Asian Journal of Political Science

ISSN: 0218-5377 (Print) 1750-7812 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rasi20

One size does not fit all: an analysis of the

corruption preventative approach of the Anti-
Corruption Commission (ACC) in Bangladesh

Nurul Huda Sakib

To cite this article: Nurul Huda Sakib (2019): One size does not fit all: an analysis of the corruption
preventative approach of the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) in Bangladesh, Asian Journal of
Political Science, DOI: 10.1080/02185377.2019.1642773

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2019.1642773

Published online: 15 Jul 2019.

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ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2019.1642773

One size does not fit all: an analysis of the corruption

preventative approach of the Anti-Corruption Commission
(ACC) in Bangladesh
Nurul Huda Sakib
Department of Government and Politics, Jahangirnagar University, Savar, Dhaka, Bangladesh

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
This paper argues that the global citizens’ engagement movement Anti-Corruption Commission;
against corruption does not always succeed in developing Community-based
countries, such as Bangladesh. Drawing on the case of the organisations; Institutional
preventative strategies of the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) in isomorphism; Citizens
engagement; Bangladesh
Bangladesh, this paper shows that government-driven citizens’
engagement processes through community-based organisations
(CBOs) are a ceremonial adaptation in response to isomorphic
pressure from the donors. The outcomes from isomorphic pressure
suggest that such donor-funded actions produce ‘isomorphic
mimicry’ of successful corruption prevention programmes from
other countries that do not succeed in the recipient country. A
micro-level analysis based on interviews with stakeholders in
Bangladesh demonstrates why isomorphic mimicry has failed to
produce a robust anti-corruption prevention approach in Bangladesh.

Introduction
What is the best way to obtain good anti-corruption results at a minimum cost? Institu-
tionalists argue in favour of institutional isomorphism. The term ‘isomorphism’ (or ‘iso-
morphic mimicry’) is drawn from biological evolution in which one animal gains survival
skills by pretending to have characteristics of other animals in a way that provides that
animal with survival value (Krause, 2013; Pritchett & de Weijer, 2011). A central tenet
of institutional theory is the belief ‘that organisations sharing the same environment
will employ similar practices and thus become “isomorphic” with each other’ (Kostova
& Roth, 2002). What succeeds in one context will also succeed in other places.
So why has the isomorphic approach of anti-corruption preventative activities not
always been a success? This paper seeks to answer this question, using Bangladesh as its
case study. Bangladesh is a good case study since corruption has been a central
problem in Bangladesh from its independence, contributing to its stagnant development
as parties and people in power have been directly or indirectly involved in corruption.
After a democratic government was elected to power in the 1990s, it was assumed that
the country would limit the flow of corruption. However, the result was frustrating with
corruption becoming more severe due to the lack of political will (Khan, 2003; Khan &

CONTACT Nurul Huda Sakib nhsakib@juniv.edu

© 2019 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 N. H. SAKIB

Islam, 2014). The party in power used state institutions to repress and suppress its opposi-
tion to gain political benefits. The elected party was involved in electoral corruption
(Akhter, 2001) and used other government agencies, such as the former Bureau of
Anti-Corruption (BAC) and the present ACC, to harass the opposition.
International development partners have made several attempts to establish anti-cor-
ruption measures in Bangladesh. One such effort was the establishment of the Anti-Cor-
ruption Commission (ACC) in 2004. At the same time, international donors vocally
supported the creation of a social movement based on the global principle of citizens’
engagement by engaging citizens in developing countries (Verdenicci & Hough, 2015).
The rich history partially supported in those countries of community organizing in
fisheries, climate change, disaster management, farming, health, education, etc. (El
Arifeen et al., 2013; Islam & Malak, 2013; Sultana & Thompson, 2004; Thompson,
2013). Aligned with this and due to isomorphic pressure, the ACC adopted the engage-
ment of citizens in anti-corruption efforts through the formation of Corruption Preven-
tion Committees (CPCs) (‘Durniti Protirodh Committee or Duprak’ in Bengali) and
Integrity Units (‘Satata Sangha’ in Bengali) since 2007. This paper argues that the
global isomorphic approach of ‘citizens’ engagement’ via CBOs like the ACC’s CPCs
and Integrity Units to fight against corruption has been frustrating and has not brought
any fruitful results in corruption prevention. Why is the Bangladesh experience contrary
to global isomorphic phenomenon? Why has the ACC in Bangladesh failed to motivate
people to prevent corruption? These questions obviously need better answers on a
context where corruption prevention is an emergency.
Thus, the paper attempts to draw the attention of policymakers and anti-corruption
professionals to the problems of the isomorphic strategy. Using empirical findings, the
paper shows that the formation of CPCs and Integrity Units was based on all forms of iso-
morphic pressure, has several problems and has created a ‘mimicry movement.’ Also, the
paper suggests that these initiatives follow the ‘buzz’ of the global principle of citizens’
engagement, are created to make donors happy and are ceremonial in nature.

Institutional isomorphism
The World Bank studies suggest that the higher the quality of an institutional framework,
the lower the chance of corruption (Venard, 2009). If the quality of institutional frame-
work is strengthened, this helps to reduce unethical behaviour. What is the best way to
obtain better institutions at minimum cost? Institutionalists often argue that it is
through institutional isomorphism (Venard, 2009). The idea of isomorphism emerged
in organizational sociology in the 1970s and 1980s, introduced mainly by Hawley
(1968), Hannan and Freeman (1977), Meyer and Rowan (1977), and DiMaggio and
Powell (1983). Hawley found isomorphism to be a ‘constraining process that forces one
unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental con-
ditions’, with this suggesting that the diversity of organizational forms is isomorphic to the
variety of environments. He extended this by stating that isomorphism is a productive
process as organizational characteristics modified in the direction of increasing their com-
parability with environmental characteristics (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Following
Hawley (1968), Hannan and Freeman (1977) argued that isomorphism would work in
society as organizational decision makers learn appropriate responses and adjust their
 ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 3

