Development Finance Agency Report

Table of Contents
Introduction.........................................................................5
List of Acronyms...................................................................6
1 International Finance Corporation.......................................7
1.1 Extractive Sector Profile.......................................................7

1.2 Transparency in the Extractive Sector...................................7
1.3 Requirements Regarding Contract, Revenue, and Payment
Disclosure..................................................................................7
1.3.1 Revenue and payments...................................................................7
1.3.2 Accessibility of disclosed revenue and payments:...........................8
1.3.3 Contracts......................................................................................... 9
1.3.4 Accessibility of disclosed contract information:.............................10
1.3.5 Additional disclosed information....................................................10
1.4 Enforcement and Compliance..............................................10
1.5 Gaps and weaknesses.........................................................11
1.6 Recommendations..............................................................11
International Financial Institutions:

Transparency and disclosure requirements for
the extractive sector
Development Finance Institutions
2 Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency........................12
2.1 Extractive Sector Profile.....................................................12

2.2 Transparency in the Extractive Sector..................................13
2.2.1 Comparison to IFC Sustainability Framework................................15
2.3 Requirements Regarding Contract, Revenue, and Payment
Disclosure................................................................................15
2.3.1 Revenue and payments disclosure................................................16
2.3.2 Contract disclosure........................................................................16
2.3.3 Additional disclosure requirements...............................................17
2.5 Gaps and Weaknesses........................................................18
3 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development..........20

3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
Financing in the Extractive Sector.......................................20

Transparency and Accountability Policies.............................22
Access to Information.........................................................23
Enforcement Mechanisms...................................................25
Dodd-Frank, EU Directives and IFC Sustainability Framework 25
4 Inter-American Development Bank....................................27

4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
Financing in the Extractive Sector.......................................27

Transparency and Accountability Policies.............................28
Access to Information.........................................................29
Enforcement Mechanisms...................................................29
Dodd-Frank, EU Directives, and IFC Sustainability Framework
29
5 African Development Bank................................................30

5.2 Transparency in the extractive sector..................................30
5.3 Requirements regarding revenue, payments, and contract
disclosure.................................................................................32
2

5.5 Gaps and weaknesses.........................................................33
6 Asian Development Bank..................................................36
6.1 Supporting Energy Infrastructure and Governance...............36

6.2 Methodology......................................................................36
6.3 Data Collection...................................................................37
6.3.1 Scope and Size of the Problem......................................................37
6.3.2 Transparency Policy and Execution................................................37
6.4 Gaps in ADB Policy and Recommendations...........................38
7 Japan Bank for International Cooperation..........................40

7.2 Transparency in the Extractive Sector..................................40
7.3 Requirements regarding revenue, payments, and contract
disclosure.................................................................................41
7.3.1 Revenue and payments:................................................................41
7.3.2 Contracts....................................................................................... 41
7.3.3 Additional disclosed information....................................................41
7.3.4 Enforcement and Compliance........................................................41
7.3.5 Gaps and weaknesses...................................................................41
7.3.6 Recommendations.........................................................................42
7.4 Development Finance Power Map........................................42
7.4.1 Relevant stakeholders and decision makers..................................42
7.4.2 Relevant advocates and potential allies/ Potential areas of
influence.................................................................................................. 42
8 Overseas Private Investment Corporation..........................43
8.1 Supporting Private Finance and Investment with a

Development Agenda................................................................43
8.2 Decreasing Investments in Extractive Projects in Favor of
Renewables..............................................................................43
8.3 Methodology......................................................................44
8.4 Data Collection...................................................................45
8.4.1 Scope and Size of the Problem......................................................45
8.5 Transparency.....................................................................46
8.5.1 Payment and Contract Disclosure..................................................46
8.5.2 Mechanisms of Compliance...........................................................47
8.5.3 Accessibility of Information............................................................48
8.5.4 Comparison of Coverage...............................................................48
8.5.5 Recommendations.........................................................................48
9 Annexes........................................................................... 51
9.1 International Finance Corporation.......................................51

9.1.1 Power Map..................................................................................... 51
9.1.2 Tables and Charts..........................................................................55
9.2 Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency..........................62
9.2.1 Power Map..................................................................................... 62
9.2.2 Tables and Charts..........................................................................64
9.3 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development............67
9.3.1 EBRB Draft Mining Strategy...........................................................67
9.3.2 Criticisms of the EBRD Mining Operations Policy...........................68

9.3.3 EBRD Public Information Policy......................................................69
9.3.4 EBRD Administration Tribunal Case Study.....................................70
9.3.5 EBRD Financed Extractive Industry Projects..................................71
9.3.6 Transcript of EBRD-related Interviews...........................................71
9.3.7 EBRD Financed Extractive Industry Projects..................................76
9.4 Inter-American Development Bank......................................77
9.5 African Development Bank..................................................77
9.6 Asian Development Bank....................................................77
9.7 Japan Bank for International Cooperation............................78
9.8 Overseas Private Investment Corporation............................80
9.8.1 Power Map..................................................................................... 80
9.8.2 OPIC Extractive Projects................................................................80
9.8.3 Communication with OPIC regarding Policy inquiry.......................81
Introduction
Terra Lawson-Remer, J.D., PhD, Assistant Professor, The New School
Manuel Valderrama Florez, PhD Student, The New School
The present report is product of a collaborative research project between

Revenue Watch Institute and the Studley Program in International Affairs at
The New School University. The project sought to provide background analysis
for potential broad-based coalition efforts to improve global governance of
extractive industries by promoting the transparent and accountable
management of oil, gas and mineral resources. For this, the research
addressed two main topics: a) transparency and disclosure requirements in
the official development finance (private sector development loans and
sovereign risk guarantees) from bilateral import-export credit agencies and
multilaterals, and b) beneficial ownership in the extractive industries sector.
These distinct arms were developed through two respective deliverables. All
research and the respective deliverables were executed and written by the
class of the Resource Curse course of the fall semester of 2013 1.
The main objective of the first arm of the research project was to examine the
current requirements of International Finance Institutions regarding revenue,
payment, and contract disclosure. In addition to mapping these said
requirements, the project also assessed how did these compare to those
included in the 2012 IFC Sustainability Framework, and to new US-EU
mandatory disclosure rules through stock market regulations (e.g., CardinLugar); examined the different enforcement mechanisms deployed by all
IFIs; determined the accessibility of the information that was being disclosed
if any-; and, estimated the coverage of stock market regulations in terms of
projects and capital where possible-. The researchers used existing RWI
comments on IFI policies (e.g. EBRD and US Ex-Im), international good
practices (e.g. IMF Guide on Resource Revenue Transparency), New Schools
Resource Curse course literature, and other secondary literature, for the
assessments. Additionally, the project also described the key stakeholders
and decision makers of the IFIs examined.
Due to its extent, the deliverable for the first arm of this research was divided
into two reports, according to the type of IFI: a) Development Finance
Institutions (DFI), and b) Export-Credit Agencies (ECA). This document
addresses transparency and disclosure requirements in Development
Finance Institutions. Each chapter develops the above-mentioned research
objectives to the extent that was possible due to information constraints 2-,
and presents the results in four broad sections: background information of
each DFI, contract and payment transparency requirements, a comparison of
1 Except Chapter 6 - The United States Export-Import Bank of the report dedicated to
Export-Import Credit Agencies, which was developed by project manager Manuel Valderrama
Flrez, PhD Student at The New School University.
2 Since we are dealing with transparency requirements, not all IFIs have included these sort of
reforms in to their policies.
these said requirements with mandatory disclosure rules through stock

market regulations, and policy recommendations. The DFIs examined in this
document are the following: i) International Finance Corporation, ii)
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, iii) European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, iv) Inter-American Development Bank, v)
African Development Bank, vi) Asian Development Bank, vii) Japan Bank for
International Cooperation, and viii) Overseas Private Investment Corporation.
List of Acronyms
ADB: Asian Development Bank
AfDB: African Development Bank
ATI: Aid Transparency Index
BTC Pipeline: BakuTbilisiCeyhan pipeline
China ExIm: The Export-Import Bank of China
COFACE: The Compagnie Franaise d'Assurance pour le Commerce Extrieur
COO: Country of Operation
CSE: Civil Society Engagement Unit
CSO: Civil Society Organization
EA: Environmental Analyses
EU: European Union
EBRD: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ECA: Export-Credit Agency
ECG: Export Credits and Credit Guarantees
EI: Extractive Industry
EIA: Environmental Impact Assessments
EITI: Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative
ESHR: Environmental, Social and Human Rights
ESIA: Environment and Social Impact Assessment
ESMR: Environmental and Social Management Reports
ESS: Environmental and Social Strategies
EU: European Union
Dodd-Frank: Dodd- Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
ICC: Inter-American Investment Corporation
IDB: Inter-American Development Bank
IFC: International Finance Corporation
IFI: International Institution
JBIC: The Japan Bank for International Cooperation
KEXIM: Korea Export Import Bank
LAC: Latin America and the Caribbean
MIGA: The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
OECD: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPIC: Overseas Private Investment Corporation
PCM: Project Complaint Mechanism
PIP: Public Information Policy
PSD: Project Summary Document
PWYP: Publish What You Pay
RWI: Revenue Watch Institute
SCF: Structured and Corporate Finance
SDR: Special Drawing Rights
SEA: Strategic Environmental Analyses
SEC: U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
US Ex-Im: United States Export Import Bank
UKEF: United Kingdom Export Finance Department
WBG: World Bank Group
1 International Finance Corporation3

The International Finance Corporation (IFC) is a legally and financially
independent affiliate of the World Bank Group with 184 member countries.
The IFC provides investment services, advisory services, and asset
management with a vision to end extreme poverty and increase shared
prosperity in every developing country.
1.1 Extractive Sector Profile

The International Financial Corporation (IFC) works with 30 companies in 23
countries on oil and gas projects and has a $2 billion oil and gas portfolio. It
has 37 mining projects in 25 countries, with a $500 million mining portfolio. 4
During the fiscal year ending June 30 th 2013, the IFC invested $389.34 million
in oil & gas, and mining projects (Flow variable: spans across a period). 5
Table 1: Oil, gas and mining sector portfolio fiscal year 2013
Number of
Projects
Number of
Countries
Total Portfolio
Oil & Gas
Mining
30 (companies)
37
23
225
$2billion
$500million
Source:
IFCIndustries:
Annual Report
2013: Industry Results, www.ifc.org
FY13 Total Invested in All
Extractive
$389.34million
1.2 Transparency in the Extractive Sector
According to the Access to Information Policy outlined by the IFC,

transparency is essential to building and maintaining public dialogue and
increasing public awareness about IFCs development role and mission. It is
also critical for enhancing good governance, accountability, and development
effectiveness. Through the IFCs Sustainability Framework, the corporation
promotes transparency of revenue payments from extractive industry
projects to host governments.
3 This section was elaborated by The New Schools students Alix Schroder
<schra652@newschool.edu>, Kaili Jackson <jackk073@newschool.edu>, Zo Meroney
<meroz441@newschool.edu>, Rudy Shaffer <shafr174@newschool.edu.
Oil & Gas Overview Presentation, International Finance Corporation (IFC).

