
Od
CO
P_
0
7
7 0
r--
0
r'_
j
4335V
Steel
PITCH NOSE CONE
TOWER CONTROL BALLAST & Q BALL
JETl I SON MOTOR
4335V MOIOR
Steel 4135 Steel
LAUNCH INCONEL
ESCAPE P_ X-lSO
Ti_6A1-4V
Skins MOTOR PHI5-/MO
STRUCTURAl
L,NARD
LAUNCH ESCAPE MOTOR RT CANARD
IHRUST ALIGNMENT FITTING I i-6A1-4V ACT I IAI OR
.=,=i
SAIURN V Ring PIICH CONTROl INCONEL X-150
o !
i DAMPER MOTOR SUPPORT l/-@-PH ,=..I
• .=..i STUDS &

fRANGIBlE NUIS \ INCONEL X-750
130
15- 5PH
H-_J STEEl
BEAR I NG
"-,,,..I
0o
i",o
POWER SYSIEMS &
INSTRUMENTAI I ON
WIRE HARNESS
A286 BOLl
LAUNCH ESCAPE
TOWER
BUNA N Ti--6AI-4V IUBING

RUBBER
INSULAT ION
ELECTRICAL
D I SCONNECT
BOOST
ITTINGS
PROTECTIVE
(:OVER T_-iE. LAUNCH ESCAPE _v £_-_I
o-_ ......... (L F_"
TYPICAL MATERIAL USAGE ON
IAPEX SECTION) Figure 10-3
UPPER
HINGE
"O-BAI L" INTERI:ACE

ALUMINUM PER MSI:C-50M68942 E3
BALLAST WTS LEAD CANARD

!
INCONEL-X 750
STRUCT-15-1 &
---4
O INCONEL-X 750 GO
I r_
GO
ACTUATING ARM
AC
|7-4 CRES
TOWER
SKI NS-INCONEL -X IDLER LINK-L7-4 CRES
STRUCTURE INCONEL-X
BELL CRANK
& 15-7 CRES
17-4CRES, 15-5 PM, H-I| BEARING
LOWER HINGE
TOWER JETTI SON
MOTOR INTERFACE
Figure 10-4 TYPICAL MATERIAL USAGE (LES)

PHENOLIC GLASS LAMINATE FACE SHEETS
GLASS FABR IC HC CORE
4340 FRANGI BLE
HOUSING
,_'_, NUT
,_::_..,.--WASHER
PARACHUTE
r i
I
PROTECTOR (.71
\
I
434O ..,-i
.,..l _ _..--'-- SPRING rJrl
O PHENOLIC .DETONATOR 302SS CO

I
GLASS
I:, I
FAIRING
_STUD
NUT 434O
BOLTBODY 200-220KSI
ASSEMBLY I
_'"_ SE_
SILICONE
RUBBER
434O
TOWERLEGFll'rlNG
Figure 10-5 TYPICAL MATERIALS USAGE (LES)

D5-15782
I0.2.2 Continued
Allowables
The allowables used for the LES were obtained from MIL-HDBK-
5, NR Structures Manual, Materials and Producibility Bul-
letins 16, 44, 45, 46, 48, and 49, and Rocket Motor Vendors
Design Documents.
lO-15
D5-1 5782
10.3 CM FORWARD BULKHEAD
lO.3.1 Design Adequacy Review
The CM Forward Bulkhead was chosen because an MR against

it, MR No. I03605, could not be cleared by cursory examina-
tion. The adequacy of the desiqn was not in question, as
indicated by the factor of safety shown in Figure I0-6. The
MR was cleared by in-depth stress analysis and the Forward
Bulkhead judged adequate for the AS-503 flight.
I0.3.2 CM General Materials Usage
A general picture of the CM metallic structural material

usage on the CM and the applications of materials are shown
in Figures I0-7 through lO-18. The inner structure, a
welded pressure hull of 2014-T6 aluminum alloy, is rigid-
ized and strengthened with adhesive bonded 5052-H39 aluminum
honeycomb and 2014-T6 outer face sheets. The adhesive
bonding of this inner structure and the secondary bonding
of stringers, brackets, etc., is discussed to some extent
under "Adhesive Bonding" in this section, he main emphasis
being placed on adhesive bonding because it is basic to
the structural design concept of the CM.
Metal parts such as sifffeners, brackets, fittings, etc.,

which are not attached by welding to the inner structure
are heavily machined from 7075-T6 and 7079-T651 aluminum
plates, extrusions, bars, or forgings. The alloys are
known to be very susceptible to stress corrosion in the
short transverse grain direction. The detail drawings
do not specify the preferred grain direction in these
parts. Attachment members of the outer structure, the
docking system, forward pressure hatch, etc., use 17-4PH
CRES Steel, A-286 CRES Steel, Inconel 718, PHI5-7Mo, Ti-
6AI-4V plate, rods, bars, forgings, extrusions, etc.
Insofar as could be determined, the selection and applica-

tion of the structural materials appears to be satisfactory.
The metallic materials are ordered to recognized federal
specifications or adequate North American Rockwell speci-
fications.
Adhesive Bondin 9
The principal adhesive bonding specification used on the

CM is NR specification MA 0606-006, "Adhesive Bonding
Apollo Command Module and Secondary Honeycomb Structure
for Usage from -200 ° F to +250°F. " A subsidiary specifi-
cation is MA 0606-014, "Secondary Bonding of Stringers,
10-16
ITEM OF CoMPARIsON Co_frRACTOR JSAT
SAME
ENVI RON_]Er_- 8() ° F,
LOADS
PARACHUTE SHEAR V : 3],200 LB. (3(T)
(LIMIT) V = 41,800 LB. (WORST-_N-_RST)
(.,."I
!
ALLO_._ABLE V = 52,100 LB.

....i ,,,j
C:) O0
|
ASSUMPTIO_JS r_
"-4
MIN!NLr,-I
FACTOR OF SAFETY 1.4
FAILURE ._IODE LONGERONBENDING
FIGURE 10-6 SELECTED ELEMENT REVI_ DATA COMPARISON - CM FORWARD BULKHEAD

39VSN 7VI_31VN NOIIVaNg!-4NO3 NITS 37NGOH aNVNNO3 L-OT a_n6_3
04
CO OO
I..0
O
II
----.-
z+ / /
SJ-._HS 33VJ 91-17102.
//
J.33HS33V3 ol_-l_IHd ./
_____ _ (]I31HS I_'3H
IIIIH :l_Inss3_Id 3_I111311_1S_FINNI
Inner Structure
17-4PH Rings --_-_ / 17-4PH Jettison Fittings (4) 17-4PH Frames

PHI4-8 Mo "_
Face Sheets & /v____ __
Core \_ _ _
17-4PH Rin_ _ _"

17-4PH Fitting (4) _
FORWARDHEAT SHIELD
!
0
I
Access Panels (Typ)

GO
PHI4-8 Mo or PHI5-7 Mo
Cores, Face Sheets, Edge
Members
Ti-6AI-4V Frame
AFT HEAT SHIELD -_ CREW COMPARTMENTHEAT SHEILD
17-4 PH EDGE
Inner Structure:
PHI4-8 Mo Face Sheets
PH14-8 MO FACEt PHI4-8 Mo or PHI5-7 Mo Cores
MEMBERS
SHEETS AND COR 17-4PH Edge Members
\
Figure 10-8 COMMANDMODULE HEAT SHIELD MATERIAL USAGE

Isolator Ring -
Fiberglass (Pyropreg) Laminate
CYLINDER ASSEMBLY
Feed Thru Fitting /0/9-T651

FORWARDBULKHEAD 7075-T6
2014-T6 Face Sheets
5052-H39 Core
pRWARDLONGERON
Alclad 2014-T6 Face
2014-T652
Sheets, 5052-H39 Core
Upper Support Beam
2014-T651
FORWARDASSEMBLY
Kick Ring Frames

o
! Inner Cap 7075-T651
!
o
Shear Webs 7075-T651
SIDEWALL
Outer Cap 2014-T6
INNERFACE
7075-T6 Fittinos SHEET ASSY
and Splice Plates Face Sheets
2014-T6
Core 5052-H39
AFT ASSEMBLY
AFT--'__
BULKHEAD
RING
2014-T652
AFT AFT LONGERON

INNER FACE SHEET ASSY 2014-T6511
Face Sheets 2014-T6 (Intermediate)
Core 5052-H39
Figure 10-9
Tunnel Skins Alclad 7075-T6[
Gussets 7075-T6 ]- Parachute Attach Beam 7079-T651
Fitting Plates 7075-T651 (Not Shown) Lugs 7079-T652
Ti-6AL-4v
Shims 2014-T6
Pins A-286
Caps 7C
ACCESS CYLINDER ASSY
Longerons 2014-T652.
CORESO52-H39
FC
BULKHEAD
)RWAkD LONGERON
FORWARD ACCESS HATCH FRAME

ASSY
0 !
I
2014-T651
\ O0
rSeal Silicone Rubber"

Turnbuckle Be-Copper
AFT BULKHEAD RING Tensicn Rods A-286
Bracket 2024-T351
Hook Side Adapter 7075-T6
AFT BULKHEAD INNER FACE

\
SHEET ASSY _D _, Hatch Adapter Frame 2014-T652
+z_+v hatch Torque Box
-Y -z 7075-T6 Bar
2024-T3 Plate
707F-T6 Fitting Hinge Fittings Ti-6AI-4v
Figure 10-10 COMMANDMODULE INNER STRUCTURE MATERIAL USAGE

FORWARD
HATCH
LET ATTACH POINT
Xc = 80.75
Fwd Sidewall
Pressure Hull
Face Sheets Alclad 2014-T6 REW ACCESS HATCH FRAME
C-CHANNELS
7075-T651
Inner "T" 7075-T6
0
!
!
_0
Xc = 14.07
AFT LONGERON (Tension Tie

T-STRINGERS
FWD 2014-T652
Frame 7075-T651 Fitting Splice 7075-T6
Retainer 7074-T6 Frames Alclad 2014-T6
7075-T651
Corning No. 1723 2014-T652
Aluminosilicate
Glass _2)
Figure 10-11 COMMANDMODULE IN,_,IER ,:_-rD,__,,,,>..,-

-_,E_--_;_._.
MATERIAL USAGE
COMMANDMODULE TUNNEL PRESSURE
EQUALIZATION AND INDICATOR VALVE
Inconel 718, 7075-T6
BELL CRA! 7075-T6 Plate (Center)
nd Bar (Support)
A-286 (Bushings)
Alclad 2014-T652
Outer Face
5052-H39
2014-T651 Plate Inner F.S
and Built-Up Edge
!
!
C_
Housing 2024-T351
Gears Inconel 718
GEAR BOX CO
Ti-6AI-4v PLUNGER 2024-T4

Incl 718
Spring 302 B Wire
2024-T4
ROD ASSY (Typ)
Spring 17-7PH 2024-T3 Tubes (7)
A286 End Fittings
7075-T6 (Typ)
7075-T6
HANDLE IN STOWED POSITION

Button Spring 2024-T4
302 SS
Figure lO-12 TYPICAL FORWARD PRESSURE HATCH MATERIALS

Corning 1723 Aluminosilicate Glass
Frame 2024-T351, 7075-T651
Retainer 2024-T351
Flange 7075-T6
BOOST COVER
RELEASE FAIRING
VENT P,ORT
PURGE
A-286
(jm
!
©
! Oo
ixJ
4:=
Ablator
Outside
Inside Slab 2014-T652

2014-T652 FG
FRAME
HATCH DRIVE PENETRATION
Fiberglass Honeycomb Between HINGE

Aluminum Slab and Ablator
BOOST COVER
Figure 10-13 TYPICAL UNIFIED HATC_ AND BOOST COVER MATERIALS
!
Shell Structure
PHI4-8 Mo Face Sheets
PHI4-8 Mo Honeycomb Core
RING ASSEMBLY 321 Stainless Ann.
71 78-T,
!
O
I
C_
A-286
Inc 718
HANDLE ASSEMBLY
(OPEN POSITION)
HANDLE ASSEMBLY
(STOWED POSITION)
Figure 10-14 TYPICAL ABLATIVE HATCH MATERIALS

39VSn IVI_]iVW AIBW3SSV _31SnUH1 _I-OI Bjn6£j
NOISId
311 NOISN3i
9NIU-O
C_
NOISId
CO
NId
N
!
0
L._
r-_ 0N3 QOU 9NIUdS X [euoDuI
_3QNI7XO U31NO 9BS-V
9NIIIIJ
UOIVIIINI
0N3 QOU
DOCKING RING (CM)
_Inconel 718 Hook Latch Fittings A286

Inconel 718
Base 2024-T4
201 4_TR_B_ap Fiberglass
\ Ti-6AI-4v
DROGUE ASSEMBLY.--,
0 I
!
_0 0'3
17-4 PH PLATE CO
+Z
!J
2014-T6 CYb
CH SSEMBLIES
2014-T6
Inconel 718
Inconel 718
Inc l" 718 Shaft
2014-T4 Collar-- . Ti-6AI-4v Yoke
Figure I0-16 DOCKING SYSTEM MATERIAL USAGE

Cable 301 SS
SEA RECOVERY Bar Inconel 718
CABLE Plate 7075-T6
DROGUE PARACHUTE MORTAR
LES TOWER ELECTRICAL

÷Y
RECEPTACLE
Flower Pot Ti-6AI-4v

Beams 7079-T652
0 !
! ..=a
P,)
CO PARACHUTE
CO
RISER PROTECTOI
Mortar Supt. RCS ENGINE PROTECTOR

7075-T6
PILOT 7075-T6
MORTAR, Cap 7075-T6 7075-T651
MAIN LANDING DYE MARKER AND SWIMMER UMBILICAL

Retention Frame 7075-T6 HF RECOVERY ANTENNA
UPRIGHTING BAGS
UNDER MAIN PARACHUTES (3 PLACES)
Tiedown Fitting 7075-T651
Figure 10-17 LES- EQUIPMENT MATER!AL VSAGE
,t • •
17-4PH CRES STEELMBOI60-018
V36-321280
IMPREGNATEDFIBER GLASS
LAM I NATEMBO130-O04
V36-321278
V36-310001 (REF)
CZ_
(31
O
I
ML C_
" " "X_ OUTER CO

f r,O
/
-286CRES EELMB01_-029
\ V36-321279
• BONDEDAL HONEYCOMB
Ti-6AI-4VCOND. A
\ 5052-H39 CORE
V36-3212/5(REF)
lO15-T651/QQ-A
-22519
V36-211006
',_..-.--V36-320001
(REF}
_---.- I NNERML
Figure 10-18 INNER TO OUTER SHELL ATTACHMENT MATERIAL USAGE

D5-15782
10.3.2 Continued
Adhesive Bondin 9 (Continued)
Tie Brackets, Doublers, Etc. to Apollo Spacecraft." MA

0606-006 will be discussed first.
The primers, adhesives, and fillers for use with MA 0606-

006 are epoxy-based. The primers are MB 0120-032 (Pitts-
burgh Plate Glass M-602 for -423 ° to 300°F), MB 0120-047
Type I (Am. Cyanamid HT-424B or Adhesive Engineering Aero-
bond P-413 for -423 ° to 180°F), and MB 0120-047 Type II
(Am. Cyanamid HT-424F, or Adhesive Engineering Aerobond
P-413 for -300 ° to 300°F. and short time to 500 °F _.
MA 0606-006 makes use of four adhesives. MB 0120-048, the

primary structural adhesive for honeycomb panel fabrication,
is an epoxy-phenolic glass tape supported adhesive for
-423 ° to 500°F service (HT-424 or Aerobond 430). For core-
to-core splicing and for core-to-edge member or insert
bonds, a thixotropic HT-424 paste, MB 0120-026, is used
for -423 ° to 300°F, or short time to 500°F service. It
is dyed blue to distinguish it from MB 0130-030. A foaming
type adhesive, MB 0120-030 (HT-424, Type I) is used instead
of the thixotropic paste where the core density is 4.4 lb.
per cu. ft., or less, or where little or no pressure can
be obtained during cure. It is also used as a stiffening
medium to prevent edgewise collapse of core cells when
inserting into channels, etc. As an alternate to the
foaming type adhesive, a mineral-filled epoxy, MB 0120-037
(Epon 954, Reliabond 377), may be used to rigidize core
edges. It is room-temperature curing. Figure lO-19 shows
examples of adhesive selection.
For filling exposed core edges or core cells, where speci-

fied, three types of fillers are used: Type I consisting
of lO0 pbw MA 0120-039 (Am. Cyanamid Corfil 615) and 14
pbw Apco 320 hardener (Applied Plastics), Type II made up
of 50 pbw LB 0120-012 (PPG Bondmaster M611/CH60) and 50
pbw Buehler 15-57AB alumina powder with 7 pbw Apco 320,
and Type Ill composed of lO0 pbw, MB 0120-039 with 7.5
pbw red di-ethylene triamine.
Details are fabricated for bonded honeycomb sandwich per

LA 0102-004; surfaces are prepared for bonding per MA 0110-
024; and process controls such as solution control, ad-
hesive validation, production peel tests, etc., are covered
in MQ Ol03-OOl. The specification itself, MA 0606-006,
includes general requirements, detail requirements, and
quality assurance provisions.
I0-30
D5=15782
ORE OUTERSKIN MB 0120-048 I (HT424, AEROBOND430, FILM)
J CORE-EDGE-
__MBER
/ ............ CORE
SPL,CE'---"/
INNER WELDEDSKIN WELD
MB 0120-030 (HT424 FOAM)
"MB 0120-026 (HT424THIXOTROPIC PASTE) OR

MB 0120-030 (HT424 FOAM} DEPENDING ON
CORE DENSITIES
Figure 10-19 EXAMPLES OF ADHESIVE & FILLER SELECTION BASED ON

MA 0606-006 ADHESIVE BONDING SPECIFICATION
lO-31
CJ
CO
I_.
I.O
I
0
tO
_IJ c- I rO ¢1_ u_ O-r--'_- l
0'_" _- _ _ c- .,-- _LO_t
c- E ,-- 0 0 0 c- (lJ 0 _--
•z-- (L_ -0> _' _.,-- CI. •,-- _ c- !
4-_ _ 0_0
0 "0 0 q- .J',-"
0" c- , __.,--
OJ -_ J,o O_--_E_ rO c- _" .,--
c- 0
r--"
._ .I-_ _ __
04-_ CJ.,-- ,--- •,- 0 0 c-
• c- _I_ .,- _-- -I_
O (D c- _" _ ,-- .,-
D5-15782
I0.3.2 Continued
Insulation
The insulation blanket installed between the inner and

outer structure is an aluminum faced silica fibre matte
known as TG-15000. The heat shield ablative material
applied to the surface of the PHI4-8Mo honeycomb sandwich
of the outer structure, is AVCOAT 5026-39HCG. This is
an epoxy-novolac with phenolic micro-balloons and random
silica fibres in a phenolic fiberglass honeycomb. The
phenolic honeycomb is bonded to the brazed steel honey-
comb sandwich prior to filling with ablative material.
10.3.3 CM Quality Assurance
Quality Assurance covers process control specification,

method of tool proofing, adhesive and filler evaluation
prior to use (including peel and tensile strength require-
ments and others for MB 0120-039, MB 0120-012, MB 0120-030,
MB 0120-030, and MB 0120-026), production testing (includes
running test coupons with each production part - lap shear,
if only metal-to-metal bonds; both lap shear and honeycomb
peel if honeycomb bonds present - placement of test coupons
and minimum test strengths; however, test coupons for foam
and thixotropic adhesives not required), visual inspection
(including adhesive primed surfaces and bonded parts),
ultrasonic inspection ("where practicable," including
rejection and drying requirements), sonic inspection (tap
test where ultrasonic impracticable), X-ray inspection
(core-to-core splices and core-to-edge member bonds single
stage only to check maximum foam splice line width, core
splice intersections, and repair of both), bondline thick-
ness control, metal-to-metal adhesive defect inspection
(visual for edge and corner lack of adhesive), and main-
tenance of records for each production part.
Radiographic inspection is controlled by NR specification

MQ 0501-007 and ultrasonic inspection by MQ 050-010. One
of the most important of the quality specifications is
called out by number on drawing MQ 0501-026, "Production
Quality Verification (PQV) Testing of Apollo Command
Module Inner Structure Adhesive Bonds." This specification
presents methods to locally destructive test production
hardware to determine the strength of primary adhesive
bonds° Four Block II tests are described: (I) face sheet-
to-core tension (Tc) , (2) metal-to-metal tension (TM),
(3) metal-to-metal shear (SM), and (4) metal-to-metal
Porta Shear. In the first three types, small grip pieces
are bonded to the test surfaces, the test areas are tre-
panned by cutting through the skins and into the primary
10-33
D5-,15782 ,_
I0.3.3 Continued
bonds to isolate the areas, and the loads applied by suit-

able calibrated equipment° In the Porta Shear test a hollow
cutter is used to cut through the metal and bond line and
the shear load is then applied directly to the remaining cir-
cular piece of bonded metal. After testing the damaged
areas are repaired.
Sketches define the locations of all test areas on the CM

inner structure. Tables define the specimen types, loca-
tions, and loads required for the forward bulkhead, forward
sidewall, aft sidewall, aft bulkhead, and bellyband. The
number of tests to be performed are 16 TC, 4 Tm, 16 S , and
21 Porta Shear, although current practice has eliminated
Sm in favor of Porta Shear. These numbers are reduced to
5, 2, 5, and 5, respectively, if two successive spacecraft
have met the P&V requirements of the more extensive test
sequence.
MA 060_014, "Secondary Bonding of Stringers, Tie Brackets,

Doublers, Etc., to Apollo Spacecraft" makes use of both
the MB 0120-032 primer and the MB 0120-048 adhesive pre-
viously mentioned plus the MB 0120-053 high peel adhesive
film (Am. Cyanamid FM-123-2). All CM details are required
to be primed except shims which do not have to be primed
if they are bonded within 24 hours after cleaning. Process
verification coupons are run with the assembly when re-
quired by Quality Assurance° This option of process verifi-
cation coupon testing could be a weakness in the specification.
The two quality specifications in MA 0606-014 are MO 0103-

001 and MO 0501-024, the former being a general process
control specification and the latter being specifically
directed to the testing of MA 0606-014 bonded members.
MQ 0501-024, "Verification Testing of Apollo Secondary
Bonded Structures" is a 117 page document which shows in
detail by means of sketches how each member such as chan-
nels, tees, and brackets is tested by using appropriate
torque wrenches or tension scales with tools to grip the
member under test. Test loads are those given on the
engineering drawing.
In summary, it is difficult to pick an obvious weak spot

in the adhesive bonding procedures. The adhesives are
well known and acceptable. The specifications appear to
be complete in their requirements for handling bonding
surface preparation, validation procedures and storage
life, and temperatures for primers and adhesives, fit
checks, process validation test coupons, etc. The use
of PQV (Production Quality Verification) testing (MQ 0501-
026) of the honeycomb panels and the verification testing
10-34
D5-15782
10.3.3 Continued
of secondary bonded structural members (MQ 0501-024) de-

notes the extent to which quality assurance checking has
been carried; although, of course, such tests are still in
essence only sampling the structure to increase confidence
in its reliability. PQV test reports for CM's No. I08,
I09, and llO were reviewed. In general, the test results
were excellent with only two material review actions being
required.
The problem of degrading the strengths of some heat treated

aluminum alloys during bonding cure cycles was discussed
with NR M&P allowables people. They were aware of the
potential problem and claimed that necessary steps were
taken to keep the designers informed and that degraded
allowables were issued where necessary. Also, they indi-
cated that they survey repair or rework bonding thermal
cycles for the same reason.
Another potential problem area, that of the designer calling

out the wrong specification for adhesive bonding (there
being five MA 0606-XXX and five MA OI06-XXX specifications
for adhesive bonding) was discussed with M&P. They indi-
cated that the designer generally comes to the Project M&P
group for consultation. Also, the Project M&P group re-
ceives one of four courtesy copies of all drawings for
review. However, M&P does not have drawing sign-off rights
and cases have occurred apparently where a drawing was
released before M&P had reviewed their courtesy copy.
No amount of quality control nor sampling plans can sub-

stitute for good workmanship. This may be a problem area
which could cause some trouble inasmuch as it is understood
from NASA inspectors that (1) NR has no formal training
program for shop bonding personnel and (2) periodic layoffs
result in "bumping" which permits less qualified personnel
with seniority to replace bonding shop personnel. This
latter situation results in a measurable rise in bonded
assembly rejections. It is conceivable that a greater
number of marginal, or inadequate, parts are accepted des-
pite the quality assurance provisions when "bumping"
occurs,
One area of concern is the inadequate control over adhesive

bonding process variables typified in the notes on drawing
numbered V36-311001. This drawing authorized options re-
sulting in bondline thicknesses up to 0.024 inches. The
NR design allowables limit bondline thicknesses to 0.012
inches maximum. The NR document QEL-NMP-103-98, dated
October 31, 1963, titled "Results of Lap Shear Strength vs.
Glueline Thickness Tests," concludes that "gluelines"
10-35
D5-1 5782
I0.3.3 Continued
for the HT 424 adhesive system below 0.014 inches will

generally produce adequate bond strengths, which is in
agreement with the NR allowables. Figure I0-20 obtained
from the above document demonstrates that increasing the
bondline thickness from 0o012 inches to 0.024 inches de-
creases lap shear strength at room temperature by 30 per
cent and causes a 25 per cent reduction from design allow-
able.
Allowables
The allowables used for the CM were obtained from MIL-HDBK-

5, North American Rockwell (NR) Structures Manual, and NR
Material Producibility Bulletins 16, 44, 45, 46, 48, and 49.
The allowables used for the PHI4-8Mo brazed honeycomb were
not available for assessment of this structure since NR
considered these data proprietary.
I0-36
D5-15782
4O
32
28
24
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTR.T.
20
16 '"
12
4 R.T,
i i|
i
2 4 8 I0 12 i4 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36
BONDLINE THICKNESS x 10 -3 INCHES
Figure 10-2o HT-424 ADHESIVE SYSTEM
10-37
D5-15782
I0.4 CM LONGERONS
The reason for selecting the longerons was based on the low
factor of safety reported in the NR analysis (F.S. = 1.53)
coupled with the fact that the plastic bending part of the
analysis was incorrectly handled. The analysis erred in
computing the plastic bending section factor and in cal-
culating a factor of safety based on stress allowables
rather than based on bending moment allowables as is the
required procedure for unsymmetrical sections (conserva-
tive in this case).
The longerons appear to be the controlling element of

X A I083 interface capability for both liftoff and engine-
out loads. Using the same internal loads, the plastic
bending analysis was corrected with the result being that
the error in the conservative direction was over-riding
and that the factor of safety increased to 1.62. The
corrected analysis demonstrates a higher factor of safety
than was reported in the stress analysis. A summary of
the review is presented in Figure I0-24.
I0-38
D5-15782
I0.5 CM/SM INTERFACE XA lOlO