behaviour accordingly. Meyer and Rowan (1977) tried to understand firms’ quest for
legitimacy. They argued that the rules set by institutions mainly functioned as myths by
which organizations incorporate, gaining legitimacy, resources, stability, and the ability
to survive for a longer time (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008; Meyer & Rowan, 1977;
Zucker, 1977).
DiMaggio and Powell explained isomorphism through two types of isomorphism
dynamics: competitive and institutional (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). However, they
focused more on institutional isomorphism as it is crucial to understand politics and cer-
emony in modern organizational life, especially in developing countries where political
leaders are actively involved in carrying out both. Thus, external organizational forces
are crucial as an organization not only competes for resources and customers but also pol-
itical power and legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In this context, the fundamental
mechanisms through which isomorphic change occur is a critical issue in this research.
The reason is that the institutional isomorphism process of the global citizens’ movement
through community engagement has several internal and external problems in Bangladesh
that make anti-corruption prevention activities difficult.
Institutional isomorphism identifies three processes of constraining influences, namely,
coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphism to explain why organizations are driven to
similarity and to seek to maintain their legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) (Table 1).
Coercive pressure shapes through different mechanisms, such as performance evalu-
ation, budgetary control mechanisms, and accounting practices by mother organizations
(Chang, Mellahi, & Wilkinson, 2009; Yazdifar, Zaman, Tsamenyi, & Askarany, 2008). In
this regard, coercive isomorphism is likely to be the dominant force in the preventative
approach activities of the ACC’s CPCs and Integrity Units as a large part of the preventa-
tive approach depends on donor funding. Mimetic isomorphism occurs as a response to
uncertainty as the institution seeks legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan,
1977; Mizruchi & Fein, 1999). Mimetic isomorphism could also be driven by ‘obligatory
action’ as any action is driven by the majority of social actors, ultimately these actions
become familiar, taken for granted, or institutionalized (Haveman, 1993). Thus, although
anti-corruption prevention activities through the ACC in Bangladesh may develop
through coercive pressure, the formulation process of that strategy is mainly through
mimetic isomorphism. Normative isomorphism suggests that institutions and insti-
tutional change can also be the result of attraction from other successful initiatives.
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argued that normative isomorphism is a matter of professio-
nalization as formal education and professional networks lead to the spread of insights,
models, and normative rules. Thus, the activities of the ACC’s CPCs and Integrity

Table 1. Global dynamics of isomorphic pressure.

Dynamic Mechanism Examples
Competitive Performance Markets
Institutional
Coercive Power, dependency Hegemonic states, multilateral agencies,
multinational firms
Mimetic Frequency-based imitation to cope with uncertainty and Bandwagons, fads, fashions
secure legitimacy
Shared ideologies, world views, framework, or templates Keynesianism, neo-liberalism, democracy, legal
Normative tradition
Source: Adapted from (Guillén, 2014).
4 N. H. SAKIB

Units that are conducted to increase professionalization or to make citizens aware of their
rights exert normative pressure.

Isomorphism and anti-corruption efforts

Scholars have extensively studied institutional isomorphism. Amongst these studies, the
effect of societal and institutional environment through coercive, mimetic and normative
isomorphism has been widely noted in areas such as budgetary control systems, NGO
accountability and reporting, the evolution of hospital structures, the adoption of civil-
service reform by municipal governments, financial management reforms and environ-
ment management. Institutional isomorphism has also been applied to combatting cor-
ruption. Corruption and anti-corruption efforts have both become globalized. Countries
around the world have adopted various anti-corruption policies and programmes based
on institutional isomorphism. For example, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in International Business Transactions promulgated in 1997 has placed isomorphic
pressure on many countries to impose tough sanctions against bribery like fines and
imprisonment.
Anti-corruption efforts in Bangladesh since the 1990s have followed the trend of deli-
vering major reforms based on isomorphic pressure, through the structural adjustment
programme of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Three impor-
tant elements of this isomorphic institutionalism were developed—the National Integrity
Strategy based on TI’s NIS, the establishment of an anti-corruption agency, and commu-
nity organizations. In this paper special focus is given on community engagement through
ACC’s prevention committees.

Community engagement through CBOs

Community engagement in public affairs has a long history, with citizens having made a
significant contribution to public service delivery and on local issues through leadership
and decision making. The past few decades have seen tremendous growth in citizens’
engagement through community development committees, citizen satisfaction surveys,
public consultations, participatory planning, budget consultations, and social audits
(United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2016). Thus, the role of CBOs is
emerging and has received an enormous amount of scholarly attention. The CBO is a
non-profit organization in which the activities are based on volunteer efforts where
members contribute labour, materials, and finance (Chechetto-Salles & Geyer, 2006,
p. 4). Citizens’ engagement involves citizens in the form of individual or collective
action (including that in civil society organizations) (Joshi, 2007). As a result, various
but similar terminology is used, such as ‘community’, ‘collective action’, ‘civic engage-
ment’, ‘neighbourhood’, ‘localism’, ‘good society’, etc. Considering the modern governance
regime, Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti (1994) argued that if citizens in a ‘civic commu-
nity’ demand better public services and collaboration, public sector officials are aware of
their responsibility for civic duties.
Conversely, ‘uncivic’ people not only do nothing but are instead separate and suspi-
cious. Similarly, Sen (1999) argued that citizens’ engagement provides people with the
 ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 5

opportunity to speak up against injustices and discrimination. It fosters human capabili-

ties, promotes fundamental freedoms, and contributes to people’s well-being and quality
of life.
Scholars researching community organizing or community engagement have mostly
defined the terminology, relevant theories, characteristics, formation, initiation, and chal-
lenges (Murphy, 1990; Phillips & Pittman, 2009; Walker & McCarthy, 2010 ). Also,
various successful community efforts around the world have drawn the scholarly attention
of many authors (Craig & Mayo, 1995; Murphy, 2012; Webb, 2012; Yap, 2017). However,
one fair criticism of community engagement on ‘rights-based’ issues, such as corruption, is
that this requires extraordinary efforts compared to when it is focused on ‘needs-based’
issues (Murphy, 1990). Combating corruption thus always needs special efforts. The
core argument of institutional theorists is that beliefs, rules, cultural values, and ethical
expectations influence institutions to direct behaviours towards the attainment of external
legitimacy (Zucker, 1987). In combating corruption and in their efforts to address other
issues, CBOs face similar challenges related to legitimacy, funding or resources, strategy,
target populations, etc. (Walker & McCarthy, 2010). They are often operated by develop-
ment partners, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), or individual people in relation
to their funding and resource collection. These CBOs either scamper to fulfil the goal/s of
these organizations or individuals, or they influence their activity to achieve their own
(intergovernmental organisations [IGOs], NGOs or individuals) targets. In recent years,
Yap (2013, 2017), in two separate studies, has shown that citizens’ demands for the pun-
ishment of corruption depend on several conditions, such as the credibility of their
demands, the problem of coordination, the extent of collective action, the size of the popu-
lation, and mutual benefits. To gain credibility and implement effective anti-corruption
measures, CBOs also need political support. For example, CBOs in the United States
(US) seek political power, but they never drift away from the greater social context. The
organizers unite and organize people, cultivate leaders, educate members, and foster a con-
sciously ideological practice (Fisher, 1994). However, many of these examples suggest that
citizens’ engagement needs to begin at the local level (Warburton & Baker, 2005) as CBOs
cannot survive without the support of local people. Therefore, it is imperative to form
friendship or kinship ties within a community to create social bonding.

