Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E PDF

HAZOP STUDY REPORT,
REMEDIATION OF THE FORMER

ORICA VILLAWOOD SITE
Prepared by: Dean Shewring

17 April 2013
Pinnacle Risk Management Pty Limited

ABN 83 098 666 703
PO Box 5024 Elanora Heights

NSW Australia 2101
Telephone: (02) 9913 7284
Facsimile: (02) 9913 7930
Pinnacle Risk Management
HAZOP Study Report, Remediation of the Former

Orica Villawood Site
Disclaimer
This report was prepared by Pinnacle Risk Management Pty Limited (Pinnacle
Risk Management) as an account of work for Orica. The material in it reflects
Pinnacle Risk Managements best judgement in the light of the information
available to it at the time of preparation. However, as Pinnacle Risk
Management cannot control the conditions under which this report may be
used, Pinnacle Risk Management will not be responsible for damages of any
nature resulting from use of or reliance upon this report. Pinnacle Risk
Managements responsibility for advice given is subject to the terms of
engagement with Orica.
Rev
Date
Description
Reviewed By
27/6/12
Draft for Comment
Orica
12/8/12
Orica Comments Included
Orica
13/8/12
Final Issue
16/4/13
Supplementary and Water Treatment Plant

HAZOPs Added
Orica
17/4/13
Final Issue
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc

17 April 2013
CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................ I
GLOSSARY ............................................................................................................ II
1
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 1
PROCESS DESCRIPTION AND HAZOP SCOPE .................................................. 2
METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................. 2
3.1
General ............................................................................................. 2
3.2
Meeting Procedures ........................................................................ 3
STUDY TEAM ................................................................................................. 4
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................... 5
5.1
Analysis of Main Findings .............................................................. 5
5.2
Actions Arising from the HAZOP ................................................... 6
REFERENCES ................................................................................................ 7
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 HAZOP Team .................................................................................... 4
LIST OF APPENDICES
Appendix 1 - Approval of HAZOP Chair.
Appendix 2 - Process Description
Appendix 3 - HAZOP Drawings
Appendix 4 - HAZOP Guide Words.
Appendix 5 - HAZOP Minutes.

17 April 2013
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Orica is proposing to install and operate a soil processing facility at the former
Orica Villawood site. The Site contains waste byproducts of industrial activities
which ceased in 2000, in particular DDT and its degradation products DDD and
DDE. The contaminants will be separated from the soil and destroyed within
the process.
The Minister for Planning granted development consent for the Project in May,
2012. Project Development Consent Condition 21(b) requires the preparation
of a Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study.
Orica requested that Dean Shewring from Pinnacle Risk Management chair the
HAZOP study. This report details the results of the HAZOP study in
accordance with the requirements of the Department of Planning and
Infrastructures HAZOP Guidelines.
The main participants had appropriate experience in the design and operation
of soil processing (or similar) plants. Therefore, the hazards were generally well
known as well as the required control measures to reduce risk to acceptable
levels.
The plant design is an established design with a number of similar plants being
operated throughout the world. Therefore, many of the significant potential
hazardous events and operability problems were already known which reduced
the demand on this study. This included incidents from recently commissioned
plants for Orica and other companies.

17 April 2013
GLOSSARY
DoPI
Department of Planning and Infrastructure
DTD
Directly-heated Thermal Desorption
ECS
Emission Control System
FSB
Feed Soil Building
HAZOP
Hazard and Operability Study
HIPAP
Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper
PHA
Preliminary Hazard Analysis
P&ID
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
STA
Soil Treatment Area
VOC
Volatile Organic Compound
ii

17 April 2013
REPORT
1
INTRODUCTION
Orica is proposing to install and operate a soil processing facility at the former
Orica Villawood site. The Site contains waste byproducts of industrial activities
which ceased in 2000, in particular DDT and its degradation products DDD and
DDE. The contaminants will be separated from the soil and destroyed within
the process.
The Minister for Planning granted development consent for the project in May,
2012.
Development Consent Condition 21(b) specifies the following requirements for
the HAZOP study.
"Prior to Site Establishment, the Proponent shall obtain the
Director-Generals approval of the following study:
b) a Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) chaired by an
independent, qualified person or team. The independent person
or team shall be approved by the Director-General. The Study
shall be carried out in accordance with the Department's
publication Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper (HIPAP)
No. 8 - HAZOP Guidelines (Ref 1) and shall include consideration
of measures to prevent any accidental spills of liquids and/ or
liquid wastes on all relevant tanks and equipment used for the
storage and handling of liquids or liquid wastes, including
associated pipes and hoses.
Orica requested that Dean Shewring from Pinnacle Risk Management chair the
required HAZOP study. The approval received from the Department of
Planning and Infrastructure (DoPI) for the chair of this projects HAZOP study is
shown in Appendix 1.
This report details the results of the HAZOP study and is written to meet the
requirements of the Department of Planning and Infrastructures HIPAP Number
8 and Development Consent Condition 21(b).
The HAZOP study on the main contaminant destruction process was detailed in
revisions A to C of this report. Following this study, two additional HAZOPs
were performed. The first additional study reviewed the air compressor for the
evaporative cooler and the pugmill water system. The second additional study
reviewed the waste water treatment plant. The results of these two additional
studies have been added to revision D of this report.
The aim of the HAZOP study is to identify potential hazardous events and
significant operability problems associated with the proposed operations. This

17 April 2013
aim is inherent for all HAZOP studies. The scope for this study is detailed in
Section 2 of this report.
PROCESS DESCRIPTION AND HAZOP SCOPE
A copy of the detailed process description for the soil treatment plant is supplied
in Appendix 2.
In summary, the feed soil is initially heated in a dryer to remove the volatile
contaminants which are then destroyed in a directly-heated thermal desorption
unit. The resultant product gases are then absorbed within a scrubber. Treated
soil can then be returned to the site.
In the waste water treatment plant, water from various site containments is
processed via settlers, flocculation (including chemical additional and pH
adjustment) and a series of filters to remove the contaminants. The purified
water is discharged to sewer.
Copies of the drawings used in the study which detail the process areas are
supplied in Appendix 3.
As the natural gas supply train to the directly-heated desorption unit will be
compliant to the relevant Australian Standard then the HAZOP just considered
deviations from the design intent associated with natural gas supply (rather than
try to alter an Australian Standard compliant system).
METHODOLOGY
3.1
GENERAL
A HAZOP study is a hazard study which concentrates on how the design will
cope with abnormal conditions, rather than on how it will perform under normal
conditions. The study is comprised of a review of each unit operation,
examining each for possible causes of a wide range of process abnormalities
and their consequences.
HAZOP provides the opportunity for people to think creatively and examine
ways in which hazards or operating problems might arise. To reduce the
chance of missing something, a HAZOP is carried out in a systematic manner,
using guide words to consider each pipeline and each type of hazard in turn.
The study is carried out by a team so that input from all areas of functional
expertise can be provided.
The results of a HAZOP depend heavily upon the experience and attitudes of
the team members and on the leadership style adopted. In this study, the
members of the team had good experience, knowledge and skills and had the
authority to approve the actions decided upon.

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3.2
MEETING PROCEDURES
The HAZOP study of each section of plant followed the procedure given below:
The process design engineer outlined the broad purpose of the section of
design under study and displayed on the relevant P&IDs on the wall. This
outline included design features, operating conditions, description of fittings
and details of equipment.
Any general questions about the scope and intent of the design were
answered.
The first section or area of the design was highlighted for study, typically an
area where material flows into the plant.
Any general questions about this area were then answered. Minutes may
be generated during this discussion. If so, they have been recorded with the
guide word General Discussion.
The detailed "line by line" study commenced at this point. The HAZOP
leader led the group through the HAZOP guide words. Each guide word is a
prompt, such as "MORE OF OR HIGH FLOW", which identifies a deviation
from normal operating conditions that may lead to a hazardous event or
significant operability problem. This is used to prompt discussion of the
possible causes and effects of flow at an undesirably high rate. If, in the
opinion of the team, the safeguards for the combination of the consequences
and likelihood of a credible event are inadequate then an action is recorded
in the minutes.
For major risk areas the need for action is assessed quantitatively (by
Hazard or Reliability Analysis). For less significant risks the need for action
can be based on experience and judgement. For this study, all actions could
be appropriately addressed by the nominated HAZOP team members /
company.
The main aim of the meeting was to find problems needing solution, rather
than the actual solution. When the group became tied down by trying to
resolve a problem, the issue was minuted as requiring further review outside
the meeting, and the study proceeded.
All changes agreed at the meeting were minuted with some being marked
on the HAZOP master P&IDs.
Note that all actions were recorded in the minutes as well as significant
discussion points which did not result in any actions. The latter were
recorded as a means to record the basis of safety for a potential hazardous
event or operability problem.
The guide words used during the study are listed in Appendix 4.

17 April 2013
All actions are listed in the HAZOP minutes, contained in Appendix 5. It is

noted that safeguards are only recorded by exception. It is assumed that the
procedures within the Orica safety management system will be used effectively
(as discussed throughout the HAZOP study).
As the purpose of a HAZOP study is to identify, i.e. not necessarily solve,
potential hazardous events and significant operability problems associated with
the process under review, some of the actions require further review post the
study. As a general rule, a HAZOP facilitator allows approximately 5 to 10
minutes to resolve any issues identified during the study. If a solution cannot be
agreed to within this timeframe then the issue is minuted and the study
proceeds.
The reason for this approach is that a positive, open, questioning mindset is
required from the team members. This allows creative brainstorming to identify
possible abnormal plant conditions that may lead to potential hazardous events
and/or significant operability problems. Teams that become tied down trying to
resolve all issues, in particular problems that require further calculations etc,
lose their creativity and hence the basis for the study effectiveness is lost.
STUDY TEAM
The HAZOP study for the project was conducted in a number of sessions from
January to November, 2012.
The main HAZOP team participants had the appropriate level of experience in
design and/or operation of soil processing plants (or similar processes). Table
1 shows the team members who participated in the HAZOP study.
The meetings were led by Dean Shewring with the minutes being recorded by
Peter ODea.
Table 1 HAZOP Team
HAZOP Role
Name
Company
HAZOP Chair
Dean Shewring
HAZOP Secretary
Peter ODea
Orica
Project Management
Peter ODea
Lindsay Killin
Cameron McLean
Richard Giles
Orica
EnviroPacific
EnviroPacific
EnviroPacific
Site Management
Representative
Gwenda Lister
Orica
Process Design and Plant

Operation Representatives
Brett Garton
Bala Kathiravelu
Rudy Maes
Keith Chapman
Tai Truong
Pearce Anderson
EnviroPacific
Orica
Consultant to Chapman Services
Chapman Services
EnviroPacific
EnviroPacific

