Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2550
2550
.
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
2540
800
Thaksinomics
101
201
2531 2534
202
2534 2535
301
2534 2535
302
()
2535
501
( 2534 2535)
:
.. 2540
: .. 2540
2546
2546
2547
601
.. 2540
2544
602
.. 2540
2544
603
2545
604
:
2546
605
() .. 2549
2550
2540
701
2540
2546
702
2540
2547
703
:
2548
704
2540
2548
705
2540
2548
706
2540
2548
707
: 2540
2548
708
2540 :
2548
709
2540:
2548
1.
2. 2475
3.
3.1
3.2
3.2.1
3.2.2
3.2.3
3.2.4
3.3
3.3.1
3.3.2
3.3.3
3.4
3.4.1
3.4.2
3.5
3.5.1
3.5.2
3.5.3
3.6
3.7
3.8
1
2
13
16
18
19
19
22
22
24
28
32
34
48
49
51
53
54
57
58
61
65
69
4.
5.
6.
71
76
81
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
2475 2549
2475 2549
2475 2549
2475 2549
2475 2549
2475 2549
2475 2549
2475 2549
2475 2549
2475 2549
2475 2549
2475 2549
2475 2549
2475 2549
2475 2549
2475 2549
2475 2549
2475 2549
2475 2549
2475 2549
2475 2549
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
103
104
105
22
2475 2549
23
2475 2549
24
2475 2549
25 2475 2549
26 2475 2549
27 2475 2549
28
2475 2549
29
2475 2549
30
2475 2549
31 2475 2549
32 2475 2549
33 2475 2549
34
2475 2549
35
2475 - 2549
106
107
109
110
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
122
125
...
...
[ (2546)
(2545: 25)]
1.
6
2475
.
__________________________
* (.)
2. 2475
2475
2475
3
1
2475
2516
2516
2516
2519
/
2520
(2523 2531)
(2531 2534)
2534
Buffet Cabinet
2535
.. 2540
2516
/
2535
(2544 2549)
2549
/
/
/
2516 2535
2540
2475
2 /
BureaucraticPolity .
(2530)
Riggs
(1966) 2520
Girling (1981; 1981a), Neher and
Bowornwathana (1984), Ramsay (1985) Suriyamongkol and Guyot (n.d.)
(2532/2546: 241) ... 2516 2531
... 2549
(Constitutional Mapping)
/
2475 2511
2521
2519
2534
2535
2475 2549 9
/ (7 ) (1
) ( 2)3
8 ( 2) 5
( 2549)
4 1 4
3 ( 2511 2521 2534)
1 (. 2492)5 ( 3)
3
2489 2517 2540
2489 2517 2540
2475
. 2515 2514
2516
5
2492
2490 2490
2490
. 2491 . 2490
2492 2492 2492
( 2518)
4
2475 2516
.. 2475 2475
2489 2490 2490 /
2492
2494 2475/2495
2500 2501 .. 2502
/ .. 2502
2511 2511
2489 2490
2511
2514
.. 2515 / ( 1)
(2529/2524) (2546 :
72 89) (2514) (2519 ; 2520) (2522)
(2524) SuwannathatPian(2003)
2489 (2530) 2492 (2518) 2517
(2523) (2519)
7
1
2475 2516
. 2489
. 2492
. 2511 . 2475
. 2475
. 2490
. 2475/95 . 2502
. 2515
2516
2517
.. 2515 /
2519 /
2519 .. 2520
/
2521
2517 2519 ( 2)
2
2516 - 2531
. 2517
. 2521
2515
. 2519
2520
2521
2534
.. 2534 /
2521 2534
2521 7
2535 2540
2549
2534 2534
(2535)
9
2549 ( 3)
3
2531 2549
. 2521
. 2549
10
4 2475 2549
(Peak) 2489 2492 2511 2517 2521
2540 (Trough) 2490
2502 2515 2549 3
(1) 2475 2488
(2) 2489 2520
(3) 2521 2549
4
.. 2475 2549
11
2475 2488
.. 2475
2489 2520
2521 2549
12
3.
Constitutional Convention
Constitutional Convention
ArticleV
200
26 (Barendt 1998: 8 9 ) Rigid
Constitution Levinson (1995) Flexible
Constitution
13
9
10
/
11
?
(2534)
...
14
...