Institutional isomorphism in community organizing to prevent corruption

Community engagement in anti-corruption measures which has gained tremendous
success worldwide is a concept borrowed from the well-known US civic education
system. Operating since the nineteenth century, this concept has been, and continues to
be, very influential. It has been packaged and ‘sold’ to other countries through the
Centre for Civic Education’s CIVITAS programme (Marquette, 2007). Similarly, since
October 2002, the World Bank Institute (WBI)’s pilot-based Youth for Good Governance
Learning Program, which was designed to engage the younger generation, has operated in
several selected countries (Tanzania, Ghana, Uganda, Zambia, Russia, the Ukraine, Yugo-
slavia, and the US), to highlight the vital role this generation can play in improving the
quality of governance in their countries (The World Bank Institute [WBI], 2002). Further-
more, the World Bank has acknowledged the relationship between anti-corruption
measures and citizens (as individuals or as members of civil society) in preventing
6 N. H. SAKIB

corruption. Both the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation for Economic Co-oper-
ation and Development (OECD) follow the path of emphasizing the broad participation of
citizens in decision making (Verdenicci & Hough, 2015).
The global citizens’ engagement process has become a role model for individual
countries, as has the donor-prescribed format, mainly due to the immense success of
the Community Relations Department of Hong Kong’s Independent Commission
Against Corruption (ICAC) (Marquette, 2007). The success of Hong Kong’s ICAC has
been due to the Community Relations team, with its team members responsible for the
education, publicity, and moral leadership of the Commission (Chan, 2000; Gong &
Wang, 2013; Quah, 1994). Also, community leaders, as executive members from the com-
munity, hold extensive power, playing an advisory role to the Chief Executive who is head
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) (Huberts, Anechiarico, & Six,
2008). Both the legislative council and district council have direct contact with the com-
munity regarding ideas and opinions on various social issues. Furthermore, HKSAR’s pol-
itical system encourages community leaders to enter politics which, in turn, enhances
community participation and reduces the opportunities for corruption among politicians.
The Citizens Advisory Committee has a crucial role in the content of films, billboards, and
other forms of advertising to educate the public (Heilbrunn, 2004). Civic engagement, as
shown in these examples, also contributes to better governance.
The isomorphism of citizens’ participation has achieved outstanding results. In the case
of the United Kingdom’s (UK)’s Localism Act 2011, Lawton and Macaulay (2014) found
that involvement in local issues was critical to achieving rights and for citizens to become
‘expert citizens.’ In a different context, Webb (2012) showed that poor people in Delhi
obtained services from public institutions through a collective approach and the use of
the Right to Information Act 2005. Similarly, leading examples of community organizing
and citizens’ engagement include the following: the Thai municipal government initiated
Cooperative Community Groups (CCGs); Residents’ Committees were set up in Singa-
pore; Neighbourhood Associations in Japan (Read & Pekkanen, 2009); and Civic Organ-
izations in Indonesia (Achwan & Ganie-Rochman, 2009). In a different study based on 60
case studies, (Goetz & Gaventa, 2001) found that citizens’ engagement and civil society
initiatives have fostered public services, thus making a direct influence on policy and
spending decisions. The underlying fact is that these initiatives not only encourage local
development but also reduce opportunities for corruption by engaging citizens in the
process. However, experiences from these countries suggest that creating a social move-
ment of citizens’ engagement is one fruitful mechanism for fighting corruption. It also
motivates donors to frequently promote the citizens’ engagement process through
CBOs and other organizational forms. Having been developed by following such
examples, community-driven anti-corruption initiatives in Bangladesh have become not
only popular but are increasing. Various government and non-government initiatives
have been introduced via CBOs and other organizational forms.
Thus, many countries have significantly improved their capabilities to prevent corrup-
tion via citizen involvement; however, some countries with similar capabilities have had
different outcomes. This is a puzzle that has been underexplored and that needs better
explanation. This paper fills a gap in the literature by exploring this puzzle and creating
a new avenue of research focused on isomorphism and corruption.
 ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 7

In the next few sections, this paper attempts to explain why and how all three dynamics
of isomorphic pressure have occurred and why these efforts have limited success in the
citizens’ engagement process of the ACC’s corruption prevention approach through
CPCs and Integrity Units.

Methodology
This paper is part of the research titled ‘Anti-Corruption Efforts in Bangladesh’ which
follows the case study method as its research strategy. This method is selected as it is suit-
able for exploratory and explanatory research and can bring a broad range of factors into
account (Creswell, 2012). The research mainly focuses on the institutional arrangements
of anti-corruption efforts, and keenly seeks to find a better anti-corruption initiative, one
that is capable of combating corruption in Bangladesh. Thus, it deals with a range of anti-
corruption initiatives in Bangladesh, such as the roles of the ACC and the National Integ-
rity Strategy (NIS), and the role of CBOs in citizens’ engagement. However, in this paper,
the focus is only on corruption prevention through the ACC’s citizens’ engagement
process. Thus, the emphasis is placed on the activities of the ACC’s CPCs and Integrity
Units. Although the entire research is involved with a range of methods such as élite inter-
views, BCS 2015–2016 (Bangladesh Citizens Surveys 2015–2016),1 observations, and the
analysis of many secondary documents, major findings of this paper are mainly based
on élite interviews. The reason is that the focus is at the micro level and only deals with
the activities of the ACC’s citizens’ engagement process.
The fieldwork was carried out at different locations in Bangladesh from September 2015
to April 2016. For the élite interviews, an interview schedule was prepared following the
guidelines of the University of Sydney’s Human Research Ethics Committee. Élite inter-
views were conducted across different classes of society, including anti-corruption
officials, CBO leaders, academics, civil society members, activists, and journalists. Along
with the élite interviews, the observation method was used while visiting CPCs, and
while participating in CPC rallies, seminars, and other activities. Also, information
accessed from some evaluation reports and various secondary materials was used to
define the operations of CPCs and Integrity Units.

The case of CPCs and integrity units of ACC in Bangladesh

The ACC formed CPCs and Integrity Units by engaging voluntary, comprising honest and
active people from a cross-section of the society, including teachers, religious leaders, former
government officials and students. After consultation with Transparency International Ban-
gladesh (TIB) and the Institute of Governance Studies (IGS), the ACC established CPCs and
Integrity Units, based on the Committee of Concerned Citizens (CCC) and Youth Engage-
ment & Support (YES) approach developed by TIB. Thus, based on Article 17 (k) of the
Anti-Corruption Act 2004, the Commission established CPCs (Durniti Protirodh Commit-
tees or Duprak in Bengali) in district and sub-district level and Integrity Units at the
school level to engage citizens and school children in anti-corruption initiatives. Both district
and sub-district committees of the CPC must have a president, vice-president, and secretary.
One-third of the members are women, wherever possible. An adult Bangladeshi citizen is
qualified to be a member of a committee unless they are an elected public representative,
8 N. H. SAKIB

civil servant, party activist, insane, bankrupt, accused or convicted of a criminal offence. The
Integrated District Offices primarily nominate committee members and vetted by the Head-
quarters before endorsement. After the formation of committees, an orientation pro-
grammed is arranged, and committees then meet monthly. Committees have been
established in nine cities, 62 districts and 422 Upazilas (ACC, 2016).
The ACC formed Integrity Units (Satata Sangha in Bengali) in every district, Upazila
and city under the CPC’s Constitution of 2010. The executive committee of each Integrity
Units comprises 11 members. All students of the respective educational institutes are
granted general membership. A three to the five-member advisory council is formed, con-
sisting of teachers to guide the Integrity Unit’s activities. The ACC has established 21,744
‘Integrity Units’ across the country (ACC, 2016).

