Fifteenth National Power Systems Conference (NPSC), IIT Bombay, December 2008

Directional Earth Fault Protection for Transmission Lines Need and Operational Experiences
V.H.Manohar, N.Sankaranarayanan and K.Jagannath


Abstract This paper attempts to bring out the necessity of activating directional earth fault protection in numerical distance relays and also highlights an operational problem with this protection in double circuit lines. These aspects are discussed with specific reference to two incidents taken place in 400 kV and 220 kV transmission lines emanating from Gas Insulated Switchgear (GIS) of 540 MWe Nuclear Power Plant and from 220 kV Out door Switchyard of 220 MWe Nuclear Power Plant respectively. Index Terms Broken conductor , Directional, Double Circuit, Earth Fault
I.

INTRODUCTION

kV sub-station at Phadge. On 1/10/06 at 22:23:31:500, 400 kV Tarapur Padghe Line-1 (Fig. 1) tripped on directional earth fault with C-Phase to ground fault indication and disturbance recorder data showing an earth fault current of 500A(Relay setting 200A-1sec time delay)max varying from a value of 152A to 500A in around 5seconds. Exactly 1sec after this incident at 22:23:32:500 400 kV Tarapur-Padghe Line-2 tripped on Zone-3 with a distance to fault (DTF) of 192.7 Km. Around 1.4 sec after that 400 kV Padghe Line-1 remote end tripped on Zone-2 DTF- 92Km. The fault existed on 400 kV Tarapur Padghe Line-1 very near to the TAPS- 3 &4 Switchyard, but nothing abnormal was found even after thorough yard survey. The fault might be high resistance arcing discharge in the line.

Traditionally 220 kV transmission lines are provided with distance protection relay as main protection and directional over current and earth fault protections as back up. But now as per CEA recommendations, two main protections each having distance relay of different type not necessarily of different make are provided. 400 kV transmission lines are generally have Main-I and Main-II protections at least one of them is distance principle. With the introduction of numerical relays which have multiple protective functions, apart from distance protection other protections such as broken conductor and directional earth fault protection are normally activated. However, some utilities are not in favour of activating the directional earth fault (DEF) protection in the numerical relay. A case study is presented here illustrates the necessity of DEF protection in 400 kV transmission lines which is useful in clearing high resistive faults thereby enhancing 400 kV system security. On the contrary second case study highlights the possibility of healthy line tripping by DEF protection in case of broken conductor in one of the double circuit lines. II.CASE STUDY-1 A. Description of the Incident This case study pertains to an incident that took place in one of the 400 kV double circuit lines emanating from 400 kV Gas Insulated Switchgear (GIS) of 540 MWe Tarapur Atomic Power Station -3&4. These lines are connected to 400
 Mr. V. H. Manohar,Mr. N. Sankaranarayanan and Mr. K. Jagannath are with Nuclear Power Corporation of India limited, Mumbai, 400 094, India. (eand mail: vhmanohar@npcil.co.in , nsankaranarayanan@npcil.co.in, kjagannath@npcil.co.in )

400KV L-1

Arcing fault
C 400KV L-2 D

Fig. 1 Double circuit 400 kV lines from TAPS-3&4 to Padghe

B. Analysis of the incident The trippings occurred due to a transient C-phase fault near TAPS-3&4 switchyard on 400 kV Line -1.The fault resistance was so high that the distance protection at Local/remote end could not detect the fault and directional earth fault (backup protection) at A tripped Circuit breaker at A. The remote end breaker did not trip as the directional earth fault element was not activated at B. Zone-3 starter for 400 kV Tarapur Padghe Line-2 picked up due to the reduction in the fault resistance as seen by the relay at C. After 1 sec of A breaker tripping on D.E.F. breaker C tripped on Zone-3 leading to outage of both the lines. Similarly after 1.4 seconds of the breaker C tripping on Zone -3 breaker at B tripped on zone -2 as the C phase voltage dipped to 54.3 kV i.e. the fault resistance reduced drastically. Thus the fault in the line could not be cleared until it transformed into a low resistance fault. Had the fault not been cleared by DEF, it would have tripped TAPS-3&4 Generator Transformer. Also non-provision of back up DEF protection and the non operation of main/backup protection at remote end of Tarpur-Padghe Line-1 led to unwarranted outage of healthy 400KV Tarapur Padghe Line-2
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Fifteenth National Power Systems Conference (NPSC), IIT Bombay, December 2008

C. Remedial action This incident was discussed in detail with Grid Authorities and provision of back up DEF protection along with main-1 & main-2 distance protection for all the lines was agreed upon. III. CASE STUDY-2 A. Description of the Incident This case study pertains to an incident that took place in one of the 220 kV double circuit lines emanating from 220 kV Switchyard of 220 MWe Kakrapar Atomic Power Station 1&2 (KAPS-1&2). 6 nos. of 220KV lines i.e KAPS-VAPI1&2, KAPS-VAV-1&2, KAPS-HALDARWA-1&2 are provided for power evacuation from two 220 MWe units of KAPS-1&2. Out of these, KAPS-VAPI-1&2 (double circuit lines) usually remain heavily loaded (in the range of 140 MW on each line with present KAPS-1&2 total generation of 300 MW). On 10/8/2005, KAPS-VAPI-2 line tripped on actuation of directional earth fault relay (67N). Further checks in field revealed that R-phase jumper to wave trap of KAPS-Vapi-1 line had snapped at KAPS end. The snapped conductor was found to be hanging in the air, which means that it has not touched the earth. B. System Configuration prior to and after the Incident As the conductor snapping incident without involving earth took place in one of the double circuit lines to VAPI i.e KAPS-VAPI-1 line, the analysis is restricted to the double circuit lines VAPI-1 and VAPI-2 and the other lines are not considered. Accordingly system configuration prior to incident is as given Fig. 2

other lines. The system configuration and vector diagram after the incident are shown in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5