The X^ = lOlO interface is made up of six radial beam

trussBs, six truss load pads, and 3 CSM tension ties. The
outboard leg of the Radial Beam #3 Truss was selected as
the critical element since the analysis indicated negative
margins-of-safety in that area. Both the load pads and
tension ties have been adequately demonstrated by test.
Boeing analysis is in close agreement with the NR analysis.
The conclusions as to the criticality of the Radial Beam #3
Truss are the same, both indicating an analytical factor
of safety of about 1.47 for the AS-503 C-Prime flight loads.
The comparison is shown in Figure I0-25.
There has been no structural test performed which adequately
demonstrates the ultimate capability of Radial Beam #3.
However, because of the similarity between Radial Beams #1
and #3, the ATR 222013 test demonstrates a Radial Beam #3
factor of safety >l.4O for the AS-503 C-Prime loads.
Radial Beams #2 and #5 will be tested for engine-out
loads before the AS-503 flight, and since Radial Beams #3
and #5 are similar, it will then be possible to determine
a new test factor of safety for Radial Beam #3.
I0.5.2 SM General Materials Usage

The SM outer structure is a one-inch thick, cylindrical,
bonded aluminum honeycomb sandwich shell. This shell con-
sists of four basic panels which are attached to six
radial beams and to the forward and aft bulkheads, plus
four smaller reaction control system panels. Except for
the radiator panels, the outer face sheets are 2024-T81,
the radiator panels outer face sheets being 6061-T6.
The inner face sheets are 7178-T6. The honeycomb cores
are 5052-H39 in two sizes, i.eo, 3/16 x 0.0007 and 3/16 x
0.0015. The structure is bonded with epoxy-phenolic adhesives.
The inner structure consists of the six radial beams, forward

and aft bulkheads, equipment shelves in one bay, and the
various hardware associated with engine support, tank support,
etc. Except for the bulkheads and shelves, the material
used is generally 7075-T6, -T651. Some 2024-T3, -T4, -T42,
and 2014-T6 are used also, but less extensively. The equip-
ment shelves and forward and aft bulkheads are of bonded
aluminum honeycomb structure.
The radial beams are machined and chem-milled from single

plates of 2-I/2 inch thick 7075-T651 per NR specifications
MA 0103-005 and MA 0103-004, respectively, to webs as thin
I0-39
I
:E
_j r_
(_J I c- _r- , E
c--_3 (D E .r- E ::::D _- 0
c- i__ c_ c- ,-- (I,) _J 0 c- 0 _ O
_- 0 ,--. u') _
(I_v (D _'13.r- •, 9- _-'- ,,'i3 (D
-_ O - C_ ,--- I:::: (_ _ (/) 0'_1" (1,_ . (_ c-
Ul .r- _0 O- _--
t_t'M LAJ "r- • ,-- ,--- (_J u) O',-- _}',"- O) '-_ (_ -_ t_4- tO c-
Q,) t_ > _0 4J T,_ -_ c- O,---ML
_p (j,-- t_ I _ _ 0"., - c- (Jo _ • (/)'_
(;j,-- c-
r-- c- 0 t/1 (_I
r_ -r- (I,)
r_ _n _ o
q- , o _ _.-
_o E3r_r_ _:L
_" 0
c" (/) f_ I:_E
C_J
CO 0
_- ID_ _ 4-)
P_
If) I
_" O_
0
T
LO 0 c- _,-- -_
rm %-.,-- O (1S E
4J O4J ' _--
N-- (.1") (1) _D -E::
O EO4J
(D _J_D O
V) _.. cr)
_J _13 c" E:
c-
0r--
-l-a _ - D_
E-E _- E E c-
•P Ul O _J'r" O
O -I-J -I-a -IJ
•,--_ _.. _ C_1 -I-)
•,-- >_.,--
r-- -IJ'_ V) 9--
°P O 0r-
O_(:D LF) .IJ "_ e--
>_ c- I::M. ,1:1,"-
I_ 4J LLI -_-" el--
D5-15782
OUTER SHELL PANELS FORWARD BULKHEAD (6PANELS)

(EXCEPT RAD IATORS) 7178-T6FACE SHEETS
2024-TBIFACE SHEETS (OUTER) 5052-H39CORES
7178-T6FACE SHEETS (INNER) 7178-T6DOUBLERS
5052-H30CORES 2024-T3DOUBLERS 7075-T6CLOSEOUTS
7075-T6CLOSEOUTS,.ETC.
BEAM NO. I
BEAM NO. 2
BEAM NO. 3
"_'BEAM NO. 5
7075-T651
(ALL BEAMS)
BEAM NO. 4
7075-T6, T651
FRAMING (TYP)
2024-T3
DOORS CTYP)
7075-T6
BEAM NO. 2
BEAM NO.
+Z -Z 6
BEAM NO. 3
BEAM NO. 4 _y 1075-T652 I RINGS

AFT BULKHEAD 7075-T6FITTINGS
7178_T6FACE SHEETS
5052-H39CORES
7075-T6CLOSEOUTS, CAPS, ANGLES, FITTINGS,
ETC.
Figure 10-21 TYPICAL SM MATERIAL USAGE
lO-41
31nOON dOIAU_, VD JgV_,, 9VIUTIVN lVOldXi _-OT aJn6Lj
I
o
i--
D5-1 5782
HORIZONTAL ENGINE MOUNT WEB.

ALL 7075-T6
7075-T651 ' '
7075-T6
RADIAL BEAM
7075-T65!
MACHINED &
CHENFMILLED
# I
I I
I I
2024-T3
\
BEAM
NO 6
7079-T652
X2 200.00
ENGINEMOUNT ASSY
Figure 10-23 TYPICAL MATERIAL USAGE IN THE SERVICE MODULE

ENGINE MOUNT ASSEMBLY
10-43
COnTraCTOR JSAT
ITEM OF COMPARISON
ENVIRONMENT Room Temperature Room Temperature
M = 1,03 x 106 in-!bs. H : 1,03 x 106 in-lbs.

LOADS
Limit Loads at P = |22,0_0 Ibs. P : 122,000 ]bs.
Xc I083 Interface
ALLOWA3LE FTU :60,000 #/inZ FTU = 60,000 #1in 2

" = 139,500 _n-lbs.
0 FBU = 87,550 #/_n2 '"ALL |
ASSUMPTIORS Plastic b_n_ing Plastic b_nding

GO
MINIMUM FACTOR OF SAFETY 3.53 1.62
FAILURE NODE Be_}ding & tension on _nner cap Bending & Tension on
at Sta. Xc = 71.5 inner cap at Sta. X c = 71.5
FIGURE 10-24 SELECTED _L_,,ENT _,_ J_,_ DATA CO,,,PA,,IJON - CFI LONGERON
CONTRACTOR JSAT
ITEr-! OF COZ:_PARISO_
ENVIRONME_ Not applicable Not applicable
LOADS (I MTE_NAL) Compression Pad Load Compression Pad Load

Pc = 21060# P _ = 21060#
LIMIT Loads in Outboard Leg Loa_ in Outboard Leg
P = -_4479= P : -24479#
V = 871# V = 871 #
M = 9281 in_Ib M = 9281 in-lb
ALLOt.tABLE Comp. Pad Allowable Pcu = 31000# Comp. Pad Allowable Pcu : 31200#
0
Leg a]lowables Leg allo_cab]es |
L
Fcc = 58390 psi, Fcc = 5_000 psi
Fsu = 41000 psi Fsu = 42000 psi CO

P,)
Mu = 37170 in-lb _ = 36900 in-lb
ASSUHPTIONS 1. P]astic bending in truss I. Plastic bending in truss members

members
2. Moments fro_ beam-colL_n 2. Moments from beam-column
eccentricities neglected eccentricities neglected
M[RIMUM fACTOR OF SAFETY 1.47 1.48
FAILURE NODE Interaction of shear, bending, and Interaction of shear, bending, and
compression stresses in outboard compression stresses in outboard leg
leg
.... FIGUEE 10-25 SELECTE_ ELEHENT _EV!EW DATA COHPAR!SOt: - CMISM [NTERFACE 1010
J •
V3_V _OIVIOV_ $d3 GNV
9Z-OI o_n6.t3
DNI_IVa WS3 39vsn lVI_3±VW 7V31d1±
_3
o,,I
I
co
o
r---
r-_
D5-15782
7075-T6
-Phenolic Laminate
2024-T81
6061-T6
5052-H39 Core
Splice
Glass-Phenolic Laminate
--Glass-Phenolic Honeycomb Core
Glass-Phenolic Laminate
;-T6
7178-T6 Doubler
'178-T6
7075-T6
Cork
5052-H39 Core
?O7_
2024
7178-T6
5052-H39 7178-T6
Figure 10-27 TYPICAL MATERIAL USAGE, FORWARD BULKHEAD -

OUTER SHELL PANEL - CSM FAIRING AREA
(ALL FASTENERS NOT SHOWN)
10-47
D5-15782
_052-H39 Core
202h-T81 7178-T6
7075-T6
-- 7178-T6
_----7075-T6
5052-H39- Q
Core
-_---7075-T6
I
I
7178-T6
°.
, i -_---- SLA
i
I I
, /
:h ,,
I _.j
l
Figure 10-28 TYPICAL MATERIAL USAGE, AFT BULKHEAD -

OUTER SHELL PANEL JOINT AREA (FASTENERS
NOT SHOWN)
I0-48
D5-15782
I0.5.2 SM General Materials Usage - Continued
peel process verification test coupons are run with pro-

duction parts- honeycomb tensile specimens not being required.
In general, the specification appears to be quite thorough

in its coverage, being similar to MA0606-006. Test coupons
are required to be run simultaneously with each production
part to verify the bonding process. Also, production quality
verification testing (a distinctive test of a small area
of an actual production part to determine adhesive bond
strength) is required. For example, the aft bulkhead draw-
ing, V37-329810, requires eight Porta-Pull (tensile
strength of honeycomb to face sheet bond) and two Porta-Shear
(shear strength of metal-to-metal bond) tests. A check of
other drawings shows single Porta-Pull tests usually are
required for the various outer shell panels, although the
forward bulkhead panels and shelves do not appear to require
such tests.
Finishes
Part finishes generally are called out on the drawing by

reference to V14-000-24, "Finish Specification Apollo
Spacecraft" The standard finish for most of the SM is
a chromate conversion coating per MAOI09-O03, "Application
of Chemical Films to Aluminum and Aluminum Alloys" (MIL-C-
5541), followed by one coat of clear epoxy. The chemical
film constituents are either Iridite 14-2 or Alodine 1200S.
Typically, this finish system is called out for the aft
bulkhead, the forward bulkhead, the three shelves supporting
the fuel cells, etc., the radial beams, the inside surfaces
of the outer shells, and the outside surfaces of the outer
shells except for the radiators and non-aluminum alloy
surfaces. The radiators have a white inorganic temperature
control coating, MB 0125-031, applied per MA 0108-022.
Some of the smaller aluminum alloy parts, especially where

painting would interfere with their function, are sulfuric
acid anodized. The CM/SM tension-tie bolts (4340 steel)
are given a nickel-tin plated finish per MB 0125-041
which appears to have adequate hydrogen embrittlement
relief coverage. Where aluminum and titanium alloys are
in contact, special precautions are taken, e.g., in the
assembly of the main propellant tank it is noted that both
of the alloys contacting surfaces receive one coat of
MB 0125-012 white epoxy primer per MA 0108-013 before assembly.
In general, the finishes appear to be adequate. The chromate

conversion coatings were used successfully on the Boeing Lunar
I0-49
CM
O0
0
L_
I
0
L_
D5-15782
I0.6 SM/SPS PROPELLANT TANK UPPER SUPPORT
The adequacy of the SPS Forward Tank Supports was questioned

because of the presence of thrust-oscillation induced tank
vibrations. The effect of these dynamic loads for AS-503
was not considered in the design.
The Tank Supports were checked for tank lateral loads,

including dynamic effects, as given in D5-15778 (Loads and
Criteria Document). At the time the check was being made,
the tanks were tested in the CM/SM End-Boost Stack Test
(SD 67-554) for a tangential tank mode.
It was found that the Supports can be expected to show a

factor of safety of at least 2.49, and thus are judged
to be adequate for AS-5O3, see figure I0-29.
lO-51
ITEM OF COt,IPARISON CONTPJ_CTOR JSAT
ENVIRONI,_ENT Not applicable SAME
LOADS Ultimate column load = ]560 Ibs. Ultimate column load = 2020 Ibs.
_.LLOIIABLE Column buckling SAI]E

Allo_vab]e = 3600#
ASSU:_PTIONS Column load is determined from S,_,_E

O
SD 67-554 End Boost Test and
I
!
(j1 transverse accelerations
rO
(31
CO
MINIIiUt.!
FACTOR OF SAFETY 3.20 2.49
FAILURE NODE Colu,_1 buckl ing S_E
FIGURE IO-2-9 SELECTED ELEMENT ,REVIEW DATA CONPARISON -- SM/SPS PROPELLANT TANK UPPER SUPPORT
_J
r_
000
-I-)0
0
"04--
¢-
0 ¢_
0_ .iJ
.t-
O
0,,I
CO
k_
I
0
._
_J
0-1J
_E
0_
(I.)(I.)
(I)
u_ e-
(I;
c- (I;
-I-)-IJ
I (I.)-,--
L
COI'ITPJ_CTOR JSAT
ITEM OF CO_,IPARISON
88 ° F.
SA_E
E_V IRON_,_E!IT
LOADS @ XA lOlO SA = 25.430 lb.

MA = 1.84 x 106 in-lb.
(LIHIT)
P = -94,640 lb.
T = 200,000 in-lb.
(31
ALLOL_ABLE !
C)
!
O0
ASSU_..T IOilS
HINII;IU;,I
FACTOR OF SAFETY l .43
FAILURE F_)DE Compression yielding around cutout
FIGURE 10-30 SELECTED ELEMENT REVIEW DATA COHPARISON - SM SHELL

O0
LO L_
I
LO 0
GJ
ol--
Cn
I-- r_"
e_
(,/3 -r-
CO
_" aJ
O0 r_
oo o_
0 0
JSAT
ITEM OF. CO_:IPARISO_I CONTP_CTOR
Room temperature considered

ENVI RON:_IENT Room temperature considered
/Lxial Load Factor = 4,027 g (limit)

LOADS Axial-Load Factor = 4.032 g (limit |i
Lateral toad Factor = 0.236 g " Lateral Load Factor = 0.150 g

Values incluCz accelerations Values include accelerations
_ue to thrust oscillations. d._ to thrust oscillations.
O Inte_nal tank pressure = Internal t_nk pressure -
| 230 psi (limit) !
230 psi (limit}
Fcc = 35,970 psi Fcc = 35,970 psi DO

ALLO'._ABLE r_o
ASSUI,IPT
IONS Axial peak!ng factor = 1.831 Sa_e
_om_nt pea:_ing factor =I.42_
Values de_e}_nne by 2-$2
structural test.
l .42
MINIM_I FACTOR OF SAFETY! 1.40 (test)
Meridional compressive stress Same

FAILURE MODE
on inner surface of the Skirt.
FIGURE 10-31 SELECTEI)ELENENT REVIEW DATA COF_PARISON- SM SPS LOWER TANK SKIRT
D5-15782
10.9 SM AFT BULKHEAD
10.9.1 Design Adequacy Review
The critical area for the SM Aft Bulkhead is in Bay #5. In-
vestigation into this area was initiated by an analytically
derived factor of safety of 1.34, as shown in the NR stress
analysis. The mode for this factor of safety is one of core
shear stress.
The loads applied to the aft bulkhead were checked and found
to be correct. A math model was set up by NR to simulate
the highly redundant aft bulkhead structure. The stresses
in the bulkhead, derived from the application of the internal
loads, were assumed to be correct. The structural capability
of the aft bulkhead was determined analytically by JSAT. The
data comparison is shown in Figure 10-32.
The JSAT analysis demonstrates a higher factor of safety for

the critical area than does NR. The aft bulkhead has success-
fully completed structural tests and is therefore considered
structurally adequate for its design conditions.
10-57
CONTRACTOR JSAT
ITEM OF COI'_PARI_O,,
E_VI RONMENT Roc_ temperature considered Room temperature considered
LOADS Axial Load Factor = 4.036g(limit) Axial Load Factor - 4.042 g (limit)
Lateral Load Factor = 0.00 g (]imit) Lateral Load Factor = 0.025 g (limit]
Values include accelerations Values include accelerations

due to thrust oscillations. due to thrust oscillations.
ALLO'./ABLE Core shear = 251 psi Core shear = 326 psi

I !
(._ S_m_
/LSSU_PTIOr:S Loads applied to the tank structure
Co
were assu;_ed to be distributed
around the tank circumference. OO
NI_I{4UF!FACTOR OF SAFETY 1.40 (Test) ].40 (Test)

1.65 (Analytical) I .73 (Analytical)
FAILURE fC_DE Core shear stress in Bay #5
FIGURE 10-3-2 SELECTED ELE_._NT REVIEW DATA CO_;PARISON - SM AFT BULKHEAD

0 __ 4_ (l_ o_._-- c- -I-_ c" _C_I r--
_- _-) 0 _ _ I_ n_ _-
OJ
L_
O0
I
0
t_
ITE[,I OF CO_;PARISON CONTPJ_,CTOR JSAT
156° F. R.T.
LOADS(LIr.ITT) First Stage separation Max q_-W

NT = 225 #/in0_ithout peaking) Nc = 807 #/in (without peaking)
ALLO_!A_LE (ULT.) FTU = 73,260 psi FSU = 2210 #/in
AS.>bMPI i v ___
_e-*- -- {lw_,,-*
No plastic bending. Assume plastic bending on Ring
(J1
reduced section; asst'me no shear !
'O
strength thro,_gh core bond.
O
',I,,1hdA FACTOR OF SAFETY 1.42 (Analytical) 1.45 (Analytical)
O0
3.51 (Panel Test @ 505 ° F. -

corrected to R.T.)
FAILURE I,_ODE Ring reduced section fails in Lap shear splice _,'ith outer skin.
tens ion (Analytical). (Analytical)
Outer face sheet " ' _"
wr_nK,_ng (Test).
FIGURE 10-33 SELECTED ELEMENT REVIEW DATA COT.iPARiSON- SLA 838 RING
D5-15782
lO.lO.2 Continued
The three ring frames - forward, aft, and at the L M support

plane - are 7075-T6 extrusions which are part of the bonded
quarter panel structures. Also, 7075-T6 is used for the
heavier brackets and fittings and for the mechanically fas-
tened straps along the separation lines between the quarter
panels. The 7AI-4Mo titanium alloy finds use in some of
the aft splice plates and in the L M tie down structure.
Typical material usage is shown in Figure 10-34 through I0-
38.
The honeycomb core is purchased to North American specification

MB0170-027, "Core Material Aluminum Honeycomb, 5052-H39."
Perforated core of I/4-inch cell x O.O01-inch wall and I/8-
inch cell x O.O02-inch wall is used, the latter where greater
compressive and/or shear strength is required, e.g., in the
vicinity of cut outs.
Adhesive Bondin 9
The principal bonding specification for panel construction

is North American MA 0606-012, "Adhesive Bonding, Apollo
Space Vehicle Hoenycomb Structure, for -300°F to 500°F Usage."
For core-to-face sheet bonding, epoxy-phenolic glass fabric
supported tape adhesive per North American specification
MB 0120-048 is used. For core splicing and core-to-edge
member or insert bonds, epoxy-phenolic adhesive foam paste
per MB 0120-030 or thixotropic paste adhesive per MB 0120-
026 are specified. All three of these materials are typically
American Cyanamid (Bloomingdale) HT424 adhesive, although
Aerobond 430 tape adhesive has been qualified also. All
metal parts including honeycomb cores are primed with MB
0120-031, American Cyanamid FM-47 liquid adhesive.
The materials and processing for adhesive bonded primary

structure are assessed to be adequate to satisfy design re-
quirements when in compliance with specifications. However,
drawing authorized options and MR actions must be compatible
with specification requirements to maintain this adequacy.
Particular attention was directed to these items for SLA-II
because:
a . There were manufacturing difficulties on SLA-5

due to inadequate processing for adhesive bonding
on AS-205.
bo A possible failure, as yet unexplained, occurred
on SLA-9 on AS-502.
Co SLA-II was fabricated like SLA-9 and is next in
this series for flight.
10-61
VIEW A
DOUBLER
HONEYCOMB 2024-T81 I
I"-" I
CLOSEOUT Z
SIC
2024-T42
ADAPTER
/ _ x^-r_
TYPICAL
QUARTER__
I xs -2oo
ADAPTER
PANELS PANE
ROTATED CLOSE-OUT. J HONEYCOMB PANELS_024-T81
180° CHANNELS
2_4-T3
(TYP)
t
I
o CORE
I
CLOSEOUT -,....I
_.._ 120,?.4-T81
SPLICE PLATES Oo
Z SECTS (
r_
_444Z INSTRUMENT
UNIT x A - _.z
0
L • _L--lO75-T6 EXTR RING
L_ zoz4-TS1
DOUBLER
i_ _ _ 2024-T81SPLICE
VIEW A - 902 PLATES

|,
I _ {7075-T6XA EXTRU
| r SPLICE PLATES
II
B=
Figure 10-34 TYPICAL MATERIAL USAGE

J
CABLE \
30z_ ss
.=_ (31
0 |
O_
I
=J"I _ 2021-T351 (31
"4
CA)
O0
_0
I
CORE
I
i II ,_6061-T651
]I
Q _303 Se or 305 SS I,
11
-----PISTON
I-- 202_-T351
NEGATOR SPRING REEL
7075-T6
ATTENUATOR {4 PLACES)
(8 PLACES) Stabilizing Device Assy.
(When LEM Not Present)
202A-T&2 Stringers
202&-T& Chords
7075-T6 Fit t ing s

_._1 E:3
C) (31
!
!
LT1
CO
r_

39VSN 7VIH31VN 7VOIdll LE-OI e_n6_a
eW1_-
IVL--
11 -7
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w3tsAs _ -J- , /_ .....
"_ iL_>_ .
NI'¢_D0311 " I ,_ (6bO_ SWV) 1]NO3NI
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I [
SEPARATJ ON LINE
) C]_'
/202_-T351
SLA PANEL
0 0"I
!
A-286 !
Oh
Ch 0"I
A-286 --4
O0
Inconel 718 I'O
Inconel 718
A-286 _SJDE VIEW
Figure 10-38 TYPICAL M#.FERIAL USAGE

D5-15782
10.10.2 Continued
Processing anomalies which have been identified on SLA-II

resulted in many flaws which were detected by nondestructive
testing (NDT) techniques and subsequently repaired. The
reliability of these repairs is assured primarily by process
control.
The design of SLA-5 did not provide venting for relief of

pressure due to water released during curing of the adhesive.
The effect of this deficiency is particularly noticeable in
large areas of metal-to-metal bondments, as indicated by the
extensive repairs required for doubler and splice-to-face
sheet bondments. Although NDT inspection will detect all
unbonded areas, it will not verify bond strength. Processing
anomalies which result in unbonded areas may also be expected
to result in undetectable weak bonds. According to NR
drawings, SLA-9 had venting holes for relief of pressure
during the bonding process; forward panels 1 and 3 had core
and doubler venting whereas forward panels 2 and 4 only had
venting of stiffeners to the core at the LM attach point.
Panel 1 was associated with the AS-502 anomaly. SLA-II and
SLA-9 have the same provision for relief of pressure during
bonding.
A 12-man team headed by Mr. J. T. Doke evaluated SLA-5, 9,

and II, and IU honeycomb processing and inspection techniques
at Tulsa. Results are given in Review of Honeycomb Structure,
Apollo Spacecraft Adapter (SLA and IU), 9-16-68, J. T. Doke.
Processing differences between SLA-5 and later SLA's are iden-
tified in regard to doubler venting. Boeing evaluation of
SLA drawings showed more extensive venting differences than
called out in the 12-man team report. Porta-Pull and Porta-
Shear test results from testing at KSC on SLA-5 are given
in the report. Although some test values fall below the
specification levels, Boeing considers the test results showed
adequate strength for the AS-503 mission in regions where
test specimens were taken. However, the limited tests con-
ducted do not verify adequate strength of bonding over the
total panel surface. Eddysonic inspection also was done at
KSC. The side loading of SLA-5 referred to in the report
is understood by Boeing to consist of a 6000# load applied
just above the CM/LES interface to provide strain gage
calibration. Such a test would neither damage nor verify
the SLA structure.
Vent holes were added to the inner face skins of SLA-5 and
SLA-II to reduce honeycomb internal pressure during boost.
The effectiveness of these vent holes to reduce inflight
pressures is still being evaluated by MSC at this time.
The latest data from this evaluation shows maximum internal
pressure of 16 to 20 psi.
10-67
D5-15782
lO.lO.2 Continued
Under C/S No. 5-2962-JB-083, Boeing recommended a SLA proof
pressure test for increased confidence in structural integrity.
An experimental program, conducted at Boeing-Kent facilities,
established feasibility for such a test. In that program,
failure of two SLA-2 panels occurred at 50 and 60 psig in-
ternal pressure. It was recommended that further development
of the technique be carried out on a full scale SLA quarter
panel.
NR-Tulsa performed a structural test which combined axial

loads, internal pressure, and elevated temperature. A 12 x
12-inch flat panel simulating a SLA honeycomb panel was pre-
pared. The panel was tested without failure with the outer
face sheet at 275°F, honeycomb internal pressures of 15,
40, and lO0 psig, and an axial load of 700 pounds/inch. The
axial load was increased to 1500 pounds/inch and the panel
was pressurized to 40 psig without failure. When the panel
pressure was increased to lO0 psi the RTV silicone rubber
edge seal failed. Materials and processing used in fabri-
cation of the test panel are unknown as of October 8, 1968°
In the case of the SLA, a check of several of the quarter

panel drawing callouts indicates that only the foam paste
is to be used for core-to-closeout and core-to-edge member
bonding. The foam paste ashesive is used also for core-to-
core splicing per MA 0606-012 because of the low density
core material. Core-to-face sheet bonds where little or
no pressure can be obtained during cure require the use of
the adhesive foam paste.
The bonding specification, MA 0606-012, includes a listing

of applicable documents and mateterials, general require-
ments, detail requirements, and quality assurance provisions.
The general requirements cover solution control, pre-bond
surface preparation, storage and handling (including storage
temperature and time for adhesives), fabrication of de-
tails (including treatment of damaged cores) and bonding
equipment verification.
The detail requirements cover pre-fit of details, primer

