FAILURES DUE TO SHEAR

BY : SAURABH SHAH

CODE : 1710
FACULTY : PROF. R.J.SHAH
Definition:
 Shear failure is actually a diagonal tension failure that is brittle in nature and
should be avoided.
 To better understand diagonal tension consider the basic mechanics of a
beam with no shear web reinforcing:

 Recall from Mohr's circle - an equivalent state of stress different than that
shown above is obtained by rotating the differential element 45°.
 This rotated element yields principal tension and compressive stresses which
are occurring simultaneously with the previous maximum fv state of VQ / Ib.
 In general this ft will exceed the inherent tensile strength of
masonry, before fv exceeds masonry shear strength.
 When this happens, diagonal cracks, originating at the N.A
begin to occur and grow with increases in beam loading.
Contents
 Introduction
 Shear Transfer Action and Mechanisms
 Failure Modes in Shear (Without Web Reinforcement)
 Factors affecting Shear
 Failure of corbels in shear
 Case study
 Few pictures of shear failure
 Bibliography
INTRODUCTION
• The early use of reinforced concrete was characterized by a large number of

patented “systems”, the design methods of which were generally not

brought to public attention.
• Study of the historical development of shear design was required so as to

find out the problems in basic shear design from the early days.
• The equations were brought to the codes after many experiments and

research work done by numerous people.

• Early pioneers of reinforced concrete before the year 1900 developed two

schools of thought pertaining to the mechanism of shear failures in

reinforced concrete members.
• One school of thought considered horizontal shear as the basic cause of

shear failure , The second school of thought, accepted by nearly all

engineers today, considered diagonal tension the basic cause of shear
failures.
THE MECHANISM OF SHEAR RESISTANCE IN REINFORCED
CONCRETE BEAMS WITHOUT WEB REINFORCEMENT

Equilibrium in the Shear Span of a Beam:

 The internal and external forces that maintain equilibrium for this free body,

bounded on one side by a diagonal crack, can be identified.

 It may be seen that the total external transverse force V, is resisted by the

combination of

1, A shear force across the compression zone (Vc)

2, A dowel force transmitted across the crack by the longitudinal

reinforcement (Vd)
3, The vertical components of inclined shearing stresses transmitted across
the inclined crack by means of interlocking of the aggregate particles.

 Thus, V = Vc + Vd + Va
As the shear force increases each of the above resistances reach their

capacity in the following order in the absence of web reinforcement.

1, Dowel action (Vd), i.e the resistance of the longitudinal reinforcing to a

frictional force of shear i.e.(15% to 25%) 

2, Aggregate interlock (Va), i.e. the tangential friction developed due to

the interlocking of the aggregate on the concrete surfaces on opposite

sides of the crack i.e.(33% to 50%)

3, Shear capacity of concrete in compression zone (Vc).i.e.(20% to 40% of

the total resistance) – it is the shear resistance of the uncracked section

above the crack.

 As load is applied to the beam, the noticeable change is the formation of

practically vertical tension cracks in the region of maximum moment. Here

the cracks develop almost perpendicular to the axis of the beam. These are
called flexural cracks.
 With increasing load, additional cracks form closer to the supports and

some of the cracks become slightly inclined toward the load.

 These are the regions of high shear and low moments and due to the

diagonal tension, the inclined cracks develop as an extension of the flexural

and are called web shear cracks.
 The cracks developed in the intermediate region and starts at the top of an

existing flexural cracks and propagates into the beam are called flexure
shear cracks.
 The contribution of shear reinforcement to the shear strength of a
reinforced concrete beam can be described as follows:

 It resists part of the shear, Vs. The stirrup passing across the cracks

carries shear directly.

 It increases the magnitude of the interface shear, Va, by resisting the

growth of the inclined crack. By limiting the opening of diagonal

cracks within the elastic range, it enhances and preserves shear transfer
by aggregate interlock.
 It increases the dowel force, Vd in the longitudinal bars, thereby

improving the dowel action. A stirrup can effectively support a

longitudinal bar that is being crossed by a flexural shear crack close to
it. It restrains the bars from prying off the covering concrete.

 The confining action of the stirrups in the compression concrete may

increase its strength.

