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Revised March 1980 Analysis of Three Mile Island - Unit 2 Accident

Revised March 1980 Analysis of Three Mile Island - Unit 2 Accident

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Categories:Types, Research, Science
Published by: Enformable on Feb 24, 2012
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial

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05/28/2015

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*1
S
4,
',
V,
...
Analysis
of
Three
Mile
Island
-
Unit
2
Accident
4NSAC-80-1
.
:
NSAC-1
Revisedi
March
1980
Prepared
bythe
Nuclear
Safety
Analysis
Center
Operated
by
the
Electric
Power
Research
Institute
3412
HilMew
Avenue
P.O.
Box10412
Palo
Alto,
California
94303
'''I
I,
8307050509
800331
'
PDR
ADOCK
03000289
Az
P
HOL
....*
.4,
100mapo.-Rommý
 
NUCLEAR
SAFETY
ANALYSIS
CENTERSEQUENCE
OF
EVENTS
TMZ
2
Accident
-
March
28,
1979
COMMENTARY
The
intent
of
this
sequence
of
events
(SOE)
prepared
by
the
Nuclear
Safety
AnalysisCenter
(NSAC)
staff
is
to
present
a
factual
accountof
the
event
at
the
Three
Mile
Island,
Unit
2,
nuclear
power
plant
on. March
28,
1979.
It is
not
meant
to
explain
why
the
event
occurredor
to
speculate
'on
why,
certain
actions
were
taken.This
SOEEhas
been
verified,
when
possible,
by
raw
data
such
as
computer
output,
reactimeter
data,
strip
charts,
ete.
Events have
also
been
identified
and
verified
by
thermal
hydraulic
or
core
analysis.
Entries
concerning
radiation
readings
were
the
only
ones
which
I
p.
were
not
substantiated
by
raw
data
because
of
the
una'vailability
of
readable,
reproducedor
original,
strip
charts
at
NSAC.
Limiteduse
was
*"
made
of
interviews
by
others
with persons
involved
in
the
event.
NSAC
had
*
no
first-hand
interviews
with
TMI-2
operators
on
duty
at
the
time.
Commentary
as
to
why
certain
actions
were
taken
have
been
generally
'
omitted,
except.
by
inference.Certain
actions
may
havebeen
omitted
if
theycouldnot
be
confirmed,
even
though
they
have
been
reported
by
other
sources,
aslong as
these
actions
did
notappear
to
play
an
important
role
in
the
event.
Appendices
have
been
prepared
to
further
explain
the
actions
and
remarks,
and
to
give
a
narrativedescription
of theevents
from
a
thermal
hydraulic
and
coreassessmentviewpoint.
System
related
appendices
are
not
meant
to
be
independent
system
descriptions,
but are
written
to
clarify
or
amplify
remarks
in
the
SOE.
In
some
cases,
it
has
been
difficult
to
interpret
the
available
data
and
the
interpretation
is stillin
progress.
An
example
of
this
is
the
interpretation
of
make
up
pumps
status
alarms
and
engineered
safeguardactuation
status
alarms.
 
WICLZAR
SAFETY
ANALYSIS
COMR
SEQUqD4CZ
OF
EVENITS
TH!
2
Accident
-
March
28,
1979
Plant
Status
Prior
to Start
of
Event
fUI
Unit
2
a
operating
at
97%
power
with
the
Integrated
aontrol
system
(ICS)
in full
automatic.
The
reactor
coolant
system
was
o"erating
with
four
1
reactor
coolant
ps at
&
pressure
of
2155
p.1g.
Roactor
coolant
makeup
-9
Is
wa
in:
service
providing
normal
makeup
and
reactor
ooolant
pump
meal
injectiou
flow.
Roactor
coolant
system
letdown
flow
was
approximately
70
gpm.
2he
reactor
coolant
system
boron
concentration
was
aproKimately
1030
parts
per
million.
Red
groups
oe
through
five
were
fully
vithdrawn,
rod
groups
six
and
sevem
We"e
9
withdrawn
and
rod
groupeight
.was:27%
'
withdrawn.
Reactor
coolant
system
leakage
was
approximately
.,6
.-.-
h.
mate
system
was
operating
vith
two.
condensate
pumps
and
two
condensate
booster
pumps
In
service.
both
turbinedriven.
feed
pump..
were
in
service.
The
pressurizer
spray
valve
and
the
pressurizerheaters
were
in
manual
control
while
sprayingthe
pressurizer
to
equalize
the-ý
boron
concentrations
between
the
pressurizer
and
the
rest
of
the
reactor
coolant
system.
This
eqialization
WAs
necessary
because
of
steam
leakage
past
either
the
electromatic
relief
valve
ar
the
pressurizersafety
valves.
This-
leakage
was
evidenced
by
periodic
safety
valve
discharge
header
temperature
alarms.
;
Operators
were
experiencing
difficultiesin
transferring
resins
from
an
isolated
condensate
polisher
to
the
receiving
tank.
AttAmpts
to
free
the
plugged
transfer
line
had
bee.a
in
progress
for
about
eleven
hours.
TM
Ounit
I
was
in
hot
shutdown
for
low power
physics
testing
following
refueling.
here
was
a
vacuum
on
the
c0nden0se
and
al
iliary
steam
ws
being
supplied
from
Wit
2.
2

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