application, honeycomb core splicing, adhesive selection,
application of adhesives, and pressure application and
curing. SLA quarter panel drawings call for priming detail
parts. The primer per MA 0606-012 is thinned American
Cyanamid vinyl-phenolic liquid adhesive FM 47 which is air
dried after spraying and cured for one hour at 220-245°F.
The amount of foam paste used for splicing or edge member
bonding is specified in MA 0606-012 by weight for different
core thicknesses.
In the pre-fit of details, core fit is checked at splices,
10-68
D5-15782
lO.lO.2 Continued
inserts, and edge members. A slight interference fit is

required except at inserts where a maximum clearance of 0.25
inches is permitted. When the core details are installed
in the assembly, visible gaps at core splices and edge
member bonds (with the exception of inserts) should not ex-
ceed 0.375 inch when measured. Under Quality Assurance,
X-ray Inspection, the splice and core-to-edge member bond
widths are required to be measured after bonding. The maximum
permitted widths are specified as a function of core density,
the higher the core density the less the permitted gap. In
honeycomb bonding, the minimum positive pressure is 15 psi,
the maximum 60 psi, or not more than 50 percent of the core
flatwise compressive strength. If vacuum is used, the vacuum
cannot be increased beyond one to five inches of mercury
until the temperature has been at 260°F, or above, for at
least 30 minutes. Curing conditions are one hour at 340°F,
or three hours at 290°F, the temperature increase being pro-
grammed. The bondline thickness for the adhesive tape
(MB 0120-048) is generally limited to 0.012 inch. Bond
strength requirements at this thickness level using 3/16-
inch cell size x .002 or .003 inch thick perforated core are
lap shear strength of 2500 psi, average, and 2250 psi, mini-
mum, and honeycomb peel of 6 in-lb/inch average, and 5.4 in-
Ib/inch minimum.
Finishes
Except as noted on individual drawings, the finishes are

controlled by drawing V14-000024, "Finish Specification
Apollo Spacecraft." For corrosion control of aluminum al-
loys during storage, manufacturing, and assembly, the
controlling specification is MA 0609-002, "Corrosion Con-
trol of Apollo CSM Components." All drawings call for
finishing the exterior surfaces per MA 0109-003, "Applica-
tion of Chemical Films to Aluminum and Aluminum Alloys"
(or MIL-C-5541). The chemical films are Iridite 14-2 or
Alodine 1200 S chromate conversion coatings, preferably
applied by immersion or spraying rather than by manual
application (per V14-000024). Sample panels are required
to meet salt spray test requirements. An overcoat of clear
epoxy is not required; however, it is noted that a 7075-T6
extruded forward-to-aft section splice requires the chromate
conversion coating plus the epoxy per V14-000024, item 1-145.
The quarter panel drawing calls for most of the interior

surfaces to be finished per MA 0109-801, "Application of
Low Emissivity Chemical Film Coatings to Aluminum and
Aluminum Alloys°" To obtain a total emittance of less than
O.lO, the aluminum is first subjected to a controlled polish
followed by a sprayed Alodine 1200S conversion coating°
I0-69
•_- I
(_L._
(D
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(D Q-m-- _ .r- 4J
O "
_--= c- O e-.,-- _
_-__ c- OJ 4J 4J
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0 _
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(ij "_ c" _ •
D5-15782
lO.lO.3 Continued
metal-to-metal bonds are cause for part rejection as are

voids larger than a nominal cell size in core-to-face sheet
bonds where the core density is greater than three Ibs/cu. ft.
Where the density of the core is less, a part with a void
containable in a rectangle 1.25 x 0.25 in. is acceptable
providing the void is at least five inches from any other void.
The specification provides that panels subjected to the
entrance of water during ultrasonic inspection as determined
by Quality Assurance must be dried for six hours at 230 ± lO°F
in circulating air or for three hours at 230 _ lO°F in
vacuum, the minimum heat up time being 45 minutes.
SLA quarter panel drawings for model numbers 7, 7A, 8, 9,

lO, II, etc., call for Hobott or Porta-Pull testing of core-
to-face sheet adhesive bonds. Drawings for model numbers l,
2, 3, 4, and 6 do not. The controlling specification is
MQ 0501-801, "Production Quality Verification (PQV) Testing
for the Spacecraft LM Adapter and Block II Service Module
Primary Structure, Core-to-Metal Adhesive Bonds." In brief,
the test consists of bonding a l.ll6-inch diameter test
lug to the face sheet, cutting the face sheet around the
lug with a hole saw, and pulling the test lug until a tensile
failure occurs in the honeycomb core or the adhesive bond
between core and face sheet° After the test, the hole is
repaired per the specification, essentially with filler and
a doubler. Minimum pull-off values are specified° For the
I/4-inch cell x O.OOl-inch wall, the minimum pull-off value
is 400 psi tensile stress. One Porta-Pull test is required
per quarter panel, the test being taken near the center of
the panel.
lO-71
I
O0
l-.-
I
ClJ
I
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m_
0
O-
.J
i,i
-P-
OQ t_n
OJ
09
i---
r--
l--
o o
I--
COntraCTOR JSAT
ITE_I OF COIIPARISON
(Sta. 555) 211° F. outer (Be_ow 709.9 splice) R.T.

136 ° F. im}er
End Boost Kax q_<

LOADS (L!rIIT)
N_ : 615 #/in N c = 754 #/in
O/i_hout peaking) (IJithout pe_king)
3.626 x 106 11.308 × i0 _
MOMENT- (IN-LBS)
_D
-405,580 -221,740 oi
AXIAL LOAD - (LBS) !
(31
ALLOVA_LE (ULT.) Fcw = 49,700 Fcr= 49,560 -.4
O0
: .430 Fcr = .0077 EF r,o
(Intercellular dimpling is critical)
ASSUi,;PTIO;CS
1.98 (Analysis) F.S. = 1.93 (Analysis)

MININUII FACTOR OF SAFETY
F.S. = 1.64 (Test)
1.91 (Test)
Outer face sheet vzr_nkling Inner face sheet inL:ercellular

FAILURE _;ODE
(analysis); no failure of SLA-2 buckling (aaa!ysis); no failure
test article in this area. in this area in SLA-2 test article.
FIGURE 10-39 SELECTED ELE_IEG'T REVIEW DATA CO[,IPARISON - SLA SHELL

C_
CO
LO I
°w-- (D
r--
(D
U
--J
O-
t_
C_
c-
0 t_
°w--
II
X
C_
r--
0 0
r--
CO_ITP_CTOR JSAT
ITEM OF CO_,_PARISON
ENVIRONHENT (Critical in splice) 164° F. (Critical belo_ 709.9 splice)

R.T.
LOADS (LIMIT) End Boost Nax q _<

N = _,_j #/iI_ Nc = 754 #/in
(_ithout peeking) (_!ithout peaking)
2.996 x 106 11.308 x 106

NOT_ENT (IN-LBS)
I
AXIAL LOAD (LBS) -3i7,130 -221,740 .--d
Ol
AL-O,;..,'_BLE Fc = 53,080 psi Fc = 49,660 psi O0
Inter-cellular dimpling in the inner

ASSU;._PTIO__S Outer S_l_ -"" splice plate not skin is more critical if both outer
effective.
skin splice plates are considered
effective.
MINIi_UF] FACTOR OF SAFETY F.S. = 2.60 (Analysis) F.S. = 1.93 (Anaiysis)

F.S. = 1.90 (Test) F.S. = 1.64 (Test) Max q_
FAILURE MODE Comp. + bending of outer skin Intercell_lar d_mp!ing of the inner
inner spliCe p)ate. skin {Analysis)
FIGURE 10-40 SELECTED ELEMENT REVIEW DAT# CO_,;PARISON- SLA XA 709.9 SPLICE
D5-15782
10.13 585 INTERFACE
10.13.1 Design Adequacy Review
The reason for selecting this element is the key importance

of this interface to the structural integrity of the SLAo
NR shows the inner skin critical above the 3" doubler for
Max q _ loading.
The JSAT evaluation agrees with the NR choice of critical

point. Minor differences change the analytical safety
factor slightly as shown in Figure 10-41.
This element is adequate for the AS-503 loads with an

analytical F.S.=I.73, the SLA-2 test demonstrated a F.S.=
1.68, and the SSST demonstrated a F.S.=I.45.
10-76
CO;_TRACTOR JSAT
ITEM OF COt.IPARISON
Sa_@
ENVI RO_';,FNT R.T°
Max qC_-
LOADS (LIMIT)
NOMEI!F -
AXIAL
#&LOVAgLE
(Ir;-LBS)
FORCE - (LBS)
N_ = 687 #/in
(v_thout pgaking)
15.48 x lO °
-234,450
I
San:e
FTU = 52,900 psi
C_
• I
(Jq
i
ASSUEPTIONS
oo
MI_iit_U:.l
FACTOR OF SAFETY 1.89 {Analysis) 1,73 (Analysis)
1.68 (SLA-2 Test) 1.68 (SLA-2 Test)
S_
FAILURE _DE Inner face sheet wrinkling at
edge ofdoubler (Analysis);
no failure in this area in
SLA-2 Test.
FIGURE 10-41 j._L_,_u ELENENT P.LV_W DATA COi,PARISON - SLA ZA 585 INTERFACE
OJ
O0
I".,,
OD
Q.} l
I_O
o_-- 0
r-_
QJ
ILl
C..)
I.I-
r',-
ILl
:7 "0
,r'-
U_
.--I Q.}
C_ r',
r--'
o o
ITEM OF CO_.;PARISO_I COrJTRACTOR JSAT
i
ENVI ROtC;'_ENT Ambient Ambient
LOADS LM attach point loads will not be LM attach point loads will not
available. be avai|able.
ALLOWABLE Not available 27 Kips U1t. load in strap leg.
.=.a
0 !
!
-.j
ASSUMPTIONS
O0
MINIMUM FACTOR OF SAFETY >1.59 (Analysis) >1.35 (Analysis)

>2.19 (Test) >2.19 (Test)
FAILURE MODE (TEST) Frangible link of strap bro:ce Frangible link of strap broIce.
FIGURE 10-42 SELECTED ELEMENT REVIEW DATA COr,]PARISON- SLA/LM INTERFACE

Od
0
CO
CO
I
LO
°_ 0
t--
LO
r_
L_
ILl C_"
II O0
X r-_
r---
o o
ifEr,_ OF CO_;:2ARISO,.'_ CO,_,RACTOR JSAT
ENVI RON,,,___T O/S- 173 _ F. 156 ° F.

I/S - 153 ° F.
LOADS (LIt,]!T) End Boost Separation

Nc - 5_I .=/I,1 ,L___,- 163 #/i_
(,_Ithout peoklag) (;-'_ thout _ea!cing)
t._O.;ENT- (IN-LBS) 3.864 x IO G 7.20 x IO b
O AXIAL LOAD - (LBS) -409,590 -40,000 !

I
O0
A,..I._
! _..,_.
C'L_A r, l E
Fcw = 51,050 psi FBU = 99,200 psi
CO
Use plastic bending. PO
HIIII_,;U;'I FACTOR OF SAFETT 2.32 (A_alysis) 1.76 (Analysis)

2.13 (SLA-2 rest)
Not tested in tension bending
in t_-_.._ns_rs_,_
_ plane of SEA.
FAILURE I,,ODE Inner face sheet wrinkling.
FIGURE I0-43 SELECTED ELE,r.IENTREVIE_'t DATA CO,i,_ARlmOi_

.... _ _ _' - SLA xA _np
..... RI_CG
I
J_
0 !
! _J
00 rn
f_ q_j
Z 00
r_
Z
m_
m
Z
0
Z
lm
Im
D5-15782
SECTION II
CONCLUSIONS
ll-l
D5-15782
Iio0 AS-503 S/V
The following conclusions resulted from the detailed review

and assessment of the twenty-three (23) AS-503 Space Vehicle
selected structural elements:
On-site reviews and examination of documentation

provided a high level of confidence in the
contractors manufacturing and quality assurance
procedures. Good traceability of records was
noted.
@ All discrepancies resulting in MRB action were

dispositioned satisfactorily.
No known stress corrosion problems remain in

AS-503 primary structures other than as an
acceptable risk.
<_ The primary structure of AS-503 has no open

items associated with hydrogen embrittlement.
@ Fracture mechanics analyse_ including proof

pressure testing, and NDT inspection veri-
fied the adequacy of pressure vessels to
perform their required missions.
@ Honeycomb structures employed in the AS-503

S/V are considered to be adequate to perform
their intended mission in their present
configuration.
0 Adequate assurance was provided that the

structural integrity of the selected
elements is consistent with the AS-503
design objectives.
11-2
Z
G
i=..
O0
l--
LO
0
Z
i,I
L_
0,I
i,i i..=
0
Q.D
ILl
OZ
D5-15782
12.0 AS-503 S/V
Any damage, repair, or modification made to these elements J_
between the time of this review and launch time should

be reported immediately to the JSAT chairman at MSFC.
12-2
D5-15782
APPENDIX A
AS-503 MRB ACTION ASSESSMENT

FOR THE
AS-BUILT L/V STRUCTURALCAPABILITY
GENERAL
A total of 1336 MRB actions pertaining to the Launch Vehicle

were reviewed and evaluated by Materials Engineering per-
sonnel. Of this number, 79 are considered significant
for the final assessment of the "as-built" structural cap-
ability of the AS-503 Launch Vehicle. These MRB's are
detailed in tables and stage sections within the body
of this report.
Generally, weld discrepancies were the most prevalent. For
this reason, weld maps have been included in this report
to allow an evaluation of possible cumulative effects.
The Materials Engineering Group concludes that these 79

MRB actions require a stress review and evaluation to
ascertain their individual or cumulative effect on the
structural integrity of the AS-503 L/V.
A-I
D5-1 5782
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS A-2

LIST OF TABLES A-3
LIST OF FIGURES A-4
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS A-5
1.0 INTRODUCTION A-7
2.0 SUMMARYOF MATERIAL REVIEW BOARD A-8
ACTIONS ON AS-503 LAUNCHVEHICLE
STAGES
2.1 SUMMARYOF UNPLANNEDEVENT RECORD A-9
(UER) DISPOSITIONS FOR THE S-lC-3
2.2 SUMMARYOF MATERIAL REVIEW DIS- A-28
POSITIONS (MRD) FOR THE S-II-3
2.3 SUMMARYOF FAILURE AND REJECTION A-37
REPORT(FARR) DISPOSITIONS FOR
THE S-IVB-3
2.4 SUMMARYOF MATERIAL REVIEWBOARD A-52
(MRB) ACTIONS FOR THE IU-503
3.0 CONCLUSIONS A-56
A-2
D5-]5782
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
2.l-I Summary of Significant MRB's, A-15

S-IC-3
2.2-I Summary of Significant MRB's, A-33

S-II-3

S-IVB

IU
A-3
O0 O_ 0 _ Oq
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IIIII I I i I I I I I I I
• • o • . . . _ _ - . .
C_ • • • 0,1 C,J 0,,I C'_I O,,t O_ 0,,I
D5-15782
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Abbrevi ations Meani ngs
ABCL As-Built Configuration List (MDC)
B/P Blueprint (MDC)
CL Centerline
CNC Contract nonconformance (NR)
C/T Common to (TBC)
DPS Douglas Process Standard (MDC)
ECL Engineering Configuration List
ECP Engineering Change Proposals

(TBC, MR, MDC)
ED Edge distance
EM Edge margin
EO Engineering order (TBC)
FARR Failure and Rejection Reports (MDC)
IBM International Business Machines
IL Internal Letter (NR)
inbd Inboard
IU Instrument Unit (IBM)
LH 2 Liquid Hydrogen
LOX Liquid Oxygen
L/V Launch Vehicle
MDC McDonnell-Douglas Corporation
MRB Material Review Board
MRD Material Review Disposition (NR)
NR North American Rockwell Corp.
NTL Net Trim Line (NR)
outbd Outboard
A-5
D5-15782
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS (CONT'D)
Plan of Action (NR)

PA
Pounds per square inch absolute

psia
Pounds per square inch gage

psig
QEC Quality Engineering Charts
Should be (MDC, NR)

S/B
S/C Scope Change (MDC)
SED Short edge distance (MDC)
TBC The Boeing Company
TD Technical Directive
UER Unplanned Event Record (TBC)
VCL Vehicle Checkout Laboratory (MDC)
WRO Work Release Order
The company using the abbreviation is parenthetically shown

after the meaning of the abbreviation. When the abbreviation
is common to all the companies, no parenthetical identification
is shown.
A-6
D5-15782
Io0 INTRODUCTION
The task of reviewing and evaluating MRB action taken on the

AS-503 Launch Vehicle was performed in accordance with the
"Technical Approach Plan for AS-503 Structural Integrity
Assessment" under contract NAS8-5608, Schedule IV, Exhibit
"A", Part IV, Task l.O.
Criteria employed in this review was based on the assess-

ment of corrective action taken on reported discrepancies
as applied to the design configuration• Review considera-
tions included:
I. Repair adequacy
2. Physical properties of repair materials
• Compatibility of repair material with

existing structure material
no Possible change in load path or stress

distribution
• Possible effect of discrepancies or

repairs on thermal gradients
o Possible change in margin of safety

due to repairs
A-7
4-
0
c-
c-
OJ
c-
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4-.} O
0
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D5-15782
2.1 SUMMARY OF UNPLANNED EVENT RECORD (UER)

DISPOSITIONS FOR THE S-IC-3
2.1.1 General
The "as-built" configuration of the S-IC-3 stage has been

established for the AS-503 Structural Assessment Program
by applying an evaluation of the significant UER's to the
"as designed" stage.
The specific elements assessed included the stage assembly,

the forward skirt, the LOX tank, the intertank, the fuel
tank, the thrust structure, the fins, and the engine fair-
ings.
Six hundred and eight-six (686) UER's on primary structure

were reviewed of which 48 were considered significant for
further analysis by the stress group. A summary of Signi-
ficant UER's is presented in Table 2-1.1.
Sketches showing location of these UER's are presented as

figures 2.l-II through 2.l-V.
2.1.2 Conclusions
Of the 48 significant MR's recommended for stress analysis,

30 (6_%) resulted from misplaced or out-of-tolerance holes,
6(12.5%) actions resulted from weld porosity, pitting or
mismatch, and the remainder from miscellaneous causes,
Although the extent of damage described in these MR's
could be considered of minor significance, there is in-
sufficient evidence to support an unqualified approval with-
out a stress analysis. Completion of the stress analysis
of the significant MR's will establish the structural
capability of this stage.
A-9
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D5-15782
POS: I
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II I UER 225258
_ER 21 7189
UER 193950
FIGURE 2.1-11 UER MAP, FORWARD SKIRT, S-lC-3
A-II
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UPPER FUEL BULKHEAD
FLIGHT DIRECTION
FIN O FIN C
IN B
FIN A
CYLINDER SKIN ASSEMBLY
POS II
i
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UER 173259
POS Ill
POS I
POS IV
LOWER FUEL BULKHEAD
FIGURE.2..1-IV UER MAP, RP-1 FUEL TANK, S-IC-3
A-13
D5-15782
.UXILIARY SHEAR PANEL
CENTER ENGINE SUPPORT ASSEMBLY

INTERMEDIATE RINGS
/UPPER THRUST
"_""-.. IRING ASSEMBLY
./_UER 191663
w
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!ii,'UER 222263
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STA. 116
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HOLDDOWN POST ASSEMBLY

FIN A
THRUST POST UER 191277
SKIN ASSEMBLIES ASSEMBLY
THE FOLLOWING UER'S WERE NOT LOCATED:
191574, 157286, 253473, 188987,

188988, 191662, 189332, 188978
155884, 170234
FIGURE 2.1-V UER MAP, THRUST STRUCTURE, S-IC-3
A-14
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A-19
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT MRB'S
EFFECTIVITY: AS-503 COMPONENT: INTERTANK

STAGE: S-IC
Reason
MR ( UE Requirement Devi ati on/Di s pos i ti on For Concern
Element Number )D_/_aerrt
INTERTANK Reduction in
ASSY. 157989 60B29800 0.50O E/M 69 rivets in 5th skin splice
IB-905 between 60B28320 and 60B28380 margin of safety
rings have shy E/M. (Possible)
Disposition - Use as is
D5-15782
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A-24
S-IC-3
TABLE 2.1-I SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT MRB'S
AERODYNAMIC FINS
EFFECTIVITY: AS-503 COMPONENT"
STAGE: S-!C
Reason
MR D_g/part Devi ati on/Di sposi tion for Concern
Number _umDe_ Requirement
Element
Six holes common to T.E. beam Shy E/M. Reduc-
FIN ASSEMBLY 236235 60B30005-I
drilled oversize, ed safety factor
Seven holes between spar & T.E.
beam drilled oversize.
O/B most hole in 60B30114-2 Shy E/M. Reduc-

236370 60B30005-I
angle close to far side skin is ed safety factor
elongated.
Eight holes in 60B30504-1A dril- Shy E/M. Reduc-

236324 60B30005-I i
led oversize. ed safety factor
!
Info. on hand (8-8-66) states Insufficient

264505 60B30008-I E.O. 501 to be (_
that hand located holes were E,M. on skin
incorp. O0
splitting edge margin but in- panel. r_
corp. of E.O. 501 would in-

crease E.M.
8 holes in skin and L.E. enlarg - Shy E/M. Reduc-

236999 60B30008-I
ed or mislocatedo ed safety factor
Mislocated hole
not accepted.
D5-1 5782
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A-26
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT MRB'S S-IC-3
TABLE 2.1.1
STAGE: S-IC EFFECTIVITY: AS-503 COMPONENT: ENGINE FAIRING

I
MR Reason
Element I Number D_BL_ _ rtr Requirement Deviation/Disposition for Concern
ENG. FAIR.
236305 60B16183- One 0.190/0.194 hole elongated Reduction in
ASSY. LWR.
1 -900 to 0.275. Installed fastener safety factor.
HL-.i3V-6-X with collars. Mfg.
head to cover elongation. Use
as reworked.
265547 60B16183- Twenty-three 0.190/0.194 holes Reduction in

1-902 in the air scoop sub assy., are safety factor.
oversize from 0.195 to 0.218.
Fifteen holes enlarged to 0.203/
0.207. Eight holes enlarged to
0.250/0.254. Use as reworked.
,> ANGLE 213292 60B16313- Three dimensions on each of Possible reduc-

1 eleven parts are out of toler- tion in safety
ance. factor (insuf-
ficient time to
determine how
these parts
mate with others
FIN & 400028 60B16391- Six 0.312 holes between fin & Reduction in
FAIRING 1 fairing assembly D are misalign- safety factor
ed and bolts will not fit in
holes. Holes reamed to 0.374 &
fasteners installed•
RETRO INSTL. 287526 60BI6636- Two holes common to 60B16014 ftg Reduction in
3A on fairing assy. have been c'sk • safety factor
C'sk is not required per dwg.
Disposition - Use c'sk. fas-
teners.
D5-15782
2.2 SUMMARYOF MATERIAL REVIEW DISPOSITIONS

FOR THE S-II-3
2.2.1 General
Five hundred thirty-two (532) Material Review Dispositions

(MRD's) were reviewed to identify the "as built" configura-
tion for determining the structural capability of the S-II-3
stage of the AS-503 Launch Vehicle. Of these, eighteen
were considered significant. (These are summarized in
Table 2.2-I.) Some of these MRD's were included because
they did not show completion of repairs, or proof testing
of repairs where required. Maps of discrepancies on the
common bulkhead, aft LOX dome, and total stage are included,
Figures 2.2-I thru 2.2-IV.
2.2.2 Conclusions
Assessment of the total discrepancies disclosed eighteen

(18) actions which were considered significant enough
to warrant a stress analysis, Although the proof test of
the LH2 tank at -423°F validates the tank (and adequacy
of repairs) by a factor of 1.05 (as compared with antici-
pated flight loads)the analysis will provide additional
quality assurance. A stress analysis of the significant
discrepancies of the LOX tank is also considered mandatory
as this structure was proof tested as subassemblies (aft,
LOX and common bulkheads) and not as a complete unit.
Integrity of the girth weld has not been established.
Upon completion of these tasks, the structural capability

of the S-II-3 stage, as-built configuration will be
established.
A-28
D5-15782
MR 176526
MR 176528
MR 176548
MR 140946
MR 218036
MR 141550
MR 1415 TANK
]MR 1 40671
IMR 140751
LOX COMMON MR 140539

MR 31670 BULKHEAD
LIQUID OXYGEN
MR
MR 87601
140823
TANK
MR
MR 140602
140590
AFT SKIRT
THRUST MR
MR 72953
140540
STRUCTURE
INTERSTAGE
FIGURE 2.2-I MAP OF SIGNIFICANT MRD'S, STAGE

ASSEMBLY, S-II-3
A-29
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Vl EW A-A
P020982 P020983
POS IV
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(,.o
P020984 P020979
P020991
\
POS I
P020975 P02097
T (360 ° FLAT
A
PATTERN - "J" PANEL)

T
A A
NOTE" ViP__W I-O01,_,IN(._" _'1" FIGURE g.2-11 MRD MAP, COMMON BULKHEAD FWD
FACING SHEET & "J" PANEL, S-II-3
IJV OV3H_ln@ NOWWO3 'dVW QUW III-_'_ 3uflgIJ
I...4_ONl_O0-1 A_BIA :3iON
OIL% _3d ffl_aff_- A_f_IX-¢HSnl] "VIIIM-
/
/
//
N
_0
CO
I
,=_
/
_-II-S '@V3H_ln@ /Jr _NVL XO1 'dVN Q_W AI-8"8 3_In9 I:I
c=_ s'_ :_o- 1/o _1¢m _,_I q_]t_- GgSo-_/,_V_
II
_Ot ibIa3(] NOI_.91_V_IIQ -'_Q99L_W
"_S_ _o _d(_Wm_ "icv_i5/o _vL_
_ld_ dN_7 _T]_A -Ot_OLL_V_
60LgSOd
660880d 9Lt880d
@I SN _lO - _l_ ODL -_;_#9 -_69L9_
_OtSgOd
LOt880d
QQ ¢0
I
II SOd
I SOd
lO1880d 8LLgSOd
c_170@
%mo9 Lno_ioov_ s- IIZOLL_Vi
_fTlO_ 30 _1 30 3dI_-:
960880 8LL88
a/n _ _Ts_m s_o_- _OZLam
i_LL880 680880d
LOtLgSOd
7
3111gOQ 77_1gI_11 7i1_(] _ "-'¢"
AI SOd
S-II-3
TABLE 2.2-I SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT MRB'S
EFFECTIVITY" AS-503 COMPONENT: FQRWARD SKIRT

STAGE: S. II-3
Reason
MR art Devi ati on/Di spos i ti on for Concern
NumBer D_/_er Requirement
Element
V7-311002 At STA 848, Stringers 6-13, 20 Load redistri-