( 2534/2538: 138)
12 /
12
2
8
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5) (Fiscal and
Monetary Constitution)
(6)
(7) (Minority Voting Rule)
(8)
3.1
2475
16
2516 2519
2535
2492
... 2511
( )
( )
251713
2521 2534
2534/2539 ( 2540) 2549 (
2550 ?) (Voice)
2540
(
2546: ) 2549 (
2550)
2517 (2528)
13
17
2540
(. 2540 12 313)
14
3.2
( 2)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
14
2540 5
( 336)
(1)
(2)
(3)
[ 313 (1)]
(1)
(2) 20%
(3) 20%
2540
5
18
3.2.1
2489
( 66)
4 2475 2549
15
/ ( 2475
2475/2495 2511)
( 2521 2534)
17 2475 2549 7
( 4)
3.2.2
.. 2475 ( )
15
( 2475 33) 16 /
17
2475 2549 3 17
2517 2534 ( 4) .. 2535 2540
2489
( 5)
2517
( 2517 177 )
2516
2519 2521
2519 8
(2523 2531)
2531
2534 2521
2534 2521
2535
10 .. 2475
70 6
17
. 2475 2475 2
.. ..
16
20
2535
2534 4
(1) [ 2534 ( 1)
.. 2535]
(2)
[ 2534 ( 2) .. 2535]
(3)
[
2534 ( 3) .. 2535]
(4) [ 2534
( 4) .. 2535]
2540
21
3.2.3
17 2475 2549 3
( 6)
.. 2475 (
)
(1) 2475 14
( 2475 47) 14 24 (
) ( 46)
(2) 2517
( 2517 177 )
.. 2475
3.2.4
(Unicameralism)
22
(Bicameralism)
17 2475 2549 8
( 3)18 2489 2490 2492
2511 2517 2521 2534
2540 8 6
( ) ( 7)
2489 2517 2517
2521 2534
2534
2534
2534 2535
[ 2534
( 1) .. 2535] 2540
18
23
2540
2540
3.3
(Separation of Powers) (Check and Balance)
2475
(Montesquieu)
LEsprit des Lois (The Spirit of the Laws) (1748)
24
19
(Separation of Functions)
(Physical Separation of Persons)
(Checking and Balancing)
(Marshall 1980: 100)
2
(Marshall 1980: 101)
Marshall(1980:100103) 5
19
25
(1)
(Impeachment)
(
)
(2)
(Veto)
(3)
Barendt (1998: 14 17)
2
Pure Separation of Powers
(Separation of Functions) (Physical
Separation of Persons)
Partial Separation
of Powers
26
Pure
Separation of Powers Partial Separation of Powers
(Carroll 2002: 35 36)
(House of Commons) (Lord
Chancellor) () ()
()
(Parliamentary
System) (Presidential System)
Partial Separations of Powers
20
3
(1) (Separation of Functions)
(2) (Physical Separation of Persons)
(3) (Check and Balance)
(2538)
20
(2540)
27
21
( 8)
28
17 2475 - 2549 13
( 9)
2489
( 3.5)
(
2532/2546: 136 137)
22
(Administrative Law)
( 9)
2
(1)
(2)
2475
22
( 4)
29
( 2532/2546: 164
166)
3.3.1.2
( 9)
( 15)
..
.. 2513 (
2546 : 162 165)23 2540 (. 2540 180
6)24
2512 2514
2511 ..
24
. 2540 180 6
23
30
25
3.3.1.3
( 10 ) /
(7 ) ( 25)
.. 2475 ( 25)
( 22)
26
2544 -2549
/ ( 17)
2546 2547
25
( )
2540 ( 2546 ; 2548 :147)
26
2540 255 257
277 - 278
31
(1)
(2)
2521
/
2534 (
) .. 2449 ( 25)
2475 8
( 17) 2
/ 6
2502 2515 2519
2520 2534 2549
6
32
2 2511 ()
2540 ()
(Separation of Powers)
.. 2511
...
...
2511
(2500 2511)
..
2514
2540
2511
(. 2540 204) 2540
2511
33
2511 2540
27
3.3.3 (Check and Balance)
Check and Balance
28
2540
27
89
95 2540
109 (8) ...
(2544 2549)
28
(2530) (2543)
(2549) CheckandBalance
34
3.3.3.1
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(1)
17 2475 2549 11
/
( 19)
(2)
17 2475 2549 11
/ ( 10)29
29
.. 2475 () .. 2490
35
(3)
2
()30 ()
2492
( 2492 146) 2475/2495
2511
/
31
32
2511
( 2511
141) 2517 ...
2518
30
31
32
36
17 2475 2549
( 11)
6
33
5
34
6
35
2517
( 2517 184)
(16.67% + 1) (
32)36
( 3.3.7 32)
37
(4)
17 2475 2549
33
37
10
/38 ( 12)
3
(8 -9 10 )
2492
2511
2534
251139
. 2534 2521
. 2535
2534 [ 2534
(3) .. 2535]
2511 2534
() ( 24 2489
2490) (% )
38
2490
( 12)
2534 150 219
150 150
... 221 ... 217
219 4
2534
39
38
2492
2492
2511
2540
(
40% 20% ) 2540
?