17 April 2013
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
5.1
ANALYSIS OF MAIN FINDINGS
The HAZOP team assembled for the study was well balanced in terms of
disciplines and experience. The team sizes were generally kept to the required
four to eight people. This increases the ability to achieve a creative
brainstorming workshop to help ensure maximum effectiveness and quality.
The main participants had appropriate experience in the design and operation
of soil processing (or similar) plants. Therefore, the hazards were generally well
known as well as the required control measures to reduce risk to acceptable
levels.
The plant design is an established design with a number of similar plants being
operated throughout the world. Therefore, many of the significant potential
hazardous events and operability problems were already known which reduced
the demand on this study. This included incidents from recently commissioned
plants for Orica and other companies.
Potential hazardous events concerning releases of harmful materials via
gaseous, liquid or solid losses of containment were reviewed during the study.
Assuming the proposed safeguards remain effective then the risk of such
events should be low.
Any significant changes to the HAZOP design should be separately assessed
for new potential hazardous events and operability problems. This is commonly
achieved by utilising a management of change programme within the project
and may require further review using the HAZOP technique.
During the study, industry standard operating procedures were discussed and
included as potential causes for hazardous events and significant operability
problems. Any significant issues identified have been recorded in the HAZOP
minutes for inclusion in the final version of the standard operating procedures
for the Orica facility.
HAZOP studies are, by definition, a qualitative risk assessment. The decisions
made by the HAZOP team members are based on their experience and
knowledge of the type of processing plant under review. If the HAZOP team
members determined the existing control measures were adequate then no
further action is required. Significant points of discussion (generally if significant
consequential impacts are possible) were recorded even though the control
measures were deemed acceptable by the HAZOP team. All issues requiring a
response were included in the HAZOP minutes.

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5.2
ACTIONS ARISING FROM THE HAZOP
Completed HAZOP actions need to be tracked within the projects HAZOP

action register or equivalent. Regular project meetings should include a review
of the progress of closing-out all of the actions. It is normally the responsibility
of the project manager to ensure that all of the HAZOP actions are completed.
The HAZOP drawings and a record of the completed actions should be retained
with the plant files.

17 April 2013
Appendix 1
Approval of HAZOP Chair
HAZOP Study Report, Remediation of the Former Orica

Villawood Site
A1.1

17 April 2013
Appendix 1 Approval of HAZOP Chair.
A1.2

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Appendix 2
Process Description

Villawood Site
A2.1

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Appendix 2 Process Description.
1. Pre-Treatment of Materials
The pre-treatment of excavated materials will be undertaken in two stages. Initially, excavated
material and overlying material may be screened within the Remediation Area compound.
Material required to be treated (in the Directly-heated Thermal Desorption (DTD) Plant) will be
transported to the Feed Soil Building (FSB), where further handling and testing of this material
will take place.
The material will be stockpiled in the FSB using a front end loader before undergoing further
screening and testing for contaminant levels and other characteristics which will be required for
the DTD treatment process. The material will then be blended to achieve a relatively
homogenous feed material prior to being loaded into the feed hopper of the DTD Plant.
Activities within the FSB, including screening and testing will take place 24 hours per day, seven
days per week.
2. Feed Soil Building and Emission Control System

The purpose of the FSB is to control emissions during pre-treatment activities and ensure these
emissions are vented to atmosphere through an Emission Control System (ECS).
The FSB will be constructed of a steel frame with metal sheeting. The building will contain an
approximate seven day working inventory of feed soil plus a sufficient buffer for soil drying and
other pre-treatment activities. This inventory volume is designed to provide adequate storage
capacity to feed the thermal treatment plant during periods when unforeseen conditions
interfere with normal excavation activities.
The FSB will be fitted with an air-lock and automated wheel wash, louvres and an ECS for air
quality control.
The FSB will be equipped with personnel entrances and truck entrances. The truck entrances
will include an air-lock consisting of a small structure internal to the enclosure. The air-lock will
be equipped with two doors. When a truck enters the air-lock, the outer door will open while the
inside door is closed. Once the truck enters the air-lock, the outer door will close, the inner door
will open and the truck will enter the enclosure. The procedure will be reversed when a truck
exits the enclosure.
An ECS will be constructed and operated to preserve air quality within the building and minimise
emissions (dust and organic vapours) to the atmosphere. The ECS will be operated to ensure
the flow of air into the FSB (i.e. air pressure within the FSB will be slightly lower than ambient air
pressure). Conceptually, the ECS will comprise an induced draft fan, duct work system,
particulate control device (dust filters) and a stack.
The air exhausted from the FSB will first pass through a particulate control device to remove
fugitive dust. Dust removed will be collected in enclosed drums or hoppers. When the dust
collection container is taken off-line, the dust will be taken to the Soil Treatment Area (STA) for
treatment.
Air will be exhausted to the atmosphere via a stack. Periodic stack testing will be undertaken in
accordance with license requirements. Permanent analysers will also be installed on the stack to
detect any unacceptable contaminant concentration levels.
A2.2

17 April 2013
3. Directly-heated Thermal Desorption Plant

The DTD Plant will be located within the STA. After pre-treatment in the FSB, the excavated
materials will be fed into the feed hopper located inside the FSB. The materials will be
transported via a conveyor to the DTD Plant for treatment.
The DTD Plant will operate 24 hours a day, seven days a week with the seventh day typically
scheduled as downtime for maintenance. The nominal maximum rate of treatment through the
DTD Plant is 15 tonnes per hour.
The DTD Plant will have a footprint of approximately 50 m by 25 m. It will be established within
a concrete paved and bunded area having its own internal surface water drainage control
measures. Electrical power to the DTD Plant will be provided by mains power, with a diesel
powered generator used as a back-up. Natural gas sourced from the mains supply, will be used
to fire the heating burners of the plant.
Brief descriptions of typical key unit operations in the process are presented below.
Rotary Dryer
The first step in the DTD treatment process involves the volatilisation or separation of
contaminants from the material in the rotary dryer.
The rotary dryer utilises natural gas as fuel to heat the contaminated material to a temperature
of approximately 350C to 450C.
In a co-current system, the contaminated material enters the rotary dryer at the end where the
burner is located and the combustion gas and treated soil move in the same direction to where
they exit at the opposite end of the dryer.
Contaminants desorb and volatilise as they pass through the dryer. Soil is heated in the first
third of the dryer with most desorption and volatilisation occurring in the next third as
contaminants reach their boiling points.
Once it has passed through the rotary dryer, the heated soil material passes to a pugmill where
it is sprayed with water for cooling and rewetting. The treated material is then transferred to
temporary treated soil stockpiles awaiting validation.
Cyclone
The off-gases flow from the rotary dryer through a cyclone, where large dust particles are
removed, to the thermal oxidiser. The dust from the cyclone is directed to the pugmill where it is
mixed with the treated soil for rewetting and validation.
Thermal Oxidiser
The thermal oxidiser is used to treat the gases produced through the heating of the soil material
in the rotary dryer and would be designed to be Stockholm compliant, i.e. with appropriate
residence time, temperature and turbulence.
The thermal oxidiser operates at a temperature of about 1,000C using natural gas. At this
temperature, the contaminants present in the gas (from the feed material) oxidise or decompose
forming carbon dioxide, water vapour and hydrogen chloride with small amounts of other byproducts such as chlorine and sulphur compounds.
A2.3

17 April 2013
In order to maintain the correct temperature to maximise destruction efficiency and minimise the
formation of by-products, the thermal oxidiser will be fitted with a sophisticated temperature
control system which will be consistently monitored.
Quench
Once gases have passed through the thermal oxidiser they must be rapidly cooled to minimise
the potential for dioxin formation and allow further treatment before release to the atmosphere
(as required by the Stockholm Convention).
To achieve this, the hot gases are drawn into the quench by an induced draught fan. In the
quench, water is injected to rapidly cool the gases to a temperature which is suitable for further
treatment.
Baghouse
The cooled gas from the quench is combined with steam from the pugmill and drawn into the
baghouse by an induced draught fan. The baghouse contains a series of fabric filters which
remove particulates.
Acid Gas Scrubber
The final step in the treatment process involves the removal of acid gases from the exhaust gas.
The acid gas scrubber consists of a packed tower with a re-circulating caustic solution that
reacts with any hydrogen chloride and chlorine in the exhaust gas to form a salt solution.
Following this, the clean treated gas is vented to the atmosphere via the scrubber stack which
is some 30 m in height.
Treated Soil
Treated soil will be stockpiled adjacent to the STA with drains and bunds provided to manage
runoff. Treated materials stored in this area will undergo validation testing and reclassification.
This is to determine whether the process has been effective and whether or not the materials
are ready for reuse at the Site. Stockpiles will be stabilised with spray grass or other such
treatment and will be wetted when necessary to control dust.
The treated, stockpiled soil will be retained until completion of remediation works at the Site
when it will be transported (by truck) to the Remediation Areas for reinstatement works.
A2.4

17 April 2013
Appendix 3
HAZOP Drawings

Villawood Site
A3.1

17 April 2013
Appendix 3 HAZOP Drawings.
A3.2

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A3.3

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A3.4

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A3.5

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A3.6

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A3.7

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A3.8

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A3.9

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A3.10

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A3.11

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A3.12

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A3.13

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A3.14

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A3.15

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A3.16

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A3.17

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A3.18

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A3.19

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A3.20

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A3.21

17 April 2013
Appendix 4
HAZOP Guide Words

Villawood Site
A4.1

17 April 2013
Appendix 4 HAZOP Guide Words.

Note that the main headings are shown only. Some main headings included
various sub-prompts as well.
Line-By-Line Guide Words Continuous Fluid Systems
High Level / High Flow
Low Level / Low Flow
Zero Flow / Empty
Reverse Flow
High Pressure
- Venting, relief
Low Pressure
- Venting, relief
High Temperature
Low Temperature
Impurities
- Gaseous, liquid, solid
Change in Concentration or Composition / Two Phase Flow / Reactions
Testing
- Equipment / product
Plant Items
- Operable / maintainable
Electrical
Instruments
A4.2

17 April 2013
Overview Guide Words
Toxicity
Commissioning
Startup
Shutdown (isolation, purging)
Breakdown (including services failure)
Effluent
Fire and Explosion
Noise / Vibration
Materials of Construction
Quality and Consistency
Output - Reliability and Bottlenecks
Efficiency Losses
Simplicity
A4.3

17 April 2013
Appendix 5
HAZOP Minutes

Villawood Site
A5.1

17 April 2013
Appendix 5 HAZOP Minutes.
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET

PROJECT:
Orica, Villawood, DTD Project
TEAM MEMBERS:
Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman,

Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett
Garton
SYSTEM:
Feed Supply Bin and Conveyors
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10001 Rev B
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 23/1/2012
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
1.
General
Discussion
Bricks, rubble and

oversized material,
clay etc
Feed interrupted due to

blockages or equipment
damage
No further action required
Belt failure,
maintenance
No need for hopper

screen or clay breaker
as pre-screening. will be
done in the feed soil
building
Will use chemical
resistant belts
2.
General
Discussion
3.
General
Discussion
Chemical (i.e. from

the contaminated
soil) attack on
conveyor belts
Rain
Increased moisture
impacts process
Conveyor covers to be
installed
4.
High Flow /
High Level
Front end loader

(FEL) overfills
hopper
Spill to the bunded

building floor
DTD operator in contact

with FEL operator, any
spilt soil can be swept
up and reprocessed
Review the need for providing a mirror

or screen in the FEL cabin so the FEL
driver can see the level in the feed
hopper
A5.1
LK

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Garton
SYSTEM:
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 23/1/2012
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
5.
Low Flow /
Low Level
Soil clumps in
hopper
Potential to fall onto the

belt below (damage)
and possibly cause
blockages
6.
Zero Flow /
Empty
Hopper empty
Only financial keep

burning gas etc
7.
Zero Flow /
Empty
Feeder fails
Hopper full of material.