STRINGER 140679
holes were elongated in the bution
stringers. Disposition - Eight
I/8 x 3/4 x 26-I/2 2024-T3
doublers were installed with
(16) extra jo-bolts. Jo-bolt
holes in stringers were re-
drilled per hole pattern in
insulation panel.
,>
C_
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT MRB'S S-TT-3
_.2-I
STAGE: S-II-3 EFFECTIVI TY: AS-503 COMPONENT: LH? TANK

Reason
MR Requi rement Devi ati on/Di spos i ti on for Concern
Element Number
FORWARD BULK-
HEAD MERIDIAN
Offset in "1 'I meridian weld. Reduce margin of
WELD 141550 V7-312142
Acceptable as is. safety_
.00196 inch 2 Porosity and oxide_Acceptable Repetitive type

141512 V7-312142
as is. defect.
FORWARD BULK-
HEAD CIRCUM-
Porosity and oxide, under tol- )efects have an
FERENTIAL 176526 V7-312002
erance weld land, local offset, interaction on
WELD 176528
176548 difference in mating weld 2 and _ each other. Re- !
,> 140946 some areas acceptable as is, duce margin of

C_
218036 other reworked° safety_
TANK ASSY. 14O671 V7-300001 No cracks Excessive cracks on stringers Repetitive type
140751 & ribs Repair by removing crack- defect, load
ed areas, adding splices, dou- redistribution_
blers;
2 Reduces margin
140539 V7-313002 .045 inch max. Porosity and oxide, common bulk
head to Cyl. #I, J Section Weld, of safety.
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT MRB'S SII-3
TABLE 2.2-1
COMPONENT:
STAGE: S-II_3 EFFECTIVITY:__
MR Requirement Deviation/Disposition F for Reason

Concern
Element NumBer D_B/_aerrt
AFT FACING Unproofed weld,

140602 V7-313002 .045 inch2 max. At STA 282, a porosity of .099
SHEET_ COM- exists at the girth weldo Dis- repetitive de-
MON BULKHEAD fect, reduces
position - Use as is.
margin of safet
Interaction witl
140590 V7-313002 .484 inch min. STA 282 LOX girth weld land
thickness under tolerance, Dis- MR-140602 re-
duces margin of
position - Use as is
safety o
C71
!
At "C" meridian weld, 54" above Thickness re-

(JJ 31670 V7-313002 .152 thick
(._ trim line, material thickness is duction reduces O0
under tolerance, measures 0.136 margin of safet f. r_

thick. Disposition - Use as is,
At Pos. IV Gore_l.5" crack in Stress redistri

AFT LOX BHD 876O1 V7-313202 No cracks
waffle rib, Disposition - In- bution.
stall I/8 x 4 x 7_ 2014-T6
doubler to opposite side of
bhd.
Corrosion of waffle surface at Reduces margin

140823 V7-30001
gore at Pos. II Disposition - of safety.
Remove corrosion & protect
surface.
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT MRB'S _ TT ,,,,3
_T_AB_LE__ 2- I
SII-3 EFFECTIVITY: AS-503 COMPONENT:_

STAGE :
Element
MR
T Number Requi rement V Deviation/Disposition for
Reason
Concern
FIN D, ARM
72953 V7-315367 .500O ± .OO05 Two holes oversize through Oversize bolts
7 AFT
dia hole V7-315367-7 Cap, Disposition - in critical
Redrill for 9/I 6" bolt,, s p l ices,,
CENTER
ENGINE
BEAM 14O54O V7-315252 .4375 ± .0005
dia hole At STA 112, R.H. side of Fin D Oversize bolts
the L.H. outboard hole in in critical
V7-315252 fitting is oversize. splices,
Disposition - Redrill for I/2"
bol tj
D5-1 5782
2.3 SUMMARYOF FAILURE AND REJECTION REPORT

(FARR) INSPECTION FOR THE S-lVB-3
2.3.1 General
One hundred fourteen (114) Failure and Rejection Reports

(FARR's) on the primary structure were reviewed to identify
the "as-built" configuration for the structural capability
of the S-lVB stage of the AS-503 Launch Vehicle. Of these,
twelve were considered singificant. These are summarized
in Table 2.3-I. Nine of the significant discrepancies
occurred on the tank assembly, and three on the aft inter-
stage.
Contractor furnished maps, (Figures 2.3-11 thru 2.3-X) of

the tank FARR's are included. The nine significant tank
FARR's are identified on the maps by asterisks next to
the FARR numbers. Figure 2.3-I illustrates a stage as-
sembly and locates the (3) FARR's on the aft interstage
and nine (9) on the tank assembly.
2.3.2 Conclusions
Assessment of the total discrepancies resulted in the

identification of 12 actions which were considered
significant enough to warrant stress analysis.
A stress analysis of these discrepancies, including possible

cumulative effects, will establish the structural capability
of the S-IVB stage as-built configuration.
A-37
FORWARDSKIRT
A212749
TUNNEL (2)
A203415
A209930
93505
AFT SKIRT
(._
LH2 TANK THRUST STRUCTURE !
ASSEMBLY
AFT
! O0
A197905 NTERSTAGE
O0
COMMON
BULKHEAD
A2201
A196281
LOX TANK ASSEMBLY
A193576
A197749--
J-2 ENGINE
MR 500-073-64
A22040
A220406
FIGURE 2,3-1 MAP OF SIGNIFICANT FARR'S, STAGE

ASSEMBLY, S-IVB
8AI-S '133HS
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1:IV ONIXOO1 MBIA
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"_" POS II POS II

RING SEAM RING SEAM #3
I ;
NG SEAM #1
I
\
CO
P_
POS
I I
_-_ 111 ACCEPT
REWORKS
VIEW LOOKING AFT
_ouc_s IK TInS AREA.-_,_ WEL0

FeD pom-_
FARR NU_BER INITIATION DATE IDEFECTS RE',VORKS REQUIRED HOW RE_ER_ED fiEWELZS ITEI,_ FARR R'.'k%BE
R I_JTIAT_ON ;ATE DEFECTS REWORKS REQUIRED WELDING REWORK REWELDS
_ krToo_ A_9]SO_
{z) Aln37o *
"_°° ° ° o
'_(LD fo_ r_OLAhC
_T C_N ITEM
• $ RING $EA'_S
*RE DISPLACEDGO BETWEEN FIB & AFT DISCREPANCY
NOTED AFIE_ eD_G _ BEFO_ _C_INING
FIGURE 2.3-IV FARR .MAP, COMMON BULKHEAD ASSEMBLY, S-IVB

(3,3) GOUGE
(33)
POS III
ACCEm
DEBURR& BLEND
& ACCEPT
ACC£_
POS IV
(30) GRIND AND
IlH,Eo
,..o,-
GRIND I ACCEPT
(.I"1
I
(14) BLEND |
CJ'l
,,.,,,,,,j
CI3
--(32) DEBURR & BLEND It ACCEPT
REWORKS
VIEW LOOKING FWD
INITIATIONDATE DEFECTS RE_'_ORKS

REQUIRED _#ELOINGR(_ORK REIELDS
l-iI-_ 1 I w/a o -
IsANUAL TtG I
LEGEND
4-_ , z stunl[uO_ I
]-BRACKET
Ii-INACKET
|II-F|TTING ASSY(LOX PILL LINE)
IV-ELBOW ASST(LH2 FILL LINE)
V-ELBOW ASSY(LM2 CHILL RETURN)
¥I-F|TTING ASSY(LH 2 FEED LINE)
V||-FLA_GEILH 2 CHILE P.UNP}
VIII-FLANGE(LOX VENT)
IX-LOX |MSTR PROBE
I-LOX HELI;ifl HEATER
EI-LOI CHILL RETURN
TANK _y
.tll::iil _f!ll_i,llll
'}!l.LIi HEL Ill .
LOX TANK AFT DOME, S-IVB
F[GtJRiL2;.3-V FARR MAP,
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POSI POSII PO_ III _{Z_ sc POe =IB O
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cOWl BLK>HD vl£w LOOKINO INBOARO
_i._ u'_ AFT OOtlE

VIEW A-A
LOiER LAPi
FIGURE 2.3-VIII FARR MAP, COMMON BULKHEAD TO LOX

TANK AFT DOME WELD, S-IVB
{i) L_ OENSE mCLUSI_ UN[AR I_ICATIO_ES--
&C.P_
• (_I LAC_ OF P(. 0! _ II----]
(nl SCPOeOI p_1_TO_
(I)_ IC PO_--
(t3) ACCEPT
(13) GOUGE
TANK _ ANK TANK TANK _ I
EAM a 6 SEAr_ _, S SEAM.4

SE Am = 7
I
I
000
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
FIGURE 2.3-IX FARR MAP, LH 2 CYLINDRICAL WELDS, S-IVB

FWD DOME'--'_NK_
OUTSIDE WELD BEAD
ATTACH RING
r_E_,Z:,_=S_L.rr, E_ _ELOtNGREIDR_ RE_ELS$
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S,:._E _ECECTS ;. ,,_/A i
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_-?I.F57t__-_++_-2tK
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CE FECTS &IPT
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INS_OE WELD BEAD _-._..,k%.\,c.\¢.\_\\-,i .......
CYL TANK
(_o) _l_n4s
I
VIEI A,A
TANK A$SY
FIGURE 2.3-X FARR MAP, LOX TANK AFT DOME TO LH? CYL.
& LH 2 TANK FWD DOME TO LH 2 CYL. WELD, S-IVB
TABLE 2.3-1 SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT MRB'S, S-IVB
STAGE: S-IVB EFFECTIVITY: AS-503 COMPONENT: TANK ASSEMBLY

Reason
MR Requirement Deviation/Disposition for Concern
Element NumBer D_/m_e artr
DPS-15104 Dye check of fwd. dome to ring Repeated re-

LH 2 TANK A197905 IA39303- work used to
ASSEMBLY 521 weld shows numerous greater than
#3 porosities. Defects were effect repair,
bu t no x-ray
ground out, blended and refinish
ed. Final inspection by dye in spection
check. "Acceptable to Engineer- ma de during
ing for use. " fi nal inspec-
ti on. Possible
reduced safety
factor from
undetected
flaws.
!
IA39303- DPS-15104 Dye check of Common Bulkhead No repair work

,> A203415
515 meridian welds (fwd. face) re- attempted - Co
veals numerous greater than #3 Common Bhd. r,,)
porosities. "Acceptable to En- was fully as-

gineering for use" sembled, flaws
detected after
Hydrostatic
Test. Reduced
sa fety factor.
A196281 IA39303- DPS 10220 Dye check of aft dome to ring Re peated re-
521 15104 weld shows intermittent linear wo rk, but no
defects and porosity. Defects x- ray inspec-
were ground, blended and refin- tion was made
ished. to verify final
integrity of
welds or parent
metal. Possible
reduced safety
factor from
undetected de-
fects.
% _
_v
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT MRB'S S-IVB

TABLE 2.3-1

Reason
Element
MR
NumBer D Imarter Requirement Deviation/Disposition for Concern
Welds should not Forward Dome Assy. contour of 82 ' Reduction in

LH 2 TANK ASSY A212749 IA39304
shrink segments latitude checks out of tolerance safety factor.
FWD. DOME
ASSY. into an out-of- by following range:
tolerance cond. -.001 to -.240
Tolerances: Acceptable as is.
+0.041
-0.139
Seal we_d, common bulkhead, aft Deviation from

LH 2 LOX TANK A193505 IA39280- Two(2) 5/32" fil-
II let welds requir- dome joint. A third weld pass welding proce-
ASSY. COMMON
ed. has been made covering center dures.
BULKHEAD
of -9 spacers Acceptable as is.
I
LOX TANK AFT A209930 IA39303 Pre-production Aft. dome to Cylindical skin Open item - C71
I
See A-A tensile coupons weld. Three setstest specimens "Inspection in-
DOME & LH 2 CO
'.0
CYLINDRICAL min. 30,000 PSl failed to meet required 30,000 compl ete'_
Panel #I. PSI Disposition - Prepare new
set of pre-production specimenS.
Result of this test is not docu-
mented.
IA39153-I No cracks allowed Dye Penetrant Inspection DPS No evidence of

LOX TANK ASSY • A197749
FITTING ASSY. 15104 of fitting assembly IA- hydrostatic
39153-I located in segment #3 test or equiva
of the aft dome O.D. side, has lent on new
approx. 2-I/2" cracks at 6 part.
o'clock in fillet weld of fit-
ting assembly to flange. Dis-
position - Remove and replace
fitting per salvage SEO IA39-
303-015 E.
TABLE 2.3-I SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT MRB'S $-IVB

Reason
MR Requirement Deviation/Disposition for Concern
Element NumBer D_B/_a rtr
A220157 IA39306- DPS 14052 Aft ring to cylinder weld,46-3/4 I" Possible reduc-
LH 2 TANK
ASSEMBLY 511 from seam 4 to seam 5. Linear ed factor of
porosity revealed by x-ray in- safety.
spection of aft ring to cylinder
tank. "Acceptable to Engineering
for use_
A193576 IA39308 Ultimate tensile Aft. Dome, center flange weld. Possible de-
LOX TANK
ASSY. AFT strength should Results of pre-production test: crease in
DOME be 38_500 psi, margin of
(pre-productiQn #1 - 36,461 psi safety.
weld value), per #2 - 36,162 psi (Jm
DPS 14052 #3 - 36,348 psi
Also canned areas evident.
Oo
Final disposition - Acceptable
to Eng. for use..
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT MRB'S S-TVR
TABLE 2.3-I
COMPONENT:_
STAGE : S-IVB EFFECTIVITY :__
Reason
D_glPart Deviation/Disposition for Concern
NMR_er mumDer Requirement - T
Element
AFT INTER- 500-073- IA71604-

STAGE ASSY. 641 503
STA 132, Ring Plane 5. I/2" Reduced safety
SKIN PANEL
II
IA70707- No cracks allowec
crack in length of skin panel. factor, load
AT STA. #132 464 redistribution.
& RING PLANE Disposition - Repaired cutout
crack area, filled with a stain- (See notes l, 2,
5 and 3 below)..
less steel 301-I/2 hard, 0.020"
doubler. The doubler is fasten-
ed by removing and replacing
fasteners in skin and stringer.
All edges sealed and filled.
NOTES:
O0
I. Potentia 1 hot spot from aerod ynamic heating
The coeficients of linear exp ansion & thermal conductivity of A1 & steel are in, ompatible.
o
A thermal discontinuity was c reated.
3. Potential c corrosion between Al. & CRE_ • should failure of edge seal oc( ur.
galvani
Tolerance-.240" STA 2519, STR 6 to 12_ under Possible reduc-

INTERSTAGE A220403 IA71604
tolerance frame caps. Rework tion in safety
ASSY. ±.010
outlined. Inspection incomplete factor.
A220406 IB56534 STA 2519, STR 178 to 2401 under

tolerance frame caps milled.
Rework and inspection incom-
plete.
D5-1 5782
2.4 SUMMARY OF MATERIAL REVIEW BOARD

ACTIONS FOR THE IU-503
2.4.1 General
Thirty-two (32) Material Review Board reports were reviewed.

Of this number, four are considered as being of a struc-
tural nature, and only one is significant. This MRB report
is summarized in Table 2.4-1.
Figures 2.4-I and 2.4-11 locate this discrepancy.
2.4.2 Conclusions
Assessment of the total discrepancies resulted in the iden-

tification of 1 action which was considered significant
enough to warrant stress analysis.
Upon completion, this analysis will establish the struc-

tural capability of the IU as-built configuration.
A-52
POS. III
POS. IV
(jrl
!
!
(J'l (J"l
(..,3
CO
POS, II
POS. I
FIGURE 2,4-I INSTRUMENT UNIT

D5-15782
I I I I
I l I I
i STA 3258.55
ECS
PANEL
"7- .... _
I z--MRB 1450
Ii
I
//lip
i
ttt . _ II
...-. /!
5TA 3222.55
I i I I I I I I I
I I I I i I I I I
VIEW _.OOK/NG OUTBC:
._r F_G 2 4--I
FIGURE 2.4-11 SIGNIFICANT MRB, ECS PANEL, IU
A-54
TABLE 2.4-1 SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT MRB'S T_il
STAGE" IU EFFECTIVITY: AS-503 COMPONENT: IU SHELL

Reason
MR D_g/part Requirement Deviation/Disposition for Concern
Element NumBer NumDer
i Slight circumferential scratch Two adjacent
SHELL 1450 Spec. 6009029 defects not
visible on base of insert, cau-
sed by screw that bottomed out. repaired because
Use as is. damage was
similar to that
on test inserts
which checked
out as accept-
able. X-ray
would have re-
vealed defects
(Of
in flight hard- !
ware, if they
(in
existed, but
!
O0
none was run.
C_ Possible re-
duction in
margin of safet_
from hidden da-
mage to insert
potting.
D5-15782
3.0 CONCLUSIONS
A total of 1336 discrepancies against the L/V were reviewed

in this report. Of these, 79 were considered to have a
potential significance on the structural integrity of the
vehicle. Of the 79, twenty-two percent (22%) of these
actions resulted from weld inadequacies such as inclusions,
porosity, drop through and mismatch. Forty-four percent
(44%) resulted from out-of-tolerance or misplaced holes;
and the remaining actions (34%) resulted from dents, cracks
and mismatch of parts. Although each of the 91 discrepancies
could be considered minor, they were the most significant
found and are being transmitted for stress analysis.
Completion of the stress analysis of these actions will

establish the structural capability of the "as-built"
vehicle. These data are reported in the "AS-503 S/V
Structural Capability Report."
A-56
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LO
r-_
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FACTORS INFLUENCING STRESS CORROSION CRACKING
0 MATERIAL SUSCEPTIBILITY
GRAIN DIRECTION I:D
!
,..=I
TENSILE STRESSES & CORROSIVE ENVIRONMENT

O0
I
SUSTAINED
COMBINED
0 TIME DEPENDENCY
NUMBER OF FAILURES INCREASE WITH TIME

D5-1 5782
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PLAN AND APPROACHUSED TO ASSESS STRESS CORROSION
REVIEW SELECTED DRAWINGS AGAINST ESTABLISHED CRITERIA

! !
REVIEW MR'S FOR ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL STRESS CORROSION PROBLEM

O0
REVIEW AND ASSESS CONTRACTOR STRESS CORROSION SURVEYS AND INCOR-

PORATE NASA ASSESSMENT OF CONTRACTOR SURVEYS
STRESS CORROSION ASSESSMENT TASKS PERFORMED
I. CONDUCTED LITERATURE SEARCH ON STRESS CORROSION AND ESTABLISHED ASSESSMENT

CRITERIA
2. COMPILED AND ASSESSED AVAILABLE DATA FROM CONTRACTORS STRESS CORROSION

SURVEY TO DETERMINE POTENTIAL PROBLEMS IN PRIMARY STRUCTURE
3. REVIEWED MR'S FOR ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL STRESS CORROSION PROBLEMS
4 REVIEWED FINDINGS OF STRESS CORROSION SURVEY AND MR ASSESSMENT WITH I
NASA FOR CONCURRENCE

I
O0
• PERFORMED DETAILED INVESTIGATION OF RING BAFFLE STRESS CORROSION PROBLEMS
INCLUDING:
(A) REVIEW OF PERTINENT DOCUMENTATION
IB) ON-SITE REVIEW OF HARDWARE AT MTF
(iC) RE?ORTED FINDINGS
!
t •
STRESS CORROSION ASSESSMENT
0 ONLY ACCESSIBLE PARTS WERE VISUALLY INSPECTED
LIKE PARTS INSTALLED ON OTHER VEHICLES WERE INSPECTED

! (jrl
l
NOT ALL AS-503 PARTS WERE INSPECTED
VISUAL INSPECTION IS SUBJECTIVE O0
PART REPLACEMENT NOT PROGRAM EFFECTIVE
ASSESSMENT - LIMITED DEGREE OF ASSURANCE

D5-15782
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STRESS CORROSION ASSESSMENT
CONCLUSION
I. AS-503 IS A YOUNG VEHICLE
2. PRIMARY STRUCTURE IS MOSTLY IN COMPRESSION
3. KNOWN DISCREPANCIES HAVE BEEN CORRECTED OR THEIR RISK ACCEPTED
! !
4. A REVIEW OF STRESS CORROSION SURVEYS PERFORMED BY THE CONTRACTORS
SHOW THAT:
O0
A. CONTRACTORS HAVE PERFORMED A SURVEY OF SUSCEPTIBLE

MATERIALS FOR EACH STAGE
B. PRIMARY STRUCTURE HAS THE FEWEST SUSCEPTIBLE MATERIALS
C. NO OPEN ITEMS EXIST ON _PRIMARY STRUCTURE
5. PRESSURE VESSELS AND PROPELLANT TANKS ASSESSED FOR STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY,

INCLUDING STRESS CORROSION AND FRACTURE MECHANICS, ARE CONSIDERED
ADEQUATE.
D5-15782
B-IO
D5-15782
APPENDIX C
HYDROGEN EMBRITTLEMENT
1.0 GENERAL
This appendix contains a presentation on hydrogen embrittle-

ment which was prepared during the course of the AS-503
Structural Integrity Assessment.
C-l
DEFINITION OF HYDROGEN EMBRITTLEMENT
C') DELAYED BRITTLE FAILURE AT REDUCED TENSILE STRESS AS A RESULT OF !

!
ABSORBED HYDROGEN IN METALS

FACTORS INFLUENCING HYDROGEN EMBRITTLEMENT CRACKING
I , SUSCEPTIBLE METALS
A. MI CROSTRUCTURE
B. STRENGTH LEVEL
C. TEMPERATURE
! II HYDROGEN
(3O
A. ATOMIC HYDROGEN
B. MOLECULAR HYDROGEN (AT EXTREME PRESSURE ONLY)
iii STRESS
A. RESIDUAL
B. APPLIED
CRITERIA FOR THE ASSESSMENTOF HYDROGENEMBRITTLEMENT
MATERIAL SUSCEPTIBIL%TY
RESTRICTED TO HIGH STRENGTHSTEEL ALLOY
CONDUCIVE ENVIRONMENT
TENSILE STRESS
I
I APPLIED .-.,i
RESIDUAL
O0
IX)
EXPOSED TO HYDROGEN PRODUCING PROCESS
EXPOSED TO HIGH PRESSURE GASEOUS HYDROGEN UNDER

SERVICE CONDITIONS
EFFECT OF FAILURE
LOSS OF LIFE
LOSS OF MISSION
NO MAJOR IMPACT
PLAN & APPROACH USED TO ASSESS HYDROGEN EMBRITTLEMENT
Q REVIEW OF SELECTED DRAWINGS AGAINST ESTABLISHED CRITERIA
REVIEW MR'S FOR FAILURES OF SUSCEPTIBLE MATERIALS
! !
REVIEW HISTORY OF SUSPECT PARTS FOR POSSIBLE EXPOSURE TO HYDROGEN
CO
REVIEW HISTORY FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION
REVIEW AND ASSESS CONTRACTORS SURVEY OF HYDROGEN EMBRITTLEME.NT PROBLEM
INCORPORATE NASA ASSESSMENT OF CONTRACTOR REVIEW

HYDROGEN EMBRITTLEMENT
AN NR HYDROGEN EMBRITTLEMENT SURVEY IDENTIFIED SEVEN TYPES OF PARTS
INSTALLED IN CSM-I03 AS HAVING POSSIBLE HYDROGEN EMBRITTLEMENT DUE
TO AN IMPROPER NON-SPECIFIED BAKING PROCESS. THESE PARTS AND THE MSC
DISPOSITION ARE AS FOLLOWS:
ACTION TAKEN
PART DESCRIPTION
REPLACED WITH QUALIFIED BOLTS

(i) LES TOWER BOLT
REMOVED PRELOAD 1
(2) CREWCOUCH BOLT
C-) I
I
ACCEPTED "AS IS" 2
(3) TENSION TIE BOLT (CM) (._
O0
ACCEPTED "AS IS" 2
(4) TENSION TIE STRAP
ACCEPTED "AS IS" 2

(5) TENSION TIE BOLT (SM)
ACCEPTED "AS IS" 2

(6) ' TENSION TIE NUT
ACCEPTED "AS IS" 2

(7) SLEEVE V & H ADD.
1 THESE BOLTS ARE USED IN SHEAR AND NEED NOT BE INSTALLED UNDER TENSION
2 THESE PARTS CANNOT BE READILY REPLACED. A TEST PROGRAM DEMONSTRATED
THE ACCEPTABILITY OF THIS HARDWARE
ASSESSMENT - ADEQUATE ACTION TAKEN TO AVOID HYDROGEN EMBRITTLEMENT PROBLEM

HYDROGEN EMBRITTLEMENT ASSESSMENT
CONCLUSION
i • EVIDENCE HAS DISCLOSED THAT NO FAILURES HAVE BEEN ATTRIBUTED TO PURELY

HYDROGEN EMBRiTTLEMENT
I
I • PLATING PROCESS SPECIFICATIONS REQUIRE POST-PLATING BAKING OF PARTS TO

DIFFUSE HYDROGEN O0
• SUSPECT FAILURES ARE ASSOCIATED WITH STRESS CORROSION AND HAVE BEEN
TREATED ACCORDINGLY
o NO OPEN ITEMS EXIST ON PRIMARY STRUCTURE

-r
_>
!
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I
p-
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Z
m
Z
0
Z
D5-15782
APPENDIX D
FRACTURE MECHANICS ASSESSMENT
1.0 GENERAL
This appendix contains fracture mechanics assessments on

the space vehicle. Paragraph I.I contains a presentation
prepared during the course of the assessment. Paragraph
1.2 presents a tabulation of fracture mechanics data for
the AS-503 Launch Vehicle. Paragraph 1.3 contains a
fracture mechanics evaluation of the Spacecraft SM/SPS
propellant tanks.
D-I
SUMMARY OF
! FRACTURE MECHANICS ASSESSMENT OF THE

!
AS-503 LAUNCH VEHICLE
PROPELLANT TANKS AND AUXILIARY PRESSURE VESSELS
FOR C PRIME MISSION

PURPOSE
0 THEPURPOSE OF THIS PRESENTATION IS TO
I REPORT THE FRACTURE MECHANICS ASSESSMENT

I
OF THE AS-503 LAUNCH VEHICLE PROPELLANT TANKS ¢.Jrl
O0
AND AUXILIARY PRESSURE VESSELS
BACKGROUND
PREVIOUS FRACTURE MECHANICS ASSESSMENTS ON NINETY-SEVEN

(97) LAUNCH VEHICLE PRESSURE VESSELS AND PROPELLANT
TANKS WERE REVIEWED AND UPDATEDTO:
0 REASSESS ADEQUACY OF PROOF PRESSURE TESTS I