http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/2e17440049a5ca20a138e3a8c6a8312a/IFC2012_Oil_a
ndGasOverview.pdf?MOD=AJPERES (accessed November 20, 2013.
Annual Report 2013: Industry Results, International Finance Corporation (IFC)

http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/corp_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/annual+r
eport/2013_online_report/global_results/industry_results/ar13_results_industry_ogmc
(accessed November 20, 2013).
1.3 Requirements Regarding Contract, Revenue, and

Payment Disclosure
1.3.1 Revenue and payments
IFCs Policy on Social and Environmental Sustainability states that all IFCfinanced extractive industry projects are required to publicly disclose their
material project payments made to the host government (such as royalties,
taxes, and profit sharing). Such disclosure is made on a project basis or on a
corporate basis, depending on what is most appropriate given country
taxation and corporate arrangements.6
The IFC now provides links to its clients revenue payments to host
governments on its website: The site only includes projects approved as of
January 1, 2007. Reports are available up to 2011. Clients payment data is
updated every August.
Beginning in August 2010, IFC commits to ensure that clients report on a
standardized disaggregated basis. As part of this initiative, the IFC has
developed a standardized revenue-reporting template for it extractive
industry clients (however, to date the link for this template is broken on the
website).
1.3.2 Accessibility of disclosed revenue and payments:

As client projects enter a phase in which revenues will accrue, disclosure
documents are available on the IFC website. Information included spans
economic data and impact, government material payments such as royalties
and taxes paid, and environmental and social impacts.
Out of the 14 payments disclosed in 20117 (See Annex 9.1.2, Table 2

for more details):
o Some used some form of an easy to understand consolidated
chart disclosing total payments to host government (Vostok,
Peru LNG, Kuwait Energy)
o Hyperlinks were unavailable for 2011 (Melrose and ROCH)
o 1 used an easy to read template however it aggregated totals
paid for the entire region (Salamander Energy/Southeast Asia
(Thailand, Borneo, and Indonesia)
Policy on Environmental and Social Sustainability, in IFC Sustainability Framework,

International Financial Corporation: World Bank Group. January 1, 2012, p11
Government Revenues, International Finance Corporation (IFC),

http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/industry_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/indus
tries/oil
%2C+gas+and+mining/development_impact/development_impact_disclosure/development
_impact_disclosure_government_revenues (accessed November 15, 2013)
o
o
o
o
o
8
9
1 used an easy to understand template that broke payments

down to local, regional, national, and aggregate country total
(Geopark)
1 used an easy template broken down into PAYE, SDL, UIF,
Royalties, and VAT payments to a country however, some
website digging was needed (Petra Diamonds)
1 used a Spanish only website (Medanito)
1 file was corrupted when downloaded. Only linked method of
disclosure (Pan American Energy)
embedded payment disclosures in lengthy documents or annual
reports making it difficult to find the actual amounts disclosed
(Lonmin, BPZ Resources, Bankers Petroleum, Candax).
Of the disclosure methods deployed those with a direct link from the
IFC website to a consolidated chart detailing specific payment data
such as income tax, VAT, royalties, license and production bonuses,
and other material payments provided the clear and functional
understanding. Companies such as Salamander Energy and Kuwait
Energy exemplified this method. Those companies employing the use
of an Annual Report to disclose payments had a tendency to embed
the information amongst lengthy Management Discussion and Analysis
reports and financial statements, making it difficult for the layman to
decipher payments made directly to the host government. Examples
would be reporting the Sales, net royalties and Gross Sales across
various financial statements essentially withholding the specific value
of the royalty paid. Thus affording a calculation to be made. 8 It is
unclear as to the reason for the lack of specificity.
Project specificity was similarly difficult to find unless the company was
created to work on only one project or if the IFC funded multiple fields
headed under a single project name. In the case of Peru LNG, the
company was created specifically for the project the IFC is funding and
thus it was easy to delineate the payments made to the host country. 9
Yet, typically if multiple countries were involved in the IFC funded
project disaggregated totals would be disclosed by country, but not
necessarily by specific projects. For example, Petra Diamonds discloses
its payments by country and by type of payment, but not by specific
project or field. This is problematic in that according to the Summary
of Investment by the IFC only one field in South Africa is funded by the
IFC commitment, yet Petra has licenses for five mining sites. 10
Candex Energy, Inc. Annual Report 2011, p27, 50
Payment to Governmental Authorities 2011 Peru LNG.

https://portal.perulng.com/irj/go/km/docs/documents/PLNG%20Website/English/Static
%20Content/WSiteV2_ENG/POPUP_ENG_WSiteV2/NUESTRO_PROYECTO_ENG_WSiteV2/POPU
P_IMPECOGLOBALENG_2011_ENG_WSiteV2.htm (accessed on December 8, 2013)
10
Other projects were disaggregated by stages of project development.

No payment disclosures were available for projects in the exploration
phases as no material payments were yet made. Summarized
investment information is available via the www.ifc.org under the
subheading of Projects.
1.3.3 Contracts
The IFC requires that those extractive industry projects backed financially by
the IFC are made publicly available. As stated in the Policy on Environmental
and Social Sustainability, the principal contract set forth between the IFC
client corporation and the host government that outlines the key terms and
conditions, under which the resource will be exploited, along with any
significant amendments to that contract, are to be made public.11 These
contracts
include
host
government
agreements
(HGAs)
and
intergovernmental agreements (IGAs). A summary may be accepted in lieu of
full contract disclosure if it includes the life of the contract, any material
payments due to the government, other fiscal terms and conditions, and a
summary of any significant stabilization clauses.
1.3.4 Accessibility of disclosed contract information:

In practice contracts and contractual summaries are not very accessible.
Specific details of contracts are not available from the IFC website unless by
proxy of disclosure within an annual report. For example, the 2011 10-K
Annual Report for BPZ Resources, Inc. can be found on the IFC website and
embedded within are the details of the license contract between Peru and
BPZ. Details included key terms such as the duration of the contract, terms of
exploration, tax deferment, bonds, and royalty percentages along with details
on labor, technology, and environmental issues. 12 Possibly due to the
passage of the Cardin-Lugar provision within the Dodd-Frank Act in which it is
required that those companies publically traded on US stock markets disclose
contracts or summaries thereof accessing contracts was possible. See Annex
9.1.2 for more details. Methods used in locating the contracts was either
through the IFC website or the Securities and Exchange Commission website,
www.sec.gov. However, locating contracts of those companies not traded in
US stock markets proved difficult.
10 Sustainable Development Report 2011, Petra Diamonds.
http://petradiamonds2011.html.investis.com/economic-performance.html (accessed
November 15, 2013)
11 Policy on Environmental and Social Sustainability in IFC Sustainability Framework.

International Financial Corporation: World Bank Group. January 1, 2012, p11
12 BPZ Energy, Inc. 2011 Annual Report, p. 26-28
11
1.3.5 Additional disclosed information

The IFC makes available investment information and project details as
according to the Performance Standards outlined in the IFC Sustainability
Framework. Available details on IFC investment information is accessible on
IFC website, www.ifc.org, through the Oil & Gas and Mining drop-tab under
the subheading Industries.
A Summary of Investment Information (SII) from the proposal to approval
stages and each subsequent year is available whilst an IFC commitment. The
SII provides details of the project and the expected role of the IFC including
the proposed investment amount, type of project, the use of IFC funding,
major shareholders, total project cost, amount, nature of IFCs investment,
and the development impact.
The Environment and Social Summary Review includes information on the
development impact on the environment, the clients adherence to the
Performance Standards as outlined by the IFC Sustainability Framework, and
compliance with Good International Industry Practice (GIIP). 13
1.4 Enforcement and Compliance

The Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman, an independent recourse mechanism
for the IFC and MIGA, ensures enforcement and accountability. With a purpose
of addressing complaints by people affected by IFC/MIGA projects and to
enhance the social and environmental accountability of both institutions.
Revenue payment disclosure is enforced by the IFC as outlined per the
Performance Standards. Supervision is conducted by the IFC through the
clients Annual Monitoring Report. If a client fails to comply with IFC
standards, the IFC will work with the client to reestablish compliance and
exercise remedies as appropriate.14
Additionally, the Independent Evaluation Group, a unit within the World Bank
charged with objectively evaluating and assessing members of the World
Bank Groups performance. As a member of the World Bank Group, the IFC is
subjected to project and policy level evaluations to ensure adherence to the
goals as stated by the IFCs mission.15
13 Access to Information Policy, in IFC Sustainability Framework. International Financial

Corporation: World Bank Group. January 1, 2012, p62-65
14 Policy on Environmental and Social Sustainability and Access to Information Policy, in

IFC Sustainability Framework. International Financial Corporation: World Bank Group.
January 1, 2012, p8, 67
15 Methodology, Independent Evaluation Group (IEG)
www.ieg.worldbankgroup.org/methodology (accessed November 15, 2013)
12
1.5 Gaps and weaknesses

The IFC Sustainability Framework fails to indicate the method in which
disclosure of payments and contracts should be made publicly available (e.g.
location, languages, etc.).16
The IFC does not require that its client organizations disclose disaggregated
project specific payments from the client companies to governments. Instead
what can be attained from client is dependent on what is deemed appropriate
by the company or corporation. Also, the types of data that the companies do
disclose vary greatly among companies. For example, some companies only
report company-level aggregated data across all operations and some
aggregate across more than one year.17
The IFC requires public accessibility of contracts, yet provides limited
knowledge in which to locate contracts.
The IFC has no policy provision concerning transparency in operations with
Financial Intermediaries.
Though there are requirements regarding
compliance of Performance Standards, there are no specific extractive
industry requirements regarding revenue payments or contract disclosure.
This is of significant concern as over 40 percent of all IFC lending takes place
through financial intermediaries allowing for secondary investments (those
companies who are being invested by a financial intermediary) to lack the
same kind of scrutiny as direct investments.
1.6 Recommendations
The IFC should create an addendum to the Policy on Environmental and
Social Sustainability specifying the types of payments to be disclosed, how
they are to be disclosed, and where they are to be disclosed. Additionally, an
accessible template preferably in the form of a consolidated chart detailing
the determined payment types should be required.
The IFC should develop a hyper linked table of all Oil & Gas and Mining
projects with links to SII, ERSR, Annual Reports, above template, and
contracts. Increasing the accessibility of information for the public.
16
Quick Reference Guide to Extractive Industries Revenue and Contract Transparency at

the International Finance Institutions, Bank Information Center (BIC), January 2010.
http://www.bicusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/2010_Reference_IFIPolicies.pdf
(accessed October 25, 2013)
17 Government Revenues, International Finance Corporation.
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/industry_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/indus
tries/oil
%2C+gas+and+mining/development_impact/development_impact_disclosure/development
_impact_disclosure_government_revenues (accessed October 29, 2013)
13
Develop an action plan to encourage contract disclosure requirements by

those governments with a high number of extractive industry corporations.
Possible avenues may be through the EITI, its advisory commitments, and
through its member states and partners.
14
2 Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency18

The Multilateral Investment Agency (MIGA) is a member of the World Bank
Group with 179 member countries. MIGA provides political risk insurance
guarantees to private sector investors and lenders, with the mission to
promote foreign direct investment (FDI) into developing countries.