Confined space entry to
unblock
8.
Zero Flow /
Empty
Feeder fails (as

above)
Hopper full of material.

Confined space entry to
unblock
Steep sided hopper

minimises the risk of
material hold-up on the
hopper walls.
Can adjust the gap
below the hopper during
commissioning
Process controls come
into effect to trip
downstream fired
appliances
Routine checks on belt
feeder during
shutdowns, confined
space risk assessment
Routine checks on belt
feeder during
shutdowns, confined
space risk assessment
A5.2
Preventive maintenance procedures to

emphasise belt feed conveyor checks
BG
Review the need for hatches etc in the

feed bin walls for ease of clearing
material provided they also do not hold
up material
LK

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Garton
SYSTEM:
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 23/1/2012
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
9.
Zero Flow /
Empty
Spillage from
conveyors
Clean-up.
Damage to adjacent
equipment
Scrapers prevent return

below belt.
Canopy over conveyors
10.
Zero Flow /
Empty
Friction, e.g. from

wood stuck on belt
etc
Fire hose nearby.

Building vented through
carbon filters
11.
Zero Flow /
Empty
Plant outage
Conveyor belt fire with

toxic products of
combustion potentially
smoke logging the
building
Potential for conveyor
belt fire on restart if
material dries out /
solidifies
12.
Reverse Flow
13.
Impurities
Belt stops on the

inclined conveyor
and runs back due to
soil load
Asbestos cement
sheeting pieces in
the feed
Provide a cover around the slinger

conveyor to prevent any spilt soil
damaging adjacent gas burner and
other equipment
Include in the fire safety study
assessment of belts fires and the risk to
emergency responders from toxic
products of combustion
LK
Spillage at bottom
requiring cleaning up
Slinger conveyor can be

run backwards for
material to be collected
in a truck, i.e. to clear
the conveyors
Back stop provided on
the conveyor
Exposure to personnel
who contact the treated
soil and maintain the
plant
Will be removed in
accordance will agreed
practices by licensed
contractor
A5.3

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Garton
SYSTEM:
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 23/1/2012
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
Include in the project plan an operability

and maintainability access review to all
equipment items
Risk assessment, including on confined
space entry, required to determine
suitable safeguards for people entering
the feed soil building when the emission
control system fails
SAFEGUARDS
14.
Impurities
PPE disposed of via

the process
Possibility of embers
getting to the baghouse
and causing damage to
the filters
Reduced online time
Will be collected and

disposed of as special
waste
15.
Plant Items
16.
Plant Items
Lack of access for

maintenance and
operational checks
Feed soil building
emission control
system out of service
Atmosphere unsuitable
for personnel
Likely to be confined
space entry if the feed
soil building emission
control system fails
17.
Plant Items
Wayward FEL
operation etc
Damage to feed hopper,

conveyors etc
Will provide Jersey

barriers
18.
Electrical
Magnetic field from

tramp metal collector
Impact on people with

pacemakers
Check impact of magnet on implanted

pacemakers and any other critical
electrical devices
A5.4
BG

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Garton
SYSTEM:
Dryer and Cyclone
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 23/1/2012
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
19.
General
Discussion (note
the cyclones
remove particles
to 30 microns)
LEL exceeded in the

dryer
Explosion
20.
High Flow /
High Level
Knockout box
blockage
Dryer full of soil

requiring confined space
for cleaning
21.
High Flow /
High Level
High gas flow
Overheating of materials
and hence the potential
for equipment damage
With the soil at

Villawood, the LEL
cannot be exceeded.
Therefore do not need
pop-off damper and
other such provisions
Low soil temperature
and position switches on
the sluice gate or rotary
valve will initiate action
prior to significant
consequential impact
Plant will shut down
from high temperature in
the flue gases (back up
thermocouples
provided).
Steel designed for 650
deg. C
A5.5

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Garton
SYSTEM:
Dryer and Cyclone
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 23/1/2012
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
22.
Low Flow /
Low Level
Low solid separation

in cyclones from a
plant turndown
Unplanned plant
shutdown
23.
Zero Flow /
Empty
24.
Reverse Flow
Burner continues to
run when the ID fan
stops
25.
High
Temperature
Hot exterior of dryer

and ductwork
Baghouse overloaded
Material sitting hot in the

bottom of the dryer can
deform the dryer drum
High temperature
damage to the dryer or
injury to personnel if
flames are emitted from
the dryer
Burns to personnel
Cyclones designed for

minimum turndown of
the burner
Drum must be able to
turn
Run on of the fan when
shutting down and the
draft from the stack will
initially prevent damage
and the burner flame is
contained within the
dryer, i.e. no potential
for impact on personnel
Personal protection, e.g.
mesh guards or
insulation, will be
provided for surfaces
over 60 deg. C
A5.6
Make provisions to turn the drum in

case of plant, including power,
shutdown, e.g. manual jogging
KC

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Garton
SYSTEM:
Dryer and Cyclone
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 23/1/2012
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
26.
Plant Items
Dryer flight breakage
Equipment damage
27.
Electrical
Lightning
Instrument damage
28.
Instruments
Routine maintenance
checks and operator
response to noise from
within the dryer
A5.7
Review the need for lightning (surge)

protection of the instruments
KC
Ensure redundant pressure transmitters

on the dryer, i.e. separate transmitters
for control and trip actions
KC

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Garton
SYSTEM:
Thermal Oxidiser
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10006 Rev A
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 23/1/2012
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
29.
General
Discussion
Burner continues to
run when the ID fan
stops
High temperature
damage to the burner or
injury to personnel if
flames are emitted from
the burner
30.
High Flow /
High Level
High feed rate
Thermal oxidiser (TO)

residence time less than
design
31.
High Flow /
High Level
Buildup of slag in
bottom of TO
Shutdown for cleanout
Run on of the fan when

shutting down and the
draft from the stack will
initially prevent damage
and the burner flame is
contained within the
burner, i.e. no potential
for impact on personnel
TO designed for > 2
seconds at maximum
flow plus there is some
extra time in the ducts to
the baghouse
Special burner / inlet
gas design eliminates
creation of sticky
particles and
agglomeration
A5.8

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Garton
SYSTEM:
Thermal Oxidiser
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 23/1/2012
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
32.
Low Pressure
ID fan draws too

much flow
Worst case could

extinguish burner
33.
High
Temperature
Equipment damage
34.
High
Temperature
Too much natural

gas flow due to the
control temperature
transmitter reading
too low
Refractory failure
35.
Low Temperature
Loss of process
control due to the
control temperature
transmitter reading
too high
Fail to achieve
regulatory destruction
temperature
Shell temperature rises

(would probably see
glow on the outside of
the shell)
Burner management
system takes control,
i.e. flameout detector
shuts of the natural gas
flow
TO temperature trips
plus there are also
downstream
temperature controls
Plant operators will

regularly shoot
measurements with an
infrared gun to detect
hot spots
Thermocouples in series
will pick up temperature
discrepancies.
Calibration instrument
has been purchased
A5.9

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Garton
SYSTEM:
Thermal Oxidiser
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 23/1/2012
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
36.
Low Temperature
Emergency stop
37.
Plant Items
Flame impingement
on shell opposite
burner
38.
Plant Items
Dust in the TO
Residual material in the

TO cools with potential
to form other
compounds, e.g.
dioxins, furans
Damage to vessel shell
Flame detector does not

see the flame and
hence nuisance trips
Slow cooling allows

plant to be purged of
gases using ID fan
Burner entry is longer

than burner flame length
so direct flame
impingement not
expected
Flame sensor is selfchecking and air
purged. System fails
safe
A5.10

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Garton
SYSTEM:
Evaporative Cooler including the Air
/ Water Flows
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 23/1/2012
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
39.
General
Discussion
Power failure
40.
General
Discussion
Rapid quenching
does not occur
41.
High Flow /
High Level
False low
temperature reading
at the outlet duct
42.
High Flow /
High Level
Dilution air damper

open when it should
not be
Loss of water flow

leading to high
temperature and hence
damage to equipment,
e.g. the downstream
scrubber
Dioxin formation
Too much water flow

resulting in pooling in
the vessel bottom
causing corrosion
Nothing unsafe just a
change in plant
pressure
Inlet water valve fails

open
Show the inlet water valve on the P&ID

to fail open designate as FO
Design is to quench to
below 200 deg. C in
1 second
Water will evaporate.
Operator is constantly
observing temperature
to the baghouse
Will be detected through
plant pressure controls
A5.11
Review the need to install a low

temperature alarm on the existing
downstream thermocouple
KC
RM

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Garton
SYSTEM:
/ Water Flows
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 23/1/2012
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
43.
High Flow /
High Level
ECU (emission
control unit) water
pump keeps running
when the
evaporative cooler is
shutdown
Bottom of the
evaporative cooler
floods
44.
Low Flow /
Low Level
Loss of water flow
45.
Low Flow /
Low Level
46.
Reverse Flow
Low air flow, even if

air pressure is
maintained due to
the air nozzle
clogging
Hot gases out the
open dilution
damper??? - no
record of this
happening
High temperature and

hence damage to
equipment, e.g. the
downstream scrubber
Large water particles
created. Inefficient
cooling. Control system
calls for more water
Burns to nearby
personnel
Procedures dictate
pumps to be manually
shut down when the
plant stops.
Water will come out the
dilution air damper and
become visible
Dilution air damper
opens. If control not
regained, plant trips
Operator is constantly
observing temperature
to the baghouse and a
low temperature alarm
Damper located
sufficiently high to avoid
damage
A5.12
Dilution air damper to be as close to the

evaporative cooler outlet duct as
possible for effective cooling
KC

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Garton
SYSTEM:
/ Water Flows
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 23/1/2012
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
47.
Impurities
Oil from the air