10 2475 2549
6
40 ( 12)
(Minority Voting Rule)41 32
2517
(Simple Majority Rule)
( 8)
40
41
6
(16.67%+1) ( 32)
39
(Super Majority Rule)
2475
()
() ()
2534
2534 253542
2540 ( 159)
(5)
17 2475 2549 11
6
2534 127
42
( 2534 127 ) 2535 127
( 2) .. 2535 29 2535
2540
40
/ 43 ( 14) /
2 2490 2549
2475 ...
11
( 14)
2475
2
2534 2
44 2534
( 149 )
(1)
43
Carroll(2002:137138)
44
41
(2)
45 2540
..
..
3
( 2540 184)
(6)
17 2475 2549 7
/
2549 ( 15) 2
?
( 2475/2495
2549) (
( 2492 2511) 2517
2534 ( 151)46 2540 ( 187)
151 2534 2535
Carroll(2002:137)
45
46
2535 2534
.
. 2535 2534 151
.. 2534 ( 3) .. 2535
42
187 2540
?
( 2492
2475/2495 2511 2517)
( 2534
2540) 2549 100 (
16)47
( 2492
2475/2495 2511 2517)
2534 2540
(
2540)
(7)
2
(1)
47
250
43
(2)
/ ( 2541 7: 26 29)
2489
2534
( 2534 173)
2540 2534 ( 2540
219)
(8)
17
2475 2549 11
2
( 2475 2490) ( 15)
(1)
44
(2)
2475 2489 2492 2475/2495 2511
2517 2521
2517
( 22)
(1)
(2)
(3)
2534 2540 ( 22)
(2532/2546: 156 -157) ...
(MFA)
( 2525 2529)
(GATT)
2475
45
3.3.3.2
17 2475
2549 10 ( 24)
?
(2530: 607 620)
...
.. ( 2530: 607 608)
...
... ( 2530:
610)
48
48
(2530)
(SubordinateLaw)... ( 2530:608)
46
49
( 2530: 610
614)
Blank Cheque
3.3.3.3
2540
(1)
(2)
(3)
3.4
(Albert Venn Dicey 1835 1922) 50 (Parliamentary
Sovereignty)
51
Parliamentary Supremacy Barendt (1998: 93 96)
(House of Commons)
(House of Lords)
A.V.Dicey
50
LondonSchoolofEconomicsandPoliticalScience AnIntroductionto
theStudyoftheLawoftheConstitution(1885)
51
48
2
3.4.1
8 ( 9 33)
( 2475) ( 2489)
52
(2512 2514)
2511
..
49
( 2534)
( 2489)
20 ( 2521)
20
( 2511)
2517
2521
( 2511
) ( 2540
)
(Minority Voting Rule)
(Simple Majority Rule) 50% 50%
( 2517)
( 2521)
(Minority Voting Rule)
( 3.7)
50
( 2475)
3.4.2
2475 2549
2540
53
2 (
34)
() ( 2489)
( 2490)
2511
( 2540
)
( )
( 2489)
(1)
( 2489)
(2)
2489
53
51
( 2492) ( 2511)
2534 [ 2534/2535 (3)]
(3) ()
( 2489)
(4)
( 2492)
( 2534 2540)
2475 2549
2540 2540
( 2546 : 185 -188)
2475 2549
(Strong Prime Minister)
2540
2475 2549
52
(Power Concentration)
3.5
(Fiscal and Monetary Constitution)
Public Choice Constitutional
Political Economy54 (Leviathan)
(McKenzie 1984)
(Democracy in Deficit)55
(Balance Budget Amendment)56
57
(McKenzie
1984)
2500 (Yeager 1962) Friedman (1962)
54
(1992),MarlowandOrzechowski(1997),Forte(1999) PerssonandTabellini(1996a;1996b)
Buchanan and Wagner (1977) Buchanan, Rowley and Tollison
55
(1986)
Zelenak(1999)
53
3.5.1
2489 / (
2502 2520 2534)59 26
58
Leijonhufvud(1984) Bernholz(1986)
/ 2490 2515 2519 2549 ( 26)
59
54
()
()
?
2475
( 20)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
17 2475 2549 12
( 26) 7
( 27)
2540
( 27)
55
( 2532/2546: 132 133)
...
56
3.5.2
17 2475 2549 14
2489 ( 28)
( 2540 220 )
57
(Taxation Without Representation) (
2532/2546: 166 167)60
14 2475 2549
1
13 5
5
2 2 3
3 ( 29)
(Tax Constitution)
(Monetary Constitution)
Public
Choice Constitutional Political Economy Public Choice Constitutional Political
Economy
() 61
3.5.3
17 2475 2549
3 ( 2521 2534
60
2
(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)
(3)
( 2540 180 )
.. 2517 ( 25
2517) (Constitutionalization)
2521
2517
9
( 2517 104)
( 105)
2521
2534 2540
2521
59
?