 It suppresses flexural tensile stresses by the means of the diagonal

compression force resulting from truss action. The holding together of

the concrete on the two sides of the cracks help keep the cracks from
moving into the compression zone of the beam.
 The confining action of stirrups on the concrete increases the rotation

capacity of plastic hinges that develop in a member at ultimate load

and increases the length over which yielding takes place. These stirrups
wrapped around the core of concrete act like hoops and thus increases
the beam’s strength and ductility.
 It can be said that suitably detailed web reinforcement will preserve the

integrity, therefore the strength, of the beam mechanism, allowing

additional shear forces to be resisted by truss mechanism.
Failure Modes in Shear (Without Web Reinforcement)
The various failure modes in shear without web reinforcement are-

a) Diagonal Tension failure

 The shear failure always in the shear span when the a/d ratio is above 2.
The diagonal crack starts from the last flexural crack and turns
gradually into a crack more and more inclined under the shear loading.
 Such a crack comes not proceed immediately to failure, although in
some of the longer shear spans this either seems almost to be the case
or an entirely new and flatter diagonal crack suddenly causes failure.
b) Shear compression failure
 A large shear in short shear spans may initiate approximately a 45
degree crack, called a web shear crack, across the neutral axis before a
flexural crack appears. Such a crack crowds the shear resistance into a
smaller depth and thereby increasing the stresses, tends to be self-
propagating until stopped by the load or reaction. A compression
failure finally occurs adjacent to the load. This type of failure has been
designated as a shear compression failure because the shaded area in
Fig. also carries most of the shear and the failure is caused by the
combination. This failure occurs at a range of a/d between 1.0 and 2.5.
The ultimate load is sometimes more than twice at diagonal cracking.
c) Splitting or true shear failure
When the shear span is less than the effective depth d, the shear crack is
carried as an inclined between load and reaction that almost eliminates
ordinary diagonal tension concepts. Shear strength is much higher in
such cases. The final failure, as shown in Fig, becomes a splitting failure
or it may fail in compression at the reaction. The analysis of such an end
section is closely related to the analysis of a deep beam. This failure
occurs when a/d is less than unity.
Influence of Shear span to depth ratio on Shear

Shear resistance of beams decrease with the increase of shear span to

depth ratio
It is well established in both British and American design practice ( Evans
and Kong, 1967) (ACI-ASCE Committee 426, 1973) that the failure mode
of rectangular reinforced concrete beams without shear reinforcement is
strongly dependent on the shear span/depth ratio.
(a) for a/d > 6, failure usually occurs in bending;
(b) for 6 > a/d >2.5. the development of a flexural crack into an inclined
flexure-shear
crack results in diagonal tension failure,
(c) for 2.5 > a/d > 1, a diagonal crack forms independently but the beam
remains stable
until shear-compression failure occurs;
(d) for a/d < 1. the behaviour approaches that of deep beams
In addition to the shear-span to depth ratio. the contribution of the
concrete to the shear
strength, Vc, is dependent on a number of other factors including the
concrete strength (fi) the main tension reinforcement ratio (p) and the
beam size (b.d). These factors are
represented in both the ACI and BSI design formulae for Vc.
The shear strength of reinforced concrete beams may be substantially
increased by the
provision of suitable shear reinforcement, usually in the form of stirrups
or links, which
serve to intercept the diagonal shear crack. Thus, the external shear
force, V, is resisted
partly by the concrete, Vc, and partly by the shear reinforcement, V. such
that
V=Vc +Vs
Influence of Beam size on Shear 

 It has been shown by Kani (1967) and Taylor(1972) that larger beams are
proportionally weaker in shear than smaller beams; that is , the ultimate
shear stress reduces with beam depth . It is believed that this is because
the aggregate interlock contribution to shear strength Vc, does not
increase in the same proportion as the beam size, Design shear stress
values in BS8110 allow for the influence of the effective depth ,d. The
proportion of the strength that the bonded shear plates contributes is
also likely to change.
Web reinforcement contribution to Shear Strength

 Stirrups provide a contribution to shear strength if crossed by a diagonal

crack: therefore , the contribution of steel shear reinforcement can be
estimated on the basis of the cracking pattern , depending on the
number of stirrups intercepted by the primary shearcrack (Tompasand
Frosch 2002). It is known that the opening of the critical shear crack is
not same along its length. In particular , the opening of the shear crack
has the maximum value at the initiation of the critical crack, where the
stirrups yield , and a low value at the end of the crack near the
compressed zone, where the stirrups could not reach the yield stress
Location of Maximum Shear for Beam Design