Activities of the CPCs and integrity units

The CPC and Integrity Units mainly provide a work plan to the ACC’s office to which they
are attached. On the advice of the ACC, the role of these committees is to arrange discus-
sion meetings, seminars, workshops, and rallies throughout the year. More specifically, the
function of these committees is crucial in carrying out Anti-Corruption Week (26 March
to 1 April in every year) and observing International Anti-Corruption Day on 9 December
across the country. Committees receive a lump sum of money to organize the events as
well as anti-corruption slogan-inscribed caps and T-shirts from the ACC to distribute
among the general population.
With the assistance of CPCs and Integrity Units, seminars, discussions, drama perform-
ances, and debate and essay competitions are organized in different districts and towns, in
which students of schools and colleges participate. The ACC distributes thousands of posters
inscribed with ‘Honesty is the best policy’ and ‘We shall not be involved in corruption, tol-
erate it or accept it’ among Integrity Unit members. Every Integrity Unit helps students to
undertake more significant endeavours to build moral character, develop their education
and health, and conserve the climate and the environment as part of anti-corruption

Table 2. Events organized by CPCs (2012–2015).

Speeches by
Essay Human Drama distinguished
Year Discussions Debates competitions chains Rallies Seminars performances people Others
2015 2521 448 303 1052 1070 60 92 970 1669
2014 2171 509 432 939 1008 87 187 1013 1837
2013 2519 429 386 672 705 184 172 756 808
2012 2069 400 422 648 684 214 185 576 761
Total 7211 1786 1543 3311 3467 545 636 3315 5075
Source: (ACC, 2015, 2016).

Table 3. Events organized by integrity units (2014–2015).

Speeches by
Essay Human Drama distinguished
Year Discussions Debates competitions chains Rallies Seminars performances people Others
2015 2113 426 273 1013 1068 31 86 773 1049
2014 1378 398 347 644 744 20 122 413 681
Total 3491 824 620 1657 1812 51 208 1186 1730
Source: (ACC, 2015, 2016).
 ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 9

initiatives. The ACC distributes crests, testimonials, and awards among the winners of the
competitions described above. The Prevention & Mass Awareness Cell organizes different
anti-corruption competitions in phases as part of student awareness programmes in edu-
cational institutions across the country. Through its efforts and these programmes, the
ACC continues to build a moral attitude among the country’s future generation.
The ACC also distributes different posters through CPCs and Integrity Units that convey
related religious messages against corruption. In recent times, the ACC has held public hear-
ings to engage citizens in measures against corruption. Both CPCs and Integrity Units
provide some support to organizing public hearings in their area. Based on the performance
of all activities throughout each year, the ACC offers awards for the ‘Best Upazila CPC’ and
the ‘Best District CPC’ at the Divisional level in the fight against corruption in Bangladesh.

Dynamics of the isomorphic mimicry of ACC’s prevention approach in

Bangladesh
The ACC’s mechanism for engaging citizens, this paper has found all forms of isomorph-
ism (i.e. coercive, mimetic, and normative) to explain the effectiveness of the citizens’
engagement process. The citizens’ engagement in anti-corruption efforts in Bangladesh
is coercive as it emerged in tandem with donors (i.e. based on donor prescription). As
stated, the ACC in Bangladesh was formed in 2004, based on pressure from donors, as
an isomorphic process of creating an institution following the ICAC model in Hong
Kong. Bangladesh has been part of these anti-corruption package reforms since 1990
and carries out some prescribed measures to improve good governance, based on the
global perspective (Aminuzzaman & Khair, 2014). Thus, the World Bank and other
donors placed their emphasis on horizontal accountability and assumed that citizens’
engagement would reduce corruption. Thus, donors exerted tremendous pressure on Ban-
gladesh to sign the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), to re-con-
stitute the ACC, and to make several reforms (United States Agency for International
Development [USAID], 2004). The opportunity came when a dramatic political change
occurred in 2007, and the military-backed caretaker government (CTG) came into
power. Due to pressure from donors, Bangladesh signed the UNCAC in 2007. That
pressure was strengthened in the same year when the ADB provided loans to prepare
for the NIS and to strengthen the ACC under the Good Governance Project. In addition,
the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) provided a small amount of support
to implement the NIS (IvCSAcaNGO22, 2016). Being a signatory of the UNCAC, Bangla-
desh had to make several reforms and had to initiate the preventative approach through
the ACC in 2007. The then-chairman of the ACC, General Hasan Mashud Choudhury
took initiatives to promote public participation in corruption prevention (ACC, 2008;
Ali, 2010).
Both ACC’s CPCs and Integrity Units were created due to coercive pressure to raise
awareness against corruption. These bodies were not designed based on local policy or
needs, nor did they come from decision-makers’ spontaneous efforts. To be specific,
donors wanted to see these bodies in operation, so they created them. The CPC and Integ-
rity Units are driven by several development partners, such as the World Bank, the ADB,
JICA, German International Cooperation Agency (GIZ), TIB, etc. in different prevention,
education, and outreach activities: they are project-based and short-term needs-based
10 N. H. SAKIB

(Aminuzzaman, Akram, & Islam, 2016). For example, JICA provides funds to organize
public hearings, whereas GIZ has provided funding to establish CPCs and Integrity
Units (IvACC18, 2015). In recent years, TIB also agreed to provide guidelines and tech-
nical support to the ACC’s CPCs and Integrity Units.
Actors copy organizational leaders as a result of an uncertain environment (Park, 2014)
Thus, both CPCs and Integrity Units have copied the activities of TIB’s CCCs and Youth
Engagement Support Groups (Yes Groups), with these also driven by the global movement
against corruption through community engagement. The adoption by TIB of the citizens’
engagement process is mainly due to its donors (the World Bank, UNDP, and OECD) and
their continuous support towards building a partnership with civil society in addressing
corruption ‘to ensure the broad participation of citizens in decision-making’ (Verdenicci
& Hough, 2015). For example, UNDP emphasizes participation by women and youth to
prevent corruption and to increase access to public resources in their 2008–2013 Global
Programme on Anti-Corruption for Development Effectiveness (PACDE) project
(UNDP, 2014). Thus, ACC continues its citizens’ engagement process through the
mimetic process by copying citizens’ engagement through committee formation, civil
society engagement, and youth engagement at the local level.
Professionalization is the way of bringing together a group of people on a similar plat-
form to make a collective effort. It helps them to manage and execute their task (DiMaggio
& Powell, 1983). All activities of both CPCs and Integrity Units are based on normative
isomorphism as the ACC is looking ahead to bringing together community participation
on a specific platform with a range of similar activities. For example, the ACC has a code of
conduct to select particular people for the positions of member and president of both
CPCs and Integrity Units. Thus, according to the code of conduct published by the
ACC, CPCs are formed to prevent corruption by engaging voluntary participants, com-
prising honest and active people from a cross-section of society at the Upazila (sub-dis-
trict), district, and municipal levels. According to the constitution, one CPC,
comprising ten members, should be formed in every district and metropolitan area, and
one CPC, composed of six members, should be established in every district and
Upazila. Each committee should have the position of president, vice-president, and sec-
retary among its members (ACC, 2016).
Similarly, Integrity Units (‘satata sangha’ in Bangla), comprising students of schools,
colleges, universities, madrasas, hostels, training institutes, etc., are established to
develop a sense of honesty and integrity among youths (ACC, 2016). Wouters and Wild-
erom (2008) have argued that professionalism positively influences employees’ positive
perceptions of a performance measurement system. Similarly, with the help of donors
and the ACC, both CPCs and Integrity Units have organized a range of awareness activi-
ties to engage citizens in anti-corruption efforts. They have sought to conduct various
activities, such as seminars, workshops, debate and essay competitions, drama perform-
ances, street meetings, road marches, etc. to raise public awareness.