I BASED ON AS-503 C PRIME MISSION REQUIREMENTS
¢Jrl
O0
REASSESS POST-PROOF TEST HISTORY INCLUDING:
PRESSURIZATION/TIME/CYCLE LIFE
FLUID EXPOSURE
MRB ACTIONS
CRITERIA FOR FRACTURE MECHANICS
ASSESSMENT
e PROOF PRESSURE TEST
o PROOF FACTOR ADEQUACY
MAXIMUM OPERATIONAL PRESSURES

!
,,iI
I PROOF TESTING TECHNIQUE

",,,,,I
• CRITICAL FLAW SIZE DETERMINATION
PREDICTED FA!LURE MODE
o NDT DETECTION CAPABILITIES
_• POST PROOF TEST HISTORY
PRESSURE/TIME/CYCLES
FLUID EXPOSURE
MRB ACTIONS
9-(]
03
!
-11
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o
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ASSESSMENTOF POST-PROOFTEST HISTORY
D PRESSURIZATION/TIME/CYCLES (PROJECTED TO LAUNCH)
ALL PRESSURE VESSELS AND PROPELLANT TANKS ARE WELL

WITHIN THEIR MINIMUM GUARANTEED PRESSURE/TIME/CYCLE
LIFE EXCEPT S-ii, POSITION #I, J-2 - HYDROGEN START
! BOTTLE
FLUID EXPOSURE
PROCESSING AND PROOF TEST RECORDS INDICATE NO KNOWN

EXPOSURE TO ADVERSE FLUIDS
MRB ACTIONS
MRB SUMMARIES I,qDICATE NO OPEN iTEMS ON PRESSURE

SE-S
VES ' OR PROPELLANT TANK
D5-15782
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D5-15782
1.2 LAUNCHVEHICLE FRACTUREMECHANICSDATA
The following tables present the fracture mechanics data

for each AS-503 L/V pressure vessel and propellant tank.
These data have been assessed for the C prime mission and
the conclusions noted in the "Remarks" column.
D-9
SUMMARY-SATURN V
AS-503
APOLLOLAUNCH VEHICLE PRESSUREVESSELS FRACTURE MECHANICS ASSESSMENT
VESSEL MATERIAL
CONDITION VESSELCONFIGURATION1 TEMPERATURE PRESSURE FLUID ALLOWABLES
USED
DESIGNATION ANDDIMENSIONS I °F (PSIG) BY DESIGNACTIVITY
NO. OPER- TEST
PART NAME SERIAL MATERIAL& METER LENGTH THICK- OPER- PROOF ATING PROOF WELD METAL
BURST ATING PROOF BASE METAL
NUMBER NUMBER CONDITION FILLERIMETHOD (INCHES (INCHES (INCHES) ATION
I
S-IC B)EING
S-IC Fuel Tank

P/N60B24000-7B
(l per stage)
31.5 KSI
AI 2219- Al 23 TIG Domed 396 517 D 70:F 70OF 70°F 48.9 31.5 33,1 59.0 RP-I H20 MIL-HDBK-
S/N O000001 JP-4 5A (RT)
T87 19 and Cylin- 0.128 to to .9 factor
60B32042 60B- MIG der DW 45.5 51.8 of pre-pro-
_2004 0.202 duction
C veld value
0.175 in 60B-32-
OO9
2 LOX Tank
60BI2000-7B
!
(l per stage) 31.5 KSI
A Al 2219- _l 23 TIG Domed 396 769 D IO°F -297°F 70°F 63.0 25.5 38.4 88.2 H20 MIL-HDBK-
! S/N O000001 LOX 5A (RT)
T87 19 and Sylin- 0.152 to to
.9 factor a_ -,,4
0 60B32042 BOB- MIG der DW 34.7 66.14
above CO
32004 0.245
C
0.185
CW
0,254
Helium Bottle in LOX

P/N60B49031-1
stage)
(4 per J
•320 -297 -320 ° 3200 3200@ 5000 _660 He N2 MIL-HDBK- No weld
S/N 0000055 Al 2014- No -- Spher. 20.90121l_8 C
He 5A
T6 Weld Domed ! 0,890 to
-250°F
to
+250°F
F t-297°F-297QF
1500
!
Extrus- ler _+250°F
QQ-A-261
ion _ylin- 1
S/N 0000059
i
S/N 0000061
r I I l 1 r
r r
N2 MIL-HDBK- No Weld
-320 -297 -320 ° 3200 3200@ 5000 1660 He
S/N 0000063 AI 2014- No -- Spher.?O.90 211.88 C He 5A
T6 Weld Domed 0.890 to to F -297°F-297 °
250OF +250°F 1500
QQ-A-261 Cylin-
+250°F
Extrusion der
-- D= Dome Base Mel _I C= Cylinder Base Metal W= Wel J

IA
SUMMARY-SATURN V
AS-S03
APOLLOLAUNCH VEHICLE PRESSUREVESSELSFRACTURE MECHANICS ASSESSMENT
SERVICELIFE BURST
KIC Thresh'd Values OPERATING PRESSUREPROOF FACTOR FACTOR PROB#_BLE MANUFACTURER
(Oper. Fluid) (INCHES) PRE#SURE(Operating Fluid)
REMARKS
NO KTH FLAW SIZE
CYCLES _NTICIAPTED BuARANTEED MIN.PROOF MIN.BURST FAILURE OR SOURCE
i " KSI(IN)I/2 KSI(IN)I/2 SCREEN- THRESHOL[ MODE
EXPERIENCEDPRESSURE BY PROOF PRESSUR ADEQUACY _. _
PRESSURE
BASE WELD BASE WELD ED BY CRIT CRITICAL TEST
CYCLES OPE R.PRESSURE OPER. PRESSURE
METALMETAL METAL _ETAL PROOF OPERATINE
S-IC B EING
l
>2.6 Leak-Remote Boeing No apparent pro-
1 - SF 1 CDDT
A 35 28 28 22 (O.31_N/A NIA 1.05 Yes 1.52 Michoud blem for flight
20 psig 20 psig mins, at )ossibility
_T time
max max max. rain. of catastro-
2 - LC 2 - LC flight phic
14.5psig 14.5psig pressure
max max
2
Leak-Remote Boeing No apparent pro- !
l - SF l CDDT >2.6 1.21 Yes 1.61 Michoud blem for flight
A 35 28 28 22 _.286] N/A N/A Jossibility
18 psig 18 psig mins. at min. of catastro- time c71
(RT) (RT (-297 ° _297 ° >T
max max max )hic
! 2 - LC 2 - LC flight CO
II.3 psig 11.3 psi_ pressure P_
max max
3 i
1950 1.56 Yes 2.08 Catastrophic M_r_n- OK. No apparent

A 20 No 18 NO 3.032 N/A 0.074 1 6 A IA
Marietta Cor problems.
Wel -297 ° Weld
Denver I
I I
i r
20 No 18 No 0.032 N/A 0.074 l 6 A IA 95O 1.56 Yes 2.08 Catastrophic Martin- OK. No apparent
Weld -297 ° Weld Marietta Corp problems
F Denver
: Check
SF Stat ng
A Maximum Operating Pressure Cycles Assumed
SUMMARY-SATURN V
AS-503
VESSEL PRESSURE
MATERIALCONDITION VESSEL CONFIGURATION TEMPERATURE ALLOWABLESUSED
(PSIG) FLUID
DESIGNATION AND DIMENSIONS :F BY DESIGN ACTIVITY
NO. PART NAME SERIAL
MATERIAL& METERLENGTH T_- OPER- ROOF DESIGN
BASE WELD WELD DIA- WALL DESIGN P ATINGOPER'I
PROOF BURsTOPER- TEST BASE METAL WELD METAL
NUMBER NUMBER CONDITION FILLER METHOD SHAPE {INCHES {INCHES (INCHE_) ATION MAX ATI NG PROOF
S-ICiBOEING (CONH'D)
4 Helium Sphere High I
Pressure 60B52110-IB
(7 per stage)
A S/N 0000010 Forged Ti6AI- TIG Sphere 6.75 -- 70 -65 '7±18 3300 3000 5000 5600 He MIL-HDBK-5A MIL-HDBK-
H20
Ti6AI4V CV i I ).168 to He 5A
STA BAC I +165 i :
60B32534 5947 : ).123 I
i
!
B S/N 0000016
i I
CD C S/N 0000017 (._

I
i CO
I'O
D S/N 0000022
E S/N 0000027
F S/N 0000028
r r r I i I i i I
G 60B52110-3 Forged Ti6AI TIG iphere 6.75 -- B 70 -65 77±1813300 3000 5000 i600 He H20 MIL-HDBK-5_ MIL-HDBK-
S/N 0000001 Ti6AI4V 4V 0.168 to
He 5A
STA BAC W +165
60B32534 5947 0.123
5 Nitrogen Sphere
60B52111-lB
(5 per stage)
He H20 MIL-HDBK-5_ MIL-HDBK-

A S/N 0000017 Forged Ti6AI- TIG Spher_12,33 -- 8 70 -65 77t18 750 750 250 1650
Ti6AI4V 4V O.llO to ! He 5A
3600) CAct-
B S/N 0000038
60B32534 8AC
5947
W
0.124
+165
He
,i H2 0
r r
C S/N 0000039 FI6AL4V 6AL-4V TIG ;phere 12,33 W.124 !70 77±18 750 75(3 125C) 65N _I L-HDBK- 5A; MI L-HDBK-5A
2A
SUMMARY-SATURN V
AS-503
!
FLAWSIZE SERVICELIFE BURST '
KIC T,_es, KTH
d w]ues 1 OPERATINGPRESSUREPROOF FACTOR _tAIIUFACTURER
{Oper. Fluid) ! (INCHES) PRESSURE(OperatingFluid) FACTORI PROBh3LE REMARKS
NO
MIN.PROOF _IB BURST
_RESSURE j
OR SOURCE
2 KSI(IN)I/2 SCREEN_ ITHRESHOLO CYCLES _NTICIAPTEDGUARANTEED PRESSUR CY _ FAILURE
ED BY|CRIT CRITICAL EXPERIENCED PRESSURE BY PROOF _.ADEQUA ' MODE
BASE WELD
METALIMETAL METAL METAL PROOF| OPERATING CYCLES TEST OPER.PRESSURE DPER.PRESSURE
S-IC B)EING (CO]IT'D)
Airite No apparent problem

IA 73 l .67 Yes 2.2 Catastrophic
B NA B.075
44 39 40 35 16 A
i
l 0.032 W,092
W !
i i
0.040
!
(31
!
(,_ O0
J
i
r I F p
16A 1 A 73 1,67 Yes 2.2
44 39 40 35 B NA B ,075
0.032 W.092 Catastrophic Ai ri te No apparent problem
_.040
2.2 Leak Airite OK if no leak in

44 39 40 35 >T _T >T 16 A IA None 1 .67 Yes
pre-flight pres-
surization
J
L r ' r r
OK if no leak in
16 A IA NONE 1,67 Yes 2.2
44 39 40 35 Leak Airite _a_light pressur
SUMMARY-SATURN V
AS-503
APOLLOLAUNCH VEHICLE PRESSURE VESSELS FRACTURE MECHANICS ASSESSMFNT
VESSEL MATERIALCONDITION VESSELCONFIGURATION TEMPERATURE PRESSURE FLUID ALLOWABLESUSED

AND DIMENSIONS °F (PSIG)
DESIGNATION BY DESIGN ACTIVITY
BASE ! DIA-I I WALL i
NO. PART NAME SERIAL
MATERIAL& WELD WELD METER LENGTH THICK- DPER- BASE METAL WELD METAL
I OPER-IATING
PROOF BURST :oPER-TTEST
NUMBER NUMBER CONDITION FILLER METHOD SHAPE ,INCHESI(INCHES
NESS ) DESIGN
I(INCHES ATION IPROOF DESIGN MAX ATI NGIPROOF
S-I( BOEIN f (CO_T'D)

5 Nitrogen Sphere
60B52111-1B (CONT)
MIL-HDBK-
Forged Fi6AI- TIG Sphere 12.33 -- 3 70 -65 /7+18 750 750 1250 1650 He H20 MIL-.HDBK-
D S/N 0000042 5A 5A
Ti6AI4V IV ].II0 to I(3600) (Ac-
60B32534 _AC +165 tual
B947 D.124 6300)
MIL-HDBK-
70 -65 77+18 750 750 1250 1650 He H20 MIL-HDBK-5A
Forged Fi6AI- TIG Sphere 12.3_ -- B 5A
E S/N OOOOO7O
Ti6AI4V _V O.llO to [3600) (Ac-
N 165 tual
60B32534 _AC
6 Retro Rocket-Solid 5947 0.124
6300)
Prop. Motor Case
TE 424 !
60B470001 (8 per
stage) (jr1
-.j
1862 2175 !965 So- H20 MIL-HDBK- _I L-HDBK-5A
A S/N F7 Ladish 17-22 TIG Cylin- 1_524 80.311 7O '-65 AMB, 1862 CO
! 1.106 5A
D6AC AS der to l lid!
Steel _ Pro-
Elip- +170
200 KSI tical 1.098 pel
lanl
Yield 7.5 MA
4.7 mi ).262
).119
B S/N FlO
C S/N FII
D S/N Fl2
i
I
I i
E S/N FI4
I
F S/N FI5
G S/N FI6 i
r r
H S/N FI7 D6AC 17-22 TIG Cyl. -65 tc AMB 1862

STEEL i 5,52a 80.31 W:II9
C 098 170 _170 1862 2175 12965 S.P I H20 MIL-HDBK-5! _IL-HDBK-5A
i i
3A
SUMMARY-SATURN V
AS-503
APOLLO LAUNCH VEHICLE PRESSURE VESSELS FRACTURE MECHAN CS ASSESSMENT
KTH FLAWSIZE SERVICELIFE BURST

KIC Thresh'd Values
OPERATING PRESSUREPROOF FACTOR FACTOR
(INCHES) PROB#_LE MANUFACTURER
(Oper. Fluid) PRE.%URE (Operating Fluid) REMARKS
FAILURE OR SOURCE
NO.
KSI(IN)I/2 KSI(IN)I/2 CYCLES ANT ICIAPTE D GUARANTEED MIN "PROOF I
SCREEN4ITNRESNOLD MIN.BURST
ED BY|CRITICRITICAL EXPERIENCED PRESSURE BY PROOF IPRESSUR

_j ADEQUACY _.
PRESSURE MODE
BASE WELD BASE WELD
METALMETAL METAL METAL PROOF| IOPERATING CYCLES TEST )PER.PRESSUREI OPER PRESSURE
S-IC BOEING (;ONT'D)
5 CONI)
16 A IA NONE 1.67 YES 2.2 Leak Ai rite OK if no leak in

D 44 39 40 35 >T >T _,T
pre-flight pres-
surization
IA NONE 1.67 YES 2.2 Leak Ai rite OK

E 44 39 40 35 >T >T _T 16 A
Catastrophic Thiokol Must be carefully

A 90 60 81 54 D D_-T NA NA 1 1.17 Yes 1.6
! protected from
0.091 7T C
.-J
C C 0.062 ! i
moisture
CO
0.053 0.074 C_-T
C W
0.227 _T 0.054
W W
0.043 _07C
i l
t
r
r r i 1
Must be carefully
C.053 G074 C.062 NA NA 1 1.17 YES 1.6 ICatastrophic Thiokol )rotected from moisl re
90 . 60 81 54 ,W.O431&07 _ W.054 l
SUMMARY-SATURN V
AS-503
_SSEL MATERIAL
CONDITION
r VESSELCONFIGU_TION TEMPERATU_ PRESSURE FLUID ALLOWABLES
USED
(PSIG) BY DESIGNACTIVITY
_SIGNATION ANDDIMENSIONS °F
OPER-
BASE O A- OPER- ATING p_nn_ID,,_TIOPER-ITEST
_ASE META_ WELD METAL
m_o.
DESIGNI MAX I ..... I° .... IATINGIPROOF
,KWELL T
I
MIL-HDBK-5P 41 UTS
3600 133.0 36.1 46.8 LH2 Air @ -423_F
S/N 503 2014-T6 )omed 396 623 7D -423 -423 - to to to LH_
043 IMAOI-I]yl i n-| i 3.122 L (SID 65-1676
42.8 35.5 37_ _ 55.
6F
]070l-_er
/
|
!C l
.I02) I
I :W.310
Liquid Oxygen
Propellant Tank
P/N V7-313002-973 !
MIL-HDBK- 33 UTS @
S/N 503 2014-T6 !319 TIG Sphe_- 396 392.{ B.141 -297 297 RT 42o0 37.5
to 59.8
to 54.7
to !LOX Air
LN2 5A -300°F
! _043 MAOI- oidal W.235 i[SID 65-167_
(_ l 81.4 72.2 74.3 I06

CO
r_
Helium Receiver I
ME 282-0010-0002 |
(Pneu. Control and He /
Injection)(2 per stag() 1
S/N O0407ABJOOI3 Forged

Ti6AI4V
[i6Al
_V
TIG Sphere I_928 -- B.230 -250
to
-50
to
RT 3250260
50008o00
.e MIL-HDBK-5A MIL-HDBK-5#
STA _AOIO W.326 +160 160

LAOIII- 7-001 !
S/N O0407ABJO007 008 250 3250 5000 8000 He He

TI6AL4V AL 4_ TIG Sphere 16928 -- B.230 +160 _60 RT MIL-HDBK-5A_IL-HDBK-5A
W 326 max max
I H20
Helium Surge Press.Re-

ceiver ME 282-0036-
0002 (Pneu. Control)
(2 per stage)
800 8Q0 2000 4000 He He 155 KSI UT; 130 UTS
S/N IOIOADO0022 Forged Ti6AI TIG Bphere I0050 -- B.072 -5Q -5( RT
N2 145 KSI
Ti6AI4V 4V to to
Yield
STA MAOIO [ W.096 +160 _16(
LAOlll- 7-001 10% Elong
008 I I H20
.... I0106AD00046 I J L I
F D = Forward Dome C = Cylinder B = Base Metal W = Weld and Haz

ZVH _ ptaM = M
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V_
SUMMARY-SATURN V
AS-503
VESSEL VESSEL
CONFIGURATION
i TEMPERATURE
i PRESSURE FLUID I ALLOWABLES
USED
MATERIAL
CONDITION
NO
DESIGNATION ANDDIMENSIONS| °F T
T
i
, I
(PSIG)
OPER-!TEST
TJ I
BY DESIGN
ACTIVITY
PART NAME SERIAL BASE I WEL D R TH HICK- OPER- ATING i
MATERIAL& WELD
NUMBER NUMBER CONDITIONIFILLER METHOD
SHAPE MENcTHEEs)I_ENNcHGEs)i
NEC_:IDESIG"I ATION I PROOF DESIGN MAxGI PROOF BURST A'r.!._"GLPR0
OFI BASE HETAL[WELD METAL
1 S- I NORT[I AME ICAN RCCKWELI (CONT'D)
Accumulator Reservoir
MC282-0028 (Hydraulic i
System)(4 per stage) I
N_ MIL-HDBK-5/ NO WELD
20.6 0.167 -65 I 0 I RT 3650 3650 5500 9200 N2
S/N 06553CI01736 Forged No Capped 5.80E
to (3 min (0 il
,(O_l! !
SAE4340 Weld Cylin- i to ]
MIL-A- der +275 !+200 i
i7190A i i
195 KSI-' i
I
UTS i
S/N 06553CI01739 i
i
S/N 06553CI01740 i ' con

I
20.6 0.167 -65 0 RT 3650 3650!5500 _200 N2 N2 IIL-HDBK-5A NO WELD I
S/N 06553CI01743 Forged No -- Sapped 5.808
O0 SAE 4340 Weld gylin- to to i(3 min (0i_ [Oil )
M_-A- der _275 +200
7190A
1
195 KSI
P_
Accumulator Reservoir
I
MC 282-0028A (Hydrau- !
lic System)(4 per
stage)
i '
No Capped 8.62 8,5 0.094 -65 0 MIL-HDBK- i NO WELD
S/N 06553CI01736A Forged j RT l )0 i lOiO 300 600 N2
5061-T6 to to 5A
Cylin-
der _275 i+200
Weld
S/N 06553CI01739A
QQ-i -367
l
SIN 06553C101740A I , I r i r it 1 r I r r
I
No ,apped 8.62 8.5 0.094 RT N2 MIL-HDBK- NO WELD

S/N 06553CI01743A Forged I00 I00 300 600 _ N_I
5061-T6 Weld I :ylin-
-65
e275
_o
]o Oil
1
5A
QQ-A-367 / ler to I+200

i i
I I
I , !
i i !
' I i i :
i
i : i I
I
t I
Base Weld W = Weld STA = Solution Treated and Aged Ann = Annealed
SUMMARY-SATURN V 5A
AS-503
VEHICLE PRESSUREVESSELSFRACTURE MECHANICS ASSESSMENT
PROBABLE MANUFACTURER REMARKS

FAILURE ORSOURCE
I.IODE
S-
North Leak should not

16 A Leak
American occur during the
0
i
Rockwell sustained load of
flight
NR No leak will devel I

16 A 1 A Leak
O8
I ...j
O0
_0 DO
Leak NR No leak will

develop during
i flight
415 - i
1 A Leak NR No leak will develo

45 --
= Thickness W : Weld
SUMMARY-SATURN V
AS-503
APOLLOLAUNCH VEHICLE PRESSURE VESSELS FRACTURE MECHANICS ASSESSMENT
VESSEL PRESSURE
MATERIALCONDITION VESSELCONFIGURATION TEMPERATURE FLUID ALLOWABLESUSED
(PSIG)
DESIGNATION AND DIMENSIONS °F BY DESIGN ACTIVITY
NO. BASE DIA- WALL 1 )PER- TEST
PART NAME SERIAL ATING
NUMBER NUMBER IMATERIAL&coNDITION
FILLERWELDMETHoDWELDSHAPE
METER LENGTH
(INCHES)(INCHES)
NESS
THICK-
(INCHES)
DESIGN
I OPER-
ATION
PROOF
DESIGN
OPER-I
MAX PROOF BURST ATING PROOF BASE METAL
WELD METAL
(min) [
S-II NORTH AME_:CAN R(,CKWELL (CONT D_
Ullage Motor Solid

Propellant Motor
Case ME901-OO89E
(4 per stage)
IB22AS TIG Domed 12.60 68.2 D -30 -30 RT 1250 1250 1450 MIL-HDBK- MIL-HDBK-
S/N 06-357-014-4200 Forged 1820Soli H20
SAE 4130 Girt_Cylin- ].075 to to I I Pro- 5A 5A
Steel Weld_der C _155 +155 ! )el-
180 KSI ;2-I ].075 ant
Yield Elipse : C
].194 !
290
194 O0
I =
S/N 06-357-015-4200
!
L r r , _ i
• E) S/N 06-357-016-4200
68.2 ;.075 155 155 RT 1250 125Q 1450 1820 i

SAE 4130 17-22 TIG Cylin- 2.60
S/N 06-357-016-4200 W.194 max. max.
18 KSI AS der MIL-HDBK- IIL-HDBK-5A
S.P. H20
Td. 5A
S-II Retro Rocket-
Solid Propellant
Motor Case
T 15179
IA59670"
(4 per stage)
RT 21:8 2138 i2700 Solid H20 MIL-HDBK- MIL-HDBK-

S/N 6-745-I0 Forged MIL-W- TIG Domed 9.00 90.65 D -lO -lO
Pro- 5A 5A
SAE 4130 8611 Girth Cylin- 0.130 to to
Steel We ds der ! C +155 +145 pel-
lant
50 KSI ! 0.077
Yield I
S/N 6-745-II
S/N 6-745-07
i r r
S/N 6-756-06 SAE 4130 MIL-W TIG Cylin- 9.00 90.65 -lO -lO RT 2138 2138 2700
]
150 KSI 8611 der .130 to to
S.Po H20 MIL-HDBK-5# MIL-HDBK-
Yield +155 +145
5A
.077
Base Metal W = Weld D = Dome Base Metal C = Cylinder Base Metal

SUMMARY-SATURN V 6A
AS'503
SERVICE LIFE BURST
KT, I FLAW SIZE
KIc OPERATINGPRESSURE PROOFFACTOR FACTOR PROBABLE MANUFACTURER
PRESSURE (Operating
(INCHES) REMARKS
Fluid)
4IN .BURST FAILURE OR SOURCE
SCREEN_ ITHRESHOL[CYCLES _NTiCIAPTEDGUARANTEED
NO, MIN .PROOF
KSI(IN)I/2 )RESSUR
KSI(IN)I/2
BASE WELD ED BYICRIT CRITICAL EXPERIENCEDPRESSURE BY PROOF P_. ADEQUAC_ MODE
BASE WELD
CYCLES TEST OPE R.PRESSURE )PER-PRESSURE
METALMETAL METAL METAL PROOF I OPERATINE
t S- I NORTH MERICAN OCKWEL[ (CONT'D)
NA NA NA 1.26 Yes l .46 Le ik ** Rocketdyne &ppears OK

130 120 ll7 IO8 _T >T >T
i
1
I
i
l
i
I
I
(._
I
i O3
!
i
]
i
r 1 r
J r r 1 i I
Leak
r
** Rocketdyne
r
OK
lit I08 >T >T _T NA NA NA 1,26 Yes 1.46
130 : 120
NA NA NA 1,26 Yes 1,46 Leak ** Thiokol

150 140 135 126 > T _T !*McDonnell-Douglas
provides retro-
! rocket for S-II
**Catastrophic
failure at dis-
continuities
i possible
r r
T
150 140 135 126 > T >T >T NA NA NA 1.26 Yes 1 .46 Leak Thiokol OK
i i
T=TH[( KNESS ,_A=NOT APPLICABLE
SUMMARY-SATURN V
AS-503
VESSEL PRESSURE
MATERIALCONDITION VESSELCONFIGURATION TEMPERATURE FLUID ALLOWABLESUSED
(PSIG)
DESI GNAT
I ON AND DIMENSIONS °F BY DESIGN ACTIVITY
NO. PART OPER- TEST
NUMBER
NAME SERIAL
NUMBER
BASE
CONDITION
MATERIAL& FILLER
WELD METHO[
WELD SHAPE
METER LENGTH I THICK-
DIA-I I WALL DESIGN OPER-
NESS
(INCHES) (INCHES) {INCHES) ATION PROOFI DESIGN PROOF
BURST
OPER-
IuTIN
ATING PROOF I BASE METAL WELD METAL
(min)
S-IVB ICDONNELL DOUGLA!
P _ESSURE ESSELS
l Liquid Hydrogen Tank