Fig. 3 Sequence components prior to the incident

Fig. 4 System configuration after the incident

Fig. 5 Sequence components after the incident

Fig. 2 System configuration prior to the incident

Following assumptions are made for constructing the above diagram. Both the generators of KAPS are lumped and are supplying 1 p.u current to the double circuit lines of VAPI1&2. As both the lines are identical, the current would divide equally. Accordingly the current distribution is shown in the above figure. The corresponding vector representation of the total currents and currents in both the lines is shown in Fig. 3. When the R-phase conductor got snapped in VAPI-1 line, the current through R-phase would get diverted to R-phase of VAPI-2 line. This is an assumption as we have neglected

C. Analysis of the incident After the incident the currents in three phases of VAPI-1 line are : IR1 = 0 IY1 = 0.5 (-0.5 - j0.866) = -0.25 j0.433 IB1 = 0.5 (-0.5 + j0.866) = -0.25 + j0.433 Positive sequence components can be obtained as follows: IR1+ = 1/3(IR1 + a IY1 + a2 IB1) where a = -0.5 + j0.866 and a2 = -0.5 j0.866 By substituting the values, we get IR1+ = 0.33 at 00

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Fifteenth National Power Systems Conference (NPSC), IIT Bombay, December 2008

IY1+ = 0.33 at -1200 IB1+ = 0.33 at -2400 Negative sequence components can be obtained as follows: IR1- = 1/3(IR1 + a2 IY1 + a IB1) where a = -0.5 + j0.866 and a2 = -0.5 j0.866 By substituting the values, we get IR1- = 0.167 at 1800 IY1- = 0.167 at -600 IB1- = 0.167 at 600 Zero sequence components can be obtained as follows: IR10 = 1/3(IR1 + IY1 + IB1) By substituting the values, we get IR10 = 0.167 at 1800 IY10 = 0.167 at 1800 IB10 = 0.167 at 1800 The above sequence components and total currents are shown in vector diagram in Fig. 6.

IB20 = 0.167 at 00 The above sequence components and total currents are shown in vector diagram in Fig. 7.

Fig. 7 Vector diagram for healthy line

It can be seen that zero sequence currents are flowing in the direction for which DEF relay 67N is supposed to pick up. This relay would pick up if the level of zero sequence current is above set value and polarizing voltage is available. The polarizing voltage for DEF is residual voltage of 220 kV bus PT secondaries which is zero under normal condition. In this particular incident also polarizing voltage is supposed to be zero. However relay actuated and this may be due to little unbalance in bus PT secondary voltages. The ratio of negative sequence current to positive sequence current is 25%. D. Remedial action To avoid wrong actuation of DEF relay of healthy line during conductor snapping in the other line of the double circuit lines, Broken conductor protection which is generally available in numerical distance protection relays can be activated and wired for alarm in case of single feeders and for trip in case of double circuit lines. Setting of broken conductor protection can be 30% (alarm) in case of single feeders and 40% (trip) in case of double circuit lines. REFERENCES
[1] [2] [3] Incident report from Tarapur Atomic Power Station-3&4 Incident report from Kakarapar Atomic Power Station-1&2. Olle I Elgerd, Electrical Energy Systems Theory, Tata McGraw-Hill Publishing Company Limited, New Delhi, 1999

Fig. 6 Vector diagram for the line with broken conductor

It can be seen that zero sequence currents are flowing in the direction opposite to that set in 67N. Hence 67N of VAPI-1 line has not picked up during the incident. The ratio of negative sequence current to positive sequence current is 50%. After the incident the currents in three phases of VAPI-2 line are : IR2 = 1 + j 0 IY2 = 0.5 (-0.5 - j0.866) = -0.25 j0.433 IB2 = 0.5 (-0.5 + j0.866) = -0.25 + j0.433 Positive , Negative and Zero sequence components are IR2+ = 0.67 at 00 IY2+ = 0.67 at -1200 IB2+ = 0.67 at -2400 IR2- = 0.167 at 00 IY2- = 0.167 at -2400 IB2- = 0.167 at -1200 IR20 = 0.167 at 00 IY20 = 0.167 at 00

V.H. Manohar received his BE (Electrical) degree from University of Mysore, India in 1983. His areas of interest are EHV system design, power system analysis and power system protection N. Sankaranarayanan received his B.Sc Engg (Hons.) from Regional engineering college, Calicut in 1980. His areas of interest are main power output system for nuclear power station. K. Jagannth received his B.Sc Engg (Hons.) degree from Sambalpur University, India in 1979. His areas of interest are power supply system for nuclear power stations.

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