Why has the isomorphic approach failed to produce a strong anti-

corruption prevention?
Why has the isomorphic approach to combating corruption through ACC’s preventative
activities (CPCs and Integrity Units activities) in the case of Bangladesh been somewhat
 ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 11

disappointing? The failure of isomorphic anti-corruption efforts in Bangladesh suggests

that the reasons for this can be underlined into lack of political will and some micro-
level problems within the preventative approach such as a lack of resourcing for insti-
tutions. The paper found that lack of a political will has a strong influence over the ident-
ified micro problems within those CPCs and Integrity Units of ACC.

Table 4. Problems of isomorphic approach in preventative activities by CPCs and integrity units.
Lack of political will Micro problems
Locus of initiatives Funding crisis and donor dependency
Degree of analytical rigour in anti-corruption solutions Lack of attention by government and the ACC
Mobilization of stakeholders Failure to involve people
Application of credible sanctions Political influences and involvement in corrupt practices
Continuity of efforts Member inactivity
Misguided efforts

Lack of political will

Assessments of the success and failure of anti-corruption efforts around the world often
emphasize the need for strong political will among leaders to support those efforts
(Abdulai, 2009; Pope & Vogl, 2000; Quah, 2013). In a comparative study, Quah (2010)
found that the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) in Singapore and the Inde-
pendent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in Hong Kong were more effective than
the National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC) in Thailand and the Korea Inde-
pendent Commission Against Corruption (KICAC) partly because of differences in the
political will of government leaders in the four countries. In a recent comparative study
between Bangladesh and Singapore, Ankamah and Khoda (2017) found that political
will had a strong influence in shaping the success of Singapore and the failure of Bangla-
desh in combating corruption.
Why is the political will so important to combat corruption? In answer to this question,
Brinkerhoff (2000) provides a detailed model, which incorporates political will, the
environmental factors that influence political will, anti-corruption reforms, and reform
outcomes. He identifies five key characteristics of political will: (1) locus of initiatives,
(2) degree of analytical rigour in anti-corruption solutions, (3) mobilization of stake-
holders, (4) application of credible sanctions and (5) continuity of efforts (Brinkerhoff,
2000). His model argued that these five phenomena are critical to understanding political
will in combating corruption. The manifestation of these characters in the country likely to
have a strong political will to combat corruption. In this case study, these characteristics of
political will are discussed below in the context of ACC’s preventative approach in
Bangladesh.

Locus of initiatives
The locus of initiatives concerns the origin of the anti-corruption reforms or efforts. Does
the change come from internal actors who are desperate for transformation or does it
come from outside groups? ‘Home grown’ initiatives hold the key for successful anti-cor-
ruption initiatives because reformers can perceive the problem of corruption (Brinkerhoff,
12 N. H. SAKIB

2000). In the case of the CPC and Integrity Unit of the ACC of Bangladesh, lacks ‘home-
grown’ initiatives. As mentioned in the dynamics of isomorphism these committees were
formed based on coercive pressure and the ACC did not create these committees willingly,
thinking about the mass of people’s suffering.

Degree of analytical rigor in anti-corruption solutions

The degree of analytical rigour concerns whether the reforms are feasible or not. That
suggests that reformers need to take account of political and technical issues. Reformers
must understand in depth corruption problems of society so that they can build a feasible
strategy (Brinkerhoff, 2000). The anti-corruption efforts especially the formation of the
citizen-based committee like CPC and Integrity Units of the ACC in Bangladesh lack
these insights. Although the CPC and Integrity Units of the ACC included meetings
and consensus with TIB and Institute of Governance Studies (IGS), it lacked feasibility
because it stuck firmly to pre-set indicators and goals. For example, several elite intervie-
wees in this research mentioned that the activities and the committees were formed to
initiate corruption prevention by the ACC could not be achieved due to the nature of
the political system in Bangladesh. It is found that most of the committee was formed
with no further thought of in-depth analysis. The ACC cannot monitor the activities of
these committees. For example, the government did not provide the legal, administrative,
and financial support to make the ACC effective (see also Ankamah & Khoda, 2017). It
suggests that despite having legal codes, the supporting element is not enough to
prevent corruption in Bangladesh. An overview of the financial budget of the ACC in
any financial year might provide clear evidence. In theoretical terms, ACC proposes a
budget and the Ministry of Finance approves it. In practice, the ACC is financially depen-
dent, and budgets are controlled by the Ministry of Finance (Aminuzzaman et al., 2016;
IvACC7, 2015). Despite some recent increases, the overall budget of the ACC is 0.025%
of the national budget, which is very low compared to the population and volume of cor-
ruption in Bangladesh (Aminuzzaman et al., 2016).
The ACC also lacks the human resources to conduct their regular activities. A total of
1264 officials is minimal to cover the population and volume of corruption in the country.
In fact, in 2011 it was less than 0.1% of the total number of posts in the civil employment in
Bangladesh, which was 1,182,765 (Parnini, 2011). Regional offices have fewer investigation
officers than local police stations. According to one government official, the ACC cannot
control or address complex corruption cases like money laundering because they have a
limited workforce (IvACC30, 2016).
In addition, ACC officials are not provided with enough training for their work. In the
last few years, ACC officials have been sent on short training courses sponsored by gov-
ernment departments, non-government organizations and development partners. In the
last three years, 47 training programmes were organized for the ACC staff and 956 staff
took part. Some of these training concerned technical issues like anti-money laundering,
financing of terrorism, asset recovery, the Public Procurement Act 2006 and Public Pro-
curement Rules 2008 and land management. The rest of the sessions concerned more
basic training in computers, English language, orientation to the ACC, and so on (Ami-
nuzzaman et al., 2016). This training was insufficient and inferior to the more intensive
 ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 13

and long periods of training required of police and other law enforcement officials
(IvACC7, 2015; IvACC30, 2016).