Compression from support at bottom of

beam tends to close crack at support
 Clauses 22.6.2 and 22.6.2.1 stipulate the critical section for shear and
are as follows:
 For beams generally subjected to uniformly distributed loads or where
the principal load is located further than 2d from the face of the
support, where d is the effective depth of the beam, the critical sections
depend on the conditions of supports as shown in Figs.a, b and c and
are mentioned above.
 (i) When the reaction in the direction of the applied shear introduces
tension into the end region of the member, the shear force is to be
computed at the face of the support of the member at that section.
 (ii) When the reaction in the direction of the applied shear introduces
compression into the end region of the member , the shear force
computed at a distance d from the face of the support is to be used for
the design of sections located at a distance less than d from the face of
the support.
Design Shear Strength of Reinforced Concrete

 Recent laboratory experiments confirmed that reinforced concrete in

beams has shear strength even without any shear reinforcement. This
shear strength (τc) depends on the grade of concrete and the
percentage of tension steel in beams. On the other hand, the shear
strength of reinforced concrete with the reinforcement is restricted to
some maximum value τcmax depending on the grade of concrete. These
minimum and maximum shear strengths of reinforced concrete (IS
456, cls. 40.2.1 and 40.2.3, respectively) are given below:
Table 6.1 Design shear strength of Grade of concrete
concrete, τc in N/mm2 (100 As /b d)
M 20 M 25 M 30 M 35 M40
 

≤ 0.15 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.30

0.25 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.38
0.50 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.51

0.75 0.56 0.57 0.59 0.59 0.60

1.00 0.62 0.64 0.66 0.67 0.68
1.25 0.67 0.70 0.71 0.73 0.74

1.50 0.72 0.74 0.76 0.78 0.79

1.75 0.75 0.78 0.80 0.82 0.84
2.00 0.79 0.82 0.84 0.86 0.88

2.25 0.81 0.85 0.88 0.90 0.92

2.50 0.82 0.88 0.91 0.93 0.95
2.75 0.82 0.90 0.94 0.96 0.98
≥ 3.00 0.82 0.92 0.96 0.99 1.01
Maximum shear stress, τcmax in N/mm2

Grade of concrete M 20 M 25 M 30 M 35 M 40
and
above

Τcmax, N/mm2 2.8 3.1 3.5 3.7 4.0

Factors Affecting Shear Resistance:
 Concrete Strength

 Tensile reinforcement ratio

 Shear arm ratio

 Tensile reinforcement type, grade, arrangement

 Shape of cross section

 Section dimensions

 Web reinforcement types

 Spacing and arrangement of web reinforcement

 Loading configuration

 Beam types
Failure of corbels in shear

BEHAVIOR OF CORBEL
The followings are the major items show the behaviour of the reinforced
concrete corbel, as follows :
 The shear span/depth ratio is less than 1.0, it makes the corbel
behave in two-dimensional manner.
 Shear deformation is significant is the corbel.
 There is large horizontal force transmitted from the supported beam
result from long-term shrinkage and creep deformation.
 Bearing failure due to large concentrated load.
 The cracks are usually vertical or inclined pure shear cracks.
 The mode of failure of corbel are : yielding of the tension tie, failure of
the end anchorage of the tension tie, failure of concrete by
compression or shearing and bearing failure.
It is very common that corbels are failed in shear.
 Failure mechanism in corbels as under.

1. Flexural tension in corbels.

2. Diagonal splitting .

3. Sliding shear.
4.anchorage splitting.

5. crushing due to bearing

 Diagonal shear reinforcement in corbel.
IS CLAUSE FOR PROVISION OF SHEAR REINFORCEMENT IN
CORBELS
Shear reinforcement should be provided in the form
of horizontal links distributed in the upper two-third
of the effective depth of root of the corbel; this
reinforcement should be not less than one-half of the
area of the main tension reinforcement and should be
adequately anchored.
Case study shear failure
 Wilkins Air Force Depot, 1955

 Two warehouse roofs at Air Force Bases in Ohio and Georgia cracked
and collapsed under combined load, shrinkage, and thermal effects in
1955 and 1956.  122 m (400 ft) lengths of reinforced concrete roof
girders functioned as single units because of defective expansion
joints.  Other warehouses, built to the same plans, survived because
separation between adjacent two-hundred-foot bays was maintained
by functioning joints.  These failures led to more stringent shear
reinforcing steel requirements in subsequent editions of the ACI
Building Code.  In the warehouse structures, the concrete alone, with
no stirrups, was expected to carry the shear forces, and the members
had no shear capacity once they cracked (McKaig 1962, Feld and
Carper, 1997).
 At the Wilkins Air Force Depot in Shelby , Ohio , about 370 m2 (4,000
ft2) of the roof collapsed suddenly on August 17, 1955.  At the time of
collapse, there were no loads other than the self-weight of the roof
(Feld 1964, p. 25).