compressor
Could send some of the

stack readings high
48.
Change in
Composition or
Concentration /
Two-Phase Flow
/ Reactions
Testing
Poor spray nozzle

atomisation
Pooling in the vessel

bottom causing
corrosion
Bypass valves on the

air or water supply
left open
No serious outcome
49.
The compressor will be

oil-free or have a
coalescing filter
Nozzles can be
withdrawn and tested
Confirm compressor selection and

hence no oil will flow to the evaporative
cooler
Bypasses are useful for

maintenance purposes
and are to be retained
A5.13
LK

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Garton
SYSTEM:
Baghouse and Dust Screws
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 23/1/2012
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
50.
Low Flow /
Low Level
Inadequate air
pulsing
Bags become blinded
High differential
pressure alarm
Review the air pulsing duration and

frequency in the detailed design
51.
Zero Flow /
Empty
Dust goes solid and

hence maintenance
access is required
Procedure is to run and

empty the dust screw for
prolonged shutdowns
52.
Zero Flow /
Empty
Dust in the bottom of

the baghouse plus
moisture, e.g. during
a shutdown
Backup of dust if a
screw conveyor fails
Dust is held-up in the

system
53.
Impurities
Dust screw blocked
54.
Plant Items
Torn bags falling

onto the dust screw
in the bottom of the
baghouse
Bag failure
The last screw runs

nd
faster than the 2 last
which runs faster than
dust screw at the
baghouse bottom to
prevent dust being heldup
A grate is provided at
the bottom above the
baghouse dust screw
PM10 analyser and low
differential pressure
alarm
Dust not collected
A5.14
RM

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Garton
SYSTEM:
Baghouse and Dust Screws
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 23/1/2012
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
55.
Plant Items
Moisture ingress
Corrosion, e.g. of the

baghouse dust screw
conveyor
Appropriate materials of
construction
A5.15

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Garton
SYSTEM:
Scrubber (gas stream to
atmosphere) including the Induced Draft Fan
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 23/1/2012
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
56.
General
Discussion
HCl will be present at

elevated
temperatures
Low plant feed rate
Corrosion and hence

equipment damage
57.
Low Flow /
Low Level
58.
Impurities
Baghouse failure
Solids through to the

scrubber
59.
Plant Items
Stack top silencer

corrosion
Higher risk maintenance

due to work at heights
60.
Plant Items
Stack top silencer

corrosion (as above)
Higher risk maintenance

due to work at heights
Low stack velocity, poor

dispersion
construction will be
provided
The stack top diameter
will be such that the
minimum velocity to
ensure good dispersion
will be maintained at the
design plant turndown
TDS (total dissolved
solids) analyser
provided
Fan is silenced.
Unsure if the stack top
needs to include a
silencer
Fan is silenced.
Unsure if the stack top
needs to include a
silencer
A5.16
Check the need from the noise studies

for a stack top silencer not preferred
as it will be difficult to maintain
If uncertain about the need for a stacktop silencer, make provision for bolting
one on later (including allowance for the
weight)
POD
KC

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Garton
SYSTEM:
Scrubber (gas stream to
atmosphere) including the Induced Draft Fan
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 23/1/2012
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
Provide safety showers with insulated

pipes (to prevent hot water flowing
during high ambient temperatures),
green fluoro light above the shower, a
flow sensor to alarm when a person is
using a shower and procedures for lone
workers
LK
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
61.
Plant Items
Caustic leak
Splashing and corrosive

burns to personnel
Safety showers
A5.17

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:
Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes,

Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
SYSTEM:
Feeds
Scrubber Make-up Water Supply
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 27/1/2012
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
62.
General
Discussion
Dust carryover from

baghouse
Demister blockage and

hence high scrubber
63.
General
Discussion
Power failure and the

recycle pumps stop
Loss of containment of
acidic gases to
atmosphere
64.
General
Discussion
Failure of the check

valve to the scrubber
quench
Caustic flows back to

the towns water tank
Sprays onto demister,

high differential
pressure alarm across
the scrubber
Emergency power
generator feeds the
scrubber pumps,
analysers installed on
the scrubber stack
The makeup water
supply main block valve
to the scrubber quench
is normally closed and
will only be opened
when the scrubber
recycle pumps are not
operating
A5.18

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

SYSTEM:
Feeds
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 27/1/2012
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
65.
General
Discussion
66.
General
Discussion
67.
General
Discussion
Review need for the low flow alarm on

the make-up water supply line to the
quench as this will be a nuisance alarm
during normal operation when there is
no flow in this line (i.e. as above, this
line is left isolated when the scrubber
recycle pumps are running)
Check with BK the reason for installing
the flow meter in the make-up water
supply line to the quench given the
operation is manual
Show on the P&ID the sump pump and
its controls
A5.19
RM
POD
KC

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

SYSTEM:
Feeds
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 27/1/2012
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
68.
High Flow /
High Level
Solenoid valve to the

scrubber sump fails
open
Scrubber sump fills and

then overflows via the
emergency overflow
69.
Zero Flow /
Empty
Solenoid valve to the

demister sprays is
stuck closed
Buildup of solids on the

demister resulting in
high scrubber
70.
Reverse Flow
Acidic gases absorb

back into the makeup water feed lines
Corrosion of the piping

and piping items
Sump high level alarm.

pH meter will detect a
drop in pH.
The emergency
overflow is sized for all
make-up water supply
flows operating together
at maximum rates.
Bunded area if it does
overflow
Scrubber DP high alarm
construction, e.g.
stainless steel or plastic
A5.20
nd
Show on the P&ID the 2 level detector

in the scrubber sump to separate the
control and trip functions
KC
Include in the functional description a

low flow alarm that is only active when
the solenoid valve to demister sprays
should be open (i.e. to avoid a nuisance
alarm when the solenoid is meant to be
closed)
RM

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

SYSTEM:
Feeds
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 27/1/2012
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
Amend the P&ID to show actual types of

valves: electric or pneumatic actuation
KC
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
71.
Plant Items
Control valves
wrongly selected,
e.g. solenoids for
larger (100 to 150
mm) lines not
appropriate
Loss of plant control
Correct valve selection
A5.21

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

SYSTEM:
Scrubber Recycle
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 27/1/2012
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
72.
General
Discussion
Scrubber recycle
pump failure
Plant shuts down

(accepted response)
Manual changeover of
pumps
73.
High Flow /
High Level
Pump seals fail
Release of 80 C liquid.
Operator regular
inspection and
maintenance as
required
pH meter will alarm high

pH
Routine manual
sampling of the
scrubber recycle liquid.
pH meter including a
low alarm.
CEMS stack analysers,
e.g. NOx and SOx will
also rise and alarm for
operator response
74.
High Flow /
High Level
Overdosing caustic
75.
Low Flow /
Low Level
Underdosing caustic
(e.g. from pH meter
drifting, failure to top
up the caustic IBC)
Slow leak only expected

from these types of
pumps
High pH no significant
consequences identified
Lack of absorption of
acidic gases and hence
atmospheric emission
A5.22

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

SYSTEM:
Scrubber Recycle
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 27/1/2012
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
76.
Low Flow /
Low Level
Nozzles fall off the

reflux distributor
(screw type which
can unwind)
Inadequate liquid / gas

contact due to
channelling in the
packing
77.
Low Flow /
Low Level
Loss of scrubber flow
Increase in temperature
in the plastic packing
with possible damage
78.
Zero Flow /
Empty
Valve left shut before

the scrubber liquor
analysers
79.
Reverse Flow
Recycle flow goes

back to the caustic
pumps
Analysers do not detect

changes in pH or
conductivity hence the
potential for poor
scrubber performance
Overpressure, loss of
containment at the
caustic IBC
Nozzles to be screwed
in tight and are
replaceable through the
side of the scrubber
column
Correct packing
selection
Operator observes
signals not fluctuating,
analysers in the stack
will alarm
Pressure control valve
in the common delivery
line from the caustic
pumps
A5.23
Ensure the scrubber packing can

withstand higher temperatures due to
deviations in the recycle scrubber flow
rate
Include in the functional description flatline detection on the signals from the pH
and conductivity analysers
Review need for a check valve in the

common caustic pump discharge line
RM
RM

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

SYSTEM:
Scrubber Recycle
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 27/1/2012
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
80.
High
Temperature
Hot pipelines (i.e.

approximately 80 C)
Burns on contact
81.
Impurities
Blockage in the
scrubber
82.
Change in
Composition or
Concentration /
Two-Phase Flow
/ Reactions
Testing
Iron oxide dust not

collected in
baghouse
Solids buildup in
system
High flow when

taking samples
Splashing
83.
Pipes above 60 deg. C

potentially in contact
with personnel to be
provided with personnel
protection through
insulation, mesh
guarding, signage, etc
Operator checks for
water discolouration
High conductivity but

this is a slow process
and can be controlled
manually
Manual blowdown to control conductivity

is appropriate. Therefore, delete the
actuated blowdown valve and upstream
/ downstream isolation valves
Valves (e.g. gate type)
that can be slowly
cracked open, PPE
A5.24

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

SYSTEM:
Liquid Feeds to Pugmill
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10009 &

No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 27/1/2012
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
84.
General
Discussion
Pump requires
maintenance
The pump discharge

(i.e. after the check
valve) needs to be
flushed for maintenance
85.
General
Discussion
Power failure
Loss of water to the

pugmill dust release in
the area
86.
General
Discussion
Review the need for individual drain

valves on the discharge of each pump
(as per the scrubber recycle pumps) for
maintenance purposes when the other
pump is still operational
Show the flow control valve to the
pugmill as fail open on the P&ID
Hazop suspended until the liquid
balance assessment is carried out on
the liquid feeds to the pugmill.
Preference is to use treated water
instead of Towns Water for sustainability
reasons.
Note: the current design requires
makeup water via the scrubber and
hence excessive caustic usage will
result.
It is expected the liquid feed system
design will change and then the HAZOP
should be performed
A5.25

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

SYSTEM:
Soil to and from the Pugmill
(including the cyclones underflow)
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10002 &

MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 27/1/2012
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
87.
Low Flow /
Low Level
88.
Zero Flow /
Empty
89.
Zero Flow /
Empty
Rock, metal piece,

etc gets into the
pugmill
Screw conveyor
below the cyclones
or rotary valve stops
Loss of water
Baghouse drive
overloads and
equipment damage
High dust flow to the
baghouse
Soil too hot, potential
damage to conveyor
belts, burns, etc.
Potential for a build-up
of solids in the dryer and
hence heat damage to
the dryer
90.
High
Temperature

pugmill
Potential for burns from

the hot treated soil
High current detected

shutting down the
pugmill
Pressure measurements
and/or operator will shut
down the plant
High temperature
alarms.
Camera shows high
dust.
Constant operator
attendance.
Operator shuts down
pugmill if it cannot be
controlled
Temperature alarms.
Operator intervention
A5.26
Show on the P&IDs a trip of the dryer if

the pugmill is shut down
RM
Ensure barriers, etc so people cannot

come into contact with hot material
LK

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

SYSTEM:
Overview
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
All Drawings
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 27/1/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
91.
Toxicity
No further issues
identified with the
overview guide
words
A5.27