P/N IA39300-509
(l per stage) 32.o UTS at
A S/N ]008 Plate AL4043 MIG Domed 260 429 CB.123 RT -75 RT 37 34.0 38.0 53.1 LH H_O MIL-HDBK-5A
61.4 In_u- Air RT .8 of
2014-T6 DPS Cyl. CW.246 to to to
14042 DB.060 +llO 41.5 38.3 Actua latec values in
SM45961
2 Liquid Oxygen Tank

P/N IA39300-509
(l per stage)
37.6 UTS at
A S/N I008 Plate _L4043 MIG Sphe- 260 176.7 B.086 -297 -270 RT 44 41.0 51.6 88.2 LOX H20 MIL-HDBK-5A
Air -300 o F .8
2014-T6 DPS roidal W.191 to to to to
14042 -297 74 68,6 54.2 of values in I
SM45961
C_
3 Helium Storage Sphere
IB66868 (Repressurization
GO
! _System--l per stage)
PO A S/N If5 Forged Ti6AL TIG Sphere 25.26 -- B -40 -40 -40 3200 3200 4800 8000 He He MIL-HDBK-5A MIL-HDBK-5A
Ti6AI4V 4V- IPO0 .334 to to to H20
STA STP 128 W +210 +120 +210
IP20047 0308 .452

IA49990 (Propellant
Repressurization System)
8 Per Stage
A S/N 15 Forged Ti6AL TIG Sphere 25.26E -- B -40 -40 -40 3200 3200 4800 8000 He He MIL-HDBK-5A iMil-HDBK-5A
Ti6AL4V 4V IPO0 .334 to to to H20
STA STP 128 W +210 +i20 +210
:IP20047 0308 .452
B S/N 16 Forged Ti6AL TIG Sphere 25.26E -- B -40 -40 -40 3200 32OO 48OO 8000 He He MIL-HDBK-5A MIL-HDBK-5A
-i6AL4V 4V- IPO0 .334 to to to H20
STA iSTP 128 W +210 +120 +210
IP20047 0308 .452
C=CYLINDRICAL B=BASE METAL W=WELD AND WELD HAZ D=DOME

7A
SUMMARY-SATURN V
AS-S03
APOLLOLAUNCH VEHICLE PRESSURE VESSELS FRACTURE MECHAN CS ASSESSMENT

KIC Thr,s.'. V,_.e_ FACTOR PROBABLE MANUFACTURER
(op._ F,._,) (INCHES) PREcISUR
E OPERATING
(Operatin
PRESSURE
9 Fluid)
PROOFFACTOR REMARKS
_IN .BURST FATLURE OR SOURCE
NO.KsI(IN)I/2
BASE WELD
KSI(IN)I/2
BASE
SCREEN- ITHRESHOL[ CYCLES
WELD ED BY CRITICRITICALEXPERIENCED
_NTICIAPTEDGUARANTEED
PRESSURE BY PROOF
(IN.PROOF
>_
ADEQUACYI )RESSUR
MODE
METALMETAL METAL METAL PROOF _)PERATING CYCLES TEST )PEP_PRESSURE )PER,PRESSURE
S-IVB MQ DONNELL )OUGLAS
l CDDT NONE .99 NO 1.39 Catastro- McDonnell Adequacy verified

27 14.6 (27) (14.6) 0.139 D.131 .137 S.F.Cycle
(RT) (RT) RT) (RT) Cycle phic Douglas Corp. by analysRs and •
/NbT/:l_pec£ion
m124 S.F,Cycle I CDDT NONE .19 NO 1.28 Leak McDOnnell Adequacy verified
27 16.5 (40) (16.5)i0.170 124 (31
RT '(RT) '- 97 (-297 Cycle Douglas Corp. _I_ anal_es a_d
'_F) OF) T_ectlo_ CO
c_
44 39RT 140RT 35RT B B B I A 32 1.5 YES 2.5 Catastro- Airtek Looks o.k.
16A
(RT) 34(- 37 (- 31 (- .062 ,142 .120 phi c McDonnell-
41(- 40OF) 40OF) 40OF_ W W Douglas
40OF) .Ogl ,202 .160
44 39RT 40RT 35RT B B B 16 A l A 32 1.5 YES 2.5 Catastro- Airtek Looks o.k.
(RT) 34 (- 37 (- 31 (- .062 142 .]20 phic McDonnell-
41 (- _OOF) 40OF) 40OF) W W W Douglas
40OF) .091 .202 .160
44 39RT 40RT 35RT B B B 16 A l A 32 1.5 YES 2.5 Catastro- Airtek Looks o.k.
[RT) 34 (- 37 (- 31 (- .062 .142 .120 phic McDonnell-
11 (- 40OF 40OF) 40OF) W W W Douglas
_OOF) .091 .202 .160
S.F. = STATIC FIRING CDDT = COUNT DOWN DEMONSTRATION B= BASE METAL W = WELD OR WELD HAZ
A=ASSUMED CYCLES
SUMMARY-SATURN V
AS-S03
VESSEL MATERIAL
CONDITION VESSELCONFIGURATION TEMPERATURE PRESSURE
DESIGNATION ANDDIMENSIONS °F (PSIG) FLUID ALLOWABLES
BY USED
DESIGNACTIVITY
NO. BASE DIA_ I WALL 1 OPER'I DPER- TEST
PART NAME SERIAL MATERIAL& WELD METHocWELD METER LENGTH THICK-NESSDESIGN OPER- I PROOF DESIGN ATING
MAX PROOF BURST ATING PROOF BASE METAL WELD METAL
NUMBER NUMBER CONDITION FILLER SHAPE (INCHES (INCHES (INCHES) ATION
S-IVB MCDONNEI DOUGLAS (CONTINUED)

CONT IA49990 (Repressurization
System--8 per stage)
C S/N 22 Forged Ti6AL TIG Sphere 25.2611-- B -40 -40 -40 3200 32(0 4800 8000 He He MIL-HDBK-5A MIL-HDBK-5A
Ti6AL4V 4V- IPO0 .334 to to to H20

STA STP 128 W +210 +l?O +210
IP20047 0308 .452
D S/N 78
E IS/N 80
F S/N 81
!
!
G S/N 83 !
_0 r I r r I r r r
H S/N 97 Forged Ti6AL TIG Sphere 25.26_ B -40 -40 -40 3200 3200 4800 8000 He He MIL-HDBK-5A MIL-HDBK-5A (.,,"I
Ti6AL4V 4V- IPO01
.334 to to to H20
STA STP 128 W +210 120 +210 O0
IP20047 0308 .452
5 Helium Control Sphere

1A43857-501 (Pneu. Con-
trol System--I per stage)
A S/N 33 Forged Ti6AL TIG Sphere 5.83C -- B MIL-HDBK-5A
-125 -125 RT 1600 1600 2400 400( He N2 MIL-HDBK-5A
Ti6AL4V 4V-- IPO0 •040
to to H20
Ann. STP 077 W +160 +160
IP20047 0308 ! .054

(COLD) IA48858-I (LOX
i
Pressurization and LH 2
LOX Burner Systems--
i
r r
9 per stage)
A S/N If07 Forged NO Pres. Sphere 8.064 -- B -412 -412 -423 3200 3200 5340 7100 He He MIL-HDBK-5A MI L-HDBK-5A
Ti6AL4V Fil- Butt .170
_12 _12 at at at LH 2 LH 2
Ann. ]er Weld W
IP20047 to -412 -423 423
IPO0 .182 +70 +12o F oF 6r
O76 750 @ 3500
RT at RT
SUMMARY-SATURN V
8A
AS-503

KIc Th_esh'd
values OPERATING
PRESSURE
PROOFFACTOR FACTOR PROBABLE MANUFACTURER
(Oper. Fluid) (INCHES) PRESSURE Operating Fluid) REMARKS
ORSOURCE
NO, KSI(IN)I/2 KSI(IN)I/2 SCREEN_ ITHRESHOLD
CYCLES
EXPERIENCED ANT I CI APT E D GUARANTEEC
PRESSURE BY PROOF R_
_IN,PROOF l
ADEQUAC_ _l.
_ BURST
_RESSUREE
SSUREj _. FAILURE
MODE
BASE WELD BASE WELD;ED BY|CRIT CRITICAL MAX.
METALMEIAL METAL METALiPROOF| OPERATING CYCLES TEST ]PER.PRESSURE )PER-PRESSURE
S-IVB MCDONNELL DOUGLAS (CONTINUED)
44 39RT 4OPT 35RT B _B B 16 A IA 32 1.5 YES 2.5 Catastro- Airtek Looks OK

(RT) 34 (. 37(- 31(- 062 i.142 .120 )hic McDonnell-
41(-40OF) _ 40OF 40OF) W W W Douglas
40OF) .091 .202 .160
r 1 r r 1 t i I
] (.n
I 44 39RT 4OPT 35RT B B B
I
DO (RT) 34(- 37(- 31(- .062 .142 .120
16 A IA 32 1.5 YES 2.5 Catas tro-
)hic
Airtek
McDonnell-
Looks OK
41(- 40oF)
40oF)
40oF)
. w Douglas
4O0F) i.O91 .202 .16O
CO
bo
A 44RT 39RT 4OPT 35RT B B 30 16 A 1A 22 1.5 YES 2.5 Catastro- Airtek Looks OK
40(- 33(- 36(- 30(- .029 .053 .038 l )hic McDonnell-
25OF) 125 125°F) 125OF) _ W W Douglas
i _F) .0-39 .072 .050
!
I
i
!
1 r 1 f 1
r
71RT 5OPT 64RT 45RT B B B 297 1.67 YES 2.2 Catastro. Menasco Looks OK
53(- 40(- 48(- 36(- .022 .072 .063 _7
phic
423 423 423OF) 423OF) W W W
°F) °F) .015 .055 .041
B=BASE METAL A=ASSUMED CYCLES W= IELD AND WELD HAZ

SUMMARY-SATURN V
AS-503
VESSEL MATERIAL
CONDITION VESSELCONFIGURATION TEMPERATURE PRESSURE FLUID ALLOWABLESUSED
DESIGNATION ANDDIMENSIONS °F (PSIG) BY DESIGNACTIVITY
WELD METAL
NO. PART NAME SERIAL MATERIAL& METER LENGTsH NESS
THICK- DESIGN AT!ON
OPER- DESIGN MAX AT!
ATING OPERNG[PROOF
TEST _ASE METAL
NUMBER NUMBER CONDITION FILLER METHOD SHAPE (INCHES)(INCHE) (INCHES)
S IV8 :DONNELI DOUGLAS (CONTINUED)

(COLD) IA48858-I (LOX
Pressurization and LH 2
LOX Burner Systems --
9 per stage) 7100 He He MIL-HDBK-5A MIL-HDBK-5A
No Pres. Sphere 3.064 -- B.170 -412 -412 -423 3200 3200 5340
B S/N Ill7 Forged
Fil- Butt W.182 ± 12 -+12 at at at LH 2 LH2 )
Ti6AI4V
-423
Ann. ler Weld to
P20047 IPO0 +70
±!2OF
-412 _ 23 °F !
750 @ 3500
076 !
RT at RT
!
C S/N I121
D S/N 1124 )
! O0
E S/N 1136
F S/N 1142
G S/N 1144
H S/N 1149
r r
L L i ,. i r r I
-412 -412 -423 3200 3200 5340 7100 He He MIL-HDBK-5A MIL-HDBK-5A

S/N 1152 Forged No Pres. Sphere 8.064 -- B.170
Fil- Butt W.182 +12 +12 at at
Ti6AI4V at LH 2 LH 2
to $412 z423 -423
Ann. ler _eld
+70 12OF o F OF
IIP20047 IPO0
076 750 @ 3500 i
RT at RT
7 Helium Cold Sphere

1A49991 (LOX Pressuriza-
tion and LH2/LOX Burner
Systems---3 per stage) 5000@ He He MIL-HDBK-5A MIL-HDBK-5A
No Pres. Sphere 8.064 -- B.082 -423 -423 -423 2000 2000 3000
iA S/N 24 Forged
Ti6AI4V Fil- Butt W.082 to
- _F23 LH 2 LH 2
Ann. ler Weld +160
IP20047 IPO0
076
B=BASE METAL W=WELD AND WELD HAZ

SUMMARY-SATURN V 9A
AS-503
KTH i FLAW SIZE SERVICELIFE BURST

KIC Thresh'd Values OPERATING
PRESSURE
PROOFFACTOR FACTOR PROBABLE MANUFACTURER
(Oper. Fluid> (INCHES) PRESSURE REMARKS
Operating FI ui d) _IN PROOF _IN.BURST FAILURE ORSOURCE
NO. KSI(IN)I/2 KSI(IN)I/2 _%R_E_- THRESHOLD CYCLES PRESSURE
ANT BY PROOF
ICI APT E D GuARANTE EO _RESSUR_II ADEQUAC_ 'RESSURE_. MODE
BASE WELD BASE WELD CRIT CRITICAL EXPERIENCED CYCLES TEST )pER.PRESSUREI DPER.PRESSUI_E
METALMETAL IMETAL METAL PROOF OPERATING
S-IVB M( ]3NNELL JOUGLAS ((ONTINUED)
Catastrophic Menasco Looks o.k.

297 l.F7 YES 2.2
B 53-7](R'1 SORT
40(- 64RT
48(- 'l 45RT
36(- B.022 B 072 B.063
423 423 423 423 W W W
OF) OF) OF) OF) 015 .05_ .041
C
!
D
i
E
O0
F
° 1
297 1.67 YES 2.2 Castastrophic Menasco Looks o.k.
I 71RT 50RT 64RT 45RT B B B
53( 40(- 48(- 36(- .022 072 063
423- 423 423 423 W W W
OF) OF) OF) OF) .015 055! 041
38 1.5 YES 2.5 Catastrophic Menasco Looks o.k.

A 71RT 50RT 64RT 45RT B >T B >T 16A IA
53(- 40(- 48(- 36(- .065 _T W .073
423 423 423 423 W
OF) OF) OF) OF) .050
i i i h i i
T=Thickness C=Cylinder Base Metal A=Assumed Cycles

lO
SUMMARY-SATURN V
AS-503
VESSEL MATERIALCONDITION VESSEL CONFIGURATION TEMPERATURE PRESSURE FLUID ALLOWABLESUSED

DESIGNATION AND DIMENSIONS OF (PSIG) BY DESIGN ACTIVITY
! WALL
BASE OPER- I
NO. PART NAME SERIAL THICK- OPER- ATING
WELD WELD DIA-I GN PROOF
BURsT OPER - TEST BASE METAL WELD METAL
NUMBER NUMBER MATERIAL& METERILENGTH NESS DESI DESIGN MAX PROOF ATING PROOF
CONDITION FILLER METHOD SHAPE (INCHES)(INCHES) (INCHES) ATION
S-IVB CDONNELI DOUGLAS (CONTINUED)
7 Helium Cold Sphere

IA4999] (LOX Pressuriza-
tion and LH2/LOX Burner
Systems--3 per stage)
B S/N 77 Forged No Pres. Sphere _.064 -- B.082 -423 -423 -423 2000 2000 3000 5000@ He He MIL-HDBK-5A MIL-HDBK-5A
Ti6AI4V Fil- Butt
W.082 to -423 LH 2 LH 2
Ann. ler Weld +160 OF
IP20047 IPO0
076
C S/N 80 Forged No Pres. Sphere 8.064 -- B.082 -423 -423 -423 2000 2000 _3000 5000@ He He MIL-HDRK-5A MIL-HDBK-SA
Ti6AI4V Fil- Butt _.082 to
Ann. ler Weld +160 -_F23 LH2 LH 2
IP20047 IPO0 (jrl
076 !
! 8 Air Tank IB55725-1 (jr1

IB55408 (Auxiliary
CO Hydraulic System---I O0
per stage)
A S/N II Forged No Pres. Sphere 8.064 -- B.072 -80
-80 RT 600 600 1200 2400 Air H20 MII-HDRK-5A MIL-HDBK-5A
Ti6AI4V fil- Butt W.072 to to Air
Ann. let _ELD +160 +160
IP20047 IPO0
D76
9 Accumulator IB29312
(Hydraulic System--
High Pressure--l per
stage)
A S/N 54 Forged No No Domed 5.00 19 D.285 -35 -35 RT 3650
Ti6AI4V Weld Weld cy!. C.260 to to 3650 7300 1400C Np H20 MIL-HDBK-5A NO WELD
Ann, +;75 +275
IP20047 (Oil) I N 2
/oA
SUMMARY-SATURN V
AS-503
KTH FLAWSIZE SERVICE LIFE BURST

Kic Thresh Ld Values OPERATING PRESSUREPROOFFACTOR FACTOR PROBABLE MANUFACTURER REMARKS
(Oper. Fluid) (INCHES) PRESSUREOperatin 9 Fluid)
OR SOURCE
NO. KSI(IN)I/2 KSI(IN)I/2 SCREEN- THRESHOLD CYCLES ANT iCIAPT ED GUARANTEED MIN'PR°°F PR_
MIN.BURST FAILURE
BASE WELD
BASE WELD ED BY CRIT CRITICAL EXPERIENCED
PRESSURE BY PROOF P_ ADEQUACY / MAX. MODE
IMETALMETAL METAL METAL PROOF OPERATING CYCLES TEST DPER.PRESSURE OPER-PRESSURE
S-IVB M(DONNELL )OUGLAS ( IONTINUED)
38 1.5 YES 2.5 Catastrophic Menasco looks o.k.

71RT 50RT 64RT '45RT B B B
16A IA
53(- 40(- 48(- 36(- .022 .072 .063
423 423 423 423 W _ W
OF) OF) OF) OF) .015 .055 .041
(J3
38 1.5 YES 2.5 Catastrophic Menasco looks o.k. I :
71RT 50RT 64RT 45RT B B B
53(- 40(- 48(- 36(- .022 072 .063 16A IA
423 423 423 423 W W W
-,j
! OF) OF) OF) OF) .015 D55 .041 CO
I,o
16A IA NONE 2.0 YES 4.0 Leak _enasco if bottle does not
71RT 50RT 64 45 B=-T _>T B>T
leak during pre-
71(- 50(- W_T _>T W_T
flight pres.- leak
80OFI80OF)
should not develop
during flight.
A 44 40 - DoT )_T D_-T 16A IA NONE 2.0 YES 3.9 Leak Bertea
C ;_T C_T Products if cylinder does
.165 not lea_in preflight
pressurization no
leak in flight should
occur.
T=THICKNESS C=CYLINDER BASE METAL D=DOME B=BASE METAL W=WELD AND WELD HAZ A=ASSUMED CYCLES
SUMMARY-SATURN V
II
AS-503
APOLLO LAUNCH VEHICLE PRESSURE VESSELS FRACTURE MECHANICS ASSESSMENT
VESSEL VESSELCONFIGURATION TEMPERATURE PRESSURE

MATERIALCONDITION ALLOWABLESUSED
DESIGNATION AND DIMENSIONS oF (PSIG) FLUID BY DESIGN ACTIVITY
BASE IWELD DIA_ I WALL
NO. PART NAME SERIAL MATERIAL& WELD METER LENGTH THICK-_ OPER- PROOF DESIGN A_ING PROOF
DESIGN ATION OPER-mAx BURSTATINGPRooFOPER-
TEST BASE METAL WELD METAL
NUMBER NUMBER CONDITION FILLER METHOZ SHAPE (INCHES)(INCHES) (INCHES)
NESS
I
S-IVB ICDONNELL DOUGLA_ (CONTIfUED)
Accumulator Housing and

Cap lA83362-501
IA83361-_ (Hydraulic
System Low Pres_ure--
1 per stage)
S/N50 Forged No No Domed 7,874 7 O0 D 198 -35 -3B RT 180 180 465 775 Oil N2 MII -HDBK-5A
A12014 Weld Weld cyl. to to
-T652 3.56D C.218 +275 +275
OQ-A-367 Dome
Helium ExDulsion Tank

(Teflon Bladder)
N204 - MMH C_
IB3946_ I
(Auxiliary Propulsion
System--2 per stage)
S/N 21 Forged No TIG Domed 12.50 39 D.04n +40 -40 RT 200 200 413 550 He He MIL-HDBK-5A MIL-HDBK-5A
! Dome fil- IPO0 Cyl. W.040 to tn O0
(MMH) H20
Sheet let 077 C.02 K +105 +105
ZN204)
0 Cyl.
Ti 6Al 4V
STA
%IN 22 Forged No TIG Domed 12._0 39 D.04n +40 -40 RT 200 200 413 550 He He MI L-HDBK-5A MiI-HDBK-5A
Dome Fil- IPOOI Cyl. W.040 to to
(MMH H20
Sheet ler 077 C.025 +105 +I05
Cvl. :N204) I
Ti6AlaV
STA
Helium Tank
IB39317
System, Pressurization
--2 ner stage)
S/N12 _Forged Ti6AI TIG Dome 8.0 32 D 194 +70 +70 RT 3100 3100 4800 7200 He He MiI-HDBK-5A MIL-HDBK-5A
iDome _V IPO0 Cyl. W.194 to to
H20
Ti6AI4V AMS 077 C.18_ +165 +165
STA 4954
Cyl. Ann.
D=DOME C=CYLINDER SECTION W=WELD AND WELD HAZ

SUMMARY-SATURN V llA
AS-503

KIC Thresh'd Values OPERATING
PRESSUREPROOF FACTOR FACTOR PROBABLE MANUFACTURER
(Ope,_o_) (INCHES) PRESSURE Operating Fluid) REMARKS
OR SOURCE
NO. KSI(IN)I_2 KSI(IN)I/2 SCREEN- THRESHOLD
BASE WELD BASE WELD ED BY CRIT CRITICAL EXPERIENcEDCYCLES
ANT
GUARANTEEDpRESSURE
ICI APT E D BY PROOF )RESSUR_41N'PROOF
ADEQUACY MIN.BURSTpRESSURE_. FAILUREMoDE
il
CYCLES TEST / MAX.
)PER.PRESSURE OPER.PRESSURE
METALMETAL META. METAL PROOF OPERATING
I0 S-IVB _CDONNELL DOUGLAS CONTINL-D)
1 6A IA NONE 2.57 YES 4.3 Leak Bertea if tank does not

A 25 22 D_T D:,T D>T
Products leak in preflight
C IT C>T C :T
pressurization it
should be o.k. for
flight.
16A IA NONE 2.06 YES 2.75 Leak Bell Aero- if tank does not I
A 44 39 31 27 D-:-T D--T _>T ==_
W.038 W:-T I_T space Systems leak in preflight
C.021 C_T C T pressurization it
! should be o.k. for
¢oJ flight. O0
...-,i
D_-T )>T D_T 16A 1A NONE 2.06 YES 2.75 Leak Bell Aero- if tank does not
B 44 39 31 27
W.O3B _-T W>T space Systems leak in preflight
C.021 ::'T C:T pressurization it
should be o.k. for
flight.
12
A 44 39 40 36 D T D T D_T 16A IA C 158 ]..55 YES 2.3 Catastrophic I. Pressure

W.142 W_T W_'T W 60 systems looks o.k.
C.045 C C.088 2. McDonnell
.097 Douglas
D=Dome W:Weld and Weld Haz A=Assumed Cycles

T=Thickness C=Cylinder Base Metal NA:Not Applicable
SUMMARY-SATURN V 12
AS-503
VESSEL PRESSURE
MATERIALCONDITION VESSELCONFIGURATION TEMPERATURE ALLOWABLESUSED
DESIGNATION ANDDIMENSIONS °F (PSIG) FLUID
BY DESIGN ACTIVITY
NO. PART NAME SERIAL BASE IWELD
MATERIAL& .ELD D_A-]
METER
LENGTH WALL
THICK- OPER-
NUMBER NUMBER ATINGOPER'I BURsT OPER - TEST BASE METAL WELD METAL
CONDITION FILLER METHOD SHAPE (INCHES ( NCHES (INCHEs)NESS
DESIGN ATION PROOF DESIGN MAX PROOF ATING PROOF
S-IVB CDONNELI DOUGLAS (CONTINUED)

Helium Tank
1B39317
System, Pressurization
--2 per stage)
S/N 09 Forged Ti6Al TIG Dome 8 0 32 D.19a +70 +70 RT 3100 3100 4800 7200 He He MIL-HDBK-5A MIL-HDBK-5A
Dome 4V IPOO Cyl W.194 to to
Ti6AI4V AMS n77 C 185 +165 +165
_TA 4954
Cyl. Ann.
Solid Propellant
Motor Case
IA81960 Thiokol FR280
(U11age Motor-G Force
for start up--2 per _tage)
S/N K 801-7 !
Forged 17-22 TIG Dome 8.3]3 22.92 D.05_ -30 -30 RT 1390 1390 2200 -- Solid H20 MIL-HDBK_5A MiI-HDBK-BA
! SAE4135 AS Cyl. to to _Pro-
Co 190 KSI Girth Elip_- C.054 +155 +145 pell-
r_ Yd MIL- Weld oidal ant
CO
T-6735 Dome C.-79
r_
2:1
S/N K 801-8 Forged 17-22 TTG Dome 8.313 22.92 n.054 -30 -30 RT ]390 1390 2200 MIL-HDBK-5A
-- S.P. H20 MIL-HDBK-
SAE4135 AS Cyl. i to to 5A
190 KSI Girth Elips- C.054 +I_5 +I_5
Yd MIL- Weld nidal
T-6735 Dome C -79
12A
SUMMARY-SATURN V
AS-S03
SERVICELIFE
KTH I FLAW SIZE BURST
KIC I_re_h' drlu_)
_'_ FACTOR PROB#_LE F_NUFACTURER
(Oper. (INCHES) PRE.%UREOPERATINGPRESSURE PROOF FACTOR REMARKS
Operating Fluid)
, CYCLES ANT I CI APT E DGuARANTEEE _..PR00F _..BURST FAILURE OR SOURCE
IADEQUAC_
mRESSUR MAX ,RESSURE
NO. BASE WELD

KSI(IN)I/2 BASE WELD SCREEN-
KSI (IN)I/2 ED BY CRIT CRITICAL
THRESHOLD EXPERIENCED
" PRESSURE _.
BY PROOF }PER.PRESSURE _" MODE
)PER.PRESSURE
METALMETAL METAL METALIPROOF OPERATING CYCLES TEST
S-IVB MCDONNELL DOUGLAS CCNTINLiD)

12
Catastrophic I. Pressure
IA C 158 1.55 YES 2.3
B 44 39 40 36 D >T D_T D _T 1 6A looks o.k.
systems
W.142, W>T W>T
2. McDonnell
C.045 C.09; C.088
Douglas
13
NA 1.58 YES NA Leak Thiokol looks o.k. :l

A 90 60 81 54 D.040 D>T D >T NA
C.068 C>T C->T NA
CD 0-I
!
(._ CO
Co
B 90 60 81 54 E).040 )>T D_T NA NA NA 1.58 YES NA Leak Thiokol looks o.k.