(Deflationary Mechanism)
()
2
(line item)
/
.. 2512 (
2532/2546: 134 -135)
60
(Voting Gains Maximization)
Buchanan and Wagner (1977)
Democracy in Deficit62
3.6 63
2492
.. 2492
2540 8 ( 35)
/
2502 2515 2520 2519
2492
( 2490 2491)
2490 () .. 2490
8
2491 .
62
(QuasiFiscalPolicy)
63
(2545; 2546 : 6)
61
.. 2492 23 2492
2492
( 2492 54)
2492
2 2517 2540
2517 3
2540
2517
2540
2
(Policy Menu)
62
( 54 2492)
( 62 2517)
( 54 2492)
2540 4
64
2540
64
63
2540
( 84 2540)
() ()
65
65
(2545; 2546 : 6)
64
( 35)
65
(Simple Majority Rule)
2475 (
) (Minority Voting
Rule)
2
24
2475 2549
2475 2520
(
.. 2475) 17 2475 -2549 10
2
(
31) 2521
2534
17 2475 2549 12
5
( 24)
(Minority Voting Rule)
( 32)
66
17 2475 25449 2
( 32)
(1) 16.67 % 8
(2) 25% 4
(3) 5
2475 2520
16.67% (
.. 2475) 2521 25%
16.67%
16.67%
25%
3
(Law
Enforcement)
67
66
(Social Safety Net)
50%
66
3.8
2475
2517
/
2490 2511
2511 2521
/ 2520
2511
69
2534 .. 2539
2540
2540
( 2546 : 2) 2520
/
299 12
2515
2516
/
70
4.
...
...
[ (2521) (2545 : 140)]
(2496)
...6768
69 ..
... 70
67
68
69
70
71
71
...
..
...72
2
73
...
... 74
?
...
71
72
73
...
... ( 2545 : 313 314)
74
(2516) (2545 : 13)
72
...75
76
77
(Good Governance)
(Washington Consensus) 2520
2490
3 (Transparency) (Participation)
(Accountability)
(Freedom of Information)
78
79
75
76
77
2475
78
2475 .
(8 2515)
(2538: 152 -160)
79
(2496) (2545: 403)
73
2 (Conflicts of Interest)
...
2 (1)
... (2) ...
...80
...
... 81
(2539 ; 2539 )
80
81
74
75
5.
2
( 3)
( 3.1)
( 3.8)
( 3.2)
( 3.3)
( 3.4)
76
(
3.5)
Public Choice Constitutional Political Economy
(Taxation Without Representation)
82
Carroll(2002:148156)
82
77
2
17 2475 2549
2
2517 2540 2517
2540
2540 2517
2540
( 2546 : 180 201; 2547: 127
136) 2540
2540 (Private Goods)
(
)
78
79
83
(PoliticalAccountability)
83
HumphriesandBates(2005)Bates(Forthcoming)
80
6.
81
2475
3
( 3)
82
2475 2549
2490
2502
2515
2519
2520
2534
2549
2475
2475
2475/2495
2521
2534
2492
2534/2538
2489
2517
2540
83
2475 2549
1. 2475
2. 2490
3. 2494
4. 2500
5. 2501
6. 2514
7. 2516
8. 2519
9. 2520
10. 2534
11. 2535
12. 2549
2475
2490
2475/2495
2502
2515
2517
2519
2520
2534
2540
2549
/
/
/
/
/
/
84
2475 2549
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
2490
2502
2515
2520
2534
2549
2492
2511
2521
2543
?
85
2475 -2549
2489
2492
2517
2519
2521
2534
2540
2475
2475
2490
2475/2495
2502
2511
2515
2520
2534
2549
10
: 1
86
5
2475 2549
2475
2475
2517
2534/2535 (4)
2540
2489
2490
2492
2475/2495
2502
2511
2515
2519
2520
2521
2534
2534
2549
13
: 2
: 17 2534/2535 (4) 2534
87
2475 2549
..
(100%)
14 (58.3 -100.0%)
50%
2475
2475
2517
2489
2490
2492
2475/2495
2502
2511
2515
2519
2520
2521
2534
2534
2540
2549
14
: 2
: 1. 2475
2. 2475 14 24
88
2475 2549
2517
2534/2535 (1)
2534/2538
2540
2489
2490
2492
2511
2521
2534
: 3
: 1. 2534/2535 (1) 2534/2538
2. 9
89
2475 2549
2475
2475
2475/2495
2489
2490
2492
2511
2517
2521
2534
2540
2502
2515
2519
2520
2534
2549
()
: 4
:
90
2475 2549
2489
2490
2492
2475/2495
2511
2515
2517
2519
2521
2534
2534
2540
2549
2475
2489
2490
2492
2475/2495
2511
2515
2517
2519
2520
2521
2534
2534
2540
2549
15
2475
2502
2489
2490
2492
2475/2495
2511
2515
2517
2519
2520
2521
2534
2534
2540
2549
13
2475
2475
2502
2520
4
14
2475
2475
2502
: 5
91
10
2475 2549
()
2475
2475
2475/2495
2489
2490
2492
2511
2517
2521
2534
2540
2502
2515
2519
2520
2534
2549
: 6
92
11
2475 2549
1.
2475
2492
2475/2495
2517
4
2489
2490
2511*
2521*
2534*
2540*
6
2534
1
2475
2502
2515
2519
2520
2549
6
93
2.
2475
2489
2490
2492
2475/2495
2517
6
2511
2521
2534
2534
2540
5
2475
2502
2515
2519
2520
2549
6
: 7
94
12
2475 2549
2475
2489
2490
2475/2495
2517
2521
2534/2535 (3)
2540
2511
2534
2475
2502
2515
2519
2520
2534
2549
2
7
: 8
: 17 2534/2535 2534
95
13
2475 2549
24
2475
2489
2490
2492
2475/2495
2511
2517
2521
2534
2540 ( .)
2475
2502
2515
2519
2520
2534
2549
2
5
: 8
: 1. 2475, 2489 2490
2. 2540 ..
96
14
2475 2549
2475
2475/2549
2489
2490
2492
2511
2517
2521
2534
2540
2549
2475
2502
2515
2519
2520
2534
: 9
97
15
2475 2549
2475/2495
2517
2492
2511
2534
2540
2549
2475
2475
2489
2490
2502
2515
2519
2520
2521
2534
2
2
1
10
: 10
98
16
2475 2549
2492
2475/2495
2511
2517
2534
2540
2549
2475
2475
2489
2490
2502
2515
2519
2520
2521
2534
100
1
1
1
10
: 10
99
17
2475 2549
2511
2540
2
2502
2515
2519
2520
2534
2549
6
2475
2475/2495
2
2475
2489
2490
2492
2517
2521
2534
7
/
/
..
..
: 11
100
18
2475 2549
2489
2492
2517
2521
2534
2540
6
2475
2475
2517
2534/2535 (4)
2540
5
2475
2475
2517
101
2502
2511
2515
2519
2520
2534
2540
2549
8
: 1, 2 11
102
19
2475 - 2549
2475
2475
2475/2495
2517
2521
2489
2490
2492
2511
2534
2540
2502
2515
2519
2520
2534
2549
(/)
: 12
103
20
2475 - 2549
2475
2475
2489
2492
2475/2495
2517
2521
2534
2540
2490
2511
2534
//
2502
2520
2515
2519
2549
2
1
2
3
: 13
104
21
2475 - 2549
2489
2490
2492
2475/2495
2511
2515
2517
2519
2520
2521
2534
2534
2540
2549
2475
2475
2502
14
: 14
105
22
2475 2549
1.
. 2515
. 2519
. 2520
. 2534
. 2549
. 2489
. 2492
. 2475/2495
.2511
. 2517
. 2521
.2534
. 2540
. 2490
2.
3.
4.
. 2475
. 2475
. 2502
1
3
: 14
106
23
2475 2549
1.
. 2475
. 2489
. 2492
. 2475/2495
. 2511
. 2517
. 2521
. 2534
. 2540
. 2475
. 2489
. 2492
. 2475/2495
. 2511
. 2517
. 2521
. 2534
. 2540
2517
2521
2534
2540
2.
3.
4.
2
2
107
5.
6.
7.
2517
2475
2490
2502
2515
2519
2520
2549
2
5
: 15
108
24
2475 2549
. 2475
. 2489
. 2490
. 2492
. 2475/2495
. 2511
. 2517
. 2521
. 2534
. 2540
. 2475
. 2502
. 2515
. 2519
. 2520
. 2534
. 2549
10
: 16
109
25
2475 2549
1.
2.
. 2475
. 2489
. 2490
. 2492
. 2475/2495
. 2511
. 2517
. 2521
. 2534
. 2540
10
. 2475
. 2489
. 2490
. 2492
. 2475/2495
. 2502
. 2511
. 2515
. 2517
. 2519
. 2520
. 2521
. 2534
2475
. 2502
. 2515
. 2519
. 2520
. 2534
. 2549
7
. 2547
110
3.
. 2534
. 2540
.2549
16
. 2517
. 2521
. 2534
. 2540
1
. 2475
. 2475
. 2489
. 2490
. 2492
. 2475/2495
. 2502
.2511
. 2515
. 2519
. 2520
. 2534
. 2549
13
: 17 18
111
26
2475 2549
. 2489
. 2490
. 2492
. 2475/2495
. 2511
. 2515
. 2517
. 2519
. 2521
. 2534
. 2540
. 2549
. 2475
. 2475
. 2502
. 2520
. 2534
12
: 19
112
27
2475 2549
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
. 2489
. 2490
. 2492
. 2475/2495
. 2517
. 2521
. 2534
. 2511
. 2515
. 2549
. 2519
. 2540
. 2475
. 2475
. 2502
. 2520
. 2534
: 21
113
28
2475 2549
. 2489
. 2490
. 2492
. 2475/2495
. 2511
. 2515
. 2517
. 2519
. 2520
. 2521
. 2534
. 2534
. 2540
. 2549
. 2475
.2475
. 2502
14
: 22
114
29
2475 2549
1.
2.
. 2490
. 2515
. 2519
. 2520
. 2534
. 2549
. 2489
. 2492
. 2475/2495
. 2511
. 2517
. 2521
. 2534
. 2540
. 2475
. 2475
. 2502
3. 2
4. 3
5.
: 22
115
30
2475 2549
. 2521
. 2534
. 2540
. 2475
. 2475
. 2489
. 2490
. 2492
. 2475/2495
. 2502
. 2511
. 2515
. 2517
. 2519
. 2520
. 2534
. 2549
14
: 23
116
31
2475 2549
2475
2498
2490
2492
2475/2495
2511
2515
2517
2520
2534
2475
2521
2534
2540
2549
2502 ()
2519 ()
: 24
117
32
2475 2549
16.67% +1
2475
2489
2490
2492
2475/2495
2511
2517
2534
25% +1
2475
2521
2534
2540
2502
2515
2519
2520
2549
: 25
118
33
2475 2549
2475
1.
2.
3.
1.
2.
3.
2489
1.
2.
..
1.
2.
2511
1.
1. 2517
2521
119
2517
2.
2.
1.
1. 2521
2.
2.
2521
1.
..
20
2.
1.
2. 2475
120
3.
2534
2540
2475
2521
3.
2540
1.
2.
1.
2540
1.
2550
2. 2540
121
34
2475 2549
2489
1.
()
1.
2540
2.
2540
3.
2489
2492
2517
2521
2.
3.
()
122
4.
5.
4. 2489
5.
2535
2540
2490
1.
1.
2511
2492
1.
1.
2517
..
123
2511
1.
..
2534 2540
.
1. 2511
..
.
2534
2534/2534 (3)
124
35
.. 2475 2540
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
. 2492
. 2475/2495
. 2511
. 2517
. 2521
. 2534
. 2534/2538
. 2540
:
:
. 54 72
. 38 44
. 53 70
. 62 94
. 53 73
. 59 80
. 58 89
. 71 89
19
7
18
33
21
22
32
19
17
7
15
39
36
46
54
49 (54)
(2546 : 369)
2540
125
.
2524
2528
2537
2489
2530
13 1
( 2534)
2537
2549
2538
(2545 ) 2545
(2545 ) 2545
(2545 ) 2545
:
2519
:
2520
.. 2540 3
2543
(2532/2546) :
.. 2475 - 2530
2546 ..
2532
(2539 )
5 2539
(2539 ) Financial Day
10 2539
20 2 3 ( 2545) 65
-140
(2546 ) 2546
(2546 ) 2546
(2546 )
18 2546
2547
(2548 ) Thaksinomics
OpenBooks 2548
(2548 ) Thaksinomics
OpenBooks 2548
( ) .. 2549:
605 .
( 2550)
2522
2530
2517
2523
.. 2516
2519
.. 2475
2514
2492
2518
2534 2534 2535
() 2475 2534
60
24 -28 2535
(2529/2549)
2549 .. 2529
.. 2540
:
.. 2546 2546
27 2530
16 ( 2540)
.
Ackerman, Bruce. Taxation and the Constitution, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 (January
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Aranson, Peter H. Constitutionalizing the Regulatory Process, in McKenzie (1984: 187 206).
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Bates, Robert H. Political Reform, in Benno Ndulu, et. al. (eds.), The Political Economy of
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2475 2549
2475
2475
2489
2490
2492
2475/2495
2502
2511
2515
2517
2519
2520
2521
2534
2534
2534/2538
2540
2549
66
142
179
16
148
162
166
207
/
/
2475 2549
2475
33
( 33)
2475
47
14
..
( 47)
.