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:
Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin,

Tai Truong
SYSTEM:
Caustic IBC and Pumping System
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 26/6/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
92.
93.
General
Discussion
General
Discussion
Note only:
The caustic storage

vessel will be an IBC
manual
changeover via
hoses to a second
IBC about once per
week (with a portable
plastic bund
underneath)
Note only:
The pumps will be

diaphragm pumps
with internal pressure
relief, manual
changeover, located
in a bund and a
safety shower nearby
A5.28

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Tai Truong
SYSTEM:
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 26/6/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
PCV 1082C to have a pressure indicator

integral to the valve to allow the
operators to set the pressure on the
regulator and monitor its performance
LK
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
94.
General
Discussion
95.
High Flow /
High Level
Overdosing caustic
pH exceeds limit In the

scrubber recycle circuit
no significant
96.
High Flow /
High Level
Loss of containment,
e.g. forklift tynes
puncture the IBC,
hose failure, etc
Potential to cause injury

to personnel
pH meter and alarm (it

is expected to be
reliable in this service
with routine
maintenance)
P10 high pressure
plastic piping, no joints
outside the bunded area
A5.29

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Tai Truong
SYSTEM:
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 26/6/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
Determine the maximum temperature

rise and whether there is a detrimental
effect on the scrubber system materials
of construction.
TT
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
97.
High Flow /
High Level
Pumping caustic
when the plant is
shut down
Scrubber sump
overflow.
Temperature rise due to
heat of mixing
High level alarm in the

scrubber sump
Calculate the volume in the scrubber

sump between the normal highest level
and overflow to check that a maximum
3
of 1 m from an IBC will not result in
overflow from the scrubber overflow
pipe.
98.
High Flow /
High Level
Stormwater falling
into the bunded area
Stormwater
management required
Bunded area, sump,

discharge to water
treatment plant
A5.30
Review the need for a hard wired trip to

stop the caustic pump if being run in
manual. Also, review the need for PLC
alarms to indicate that the caustic pump
is left running in manual and hence the
control system trips etc will not be
functional

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Tai Truong
SYSTEM:
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 26/6/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
99.
High Flow /
High Level
Pipe breakage, e.g.

mechanical impact
100.
Low Flow /
Low Level
101.
Zero Flow /
Empty
Empty IBC, leaks,

pump not fast
enough
Valves shut, IBC
empty, pump
deadheaded
102.
Reverse Flow
No credible causes
identified given the
safeguards
Caustic leak with the

potential to harm
personnel
Loss of acidic gas
scrubbing
Potential to exceed the
piping system design
pressure for the
deadhead case and
hence result in a loss of
containment of caustic
which could harm
personnel
Strong materials of
construction for the
proposed tubing
pH alarm and interlock,
scrubber stack
analysers and alarms
Internal pressure relief
to be included with the
pump, pH meter and
alarm in the scrubber
recycle circuit
Ensure that the small bore caustic

piping is adequately protected from
mechanical impact
Non return valve, PCV

1082C will close when
the caustic pump stops,
suction and discharge
valves for the pump will
also act to prevent
reverse flow
A5.31
LK

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Tai Truong
SYSTEM:
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 26/6/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
103.
Low Pressure
IBC vent left closed
Suck in the IBC
104.
High
Temperature
Heat of dilution with

caustic and water
No significant
105.
Low Temperature
Standby pump
freezes on cold night
106.
Low Temperature
Pump pressure relief

inlet and outlet lines
freeze
107.
Plant Items
IBC changeover
No caustic flow to the

scrubber when pumps
changed over
Loss of deadhead
protection for the caustic
pump and hence the
potential for a loss of
containment of caustic
which could harm
personnel
Potential incidents
associated with forklift
trucks and hose
disconnection and
reconnection
Procedures and training

for bung removal or
some IBCs have vents
included
Materials adequate for
100 deg. C
pH alarm and interlock,

scrubber stack
analysers and alarms
Delete the standby pump and piping and

provide a spare pump in store
LK
Review the need for insulation or heat

tracing on the pump pressure relief inlet
and outlet lines
LK
Review the layout for forklift accessibility

as well as the operability of the caustic
hose connections including hose
draining
LK
A5.32

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Tai Truong
SYSTEM:
Towns Water Tank
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 26/6/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
Thoroughly flush the Towns Water

supply pipe during commissioning to
ensure all residual solids are removed
(plus check quality of gas supply with
respect to solids in the pipeline as well)
Ensure the Towns Water pipe from the
Sydney Water main is large enough to
avoid the need for a booster pump, i.e.
delete the booster pump and fill the
Towns Water tank directly from the
Sydney Water mains supply
Show other consumers of Towns Water
on the drawing, e.g. safety showers,
ablutions, etc. These off-takes are to be
from the supply pipe upstream of the
Towns Water tank for supply quality
reliability (e.g. no process contaminants
due to reverse flow)
Ensure the Towns Water supply line is
away from the project excavation areas
GL
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
108.
General
Discussion
109.
General
Discussion
110.
General
Discussion
111.
High Flow /
High Level
Supply pipe
ruptured, e.g. by
backhoe
Tank fails to fill. No

water flow to the ECU,
pugmill, scrubber, etc
Low pressure and flow

alarms and trips on the
downstream water users
A5.33
LK
LK
LK

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Tai Truong
SYSTEM:
Towns Water Tank
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 26/6/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
The tank overflow is to be lower than the

water inlet to ensure there the risk of
reverse flow into the Towns Water
supply line to the tank is as low as
possible
SAFEGUARDS
112.
Low Flow /
Low Level
113.
Reverse Flow
114.
Impurities
115.
Plant Items
116.
Plant Items
Level control valve

insufficiently open
Frogs, vermin, etc in

tank
Work at heights
when maintaining the
tanks level
transmitter
Tank fails to fill. No

water flow to ECU,
pugmill, scrubber, etc
Blockage of the water

supply pumps inlet
strainers
Potential for falls and

serious injuries
Low pressure and flow

alarms and trips on the
downstream water users
Pump strainer
maintenance and
downstream pressure
and flow alarms
Permit to work system

including controls for fall
prevention
A5.34
Locate the LCV close to the Towns

Water tank roof manhole for ease of
inspection and maintenance
Use a differential pressure transmitter
for tank level measurement (located at
grade) in lieu of an ultrasonic transmitter
on top of tank
LK
LK

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Tai Truong
SYSTEM:
Towns Water Tank
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 26/6/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
117.
Plant Items
Work at heights
when maintaining the
tanks LCV
Potential for falls and

serious injuries
Permit to work system

including controls for fall
prevention
118.
Instruments
Failure of the sight

glass
Water leaks
Maintenance and
replacement of the sight
glass
A5.35
Review to option for replacing the roof

mounted level control valve to one at
grade (i.e. eliminate the need for a float
valve at the top of the tank and hence
work at heights injuries)
Review type of sight glass level
indication and also the need for a sight
glass for LI1074 to minimise the risk of
leaks
LK

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Tai Truong
SYSTEM:
Towns Water Pumping Systems
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 26/6/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
The scrubber blowdown (max 20-40

l/min) will go directly to the pugmill from
the discharge side of the scrubber
recycle pumps, not via the pugmill water
supply pumps.
TT
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
119.
General
Discussion
As this line has not been HAZOPed,

perform a formal design change
assessment when the final design
details are known.
120.
General
Discussion
121.
General
Discussion
Therefore, pumps PUI-0907 and 0908

are duty/standby and are the same
design as the other water pumpsets
shown on this P&ID
Review the need to replace the 6 Y-type
strainers with 2 strainers in the common
suction line to all pumpsets (ease of
maintenance)
Add an isolation valve upstream of
PCV1052 (to be consistent with the
other water pumping systems design)
A5.36
TT
TT

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Tai Truong
SYSTEM:
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 26/6/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
122.
123.
124.
High Flow /
High Level
Low Flow /
Low Level
Zero Flow /
Empty
Running 2 pumps
simultaneously
Blocked strainers,
valves gagged,
pump problems

ECU
No significant
Loss of the required flow

to the ECU, scrubber
and pugmill (as
previously HAZOPed
above)
Duty/standby selector
switch.
Flow controls
downstream will ensure
the users only take what
water they need
Alarms and trips at each
user of the water, e.g.
low pressure or flow.
Critical pumps can be
started manually when
emergency generator
started
Potential for heat

damage to the water
spray nozzles when the
plant is tripped on low
water flow
Confirm that the nozzles are made from

appropriate materials of construction for
high temperature following a plant trip
A5.37
LK

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Tai Truong
SYSTEM:
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 26/6/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
As per Plant Items, review the materials

of construction for all equipment
throughout the plant
LK
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
125.
Reverse Flow
Loss of the quench

water pumps to the
scrubber
126.
Reverse Flow
Pumps stops, e.g.

loss of power
127.
Plant Items
Acidic vapours, etc

throughout the plant
128.
Electrical
Power failure
Potential for acidic mist

to absorb into the water
in the supply pipe to the
scrubber and cause
corrosion
Water in the pipes to the
ECU and scrubber flows
back and hence drawing
gases from these
vessels, i.e. corrosion
potential as above
Corrosion of equipment
as above
Loss of critical
equipment
As above, the correct

materials of construction
are to be confirmed
Emergency generator
A5.38
Review the materials of construction for

all equipment throughout the plant
LK
Confirm the required items connected to

the emergency power supply
BK

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Tai Truong
SYSTEM:
Instrument and Compressed Air
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 26/6/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
129.
General
Discussion
130.
General
Discussion
131.
General
Discussion
Historical incidents
involving oil filled
compressors running
too hot and hence
cracking the oil
The cracked oil can

leave dust deposits
within the piping system
and hence is an internal
dust explosion hazard
Running the air

compressor within the
design limits, routine oil
sampling and
replacement
A5.39
Review the need for the standby air

compressor, including the need for the
isolation valve on the discharge of
compressor AC-1002. Delete if not
required
The air compressor is to be oil free
LK
Review the final design details from

vendor for the compressor and dryers
(HAZOP assumes desiccant dryer)
including inlet air strainer, check valve to
avoid depressurisation of the air
receiver when the compressors trip, dew
point measurement, weatherproofing to
avoid rain ingress to the compressor
suction, signals to control room,
functional logic, etc
LK
LK