C.068 C>T C>T
T=Thickness C=Cylindrical Base Metal NA=Not Applicable

SUMMARY-SATURN V 13
AS-503
VESSEL VESSELCONFI
GURATION TEMPERATURE PRESSURE
MATERIAL
CONDITION (PSIG) FLUID ALLOWABLES
USED
DESIGNATION ANDDIMENSIONS oF BY DESIGNACTIVITY
NO. BASE DIA- I WALL
PART NAME SERIAL OPER- OPER- TEST
MATERIAL& WELD WELD METER LENGTH THICK- OPER- PROOF
NUMBER NUMBER CONDITION FILLER METHOD DESIGN ATION DESIGN MAX
ATING PROOF BURST ATING PROOF BASE METAL WELD METAL
SHAPE (INCHES (INCHES) NESS
(INCHES)
IU - IB_
Gas bearing sphere

2 ft 3
20Z32013
(l per stage)
SIN 24 Ti6AI4V Ti6A]- TIG Sphere 18.76 -- B +200 20- +20O
3200 30_N 534B 7100 N2 H20 MIL-HDBK-5A MIL-HDBK-SA
STA 4V 0.P26 Expos 200
MIL-T AMS at 60= at at N2
W. -6B Fl_id +POOOF 200F 200OF 20OF
9047 4954 0.;26 to 60=20
Class 5 +140 AMB
Gaseou_ N2 sphere
165 in _
7909919
(l per stage) !
S/N 8 Ti6Al4V Ti6AI- TIG Sphere 6 838 -- B. +200 20- +200 3200 30_0 5O00 6400 N2 MIL-HDBK-5A
STA 4V H20 Mil-HDBK-5A C_
0.099 Expos 200 at 60z at at
MIL-T- AMS r2OOnF _OOF t2OOOF 200oi N2
! W. -65 Fluid
19047 4954 0.13_ to 60:2N CO
(..,o
Cla_s 5 +140 AMB ro
Methanol-water
accumul ator
POZ4207
(l per _tage)
S/N A1 _061- ,No Mech. Sphere 5.00 -- B. 70 70 70 16 16 75 __
T6 iWeld Fast- 0.059- NO WELD
N 0
CH_OH A_r0
H MIL-HDBK-5A
QQ-_- ened
250111
Water Accumulator
with Polyurethane
Bladder
20A42122
(l per stage)
S/N Al 5052- Al TIG Cylin- I0.5 25 B. 70 70
N 4043 der 0.059 70 5 5 17 (210 H20 H 0 MIL-HDBK-5A MIL-HDBK-5A
act.) A_r
QQ-A- Flat W.
250/8 Head 0.059
B = BASE METAL = WELD AND HAZ

SUMMARY-SATURN V 13A
AS-503

MANUFACTURER
KIC Oper. rloid)
T,res,'_Values (INCHES) PRESSURE
O(Ope
PERATING
rating PRESSUREPROOF
Fluid) FACTOR FACTOR PROBABLE REMARKS
MIN.PROOF --FIN.BURST FAILURE OR SOURCE
NO" KSI(IN)I/2 KSI(IN)I/2 SE%REBEyN- THRESHOLD CYCLES _NTICIAPTED GUARANTEED
BY PROOF
PRESSUR
_ .ADEQUA
CY PRESSURE
_. HODE
BASE WELD BASE WELD CRIT CRITICAL EXPERIENCED PRESSURE TEST OPE R.PRESSURE OPE R-PRESSURE
METALMETAL METAL METAL PROOF OPERATING CYCLES
A 44 39 40 35 B.042 116 .094 16 A 1 A 246 1.66 YES 2.2 Catastropic (Airtek) Glass bead peened 4%
W.033 .092 .074 each side. Appears
OK
(jm
l
A 44 39 40 35 B.038 .168 .084 16 A 1 A 40 1.66 YES 2.0 Catastropi c (Airtek) Glass bead peened 4%
_.050 .114 each side. Appears
OK
I C_)
Co
Ol
A 50 1o 45 No "T >T >T 16 A l A (NA) 4.7 YES No test Leak IBM Low pressure tanks
!eld Weld req'd not serialized.
Appears o.k.
50 45 45 40 -T z-T _-T 16 A 1 A (NA) 3.4 YES No test Leak IBM Low pressure tanks
req'd not serialized.
Appears o.k.
T = THICKNESS NA = NOT APPLICABLE

14
SUMMARY-SATURN V
AS-503
MECHANICS ASSESSMENT
APOLLOLAUNCH VEHICLE PRESSURE VESSELS FRACTURE
ALLOWABLESUSED
VESSEL-_ MATERIAL
CONDITION ANDDIMENSIONS 1 (PSIG) BY DESIGNACTIVITY
). DIJ- HICK-
DESIGNATION I BASE ] ..... ,ETIR _GTH NESS '1
WALL °F__N
R- E_ ol R-I ROOF
AI ___ .ASE METAL WELD METAL
PART NAME SERIAL I MATERIAL& ELD ,,ArL INC_ _ _ iSIGN __ -- --
NUMBER
NUMBER _N LLER -- ___ -- _ _ _ .... "_ __
-2 EN( - Rd LE'DY DIV. d CO_ -II A -IYB>

!
1 Start Bottle Gaseous

Hydrogen 307562 c-as
H2 MIL-HDBK- MIL-HDBK-
(5 per S-II Stage) L097 300 +2 1400 O0 14!0
;ph me 311 0 '0_0 0 r 5A 5A
A S-II Position #1 Forged i( _L A_R
1.210 to
J2051-4067991 Ti6AL4V V 0
140
ST/
B S-II Position #2 1786

J2053-0062
_.138
1800
C ;-II Position #3
12059-0075 i
L097 1 1786 !
D ;-II Position #4 i
]2045-0042
i
B.097 -300 1800
! E S-II Position #5 CO
J2055-4076660
, I r r
_.210 to
-140
r
L
_2( 1400 )0 1800 Gas. MIL-HDBK-5A MIL-HDBK-5A
.31 B.097 .300 )o 70 -0
F -IVB Forged ri AL Spl-=re
W.210 to ) H2
2071-4068446 Ti6AL4V _V
-140 _o
I
SUMMARY-SATURN V
AS-503
I KTH I FLAWSIZE I SERVICELIFE

KIC Thresh'd
Values (INCHES) l PRESSURE}PERATING PRESSURE PROOF FACTOR ] FBUcRTSoTR
..........................I
(Oper. Fluid) (Operatinl Fluid) PROBABLE MANUFACTURER REMARKS
IO.
;As"SI
I _JE_D)
I/2 KSI(IN)I/2 'CREEN_ THRESHOLDI CYC,IFS ANTICIAPTED ;UARANTEEDpRESSUR _-x
BASE I WELDI'!D BY| ;RIT CRITICALIEXPERIENCED PRESSURE BY PROOF MIN.PROOFMAx
_. 'DEQ JACYr"FAILUREj
'RES _uRST .l MODE OR SOURCE
IET iL IE,ALI METAL, METALLPROOF _ _ (note ] ) CYCLES TEST OPEP_PRE_S_SSURE
..... )PER)RESSURE
ing (note
i l}
l ] J- 2 {ema i n-
ENGINE RDCKETDYNE DIV. F NR(OI S-II ANI S-IVB)
A 9.0B 61 5 1.0422 NA _.0422 HA NA NONE .975 N( 2.0 1. Weld Leak WR (Col) Adequacy verified
RT (R) , 2. Possible by analyses and
2.33 65 Ic 40.55 54.11 _.1840 NA 1.1840 Catastrophic NDT ia_peCt,_en
-20) (-!OC (-_DO (-200
OF) )F) CF) OF)
B Appears o.k.
1.089 HA l.lO0 psi I I
C 3.0388 NA 1.0422 7,at 1400 I(1493 ps _6at Catastrophic Airtlte
_.089 NA I.I00 psi 1400 psi oi
1.0388 HA _.0422 , 7 at 1400 ](1440 psi l_ 1400 p i 1.28 YIS Catastrophic Airtlte
I D 3.0388 HA L0422 II at 1400 I(1455 psi 12 at Catastrophic Airtite CO
_.089 NA l.lO0 psi 1400 psi rx)
E ].0388 NA 1.0422 9 at , 12 at I. Weld Leak NR (Col)

_.164 NA 1.1840 1400 psi I(1485 ' 1400 psi 2. Possible
l r r i psi ) . , Catastrophic
F 49.0 61.,= 40.55 54.li 3.0388 HA 1.0422 II at l(1500 psi lO at 1.28 YIS 2_0 I. Weld Leak NR (Col) Appears o.k.
(RF) (IT) (-200 (-200 V.164 NA _.1840 1400 psi 1400 psi "- 2. Possible
52.3 6_.I OF) OF) Catastrophic
(o.)0 (.2C
:) )F]
NOTI 1: Assutned :hat tin at relie pressure is mini_ _ If relief valve

/
presBu_c is helc one hour, 11 tanks except 0)42 and 0_62 _il have
zerol gue 'anteed fe.
B=BASE META W=WELD AND WELD HAZ NA=NOT APPLICABLE

15
SUMMARY-SATURN V
AS-S03
VESSEL MATERIALCONDITION VESSELCONFIGURATION TEMPERATURE PRESSURE FLUID ALLOWABLESUSED

DESIGNATION AND DIMENSIONS °F (PSIG) BY DESIGN ACTIVITY
NO, PART NAME SERIAL

BASE METAL WELD METAL
BASE I METERDIA-
LENGTH THICK-NFqS OPER- DESIGN ATINGMAx PROOF BURST ATING PROOF
NUMBER NUMBER MATERIAL&coNDITION
FILLERWELDMETHoDWELDSHAPE (INCHES)(INCHES (INCH') DESIGN ATION
J-2 ;NGINE ROCKETI iYNE DIVISION OF NR(ON -II AND S-IVB_

(CONIINUED)
Start Bottle Gaseous

Helium (Inner) 307562
(5 per S-II Stage)
(l per S-IVB Stage)
S-II Position #1 _+20 1 MIL-HDBK-SA MIL-HDBK-5A
-300 -300 320O 5700 7750 Gas. H20
J2051-4067991 Forged Ti6AL TIG Sphere ]2.464 -- B.153 7U_o 3200
to to He; i
Ti6AL4V 4V i W.218
-140 -140 Gas.
STA
H2
S-II Position #2 i
J2053-0062
E_
S-II Position #3
!
J2059-0075
E_
S-II Position #4
!
)2045-0042
(.0 O3
O0
S-II Position
)2055-4076660
#5
L i , r r r r I r
S-IVB Forged Ti6AL TIG Sphere

W.218
-300
to
-300
to
7o+
° 32oo 3200 5700
7750 Gas.
He;
H20
MIL-HDBK-5A MIL-HDBK-5A
J2071-4068446 Ti6AL4V 4V 12.46, -- B.153

STA -140 -140 Gas
H2

15A
SUMMARY-SATURN V
AS-S03

KIC Thresh'd Values
OPERATING PRESSUREPROOF FACTOR FACTOR PROBABLE MANUFACTURER
(Oper. Fluid) (INCHES) PRESSURE
(Operating Fluid) REMARKS
NO. KSI(IN)I/2 SCREEN_ ITHRESHOLC CYCLES _NTICIAPTED GUARANTEED MIN.PROOF PRESsuRMIN'BURSTFAILURE
ORSOURCE
KSI(IN)I/2
BASE WELD BASE I
WELD ED BYICRITICRITICAL EXPERIENCED PRESSURE _.ADEQUACYI
BY PROOF PRESSUR [:]ODE
METALMETAL METAL METAL PROOF| IOPERATING CYCLES TEST DPER.PRESSURE DPER.PRESSURE
L
J-2 NGINE - -II AND S-IVB'_
ROCKETDYN DIV. F NR_N
(CONT NUED)
38 33 34 30 B.037 NA B.072 16A IA 51 1.78 YES 2.4 Catastrophic NR (Col) Appears o.k.
i W.060 NA W.ll4
i
i
Airi Be
B I
i I •
Airite
-.j
C i OO
Airite
I
(._ D
i NR (Col)
E
] i I ] r { r
, I
F 38 33 34 30 B.037 NA B.072 16A 1A 51 1.78 YES 2.4 Catastrophic NR (Col) Appears o.k.
W.060 NA W.ll4
B=BASE METAL W=WELD AND WELD HAZ A=ASSUMED CYCLES NA=NOT APP ICABLE
D5-15782
1.3 SM/SPS PROPELLANT TANKS EVALUATION
The four main propellant tanks in the CSM-I03 SM/SPS were evaluated as
part of the JSAT study. Tank integrity can be assured by fracture
mechanics analysis provided the following tank temperatures are not
exceeded at S-IC End Boost:
TANK MAX. SAFE TEMP. (o F.)
Oxfdi zer Sump 107

Oxidizer Storage 107
Fuel Sump 120"
Fuel Storage 120"
"120 o Fo is the limit of the evaluation data.
The basis for this evaluation is:
a. An acceleration load effect which increases the membrane stress

in the lower dome as shown in Table D-I.
b. Tank pressure at launch is 160 psig which results in 175 psi

pressure difference at S-IC End BooSt.
Co Tank cyclic pressure history from Vendor plus 3 cycles to 182 psig
at KSC in the OCP procedures and pressurization to 160 psig for
launch,
d. Flaw growth during depressurization from 300 psig proo_ test assumed
to be zero.
TableD-I is a summary of stresses, flaw sizes, and maximum acceptable

temperatures. The applicable fracture mechanics curves for the four
tanks are presented in Figures D-I throughD-4.
D-40
TABLE _I. SUMMARY OF AS-503 SM/SPS PROPELLANT TANKS FRACTURE MECHANICS EVALUATION
51" DIA I 45" DIA 51" DIA 45" DIA

FUEL FUEL
SUMP STORAGE SUMP STORAGE
OXIDIZER ! OXIDIZER S/N 2OO058 S/N 3O0058
S/N 200061 S/N 300061
90.05 90.05 56.33 56.33

Propel I ant
Density @ 70°F (#/ft 3)
Internal Pressure 175.0 175.0 175.0 175.0

(Psia)
I
Pressure Due to 32.4 32.5 20.7 20.3

"g" Load (4.1 g's)
(Psi)
!
Total Internal Pressure on 207.4 207.5 195.2 195.3

! Dome (Max) (Psia)
O0
IMaximum Membrane Stress in 94.6 93.5 89.0 88.0

Dome (KS!)
Maximum Potential Flaw at .0142 O. Ol 37 O. O143 O. Ol 38

launch (,nch_s)
I
Critical Stress at Max. 136.6 135.3 136.5 135.5

Potential Flaw (KSI)
Stress Intensity Ratio Kli with .694 .691 .652 .649
! Klc
Potential
iMaximum
Membrane S:;ress Flaw and Maximum
j 107°F i 107° 120°+ ,i 120o+
i,',!aximum Safe Operating Temp. (OF)
_ Assuming No Flaw Growth During Depressurization From Proof Test

D5-15782
SM/SPSISUMP
PROOF 309 Psi DONE/OXIDIZER
140"
Klc:3l KSI (IN)

130
120,
II0-
I070F KTH u')
hl
! 100-
iv
0.
85°F KTH
FLAW CYCLIC FLAW

0 q
BY PROOF GROWTH
70-
i! ,
I • I |
.010 .015 .020 .025 .030

FLAW DEPTH (a) IN
FIGURE D-I. OXIDIZER SUMP TANK CRITICAL FLAW SIZE
D-42
D5-15782
SM/SPS/ STORAGE
DOME/OXIDIZER
PROOF 309 Psi
140
-:37 KSI (IN)_2

130
120 -
llO
"F.
!
k_
a: 100
F-- 107° F KTH
MAX o AT END BOOST

m
93.5 Ksi
90
OF KTH
I
FLAW SCREENED BY PROOF CYCLIC FLAW
80
GROWTH
I
I
70- !
| I I
.010 .015 .020 .025

FLAW DEPTH (m) IN
FIGURE D-2. OXIDIZER STORAGE TANK CRITICAL FLAW SIZE
D-43
D5-1 5782
SM/SPS/SUMP
DOME/FUEL
PROOF 308 Psi
140 -
130 "
Kic:37 Ksi(IN)½
120
llO"
J,
u'}
F-
L#')
120°F KTH
90 MAX 6- AT END
m
BOOST - 89.0 Ksi
FLAW SCREENED
BY PROOF
70
It
|,
I I i
L
.010 .015 .020 .025 •030
FLAW DEPTH (a) INCH
FIGURE D-3. FUEL SUMP TANK CRITICAL FLAW SIZE
D-44
D5-15782
SM/SPS/STORAGE
DOME/FUEL
PROOF 310 Psi

140"
130
Kit:37 Ksi (IN)½

120
.110,,
u')
_=.
I00 -
90-
MAX AT END BOOST
88 Ksi
80 g
FLAW SCREENED BY PROOF
lO- CYCLIC FLAW GROWTH
I
I
I
!
I | |
.010 .015 .020 .025
FLAW DEPTH (a) IN
FIGURE D-4. FUEL STORAGE TANK CRITICAL FLAW SIZE
D-45
D5-15782
!<
D-46
D5-1 5782
APPENDIX E
HONEYCOMB ASSESSMENT
1.0 GENERAL
This appendix contains a presentation of a honeycomb ma-

terial assessment made during the course of the AS-503
Structural Integrity Assessment.
E-l
CRITERIA FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF HONEYCOMB
0 QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS ESTABLISHED & DEMONSTRATED
0 "IN-PROCESS" CONTROL REQUIREMENTS ESTABLISHED AND SATISFIED

m
O0
i
r_
0 "IN-PROCESS" TEST REQUIREMENTS ESTABLISHED AND SATISFIED
0 FINAL ACCEPTANCE TEST REQUIREMENTS ESTABLISHED & DEMONSTRATED

PLAN &APPROACH TO ASSESS HONEYCOMB STRUCTURE
@ DOCUMENTATION REVIEW AND ASSESSMENT
MRB ACTION
I
rrl
!
@ ON-SITE REVIEW
O0
MATERIALS
MANUFACTURING
QUALITY ASSURANCE
ASSES_,._
_J.i_i.T OF ,, IN-PROCESS" AND END ITEM STORAGE & HANDLING
AREAS PRESENTED FOR COMPARISON OF IU & SLA HONEYCOMB STRUCTURES
CONFIGURATION
PANELS
SHELL
MATERIALS
(jm
!
m QUALITY ASSURANCE
i
OO
NDT & DESTRUCTIVE TECHNIQUES
0 ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS
• MANUFACTURING PROCEDURES
• STORAGE & HANDLING

D5-15782
C_ C_
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SI3_Vd JO 13S _3_07 30 S13S OMi
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S_VW3W I NOIIVH,gDI -IN03
S3_N13N_1S 8_0313NOH V7S tiNY NI 30 NOSI_VdR03
COMPARISONOF iU AND SLA HONEYCOMBSTRUCTURES
IU SLA
! I,,_ I _ _-,_AL
METLBOND 329 IS QUALIFIED TO MIL-A-25463,

-ADHESIVE SYSTEM TYPE !I AND MMM-A-132, TYPE II.
5052-H39 CORE MATERIAL IS QUALIFIED TO 5052-H39 CORE MATERIAL IS

ALUMINUM CORE
MiL-C-7438 QUALIFIED TO MIL-C-7438
AL U_,iI _CUI_I FACE 2024-T81 CLAD FACE SHEET

SHEETS 7075-T6 CLAD FACE SHEET IS QUALIFIED
TO QQ-A-250/12C IS QUALIFIED TO QQ-A-250/
5D
I
. m
i ,, OUALITY
IBM DEMONSTRATES CONFORMANCE TO THESE NR CONDUCTS THE FOLLOWING
P_
SPECIFICATIONS BY CONDUCTING THE FOL- TESTS:

LOWI _'_G TESTS:
LAP
DRUM SHEAR}
PEEL TABS
PI-TENS!ON
LAP SHEAR 1 TABS & PANEL
PORT_n=AR > NO TESTS ARE RUN ON FULL
SIZE PANELS TO DEMONSTRATE
SANDYl _''_,_,BEAM SHEAR t LOAD BEARING CAPABILITY
EDGE CO[gPRESSION _ PANELS
f
EDGE TENSION I.
DRUi.i PEEL
N.D.T.
FLIGHT PANELS ULTRASONIC _FLIGHT PANELS
\
ULTRASONIC
RADIOGRAPHIC.
POR_ASHEAR I
RADIOGRAPHIC!
J
COMPARISON OF SM, SLA, AND IU HONEYCOMB STRUCTURES
SM SLA IU
ADHESIVE HT 424 HT-424 METLBOND 329

PRI_,I,ER
' HT 424 FM-47 NONE
LAP SHEAR STRENGTH 2223 PSl M!N

,,,,,. TE?'iP ) 2300 PSI 1900 PS! 2720 PSl AVE
.__CE
EXPERI _'_ EXTENSIVE PRIOR NO PRIOR EXTENSlVE PRIOR
INDUSTRY USAGE INDUSTRY USAGE INDUSTRY USAGE !
rr3
I
O0 (Jm
(30
CORK AREA 90 PERCENT I00 PERCENT NONE PO
223°F AVG. MAX SKIN TEMP i

MAX TEMPERATURE 211°F 255°F
225°F AVG° CORE TEMP
VENTED YES NO
MAX. PRESSURE 37 PSI AVG. CORE PRESS 18 PSI 19,8 PSl
*BARE 220°F CORKED 230°F, RADIATOR 232°F

I D5-15782
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3_IISS3Ed
ASSESSMENT OF SM AND SLA HONEYCOMB STRUCTURES
SLA-II
SM
POTENTIAL FOR PRESSURIZATION
CORK LIMITS TEMPERATURE TO 211°F.
CORKED AREA- 90 PERCENT
VENTING LIMITS PRESSURE TO 18 PSI*
RADIATOR SURFACE TEMPERATURE : 232°F
DEMONSTRATED CAPABILITY : 38 PSI (SLA-9)
!
SANDWICH TEMPERATURE CORKED AREA = 230 °F- **
m ASSESSMENT - ADEQUATE
!
SANDWICH TEMPERATURE BARE AREA : 220 °Fo O0
FINAL ASSESSMENT DEPENDENT ON MR REVIEW

SANDWICH PANEL SKINS NOT VENTED RESULTS
APPROXIMATE EQUALIZED PRESSURE = 37 PSI*
ASSESSMENT - ADEQUATE BASED ON HIGHER

ADHESIVE STRENGTH OF SM
THAN SLA AND AVAILABLE
PRESSURE TEST DATA.
*WITH ENTRAPPED WATER
**THIS IS THE TEMPERATURE UNDER THE CORK WHERE THERE IS

PROTUBERANCE HEATING, SUCH AS THE RCS QUADS AREAS.
ASSESSMENT OF IU AND SLA HONEYCOMB STRUCTURES
SLA-II
IU

NO CORK - TEMPERATURE - 255°F. *
CORK LIMITS TEMPERATURE TO 211°F *
NO OUTGASSING OF ADHESIVES
NO WICKING BY ADHESIVE SKRIM
VENTING LIMITS PRESSURE TO 18 PSI**
NO WATER USED IN NDT
NO WATER INGESTED - SEALED
DEMONSTRATED CAPABILITY - 38 PSI (SLA-9) !
PRESSURE OF ENTRAPPED AIR - 19.8 PSI MAX
m
! PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT - ADEQUATE OD
P_
ASSESSMENT - ADEQUATE
* OUTER SKIN TEMPERATURE

** WITH ENTRAPPED WATER
HONEYCOMB
STRUCTURES
AREAS INVESTIGATED:
INSTRUMENT UNIT (IU)
SPACECRAFT LUNAR MODULE ADAPTER (SLA)
SERVICE MODULE (SM)
COMMAND MODULE (CM)
rrl
I
CONCLUSIONS: I
(.}'I
"-.I
ANTICIPATED FLIGHT TEMPERATURES AND PRESSURES ARE CO
WITHIN STRUCTURAL CAPABILITIES OF THESE ELEMENTS
THESE ELEMENTS, IN THEIR PRESENT CONFIGURATIONS,

ARE ADEQUATE FOR THEIR ASSIGNED MISSION ON AS-503
D5-i 5782
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D5-1 5782
I.I S-IC-3 STAGE
I.I.I LOX Tank, Lower Bulkhead
The material design allowables for each structural element

of the S-IC-3 aft LOX Bulkhead are presented in the fol-
lowing tabulations. Design allowables for the weldments _
are also presented° All allowables shown are "A" values.
Following each set of material design allowables is a list

of part numbers, including part name, for which the allow-
ables are applicable.
2219-T87 Sheet and Plate .040-2.500
-297°F RT
Ftu KSI (L) 74°4 62
Fty KSI (L) 58.5 50
E 106 psi 11.3 10.5
These material design allowables are applicable to the

following elements:
60B12202 Gore Apex

60B12204 Gore Base
60B12206 Centerpiece
60B12209 Transition Cone
60B12213 Fitting, Drain and Fill, LOX
60B12223 LOX Fill Fitting
60B12203 Gore Apex Suction Fitting
2219-T851 Plate, 5.001-6.000
-297°F RT
Ftu KSI (T) N/A 54
Fty KSl (T) " 41
E 106 psi " 10.5

following elements:
60B12201 Y-ring
F-2
c--
v 0 CO 0_ (.n
0 ET_ r-- OJ
0 c'- c-
0 q.) O
c-"
ILl
cO qJ
_0 c- t--
0 °t- °r- L_ L_
CO °r-
OJ 0 0
t£) _'3 r-- C_ CO C_ _'_0 _ r_
ri- fl. .r-
CO CO °r- (_
oI c_ C,d
c"
°i--
c"
,f-
0
._.
t_
c-
0
c-
.r'-
"0 "0
C_J
O0
°t- l,
o
q3
o "0
LL
0 LO 0 /2X -" " o
ee_
c-
I
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O O_
c_ C_ O E
LL C_
! CO !
I
u') u_l--
C_
"0 •r- c-
O0
O _ -_ --
1.4") I._ rO _ 0 " r- • I----
I
O0 ('v3
O_
r-- I--
CO
C_
"I-'- 0 _"
C_J
_ t_ _"_ 3:,'-- r--
cr_ CO 0
--J --J
I.-- .,_ 0
v v
qJ I I I _ _ r--'-I-) (_
0_'_ =E:: C_ r._ CO (,n E)') c" _--
_-_ _
t_
0'_ oO 0
(IJ -I.-) 0_ _r_ 4-_ -_
_,, x/ _--
1.4- 1.4- O,J _c_ L_- In- C_J
r'ES
c-
cO r_ .Q
I--I
In- I.L.
I--
CM
D5-15782
(b) 2219-T81, room temperature properties
Ftu Fty Elong (in 2")
Base Metal KSI 61 44 6%
Transverse zensile
properties of MIG
wel dments (flush) KSI 38 26 3%
All Y-ring welds are according to lOMO1648B and use 2319

filler wire. The shielding gas may be any one of argon,
argon/oxygen, argon/helium or helium. The welds are butt
fusion welds by mechanized MIG. Test specimens must meet
the following strength requirements:
Ftu
Un-notched 30 KSI
Notched 34 "
Notched and stress relieved 36 "
F-4
0
0
I.l_ c- %
13 CO 0
0 CO O,.l • .p-
0 tO tO 0"_ O
OU
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tC_
4-_ ,,
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o
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tC_
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•v' v' ,--
>_ :,l
I_L. Ll_
D5-15782
60B15842-I Gusset, Struct.