Mobilization of stakeholders
Mobilizing domestic support suggests the willingness and ability of reformers to pursue
their vision and strategy to combat corruption. Although politicians in Bangladesh intro-
duced the NIS and set up the ACC, this took several years as the progress was slowed by
the reluctance and resistance of some politicians and other stakeholders. Over the years,
politicians have tried to use public sentiment in their favour by using ‘anti-corruption’
messages as a tool to win elections. They declare war against corruption before the election
and proclaim ‘zero tolerance’ against corruption in their election manifestoes to get public
support. However, the parties who win the elections look to benefit from their power and
do not attempt to build broad coalitions of support for anti-corruption strategies. For
example, both the present or former governments in their election manifesto mentioned
that they would give full freedom to the ACC, a promise they did not keep in government
(IvAca12, 2015). Again, the evidence suggests that political leaders were mostly concerned
with developing responses that would satisfy the international actor.
Although evidence found (as shown in Tables 2 and 3), the ACC organized several
activities, but it does not mobilize people significantly. According to one interviewee for
this paper claimed that these activities were ceremonial, and people were gathered only
to fill the hall or room to look it beautiful (IvCBOLaw28, 2016). The evidence from the
BCS 2015–2016 (n = 302) also suggests mobilization of stakeholders by the CPC and
Integrity Units has limited success. Thy survey shows that only 40.4% of people were
aware of CBOs in Bangladesh. From those 40.4% (n 122) only 32.8% (n = 40) people
knows the activities CBOs related corruption. Out of those people, only 4 of them
knows a little bit activity of CPCs and Integrity Units, while most of them aware of the
activities of the Committee of Concern Citizens (CCCs) and YES Groups of TIB. There-
fore, the role of the CPCs and Integrity Units were questionable regarding mobilizing
citizens.

Application of credible sanctions

The application of credible sanctions denotes the willingness of reformers to implement
incentives and sanctions to reinforce reform strategies. Strong political will suggests
higher sanctions to combat corruption and higher rewards for integrity. Although there
are some new punitive measures and rewards have been introduced; however, persistent
failures to follow through with effective investigations and prosecutions of corrupt poli-
ticians and officials, along with the low operating budget of the ACC, indicate a lack of
political will on this measure (Aminuzzaman et al., 2016).

Continuity of efforts
Corruption problems cannot be solved overnight. Continuity of efforts refers to the will-
ingness of leaders to support efforts over the long term. Although anti-corruption efforts
in Bangladesh have been continuing for a long time, they remain scattered and
14 N. H. SAKIB

fragmented. Gains made in specific eras, such as the period of the caretaker government,
have been lost once the government has changed. For example, as in the case of CPC and
Integrity Unit, it has found that many committees were outdated and was not reconsti-
tuted within the allocated time.
Overall, applying Brinkerhoff’s five characteristics of political will to Bangladesh
suggests that the necessary intention to implement an effective anti-corruption strategy
in preventative measures has lacked in the case of ACC’s approach. The isomorphic
reforms mostly remain ‘on paper’ and have had a minimal practical impact. The will to
pursue corruption that does exist comes mainly at the grassroots level, but this will be
inevitably highly variable across the country.

Problems within the preventative approach

The lack of political will in anti-corruption efforts also have created several issues within
the activities of CPC and Integrity Units. The community engagement activities operated
by the ACC (CPCs and IUs) also severely hampered by a range of factors.

Funding crisis and donor dependency

The first and most crucial problem of the isomorphic approach in the case of ACC’s com-
munity engagement initiatives is their funding dependency. Resource dependence theor-
ists suggest that money is a vital driver of compliance for dependent organizations
(Fernandez, 2008; Verbruggen, Christiaens, & Milis, 2011). In the case of both CPCs
and Integrity Units funding uncertainties are among the most significant reasons for
the lack of functioning (IvACC2, 2015; IvACC4, 2015; IvACC5, 2015; IvACC7, 2015; IvC-
BOLaw28, 2016). For example, to arrange a programme (e.g. a seminar, a workshop, or a
rally), a committee receives a budgetary allocation of 1000 BDT (approximately equivalent
to AUD 17). As these committees operate at the Upazila and district levels, they often fail
to organize any programme, even when they have an opportunity, only due to the lack of
financial support. According to an ACC official who was interviewed for this paper, when
school children and college students are brought to a programme and stay until the
evening, a large amount of money is needed for lunch, transportation, hall accommo-
dation, etc. This kind of financial shortfall is the main hindrance preventing CPCs from
arranging more extensive programmes (IvACC5, 2015). A minimum of 4000–5000
BDT is needed to arrange a programme, but the ACC only provides 1000 BDT. Some-
times, officials have had to contribute from their own pockets to organize these pro-
grammes (IvACC4, 2015; IvACC29, 2016). Because of this type of funding crisis, CPCs
and Integrity Units have relied heavily on donors. Consequently, they have had to
follow a prescribed format with specific activities and guidelines, which strengthens iso-
morphic mimicry.

Lack of attention by government and the ACC

Since 2007, the ACC and the Government of Bangladesh have paid little attention to CPCs
and Integrity Units. These committees were not regarded as having a high level of impor-
tance in preventing corruption. Thus, even after more than nine years, these committees
 ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 15

are still in their infancy. Their organizational structures also not properly developed
(IvACC30, 2016). For example, members of these committees have not even been pro-
vided with an identity card. Thus, they cannot visit an ACC office with authentic proof
of identity (IvACC13, 2015). Most of the interviewees (apart from the ACC officials)
had not previously heard about CPCs or Integrity Units. Some ACC officials also
agreed that these committees did not function at all in terms of corruption prevention.
One CPC president, who was interviewed for the current study, was very frustrated and
suggested that it is meaningless to create such CPCs as their activities and views are not
valued by decision-makers:
We do not get appointments of anti-corruption officials. We can’t say many things to them
directly. We bring [the] former chairman of the ACC, Golam Rahman, in a program and
organise a public meeting in a big auditorium. What was frustrating [was] they have sent
us [a] few posters for the awareness campaign just the day before the program. Thus, it is
quite impossible for us to hang those posters in many areas of my district within a day … I
have found that an office clerk has built a building almost overnight. But I can’t question or
give notice of such activities. So, if you do not make it active, what’s the point of taking
such initiatives? Then what is the benefit? There are some benefits as they can show others
that they have committees all over Bangladesh. If they call us, the Osmani Conference
Centre gets filled. They can show the others that we have committees and [are] doing preven-
tative activities. There were many excellent talks and suggestions at the meeting, and we were
given a paper to write down our ideas. But it [was] limited [to] paper only. (IvCBOLaw28,
2016)

Another example of the lack of attention is the complaints box set up by ACC officials
in the District Commissioner’s Office. According to one CPC president, the complaints
box was established by an ACC team in 2007 after the CPC in his district suggested it.
The ACC team members came from Dhaka and set up the complaints box, taking the
keys with them. A separate key was not provided that would have enabled the box to be
opened and the complaints sorted before they were sent to the ACC office. As the CPC
president, he became perplexed the purpose of the box, since, up to the time of the
interview, no ACC officials had come to open it and check its contents (IvCBOLaw28,
2016).
Consequently, most other CPCs have not conducted many corruption prevention
activities (IvCBO24, 2016; IvCBOLaw28, 2016). Not only do these committees receive
limited attention from the ACC officials and government, but no visible or effective activi-
ties are apparent among many committees that have been established. According to one
academic, although he has seen many events organized by Transparency International
Bangladesh’s Committee of Concern Citizens (CCC’s), he has never seen CPCs coordinate
any such activities (IvAca12, 2015). Advertisements have not even appeared in the media
to let people know about their operations.

Failure to involve people

The factors mentioned above have created confusion among people about involvement in
this social movement. Where there were early enthusiasm and participation, they have
waned. One excellent example occurred during the period of the caretaker government
in 2007. A rally was organized by the Jessore (one of the district) CPC on 23 March,
which was the best CPC programme held in Jessore’s history. People from different
16 N. H. SAKIB

backgrounds and from all over the district participated in the programme. The grounds of
the eidgah (a place for prayer during the Eid festival for the Muslim community) were
filled, with more people outside. Unfortunately, the CPCs have lost enthusiasm for this
work (IvCBO17, 2015), with people today not becoming involved. Most of the rallies
now supposedly organized by CPCs are, in fact, either organized by ACC staff or
officials from a different government wing. Intensely few ordinary people are involved
in these programmes. For example, the ACC has a form on which to lodge complaints;
to date, only one charge has been deposited at a CPC event (IvACC18, 2015).

Political influences and involvement in corrupt practices

The ACC had a rule that CPC members would be selected if they had no ‘affiliation with
any political party and [were] free from any criminal record’ (ACC, 2015). However, the
constitutions of district and Upazila CPCs do not provide clear information regarding
this issue. The inclusion of people with strong political identity is proving very costly
in the context of CPCs, with many interviewees suggesting that committee members
were selected based on their political identities or political recommendations (IvAca12,
2015). These committees later turned out to be ‘lame’ institutions as members became
involved in corrupt practices and enjoyed special benefits (IvCBO14, 2015). One inter-
viewee mentioned that, when he heard about a corruption scandal involving public
officials in his local area, he would go to that office, have some tea and come out
with a gift or some other benefit based on arriving at a mutual understanding
(IvACC4, 2015).

Member inactivity
The members of both CPCs and IUs are mostly dormant. They remain inactive not only
due to the lack of funding, infrastructure or logistics support but also as they are not given
proper guidelines or work plans for their activities. For example, the people who organize
rallies, seminars, or workshops involving ordinary people not only have to travel using
local transport but also sit with these ordinary people at the local tea stall, where they
offer them tea or small snacks. What is ironic is that the ACC needs a receipt to
provide 1,000 BDT for these rallies, workshops, or seminars, forcing them into fraudulent
activity. It is impossible to get a receipt from a street tea stall or rickshaw puller. Instead,
the organizer has to prepare a false receipt to claim reimbursement of the money. One
CPC leader explained his experiences in the following words:
The work that needs 5,000 taka [BDT] to complete, how can that be done [ for] 1,000 taka?
Recently, the program I arranged spent 5,500 taka, and I had to submit vouchers [receipts].
After two to three months, I received the payment with a charge of 5% VAT [Value Added
Tax] for each 1,000 taka. I arranged two programs worth 9,000 taka, but I had to put [in]
much effort to get 2,000 taka. I do these activities [to] see their face. We began the momentum;
[then] suddenly we are dragged into [a] black hole. The problem is those who are not compe-
tent, and incapable are made … chief of the ACC. (IvCBO17, 2015)

Another reason for CPC members’ inactivity is a conflict between members. When people
with political motivations join these committees, other members have left or become inac-
tive as they felt threatened (IvACC5, 2015). The CCCs and YES Group members are often
 ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 17

unable to provide sufficient time in the anti-corruption movement, as most of them are
involved in some other profession and have little spare time to give to such activities.
Thus, time is a significant factor in anti-corruption voluntarism (IvCBO16, 2015).

Misguided efforts
Many efforts of the ACC and TIB to engage the community to appear wrong. TIB, for
example, arranges a ‘rock concert’ during Anti-Corruption Day every year to encourage
young people to stand against corruption (IvAca12, 2015). These concerts were arranged
in urban areas, where most young people are not involved in anti-corruption movements.
It costs enormous money to organize these concerts. With those funds, TIB could easily
establish a CCC or YES Group for a year in a rural area. At the same time, CPCs and Integ-
rity Units in rural areas are involved in organizing meetings, seminars, workshops and
rallies. These work less well than in urban areas because people in rural areas are less edu-
cated and would prefer direct advocacy.
There is no doubt that the ACC’s initiatives in forming community awareness-raising
groups in local areas have opened a new possibility for ordinary people to become involved
in a social movement against corruption. It has made some local people aware of their
rights, empowered women and young people, and created some future leaders (Saha,
Gounder, & Su, 2012). Nonetheless, the challenges explored above clearly represent key
obstacles to community involvement becoming a successful part of the anti-corruption
campaign.

Ceremonial adaptation and lesson for developing countries

The isomorphism of anti-corruption prevention by the ACC in through CPCs and Integ-
rity Units, look fabulous according to the data provided by the ACC regarding their activi-
ties. However, the limitations and problems identified in this paper suggest that ‘applying
force’, ‘copying’, or ‘professionalisation’, based on these concepts from the developed
world, have proven to be the wrong option when used in developing countries. The pro-
blems with the political will and within the preventative approach of CPCs and Integrity
Units denotes that, citizens engagement of the ACC found to be ineffective and to have no
significant impact. According to one ACC official interviewed for this paper, some CPCs
and Integrity Units do not undertake any activities and do not report back effectively to the
ACC (IvACC3, 2015). Very few people know about the activities of CPCs and Integrity
Units in these local contexts. Also, some activities that are organized have only limited
reach or fall prey to control by vested interests. In the public hearings, for example, some-
times public participants are organized to ask pre-arranged questions to the government
officials in attendance, to avoid difficult issues being raised (IvAca15, 2015). A senior ACC
official agreed that this practice occurs, indicating that the ACC is trying its best to identify
such malpractices (IvACC2, 2015). Sometimes it has also been found that corruption in
the locations of public hearings becomes more severe after the hearing than before
since corrupt local officials know that no hearing will be held in their area again soon
and that any effects of the public hearing will remain for only a few days. The influence
of brokers and intermediary is similarly affected after public hearings. This happens
due to a lack of appropriate follow-up by the ACC (IvJour26, 2016). Thus, public
18 N. H. SAKIB

engagement activities may bring unintended consequences that reduce the public’s confi-
dence in the possibilities of reform through public action.
The policymakers in Bangladesh respond to the donors and change laws, but they have
no political will to implement those reforms. Many interviewees who were interviewed in
this paper believe that these approaches were taken due to coercive pressures from the
donors and funding agency, but Bangladeshi policymakers are doing nothing significant
to implement those strategies (IvACC39, 2016; IvCSAcaNGO22, 2016; IvGoBCS25,
2016). Genuine adoption and ceremonial adoption may be difficult to distinguish from
developed countries, as they look similar. Also, it seems like the local people involved
in the process are fighting against corruption, as they are organizing and participating
in seminars, workshop, rallies and other activities (IvCBOLaw28, 2016). Thus, when
outside observers see these events, they are prepared to provide more funding.
However, these events lack effectiveness as most of the participants are officials. Thus,
institutional transplantation remains ceremonial rather than substantive.
What is the result of such ceremonial adaptation to combatting corruption in Bangla-
desh? Several scholars criticize such ceremonial adaptation and argue that the failure of
isomorphic approaches leads states towards a capability trap (Andrews, 2013; Birdsall,
2007; Pritchett & de Weijer, 2011). States such as Bangladesh have minimal capacity to
implement even essential functions such as security, policing, regulation and core
service delivery. When they give priority to additional policies based on donor prescrip-
tions based on world best practice, supply-driven initiatives, close monitoring of inputs
and compliance and top-down approach, they may achieve immediate successes but
find sustained success impossible due to limited capabilities (Andrews, Pritchett, & Wool-
cock, 2017; Tiwari, 2015). Donors continue to support ceremonial measures because they
do not recognize their real limitations, while policymakers in Bangladesh are mostly happy
to demonstrate surface conformity to the donors’ requirements.
This case study from Bangladesh creates concerns about the implication of isomorphic
approach to anti-corruption strategies in other developing countries. It provides a concep-
tual framework by which we can better understand isomorphism and its problems in
developing countries. In general, policymakers in developing countries try to adopt pol-
icies (e.g. the National Integrity Strategy, ACA and community engagement, in the case
of Bangladesh) in response to coercive, mimetic and normative pressures. The pressures
have been explored in other policy contexts, but their implications for corruption policy
have not previously been fully explored. Thus, the paper challenges policymakers to recon-
sider whether to adopt these isomorphic approaches to combat corruption in developing
countries lying with such enormous problems like lack of political will. Also, it suggests
that if they want to adopt such policies, they must make sure they have the capacity
and resources to implement them and have adapted those strategies to their local context.

Conclusion
Corruption prevention needs a better framework, rather than being solely limited to
donor-driven initiatives. The underline factors identified in this paper shows that
ongoing anti-corruption prevention approach of the ACC which is also closely associ-
ated with the ‘dual role’ of Bangladeshi citizens. Especially those who are involved in
the movement, on the one hand, hate corruption and, on the other hand, accept and
 ASIAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 19

become involved in corruption whenever they get the opportunity. This is also linked to
clientelism which is a common practice in many developing countries). The clientelism
shapes politics, the economy and society in Bangladesh (Khan, 2002). Based on patron-
age politics this relationship is complicated to break by the CPCs and Integrity Units
have as, and their mother organizations have several problems and have remained
ineffective.
Therefore, an active anti-corruption movement needs effective laws, as such laws are
useless without enforcement. North (1990) emphasized the importance of efficient legal
systems and the quality of an institutional environment especially in its ability to defuse
corruption. Thus, the community movement against corruption in Bangladesh largely
depends on the goodwill of the party in power. It is thus obvious that, anti-corruption
initiatives will likely to be effective, playing a pivotal role and making much ‘direct
impact’ in combating corruption. Nonetheless, anti-corruption prevention could be
more effective through citizen mobilization at grassroot level. In recent years there have
been significant improvements in access to information through digitization, meaning
that citizens can share anomalies in public sector behaviour via social media. Thus, one
way of improving governance is to share corrupt incidents in social media and create
social barriers against corrupt people. Additionally, rather than following an isomorphic
approach in preventing corruption, organizations should focus on local innovation and
give priority to local contexts. In line with the problems, building local people’s capability
to respond to specific problems might be the most useful way to prevent everyday corrup-
tion. For example, spontaneous participation from youth groups in raising awareness
about corruption will provide more significant outcomes in society than waiting for iso-
morphic approaches to preventing corruption to work.

Note
1. The BCS 2015–2016 is a nationwide survey of 302 people was conducted to get ordinary citi-
zens’ attitudes about corruption and anti-corruption in 27 Upazila (sub-district) maintaining
the Human Research Ethics Committee guidelines of the University of Sydney.

Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank Professor Rodney Smith for his comments and suggestions. This
research would not have been possible without him. The author also thanks two anonymous
reviewers whose comments and insight were invaluable in re-shaping this manuscript. This
research was supported by the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, the University of Sydney
under International Post Graduate Research Scholarship.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding
This work was supported by The University of Sydney (University of Sydney International Post-
graduate Research Scholarship).
20 N. H. SAKIB

Notes on contributor
Nurul Huda Sakib graduated from the Department of Government and International Relations,
The University of Sydney. Dr. Sakib teaches Bangladesh politics, public sector ethics and corrup-
tion, public administration in Bangladesh and global politics at the Department of Government
and Politics, Jahangirnagar University. Dr. Sakib also taught public sector corruption and ethics
at the University of Sydney. His current research interests are governance issues related corruption,
anti-corruption, water governance, refugee governance.

ORCID
Nurul Huda Sakib http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1241-8327

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Appendix. Interviewee codes (Anonymized).

Code Organization/profession/department Date interviewed

IvACC2 Senior Official of Anti-Corruption Commission, Government of Bangladesh (GoB). 21 October 2015
IvACC3 Mid-Range Official of Anti-Corruption Commission, GoB. 26 October 2015
IvACC4 Junior Officer of Anti-Corruption Commission, GoB. 27 October 2015
IvACC5 Junior Officer of Anti-Corruption Commission, GoB. 27 October 2015
IvACC7 Senior Official of Anti-Corruption Commission, GoB. 02 November
2015
IvAca12 Corruption Expert and Professor of Political Science. 05 December
2015
IvACC13 Senior Official, Anti-Corruption Commission, GoB 06 December
2015
IvCBO14 President of Committees of Concerned Citizens (CCCs), TIB 06 December
2015
IvAca15 Professor of Public Administration and Governance Expert. 07 December
2015
IvCBO16 President of Committees of Concerned Citizens (CCCs), TIB 13 December
2015
IvCBO17 Secretary of Corruption Prevention Committees (CPCs), ACC, GoB. 22 December
2015
IvACC18 Senior Official, Anti-Corruption Commission, GoB. 22 December
2015
IvCSAcaNGO22 Prominent NGO Leader and Civil Society Member. 07 January 2016
IvCBO24 President of Corruption Prevention Committees (CPCs), ACC, GoB. 21 January 2016
IvGoBCS25 Civil Society Member, Former Senior Official of GOB 24 January 2016
IvJour26 Prominent News Correspondent on Corruption and Governance Issues on a private 28 January 2016
TV News Channel.
IvCBOLaw28 President of Corruption Prevention Committees (CPCs) and Public Prosecutor of 06 February 2016
ACC, GoB
IvACC29 Mid-Range Official, Anti-Corruption Commission, GoB. 08 February 2016
IvACC30 Senior Official, Anti-Corruption Commission, GoB. 23 February 2016
IvACC39 Senior Official, Anti-Corruption Commission, GoB. 04 May 2016