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Tai Truong
SYSTEM:
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 26/6/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
132.
General
Discussion
133.
General
Discussion
134.
General
Discussion
135.
General
Discussion
A5.40
The maximum air pressure is to be

designed for adequate operation of the
ECU nozzles (possibly 10 barg plus)
Update the air compressor P&ID to
show all air users, e.g. the ECU
LK
Rationalise the number, location and set

pressure for the pressure regulators
(e.g. PCV1079A/B/C appear to be
controlling the same pressure and
hence there is the potential for these
regulators to hunt). For the required
pressure regulators, supply pressure
indication for testing and monitoring
purposes
Make the complete system dry air (i.e.
dry air is required to all users) to avoid
wet air blocking the baghouse filter
bags. This will remove the additional air
receiver, associated equipment and
controls
LK
LK
LK

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Tai Truong
SYSTEM:
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 26/6/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
136.
High Flow /
High Level
Regulator failure
137.
Zero Flow /
Empty
Loss of power
138.
High Pressure
Compressor
deadheaded
139.
High
Temperature
Heat from 10 bar

pressure requirement
Potential for the

maximum air supply
pressure to be within the
supply pipe to the final
isolation valve at each
air user
No air to users
Confirm that the design is rated for full

air pressure to the final isolation valves
for each air user
Low pressure alarms

and trips
Potential for equipment

damage and possible
failure leading to
missiles, i.e. harm to
people and damage to
equipment
Potential high
temperature damage to
the downstream
equipment
Make sure the vendor package has

appropriate safeguards for compressor
deadhead and if a blow off valve /
pressure safety valve is provided then it
should not yield unacceptable noise
levels (e.g. provide a silencer)
Review the maximum compressor
discharge temperature and ensure that
adequate safeguards are included, e.g.
ensure the compressor package has a
cooler
A5.41
LK
LK
LK

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Tai Truong
SYSTEM:
OVERVIEW
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
Caustic, Water and Air P&IDs
MINUTES BY:
Peter ODea
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 26/6/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
140.
Commissioning
141.
Commissioning
Foreign objects in
the pipes during
commissioning
Potential to damage
equipment
142.
Commissioning
Potential for dioxin

formation from the
plant
Impact to people and

the business
143.
Commissioning
144.
Materials of
Construction
Potential
incompatibility of the
materials of
construction with the
process materials
Provide high point vents and low point

drains for hydrotesting once the piping
layout drawings are known
Provide temporary cone strainers,
remove sensitive instruments and
valves, etc for line flushing during
commissioning
Incorporate the learnings from the
ATMR plant commissioning especially
re dioxin prevention and control
Provide sufficient process sampling
points between the main plant items to
be able to measure gas composition
and diagnose problems, e.g. levels of
unwanted by-products
Review the compatibility of the chosen
materials of construction, including
gaskets, with the process materials via
the Hazard Study 1 chemicals
compatibility of materials chart
Corrosion and
equipment failure with a
loss of containment
A5.42
LK
LK
TT
LK
BK

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Tai Truong, Peter ODea, Rudy Maes, Keith
Chapman
SYSTEM:
Air Compressor for the Evaporative

Cooler
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
C143-PF-96D-CTCU-10010 (mark-up)
MINUTES BY:
Bala Kathiravelu
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 19/10/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
The tag numbers on the two air

compressor, e.g. hand switches, need to
be unique. Mark up the P&ID
accordingly
Check the vendor P&ID that high
pressure protection is provided. Also,
review the vendor supply details to
confirm adequate controls and
safeguarding is being provided, e.g.
suction screen and an aftercooler and a
high outlet temperature alarm
Minute 130 (above) regarding the need
for an oil free compressor is to be
reconsidered. If the compressor is not
oil free then provide an oil filter and
confirm the operating temperature is
less than 140 deg C exit the aftercooler
KC
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
145.
General
Discussion
146.
High Pressure
Compressor high
pressure protection
for deadheading
147.
High
Temperature
Operating the oil

flooded compressor
(to be confirmed) at
high temperatures
The compressor is a
screw compressor and
hence the potential for
overpressuring the
discharge piping with
possible failures leading
to missiles
Potential to crack the oil
and lead to a build-up
on the inside of the
pipes which can explode
A5.43
KC
KC

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Chapman
SYSTEM:
Air Compressor for the Evaporative

Cooler
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
C143-PF-96D-CTCU-10010 (mark-up)
MINUTES BY:
Bala Kathiravelu
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 19/10/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
Install an automatic condensate drain on

the receiver(s?) with an isolation valve
and bypass valve for maintenance
KC
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
148.
Low Temperature
Cooling of the air in

the air receiver
Condensate will form

and build-up within the
air receiver
Manual draining
A5.44

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Chapman
SYSTEM:
Pugmill Water System (pumps 0907

and 0908)
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
C143-PF-96D-CTCU-10009 and 10003

Rev D
MINUTES BY:
Bala Kathiravelu
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 19/10/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
Following discussion, the scrubber

blowdown is to be sent to the effluent
treatment system. The main issues being:
KC
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
149.
General
Discussion
1. The potential for corrosion in the pugmill

system, e.g. high chlorides levels in a hot,
wet environment or from changes in pH
2. Contamination of the treated soil
3. The historical problems with solids in
the scrubber blowdown causing blockages
(e.g. of the spray nozzles) and settling
(e.g. within tanks), and
4. That the treated water can be rerun and
hence is not a potential loss from plant.
Therefore, Towns Water is to be used for
the pugmill water spray systems. Also,
provide appropriate connections for a
possible future scrubber bleed blowdown
tank (if required) and allow adequate
space in the plot planning
A5.45

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Chapman
SYSTEM:

and 0908)
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
C143-PF-96D-CTCU-10009 and 10003

Rev D
MINUTES BY:
Bala Kathiravelu
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 19/10/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
Mark up the P&ID to show individual

isolation supply valves to each pugmill
spray nozzle
Show PCV1052 controlling upstream
pressure as this valve is used for
deadhead protection for the pumps
The Towns Water pumps kickback lines
are to be top entry into the Towns Water
tank (to prevent reverse flow issues
from submerged entries). Therefore
delete the isolation valves at each
kickback line nozzle to the Towns Water
tank and the check valve in the kickback
line for pumps 0907 and 0908
FCV 1019 is to be a modulating valve
and it is to fail last position on loss of air
to the actuator, i.e. show a mushroom
head valve and FLP on the P&ID
Provide an isolation valve on PI 1019B
(consistent with all PIs)
KC
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
150.
General
Discussion
Need to balance flow

to pugmill sprays
151.
General
Discussion
P&ID correction
152.
General
Discussion
P&ID correction
153.
General
Discussion
P&ID correction
154.
General
Discussion
P&ID correction
A5.46
KC
KC
KC
KC

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Chapman
SYSTEM:

and 0908)
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
C143-PF-96D-CTCU-10009 and 10003

Rev D
MINUTES BY:
Bala Kathiravelu
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 19/10/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
155.
General
Discussion
P&ID correction
156.
High Flow /
High Level
Spray nozzle
unwinding and falling
off
157.
High Flow /
High Level
158.
High
Temperature
The pugmill pump

stops and water
syphons forward
through them to the
pugmill
Note that the
scrubber blowdown
is approximately 80
deg C
Too much water flow to

the pugmill no
significant
Too much water flow to
the pugmill no
significant
Potential for burn
injuries if personnel
contact hot surfaces
A5.47
Delete the line on P&ID 1003 shown as

Cooling Water from Scrubber to the
pugmill sprays (as this was formally
used for return scrubber liquid no
longer required) and also delete PT
1019C and the associated alarms on
this line
Spot weld the spray nozzles onto the
pipes to prevent them from falling off
KC
Include in the functional description the

need to have FVC 1019 & SV 1019
closed when the pugmill pump stops
KC
Provide appropriate personal protection

to avoid burns for the scrubber
blowdown line
LK
KC

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
TEAM MEMBERS:

Chapman
SYSTEM:
Overview - Air Compressor to the

Evaporative Cooler and the Pugmill
Water System
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
C143-PF-96D-CTCU-10009 and 10003

Rev D, C143-PF-96D-CTCU-10010
(mark-up)
MINUTES BY:
Bala Kathiravelu
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 19/10/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
159.
No further significant hazardous events

or operability problems identified for
these systems using the Overview
guide words
A5.48

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
Plant
Orica Villawood Water Treatment
TEAM MEMBERS:
Bala Kathiravelu, Peter ODea, Pearce Anderson,

Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
SYSTEM:
High Capacity Settling Tank
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
SAS10883-301 Rev A
MINUTES BY:
Lindsay Killin
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 29/11/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
Delete the butterfly valve on the clarified

liquid line from the settling tank as this
line is free draining and hence does not
need to be isolated
Mark up the P&IDs to show all line
sizes, e.g. the clarified water line from
the settling tank
Delete the additional diaphragm valve
downstream of the settling tank sump
gate valves. The gate valves are at
ground level (i.e. accessible) and can be
used for isolation for pump flushing etc
instead
Ensure the coagulant pumping system
is within the IBC bunded area to contain
any leaks. Apply this action to all
chemical dosing systems
PA
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
160.
General
Discussion
161.
General
Discussion
162.
General
Discussion
163.
High Flow /
High Level
Losses of
containment from the
coagulant pumping
system
Potential environmental
consequences of
overflow to the ground
System leak checked

prior to operation, the
coagulant IBC is bunded
A5.49
PA
PA
PA

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
Plant
TEAM MEMBERS:

SYSTEM:
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
SAS10883-301 Rev A
MINUTES BY:
Lindsay Killin
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 29/11/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
164.
Zero Flow /
Empty
165.
Reverse Flow
166.
High Pressure
167.
Plant Items
Solids fouling of the

static mixer on the
inlet to the settling
tank
Deadhead of the
sludge pump
Plant downtime for

maintenance
Potential to rupture the

downstream piping
system
Operators to keep the

isolation valves open
during normal operation
A5.50
Delete the static mixer and add the

coagulant upstream in the feed line to
allow sufficient line length for mixing
PA
Confirm that design will prevent reverse

flow of coagulant to the upstream
sources (these upstream sources are to
be shown on the P&ID)
Replace the high pressure instrumented
protection system (i.e. a potential Safety
Instrumented Function to AS61511) with
a suitable mechanical over-pressure
device, e.g. a PRV or kick back line
(Note: consider the implications of
sludge fouling a PRV). Also, note that if
a PRV is installed, it should be installed
immediately downstream of the pump
for the case where the NRV is stuck in
the closed position
Confirm all off-takes from the sludge
lines are horizontal to vertical to prevent
settling and compaction of solids in the
branches
PA
PA
PA

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
Plant
TEAM MEMBERS:

SYSTEM:
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
SAS10883-301 Rev A
MINUTES BY:
Lindsay Killin
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 29/11/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
Preference is to not use PVC due to

interaction between solvents and
plasticiser. If used, then the preference
is to use UPVC (i.e. un-plasticised PVC)
Install a timer on the sludge pump to
prevent excessive amounts of water
being flushed to the sedimentation tanks
and also to allow adequate flushing of
sludge pump and lines during pump
operation
Include in the SOPs the need to keep
aboveground pipework open (i.e. not
isolated) to prevent thermal
overpressure from isolated liquid being
heated by the sun
Provide means to allow flushing of the
inlet lines to the settling tank. Treated
water to be used (not potable water due
to the risk of reverse flow and hence
contamination)
PA
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
168.
Plant Items
169.
Plant Items
Operator leaves the

sludge pump running
for too long
Overfilling the
sedimentation tanks
170.
Plant
I
Items
Isolation of water in
the aboveground
piping
Potential for heating by

the sun and thermal
overpressure, i.e. piping
system failure
171.
Plant
P
Items
Solids settling in the

feed lines to the
settling tank
Fouling of the feed lines
A5.51
PA
PA
PA

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
Plant
TEAM MEMBERS:

SYSTEM:
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
SAS10883-301 Rev A
MINUTES BY:
Lindsay Killin
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 29/11/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
172.
Plant Items
173.
Instruments
Delete the second isolation valve on

discharge side of the coagulant dosing
pump as it is only isolating a reducer
and double isolation is not required.
Apply this action to all chemical dosing
systems
Provide a diaphragm connection to all
instruments on sludge lines in the plant
to prevent blocking of the impulse lines
from the solids
A5.52
PA
PA

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
Plant
SYSTEM:
Feed Tank System including the
Untreated Water Basin
DRAWING:
302 Rev 0
No.
SAS10883 301 Rev A, SAS10883
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
TEAM MEMBERS:

LEADER:
Dean Shewring
MINUTES BY:
Lindsay Killin
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 29/11/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
Install a flashing light (to be visible from

the DTDU) and/or use a SMS text
warning service to alert the operators of
any unacceptable process conditions
when the plant is unattended
Review the need to overflow the pump
well bund to the adjacent bunded area
given the current containment areas
capacities
PA
Review the need for automating the

break tank recycle valves to lower the
risk of this occurring, e.g. two actuated
valves for flow path determination after
the transfer pump
PA
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
174.
High Flow /
High Level
Rain and the water

treatment plant not
available
Overfilling the untreated

water basin
Procedural control
monitoring water levels
175.
High Flow /
High Level
Draining of both
sedimentation tanks
to the feed tank, e.g.
manual valves
passing or left open
Potential to initially
overflow the feed tank
and then overflow the
pump well bund
Operator to check level

in the feed tank prior to
discharge from the
sedimentation tank.
176.
Zero Flow /
Empty
Operator does not

perform recycle from
the break tank to the
feed tank during start
up
Higher than normal

solids through to the
zeolite filters resulting in
plant recovery impacts
due to the need to
backwash the filters
High level alarms and

trip 2.1 to stop some
feed pumps into the
feed tank
SOPs and training
A5.53
LK

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
Plant
SYSTEM:
Feed Tank System including the
Untreated Water Basin
DRAWING:
302 Rev 0
No.
SAS10883 301 Rev A, SAS10883
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
TEAM MEMBERS:

LEADER:
Dean Shewring
MINUTES BY:
Lindsay Killin
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 29/11/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
Install a screen on the inlet to the raw

water feed pump. Apply this action to all
sump pumps in the plant
Provide means to monitor the water flow
into the mixing tank, e.g. replace the
flow switch with flow meter and a low
flow trip
PA
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
177.
Impurities
178.
Instruments
Foreign objects
entering the untreated water basin
Plant inlet water
flowrate monitoring
for mass balances
and performance
checks
Blockage and/or
damage to the raw
water feed pump
A5.54
PA

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
Plant
SYSTEM:
Flocculation Tank and Chemical
Dosing Systems (HAZOPed by Difference)
DRAWING:
No.
SAS10883 302 Rev 0
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
TEAM MEMBERS:

LEADER:
Dean Shewring
MINUTES BY:
Lindsay Killin
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 29/11/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
Review the possibility of overflowing

from the flocculation tank chamber 1 to
chamber 2 to minimise risk of short
circuiting in the first chamber and hence
inadequate mixing (i.e. use a higher
elevation overflow line)
Markup the P& ID to show the drain
valves on the flocculation tank
chambers
Show both isolation valves on the outlet
of flocculation chamber 2 from the
flocculation tank
Add a flow switch alarm to the water
supply to the proposed safety shower in
case a lone worker requires assistance
when using the safety shower
Utility station to be added to allow wash
down of any spills of flocculant
PA
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
179.
General
Discussion
180.
General
Discussion
181.
General
Discussion
182.
High Flow /
High Level
183.
High Flow /
High Level
Caustic line
breakage through
high pressure /
damage
Loss of containment
of flocculant
Potential to splash a
person and cause a
corrosive burn
System to be leak
checked prior to use,
high pressure tubing to
be used
Slip hazard
A5.55
PA
PA
PA
PA

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
Plant
SYSTEM:
DRAWING:
No.
SAS10883 302 Rev 0
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
TEAM MEMBERS:

LEADER:
Dean Shewring
MINUTES BY:
Lindsay Killin
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 29/11/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
As above, preference is to overflow from

the mixing tank (chamber 1) at a high
point which would be ideal for the
flocculant addition point to reduce the
chance of this reverse flow scenario.
Further review required
Ensure the potable water to safety
shower eyewash is protected from
reaching high temperature due to
heating by the sun
PA
Review means to ensure the caustic

does not freeze in the dosing lines
SA
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
184.
Reverse Flow
185.
High
Temperature
186.
Low Temperature
Failure of the
flocculant discharge
non-return valve and
the pump suction
and discharge
(check) valves
Water supply line to
the safety shower /
eyewash heated by
the sun
Cold winter night
Drain the entire

flocculation tank,
including both
chambers, to the
flocculant IBC
Maintenance on the
piping system and
check valves
Hot water from the

safety shower eyewash
with the potential to
render the unit
inoperable
Potential to freeze
caustic (46 to 50%), in
particular, in small bore
lines that have
intermittent flows
A5.56
LK

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
Plant
SYSTEM:
DRAWING:
No.
SAS10883 302 Rev 0
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
TEAM MEMBERS:

LEADER:
Dean Shewring
MINUTES BY:
Lindsay Killin
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 29/11/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
Perform a risk assessment on the

caustic dosing point for this scenario to
check if additional safety controls are
required, e.g. cowling around the caustic
dosing point
SA
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
187.
Plant Items
Personnel or wildlife
contact with caustic
when splash filling
into the mixing tank
Corrosive burn injuries
Caustic not dosed

during maintenance (the
system is shut down).
Plant will be shutdown
during maintenance of
the pH probe
A5.57

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
Plant
TEAM MEMBERS:

SYSTEM:
Lamella Settlers
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
SAS10883 303 Rev A
MINUTES BY:
Lindsay Killin
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 29/11/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
188.
General
Discussion
Apply the common actions from the

settling tank sludge pump as
appropriate, i.e. actions 7, 8 and 10.
PA
No further significant issues identified
A5.58

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
Plant
SYSTEM:
Break Tank / Zeolite Feed Tank
(HAZOPed by Difference) and the Filter Pumping
System, i.e. Filters on-line
DRAWING:
304 Rev A
No.
SAS10883 303 Rev A, SAS10883
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
TEAM MEMBERS:

LEADER:
Dean Shewring
MINUTES BY:
Lindsay Killin
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 29/11/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
Review the need for having two tanks in

series, i.e. the break tank and the zeolite
feed tank. Can the plant be operated
adequately with only one tank (e.g.
consider sludge fouling the filters at a
higher frequency if only one tank was
used). Delete one tank from the scope
if two are not required
PA
Confirm that there are adequate

safeguards to protect against overpressure of the filters as they are
designed for maximum pressure of 250
kPag
PA
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
189.
General
Discussion
190.
General
Discussion
191.
High Pressure
Operator leaves one

or more filter manual
valves in the
incorrect position
during or after a
backwash operation
Zeolite filters outlet
valves shut
Unwanted misdirected
flows, e.g. backwash
water to the GAC feed
tank
SOPs and training

acceptable given the
consequential impacts

design pressure of the
filters from the filter feed
pumps
PSH on filter feed

pumps discharge,
however, its set point is
unknown
A5.59

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
Plant
SYSTEM:
Break Tank / Zeolite Feed Tank
(HAZOPed by Difference) and the Filter Pumping
System, i.e. Filters on-line
DRAWING:
304 Rev A
No.
SAS10883 303 Rev A, SAS10883
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
TEAM MEMBERS:

LEADER:
Dean Shewring
MINUTES BY:
Lindsay Killin
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 29/11/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
Install an analysis point on the common

line to the GAC feed tank to allow the
operators to test the performance of the
zeolite filters
PA
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
192.
Testing
A5.60

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
Plant
TEAM MEMBERS:

SYSTEM:
Zeolite Filters Backwashing
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
SAS10883 304 Rev A
MINUTES BY:
Lindsay Killin
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 29/11/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
Install an additional valve downstream

of zeolite filters to isolate the filter
system from the GAC feed tank for
backwashing of the zeolite filters
Provide means to backwash all three
filters when blinded, e.g. install an
additional hose connection on common
backwash inlet to all three filters for
connecting a hose (must consider the
maximum water supply pressure to
ensure this does not exceed the filter
maximum pressure) or install a filter
bypass line to allow backwash with nonfiltered water from the zeolite filter feed
pump
Review the need for the flow switch after
the zeolite feed pumps as the PSH can
be used for filter blockage and
deadhead protection. Delete if not
required
PA
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
193.
General
Discussion
194.
Low Flow /
Low Level
195.
Instruments
All three filters

become blinded
Inability to backwash
A5.61
PA
PA

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
Plant
SYSTEM:
GAC Feed Tank System (HAZOPed
by Difference) and GAC Filters
DRAWING:
No.
SAS10883 305 Rev A
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
TEAM MEMBERS:

LEADER:
Dean Shewring
MINUTES BY:
Lindsay Killin
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 29/11/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
Update the P&ID to show the tank liquid

outlet nozzle isolation valve
PA
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
196.
General
Discussion
197.
General
Discussion
Operator leaves one

or more GAC manual
valves in the
incorrect position
198.
High Flow /
High Level
Two pumps in
operation
199.
High Flow /
High Level
Incorrect valve
alignment
Unwanted misdirected
flows, e.g. non-treated
water to the treated
water basins, or
deadhead of the GAC
feed pump
Potential to carry over
activated carbon to the
downstream treated
water tank and beyond
SOPs and training

acceptable given the
consequential impacts
Potential contaminants
going into the treated
water feed tank and/or
dead head the GAC
feed pump
Testing of the treated

water prior to discharge
to the sewer and the
ability to rerun off-spec
water through the plant
A5.62
The stand-by pump is to be removed

from the field and used as a hot spare
(i.e. two pump operation not possible).
Also, include in SOPs the need to only
run one pump at a time in the future to
avoid fluidisation of the GAC if a second
stand-by pump is installed
Include in the SOPs the need for
supervisory checking of valve positions
after a GAC unit valve change / change
over
PA
LK