60B14067-I, -3 Zee, LOX Vent
60B14068-I, -3 Angle
60B15864-I, -3 Angle
68B14222-I Skin, Access Door
60B14066 -I, -3 Beam, LOX Vent
60B14069-I Hat
60B14070-I Angle
60B14831-I Doubler
60B14004-I, -2 Filler, N 2 Bottle Support
60B14004-3 Filler, N2 Bottle Support
60B15650-I Plate, Splice, Leg, J-ring
60B15833-I, -3 Intercostal
60B15831-I, -3 Angle
60B15864-I, -3 Angle
60B14822-I, -3 Guide Bracket Assy., GOX Line
60B15040-I Doubler, LOX Vent Fitting
60B14019-I Stiffener, N 2 Bottle Support
7075-T6_ T6511 Extrusions <,25Q

& 7079-T6 Extrusions_1.5000
RT 1 50 ° F 200 o F
Ftu KSI (L) 78 74 69
Fty KSI (L) 70 67 64
E 106 psi 10.3 I0.0 9.8

following elements:
60B14430-I Stiffener, Hat, Skin Panel

60B14230-I Stiffener, Hat, STA 1420 to 1459
60B14233-I Zee
60B15210-I Ring Segment, Interface Ring
60B15230-I, -3 Angle, Splice, Outer, Interface Ring
60B14233-I Zee
60B14201-I, -2 Stiffener Assy., Umbilical Door
60B15863-I Tee
60B14224-I Angle, Access Door
60B14227-I Stiffener, Angle, Access Door
60B15050-I Stiffener, Hat, Fitting Tie
60B15210-I Ring Segment, Interface Ring
60B14650-I Stiffener, Hat, Upper
60B14820-I Stiffener, Hat, Fitting
[_ Applicable when 7075-T6 material is used.
F-6
°_
LL It_ c-
I.L c-
0 r---
o rI -_ o r---
0 _-- _" * EU 0
E_ CO 0 ° O c-
0 P_- _ 0 0 "_ 0 0
i---
oJ E
L
(1)
E_
o II-
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c_ ..Q
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oJ u L % •p _..
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o
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L_
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t-" V _- (_
0 cO _0 V ,p
I_l- c-
V) O
_M 4_ P_
00 I-I
ol I
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._J
0 CO O -_J
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E O_ E
c-' I
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! •_ 00_ O0 0 • r- r--
O0 (I") 0
_." r-- _,_ -,I" ,--- L (_ OJ
t_ (_ Lr)
•IJ E:)') ,-'-
p_ 4-_ (_ E mm
_._ 0000 _=:: -r- O
LI_ I__
_0 (_ O
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_0 ..E: O
C" O E--q--
I---
c- c-
O O
0
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I.I-
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0 _ cO CO
0 O
0 '_0 _ •
0 0
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"_" 0
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0
0
L_
t_ t_ O _-_
0 O_
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0 r_ -I_ o 0 t_
o 0 _" 0
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tn _l_ !
"_ i,
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0 0 4-- I---
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OO
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c- O
_--4-
D5-15782
6061-0 Plate <3.000
RT 1 50°F 200°F
Ftu KSl (L) 16 16 16
Fty KSI (L) 6 6 6
E 106 psi 9.9 N/a N/A
These material design_a.llowables are applicable to the

following elements:
60B14328-I Plate, Umbilical Frame
2024-T4 Drawn Tube <.5000
RT 150°F 200°F
Ftu KSI (L) 64 61 59
Fty KSI (L) 40 39 38
E 106 psi 10.5 10.4 10.3

following elements:
60B15846-I Struct.
2024-T351 Rod_6,500
RT 1 50 ° F 200 ° F
Ftu KSl (L) 62 60 58
Fty KSI (k) 40 39 38
E 106 psi 10.5 10.4 10.3
These material design_allowables are applicable to the

following elements:
60B15847-I End Fitting
The allowables shown for 150°F and 200°F are based on

data from the Aerospace Structural Metals Handbook_ Vol.ll
[_The RT allowables are "S" values from MIL-HDBK-5A. The
150°F and 200°F allowables are percentages of RT figures
based on data from the Boeing Design Manual.
F-9
D5-15782
2024-0 Clad Sheet and Plate_l.750
RT 150°F 200°F
Ftu KSI (L) 22 NA NA
Fty KSI (L) 8 NA NA
E 106 psi 10.5 NA NA

following elements:
60B14605-I, -2 Cover Assy., Electrical Opening
7079-T6 ForQings 3,001-4,000
RT 150°F 200°F
Ftu KSI (L) 71 71 71
Fty KSI (L) 61 61 61
E 106 psi 10.3 10.2 I0.I
These material design _llowables are applicable to the

following elements: 15"_
60B15020-I Forging, Frame, LOX Vent
7075-T6 ExtrusiQn _ .250-.499
RT 150°F 200°F
Ftu KSl (L) 81 77 71
67
Fty KSI (L) 73 69
E 106 psi 10.3 I0.0 9.8

following elements:
60B15620-I Angle Splice, Inner, J-ring

60B15420-I Angle Splice, Inner, Channel
[_ These allowables are "S" values from MIL-HDBK'5A
F-IO
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D5-15782
IA39316-81 Stringer , Thrust Structure

" -83 " " "
" -85 " " "
" - 89 " " "
" -91 " " "
" -93 " " "
" -95 " " "
" - 97 " " "
" -99 " " "
II It
IB28969-I Stringer
7075-T6 Extrusion_.249
RT 250°F
Ftu KSI (L) 78 63
Fty KSl (L) 70 58
E 106 PSI 10.3 9.5

following elements:
IA39316-121 Tee, Thrust Structure

" - 123 " " "
" - 1 25 " " "
" - 1 35 " " "
Ii
IA39316-51 Brace ,r
7075-T6 Clad Sheet, .040-.062
RT 250°F
Ftu KSI (L) 72 58
Fty KSI (L) 63 52
E 106 PSI 10.3 9.5
These material design allowables are applicable to the fol-

lowing elements:
IA39316-59 Intercostal, Thrust Structure

" - 61 " " "
U II
" -137 Doubler,
" - 1 91
F-23
I
0
4-
(]J
e-"
0
r-'-
O0
(.3
¢3_I IJ. 0_
,T,- LL- '_"I
o
0 0
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t._ Lf3 Ol 0,,I
(.)
¢_ C,.l
M:)
0 S- ¢..)=
ol r_ "_
(I") _.)I
":m'-
Od 0.31
CO
S- d.J I
(._I
¢IJ I,
e-
cO _ 0 _1 _1 0
l-- c- I-"
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c'-
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r'_
r--"
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0
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0 v v i,_
O0 C)
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(._ O0 0 •_ <_ ":::3"
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v' v" _-.
(.v..) •.I-+ r-- O0
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(i)
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4-) r-"l
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:3 C_1 C_J S.- I
4-.)= = C) I O
(.) -,
S.- 01
S- O0
::3 _1 4_
O
S- O0
'ill
O0 4-) C_l I._O
rC_l
4-) LA_
-_ loCI I
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..C:= -: • 0 0 0
I_ _0 r-- t-"
F-- _- CO r-"
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e- _')1 0
I--- _ol
I---I r--
_D
% =
°r- b"
I--- I
E L._I c- 4-_
c- E --_ .r- c- !
•r-- = = i"',,I
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4-) S.- .,-- 4J
C_ _ LL bO ,cO
•"_ °° _)
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v v C_-
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D5-15782

lowing elements:
IA39286-13 Segment, Aft Common Bulkhead

IA39286-15 P l ate , " " "
IA39280-13 Segment, Fwd " "
IA39280-7 P 1 a t e, " ,I ,,
IA39308-41 Segment, Dome Assy., Aft, LOX Tank
tt n II II il II
" -43
II li I| il ii II
" -45
II II II |1 II II
" -47
II II II II II li
" -49
il II II I| II II
" -51
II II II |1 II II
" -53
I! II II II I! II
" -55
2014-T6 Extrusion, .500-.749
RT -300°F
Ftu KSI (L) 64 72
Fty KSI (L) 58 66
E lO 6 PSI I0.5 ll.6

lowing elements:
IA39286-9 Ring, Aft, Common Bulkhead

IA39280-II Ring, Fwd, Common Bulkhead
Heat Resistant Phenolic, Glass Reinforced Honeycomb Core

Room Temperature Mechanical Properties
Longitudi nal Transverse Compression

properties Proper _ies ProDert les
Core Shear Shear Shear Shear Com. Com.
Stren _th d_ul.u s _St_n_th
.Mo du] us_ _St_r_e_n.q___h__M_o.. __M.Q
d.lLl us
Desi 9nati on
Cl ass I, 180 PSl 10,800 85 PSl 5117 410 PSI 42,000

Type I, PSI PSI PSI
Grade 4 [_>
II
Cl ass I, 265 " _

115, 400 136 " 7610 800 72,000
Type I, I PSI PSI PSI
Grade 6 _>
The Class I, Type I, Grade 4 core is equivalent to HRP-3/16-

GFll-4.0 core while the Class I, Type I, Grade 6 is nearly
_]Z_>Density is 4.0 pcf

Density is 5.5 pcf
F-26
D5-1 5782
equivalent to HRP-3/16-GF 12-6.0 core. The cores with the

beginning designation "HRP" are used in the S-IVB-503.
These sandwich design allowables are applicable to the fol-

lowing elements:
IA39292-I Core, Common Bulkhead (HRP-3/16-GF 12-6.0)

IA39292-501 Core, Common Bulkhead (HRP-3/16-GF 11-4.0)
Typical strength of 2014-T6 butt welds similar to those in

the S-IVB common bulkhead are presented in the next three
data listings.
Typical Weld Strengths
2014-T6, MIG or TIG Butt Welds, 4043 Filler
Ftu Fty Elong.
As welded properties 34 KSl 28 KSI 4% in 2 in.

at room temp.
NOTE: These are general values for both MIG and TIG weld-
ments in 2014-T6 aluminum of any thickness
Typical Weld Strengths
2014-T6 Sheet, .I00 thick_ MIG Butt Welds_ 4043 Filler
Ft u Fty El ong.
Transverse Welds
(a) Room temp. 45.0 KSI 32.5 KSl 4% in 1 in.
(b) -423°F 55.5 " 46.1 " 1.7 "
Longitudinal Welds
(a) Room temp. 60.0 " 40.0 " 9.4 "
(b) -423 °F 79.2 " 61.2 " 5 o0 "
NOTE: These weld strengths are undoubtedly more representa-

tive of S-IVB weldments since the values were obtained from
a Douglas report in which MIG and TIG welds were evaluated
in an attempt to improve tankage welds.
[_i>From The Welding Handbook, American Welding Soclety and

Welding Kaiser Aluminum, Kaiser Aluminum & Chem Sales Inc.
Douglas Aircraft Co., Rpt. SM48383, "Evaluation of MIG &

TIG Welding Processes for Joining 2014-T6 Aluminum Alloy"
F-27
D5-15782
Typical Weld Strength
2014-T6 Sheets .125 thick_ MIG Butt Welds_ 4043 Filler
Ft u Fty Elong.
As welded properties 42.1 KSI 35.5 KSI 1.7% in 2 in.

at Room Temp.
NOTE: These weld strengths tend to support those in the

preceding tabulation. It should be noted that Douglas
specification DPS 14052, Section 8.2.7, calls out a minimum
ultimate tensile strength of 38.5 KSI for preproduction
fusion butt welds in aluminum Saturn assemblies.
Typical strength of fillet welds similar to those on the

Common Bulkhead to LOX Tank Aft Dome lap joint are presented
in the following tabulations. The strength of fillet welds
is a function of the shear strength of the filler alloy.
Shear Strength vs Fillet Weld Size [_Z>

4043 Filler Alloy
Shear Strength-KSl per lineal in. of weld

Fillet Weld Size-inches
Loading Direction .125 .250 I .375 .500 .625 .750
Longitudinal
Transverse 1.5
2.0 3.0
3.5 1 4.0
5.5 5.5
7.5 7.0
9.0 II8.5.0
These values were determined from tests of fillet welds in

aluminum lap joints. The strength of 4043 aluminum filler
alloy, calculated from those tests are shown in the data which
fol 1 ows :
Typical Strength of 4043 Aluminum Alloy Filler
Property Strength - KSI
16
Longitudinal Shear
Transverse Shear 21
It should be noted that Douglas specification DPS14053, section

8.4.8, calls out a minimum ultimate tensile strength of lO
KSI for preproduction fusion fillet welds in aluminum Saturn
assemblies.
_3>NASA-CR-74992, Development of Welding Techniques & Filler

Metals for High Strength Aluminum Alloys
From The Welding Handbook, American Welding Society & Weld-
Ing Kaiser Aluminum, Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales Co.
F-28
(1)
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D5-15782
1.3.2 Continued
75OF 285°F 375°F
64 49 36
Fty KSI (L)
E 106 psi I0.3 9.3 8.6

following elements:
IA39264-I13 Support
-139 Skin
-145 Fitting
-147 Fitting
-149 Fitting
-151 Fitting
-161 Frame
-163 Plate
-201 Frame
-203 Frame
-209 Frame
-217 Fitting
-219 Angle
-225 Angle
-221 Fitting
-227 Fitting
-223 Skin
-249 Channel
-259 Channel
-281 Strap
-291 Skin
-293 Channel
-299 Channel
-315 Strap
-317 Channel
-335 Channel
-337 Intercostal
-351 Frame
-381 Strap
-383 Frame
-384 Frame
-603 Splice
-627 Strap
-645 Plate
-653 Channel
-703 Spacer
-739 Skin
-75 Strap
-77 Skin
-789 Plate
-85 Support
F-32
c-
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L.I- CO O ___.__ ___ i_ r-_.r., t-_ _-_ _-_ .r- r_
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D5-1 5782
1 .3.2 Conti nued
IA39264-759 Stringer
-769 Cap
-775 Cap
-821 Cap
-823 Cap
-825 Cap
-89 Cap
-777 Stri nger
-779 Strl nger
-781 Strl nger
-811 Strl nger
-817 Stri nger
-837 Strl nger
-839 Strl nger
-851 Strl nger
-793 Angl e
-833 Angle
-91 Cap
-93 Angle
-97 Tee
IA58875-I Frame Segment
IA74879-I Splice
IA74880-I Splice
-501 Splice
IB32058-I Splice
IA69873-I Stringer
IA58608-I Angle Segment
-501 Angle Segment
IA58609-I Angle Segment
-501 Angle Segment
IA67605-I Splice
7075-T6 Clad Sheet, .188-.249
75°F 285°F 375°F
Ftu KSl (L) 75 56 40
Fty KSl (L) 65 49 36

E 106 psi 10.3 9.3 8.6

following elements:
IA88817-I Plate
IA93571 -I Plate
F-36
D5-15782
1 .3.2 Continued
7075-T651 Bar_4.000
75°F 285°F 375°F
Ftu KSI (L) 77 58 41
66 50 37
Fty KSI (L)
E lO 6 psi 10.3 9.3 8.6

following elements:
IA88816-I Fitting
IA92868-I Fitting
-501 Fitting
IA93572-I Fitting
IA93888-I Fitting
-2 Fitting
IA86248-I Support Assy.
-2 Support Assy.
IB38194-I Fitting
-2 Fitting
-501 Fitting
IB44308-I Fitting
6061-T6 Sheet and Plate_ .010-2.000
75°F 285°F 375°F
Ftu KSl (L) 42 34 29
Fty KSl (L) 36 31 26
E 106 psi 9.9 9.5 9.1

following elements:
IA72749-5 Panel, Umbilical
2024-T351 Bar 3.001-4.000
75°F 285°F 375°F
Ftu KSI (L) 62 53 48
F-37
c- e"
r,
o o
o O 0 _ 0
_._
CO
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(.) (.)
°r- or-
o o
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CO O_ 0 _ _ °
C_
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F-- (4--
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D5-1 5782
1.4 IU-503
1.4oi I U-503 Shell
The following listings include information concerning the

minimum qualification and acceptance allowables for those
critical elements of the IU-503 shell. In the case of the
inner and outer skins and the honeycomb core, material
and sandwich design allowables are presented as well. The
minimum qualification and acceptance allowables were ob-
tained from the specifications referenced by the drawings.
Mechanical Properties, Minimum

5052 Aluminum Honeycomb Core
Minimum Strength
Density
Property 3.1 pcf 4.3 pcf 8.1 pcf
Core flatwise compression 200 psi 350 psi lO00 psi

Core shear modulus 25000 psi 38000 psi 78000 psi
Sandwich shear strength 86 Ib/in. 150 Ib/in. 472 Ib/in.
width width width
Delamination of core Shall withstand 12.5 Ib of
tension load
These mechanical properties are minimum qualification and

acceptance allowables for core of 5/8 inch thickness,
similar to that used in the following elements:
30Z13030 Core, 5052 Al Honeycomb, Density 8.1 pcf

30 Z l 3031 " " " " " 3. l "
30Zl 3035 " " " " " 4.3 "

Adhesive - Metlbond 329
Minimum Strength
Property Average Individual
l-Sandwich peel strength 12.3 in-lb/in.

(a) Room Temp. width
[_Per MIL-C-7438, qualification and acceptance tests
[_These values are representative of 5/8 inch thick

core. The 30Z13030 and 30Z13031 core are .90 inch
thick while the 30Z13035 core is .250 inch thick°
[_Per MIL-A-25463 and MIL-A-5090
F-39
D5-15782
2,Flatwise Tensile strength

(a) Room temp 450 psi 400 psi
(b) 300°F 350 psi 315 psi
(c) -67°F 350 psi 315 psi
3-Flexural strength (total

load)
(a) room temp. 1750 lb. l 575 Ib.
(b) 300°F 1500 lb. 1350 lb.
1750 lb. 1575 lb.
(c) -67°F
(d) after 192 hrs at
300°F 1200 lb. I080 lb.
4-Creep deflection in flexure

when loaded for 192 hrs. at:
(a) room temp. .025 in.
max/lO00
lb. load
(b) 300°F .050 in.
max/lO00
lb. load
5-Tensile shear
(a) room temp. 2250 psi
(b) lO min. at
300°F 2000 psi
(c) 192 hr. at
300°F 2000 psi
(d) lO min at
-67°F 2250 psi
6-Fatigue strength
(a) room tempo 750 psi at
I06 cycles-
600 psi at
I07 cycles
7-Creep-rupture
(a) room temp. and 1600 .015 in. max
psi deformation
after 192 hr.
(b) 300°F and 800 psi (Same as a)
8_ensile shear
(a) room temp. after 30
days salt water spray 21 O0 psi
(b) room temp after 30
days at 120°F. 95-I00%
relative humidity 2100 psi
F-40
D5-15782
(c) room temp. after 7 2100 psi

days immersion in
jet engine fuel
JP-4 (MIL-J-5624),
anti-icing fluid
(MIL-F-5566), hy-
draulic oil (MIL-H-
5606), standard test
fluids (MIL-S-3136,
type III) and 30
days immersion in
tap water.
9_Pi-Tension
(a) room temp 950 psi
(b) 350°F 765 psi
The minimum mechanical properties numbered 1 through 9 are

minimum qualification and acceptance allowables for the
following adhesive:
30Z13032 Adhesive, core-to-metal
The minimum mechanical properties numbered 5 through 8 are

minimum qualification and acceptance allowables for the
following adhesive:
30Zl 3034 Adhesive, Metal-to-metal

Adhesive
Stress, psi
Property RT 300°F 350°F
Flexural stress 1480 940

Compressive stress 1480 1290
Shear stress 730 635
Tensile stress 400 300
Core beam shear stress
160
(a) 8.1 pcf core density
lO0
(b) 3.1 pcf core density
These minimum mechanical properties are minimum qualifi-

cation and acceptance allowables for the following adhesive:
30Zl 3042 Adhesive, Core-to-core
F-41
D5-15782
The material design allowables in this tabulation are "A"

values in all cases:
7075-T6 Sheet, .015-.039
RT 250°F
Ftu KSI (L) 76 62
Fty KSI (L) 66 55

E lO 6 psi I0.3 9.5
These. material design allowables are applicable to the

following elements:
30Z13105-3 Skin, outer

-5 Skin, inner

-5 Skin, inner

-5 Skin, inner

-7 Skin, inner
30Z13109-3 Face sheet

" 5 II II
Sandwich Design Allowables

5052 Aluminum Honeycomb Core
Transver_ e Shear Compre_ zion

_gnqitud nal Shear
Core
Shear Shear Shear Shear Com. Com.
Desig-
nation St r_nath Mndulu_ Str_noth iModulus Strenath Modulus
RT
8.1- 529 psi 312 psi 35800 llO0 psi 175i000
971440 psi
3/16- psi
.O03P
3.1-
3/16-
NNI P 114 " 2_NNN ii 70 i, IQOOO 200 P:i 49.000
4.3-
I/4-
.O02P 265 " 150 " 360 psi 68,000
48j800 " I_000
F-42
D5-15782
250°F
8.1- 271 psi 28,640 869 psi 148750
460 psi 77952 psi
psi psi
3/16-
.O03P
- 3.1-
3116-
99 " 61 " 8,000 158 " 41650
,ooIp 221400 "
4.3-
I/4-
231 " 39000 " 131 " 14_400 284 " 578O0
.NN2P
These sandwich design allowables are applicable to the

following elements:
30ZI 3030 Core, 5052 Aluminum Honeycomb

Density 8.1 pcf
30Z13031 Core, 5052 Aluminum Honeycomb
Density 3.1 pcf
30Zl 3035 Core, 5052 Aluminum Honeycomb
Density 4.3 pcf
The following materials:
30Z13033 Potting Compound

30Z13047 Adhesive, Metal-to-metal, Class II
are not referenced to any specification or test require-

ments by the Source Control Drawings. Both 30Z13033 and
30Z13047 materials are EPON 934, supplied by Shell Chemical
Company. It is noted that 30Z13047 is equal to and complete-
ly interchangeable with 30Z13033.
F-43
D5-1 5782
1.5 CONCLUSIONS
The material design allowables used by the stage contractors

in association with each of the identified critical elements,
have been compared to those recommended by JSAT, which appear
above. It was found that in most cases the allowables
originally used were equivalent to or conservativeas com-
pared to those recommended. The non-conservative discre-
pancies were investigated as to their impact on margins of
safety. There was no case in which the employment of the
non-conservative value resulted in a negative or zero
margin of safety. Thus it is concluded that the material
and weldment design allowables used by the contractors for
the identified critical elements, are satisfactory.
F-44

NASA Saturn V Rocket Structural Elements - 1968

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NASA Saturn V Rocket Structural Elements - 1968

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APOLLO/SATURN V

SPACE VEH I CLE SELECTED .

COMPANY - SPACE DlVlSlON

APOLLO/SATURN V SPACE VEHICLE SELECTED

MODEL NO. APOLLO/ CONTRACTNO. NAS8-5608, SCHEDULE IV

ORIGINA[. RELEASE - NOVEMBER 25, 1968

,t / s ,'7", _.,._ _ " . "J _,C

THE _ItU_J_I_G COMPANY SPACE DIVISION LAUNCH SYSTEMS BRANCH

-_ _ (X') 0 O0 0 .0 "-_ E5; O0 OO

r mr- r-- r (z_

3.4 MRB ACTIONS 3-14

3.5 HISTORY OF ELEMENT 3-15

3.6 ON-SITE REVIEW SUMMARY 3-16

SECTION 4 - S-II-3 FORWARD LH 2 4-I

4.0 SUMMARY 4-2

4.3 QUALITY AND RELIABILITY ASSURANCE 4-12

4.4 MRB ACTIONS 4-13

4.5 HISTORY OF ELEMENT 4-14

4.6 ON-SITE REVIEW SUMMARY 4-15

SECTION 5 - S-II-3 FORWARD SKIRT 5-I

5.0 SUMMARY 5-2

5.3 QUALITY AND RELIABILITY ASSURANCE 5-8

5.4 MRB ACTIONS 5-9

5.5 HISTORY OF ELEMENT 5-10

5.6 ON-SITE REVIEW SUMMARY 5-11

SECTION 6 - S-IVB-503 COMMON 6-I

6.0 SUMMARY 6-2

6_3 QUALITY AND RELIABILITY ASSURANCE 6-16

-13 Z£: _/) Gb o_ O :hE "_ ,O O0 0 -r- --_ ,O -n- -_

-'rl rT1 I_ ('_ I_ o_

g'_ 00(-_ 00(-_ O0

-0 fD-O fD-O (I)

•-'.(I) -_.rD -J. fD T-

-_. _ --_ _D_ -_ c-

S-IC-3 LOX TANK LOWER BULKHEAD

SELECTED ELEMENT REPORT

POS I PUS llI

LOWER LOX BULKHEAD

FIGURE l-I S-IC LOWER LOX BULKHEAD

The apex and base gores were fabricated in Wichita from

Following the milling operation, the segments were rough

The polar cap was machined from 2219 aluminum.

The Y-ring was made at Michoud from 2219-T351 aluminum

In conjunction with the Y-ring to bulkhead weld, a certi-

'- ZSLE_ L-EiCI

GORE TRIM MERIDIAN WELD BULKHEAD TRIM

FIGURE I-4 S-IC BULKHEAD ASSEMBLY, MICHOUD

1.3 QUALITY AND RELIABILITY ASSURANCE

1.3.1 Receiving Inspection (Raw Material)

The incoming raw material from Wichita was thoroughly in-

1.3.2 In-Process Inspection

The following brief outline depicts the types of inspec-

Non-Destructive Non-Destructive Non-Destructi ve

Non-Destructive Non-Destructive Non-Destructive

1.6 ON-SITE REVIEW SUMMARY

The on-site, selected element review was conducted during

The actual hardware being manufactured at the time, was

The AS-503 vehicle had the solid Y-ring. At a later

The TIG welding process was utilized on the bulkhead-

On the AS-503 aft LOX bulkhead assembly, the polar

All of the fittings on the AS-503 aft LOX bulkhead

the fittings were machined as an integral part of the

Deviations in contour on gore segments were often corrected

During construction of the AS-503, manufacturing was still