Since its inception in 1988, MIGA has issued guarantee contracts totaling $3.4
billion for projects in the extractive sector $1.8 billion for projects in the oil
and gas sector19 and $1.6 billion in the mining sector 20. In the 2013 fiscal year
ending June 30th, the oil and gas portfolio stood at $918.4 million and the
mining portfolio stood at $240 million.
Figure 1. MIGAs Extractive Sector Portafolio, Fiscal Year 2013 - Source: MIGA 2013
Annual Report, http://www.miga.org/documents/Annual_Report13.pdf
In 2013, MIGA issued $652.1 in guarantees of oil, gas, and mining projects.
The two sectors accounted for 11 percent of MIGAs outstanding gross
portfolio.21 It is significant to note that during MIGAs 2013 fiscal year, new
business by sector shifted dramatically from the financial sector to
infrastructure and oil, gas and mining. The financial sector accounted for 17
percent of new volume in 2013, while infrastructure accounted for 46 percent
of new volume and the oil, gas, and mining sectors accounted for 23 percent
19 MIGA Brief: Oil and Gas, MIGA, April 2013.
http://www.miga.org/documents/oil&gasbrief.pdf, (accessed Oct. 23, 2013), p.3
20 MIGA Brief: Mining, MIGA, April 2013, http://www.miga.org/documents/miningbrief.pdf,

(accessed October 23, 2013), p.3
21 MIGA Annual Report 2013, MIGA, June 30, 2013,
http://www.miga.org/documents/Annual_Report13.pdf, (accessed December 4, 2013), p.3
15
of new volume (See Annex 9.2.2 for outstanding portfolio distribution by

sector).22
Infras tructure, 46%

Oil, gas , and mining 23%
Financial, 17%
Agribus ines s , manufacturing, and s ervice, 14%
Figure 2: MIGA Guarantees issued in FY 2013, by sector (by $ volume)

Source: MIGA 2013 Annual Report,
http://www.miga.org/documents/Annual_Report13.pdf
Currently, MIGA has 7 active oil and gas projects and 5 active mining projects
(See Annex 9.2.2 for a complete list of active projects) 23. The majority of
these projects are located in Africa, with the remaining located in Latin
America, Asia, and Central Europe. The guarantee holders for MIGA-supported
extractive sector projects include private companies, development banks,
and national banks. Several of the companies guaranteed through MIGA for
extractive industry projects are publicly listed in United States and European
Union stock exchanges (See Figure 3). Note: The companies listed in the U.S.
exchange markets have to comply with the Dodd-Frank Act transparency
requirements, and the companies listed in E.U. exchange markets have to
comply with disclosure and transparency requirements as dictated by the E.U
Transparency Directive24.
U.S. Exchange
Markets
London Stock
Exchange (LSE)
Sasol Ltd
El Paso Corporation
Kinross Gold
Corporation (owns
BEMA Gold Corporation)
Kenmare Resources Plc.
Anglooval Mining Ltd
Dodd-Frank Act
EU Transparency
Directive
22 MIGA Annual Report 2013, p.23

23 Note: all extractive sector projects (including non-active projects) can be found on
http://www.miga.org/sectors/index.cfm?stid=1813.
24 Transparency Requirements for Listed Companies, The European Commission (EC),
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/transparency/ (accessed December 6, 2013)
16
Deutsche Boerse
Euronext Paris
Sasol Ltd
Kenmare Resources Plc.
Mitsubishi Corporation
Eramet SA
EU Transparency
Directive
EU Transparency
Directive
Table 2: Extractive sector companies in U.S. and E.U Exchange Markets - Source: Oil
and Mining Companies on Global Stock Exchanges,
http://data.revenuewatch.org/listings/
2.2 Transparency in the Extractive Sector
On October 1, 2007 MIGA released an updated Policy on Disclosure of

Information that supersedes its previous Disclosure Policy from July 1999. The
Policy states that MIGA believes transparency and accountability are
fundamental to fulfilling its development mandate and to strengthening
public trust in MIGA and its clients25. While the updated Policy does not
explicitly mention the extractive sector, it has several implications for
extractive sector transparency:
The Policy on Disclosure of Information stipulates that MIGA has to

make available certain specific information,26 including an
Environmental and Social Review Summary (ESRS) and Summary of
Proposed Guarantee (SPG) for each MIGA-supported project. This
encompasses all extractive sector projects.
The Policy on Disclosure of Information also stipulates which

information is publicly disclosed by MIGA and how it can be accessed.
All information referred to in MIGAs Policy on the Disclosure of
Information as being publicly available or routinely disclosed by
MIGA is accessible on MIGAs web site (www.miga.org), through the
World Bank InfoShop located in Washington D.C., and through Public
Information Centers (PICS), which are situated around the world in
World Bank member countries.27 In the event that information is not
readily available from the aforementioned sources can be requested in
writing (by email, mail, or fax) from MIGA.
Extractive industry-specific information is easily accessible on MIGAs

website. Extractive industry projects are divided into two categoriesoil and
gas, and miningand are located in the Extractive Industries subheading
under the Sectors tab. Each extractive industry project has an independent
25 MIGAs Policy on Disclosure of Information, MIGA, October 1, 2007.
http://www.miga.org/documents/environ_social_disclosure_policy_021507.pdf (accessed
November 18, 2013), Section 1: Purpose, p.1
26 MIGA Policy on Disclosure of Information, Section III: Information Made Available by

MIGA, p.2
27 MIGA Policy on Disclosure of Information, Section IV: Access to Information, p.9
17
page with active links to PDF files of the project-specific ESPS and SPG. The
following information is also accessible for each extractive industry project:
(1) project name, (2) fiscal year, (3) status (active or inactive), (4) guarantee
holder, (4) investor country, (5) host country, (6) environmental category, (7)
date SPG disclosed, (8) project board date, (9) gross exposure, (10) project
type, and (11) strategic priority area.
All MIGA policy documents and discourse emphasize the importance of
information disclosure, yet the actual scope of said disclosure is limited. For
example, the MIGAs Policy on Social and Environmental Sustainability
(Sustainability Policy) states that through the Performance Standards, MIGA
requires its project companies to engage with affected communities through
the disclosure of information, consultation and informed participation. 28
However, this is the extent of the detail provided on requirements for the
disclosure of this information. It does not specify when or where this
information should be disclosed, nor does it specify any requirements or
methods for how the information is to be made public to the affected
communities.
MIGAs Performance Standards is the only document that outlines which
information clients are required to disclose to affected communities.
According to the Performance Standards, clients are required to disclose
relevant project information to affected communities and other
stakeholders.29 Relevant project information is defined as (1) information on
the purpose, nature and scale of project, (2) the duration of proposed project
activities, and (3) any risks to and potential impacts on such communities. 30 A
note on accessibility: this information was found on the Performance
Standards document from October 1, 2007. The document states that the
Performance Standards were revised in October 2013 and to visit
www.miga.org/sustainability to access them. However, there is no link or,
even reference, to the 2013 Performance Standards on the MIGA site.
It appears that the majority of the responsibility for disclosure of information
actually rests with the client, not with MIGA. The Policy on Disclosure of
Information states that most of the responsibility for disclosing information
about MIGA-supported activities rests with the relevant client 31.
28 MIGAs Policy on Social and Environmental Sustainability, MIGA, October 1, 2007.
http://www.miga.org/documents/environ_social_review_021507.pdf (accessed November

18, 2013), p.4
29 MIGA Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability, MIGA, October

1, 2007.
http://www.miga.org/documents/performance_standards_social_and_env_sustainability.pdf
(accessed November 18, 2013), p.5
30 MIGA Performance Standards, p.5

31 MIGA Policy on Disclosure of Information, Section III, p.2
18
2.2.1 Comparison to IFC Sustainability Framework

As a World Bank member, MIGAs policies on transparency and accountability
closely align with IFC policies. However, there are notable differences
between MIGAs policies and the updated 2012 IFC Sustainability Framework.
Contract disclosure requirements in MIGAs Sustainability Policy only

apply to significant new extractive industry projects (those projects
expected to account for ten percent or more of government revenues).
The updated IFC Sustainability Framework removed this stipulation.
The IFC Framework requires its clients to publicly disclose the principal
contract with government that sets out the key terms and conditions
under which a resource will be exploited and any significant
amendments to that contract. MIGA does not have this requirement 32.
Additionally, IFC provides links to its clients revenue payments to host
governments on its website and has developed a standardized
revenue-reporting template for its extractive industry clients.
The IFC Framework provides a two-stage appeals mechanism for those
who believe an information request has been unreasonably denied 33
(1) Submit an appeal to the Access to Information Policy Advisor
(AIP Advisor)
(2) Ability to appeal the AIP Advisors denial within thirty calendar
days
Compared to MIGA policies, the IFC Framework requires increased
engagement with affected communities, including the requirement to
provide periodic reports to affected communities.
2.3 Requirements Regarding Contract, Revenue, and