14
24
( 46)
2489
2490
2492
2475/2495
2502
2511
2515
2517
177
( 177 )
2519
2520
2521
2534
2534
2534/2535(4)
159
2534/2538
163
2540
201
2549
2475 - 2549
2475
2475
2489
2490
2492
2475/2495
2502
2511
2515
2517
2519
2520
2521
2534
2534
2534/2535 (1)
2534/2538
2540
2549
( 63)
( 71)
( 74)
( 72)
( 96)
( 75)
( 86)
( 3)
( 91)
( 91)
2475 2549
2475
2475
2489
2490
2492
2475/2495
2502
2511
2515
2517
2519
2520
2521
2534
2534
2540
2549
. 8
. 36
. 18
. 27
. 75
. 66
. 5
. 73
. 9
. 97
. 7
. 16
. 76
. 17
. 87
. 92
. 10
( )
( )
( )
()
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
:
:
2475 - 2549
2475
2475
2489
2490
2492
2475/2495
2502
2511
2515
2517
2519
2520
2521
2534
2534
2534/2538
2540
2549
22 53
31 61
121
73
117
9
146
15
125
17
137
143
169
10
72 73
80 81
150 151
88 89
146 147
15
190 191
19
26
157 158
26
172 174
175 177
218 220
15
56
78
86
157
95
153
16
192
20
25
159
25
175
178
221
16
2475 2549
2475
2475
2489
2490
2492
2475/2495
2502
2511
2515
2517
2519
2520
2521
2534
2534
2540
2549
. 9
. 40
. 56
. 64
. 128
. 74
. 125
. 156
. 135
. 148
. 182
-
2475 2549
2475
2475
2489
2490
2492
. 50
. 69
. 77
. 146
2475/2495
2502
2511
. 84
. 141
2515
2517*
. 184
2519
2520
2521
. 151
. (. 51)
. (. 70)
. (. 78)
.
[. 148 (1)]
. (. 87)
.
[. 187 (2)]
2534
. 19
2534
165
2534/2538
169
2540
. 211
2549
:
: 2517
2475 2549
2475
2475
. 41
2489
. 34
2490
. 42
2492
. 131
2475/2495
. 76
2502
2511
. 128
2515
.
24
.
24
.
2517
. 159
2519
2520
2521
. 137
1. .
2.
.
1. .
2.
.
2534
2534
. 150
1. .
2.
.
2534/2535
. 3
1.
2. 4
( 219
221)
(
219 221
2534)
2540
. 185
1. .
2540
. 186
2549
2.
3.
.
1. .
2.
.
2475 2549
2475
2475
2489
2490
2492
2475/2495
2502
2511
2515
2517
. 40
. 57
. 65
. 129
. 74
. 126
. 157
2519
2520
2521
. 136
2534
2534
. 149
1.
2.
2540
. 183
. 184
-
..
1.
2. ..
3
2549
. 11
3.
1
-
10
2475 2549
2475
2475
2489
2490
2492
. 130
.. ..
2475/2495
. 75
..
.. ..
..
2502
2511
. 127
.. ..
2515
.. ..
2517
. 158
..
2519
2520
2521
2534
2534
. 151
2540
.189
..
2534/
2535 (3)
29
2535
-
2549
. 11
100
:
11
2475 2549
2475
2475
.
.
( 49)
2489
2490
2492
2475/2495
. . .
( 83)
2502
( 14 )
2511
( 139)
2515
( 14 )
2517
2519
( 16 )
2520
( 24 )
2521
2534
( 24 )
2534
2534/2535(4)
2534/2538
2540
( 204 )
2549
( 14 )
12
2475 2549
2475
2475
2489
2490
2492
2475/2495
2502
2511
2515
2517
2519
2520
2521
2534
2534
. 50
. 69
. 77
. 145
. 84
. 142
. 183
. 152
. 166
2534/2538
. 170
2540
. 212
2549
:
: 2475 69
13
..2475 2549
..2475
70 ( 10)
.2475
2
( 36 65)
.2489
1.
2.
( 22)
1.
2.
( 53)
.2490
1.
2.
( 31 61)
1. (
)
2.
( 61)
.2492
1.
2.
( 121)
1.
2. ( 121)
.2475/2495
1.
1.
()
2. 2
2.
.2502
(
)
( 5, 6 7)
.2511
1.
2.
3.
( 117)
1. (
)
2.
( 117)
.2515
1.
2.
( 9)
( 9)
.2517
1.
2.
( 146)
1.
2.
( 146)
.2519
1.
2.
( 15)
.2520
( 16)
.2521
1.
1.
2.
20
..
2.
( 125)
( 125)
.2534
( 17)
.2534
1.
2.
..
( 15)
1.
2.
20
( 137)
..
( 137)
.2534/2538
1.
2.
..
20
( 143)
1.
2.
..
( 143)
.2540
1.
2.
..
20
( 169)
[ 1 2
..
]
3.
50,000
.
3 5
.
. ( 170)
1.
2.
..
( 169)
.2549
1.
( 10 )
25
2.
( 10 )
14
2475 2549
. 2475
. 2475
. 2489
72
. 2490
80
. 2492
150
. 2475/2495
88
. 2502
. 2511
146
. 2515
15
(1.)
(2.)
(1.)
(2.)
. 2489 .
2490
. 2489 .
2490
. 2517
190
. 2519
19
. 2520
26
. 2521
. 2534
157
26
(1.)
(2.)
(3.)
. 2517
. 2534
172
. 2517 1-3
173
172
. 2534
172
. 2534
173
. 2540
218
219
. 2459
15
15
.. 2475 2549
1.