 The Air Materiel Command (AMC) built warehouses to a common

design at many Air Force bases and depots.  The original design was
developed in April 1952, with a modification to reinforcement made in
March 1954.  The Ohio warehouse had been built to the original 1952
design.  It was a six-span rigid frame building, 122 m (400 ft) wide and
610 m (2,000 ft) long.  The haunched rigid frames each had six 20 m
(67 ft) spans, and were spaced approximately 10 m (33 ft) on center.  
The concrete for each frame was placed continuously in a single working
day. Vertical steel plate construction joints were set at the center of each
span before concrete placement, but they may not have been effective
(Feld 1964, p. 25).

 Severe cracking had been observed two weeks before the collapse, so
the girder had been supported by temporary shoring.  The cracks
occurred about 0.45 m (1 ½ ft) past the end of the cutoff of the top
negative reinforcement over the columns (Feld 1964, pp. 26 – 27).  A
typical AMC warehouse frame is shown below.
 A second warehouse roof collapse took place at Robins Air Force Base
near Macon , Georgia , early on the morning of September 5, 1956. 
This warehouse had been built to the revised design.  The revision
added top bars and nominal stirrups, at a volume of about 0.06 %, for
the length of the frames.  This collapse included two adjacent girders
and about 560 m2 (6,000 ft2) of the roof.  Before the collapse occurred,
cracks in the concrete girders that reached 13 mm (½ in) in width had
been observed.  Feld (1964, p. 25) suggests “It seems that the extent of
shrinkage and resulting axial tensions may be somewhat related to the
speed of concreting or to the extent of each separate placement.” 
 In both cases, the design, materials, and workmanship were up to the
codes and standards of the day.  However, the failures had still
occurred.  Feld (1964, p 27) believed that “failure took place by a
combination of diagonal tension (shear) due to dead load and axial
tension due to shrinkage and temperature change.  Circumstantial
evidence suggested that high friction forces were developed in the
expansion joint consisting of one steel plate sliding on another; some
plates showed no indication of relative displacement since their
installation.”  In other words, the expansion joints locked and did not
function to relieve stress.
Building collapsed while under construction at 2000
Commonwealth Avenue, Boston, Massachusetts
 On January 25, 1971, two thirds of a 16-story apartment building
collapsed while under construction at 2000 Commonwealth Avenue,
Boston, Massachusetts. Four workers died after a failure on the roof
instigated a progressive collapse all the way to the basement, where the
men were found. Fortunately, the collapse occurred slowly enough for
most of the other workers to run to safety. The surviving workers'
descriptions of the failure provide a textbook definition of punching
shear. Low concrete strength due to inadequate protection against cold
weather contributed to low punching shear strength of the flat slab.
Inspection, quality control, planning, and supervision were for all
practical purposes absent from the project.
 The high-rise apartment building was made of cast-in-place reinforced
concrete flat slab construction with a central elevator shaft. was
designed to be sixteen stories with a mechanical room above a five-foot
crawl space on the roof. The structure also had two levels of
underground parking. A swimming pool, ancillary spaces and one
apartment were located on the first floor and one hundred thirty two
apartments were on the second through sixteenth floors.

 Construction began on the site late in the fall of 1969. Excavation had
been partially started a few years earlier. Most of the work was
subcontracted to area specialists. Only one representative from the
General Contractor was on site during construction. At the time of
collapse, construction was nearing completion. Brickwork was
completed up to the sixteenth floor and the building was mostly
enclosed from the second to fifteenth floors. Plumbing, heating and
ventilating systems were being installed throughout various parts of
the building. It is estimated that one hundred men were working in or
around the building at the time of failure (Granger et al. 1971).
Punching Shear Failure in the Main Roof at Column E5

 At about ten in the morning, concrete was being placed in the

mechanical room floor slab, wall, wall beams, and brackets. Placement
started at the west edge and proceeded east. Later in the afternoon, at
about three o’clock, most of the workers went down to the south side
roof for a coffee break. Only two concrete finishers remained on the
pouring level near line 4-1/2. Shortly after the coffee break, the two
men felt a drop in the mechanical room floor of about one inch at first
and then another two or three inches a few seconds later. That is when
the punching shear was noticed around column E5. The slab had
dropped five or six inches around the column and there was a crack in
the bottom of the slab extending from column E5 toward column D8.
Column E5 is located directly below where the concrete was being
placed for the mechanical room floor slab on the east side of the
building as shown in the following figure (Granger et al. 1971).
 A week after the collapse, Engineering News Record reported that
there were three possible causes of structural failure under
investigation: formwork for the penthouse floor slab collapsed onto the
roof, a heavy piece of equipment fell from a crane and started the
progressive collapse, or concrete placed during previous cold days had
failed (ENR, February 4, 1971). However, after an extensive
investigation, the mayor's commission concluded that there were many
design and construction flaws that attributed to the collapse. The
committee determined that punching shear failure at column E5
triggered the initial collapse. This type of failure is caused by
unbalanced moments transferred between the column and flat-plate
(Megally and Ghali 2000) and was a result of non-conformities to the
design documents.
DELHI METRO BRIDGE FAILURE DUE TO PUNCHING SHEAR
 The pier cap of affected pier (P-67) has sheared from the connection
point of the pier and pier
cap. It is a cantilever pier cap. It was informed by the contractor and
DMRC representatives that the support system for via-duct was initially
designed as portal pier till the casting of the pier was over. The shop
owners put up resistance against casting of the other leg of the portal
and it was subsequently decided by DMRC that this would be changed
to a cantilever pier, similar to P-68 which is still standing at site.
 It was noticed that the prop support of the cantilever has failed from its
connection to the pier.
 The top reinforcement of the cantilever beam does not have any
development length into pier
concrete. As learned from the sources, the top reinforcement of the
cantilever beam had an “L”
bend of 500 mm only.
 There was very nominal (or no trace) of shear reinforcement at the
juncture.
 The launching girder has fallen below with the failure of pier cap. Also,
the span between P-67
and P-68 has fallen inclined, supported by the ground at one end and
pier cap (P-68) on the
other.
 The boom of the crane, used for lifting the launching girder on 13 July,
2009, has failed in bending
and shows clear sign of overloading.
Top deck
develops crack
while erecting
segments of
previous stretch
i.e. between pier
66 – 67
Probable Cause –
insufficient lap of
deck top tension
rebars with pier’s
projected rebars.
The cantilevered
deck shows signs
of failure as
crack.

The work is stopped for almost 2 months for deciding rectification measure
The top deck again acts as cantilever and fails in moment due to insufficient
lapping of bars
 What it taught us?

a. Structural designs should be proof checked by experienced structural

engineer.
b. Once failure observed, structure should be as far as practicable
abandoned and new structure should be built up
c. More emphasis should be given on detailing of reinforcement to cater
for connections and behaviour of the structural components.
d. Any make-shift arrangement to save a failed structure should be
avoided.
e. Reinforcement detailing in corbels, deep beams, cantilever structures
should be checked as per the provisions of more than one type of
Standards (both IS & BS should be followed).
f. Adequately experienced Engineer / Forman should be deployed for
erection works.
FEW PICTURES OF FAILURES DUE TO SHEAR
 Shear crack

Bearing

The bearing of bridge attains some fixity and do not transfer moment
by rotation, this leads to shear crack at the junction of bearing.
Failure of column-beam junction due to shear
 Failure of column through
shear crack

 Direction of shear
forces
 Shear failure of
column
Bibliography
 Beyond failure- forensic case studies for civil engineers By Norbert J.
Delatte
 Construction failure By Jacob Feld- Kenneth L. Carper
 Paper by dileep kumar (P.G M.Tech Lecturer, Dept. of Civil Engg. Govt. Engg.
College, Palakkad.
) on “SHEAR STRENGTH OF R.C.C BEAMS
WITHOUT WEB REINFORCEMENT”
 www.nptel.iitm.in Shear study by : (Dr. Amlan K Sengupta and Prof.
Devdas Menon)
 http://matdl.org/failurecases (Case studies)
 http://jan.ucc.nau.edu
 Pictures from (www.google.com\images )