Payment Disclosure
As noted above, MIGAs Policy on Disclosure of Information does not explicitly

reference extractive industry disclosure requirements. The Policy on Social
and Environmental Sustainability is the only MIGA policy document that
makes explicit reference to the extractive industries. The Sustainability Policy,
and accompanying Performance Standards, went into effective as of October
1, 2007. Under Section 3: MIGAs Roles and Responsibilities, MIGA designates
a subsection to extractive industry projects that outlines MIGAs extractive
sector-specific initiatives on governance and disclosure. The Policy states, In
the extractive industrieswhere a project can have potentially broader
implications for the public at large, MIGA recognizes the importance of
assessment of governance risks and disclosure of information as a means to
32 IFC Sustainability Framework, International Financial Corporation (IFC),
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/b9dacb004a73e7a8a273fff998895a12/IFC_Sustainabili
ty_+Framework.pdf?MOD=AJPERES (accessed December 8, 2013, p.11
33 IFC Sustainability Framework, p.66
19
manage governance risks.34 The requirements for contract, revenue and

payment disclosure are outlined below.
2.3.1 Revenue and payments disclosure

The Sustainability Policy states that MIGA promotes transparency of revenue
payments from extractive industry projects to host governments 35. According
to the Policy, MIGA requires clients of all MIGA-supported extractive industry
projects to publicly disclose their material payments (such as royalties, taxes,
and profit sharing) from those projects to the host government(s). 36
Disclosure can be made on a project-by-project or corporate basis. However,
it is unclear how this disclosure occurs or how it is monitored. The extractive
industry project pages on MIGAs website do not include any links or
information regarding revenue and payment streams to host governments.
MIGA requires that clients complete development effectiveness indicators
on the third anniversary of the effective date in order to monitor and track
the project enterprises development outcomes in the years following the
implementation of the investment project. The required indicators to be
reported are investment, taxes and fees, locally procured goods, training
outlays, direct employment, and community development outlays. 37 However,
it is unclear if clients are required to disclose the indicators publicly. There are
no references to these indicators anywhere on the website, only in the fine
print in MIGA contract templates.
2.3.2 Contract disclosure

For significant new extractive industries projects those expected to account
for ten percent or more of government revenues clients are required to
publicly disclose the relevant terms of key agreements that are of public
concern, such as host government agreements (HGAs) and intergovernmental
34 MIGA Performance Standards on Social and Environmental Sustainability, MIGA, October

1, 2007.
http://www.miga.org/documents/performance_standards_social_and_env_sustainability.pdf
(accessed November 18, 2013), p.5
35 MIGA Sustainability Policy, p.5

36 MGA Sustainability Policy, p.5
37 Contract of Guarantee for Equity Investments between MGA and Guarantee Holder,
MIGA, December 31, 2012, accessed November 19, 2013,

http://www.miga.org/documents/disclosure/Contract%20of%20Guarantee%20for%20Equity
%20Investments.pdf, Annex 3B
20
agreements (IGAs)38. However, contracts are not accessible on the website,

despite correspondence with MIGA that told us they were. We sent an email
to Mallory Saleson, Head of Communications at MIGA, inquiring where we
could locate the key agreements of public concern (as mentioned above). She
responded, They are disclosed on our websiteyou can find all projects and
documentation we publicly disclose related to those projects [on our
website]39. However, we were unable to locate any HGAs, IGAs, or similar on
their website.
2.3.3 Additional disclosure requirements

The disclosure requirements listed in MIGAs Sustainability Policy are required
in addition to the disclosure requirements specified in MIGAs Performance
Standard 1: Social and Environmental Assessment and Management Systems.
MIGAs Performance Standards do not include requirements for contract,
revenue, or payment disclosure to host countries, nor do they specifically
reference the extractive industry sector. For reference, the Performance
Standard 1 has the following disclosure requirements 40:
Where the client has undertaken a process of Social and Environmental

Assessment, the client is required to publicly disclose the Assessment
document.
If communities may be affected by risks or adverse impacts from the

project, the client is required to provide the communities with access
to information on the purpose, nature, and scale of the project, the
duration of proposed project activities, and any risks to and potential
impacts on such communities.
To remain eligible for MIGA guarantees, MIGA requires the guarantee holder
to maintain and preserve the following: (1) audited accounts of the project
enterprise in accordance with IFI reporting standards, (2) any other material
information relating to the investment project and (3) all required
registrations, filing, declarations, authorizations, approvals, permits,
consents, concessions and licenses.41 The document does not explicitly state
if the guarantee holder has to maintain these records publicly.
38 MIGA Operations Regulations, MIGA, amended through December 5, 2012,
http://www.miga.org/documents/Operations-Regulations.pdf (accessed October 23, 2013),

p.132
39 Email correspondence with Mallory Saleson, November 15, 2013

40 MIGA Performance Standards, p.5
41 Contract of Guarantee, p
21

To ensure accountability, MIGA carries out an integrity/corporate risk
assessment in all projects for MIGA guarantees. These include checks of
involved parties, clients safeguards for dealing with fraud and corruption,
and project structure and contractual agreements. After MIGA guarantees a
contract of guarantee, MIGA continues to monitor the performance of the
projects being supported42. MIGA reserves the right to terminate the contract
if the guarantee holder omits required information, fails to comply with
confidentiality provisions, violates the laws and regulations of the host
country (with respect to the project) or violates MIGAs performance
standards43. Additionally, on their website MIGA states,
MIGAs stance against fraud, corruption, or related misconduct (coercive,
collusive, and obstructive practices), or a lack of transparency, is also
incorporated into the legal documentation governing its investment
guarantees, and gives MIGA the right to deny compensation payment or
terminate guarantee coverage.44
However, we were unable to locate any precedent of MIGA terminating

coverage or denying payment due to failure of lack of transparency. Also, it
isnt clear where to find the legal documentation stating mentioned here.
There is no explicit mention of transparency requirements in any of the
contract templates available on the website.
Accountability is also addressed through the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman
(CAO), which enables individuals and communities affected by MIGAsupported projects to raise their concerns to an independent oversight
authority45, and the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), which assesses the
development impact of MIGA programs, guarantee projects and
complementary services46.
2.5 Gaps and Weaknesses
Access to contract and revenue disclosure is limited. Neither are

accessible on MIGAs website and direct requests for access were
unsuccessful. According to Mallory Saleson, Head of Communications
42 MIGA Operations Regulations, Annex B. 27 (p.134)

43 Contract of Guarantee, p.28-29
44 Institutional Integrity, MIGA, http://www.miga.org/projects/index.cfm?stid=1824
(accessed December 6, 2013).

46 About IEG, Independent Evaluation Group, http://ieg.worldbank.org/about-us (accessed
November 18, 2013)
22
at MIGA, since payments are disclosed through host country

governments, this information is not available through MIGA and we
would have to check with individual ministries. 47
MIGA limits the requirement for contract disclosure to only significant

new extractive projects.48 A significant new extractive project is a
project expected to account for ten percent or more of government
revenues.
The Policy on Disclosure of Information infers communities should have

access to publicly disclosed payments to the government, but it does
not stipulate the manner in which these disclosures should be made
available.
None of MIGAs policy documents explicitly specify the necessary types

of investment to be disclosed (i.e. production sharing agreements and
concession agreements are not mentioned) or how they should be
disclosed (e.g. location, languages, etc.).
While there is a surfeit of documentation on environmental and social

impact, MIGAs website offers very little in terms of overall financial
disclosure. Annual financial reports of the clients are not available, only
quarterly and annual financial reports from MIGA itself.
The 2007 Performance Standards document states that the

Performance Standards were revised in October 2013 and to visit
www.miga.org/sustainability to access them. However, there is no link
or, even reference, to the 2013 Performance Standards on the MIGA
site. Similarly, the Operational Regulations document is amended
through December 5, 2012 but unable to locate a more recent version.
2.6 Recommendations
Make the revenue, payment, and contract information from clients

publicly available on the MIGA website. Since MIGA requires clients of
MIGA-supported projects to (supposedly) publicly disclose a majority of
this information, providing a platform for public access would be a
simple next step. Additionally, it would bolster transparency and
accountability within the client organizations.
Require clients development effectiveness indicators reports to be

publicly disclosed, as outlined in MIGAs guarantee contracts. This
would boost transparency in the extractive sector because one of the
required indicators to be reported is taxes and fees, defined as all
47 Email correspondence with Mallory Saleson, November 15, 2013

23
transfers to all levels of the Host Government made by the Project

Enterprise, its parent company, or its operating subsidiary on behalf of
the project enterprise, including income or profit taxes, sales, and
excise taxes, and VAT receipts. Other payments collected by the Host
Government
include
royalties,
bonuses,
dividends,
management/concession fees, value of profit oil and product-sharing,
construction activities, licensing, permitting, etc. 49
Enhance external accountability for decisions regarding disclosure 50.

MIGA should address the areas of the disclosure policies that constrain
its ability to fulfill its responsibilities regarding the publics right to
know. This should include (1) conducting a comprehensive and
participatory evaluation of disclosure policy implementation, (2)
reviewing the list of exceptions to disclosure, and (3) modifying
ambiguous language regarding extractive sector policies in its Policy on
Disclosure of Information.
Specify the method for affected communities to access disclosed

contracts and payment/revenue information. Currently, no such
method is incorporated in MIGA policy. One recommendation is to
require clients to produce an annual report disclosing revenues and
payments that is specifically designed for public consumption. The
reports would be available on MIGAs website in English, as well as in
the language(s) of the host country.
Facilitate relationships between its clients and host country civil society
organizations, as a mechanism to increase public pressure for
transparency and accountability.
49 Contract of Guarantee, p.41

50 Assessing World Bank Openness: A Transparency Scorecard, Global Transparency
Initiative, September 2006. http://www.bicusa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/01/WBG+Transparency+Scorecard.pdf (accessed November 20,

2013).
24
3 European Bank for Reconstruction and

Development51
The EBRD was created in 1991 for the purpose of building the economies of
the formerly Soviet European states. It has since become the largest
financial investor in central Europe, central Asia and the southern and eastern
Mediterranean, and has a mission statement devoted to promotion of the
private sector. The EBRD is owned by The European Union, The European
Investment Bank, and 64 national governments from all over the world.
3.1 Financing in the Extractive Sector

The following facts are presented on EBRDs website, and have been
analyzed and criticized for usefulness. EBRD's total project value of
investments in natural resources as a sector was 14.8 Billion Euros, which is
divided across 105 different projects. 52 Its net business volume is 3 billion
Euros.
Unfortunately, these aggregates have little supporting information or
explanation. They fail to explain which time period is being reported upon,
how numbers were aggregated, or how project value is assessed. These
numbers, since they are not disaggregated by sub-sector include many
natural resource projects that are not specifically extractive in nature, such as
petrol distribution network projects like Galnaftogaz Loan II. 53
Figure 3. EBRDs Natural Resources Portfolio since 2006, by sector Source:
Investments in Natural Resources, EBRD54
51 The New Schools students Masha Katz -Katzm969@newschool.edu-, Justin Coburn

-cobuj499@newschool.edu-, Emma Stoskopf-Ehrlich -stose168@newschool.edu-, Jonatthan
Leonard -Leonj726@newschool.edu-, and Jaron Vogelsang -vogej566@newschool.eduelaborated this section.
52 Natural Resource Sector. EBRD. Accessed November 16, 2013.

http://www.ebrd.com/pages/sector/naturalresources.shtml
53
Galnaftogaz Loan II Project Summary Document. EBRD. Accessed Nov. 19 2013

http://www.ebrd.com/ english/pages/project/psd/2013/45462.shtml
54 http://www.ebrd.com/pages/sector/naturalresources.shtml - Accessed Nov. 16 2013
25
In its Investments in Natural Resources section, EBRD does not offer a total
investment figure, but rather visually disaggregates data by sector. By
conducting a visual estimation, EBRD finances approximately $1.5 billion
Euros in the extractive sector. The largest category of investment claims to
be in oil and gas extraction, with an investment of 300 million Euros. 55
The chart suggests that (between coal and metals) only about 70 million
Euros have been invested into mining operations. This seems remarkably
low, considering that the EBRDs project summary documents state that, over
the course of the last 10 years, at least $1.49B has been lent or approved for
future loan disbursements, to mining projects 56 (for a breakdown of this figure
see Annex 9.3.5 - EBRD Financed Extractive Industry Projects). The graph
fails to identify the time frame for the information presented.
The second largest amount of money invested by the bank is in remediation
services with a total of 270 Million Euros. Environmental remediation is the
action of remedying something, especially the reversal or stopping of damage
to the environment.57 EBRD remediation services include relocation efforts,
clean-up projects, or efficiency improvements i.e. the MOL/Slovnaft Energy
Efficiency Project.58 (Remediation projects were not classified as EI projects
55
Natural Resources Sector. EBRD. Accessed Nov. 19th 2013

http://www.ebrd.com/pages/sector/naturalresources.shtml
56 Project Summary Documents. EBRD. Accessed Nov. 19th 2013.
http://www.ebrd.com/saf/
search.html?type=project
57 Remediation Definition. The Free Dictionary. Accessed Nov 20, 2013.

http://www.thefreedictionary.com/ Environmental remediation
58 Project Summary Document: MOL/Slovnaft Energy Efficiency. EBRD. Accessed Nov. 19th
2013. http://www.ebrd.com/english/pages/project/psd/2012/43869.shtml
26
by the researcher in Annex 9.3.5 - EBRD Financed Extractive Industry

Projects)
There is no easy way to access the historical data of extractive industry
activity in a coherent or aggregated form. Instead, summary documents
(PSDs) of natural resource projects for the past 10 years were reviewed, and
independent decisions which classified the projects were made and EBRD's
amount lent to extractive projects was calculated. Many of EBRDs natural
resource projects were not included as extractive. Generally these were
loans for: refinery construction/improvement, recycling (of coal/gas), pipeline
construction, petrol station construction, treatment facilities, and distribution
networks. All of the aforementioned information was collected into a
spreadsheet (Annex 9.3.6 - EBRD Financed Extractive Industry Projects) and
analyzed.
EBRD
projects
which
are
classified
as
B-level
(in
terms
of
social/environmental impact) only sometimes are required to provide PSDs,59
so there may be significant loans made to clients for projects which are not
disclosed. These include non-disclosed B-level projects, C-level projects, and
projects using intermediary financial Institutions.
According to the PSDs used in Annex 9.3.5 - EBRD Financed Extractive
Industry Projects, in the last 10 years (2004 - 2013) EBRD has approved
$2.515B USD in strictly extractive projects:
Mining: $1.5B (16 Projects)
Oil & Gas: $1.0B (14 Projects)
3.2 Transparency and Accountability Policies

EBRD encourages their clients to disclose contracts and payments to
governments in both its Energy Operations Policy and Mining Operations
Policy. However, the policy on transparency is vague and mostly references
external frameworks, like EITI, without promising to adhere to them across all
extractive industry projects. The one major hallmark of progress (which has
already been addressed by RWI) is the requirement of disclosure of material
project payments to host governments.
The Bank will require mining companies to publicly disclose their material
project payments to the host government as a minimum revenue
transparency obligation, both in countries that apply and do not apply to the
EITI principals and criteria.60
59 EBRD Policy Brief. CEE Bankwatch. May 2013. Page 2.
http://bankwatch.org/sites/default/files/ briefing-EBRD-PIP-ESP-10May2013.pdf
60 Mining Operations Policy, October 17, 2012. Page 30
http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/policies/sector/mining-operations-policy.pdf
27
Since this significant progress was made

in 2010, there do not seem to have
been any further concrete commitments
or actions that EBRD has incorporated
into its operational policy structure. The
EBRD scored in the Poor range on the
Publish What You Fund organizations
2013 Aid Transparency Index (ATI). In
addition to its poor general rating, it
scored the lowest out of any of the
development
banks
that
were
investigated, and it scored only a 2.2/10
in its dedication to transparency. 61 The
policy does note the upcoming EU
Directive implementation, and states
that it will:
Require the implementation of the
new EU regulations on transparency
of extractive industries as soon as
they will come into application.62
For more detailed information and feedback on specific policy documents,

please see the following Appendices:
Mining Operations Policy (and its contrast with the Draft Mining
Strategy regarding RWI suggestions for alteration) Annex 9.3.1 EBRB
Draft Mining Strategy
Criticisms of the Mining Operations Policy Delivered by CEE Bankwatch
Annex 9.3.2. In its Mining Policy, The EBRD states that it encourages
EITI compliance and good governance practices:
The Bank will continue to adhere to best governance, transparency and
revenue management standards by encouraging its clients to implement
principles and criteria of the EITI.63
This statement begs the question:

what has EBRD actually done to
encourage its clients to adhere to good governance standards? To answer
this this question, EBRD projects have been identified in which the client has
agreed to adhere to PWYP or EITI policies, or are otherwise enforcing
61 2013 ATI Index. Publish What You Fund. Accessed Nov 25. 2013.
http://ati.publishwhatyoufund.org/donor/ebrd/
62 Mining Operations Policy, October 17, 2012. Page 30
http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/policies/sector/mining-operations-policy.pdf
63
Mining Operations Policy. EBRD.

http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/policies/sector/mining-operations-
policy.pdf
28
standards of good governance in well-outlined and substantial ways. For

detailed information about which projects/clients are included, see Annex
9.3.5 EBRD Financed Extractive Industry Projects. All information regarding
the good governance of these projects was taken from EBRD's own PSDs.
Where it was unclear whether adherence was a solid requirement, it was
noted in the Annex 9.3.5, but not included those projects in the aggregation
of good governance projects. All data is gathered from January 2004
November 2013.
Total # of (strictly) extractive projects64: 30
Number of projects (explicitly) requiring adherence to the well-established
good governance principals of either EITI or PWYP: 13
Percentage of EI projects requiring well-defined good governance standards:
42%
Amount of money associated with these 13 Projects: $614M USD
Percentage of Money Invested in EI projects which requires good governance:
24.5%
3.3 Access to Information

EBRD's website is simple and easy to navigate. The bank has published a
public information policy (PIP) that details what type of information it can and
cannot share with the general public. On many of EBRDs policy documents,
the bank encourages public commentary to be made within 60 days of the
policy documents creation. This exchange between the public and the bank
is then published separately.65 Despite the seemingly participatory nature of
this process, it has come under criticism by CSOs like Bankwatch. 66 For a
more granular breakdown of the PIP and a report on whether EBRD is
delivering on their disclosure promises, please see Annex 9.3.3 - EBRD Public
Information Policy.
The PIP provides an interesting insight into EBRD's trend of encouraging
transparency for its clients, rather than requiring it. In the 2011 Public
Information Policy (PIP) public commentary, a representative of EBRD
explained the reasoning for the delegation of transparency accountability:
The EBRD has a philosophy that disclosure of project information should be
primarily the responsibility of the client, and that this helps them to identify
64
Strictly Extractive Project Categorization includes: Projects which some or all of the
money lent has been allocated to either exploration or direct extraction of resources,
according to EBRDs PSDs. It does NOT include natural resource operations in the postextraction phase, i.e. pipeline construction.
65 Public Information Policy: Report on the Invitation to the Public to Comment. EBRD. May
2011. http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/policies/pip/0811/BDS11166A1w.pdf
66 CEE Bankwatch: Bankwatch letter to EBRD on the transparency of the mining strategy
review process. August 3rd, 2012. http://bankwatch.org/publications/bankwatch-letterebrd-transparency-mining-strategy-review-process
29
stakeholders, engage with them, manage information flow, and handle

complaints.... we want for them (the client) to develop the transparency and
accountability appropriate for their project.67
Indeed, much of the PIP seems more concerned with confidentiality than with
transparency. For example, the EBRD offers 9 instances in which it reserves
the right to invoke further confidentiality measures that allowed by its
general policies.68 Additionally, despite good web access to many of its
documents, an interview with CEE Bankwatchs EBRD campaign coordinator
revealed that:
..if requested to provide access to such information (Revenue/Payment &
Contract Disclosure), the EBRD refers us to its clients or their financial reports,
as published on their web sites.... When asked by Bankwatch, if any money
has been disbursed, the reply was 'check the client's website.' It is not always
easy to find or to understand financial reports of EI companies. And it should
be fairly simple for the EBRD to say 'yes, we did this much for this and that.'
or 'no, we did not disburse any moneys yet.'69
When a project is proposed, the EBRD uses the guidelines from the COO's
country strategy document, local/state law, and scale of impact to determine
a category for the project. For high impact projects, it requires its borrowers
to conduct and publish an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment
(ESIA). Projects are designated as category A when:
it could result in potentially significant and diverse adverse future
environmental and/or social impacts and issues which, at the time of
categorisation, cannot readily be identified or assessed and which require a
formalized and participatory assessment process carried out by independent
third party specialists in accordance with the PRs70
Projects are designated as Category B when:

The potential adverse environmental and/or social impacts that it may give
rise to are typically site-specific, and/or readily identified and addressed
through mitigation measures. These impacts could be from past, current or
future activities. Due diligence requirements may vary depending on the
67 Public Information Policy: Report on the Invitation to the Public to Comment. EBRD. May
2011. Page 9. http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/policies/pip/comment.pdf
68 EBRD Public Information Policy. (2011) Page 10-13.
http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/policies/pip/pipe.pdf
69
Interview with Fidanka Bacheva McGrath. CEE Bankwatch EBRD Campaign Coordinator.
October 21, 2013.
70
EBRD Environmental and Social Policy. (2008) Page 6.

http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/policies/2008policy.pdf
30
project and will be agreed with the EBRD on a case-by-case basis 71
Each category has different standards of project transparency. Category A

projects require a publicly posted Project Summary Document (PSD), whereas
category B projects can circumvented disclosure at the discretion of the
Secretary General. Several of EBRD's category B projects have come under
criticism from CSOs for inaccurate categorization, and their associated lower
standards of project disclosure. In an interview with CEE Bankwatch, its
representative explained that:
...there is the problem with categorization of EI projects, as so-called brownfield projects get a category B, which have lesser requirements on disclosure
and shorter periods for public consultation. The problem is that 'brown-field'
projects are usually associated with a legacy of heavy historic pollution and
dodgy privatization agreements, issues that raise significant public interest
that is not matched by the level of transparency provided for category B
investments. Projects that BW has followed that are examples of the B
categorization problem are: Chelopech Mining, DPM Long Term, and Centerra
Gold Revolver.72
3.4 Enforcement Mechanisms

The bank retains a number of mechanisms and reports that address policy
infractions, allegations of wrongdoing, and other types of complaints.
The Project Complaint Mechanism (PCM)
A detailed complaint-lodging process which is published on the EBRD website.
The PCM process is under review this year, and many civil society
organizations are in the process of submitting commentary. CEE Bankwatch
is currently lodging a complaint using the PCM regarding the Nuclear Safety
Upgrade Project in Ukraine. The only EBRD project that is strictly extractive
and has an open PCM complaint pending is the Oyu Tolgoi mine in Mongolia. 73
However, this complaint is regarding road development and not transparency
practices.
EBRDAT Administrative Tribunal
See Annex 9.3.4 - EBRD Administration Tribunal Case Study
Civil Society Engagement
71
ibid
72
Interview with Fidanka Bacheva McGrath. CEE Bankwatch EBRD Campaign Coordinator.
October 21, 2013.
73
Energy Resources Phase II and Oyu Tolgoi Complaint. EBRD Project Complaint
Mechanism register. Feb 8th, 2013.
http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/integrity/OT_complaint_1.07.2013.pdf
31
The bank maintains a Civil Society Engagement unit (CSE), which corresponds
with and listens to criticisms from (CSOs) and the society at large. In an
interview, Bankwatch said that the CSO department has been mostly very
helpful.74
3.5 Dodd-Frank, EU Directives and IFC Sustainability

Framework
As a method of measurement as to which of EBRD's extractive industry
clients are/will be subject to Dodd-Frank and EU Directives, the researcher
used RWIs Oil and Mining Companies on Global Stock Exchanges tool 75 to
look up which (if any) stock exchange the client company was listed under. If
the company seemed to be unlisted, the researcher looked up its country of
incorporation, to discern whether it was US/EU listed. This information is all
located in Annex 9.3.5 EBRD Financed Extractive Industry Projects. Here are
some figures that aim to demonstrate how much of EBRDs EI portfolio will be
affected by the new EU directives. (None of their EI clients are US listed or
owned).
Total number of Projects: 30
Projects with Clients that are listed on EU stock exchanges: 10
Projects with clients that are not publicly listed, but are registered in the EU:
4
Percentage of projects which would/will adhere to EU Directives: 46.6%
Amount of Money Effected by Directives: $1.01B USD
Percentage of money invested in EI which would be effected: 40.4%
74 Interview with Fidanka Bacheva McGrath. CEE Bankwatch EBRD Campaign Coordinator.
October 21, 2013.
75 Oil and Mining Companies on Global Stock Exchange. Revenue Watch Institute. Accessed
Nov. 20 2013. http://data.revenuewatch.org/listings/
32
33
4 Inter-American Development Bank76

The Inter-American Development bank (IDB) was founded in 1959 to support
efforts by Latin American and Caribbean countries to reduce poverty and
inequality. The Bank aims to bring about development in a sustainable,
climate-friendly manner and states that it is committed to increasing the
transparency, accountability and integrity in all of its activities. The majority
of the IDBs financial activity is in the public sector, however the Bank does
offer private sector loans through its Structured and Corporate Finance (SCF)
department and the Inter-American Investment Corporation (ICC), which is a
member of the Inter-American Development Bank Group. The former focuses
on large corporations while the ICC is dedicated to strengthening small,
medium and family owned businesses. 77
4.1 Financing in the Extractive Sector

Since 1961, the IDB has lent a total of $124.3 billion to both public and
private sector borrowers and of that $124.3 billion only $2.3 billion of it has
gone towards extractive industry loans. 78 According to the project documents
available on the IDB website, the Bank has only made one private sector,
extractive industry loan in the past ten years, a $488 million loan to the
Dutch company Delba Drilling International Coopeartie (a private company)
for the construction and operation of an off-shore mobile oil-drilling vessel
located in Brazil.79
In 2008-2012, the ICC (the private sector window of the IDB that is focused
on supporting small and medium sized businesses) lent a total of $50.8
76 The New Schools students Masha Katz -Katzm969@newschool.edu-, Justin Coburn

-cobuj499@newschool.edu-, Emma Stoskopf-Ehrlich -stose168@newschool.edu-, Jonatthan
Leonard -Leonj726@newschool.edu-, and Jaron Vogelsang -vogej566@newschool.eduelaborated this section.
77 Any projects that are facilitated through the Structured and Corporate Finance department
are published on the IDBs website while all ICC financed projects are found on the ICCs
website.
78 Inter-American Development Bank. Approved Loans by Sector/ Subsector. Inter-American
Development Bank. Web. November 16th, 2013. http://www.iadb.org/en/about-us/approvedloans-by-sectorsubsector,1329.html?module=01&lg=En&detail=Energy&subtitle=17,680.4
79 Inter-American Development Bank. BR-L1120: Delba Vessel. Inter-American Development
Bank, October 17th, 2007. Web. November 15th, 2013.

http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=1108308. Inter-American
Development Bank. IDB approves US$488 million for construction and operation of semisubmersible offshore mobile oil-drilling vessel in Brazil. Inter-American Development Bank,
October 17th, 2007. Web. November 15th, 2013. http://www.iadb.org/en/news/newsreleases/2007-10-17/idb-approves-us488-million-for-construction-and-operation-of-semisubmersible-offshore-mobile-oil-drilling-vessel-in-brazil,4088.html
34
million for extractive industry projects. Considering that the total amount of
money lent by the ICC in 2008-2012 was $29.3 billion, extractive industry
loans made up a very small percentage of the ICCs lending portfolio. 80
In 2009 the Bank officially endorsed the EITI 81 standards and through the
Banks Transparency Trust Fund it offers support to countries that want to
strengthen the transparency and accountability of their extractive
industries.82
However, participation in the Transparency Trust Fund is
completely voluntary and is not a requirement for obtaining an extractive
industry loan. It should also be noted that the Transparency Trust Fund only
grants loans to governments and it does not offer its services to private
companies who would like assistance in increasing the transparency in its
extractive industry activities.
4.2 Transparency and Accountability Policies

Neither the IDB nor the ICC have any concrete policies regarding contract or
payment disclosure for private sector companies operating in the extractive
industries.
It was extremely difficult to find any specific policies that
addressed either private sector lending and/or extractive industry projects
despite the Banks repeated claims that it is dedicated to protecting the
interests of native populations as well as fostering transparent and
sustainable development.
According to the Banks current Access to Information Policy there are many
exceptions for disclosure that would allow private sector companies to
80 Inter-American Investment Corporation. 2012 Annual Report. Inter-American Investment
Corporation. Web. November 11th, 2013.

http://www.iic.org/sites/default/files/documents/pub/en/iicdocs-347645-v12012_annual_report_eng_web.pdf. Inter-American Investment Corporation. 2011 Annual
Report. Inter-American Investment Corporation. Web. November 11 th, 2013.
http://www.iic.org/sites/default/files/pdf/iic2011ar_eng_lr.pdf. Inter-American Investment
Corporation. 2010 Annual Report. Inter-American Investment Corporation. Web. November
11th, 2013.
http://www.iic.org/sites/default/files/documents/pub/en/2010_annual_report_eng.pdf. InterAmerican Investment Corporation. 2009 Annual Report. Inter-American Investment
Corporation. Web. November 11th, 2013.
http://www.iic.org/sites/default/files/documents/pub/en/2009_annual_report_eng.pdf
81 Inter-American Development Bank. Better Environmental and Social Safeguards. InterAmerican Development Bank. Web. November 2nd, 2013.
http://www.iadb.org/en/insitutional-reforms/better-environmental-and-socialsafeguards,1830.html
82 Inter-American Development Bank. Transparency Trust Fund. Web. November 2nd, 2013.
http://www.iadb.org/en/topics/transparency/support-for-countries/anticorruption-activitiestrust-fund-aaf,1194.html
35
withhold information regarding contracts and payments made to host

governments. These exceptions include83:
1. Information provided in confidence which can include financial,
business, legal documentation, and other non-public information. This
exception is so broad and vaguely laid out that it could be interpreted
to encompass just about any type of financial or business transaction
between company and government, including arrangements regarding
payment streams and contract negotiation.
2. Loan and guarantee proposals for non-sovereign guaranteed
operations. This essentially means that no original proposal
documents describing private sector projects are disclosed. The
research team is working under the assumption that original proposal
documents would include contracts between private sector entities and
governments.
3. The IDB only requires that non-sovereign guaranteed operations (i.e.
private sector operations) disclose the following information:
a. Initial Project Abstracts
b. Environmental and Social Strategies (ESS)
c. Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA)
d. Strategic Environmental Analyses (SEA)
e. Environmental Analyses (EA)
f. Environmental and Social Management Reports (ESMR)
g. Abstracts of Approved Projects
4.3 Access to Information

It was extremely difficult to locate IDB/ICCs concrete policies regarding
private sector lending and the most concrete guidelines that the research
team found were within the Access to Information Policy. As demonstrated
above, the requirements and exceptions to disclosure are extremely vague
and easily manipulated to stretch a variety of interpretations. Additionally,
there was no specific document that addressed mining and/or extractive
industry projects which naturally makes it more difficult to ascertain the
Banks involvement in the sector.
4.4 Enforcement Mechanisms
Considering that the IDB and IIC have no specific policy regarding contract or
payment/revenue disclosure for private sector lending in the extraction
industries there are no enforcement mechanisms that correspond with those
requirements. The Bank does however require all contracted companies and
individuals affiliated with the Bank to adhere to its ethical standards.
Prohibited practices include:84
83 Inter-American Development Bank. Access to Information Policy. Inter-American
Development Bank, April 26th, 2010. Web. November 17th, 2013.
84 Inter-American Investment Corporation. The Inter-American Investment Corporations
Framework to Prevent Fraud and Corruption. Inter-American Investment Corporation, April

19, 2011. Web. November 10th, 2013.
36
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Corrupt practices
Fraudulent practices
Coercive practices
Collusive practices
Obstructive practices
If any contractor, sub-contractor or borrower engages in any of the above

activity then the Bank can:
1. Not finance any proposal to pay contractors
2. Suspend disbursement of operation
3. Declare misprocurement and cancel the portion of the loan
earmarked for contracted services
5. Report any illegal activity to appropriate law enforcement authority
6. Impose other sanctions it deems appropriate
Any punitive measure taken by the Bank will be immediately disclosed
to the public.
4.5 Dodd-Frank, EU Directives, and IFC Sustainability

Framework
Considering that the IDB does not have any specific policies related to
contract or revenue disclosure for private companies operating in the
extractive industries, the Bank does not even meet the minimum standards
set out by Dodd-Frank, the EU Directives and the IFC Sustainability to
Framework. The IDB has recently completed a project that assessed whether
their borrowing member countries comply with Dodd Franks requirements for
project-by-project revenue and payment disclosure. The Bank plans to use
the findings from the project to determine whether or not they will
recommend changing their policies. If the Bank does decide to amend their
policies based on this investigation it sounds as if it would be only for
sovereign loans which obviously means that private companies would not be
beholden to these stricter regulations. The research team attempted to
gather more information on this project by emailing the heads of the project
but they heard no response.
37
5 African Development Bank85

The mission statement of the African Development Bank states, The
overarching objective of the African Development Bank (AfDB) Group is to
spur sustainable economic development and social progress in its regional
member countries (RMCs), thus contributing to poverty reduction 86. Their
central mission strives to mobilize and allocate resources for investment in
RMCs and provide policy advice and technical assistance to support
development efforts.

The African Development Bank (AfDB) has a long history with the extractive
industry in Africa and has been engaged in the sector for over 30 years. The
AFDB states Transparency must be encouraged in both national and
devolved governments, especially in the hiring, administration and
functioning of the civil service. The judicial system, which has been plagued
with perceptions and instances of corruption and injustices in the past, has
now started ambitious plans for reform87.Since the AfDBs engagement in the
private sector in the 1990s, AfDBs cumulative investments in the extractive
industries sector total roughly $1.6 billion 88. The AfDB began to scale-up its
non-sovereign operations in 2001 and is currently aiming at total nonsovereign financing operations to exceed US $1.6 billion in 2011. Following
preliminary consultations with some of development partners and civil society
actors, the AfDB intends to establish a multi-donor Secretariat to support
coordination and transparency of activities in this sector 89.
5.2 Transparency in the extractive sector

The focus of the AFDB is the promotion of transparency, and accountability in
the management of extractive resources, working along the country and
86 Mission and objective, AfDB, http://www.afdb.org/en/about-us/mission-objective/

(accessed November 11, 2013)
87 ,3 http://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiatives-partnerships/multi-donorsecretariat-for-extractive-sector-mdses/background
88 Industries and Services, AfBD, http://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/sectors/privatesector/areas-of-focus/industries-and-services/ (accessed October 25, 2013)
89
38
regional platforms to strengthen accountability and transparency in the

management of public resources. The bank endorses the EITI commitments
to implement resources in rich member countries, providing technical and
financial assistance for EITI implementation, promoting advocacy and
outreach activities to strengthen the political will to improve governance of
natural resources, expand support for good governance of natural resources,
expand support for good governance of extractive industries at various
stages of the governing chain and mainstream EITI principals in the Banks
own natural resource operations90.
The AfDB website states that through its involvement, AfDB promotes the
attraction of foreign investments based on transparent, stable, and balanced
legislation in the sector.91 The AfDBs policy on transparency and
accountability is not extractive industry specific but applies across the Banks
projects. In regard to the oil and gas sector, the AfDBs new Energy Sector
policy states that the Bank Group will promote policies, principles, and
practices that enhance transparency in the exploitation of [oil and gas] as
well as in the use and distribution of the revenues. 92 In the mining industry,
one of the AfDBs policy objectives is to ensure compliance with mining
codes, foster greater disclosure, and transparency of revenue management 93.
In 2006, the AfDB endorsed the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
(EITI) and now holds an observer seat on the EITI board. At the end of 2007,
the AfDB added EITI engagement as an indicator to be monitored by the
African Development Funds results measurement framework. The Bank will
continue to provide funding for EITI implementation of country work plans,
the conduct, audit and validations involved and provide capacity building and
technical support for RMCs. The AfDB is also slated to be a key World Bank
partner is promoting value-added approach to the extractive industry sector,
particularly in developing a multi-donor trust fund for the initiative.
As of February 2013 the AfDB has enacted the Disclosure and Access to
Information (DAI) Policy, which replaces the Banks 2005 Policy on Disclosure
of Information. The new DAI policy aims to address shortcomings and gaps in
the previous policy including:
90 Negatu, Gabriel. Mainstreaming EITI at the African Development Bank.
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/GenericDocuments/Mainstreaming
%20EITI%20Presentation.ppt (accessed November 8, 2013)
91 Industries and Services, AfDB

92 Energy Sector Policy of the AfDB Group, African Development Bank (AfDB), 2012,
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/Energy
%20Sector%20Policy%20of%20the%20AfDB%20Group.pdf (accessed November 18, 2013),
p.2
93 Industries and Services, AfDB
39
Focus on the positive list (a conclusive list of documents to be

disclosed) resulting in constant revision of the policies simply to
capture newly generated operational documents
Insufficient follow-up on implementation
Inadequate supporting infrastructure, particularly IT systems and
implementation guidelines to effectively implement the policy. 94
The newly enacted DAI Policy is guided by the following principles:

Maximum Disclosure
Enhanced Access
Limited List of Exceptions
A Consultative Approach
Proactive Disclosure
Right to Appeal
Safe-Guarding Deliberative Processes
Provision for Review95
In particular, Section 3 of the DAI Policy explains what the policy covers and
enumerates the list of exemptions to the policy.
The project details of all AfDB projects can be found at the website
www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/. Board, budget, and compliance reviews
are all open to the public as well as legal documents, policy documents and
financial information. All of the projects are country specific and listed under
a given country, with most project descriptions in French only. It is hard to
find a brief summary and key facts without reading the entire document of
each project. It is also difficult to determine how much each project cost and
the specifics of each contract. It is extremely difficult to locate specific
numbers and contractual agreements, given how much information is
presented. Each project has its own document, which clearly states grant
information, the sector, the objectives, outcomes, justification and conclusion,
but projects can only be searched by country and not by sector. 96
5.3 Requirements regarding revenue, payments, and

contract disclosure
94 Disclosure and Access to Information Policy,AfDB,
http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/Bank%20Group
%20Policy%20on%20Disclosure%20and%20Acess%20to%20Infomation.pdf Sec. 1.1.6
(accessed November 20, 2013)
95 Disclosure and Access to Information Policy, AfDB.

96 Initiatives and Partnerships, AfDB, http://www.afdb.org/en/topics-and-sectors/initiativespartnerships/ (accessed November 20, 2013); Projects and Operations, AfDB,
http://www.afdb.org/en/projects-and-operations/ (accessed November 20, 2013)
40
While the AfDB does not explicitly mention extractive industry

transparency requirements, the AfDBs new Disclosure and Access to
Information (DIA), enacted in February 2013, states that all
documents should be open and transparent to the public, facilitating
better knowledge and understanding of the Bank Group Activities, its
use of resources, and engagement with client countries. 97 While the
DIA Policy actively endorses full disclosure there is still some ambiguity
about exact payment, revenue, and contract disclosure requirements
for Bank clients.
The Banks Good Governance Policy encourages transparency, freedom

of information and the disclosure of public expenditures. 98
The Bank also has a Voluntary Disclosure Program, which encourages

firms or individuals in Bank-financed projects to volunteer information
in which they may have participated.99

The AfDB states that under legal guidelines, funds are used for the purpose in
which they were intended under the enforcement and accountability
guidelines. Firms or individuals that divert these funds through fraud,
corruption, and harmful practices will be sanctioned through an
administrative process. The AfDB is a member of the Joint International
Financial Institutions Anti-Corruption Task Force and signed the Uniform
Framework for Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption. 100 Following
sanctions, the AfDB will fill out the Agreement for Mutual Enforcement of
Debarment Decision and that client will be considered ineligible to participate
in contracts financed or administered by the African Development Bank. In
order to practice good governance and transparency, the Bank also has a
Whistle-blowing and Complaints Handling Policy where clients can raise
concerns. A whistle-blower is any party who conveys a concern or allegation
97 Projects and Operations, AfDB, http://www.afdb.org/en/projects-and-operations/
(accessed October 25, 2013)
98 Bank Group Policy on Good Governance, AfDB, July 1999 (ADB website, Acrobat pdf)
99 Voluntary Disclosure Program, AfDB, http://www.afdb.org/en/about-us/structure/integrityand-anti-corruption/voluntary-disclosure-program/ (accessed November 28, 2013)
100 Integrity and Anti-Corruption Department Of the African Development Bank Group:
Standard Operating Procedures, AfDB, 2006,

http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/GenericDocuments/Integrity
%20and%20AntiCorruption%20Department%20of%20the%20African%20Development
%20Bank%20Group%20Standard%20Operating%20Procedures.pdf (accessed November
20, 2013)
41
indicating a prohibited practice such as fraud and the President will make
recommendations based on the specific case 101.
Additionally, the AfDB strives to keep stakeholders informed by ensuring that
the intended beneficiaries of the Banks Groups Development operation
understand the intended objectives and derive the benefits.
5.5 Gaps and weaknesses
While the new DAI Policy is a big step towards articulating clear
standards of information disclosure the list of exemptions included in
the document tempers the success of the policy. Several clauses are so
open-ended as to essentially negate the effectiveness of the Banks
commitment to information disclosure. Many of the clauses offer
blanket exemptions rather than applying them on a case-by-case basis
(such as documents related to the deliberation process).
o Key examples of ambiguous clauses:
Section 3.3, Subsection D, Clause i) states: The Bank
Group will not provide access to information provided to it
by a member country or third party that has indicated in
writing that such information be kept confidential.
This allows an incredible amount of leeway for
client countries to obscure important revenue or
contract information and this clause does not clarify
if there are any limits on what can be stated as
confidential.
Section 3.3, Subsection F, Clause iii) states: Details of
individual transactions under loans and trust funds,
information regarding amounts overdue from borrowers of
a short-term nature, or actions taken before any loans are
declared impaired; and
Section 3.3, Subsection F, Clause iv): Banking or billing
information of Bank Group entities, member countries,
clients, donors, recipients, or vendors, including
consultants. 102
This greatly limits the possibility of revenue and
payment disclosure and allows for the obscuring of
a great deal of relevant Bank client information.
In general, the Policy is a proponent of information disclosure without

specifically stating what information must actively be disclosed. The
exemptions demonstrate what can be kept confidential but it is not
clear exactly what clients need to disclose fully and regularly. Annex I
101 Standard Operating Procedures, p.4

102 Disclosure and Access to Information Policy, AfDB, p. 13
42
of the Disclosure and Access to Information 103 offers a sample of

information to be proactively disclosed but without sufficient
explanation.
While the AfDB website makes information widely accessible to the

public, there are several shortcomings with the actual process of
acquiring information. Projects are only found under country specific
names, and contract requirements are buried deep within the text. The
most optimal way to find information is through the search key, and
even then, the documents can be hard to sort through to determine
what is actually being presented, who is involved and what was
accomplished.
Operational Policy Papers: The most recent and useful operational

policy papers on the website included the Environmental Review
Procedure for Private Sector Operations and of the AfDB May 2000;
Environmental and Social Assessment Procedures for AfDB Public
Sector Operations June 2001; Integrated Environmental and Social
Impact Assessment Guidelines October 2003; and a handbook on
Stakeholder Consultation and Participation in AfDB Operations 2001.
These are standard guideline and procedural document, which are
apparently currently being used by the AfDB. 104
5.6 Recommendations
The policy is a good start but requires a significant amount of

clarification and specification. On a simple level there needs to be a
closer focus on exactly enumerated client requirements.
The exemptions should be case specific rather than across the board.
There should be more criteria for evaluating why a particular piece of
information should be exempted.
Annex I of the Disclosure and Access to Information is not a sufficient

explanation of information to be disclosed. There should be
descriptions of each type of information and stipulations for how often
and in what format each piece should be provided.
103 http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Policy-Documents/Bank%20Group
%20Policy%20on%20Disclosure%20and%20Acess%20to%20Infomation.pdf - (accessed
November 20, 2013)
104 Tamufor, Lindlyn and Gary Pienaar, African Development Bank Information Disclosure
Policy Implementation Research Project, Idasa, 2011,
http://freedominfo.org/documents/AfDB2011gtiReport.pdf
43
AfDB should reorganize the website. AfDB doesnt struggle with lack of
content, it struggles with an over abundance of content that cannot be
easily found, because of lack of organization. For the purpose of
practicality and functionality, less information and more conscious
presentation of the material would enhance the overall structure of the
AfDB website.
o Rather than sorting projects by country, it would be more useful
to sort projects by sector (i.e., health, agriculture, education
etc.), similar to that of IFC and MIGA. Projects should clearly
state objectives, costs, analysis, and outcomes in a way that is
clear and easy to understand without having to guess, or read
between the lines.
o The homepage should contain a Client Tab where client
information can be found. Since transparency is such a large
part of AfDB, it should clearly stand out in the left hand options
panel.
The Institute for Democracy in Africa (Idasa) believes that in order for
the AfDB to be more transparent, the following measures have been
proven most effective105:
o Senior management making statements and taking other
actions that make it clear and provides access to information as
an organizational priority;
o Providing targeted training on access to information and building
access to information elements into other training activities;
o Incorporating access to information into corporate incentive
structures and appraisal systems;
o Educating the public, particularly in project affected areas, about
their right to access information and how it may be exercised;
o Putting in place a central system for tracking requests when
they are made, who receives them, what response was provided,
any appeals, and so on which should itself be made public;
o Publishing and widely disseminating an annual review of
implementation of the access to information policy (a sort of
internal audit);
o Putting in place an effective and progressive system of record
management;
o Developing a protocol on what sorts of information should be
recorded in permanent form (such as which sorts of meetings
should be minuted); and
o Providing for individual sanctions for willful obstruction of access
to information.
105 Tamufor, Lindlyn and Gary Pienaar, African Development Bank Information Disclosure
Policy Implementation Research Project, Idasa, 2011,
http://freedominfo.org/documents/AfDB2011gtiReport.pdf, p. 46
44
A discrete budget should be allocated for purposes of

implementing this principle and a dedicated body or individual
within the IFI should have responsibility for discharging these
duties.106
106 Ibid.
45
6 Asian Development Bank107

6.1 Supporting Energy Infrastructure and Governance
Founded in 1966 the Asian Development Bank has grown into an enormous
organization that works with state governments throughout Asia on a wide
range of development infrastructure projects aimed at eliminating poverty. 108
Their work has been praised for engaging positively with renewable energy
and sustainable, well-governed business models, but many question whether
they hold governments accountable for the way their loans are used. I seek to
identify what the ADB guidelines are concerning revenue and contract
transparency in the resource extraction sector, and give an overview of the
ways in which the ADB could be leveraged to improve that policy.
The Asian Development Bank is an institution whose breadth of work in the
energy sector spans fossil fuel extraction, construction of dams, solar arrays
and other renewable technologies, electricity distribution planning and
pipeline construction as well as direct policy guidance. The banks work in the
extractive sector is mainly comprised of finding and hiring intermediary
consultants for policy research, infrastructure development, and to build
business relationships between governments and private companies. The
Asian Development Bank often works in countries with weak government
accountability, and thus its role in creating sound policy advice, including
stringent guidelines for transparency, is doubly important. The ADB has been
criticized in the past for not requiring transparency policies such as the EITI
framework in Myanmar.109 Several other Developing Member Countries
(DMCs) that work extensively with the ADB such as Afghanistan are
vulnerable to corruption as well, as Revenue Watch Institute has detailed in
their Resource Governance Index.110
6.2 Methodology
The Asian Development Bank maintains an extensive online database of

policy and project documents. I have examined this as my primary resource,
and augmented it with secondary sources concerning EITI performance and
applications as well as critiques on ADB projects and policies.
I have also compiled Annex 9.6 of extractive sector projects with total
extractive costs, organized by project. The ADB maintains a comprehensive
107 Report developed by Gabriel Stoltzfus, gabestoltzfus@gmail.com, Resource Curse course
student, The New School University
108 Overview: Asian Development Bank. Website http://www.adb.org/about/overview.

Accessed 12/09/13.
109 Door Creaks Open on Myanmars Gas Petrolium Economist. Feb. 2012.
110 Resource Governance Index. Revenue Watch Institute. 2013.
46

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Table of Contents

1.1 Extractive Sector Profile.......................................................7

International Financial Institutions:

2 Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency........................12

2.1 Extractive Sector Profile.....................................................12

3 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development..........20

Financing in the Extractive Sector.......................................20

4 Inter-American Development Bank....................................27

Financing in the Extractive Sector.......................................27

5 African Development Bank................................................30

5.1 Extractive Sector Profile.....................................................30

5.4 Enforcement and Compliance..............................................32

6 Asian Development Bank..................................................36

6.1 Supporting Energy Infrastructure and Governance...............36

7 Japan Bank for International Cooperation..........................40

7.1 Extractive Sector Profile.....................................................40

8 Overseas Private Investment Corporation..........................43

8.1 Supporting Private Finance and Investment with a

9.1 International Finance Corporation.......................................51

9.3.2 Criticisms of the EBRD Mining Operations Policy...........................68

The present report is product of a collaborative research project between

these said requirements with mandatory disclosure rules through stock

1 International Finance Corporation3

1.1 Extractive Sector Profile

Oil & Gas

1.2 Transparency in the Extractive Sector

According to the Access to Information Policy outlined by the IFC,

Oil & Gas Overview Presentation, International Finance Corporation (IFC).

Annual Report 2013: Industry Results, International Finance Corporation (IFC)

1.3 Requirements Regarding Contract, Revenue, and

1.3.2 Accessibility of disclosed revenue and payments:

Out of the 14 payments disclosed in 20117 (See Annex 9.1.2, Table 2

Policy on Environmental and Social Sustainability, in IFC Sustainability Framework,

Government Revenues, International Finance Corporation (IFC),

1 used an easy to understand template that broke payments

Candex Energy, Inc. Annual Report 2011, p27, 50

Payment to Governmental Authorities 2011 Peru LNG.

Other projects were disaggregated by stages of project development.

1.3.4 Accessibility of disclosed contract information:

11 Policy on Environmental and Social Sustainability in IFC Sustainability Framework.

12 BPZ Energy, Inc. 2011 Annual Report, p. 26-28

1.3.5 Additional disclosed information

1.4 Enforcement and Compliance

13 Access to Information Policy, in IFC Sustainability Framework. International Financial

14 Policy on Environmental and Social Sustainability and Access to Information Policy, in

15 Methodology, Independent Evaluation Group (IEG)

www.ieg.worldbankgroup.org/methodology (accessed November 15, 2013)

1.5 Gaps and weaknesses

Quick Reference Guide to Extractive Industries Revenue and Contract Transparency at

17 Government Revenues, International Finance Corporation.

Develop an action plan to encourage contract disclosure requirements by

2 Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency18

2.1 Extractive Sector Profile

19 MIGA Brief: Oil and Gas, MIGA, April 2013.

http://www.miga.org/documents/oil&gasbrief.pdf, (accessed Oct. 23, 2013), p.3

20 MIGA Brief: Mining, MIGA, April 2013, http://www.miga.org/documents/miningbrief.pdf,

21 MIGA Annual Report 2013, MIGA, June 30, 2013,

http://www.miga.org/documents/Annual_Report13.pdf, (accessed December 4, 2013), p.3

of new volume (See Annex 9.2.2 for outstanding portfolio distribution by

Infras tructure, 46%

Figure 2: MIGA Guarantees issued in FY 2013, by sector (by $ volume)

22 MIGA Annual Report 2013, p.23

24 Transparency Requirements for Listed Companies, The European Commission (EC),