.. 2475
36
()
2. .2475
54
(1)
(2)
3. .2489
76
(1)
(2)
4. .2490
84
5. .2492
154
137 (8)
(1)
(2)
6. .2475/2495
92
(1)
(2)
7.
.. 2502
8. .2511
150
134 (9)
9.
.. 2515
(1)
(2)
10. .2517
195
165 (4)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
11. .2519
12. .2520
13. .2521
162
143 (12)
(1)
(2)
(3)
14.
.. 2534
15. .2534
178
156 (12)
(1)
(2)
(3)
16. .2534/2538
181
160 (13)
(1)
(2)
(3)
17. .2540
224
193 (15)
(1)
(2)
(3)
18. .2549
16
2475 2549
2475
2475
2489
2490
2492
2475/2495
2502
2511
2515
2517
2519
2520
2521
2534
2534
2534/2538
2540
2549
. 35
. 32
. 40
. 97
. 65
. 93
. 122
. 101
. 112
. 118
. 116
-
17
2475 2549
2475
2475
2489
2490
2492
2475/2495
2502
2511
2515
2517
2519
2520
2521
2534
2534
2534/2538
2540
2549
58
80
88
161
99
157
202
169
186
186
233
59
81
89
162
100
158
203
170
187
187
234
60
83
91
165
103
19
161
19
206
23
29
173
29
190
190
249
18
18
2475 2549
2475
2475
2489
2490
2492
2475/2495
2502
2511
2515
2517
207
( 84)
( 92)
( 166 197)
( 104 105)
( 162 163)
2519
2520
2521
174
2534
2534
191
2534/2538
191
2540
250
2549
( 175 176)
( 192 193)
( 192 193)
( 251)
:
:
19
2475 2549
2475
2475
2489
2490
2492
2475/2495
2502
2511
2515
2517
2519
2520
2521
2534
2534
53
61
121
73
117
9
146
15
125
137
73
81
151
89
147
15
191
19
26
158
26
174
172
173
133
146
2534/2538
143
152
2540
169
2549
10
177
175
176
220
218
219
15
180
20
2475 2549
2475
2475
2489
( 53 )
2490
61 2489 ( 53 )
2492
( 121 )
2475/2495
73 2492 ( 121 )
2502
2511
2515
( 9 )
2517
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
( 146 )
2519
15
2520
2521
2534
2534
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
( 137 )
2534/2538
2540
2549
( 10 )
21
.. 2475 2549
.. 2475
. 2475
. 2489
. 2490
. 2492
. 2475/2495
. 2502
. 2511
. 2515
. 2517
. 2519
. 2520
. 2521
. 2534
. 2534
. 2534/2538
( 53)
( 61)
( 121)
( 73)
( 117)
( 9)
( 146)
( 15)
( 125)
( 137)
( 143)
. 2540
. 2549
. =
. =
( 169)
( 10 )
22
2475 2549
2475
2475
2489
73
( 73 )
2490
81
( 81)
2492
151
( 151 )
2475/2495
89
2502
2511
147
( 147 )
2515
15
( 15 )
( 89 )
( 88 )
2517
191
( 191 )
2519
19
( 19 )
2520
26
( 19 )
2521
158
( 158 )
2534
26
( 26 )
2534
174
( 174 )
(1)
( 172 )
(2)
20%
172
( 173)
2534/2538
177
( 177 )
(1)
( 175 )
(2)
20%
175
( 176)
2540
220
( 220 )
(1)
( 218 )
(2)
20%
218
( 219)
2549
15
( 15 )
23
2475 2549
2475
2475
2489
2490
2492
2475/2495
2502
2511
2515
2517
2519
2520
2521
133
133
(1)
(2)
(3)
2534
2534
146
146
(1)
(2)
(3)
2534/2538
152
152
2534
( 146 )
2540
180
180
2521
2534
2549
24
2475 2549
2475
( 22)
( 23)
2475
( 25)
( 26)
2489
( 40)
( 41)
2490
( 107)
( 108)
2475/2495
( 54)
( 55)
2502
( 9)
( 9)
2511
( 104)
( 103)
2515
( 8)
( 8 )
2517
( 8)
( 134)
2519
( 12)
( 12)
2520
( 13)
( 15)
2521
( 113)
( 112)
2534
( 14)
2534
( 123) ( 124)
( 16)
2534/2538
( 130)
( 129)
2540
( 156)
( 155)
2549
( 9)
( 9 )
25
2475 2549
2475
25% +1
2495
16.67% +1
2489
16.67% +1
2490
16.67% +1
2492
16.67% +1
2475/2495
16.67% +1
2502
2511
16.67% +1
2515
2519
2520
2521
25% +1
2534
16.67% +1
2534
25% +1
2540
25% +1
2549
: 24