and choice: (1) their preferences for a wide range of sexual stimuli and activities, (2) their willingness toengage in morally questionable behaviors in order to obtain sexual gratiﬁcation, and (3) their willingnessto engage in unsafe sex when sexually aroused.There are good reasons, beyond introspection and casual empiricism, to suspect that sexual arousal willaffect these dimensions of judgment and choice. The sexual circuitry of men and women evolved not only toorchestrate sexual behavior but also to motivate it in suitable situations (Buss, 2003; Rolls, 1999). By exo-genously arousing male subjects we are, in effect, parasitizing men’s evolved psychological mechanisms,providing internal and external cues that would ordinarily be associated with increased odds of gainingaccess to what Buss and Schmitt (1993) refer to as ‘‘short-term opportunistic copulation.’’Most appetitive systems in the brain, including hunger and thirst, are designed to increase motivation dur-ing times of opportunity (Rolls, 1999), and there is no reason to expect sex to be an exception to the rule.When the brain receives cues that are commonly associated with opportunities for copulation, which wouldinclude experiencing a state of high sexual arousal, we should expect to observe an increase in motivation tohavesex.
Thisincreaseinmotivationshould,inturn,havediverseconsequencesforjudgmentsanddecisions.Consistent with such a prediction, prior research has shown that sexual motivation can distort judgments of the risk of contracting sexually transmitted disease (Blanton & Gerrard, 1997; Ditto, Pizarro, Epstein, Jacob-son, & MacDonald, 2005), and that it leads to steeper time discounting in males (Wilson & Daly, 2004).The next question is whether individuals can correctly estimate the effects of high sexual arousal states ontheir preferences and behavior. Based on prior research on ‘‘hot-cold empathy gaps’’ (Loewenstein, 1996;Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, & Rabin, 2003; Van Boven & Loewenstein, 2003), we anticipated that peoplewho were not aroused would underestimate the inﬂuence of emotional arousal on their preferences and deci-sions. Previous research has demonstrated hot-cold empathy gaps across several emotional states. For exam-ple, people who do not own an object underestimate how attached they would be to it and how much moneythey would require to part with the object if they owned it (Loewenstein & Adler, 1995; Van Boven,Dunning, & Loewenstein, 2000). People who are about to exercise predict they would be less botheredby thirst if they were lost without food or water than do people who have just exercised and are thirstyand warm (Van Boven & Loewenstein, 2003). People who are sated because they have just eaten are lesslikely to choose a high-calorie snack to consume at a well-deﬁned time in the future than hungry people whohave not eaten (Read & van Leeuwen, 1998), and people who are hungry because they have not eaten expectto be more interested in eating a plate of spaghetti for breakfast than people who are sated (Gilbert, Gill, &Wilson, 2002). Heroin addicts who are not currently craving because they just received a ‘‘maintenance’’dose of opioid agonist, value getting an extra dose a week later about half as highly as those asked to valuethe extra dose an hour earlier, before they have received their maintenance dose (Giordano et al., 2002). And,in the prior research most obviously relevant to the research reported here, men who are not sexually arousedpredicted they would be less likely to engage in sexually aggressive behavior than men who are sexuallyaroused as a result of viewing photographs of nude women (Loewenstein, Nagin, & Paternoster, 1997).A ﬁnding that sexual arousal affects predictions of the individual’s own judgments and behavior would notonly support the idea that arousal inﬂuences decision making, but also suggest that people have little insightinto these effects. If peoplewere aware of how their judgments and (hypothetical) decisions were beinginﬂu-enced by their own state of arousal then they could compensate for such inﬂuences in their judgments anddecisions. When not aroused, if they appreciated how being aroused would inﬂuence their responses andexpected to be aroused in the situation asked about in the question, they could adjust their answers accord-ingly. The same logic would apply to those who were aroused if they fully appreciated how the arousal wasinﬂuencing their responses.
We might also expect to observe a commensurate decrease in other dimensions of motivation (see, Brendl, Markman, & Messner,2003).
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making
, 19, 87–98 (2006)