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
Plant
SYSTEM:
DRAWING:
No.
SAS10883 305 Rev A
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
TEAM MEMBERS:

LEADER:
Dean Shewring
MINUTES BY:
Lindsay Killin
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 29/11/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
200.
High Flow /
High Level
GAC purifier feed

pump is larger in size
than the current
pump
201.
Zero Flow /
Empty
GAC feed pump

stops
Increase pumping rate

has potential to fluidise
the carbon bed and
hence the increase risk
of carry-over of GAC
Water in the GAC
purifiers will drain down
to the treated water tank
and form a vacuum in
the upper sections of
the GAC Purifiers. Also,
if the pump check valve
fails, the pressure in the
GACs will be close to a
full vacuum when
draining back to the
GAC feed tank
A5.63
Confirm the new pump will not result in

fluidisation of the GEC purifiers
SA
Confirm that the GAC vessels are

adequately rated for the maximum
vacuum that can be generated
PA

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
Plant
SYSTEM:
DRAWING:
No.
SAS10883 305 Rev A
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
TEAM MEMBERS:

LEADER:
Dean Shewring
MINUTES BY:
Lindsay Killin
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 29/11/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
Confirm that the maximum design

pressure of the GAC vessels exceeds
the maximum supply pressure from the
new pump. If not, review the need to
replace the existing PRVs with larger
valves
Install a recirculation line from the outlet
of the GACs to the GAC feed tank to
allow GAC recirculation during
downtime
Include in the SOPs the need to rinse
the zeolite filters to the sedimentation
tank via the rinse valves
Determine availability of methods to get
quick turnaround on GAC bed analyses,
or indicator tests while awaiting lab
results
LK
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
202.
High Pressure
New pump feeding

the GACs

maximum design
pressure for the GAC
vessels as this is a
larger duty pump
203.
Impurities
Extended shutdown
(i.e. 4-5 weeks or
more)
Potential for biological

growth on the GAC and
hence deactivation
204.
Impurities
Fines from the initial

flushing of the zeolite
filters
Blinding of the activated

carbon and hence
deactivation (as above)
205.
Testing
A5.64
PA
PA
PA

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
Plant
SYSTEM:
DRAWING:
No.
SAS10883 305 Rev A
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
TEAM MEMBERS:

LEADER:
Dean Shewring
MINUTES BY:
Lindsay Killin
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 29/11/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
Confirm the mechanical integrity of the

equipment available in the existing parts
of the WTP including the structures (e.g.
stairs and platforms) and the vessels
(e.g. routine pressure vessel inspection
and testing required?)
LK
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
206.
Plant Items
A5.65

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
Plant
TEAM MEMBERS:

Lindsay Killin
SYSTEM:
Treated Water Basin System
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
SAS10883 306 Rev A
MINUTES BY:
Lindsay Killin
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 30/11/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
As the treated water tank and pump are

not required to recover off-spec material
etc then these can be removed from the
design. To prevent draining and hence
forming a vacuum in the GACs when the
GAC feed pump stops install a
motorised solenoid valve on the
common outlet line (close to the GACs)
which is to close the when the GAC feed
pump stops.
PA
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
207.
208.
General
Discussion
Also, include position switches on this

motorised valve to allow interlocking to
pump operation, i.e. prevent pump
operation if the motorised valve is stuck
closed and raise an alarm if this valve is
open when it should be closed. The
valve should fail to the last position
Retain means to recirculate the basins,
e.g. for pH correction. Note: sampling
can be achieved by manually dipping
the basin
General
Discussion
A5.66
PA

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
Plant
TEAM MEMBERS:

Lindsay Killin
SYSTEM:
Treated Water Basin System
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
SAS10883 306 Rev A
MINUTES BY:
Lindsay Killin
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 30/11/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
Change the destination selection valves

in pipes from the basin to ball valves.
Establish a protocol in which Orica and
EPS agree on discharge to the sewer to
minimise the risk of off-spec discharge,
e.g. supervisory checks that the valves
are in the correct position prior to
discharging to the sewer
Change the three basins inlet butterfly
valves to ball valves for improved
reliability of shut-off. These are to be
lockable ball valves to allow full isolation
of basins
PA
Provide means to mitigate the vacuum

that could be formed, e.g. install a vent
(vent could have a non-return valve to
prevent water discharge but allow air in)
or a vacuum breaker
SA
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
209.
High Flow /
High Level
Passing butterfly
valve
Relatively small amount

of off-spec material
could flow to sewer but
probably still on spec in
relation to trade waste
consent
210.
High Flow /
High Level
Putting an on-spec
basin off-spec and
hence having to rerun a
basin back through the
plant prior to discharge
211.
Low Pressure
Off-spec treated
water running to two
basins, e.g. basin
inlet valve passing or
inadvertently left
open
Motorised valve to
treated water basins
closes quickly
Visible inlets to basins

to make sure the
operator can check
visually during
inspections
Potential to form a
vacuum downstream of
the motorised valve and
suck in the poly pipe
A5.67
PA

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
Plant
TEAM MEMBERS:

Lindsay Killin
SYSTEM:
Sedimentation Tanks
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
SAS10883 307 Rev A
MINUTES BY:
Lindsay Killin
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 30/11/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
212.
General
Discussion
213.
General
Discussion
Review the option of using bulkabags

under the sedimentation tank drains
instead of the drying beds to improve
ease of handling of sludge
Mark up the P & ID to show the bund
under the sedimentation tanks
A5.68
LK
PA

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
Plant
TEAM MEMBERS:

Lindsay Killin
SYSTEM:
Sedimentation Tanks
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
SAS10883 307 Rev A
MINUTES BY:
Lindsay Killin
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 30/11/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
As an option in the SOPs put the sludge

line from the high capacity settler to only
one of the sedimentation tanks, i.e.
minimise the risk of blocking both tanks
with the higher sludge containing stream
PA
Operation to be reviewed during

commissioning and bulkabags
considered as alternative option to beds
if the beds are blocked too often
LK
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
214.
Zero Flow /
Empty
Sludge caking within

the sludge outlet line
Inability to drain the

sedimentation tank
215.
Zero Flow /
Empty
Fouling of the sand

dryer bed with the
sludge
Inability to drain through

the beds
Lines can be rodded.

Sedimentation tank to
be isolated by the first
outlet valve and the
second outlet valve is to
remain open (to prevent
sludge blockages
between these two
valves). For improved
operation, the
preference is to keep
one tank offline and
hence have the option
to use this standby tank
should the first
tank/lines become
blocked
A5.69

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
Plant
TEAM MEMBERS:

Lindsay Killin
SYSTEM:
Sedimentation Tanks
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
SAS10883 307 Rev A
MINUTES BY:
Lindsay Killin
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 30/11/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
216.
Plant Items
217.
Instruments
Personnel exposed
to DDT etc contained
within the sludge
Health impacts on
personnel
SWMS/JSA to be
performed on sludge
handling, e.g. disposal
via the DTDU
Position the level switch in each

sedimentation tank for ease of
maintenance access and away from the
sludge inlet to avoid any materials
potentially seizing up the instrument
A5.70
PA

17 April 2013

PROJECT:
Plant
TEAM MEMBERS:

Lindsay Killin
SYSTEM:
Overview
LEADER:
Dean Shewring
DRAWING:
All WTP P&IDs
MINUTES BY:
Lindsay Killin
No.
GUIDE WORDS
POSSIBLE CAUSES
CONSEQUENCES
EXISTING
DATE: 30/11/12
ACTION RECOMMENDED
BY
DONE
SAFEGUARDS
218.
219.
Commissioning
Contamination of the
pressure test / wash
water with existing
contaminants in the
plant
Problems in disposing of
the wash-water
Include in the commissioning plan the

ability to store water used to rinse and
test the plant and equipment for
processing through the plant at a later
date.
Also, avoid using detergents /
dispersants when cleaning. These can
cause future issues with the settling
processes
Review the existing and proposed
materials of construction to ensure that
potential contaminants do not react /
interfere with plant components.
Analysis is also required for the potential
for construction materials being
impregnated by contaminants and
therefore being unsuitable for reuse on
future projects or difficult to dispose of
Materials of
Construction
A5.71
LK
PA

17 April 2013
REFERENCES
Department of Planning, Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper

N 8 - HAZOP Guidelines, NSW Government, Sydney

17 April 2013

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E PDF

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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E PDF

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HAZOP STUDY REPORT,

REMEDIATION OF THE FORMER

Prepared by: Dean Shewring

Pinnacle Risk Management Pty Limited

PO Box 5024 Elanora Heights

Pinnacle Risk Management

HAZOP Study Report, Remediation of the Former

Draft for Comment

Orica Comments Included

Supplementary and Water Treatment Plant

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc

Pinnacle Risk Management

PROCESS DESCRIPTION AND HAZOP SCOPE .................................................. 2

Meeting Procedures ........................................................................ 3

STUDY TEAM ................................................................................................. 4

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................... 5

Analysis of Main Findings .............................................................. 5

Actions Arising from the HAZOP ................................................... 6

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc

Pinnacle Risk Management

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc

Pinnacle Risk Management

Department of Planning and Infrastructure

Directly-heated Thermal Desorption

Emission Control System

Feed Soil Building

Hazard and Operability Study

Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper

Preliminary Hazard Analysis

Piping and Instrumentation Diagram

Soil Treatment Area

Volatile Organic Compound

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc

Pinnacle Risk Management

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc

Pinnacle Risk Management

PROCESS DESCRIPTION AND HAZOP SCOPE

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc

Pinnacle Risk Management

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc

Pinnacle Risk Management

All actions are listed in the HAZOP minutes, contained in Appendix 5. It is

Pinnacle Risk Management

Process Design and Plant

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc

Pinnacle Risk Management

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

ANALYSIS OF MAIN FINDINGS

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc

Pinnacle Risk Management

ACTIONS ARISING FROM THE HAZOP

Completed HAZOP actions need to be tracked within the projects HAZOP

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc

Pinnacle Risk Management

Approval of HAZOP Chair

HAZOP Study Report, Remediation of the Former Orica

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc

Pinnacle Risk Management

Appendix 1 Approval of HAZOP Chair.

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc

Pinnacle Risk Management

HAZOP Study Report, Remediation of the Former Orica

Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc