EVELYN TOLOSA

VS
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, QWANA KAIUN (FUMIO
NAKAGAWA), ASIA BULK TRANSPORT PHILS. INC., PEDRO GARATE and MARIO
ASIS
G.R. No. 149578

April 10, 2003

Facts:
Captain Virgilio Tolosa ( husband of Evelyn Tolosa) was master of the
vessel M/V Donna owned by Quana-Kaiun, and was hired through its manning
agent, Asia Bulk Transport Phils., Inc. (Asia Bulk). During channeling activities
upon the vessels departure from Yokohama on November 6, 1992, Capt.
Tolosa was drenched with rainwater. Subsequently, he contracted fever on
November 11 which was later on accompanied by loose bowel movement for
the succeeding 12 days. His condition was reported to Asia Bulk and the US
Coast Guard Headquarters in Hawaii on November 15. However, before he
could be evacuated, he died on November 18, 1992.
Evelyn Tolosa, the widow, filed a complaint before the POEA for
damages against Pedro Garate, Chief Mate of the vessel, Mario Asis, Second
Mate, Asia Bulk and Quana-Kaiun. The case was transferred to the NLRC. The
Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the widow, awarding actual damages plus
legal interest, as well as moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
On appeal to the NLRC, the decision of the Labor Arbiter was vacated and the
complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action pursuant to the provisions of the Labor Code, as amended.
Sustaining the NLRC, the CA ruled that the labor commission had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action filed by petitioner. Her
cause did not arise from an employer-employee relation, but from a quasidelict or tort. Under Article 217 (a)(4) of the Labor Code which allows an
award of damages incident to an employer-employee relation, the damages
awarded were not proper as she is not an employee, but merely the wife of
an employee.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had jurisdiction over
petitioners action.
(2) Whether or not the monetary award granted by the Labor arbiter has
already reached finality.
Held:
(1) The Court affirmed that the claim for damages was filed not for claiming
damages under the Labor Code but under the Civil Code. The Court was
convinced that the allegations were based on a quasi-delict or tort. Also, she
had claimed for actual damages for loss of earning capacity based on a life
expectancy of 65 years, which is cognizable under the Civil Code and can be
recovered in an action based on a quasi-delict. Though damages under a
quasi-delict may be recoverable under the jurisdiction of labor arbiters and
the NLRC, the relief must be based on an action that has reasonable casual
connection with the Labor Code, labor statutes or CBAs. It must be noted

that a workers loss of earning capacity and backlisting are not to be equated
with wages, overtime compensation or separation pay, and other labor
benefits that are generally cognized in labor disputes. The loss of earning
capacity is a relief or claim resulting from a quasi-delict or a similar cause
within the realm of Civil Law. In the present case, Evelyn Tolosas claim for
damages is not related to any other claim under Article 217, other labor
statutes, or CBAs. She cannot anchor her claim for damages to Article 161 of
the Labor Code, which does not grant or specify a claim or relief. This
provision is only a safety and health standard under Book IV of the same
Code. The enforcement of this labor standard rests with the labor secretary.
It is not the NLRC but the regular courts that have jurisdiction over action for
damages, in which the employer-employee relation is merely incidental, and
in which the cause of action proceeds from a different source of obligation
such as a tort.
(2) On the finality of the award, the Court ruled that issues not raised in the
court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Thus, the issue
being not brought to the attention of the Court of Appeals first, this cannot
be considered by the Supreme Court. It would be tantamount to denial of the
right to due process against the respondents to do so.

DELSAN TRANSPORTATION
VS.
C & A CONSTRUCTION, INC.
G.R. no. 156034

October 1, 2003

Facts:
C & A construction, construct a deflector wall at the Vitas reclamation
Area in Tondo, Manila it was not formally turnover to National Housing
Authority though it was completed in 1994. On 12:00 midnight of October
20, 1994 Captain Demetrio T. Jusep of M/V Delsan Express receive a report
that that a typhoon was going to hit Manila after eight (8) hours. At 8:35 a.m.
he tried to seek shelter but it was already congested. At 10:00 a.m. Capt.
Jusep drop the anchor at the vicinity of Vitas mouth, the waves were already
reaching 8 to 10 feet. The ship was dragged by the wind toward the Napocor
power barge Capt. Jusep ordered a full stop of the vessel to avoid the
collision but when the engine was re-started, it hit the deflector wall
constructed by the respondent. P456,198.24 was the damaged cause by the
incident. C & A construction demanded payment of the damages from Capt.
Jusep but the latter refused to pay due to the cause of the incident was by a
fortuitous event. The trial court ruled that Captain Jusep was not guilty of
negligence in applying the emergency rule because it had taken
necessary precautions to avoid accident. The Court of Appeals reversed &
set aside the decision of the trial court. Captain Jusep was found guilty of
negligence in transferring the vessel only at 8:35 a.m. of October 21,1994
and held liable for damages in waiting until 8:35 a.m. before transfering the
vessel to sought shelter.
Issues:

(1) Whether or not Capt. Jusep was negligent.

(2) Whether or not the petitioner is solidarily liable under Art. 2180 of the
Civil Code for Quasi-Delict.
Held:
(1) The court finds Captain Jusep is guilty of negligence, the failure to take
immediate and appropriate action under the circumstances, despite the
knowledge that there is typhoon but he waited for the lapse of eight (8)
hours instead. Captain Jusep showed an inexcusable lack of care and caution
which an ordinary prudent person would have observed in the same
situation. The trial court erred in applying the emergency rule because the
danger where Captain Jusep found himself was caused by his own
negligence.
(2) The court finds the petitioner liable for the negligent act of Capt. Jusep.
Whenever an employees negligence causes damage to another, it instantly
arise a presumption that the employer failed to exercise the care and
diligence of supervision of his employee. In Fabre ,jr. v Court of Appeals held
that due diligence requires consistent compliance of rules & regulation for
the guidance and actual implementation of rules. But the petitioner fails to
give any evidence that its rule are strictly implemented and monitored in
compliance therewith petitioner is therefore liable for the negligent act of
Capt. Jusep. The amount of P 456, 198.27 due earn 6% interest per annum
from October 3, 1995 until the finality of the decision.
SPS. ANTONIO C. SANTOS and ESPERANZA C. SANTOS, NORA BARNALO,
BELINDA LUMACTAD, MARIENELA DY, NIKKA SANTOS and LEONARDO FERRER
VS.
HON. NORMANDIE B. PIZARDO(Presiding Judge, RTC Quezon City) DIONISO M
SIBAYAN and VIRON TRANSPORTATION COMPANY (rep. VIRGILIO Q.
RONDARIS)
G.R. no. 151452

July 29, 2005

Facts:
Dionisio M. Sibayan was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to
multiple homicide and multiple physical injuries due to the vehicle collision
between Viron Transit bus driven by Sibayan and a Lite Van Ace. However the
municipal circuit trial court was no pronouncement of civil liability. The
petitioners filed a complaint for damages to the respondents pursuant to
their reservation to file a separate civil action citing Sibayans judgment
conviction. And it was moved to dismiss by the Viron Transit. The petitioners
opposed and contends that the motion to dismiss that be ten (10) years from
the judgment of criminal action is the prescription and therefore it is within
the period since it was just barely two (2) years had elapse.
The complaint was dismissed by the trial court due to the ground that
the cause of action had prescribed; based on quasi-delict that it prescribes
four (4) years from the accrual of the cause of action. Again the petitioners

filed a reconsideration that the complaint is not based on quasi- delict but on
the final judgment of conviction in the criminal case which prescribes ten
(10) years upon the finality of the judgment. The motion for reconsideration
of the petitioners was denied by the trial court based on quasi-delict in
Article 1146 of the Civil Code that the complaint was filed more than four (4)
years after the vehicular activities therefore it prescribes already.
On the petition for certiorari the petitioners filed to the Court of
Appeals it was dismissed the same error in the choice or mode of appeal. It
also denies the petitioners motion for and the petitioners failed to allege
that the petition was brought within the recognized exceptions for the
allowance of certiorari in lieu of appeal. Petitioners insist that it should be
enforced in the complaint that arose in ex delicto and not based on quasidelict. Since the action is based on the criminal liability of private
respondents, the cause of action accrued from the finality of the judgment of
conviction. Private respondents insisted, pointing out the averments in the
complaint make out a cause of action for quasi delict in Article 2176 and
2180 of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period of four (4) years should be
reckoned from the time the accident took place. Viron transit also alleges
that its subsidiary liability cannot be enforced since Sibayan was not ordered
to pay damages in the criminal case, in sitting Art. 103 of Revised Penal Code
the civil aspect of the case were instituted in the criminal case and no
reservation to file a separate civil case was made. Respondents likewise
allege that the petitioners should have appealed the adverse order of the
trial court. Petitioners filed a reply and the private respondents also filled a
rejoinder both in reiteration of their arguments. Hence this petition.

Issues:
Whether or not the dismissal of the action was based on culpa aquiliana is a
bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary liability of the employer?

Held:
The dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the
subsidiary liability of the employer. Because the Article 103 of the R.P.C.
operates with controlling force to obviate the possibility of the aggrieved
party being deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a final
judgment convicting the employee. The trial court should not have dismissed
the complaint on the ground of prescription, but instead allowed the
complaint for damages ex delicto to be prosecuted on the merits, this does
not offend the policy that the reservation or institution of a separate civil
waives the other civil actions but this is merely an avoidance of multiple
suits. The action for damages based on quasi- delict should be considered
waived no occasion for petitioners to file multiple suits against private
respondets as available to them is to pursue damages ex delicto.

G.R. No. 116617 November 16, 1998

METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION (MMTC), PEDRO A. MUSA, CONRADO

TOLENTINO, FELICIANA CELEBRADO and THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. RODOLFO V. ROSALES and LILY R. ROSALES,
respondents.
G.R. No. 126395 November 16, 1998
RODOLFO V. ROSALES, and LILY R. ROSALES, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION, (MMTC)
PEDRO A. MUSA, CONRADO TOLENTINO, FELICIANA CELEBRADO and THE
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents.

Facts:
Musa was the driver of MMTC bus no. 27 (MMTC an operator of a
passenger busses within the Metro Manila area). The spouses Rosales were
parents of Liza Rosalie who was hit by Musa, when crossing Katipunan
Avenue in Quezon City. A witness said that that Liza was already near the
center of the street when the bus hit her. Musa is found guilty of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and sentenced imprisonment to maximum
penalty by the Regional Trial Court. The spouses Rosales filed an
independent civil action for damages against MMTC, Musa, MMTC Acting
General Manager Conrado Tolentino, and the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS). The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City found MMTC and
Musa guilty of negligence and ordered them to pay damages and attorneys
fees.
The parties appealed both to the Court of Appeals. The court affirmed
the decision of the trial court with the modification of deleting the Actual
damages and awarding in lieu thereof the death indemnity. The spouses filed
a motion for reconsideration in a resolution to partly granted by increasing
the indemnity for the death of Liza Rosalie. Musa and MMTC assailed the
decision of Court of Appeals. The spouses Rosales contended that the death
indemnity set at Actual damages, increasing the amount of damages
awarded, and to hold all the defendants-respondents solidarily liable. The
conclusions of the Court of Appeals affirm the trial court bars a reversal of
the finding of liability against petitioners MMTC and Musa, that such findings
are whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary can they be overturned. To the
contrary both the Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court are anchored on
the evidence submitted by the parties.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the employers are held liable for the damages caused by
their employees (art. 2180 of Civil Code)
(2) Whether or not the question of damages are subject of the appeal

(3) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in absolving the GSIS liability
Held:
(1) The Supreme Court cannot consider the same as sufficiently persuasive
proof that there was observance of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees, they fail to submit any other evidence which
might obviate the nature of the testimony. MMTC is primarily liable for
damages for the negligence of its employee in view of Art. 2180. Pursuant to
Art. 2181 it can recover from its employee what it may pay; the spouses
have the option of enforcing the judgment against either MMTC or Musa. The
court held that the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a
quasi delict is solidary, in view of Art. 2194.
(2) The court held the question of damages. (1) As to the indemnity for
Death, it is fixed at P50, 000 to conform the Court of Appeals increased the
indemnity. (2) Actual Damages, based on Article 2199 that one is entitled to
an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by as duly
proved. The spouses Rosales only submitted receipts showing that the
expenses were only P60, 226.65. Hence the spouses Rosales are entitled to
recover only the P60, 226.65. (3) Moral Damages under Art. 2206 the
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish
by reason of the death of the deceased. The spouses Rosales presented
evidence of the intense moral suffering they had gone through as a result of
the loss of Liza Rosalie who was their youngest child; (People v Teehankee)
the Court awarded P1 million as moral damages for the loss of a minor child.
Hence the Court holds that the MMTC and Musa are solidarily liable to the
spouses Rosales in the amount of P1 million as Moral damages for the death
of Liza Rosalie. (4) Exemplary damages. It is recovered upon the case
involving quasi-delicts if the defendants acted with gross negligence, the
records indicate that there was a pending criminal case against Musa with
another branch of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City for reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries; it also shows that he failed to
stop his vehicle at once after the eye witnesses shouted at him. Under the
circumstances the Court deemed it reasonable to award the spouses Rosales
Exemplary damages in the amount of P5000, 000. (5) Attorneys Fees. In
pursuant of Article 2208, attorneys fees may be recovered when, exemplary
damages are awarded. We held an award of attorneys fees to be reasonable
(Sulpicio Lines V Court of Appeals) the death of a minor child in the sinking of
the vessel. (6) Compensation for Loss of Earning Capacity. The
compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings but for loss of
capacity to earn money. (People v Teehankee) compensation should be
allowed for loss of earning capacity resulting from the death of a minor.
Evidence shows that Liza Rosalie was a good student, promising artist, and
obedient child. The total net earning capacity (life expectancy is equivalent
to 2/3 multiply by the difference of eighty (80) and the age of the deceased)
amounts to P321, 870.12.
(3) With respect to the GSIS, they contended that it was the insurer in a
contract for third party liability it had with the MMTC. In Article 2180 (4)
mentions managers this term is used in the sense of employers. Thus,
Tolentino and Celebrado cannot be held for the tort of Pedro Musa. The GSIS
admitted in its answer that it was the insurer of the MMTC for the third party
liability with respect to MMTC Bus no. 27 to the extent of P 50,000. Hence the
spouses have the option to claim the said amount from the GSIS.

EQUITABLE LEASING CORPORATION

VS
LUCITA SUYOM, MARISSA ENAMO, MYRNA TAMAYO & FELIX OLEDAN
G.R. no. 143360

September 5, 2002

Facts:
Raul Tutor was the driver of a Fuso tractor rammed into the house cum
store of Myrna Tamayo. Was charged and convicted of reckless imprudence
resulting in multiple homicide and multiple physical injuries in Metropolitan
Trial Court of Manila. Respondents filed against Raul Tutor, Ecatine
Corporation and Equitable Leasing Corporation a complaint for damages
docketed as Civil case in the RTC of Manila. Upon motion of the plaintiffs
counsel in the Trial court an order dropping Raul Tutor, Ecatine and Edwin Lim
from the Complaint, because they could not be found. Petitioners answer
with counterclaim that the vehicle had already been sold to Ecatine and that
Tutor was an employee not of Equitable, but of Ecatine.
The RTC rendered its Decision ordering petitioner to pay actual and
moral damages and attorneys fee to the respondents it held that since the
Deed of Sale between petitioner and Ecatine had not been registered with
the Land Transportation Office, thus the petitioner was liable to respondents.
The Court of Appeals held that petitioner was still to be legally deemed
the owner/ operator of the tractor, even if that vehicle had been the subject
of a Deed of Sale on file with the LTO still remained in petitioners name. And
CA upheld respondents to claim for moral damages against petitioner
because the appellate court considered Tutor (driver) an agent of the
registered owner/ operator.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals and the trial Court gravely erred
when they decided and held that petitioners was liable for damages suffered
by private respondents based on quasi-delict for the negligent acts of a
driver who was not the employee of the petitioner
(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals and the trial court gravely erred
when they awarded moral damages to private respondents despite their
failure to prove that the injuries they have suffered brought by the
petitioners wrongful act.
Held:
(1) In negligence cases under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code,
employers may be held subsidiarily liable for felonies, committed by their
employees in the discharge of the latters duties. This liability attaches when
the employees found to be insolvent and thus unable to satisfy the civil

liability adjudged. Under Article 2176 in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, and quasi-delict may be instituted against the employer for an
employees act or omission, respondents having failed to recover anything in
the criminal case. The evidence is clear that the deaths and the injuries
suffered by respondents and their kins were due to the fault of the driver of
the Fuso tractor. The lease Agreement of between petitioner and Edwin Lim
stipulated that ownership of the subject tractor will be registered in the name
of the petitioner, until the value of the vehicle has been fully paid. Thus the
deaths and the injuries complained of, because it was the registered owner
of the tractor at the time of the accident.
(2) Moral damages is designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings
and similar injury caused by a person. Must proportional to and in
approximation of the suffering inflicted, so because moral damages are
payment award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury
suffered, not to impose a penalty on the wrong doer. Article 2219 (2)
provides that the liability of the petitioner as the registered owner of the
vehicle, respondents have satisfactorily shown the existence of the factual
basis for the award and its causal connection to the acts of Raul Tutor.
Indeed, the damages and injuries suffered by respondents were the
proximate result of petitioners tortuous act or omission. Thus the evidence
gives no doubt that such discretion was properly and judiciously exercised by
the trial court.

MR. & MRS. ENGRACIO FABRE, JR. and PORFIRIO CABIL

VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, THE WORD FOR THE WORLD CHRISTIAN FELLOWSHIP,
INC., AMYLINE ANTONIO, JOHN RICHARDS, GONZALO GONZALES, VICENTE V.
QUE, JR., ICLI CORDOVA, ARLENE GOJOCCO, ALBERTO ROXAS CORDERO,
RICHARD BAUTISTA, JOCELYN GARCIA, YOLANDA CORDOVA, NOEL ROQUE,
EDWARD TAN, ERNESTO NARCISO, ENRIQUETA LOCSIN, FRANCIS NORMAN O.
LOPES, JULIUS CAESAR, GARCIA, ROSARIO MA. V. ORTIZ, MARIETTA C. CLAVO,
ELVIE SENIEL, ROSARIO MARA-MARA, TERESITA REGALA, MELENDA TORRES,
MARELLA MIJARES, JOSEFA CABATINGAN, MARA NADOC, DIANE MAYO, TESS
PALATA, MAYETTE JOCSON, ARLENE Y. MOTIZ, LIZA MAYO, CARLOS RANARION,
ROSAMARIA T. RADOS and BERNADETTE FERRER
G.R. no. 111127

July 26, 1996

Facts:
Engracio Fabre, jr. and his wife were owners Mazda minibus. Private
respondent Word for the World Christian Fellowship Inc. arranged with
petitioners for the transportation of 33 members of its Young Adults Ministry
from Manila to La union and back, paid the amount of P3,000.00. Petitioner
Porfirion Cabil drove the minibus. However, the bridge at Carmen was
under repair, Cabil take the detour, it was 11:30 pm, the road was slippery
because it was raining, causing the bus running at speed 50 kilometers per
hour, to skid to the left road shoulder. The bus hit the traffic steel brace and
sign along the road and rammed the fence of one Jesus Escano, then turned
over and landed on its left side, coming to a full stop only after a series of

impacts. Several passengers were injured. The driver claimed that that he
did not see the curve until it was too late, because it was dark and no sign on
the road.
Seriously injured, Amyline Antonio brought this case in the RTC of
Makati. No convincing evidence was shown that the minibus was properly
checked for travel to long distance trip. The RTC renders judgment against
defendants Mr. & Mrs. Engracio Fabre, Jr. and Porfirio Cabil y Jamil are ordered
to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs. Court of appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court with respect to Amyline and sustained the trial
courts finding that the petitioner Cabli failed to exercise due care and
precaution in the operation of his vehicle. The Court of Appeals held that the
Fabre were themselves presumptively negligent. Petitioners raise the
following issues;
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioners were negligent
(2) Whether or not petitioners were liable for the injuries suffered by private
respondents
(3) Whether or not damages can be awarded and in the positive up what
extent.
Held:
(1) The court finds that the Fabre failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection and supervision of their employee is fully
supported by the evidence on record of by factual findings of the two courts
as final and conclusive. As to the driver, Porfirion Cabil given the conditions
of the road and considering that the trip was Cabils first one outside of
Manila, he should have been driven his vehicle at a moderate speed. There is
a testimony that, that portion of the road should only be running 20
kilometers per hour, so at the speed of 50 kilometers per hour, Cabil was
running very high. Cabil was found by the Court grossly negligent and should
be held liable for the injuries suffered by the private respondents Amyline
Antonio.
(2) No distinction between one whose principal business activity is the
carrying of persons or goods or both, the law avoided distinction between a
person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled
basis. As common carriers the Fabre should exercise extraordinary diligence
for the safe transportation of the passengers to their destination. Supporting
the finding of the trial court and of the appellate court that petitioners are
liable under Arts. 2176 and 2180 for quasi-delict, fully justify findings them
guilty of breach of contract of carriage the Civil Code.
(3) The award of damages should be awarded and in favor of Amyline
Antonio. The award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees was also
properly made. However, for the same reason that it was error for the
appellate court to increase the award of compensatory damages, we hold
that it was also error for it to increase the award of moral damages and
reduce the award of attorneys fees, inasmuch as private respondents, in

whose favor the awards were made, have not appealedWithin the purview of
Art. 2219 (2) providing for the payment of moral damages in cases of quasi
delict. Thus the petitioners are ordered to pay jointly and severally the
private respondent Amyline Antonio.

AMADOR CORPUA and ROMEO GONZALES

VS
EDISON LUGUE and CATHERINE BALUYOT
G.R. no. 137772

July 29, 2005

Facts:
Jimmy Basilio was driving the Isuzu KC-20 passenger jeep it collided
with the tanker truck driven by Gerardo Lim, the K-20 was thrown towards
the left lane and it was bumped by Mazda Minibus being driven by herein
Romeo Gonzales who was then trying to overtake the KC-20, as a result of
the impact, the K-C20 was thrown across the highway where it was again hit
by the minibus pushing the former towards a deep portion on the left side of
the road. The passengers of KC-20, including respondent Edison Lugue
suffered Physical injuries. Lugue the victim filed an action for damages from
the incident before the RTC of Balanga against Amador Corpuz and Romeo
Gonzales (owner and driver of the minibus); Oscar Jaring and Gerardo Lim
(owner and driver of the tanker truck) the defendants filed a third-party
complaint against Ricardo Santiago and Jimmy Basilio (owner/operator and
driver of the KC-20). The Trial Court rendered a decision holding jointly and
severally liable Ricardo Santiago, Jimmy Basilio, Oscar Jaring, Gerardo Lim,
Amador Corpuz, and Romeo Gonzales. The court renders decision in favor of
the plaintiffs and against all the defendants and third-party defendants.
Oscar Jaring and Gerardo Lim appeals on the Court of Appeals the
court dismissed the plaintiffs Santiago and Basilio. The Court of Appeals
Affirmed with the Trial courts decision and modified that Defendants Ricardo
Santiago and Jimmy Basilio are declared jointly and severally liable with
defendants-appellants Amador Corpuz and Romeo Gonzales and Defendantsappeallants Oscar and Gerardo Lim are absolved from liability and the
complaint as against them is Dismissed. Hence Amador Corpuz and Romeo
Gonzales filed and instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellate court erred in holding them liable for damages
based on the findings of facts adduced by the trial court.
Held:
From the testimonies as well as the discussion of the Trial Court, it is clear
that the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by respondents Lugue was
the collision between the KC-20 and the Tanker truck. It is clear that it was
the reckless imprudence of the driver of the KC-20, Jimmy Basilio, which set

the other events in motion which eventually led to the passengers of the KC20 sustaining physical injuries. However no merit in appeal of Amador
Corpuz and Romeo Gonzales ( Mazda minibus) in its testimony that Gonzales
signaled to avoid hitting the KC-20, petitioner failed to do so because the KC20 had moved to the position blocking the way of the minibus. The Court
granted the petition, the decision of the Court of Appeals finding petitioners
liable is Reversed and Set aside, in all other respect the court Affirmed with
the other decision.

CONRADO AGUILAR, SR.

VS
COMMERCIAL SAVINGS BANK and FERNAND BORJA
G.R. no. 128705

July 29, 2001

Facts:
Conrado Aguilar, Sr. is the father of the victim (Conrado aguilar, Jr.) in a
vehicular accident involving a Lanser car registered in the name of the
respondent bank and was driven by Ferdinand G. Borja (assistant vice
president of Commercial Bank). As Aguilar Jr. and his companions crossed the
road, the lancer driven by Fernand Borja, overtook a passenger jeepney the
lanser hit Aguilar and Semella (friend) and caused their death. Conrado, Sr.
filed a complaint for damages against the respondents in the Regional Trial
Court of Makati. Within the reglementary period Borja did not file his answer
he was then declared in default by the trial court. Petitioners counsel showed
that Borja was negligent in driving the car. The trial court held defendants
(respondents) liable for Aguilars death ordering the defendants, jointly and
severally to pay to the plaintiff damages. On the cross-claim of the defendant
bank, the cross-defendant Ferdinand Borja is ordered to pay the crossclaimant whatever amount the latter may have paid by virtue of decision.
The trial court declared that Borjas negligence, carelessness & imprudence
caused the victims death. Article 2180 of the Civil code, the negligence of
the employee is presumed to be that of the employer, whose liability is
primarily and direct and that respondents bank failed to exercise due
diligence in the selection of its employees.
Respondent bank appealed to the Court of Appeals, the Court of
Appeals found it meritorious the appellate court found no evidence that Borja
had acted as respondent banks assistant vice-president at the time of the
mishap. The court of appeals reversed the trial courts decision. Petitioners
motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent bank, as the lancers owner, is liable for
damages.
Held:

The Supreme Court hold with the trial court that the law does not allow the
respondents to do so; the law, with its aim and policy in mind, does not
relieve him directly of the responsibility that the law fixes and places upon
him as incident or consequence of registration. The respondent bank has no
any justification for relieving him of liability the failure to comply with the
registration that the law demands and requires. And that the defendantappellant herein, is primarily responsible for the damage caused to the
vehicle of the plaintiff-appellee, but he has a right to be indemnified by the
real actual owner of the amount that he may be required to pay as damage
for the injury caused to the plaintiff-appellant. For as long as the respondent
bank remained the registered owner of the car involved in the vehicular
accident, it could not escape primary liability for the death of petitioners
son.

PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC.

VS
NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE AGANA
G.R. no. 126297

January 31, 2007

NATIVIDAD and ENRIQUE AGANA

VS
JUAN FUENTES
G.R. no. 127590 January 31, 2007
Facts:
Natividad Agana was rushed to the Medical City Hospital Dr. Miguel
Ampil diagnosed her to be suffering from cancer of the sigmoid. Dr. Ampil
performed the surgery and found the malignancy in her sigmoid
necessitating the removal. Dr. Juan Fuentes performs hysterectomy Dr. Ampil
took over, completed the operation and closed the incision. The attending
nurse entered the remarks that the sponge count lacking 2. Since nowhere to
be found the surgeon avail to continue closure. After a couple of days,
Natividad complained of excruciating pain she consulted both the doctors
about it but they told that it was natural consequence of the surgery. Dr.
Ampil. Natividad, went to the United States after four months of consultation
and laboratory examinations, she was free of cancer. Natividad flew back to
the Philippines, still suffering from pains, her daughter found gauze
protruding from her Vagina. Then after the pain intensified, prompting
Natividad to seek treatment. Dr. Ramon Gutierez detected the presence of
another foreign object in her vagina a foul-smelling gauze which badly
infected her vaginal vault. Natividad underwent another surgery to remedy
the damage.
Natividad and her husband filed with the RTC, Quezon City a complaint
for damages against the Professional Services, Inc. (PSI), owner of the
Medical City Hospital, Dr. Ampil, and Dr. Fuentes. Enrique Agana also filed
with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) an administrative
complaint for gross negligence and malpractice against Dr. Ampil and Dr.

Fuentes. The PRC Board of Medicine heard the case but it failed to acquire
jurisdiction over Dr. Ampil who was then in the United States. The case was
pending; Natividad died and was duly substituted by her above-named
children (the Aganas). RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the Aganas,
finding PSI, Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes liable for negligence and malpractice,
ordering the defendants PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC., Dr Miguel Ampil and
Dr. Juan Fuentes to pay to the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, except in
respect of the award for exemplary damages and the interest thereon which
are the liabilities of defendants Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes.
Aggrieved, PSI, Dr. Fuentes and Dr. Ampil interposed an appeal to the
Court of Appeals, Aganas filed with the RTC a motion for a partial execution
of its Decision. Aganas again filed a motion for an alias writ of execution
against the properties of PSI and Dr. Fuentes. RTC granted the motion and
issued the corresponding writ, prompting Dr. Fuentes to file with the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for preliminary
injunction. During its pendency, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution 5
granting Dr. Fuentes prayer for injunctive relief.
PRC Board of Medicine rendered its Decision in Administrative Case
dismissing the case against Dr. Fuentes. The prosecution failed to show that
Dr. Fuentes was the one who left the two pieces of gauze inside Natividads
body. The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision Dr. Miguel Ampil is liable to
reimburse defendant-appellant Professional Services, Inc., whatever amount
the latter will pay or had paid to the plaintiffs-appellees. Dr. Ampil filed a
motion for reconsideration, but it was denied in a Resolution
Aganas maintain that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that Dr.
Fuentes is not guilty of negligence or medical malpractice, invoking the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Dr. Ampil asserts that the Court of Appeals erred
in finding him liable for negligence and malpractice.

Issues:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding Dr. Ampil liable for
negligence and malpractice
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in absolving Dr. Fuentes of any
liability
(3) Whether PSI may be held solidarily liable for the negligence of Dr. Ampil.

Held:
(1) Dr. Ampil is liable for Negligence and Malpractice, an attempt to absolve
himself, gears the Courts attention to other possible causes of Natividads
detriment. His arguments are purely conjectural and without basis. He did
not present any evidence to prove that the American doctors were the ones
who put or left the gauzes in Natividads body. Neither submit evidence to
rebut the correctness of the record of operation, particularly the number of
gauzes used. As to the alleged negligence of Dr. Fuentes, we are mindful that
Dr. Ampil examined his (Dr. Fuentes) work and found it in order.

(2) The court is not convinced, that the Court of Appeals Erred in Absolving
Dr. Fuentes of any Liability. It was duly established that Dr. Ampil was the
lead surgeon during the operation of Natividad. He requested the assistance
of Dr. Fuentes only to perform hysterectomy when he (Dr. Ampil) found that
the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread to her left ovary. Dr. Fuentes
performed the surgery and thereafter reported and showed his work to Dr.
Ampil. The latter examined it and finding everything to be in order, allowed
Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room. Dr. Ampil then resumed operating
on Natividad. He was about to finish the procedure when the attending
nurses informed him that two pieces of gauze were missing. A "diligent
search" was conducted, but the misplaced gauzes were not found. Dr. Ampil
then directed that the incision be closed. During this entire period, Dr.
Fuentes was no longer in the operating room and had, in fact, left the
hospital.
(3) The issue of whether PSI is solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil for damages,
that PSI, failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of
a good father of a family in the accreditation and supervision of the latter.
Moreover PSI is also directly liable to the Aganas. When a doctor practices
medicine in a hospital setting, the hospital and its employees are deemed to
sub serve him in his ministrations to the patient and his actions are of his
own responsibility. The nature of the relationship between the hospital and
the physicians is an employer-employee relationship the hospitals exercise
significant control in the hiring and firing of consultants and in the conduct of
their work within the hospital premises. Doctors who apply for consultant
slots, are required to submit proof of completion of residency, their
educational qualifications, evidence of accreditation by the appropriate
board (diplomate), evidence of fellowship in most cases, and references.
These requirements in other words, private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise
real control over their attending and visiting consultant staff. The hiring,
and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an
employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of
wages. PSI publicly displays in the lobby of the Medical City Hospital the
names and specializations of the physicians associated or accredited by it,
including those of Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. PSI failed to discharge its
burden under the last paragraph of Article 2180 cited must be adjudged
solidarily liable with Dr. Ampil.

ROGELIO P. NOGALES, for himself and on behalf of the minors, ROGER

ANTHONY, ANGELICA, NANCY, and MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER, all surnamed
NOGALES, petitioners,
vs.
CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER, DR. OSCAR ESTRADA, DR. ELY VILLAFLOR, DR.
ROSA UY, DR. JOEL ENRIQUEZ, DR. PERPETUA LACSON, DR. NOE ESPINOLA,
and NURSE J. DUMLAO, respondents.
G.R. No. 142625

Facts:

December 19, 2006

Corazon Nogales ("Corazon"), 37 years old pregnant with her fourth

child, under the exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Oscar Estrada ("Dr. Estrada").
The Doctor noted an increase in her blood pressure and development of leg
edema indicating preeclampsia. Corazon started to experience mild labor
pains Dr. Estrada advised her immediate admission to the Capitol Medical
Center ("CMC"). The staff nurse noted the written admission request of Dr.
Estrada. Due to the "Consent on Admission and Agreement" and "Admission
Agreement" signed by Corazons husband she was then brought to the labor
room of the CMC.
Corazon manifest moderate vaginal bleeding which rapidly became
profusely, Dr. Espinola ordered immediate hysterectomy. Rogelio was made
to signConsent to Operation." Due to the inclement weather, Dr. Espinola
arrived an hour late. He examined the patient and ordered some
resuscitative measures to be administered. Despite Dr. Espinola's efforts,
Corazon died the cause of death was "hemorrhage, post partum."
Petitioners filed a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court
of Manila contending that defendant physicians and CMC personnel were
negligent in the treatment and management of Corazon's condition also in
the selection and supervision of defendant physicians and hospital staff. The
defendant fail to file their answer to the complaint the trial court declared Dr.
Estrada, Dr. Enriquez, and Nurse Dumlao in default. CMC, Dr. Villaflor, Dr. Uy,
Dr. Espinola, and Dr. Lacson filed their respective answers denying and
opposing the allegations in the complaint. The trial court rendered judgment
finding Dr. Estrada solely liable for damages.
Petitioners appealed the trial court's decision, The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied in its Resolution. Hence, petitioners filed a
Manifestation that respondents "need no longer be notified of the petition
because they are not involved in the issue raised before the [Court],
regarding the liability of [CMC]." The Court of Appeals concluded that since
Rogelio engaged Dr. Estrada as the attending physician of his wife, any
liability for malpractice must be Dr. Estrada's sole responsibility. While it
found the amount of damages fair and reasonable, the Court of Appeals held
that no interest could be imposed on unliquidated claims or damages. Hence
this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not CMC is vicariously liable for the negligence?

Held:
On the Liability of CMC
CMC is vicariously liable for Dr. Estrada's negligence based on Article 2180 in
relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Art. 2180. The obligation imposed
by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Employers shall be
liable for the damages caused by their employees. The records show that

Rogelio testified that he and his wife specifically chose Dr. Estrada to handle
Corazon's delivery not only because of their friend's recommendation, but
more importantly because of Dr. Estrada's "connection with a reputable
hospital, to provide the best medical care and support services for Corazon's
delivery.
On the Liability of the Other Respondents
There was no evidence showing that the other respondents are liable for
negligent act. The records show that all are acting with good faith.
On the Award of Interest on Damages
The award of interest on damages is proper and allowed under Article 2211
of the Civil Code, which states that in crimes and quasi-delicts, interest as a
part of the damages may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion
of the court. The Court partly grants the petition finds respondent Capitol
Medical Center vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Oscar Estrada. The
actual damages and moral damages should each earn legal interest at the
rate of six percent (6%) per annum computed from the date of the judgment
of the trial court.

JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA JR., NORMA A.

YLAYA PANTALEON A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA,
ROSALINDA A. AMADORA, PERFECTO A. AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA,
VICENTE A. AMADORA and MARIA TISCALINA A. AMADORA, petitioners
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS,
VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P. DALMASO JR., CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO
ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON thru his parents and natural guardians, MR. and
MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN, and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian, A.
FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988

Facts:
Alfredo Amadora (17years old) scheduled to graduate High School on
April 16, 1972. On April 13, 1972, while in their school, Pablito Daffon, fired a
gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well.
Daffon petitioners, as the victim's parents was convicted of homicide thru
reckless imprudence and filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180
of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector, school
principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon
and two other students, through their respective parents. The complaint
against the students was later dropped. After trial, the Court of First Instance
of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs representing

death compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral

expenses, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. On
appeal to the respondent court, the decision was reversed and all the
defendants were completely absolved. Hence this petition.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletes liable
(2) Whether or not the rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys
liable
(3) Whether or not the teacher-in-charge is liable
(4) Whether or not the absence of a teacher-in-charge is a probability that
the dean of boys be held liable
(5) Whether or not the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos can be held directly
liable under the article 1903 of Civil code due to the teacher or the head of
the school of arts and trades responsible for the damage caused by the
student or apprentice.

Held:
(1) Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, in the custody of Colegio de San JoseRecoletos though the fourth year classes had formally ended. It was
immaterial if he was in the school to finish his physics experiment or to
submit his physics report for what is important is that he was there for a
legitimate purpose for going to the premises of the school.
(2) The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held
liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge. Not the direct control
and influence exerted by the teacher placed in charge of particular classes
the evidence of the parties does not disclose who the teacher-in-charge of
the offending student was. The mere fact that Alfredo Amadora had gone to
school for his physics report did not necessarily make the physics teacher,
respondent Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer.
(3) There was no showing that Dicon as the teacher-in-charged was negligent
in enforcing discipline upon Daffon in observance of the rules and regulations
of the school, his absence when the tragedy happened cannot be considered
against him because he was not supposed or required to report to school on
that day. And it has not been established that it was caused by his laxness in
enforcing discipline upon the student. On the contrary, the private
respondents have proved that they had exercised due diligence, through the
enforcement of the school regulations, in maintaining that discipline.

(4) Probably the dean of boys should be held liable in the absence of teacherin-charged in view of the evidence that he had earlier confiscated an
unlicensed gun from one of the students and returned the same later to him
without taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to higher
authorities. This was clearly negligence on his part, he deserves sanctions
from the school, though it does not link him to the shooting of Amador it has
not been shown that he confiscated and returned pistol was the gun that
killed the petitioners' son.
(5) Finally, Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under
the article because only the teacher or the head of the school of arts and
trades is made responsible for the damage caused by the student or
apprentice. It cannot be held to answer for the tort committed by any of the
other private respondents for none of them has been found to have been
charged with the custody of the offending student or has been remiss in the
discharge of his duties in connection with such custody.

AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners,

vs.
MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA, respondent.
G.R. No. 145391

August 26, 2002

Facts:
Two vehicles, one driven by Mario Llavore Laroya the other owned by
Roberto Capitulo and driven by petitioner Avelino Casupanan , figured in an
accident. As a result, two cases were filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property. Casupanan and Capitulo also
filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict. When the civil case was filed,
the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration insisted that
the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed independently of
the criminal case. The MCTC denied the motion for reconsideration.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial
Court of Tarlac, assailing the MCTCs Order of dismissal.
The RTC rendered judgment dismissing the petition for certiorari for
lack of merit. The order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order which
disposes of the case and therefore the proper remedy should have been an
appeal. The RTC further held that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost
appeal. Finally, the RTC declared that even on the premise that the MCTC
erred in dismissing the civil case, such error is a pure error of judgment and
not an abuse of discretion. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the RTC denied the same .
Issue:

Whether or not the accused in a pending criminal case for reckless

imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate
civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal
case.

Held:
Under the Administrative Circular, the order of dismissal is without prejudice
to refiling the complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly states it is
with prejudice. Thus, the MCTCs dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a
dismissal without prejudice. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal
punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on
culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code.
Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by
preponderance of evidence, that he has suffered damage because of the
fault or negligence of another. Either the private complainant or the accused
can file a separate civil action under these articles. There is nothing in the
law or rules that state only the private complainant in a criminal case may
invoke these articles. If the separate civil action was filed before the
commencement of the criminal action, the civil action, if still pending, was
suspended upon the filing of the criminal action until final judgment was
rendered in the criminal action. This rule applied only to the separate civil
action filed to recover liability ex-delicto.

FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, FILCAR TRANSPORT, INC., and FORTUNE INSURANCE
CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 118889 March 23, 1998

Facts:
Two-car collided at dawn. Both are Mitsubishi Colt Lancers, cruising
along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, Mandaluyong City, figured in a traffic
accident. The other owned by Lydia F. Soriano was being driven by Benjamin
Jacildone, while the other car, owned by respondent FILCAR Transport, Inc.
(FILCAR), and driven by Peter Dahl-Jensen as lessee. The car owned by
FILCAR swerved to the right hitting the left side of the car of Soriano. At that
time Dahl-Jensen, a Danish tourist, did not possess a Philippine driver's
license. FGU Insurance Corporation, paid the latter by way of subrogation, it
sued Dahl-Jensen and respondent FILCAR as well as respondent Fortune
Insurance Corporation (FORTUNE) as insurer of FILCAR for quasi-delict before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.

Summons was not served on Dahl-Jensen he was no longer staying at

his given address; upon motion of petitioner, Jensen was dropped from the
complaint. The trial court dismissed the case for failure of petitioner to
substantiate its claim of subrogation. Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of
the trial court although only the fault or negligence of Dahl-Jensen was
sufficiently proved but not that of respondent FILCAR, petitioner failed to
establish its cause of action for sum of money based on quasi-delict.
Petitioner insists that respondents are liable on the strength being the
registered owner of a vehicle and is liable for damages suffered by third
persons although the vehicle is leased to another.

Issue:
(1) Whether or not the damages suffered by a third party, may be an action
based on quasi-delict against a rent-a-car company
(2) Whether or not its insurer held liable for fault or negligence of the car
lessee in driving the rented vehicle

Held:
(1) Paragraph 5 of Art. 2180 with Art. 2184 of the same Code which provides:
"In motor vehicle mishap, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the
former, who was in the vehicle, could have by the use of due diligence,
prevented the misfortune . . . . If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the
provisions of article 2180 are applicable." Obviously, this provision of Art.
2184 is neither applicable because of the absence of master-driver
relationship between respondent FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen. Clearly, petitioner
has no cause of action against respondent FILCAR on the basis of quasidelict; logically, its claim against respondent FORTUNE can neither prosper.
(2) Petitioner failed to prove the existence of one of the requisites; the (b)
fault or negligence of defendant FILCAR, because only the fault or negligence
of Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently established, not that of FILCAR. The liability
imposed by Art. 2180 arises by virtue of a presumption juris tantum of
negligence on the part of the persons made responsible thereunder, derived
from their failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of
subordinates to prevent them from causing damage. Yet, as correctly
observed by respondent court, Art. 2180 is hardly applicable because none
of the circumstances mentioned therein obtains in the case under
consideration. Respondent FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-car business
was only the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As such, there was no
vinculum juris between them as employer and employee. Respondent FILCAR
cannot in any way be responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the
former not being an employer of the latter. Therefore only Dahl-Jensen is
held liable.

RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORPORATION, petitioner,

VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ROSARIO P. DY (for herself and on behalf of
the minors Maria Luisa, Francis Edward, Francis Mark and Francis Rafael, all
surnamed Dy), respondents.
G.R. No. 129029. April 3, 2000

Facts:
Provincial Prosecutor Patricio T. Durian of Isabela filed amended
information with Regional Trial Court, charging Romeo Dunca y de Tumol with
reckless imprudence resulting in double homicide and damage to property,
the said accused being the driver of a Trailer Truck Tractor registered in the
name of Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, drove and operated in a
negligent, careless and imprudent without taking the necessary precautions
to prevent injuries to persons and damage to property, causing by such
negligence the said trailer truck to hit and bump a Nissan Pick-up driven by
Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr., and Pacquing, resulted reckless
imprudence resulting in double homicide and damage to property.
Upon arraignment the accused entered a plea of not guilty. The
offended party made a reservation to file a separate civil action against the
accused arising from the offense charged. The offended parties actually filed
with the RTC, Isabela, a complaint against petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking
Corporation, as employer of driver Romeo Dunca y de Tumol, based on quasi
delict. The petitioner settled the claim of the heirs of Feliciano Balcita (the
driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident). The trial court
consolidated both criminal and civil cases and conducted a joint trial of the
same. The trial court rendered a joint decision finding the accused Romeo
Dunca y de Tumol guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Double
Homicide through Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Motor Vehicle
Law, ordering the plaintiff to pay to the defendants the actual damages, and
the dismissal of the complaint.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not Rafael Reyes Trucking can be held liable because of filing
separate civil action base on quasi-delict
(2) Whether or not the award of damages in the criminal case was proper

Held:
(1) First issue, the answer is in the negative. Rafael Reyes Trucking
Corporation, as employer of the accused who has been adjudged guilty in
the criminal case for reckless imprudence, can not be held subsidiarily liable
because of the filing of the separate civil action based on quasi delict against
it. In view of the reservation to file, and the subsequent filing of the civil
action for recovery of civil liability, the same was not instituted with the
criminal action. Such separate civil action was for recovery of damages
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, arising from the same act or omission of
the accused
(2) Second issue, the award of damages in the criminal case was improper
because the civil action for the recovery of civil liability was waived in the
criminal action by the filing of a separate civil action against the employer,
civil indemnity is not part of the penalty for the crime committed." The only
issue brought before the trial court in the criminal action is whether accused
Romeo Dunca y de Tumol is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide and damage to property. The action for recovery of civil liability is
not included therein, but is covered by the separate civil action filed against
the petitioner as employer of the accused truck-driver.

LARRY ESTACION, Petitioner,

vs.
NOE BERNARDO, thru and his guardian ad litem ARLIE BERNARDO, CECILIA
BANDOQUILLO and GEMINIANO QUINQUILLERA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 144723

February 27, 2006

Facts:
Noe Bernardo was a passenger of jeepney driven by Geminiano
Quinquillera , owned by respondent Cecilia Bandoquillo, Noe hung or stood
on the left rear carrier of the vehicle. The jeepney stopped by the right
shoulder of the road to pick up passengers. Suddenly, an Isuzu cargo truck,
owned by petitioner and driven by Gerosano, which was traveling in the
same direction, hit the rear end portion of the Fiera, the cargo truck smashed
respondent Noe against the Fiera crushing his legs and feet which made him
fall to the ground. Noe was brought to the Silliman University Medical Center
where his lower left leg was amputated. Noe, through his guardian ad litem
Arlie Bernardo, filed with the RTC of Dumaguete City a complaint for
damages arising from quasi delict against the registered owner of the cargo
truck and his driver Gerosano. And he prayed for actual damages, loss of
income, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses
and costs of suit.
Owner of the truck and driver Gerosano filed an answer denying the
allegations in the complaint. They filed a third party complaint against
respondents Bandoquillo and Quinquillera, as owner and driver of the Fiera.
The reckless imprudence of the respondent driver was the proximate cause
of the accident. Respondents Bandoquillo and Quinquillera filed their answer

to the third party complaint asking for the dismissal of the third party
complaint and for payment of attorneys fees.
Driver Gerosano was charged criminally for reckless imprudence
resulting to multiple physical injuries with damage to property before the
MCTC of Negros Oriental. MCTC finding him guilty of the crime charged and
was sentenced him and to pay the costs. RTC rendered its judgment in the
civil case ordering defendants Gerosano and Estacion, to pay plaintiff, jointly
or solidarily to the actual damages, moral damages, attorneys fee and the
litigation expenses. Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA rendered the assailed
decision which affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Petitioners
motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the herein petition for review.

Issues:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that Larry Estacion
exercised a due diligence as of a good father of the family to prevent
damage despite the abundance of evidence to that effect;
(2) Whether the court of appeals erred in not holding that Larry Estacion
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of his employee and
in maintaining his cargo truck roadworthy and in good condition
(3) Whether the court of appeals erred in exonerating respondents Cecilia
Bandoquillio and Geminiano Quinquillera.
Held:
(1) The court held that petitioner failed to overcome the presumption of
negligence thus he is liable for the negligence of his driver Gerosano; the
respondents failed to prove it otherwise. The obligation imposed by Article
2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible.
(2) There was also no proof that he exercised diligence in maintaining his
cargo truck roadworthy and in good operating condition. While petitioners
mechanic driver testified that he made a routine check up on October 15,
1982, one day before the mishap happened, and found the truck operational,
there was no record of such inspection.
(3) Modification for the ruling of the Court of Appeals that respondents
Bandoquillo and Quinquillera are liable for the negligent act of their driver.
The judgment was ordering defendants Gerosano and Estacion, as well as
third party defendants Bandoquillo and Quinquillera, to pay plaintiff, jointly
and solidarily, the award of damages, since there was contributory
negligence on the part of respondent Noe, petitioners liability should be
mitigated in accordance with Article 2179.

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI),Petitioner,

vs.
ALFONSO VERCHEZ, GRACE VERCHEZ-INFANTE, MARDONIO INFANTE,
ZENAIDA VERCHEZ-CATIBOG, AND FORTUNATO CATIBOG, Respondents.

G.R. No. 164349

January 31, 2006

Facts:
Editha Hebron Verchez was confined due to an ailment. Grace VerchezInfante (daughter) went to the Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc.
(RCPI) to send a telegram to her sister Zenaida Verchez-Catibog (Zenaida)
who was residing at Quezon City reading: "Send check money Mommy
hospital." Grace paid was issued a receipt. Three days after, no response
received from her, Grace sent a letter to Zenaida, thru JRS Delivery Service,
reprimanding her for not sending any financial aid. After Zenaida received
Graces letter, with her husband Fortunato Catibog, left for Sorsogon. On her
arrival she disclaimed having received any telegram. Zenaida, and her
husband, brought Editha to the Veterans Memorial Hospital.
The telegram from RCPI was delivered to Zenaida 25 days later,
Edithas husband Alfonso Verchez (Verchez), by letter demanded an
explanation from the manager of the Service Quality Control Department of
the RCPI, Mrs. Lorna D. Fabian, who replied, that due to the occurrence of
radio link connecting the points of communication encountered radio noise
and interferences such that subject telegram did not initially registered in the
receiving teleprinter machine .
Verchezs lawyer thereupon wrote RCPIs manager Fabian, by letter
requesting for a conference but no representative of RCPI showed up at said
date and time. On April 17, 1992, Editha died. Verchez, with his daughters
Grace and Zenaida and spouses, filed a complaint against RCPI before the
RTC for damages, the judgment of RTC rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendant, and on appeal, the Court of Appeals, affirmed the trial
courts decision. Hence, RCPIs present petition for review on certiorari at the
Supreme Court
Issue:
(1) "Is the award of moral damages proper even if the trial court found that
there was no direct connection between the injury and the alleged negligent
acts?
(2) "Are the stipulations in the Telegram Transmission Form, in the nature
"contracts of adhesion?

Held:
(1) RCPIs stand fails. Its liability is anchored on culpa contractual or breach
of contract with regard to Grace, and on tort with regard to her co-plaintiffsherein-co-respondents. Base on Article 1170 of the Civil Code provides:
Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud,
negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor
thereof, are liable for damages.
Passing on this codal provision, this Court explained:

In culpa contractual x x x the mere proof of the existence of the contract and
the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of
relief. The law, recognizing the obligatory force of contracts, will not permit a
party to be set free from liability for any kind of misperformance of the
contractual undertaking or a contravention of the tenor thereof. A breach of
contract confers upon the injured party a valid cause for recovering that
which may have been lost or suffered.
(2) RCPI misunderstands the nature of a contract of adhesion. It is construed
strictly against the party who drafted it or gave rise to any ambiguity therein,
it is stricken down as void and unenforceable or subversive of public policy
when the weaker party is imposed upon in dealing with the dominant
bargaining party and is reduced to the alternative of taking it or leaving it,
completely deprived of the opportunity to bargain on equal footing. This
Court holds that the contract is one of adhesion which is void is, given the
facts and circumstances of the case the petition is DENIED, and the decision
of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

V.V. SOLIVEN REALTY CORP., PETITIONER,

VS.
LUIS KUNG BENG T. ONG., RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 147869, January 26, 2005
Held:
V.V. Soliven Realty Corp. and Luis Kung Beng T. Ong signed a Contract
to Sell. After 10 years from the signing of the Contract to Sell, despite
respondents full payment of the purchase price, petitioner failed and refused
to execute the deed of absolute sale and to deliver to respondent the
certificate of title over the lot. Respondent filed a letter-complaint with the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) praying for the delivery
of the certificate of title over the lot and the refund of his excess payment.
Petitioner denied respondents allegation of full payment of the
purchase price of the lot and the excess payment on the amortization.
HLURB found that respondent had already fully paid the purchase price of
the lot and that he had an excess payment.
Petitioner filed a petition for review with the HLURB Board of
Commissioners which affirmed in toto the decision HLURB. Petitioner
appealed the decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners to the Office of
the President. Petitioner claimed that respondent had no cause of action
because the subject lot was levied [on] execution in connection with Civil,
hence the same should be deemed lost through fortuitous event.
Unknown to respondent, the lot was levied on execution on in Civil
Case. Subsequently, a certificate of sale was annotated on the certificate of
title. However, petitioner was able to redeem the lot. Before its redemption,
petitioner subdivided the lot into two. Consequently, the certificate of title to
the lot, one of the subdivided lot was cancelled and two certificates of title
were issued, petitioner sold one of the property to a certain Rogelio Vizon

Carpio, Jr.
Meanwhile, the Office of the President dismissed petitioners appeal
and affirmed the decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners. Petitioner
filed a petition with the Court of Appeals questioning the decision of the
Office of the President. The Court of Appeals denied the petition.
Issues:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEYS FEES WHEN THE SAME WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY PRAYED
FOR IN THE COMPLAINT. EVEN GRANTING THAT THERE WAS A PRAYER
FOR DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES, RESPONDENT FAILED TO
FURNISH SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR [SUCH] AWARD.

Held:
True, respondent failed to allege specifically in the complaint his claim for
damages and attorneys fees. This lack of specific allegation is
understandable because no counsel assisted respondent at the time. It was
only when the instant case reached the Court of Appeals when respondents
substitute (Ma. Dolores T. Ong), who was already represented by counsel,
expressly pleaded for damages and attorneys fees.
Respondents substitute attached an affidavit to her comment to the petition
before the Court of Appeals stating that respondents death was partly due
to the stress, frustration over the lot as he had suffered sleepless nights,
mental anguish and anxiety. The affidavit further stated that petitioner has
caused [her] family great anxiety, mental anguish and injury. this Court can
award nominal damages to respondents heirs. Nominal damages are not
intended for indemnification of loss suffered but for the vindication or
recognition of a right violated or invaded. Nominal damages are recoverable
where the plaintiff has suffered some injury the amount of which the
evidence fails to show. The Court also sets aside the award of attorneys fees
for lack of basis.

G.R. No. 122039 May 31, 2000

VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and FRANCISCO SALVA,
respondents.
Facts:

Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, a college freshman at the Siliman University,

took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas.
Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat," at the rear end of the
vehicle. Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing
so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva
bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured
and confinement in the hospital. Her attending physician certified she would
remain on a cast for a period of three months and would have to ambulate in
crutches during said period.
Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation
of the contract of carriage. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party
complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck. The lower
court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant and
absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck
who was responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of another case,
filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, the same court
held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his
jeepney.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was
reversed and dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and
adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga. Hence this petition.
Issues:
(1)Whether or not the negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the
accident negates the liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make
the common carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers.
(2) Whether or not that the bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by
Salva was a caso fortuito.
(3) Whether or not the award of moral damages to Sunga is supported
evidence.

Held:
(1)Finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to
petitioner's jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that
the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck
was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause
is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving
breach of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a
person where there is no relation between him and another party. In
such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is
a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties
themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is
merely to regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of
carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are
those respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard
to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in
cases of death or injury to passengers.

(2)This is also true of petitioner's contention that the jeepney being

bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. The
jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about
two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the
middle of the highway in a diagonal angle and that petitioner's driver
took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the
jeepney. Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his
jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway.
(3)In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since
there was no factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner
acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage.
Sunga's contention that petitioner's admission in open court that the
driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in going to a nearby hospital
cannot be construed as an admission of bad faith. The fact that it was
the driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to the hospital does not
imply that petitioner was utterly indifferent to the plight of his injured
passenger. If at all, it is merely implied recognition by Verena that he
was the one at fault for the accident.

HEIRS OF THE LATE TEODORO GUARING, JR., petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., and ANGELES
CUEVAS, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:

G.R. No. 108395 March 7, 1997

Facts:

There was a collision between Teodoro Guaring, Jr., driving Mitsubishi

Lancer while, Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415, driven by Angeles Cuevas, and a
Toyota Cressida car, driven by Eligio Enriquez. The Mitsubishi Lancer was
heading north following the Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415. On the other
hand, the Toyota Cressida was cruising on the opposite lane, bound for
Manila. Killed in the collision were Teodoro Guaring, Jr., who was driving the
Lancer, and Dolores Enriquez, who was riding in the Cressida, while injured
were Bonifacio Clemente and the occupants of the Toyota Cressida.

Petitioners, heirs of Teodoro Guaring, Jr., brought an action for

damages, based on quasi delict, in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Their
evidence tended to show that the Rabbit bus tried to overtake Guaring's car
and that in so doing it hit the right rear portion of Guaring as a result of
which it collided with the Toyota Cressida car coming from the opposite
direction. On the other hand the Private respondents, presented evidence
tending to show that the accident was due to the negligence of the deceased
Guaring. They claimed that it was Guaring who tried to overtake that as a
result of the collision the Lancer was thrown back to its lane where it crashed
into the Rabbit bus.

Regional Trial Court rendered judgment finding Philippine Rabbit Bus

Lines, Inc. and its driver, Angeles Cuevas, at fault, and holding them
solidarily liable for damages to petitioners. From the RTCs judgment, private
respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. appealed in the court of appeals.
The appellate court held that since the basis of petitioners' action was the
alleged negligence of the bus driver, the latter's acquittal in the criminal
case rendered the civil case based on quasi delict untenable. Hence, this
petition. Petitioners contend that:

Issue:
Whether the judgment in the criminal case extinguished the liability of
private respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver, Angeles
Cuevas, for damages for the death of Teodoro Guaring, Jr.
Held:
Since the appellee's civil action is predicated upon the negligence of the
accused which does not exist as found by the trial court in the said criminal
case, it necessarily follows that the acquittal of the accused in the criminal
case carries with it the extinction of the civil responsibility arising therefrom.
Otherwise stated, the fact from which the civil action might arise, the
negligence of the accused, did not exist. The finding in the criminal case that
accused Cuevas was not negligent and the proximate cause of the accident
was the act of deceased Guaring in overtaking another vehicle ahead of him
likewise it also exonerates PRB from any civil liability.

HERMANA R. CEREZO, petitioner,

vs.
DAVID TUAZON, respondent.
G.R. No. 141538

March 23, 2004

Facts:
Country Bus Lines passenger bus collided with a tricycle. Tricycle driver
Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, as owner of the
bus line, her husband Attorney Juan Cerezo ("Atty. Cerezo"), and bus driver
Danilo A. Foronda ("Foronda").
His complaint that the driver of the Country Bus willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously operate the said motor vehicle in a negligent, careless, and
imprudent manner without due regard to traffic rules and regulations, and
without taking the necessary precaution to prevent loss of lives or injuries,
his negligence, carelessness and imprudence resulted to severe damage to
the tricycle and serious physical injuries to plaintiff thus making him unable
to walk and becoming disabled, with his thumb and middle finger on the left
hand being cut.
Tuazon filed a motion to litigate as a pauper. Subsequently, the trial
court issued summons against Atty. Cerezo and Mrs. Cerezo ("the Cerezo
spouses"). The Cerezo spouses filed a comment with motion for bill of
particulars and granted by the court. Atty. Elpidio B. Valera appeared on
behalf of the Cerezo spouses. Valera filed an urgent ex-parte motion praying
for the resolution of Tuazons motion to litigate as a pauper and for the
issuance of new summons on the Cerezo spouses to satisfy proper service in
accordance with the Rules of Court. The trial court issued an order resolving
Tuazons motion to litigate as a pauper and the Cerezo spouses urgent exparte motion. The Court is satisfied from the unrebutted testimony of the
plaintiff that he is entitled to prosecute his complaint in this case as a pauper
under existing rules.
Cerezo spouses filed an urgent ex-parte motion for reconsideration.
The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration. The trial court issued
an order directing the Cerezo spouses to file their answer within fifteen days
from receipt of the order. The Cerezo spouses did not file an answer. Tuazon
filed a motion to declare the Cerezo spouses in default. The trial court issued
an order declaring the Cerezo spouses in default and authorizing Tuazon to
present his evidence.
After considering Tuazons testimonial and documentary evidence, the
trial court ruled in Tuazons favor. The trial court made no pronouncement on
Forondas liability because there was no service of summons on him. The
trial court held Mrs. Cerezo solely liable for the damages sustained by Tuazon
arising from the negligence of Mrs. Cerezos employee, pursuant to Article
2180 of the Civil Code.
Mrs. Cerezo received a copy of the decision. She filed before the trial
court a petition for relief from judgment on the grounds of "fraud, mistake or
excusable negligence." Testifying before the trial court, both Mrs. Cerezo and
Atty. Valera denied receipt of notices of hearings and of orders of the court.

Tuazon did not testify but presented documentary evidence to prove the
participation of the Cerezo spouses in the case.
The trial court issued an order denying the petition for relief from
judgment. The trial court refused to grant relief from judgment because the
Cerezo spouses could have availed of the remedy of appeal. The Cerezo
spouses not only failed to prove fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence by conclusive evidence, they also failed to prove that they had a
good and substantial defense. The trial court noted that the Cerezo spouses
failed to appeal because they relied on an expected settlement of the case.
The Cerezo spouses subsequently filed before the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari.
The Cerezo spouses filed before this Court of appeals a petition for
review on certiorari the Court rendered a resolution denying the petition for
review on certiorari for failure to attach an affidavit of service of copies of the
petition and failed to show that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error. Undaunted, the Cerezo spouses filed before the Court of Appeals a
petition for annulment of judgment, with prayer for restraining order. The
Court of Appeals denied the petition for annulment of judgment in a
resolution records show that the petitioner having availed of a petition for
relief, the remedy of an annulment of judgment is no longer available.

Issues:
(1)Whether or not the case needed to be reviewed
(2)Whether or not the lower courts and the court of appeals gravely erred
in rendering decision
(3)Whether or not the petitioners are liable for damages
Held:
(1)The Supreme Court held that the petition has no merit. The issues are
interrelated. An examination of the records of the entire proceedings
shows that It is either by sheer ignorance or by malicious manipulation
of legal technicalities that they have managed to delay the disposition
of the present case, to the detriment of pauper litigant Tuazon. For
these reasons, the present petition should be dismissed for utter lack
of merit. The issues raised in the present petition to clear any doubt
about the correctness of the decision of the trial court.
(2)The lower courts and the court of appeals did not erred in rendering
their decision, and was infact competent to decide the case in favor of
Tuazon and against Mrs. Cerezo even in the absence of Foronda.
Contrary to Mrs. Cerezos contention, Foronda is not an indispensable
party to the present case. It is not even necessary for Tuazon to
reserve the filing of a separate civil action because he opted to file a
civil action for damages against Mrs. Cerezo who is primarily and
directly liable for her own civil negligence. this court affirms the
decision thereto.

(3)There is a modification that the amount due shall earn legal interest at
6% per annum computed from 30 May 1995, the date of the trial
courts decision.

SUPREME TRANSLINER INC., FELIPE SIA and NOVENCIO FLORES, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GLORIA BRAZAL and minor LOTIS BRAZAL,
represented by her father, NOEL BRAZAL, respondents.
G.R. No. 125356

November 21, 2001

Facts:
Felipe Sia and Supreme Transliner Inc. are the registered owners of a
bus driven by co-petitioner Novencio Flores. The bus collided with a
passenger jeepney carrying private respondents Gloria and Lotis Brazal. The
jeepney was owned and registered in the name of Marcelino Villones and
driven by Reynaldo Decena. Private respondents suffered injuries. They
instituted Civil Case for damages against petitioners based on quasi-delict
and against Villones and Decena for breach of contract. Petitioners, in turn,
filed a third-party complaint against Country Bankers Insurance Company,
insurer of the Supreme Transliner bus.
Decena and Villones testified on their own behalf and presented
witnesses that the jeepney was about fifteen passengers, including private
respondents Gloria and Lotis Brazal. Supreme Transliner bus coming from the
opposite direction suddenly appeared on a curved portion of the road and
overtook another jeepney, which it was then following. Thereafter, the bus
collided with Decena's jeepney.
Petitioners presented Novencio Flores and Moises Alvarez, the Manager
of Supreme Transliner. Both testified that the passenger jeepney was running
very fast when the accident occurred. On the third-party complaint,
petitioners showed that they already submitted the required documents for
insurance claim and that Country Bankers Insurance Company promised to
settle the claim, but did not.
Trial court rendered its judgment, finding that the plaintiffs [have]
established by preponderance of evidence the allegations of the complaint.
Declared that Flores was negligent in operating the bus while, Sia failed to
exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the choice, supervision
and direction of his employees.
On the third-party complaint, the trial court found that Supreme
Transliner had insured the bus with Country Bankers, paid the premiums for
the period covering the accident, and made an insurance claim by notifying
the insurer and submitting the required documents. However, until the filing
of the complaint, Country Bankers had not acted upon Supreme Transliner's
claim. The trial court ordered Country Bankers to pay third-party plaintiffs an
amount not exceeding P50,000.

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appealed Affirmed

with the RTC. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this was
denied. Hence, this petition, where petitioners raise the following:

Issues:
(1)Who has the burden of proving herein petitioners' liability?
(2) May the evidence presented by Decena and Villones be considered in
determining preponderance of evidence against herein petitioners?

Held:
(1)The party, whether plaintiff or defendant, who asserts the affirmative
of the issue has the burden of proof to obtain a favorable judgment.
For the defendant, an affirmative defense is one which is not a denial
of an essential ingredient in the plaintiffs cause of action, but one
which, if established, will be a good defense both private respondents
as well as the jeepney driver Reynaldo Decena and its owner Marcelino
Villones claim that the bus driver, Novencio Flores, was liable for
negligently operating the bus. For private respondents, the claim
constitutes their cause of action against petitioners which said private
respondents must prove by preponderance of evidence. At the same
time, the same claim is a matter of affirmative defense on the part of
Decena and Villones who are impleaded as co-defendants of
petitioners. Therefore, both private respondents as well as the said codefendants had the burden of proving petitioners' negligence by the
quantum of proof required to establish the latter's liability, by
preponderance of evidence.
(2)The court rule in affirmative. The evidence presented by the jeepney
owner and its driver, Villones and Decena, forms part of the totality of
the evidence concerning the negligence committed by petitioners as
defendants in quasi-delict case. Preponderance of evidence is
determined by considering all the facts and circumstances of the case,
culled from the evidence, regardless of who actually presented it.
Petitioners' liability were proved by the evidence presented by Decena
and Villones at the trial, taken together with the evidence presented by
the victims of the collision, namely herein private respondents Gloria
and Lotis Brazal.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (former Tenth Division),
VICTORIA JAIME VDA. DE KHO, for herself and minor ROY ROLAND, GLORIA
KHO VDA. DE CALABIA for herself and minors MARY GRACE, WILLIE, JR.,
VOLTAIRE, GLENN, and MAY, all surnamed CALABIA, DANIEL KHO, JOSEFINA
KHO,
EMERITA KHO APEGO, ANTONIO KHO and TERESITA KHO, respondents.
G.R. No. 101439

June 21, 1999

Facts:
National Food Authority (NFA, formerly National Grains Authority) was
the owner of a Chevrolet truck which was insured against liabilities for death
of and injuries to third persons with the GSIS. The said truck driven by
Guillermo Corbeta collided with a public utility vehicle, a Toyota Tamaraw.
The Toyota Tamaraw was owned and operated by Victor Uy, under the name
and style of "Victory Line." The Tamaraw was a total wreck. All the collision
victims were passengers of the Toyota Tamaraw. Three (3) cases were filed
with the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City.
The first, Civil Case for quasi-delict, damages and attorney's fees, was
commenced by Uy and against NFA and Corbeta. The second, for damages,
was filed by an injured passenger, Librado Taer, against Uy, the operator of
the public utility vehicle, and insurer, Mabuhay Insurance and Guaranty Co.
(MIGC). In turn, Uy filed a cross-claim against MIGC and a third-party
complaint against Corbeta and NFA. The third, Civil Case was instituted by
herein private respondents against the following: NFA and Corbeta for
damages due to quasi-delict; GSIS as insurer of the truck; Uy for breach of
contract of carriage; and MIGC as insurer of the Toyota Tamaraw.
These cases were consolidated and partially tried by Judge Fortunate A.
Vailoces, of the then Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan
City.
These cases were transferred to the Regional Trial Court. RTCs decision
holding that Corbeta's negligence was the proximate cause of the collision.
Concluded, if both vehicles had traveled in their respective lanes, the
incident would not have been occurred. However, the Chevy cargo truck had
crossed over to the other lane which, under traffic rules, was the lane of the
Toyota Tamaraw. Corbeta and NFA appealed the decision of the trial court to
the Court of Appeals. GSIS also elevated the decision to the same appellate
court. The Court of Appeals agreed with the conclusions of the trial court and
finding no reversible error, the decisions of the Court a quo are AFFIRMED in
toto, with costs against the appellants.
GSIS and NFA filed their motions for reconsideration respectively, which
were denied by the respondent court in its Resolution, only GSIS filed this
petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether the respondent court erred in holding GSIS solidarily liable with the
negligent insured/owner-operator of the Chevrolet truck for damages
awarded to private respondents which are beyond the limitations of the
insurance policy.

Held:
The Supreme Court GRANTED the petition in this case the records reveal that,

the private respondents sent a notice of loss to the petitioner informing the latter of

the accident. The notice constitutes evidence of the loss they suffered by reason of
the vehicular collision. the defense of laches or prescription is deemed waived
because of petitioner's failure to raise it not only before but also during the hearing.
(GSIS) was impleaded as insurer of NFA. But under the CMVLI law, the petitioner
could only be held liable under its contract of insurance. And pursuant to the CMVLI
law, its liability is primary, and not dependent on the recovery of judgment from the
insured. Hence, GSIS is directly liable to the private respondents, the Petitioner is

ordered to pay the death indemnity to each group of heirs of the deceased,
and for medical expenses of Victoria Jaime Vda. de Kho; and Gloria Kho Vda.
de Calabia.
While Guillermo Corbeta, National Foods Authority, and Mabuhay Insurance &
Guaranty Co., Inc., jointly and severally, are ordered to pay private
respondents' claims minus the amounts that GSIS must pay to the injured
victims and the heirs of the deceased victims.

Norma Mangalig and Narciso Solano

petitioners,
VersusHon. Edelwina Catubig-Pastoral, Judge of the Regional Trial Court, 1st Judicial
Region, San Carlos City, Pangasinan, branch 56 and Apolinario Serquina, Jr.,
respondents.
G.R. No. 143951 October 25, 2005

Facts:
Apolinario Serquina, Jr. filed before the RTC a complaint for damages
against petitioners Norma Mangaliag and Narciso Solano. The complaint
alleges that due to the gross negligence, carelessness and imprudence of
petitioner Solano in driving the truck, private respondent and his copassengers sustained serious injuries and permanent deformities; when a
dump truck owned by petitioner Mangaliag and driven by her employee,
petitioner Solano, coming from the opposite direction, tried to overtake and
bypass a tricycle in front of it and thereby encroached the left lane and
sideswiped the tricycle ridden by private respondent.
Petitioners filed their answer with counterclaim denying that private
respondent has a cause of action against them. They attributed fault or
negligence in the vehicular accident on the tricycle driver, Jayson Laforte,
who was allegedly driving without license. Petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
claim, alleging that the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) has jurisdiction over the
case since the principal amount prayed falls within its jurisdiction.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the
respondent RTC Judge. Hence, they appeal for petition for certiorari, with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. The RTC resolved to
issue the temporary restraining order prayed for by petitioners.

Consequently, the respondent RTC Judge desisted from hearing further the
Civil Case.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order, set asides the Order of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of the action for damages.

Held:
The Supreme Court held that the instant petition for certiorari is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad

rule. It generally applies to cases involving warring factual allegations. For this
reason, litigants are required to repair to the trial courts at the first instance to
determine the truth or falsity of these contending allegations on the basis of the
evidence of the parties. Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision cannot
be brought immediately before appellate courts as they are not triers of facts. the
courts jurisdiction in a case of quasi-delict causing physical injuries would only be
based on the claim for actual damages and the complaint is filed in the MTC, it can
only award moral damages in an amount within its jurisdictional limitations, a
situation not intended by the framers of the law. The Regional Trial Court, is

DIRECTED to continue with the trial proceedings in Civil Case and resolve the
case with dispatch.

VICTOR ORQUILA & HONORATA ORQUIOLA

VS
COURT OF APPEALS, ETC.

G.R. No. 141463 August 6, 2002

Facts:

Petitioner spouse purchased the subject land in 1964 from Mariano

Lising. The spouse acquired the land in question without knowledge of any
defect in the title of Lising. Shortly afterwards, they built their conjugal home
on said land.

It was only in 1998, when the sheriff of Quezon City tried to execute
the judgment in Civil Case Q-12918, that they had notice to private
respondents adverse claim.

Issue:

Can the institution of Civil case serve as notice of such adverse claim to
petitioners?

Held:

No, it cannot since petitioner-spouses were not impleded therein as parties.

As bilders in good faith and innocent purchases for value, petitioners have
rights over the subject property and, hence are proper parties in interest in
any case thereon. Consequently, private respondents should have impleaded
them in Civil Case Q-12918.

Since they failed to do so, petitioners cannot be reached by the decision in

said case. No man shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a
stranger, and strangers to a case are not bound by any judgment rendered
by the court.

THE CONSOLIDATED BANK and TRUST CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and L.C. DIAZ and COMPANY, CPAs, respondents.

G.R. No. 138569. September 11, 2003

Facts:

L.C. Diaz opened a savings account with Solidbank, through its cashier,
Mercedes Macaraya. Macaraya instructed the messenger of L.C. Diaz, Ismael

Calapre (Calapre), to deposit the money with Solidbank. Macaraya also

gave Calapre the Solidbank passbook. Macaraya, together with Calapre, went
to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the deposit slip and check. When
Macaraya asked for the passbook, teller told that someone got the passbook
but she could not remember to whom she gave the passbook. When
Macaraya asked Teller No. 6 if Calapre got the passbook, Teller No. 6
answered that someone shorter than Calapre got the passbook.

L.C. Diaz through its Chief Executive Officer, Luis C. Diaz (Diaz),
called up Solidbank to stop any transaction using the same passbook until he
could open a new account. On the same day that L.C. Diaz learned of the
unauthorized withdrawal the day before, The withdrawal slip bore the
signatures of the authorized signatories of L.C. Diaz, namely Diaz and Rustico
L. Murillo. The signatories, however, denied signing the withdrawal slip. A
certain Noel Tamayo received the P300,000.

In an Information L.C. Diaz charged its messenger, Emerano Ilagan

(Ilagan) and one Roscon Verdazola with Estafa through Falsification of
Commercial Document. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the criminal case
after the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Dismiss. L.C. Diaz through its
counsel demanded from Solidbank the return of its money. Solidbank
refused. L.C. Diaz filed a Complaint for Recovery of a Sum of Money against
Solidbank with the Regional Trial Court. The trial court rendered a decision
absolving Solidbank and dismissing the complaint. L.C. Diaz then appealed
to the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals issued its Decision reversing the
decision of the trial court.

On the other hand Court of Appeals issued its Resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration of Solidbank. The appellate court, however,
modified its decision by deleting the award of exemplary damages and
attorneys fees. Solidbank seeks the review of the decision and resolution of
the Court of Appeals

Issues:

(1)THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER BANK

SHOULD SUFFER THE LOSS FOR ALLOWING THE WITHDRAWAL OF
P300,000.00 TO RESPONDENTS MESSENGER EMERANO ILAGAN.

(2) THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT MITIGATING THE DAMAGES

AWARDED AGAINST PETITIONER UNDER ARTICLE 2197 OF THE CIVIL
CODE, NOTWITHSTANDING ITS FINDING THAT PETITIONER BANKS
NEGLIGENCE WAS ONLY CONTRIBUTORY.

Held:

(1)The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the decision of the Court of Appeals L.C.
Diaz was not at fault that the passbook landed in the hands of the
impostor. Solidbank was in possession of the passbook while it was
processing the deposit. After completion of the transaction, Solidbank
had the contractual obligation to return the passbook only to Calapre,
the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz. Solidbank failed to fulfill its
contractual obligation because it gave the passbook to another person.

(2)In this case, L.C. Diaz was guilty of contributory negligence in allowing
a withdrawal slip signed by its authorized signatories to fall into the
hands of an impostor. Thus, the liability of Solidbank should be
reduced. L.C. Diaz must shoulder 40% of the actual damages awarded
by the appellate court. Solidbank must pay the other 60% of the actual
damages.

SPOUSES MARCELO B. ARENAS and ANITA T. ARENAS, petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES CONRADO S. ROJAS AND ROSALINA
BAUZON ROJAS, respondents.

G.R. No. 126640.

November 23, 2000

Facts:
Rosalina B. Rojas was the co-owner of a two-story building located in
Calasiao, Pangasinan. Rojas entered into a verbal contract of lease with
petitioner Marcelo B. Arenas over one stall located at the ground floor of the
building, on a month to month basis. Petitioner Arenas used the leased
premises as an optical clinic. Rojas wanted to demolish and reconstruct the
building and terminated her lease contract with petitioner Arenas.
Respondents sent petitioners a notice of termination and a demand to
vacate the premises However, petitioners refused to vacate the premises.
Rojas filed a complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages against
petitioner Arenas. Arenas filed his answer to the complaint and counterclaim
for moral damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees, stating that the
case was maliciously filed. Municipal Trial Court decided against petitioner.
Arenas appealed to the Regional Trial Court. Regional Trial Court denied the
appeal and affirmed the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in toto.

Regional Trial Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the

Municipal Trial Court, from hearing Civil Case. The temporary restraining
order also directed respondents to cease and desist from committing acts of
disturbances respondents moved the trial court to dismiss the case. Trial
court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. Respondents filed with
the trial court their answer to the complaint with counterclaim, reiterating
their motion to dismiss with an alternative motion to suspend the
proceedings. The trial court issued a resolution stating that it had jurisdiction
to hear, try and decide Civil Case The trial court decided the case in favor of
petitioners.

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals

rendered its decision reversing that of the trial court and dismissing
petitioners complaint. The Court of Appeals reasoned that since petitioners
interposed a counterclaim for moral and exemplary damages they were
barred from instituting Civil Case. Hence this petition.

Issues:
(1)Whether the causes of action complained of in the Regional Trial Court
were in the nature of compulsory counterclaims that must be pleaded
in Civil Case of the Municipal Trial Court.

(2)Whether or not that the acts complained of in Civil Case No. 16890
arose after the filing of the complaint and the answer in Civil Case No.
658. Thus, damages arising from such acts could not be raised therein
as compulsory counterclaims.

Held:
(1) The appeal is meritorious the court agree with petitioners that the

causes of action pleaded the trial court erred in for touching on the
propriety of the ejectment case which was settled and affirmed on
appeal We agree with petitioners that the acts complained of were not
founded on the contract of lease but could constitute violations of the Civil
Code provisions on Human Relations, of articles 19-21 of civil code . The fact
that the rule on summary procedure governs ejectment cases emphasizes
the point that an action for damages incapable of pecuniary estimation can
not be pleaded as counterclaims therein. It cannot be overemphasized that
the reason for the rule on summary procedure is to prevent undue delays in
the disposition of cases. To achieve this, the filing of certain pleadings is
prohibited and the periods for acting on motions as well as on the case itself
are relatively reduced.

(1)

In lieu thereof, the Court renders judgment setting aside the decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Pangasinan, Branch 39, Lingayen, in Civil
Case No. 16890, and REMANDING the case to the court of origin with
instructions that the court shall hear the case with all deliberate
dispatch, limiting itself to the determination of whether the acts
committed by respondents constitute quasi-delict, entitling petitioners
to the damages prayed for. The trial court shall report to the Court the
progress of the case on a month to month basis.

SAN ILDEFONSO LINES, INC., and EDUARDO JAVIER, petitioners,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS (Thirteenth Division) and PIONEER INSURANCE and
SURETY CORPORATION, respondents.

G.R. No. 119771 April 24, 1998

Facts:

Annie U. Jao drove the Toyota lite ace van and a passenger bus of
herein petitioner San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. (hereafter, SILI) figured in a
vehicular mishap. A criminal case was thereafter filed with the Regional Trial
Court charging the driver of the bus, herein petitioner Eduardo Javier, with
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with multiple physical
injuries.

Private respondent Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation (PISC), as

insurer of the van and subrogee, filed a case for damages against petitioner
SILI with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, seeking to recover the sums it
paid the assured under a motor vehicle insurance policy as well as other
damages.

Petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion to Suspend Civil

Proceedings grounded on the pendency of the criminal case against
petitioner Javier in the Pasig RTC and the failure of respondent PISC to make
a reservation to file a separate damage suit in said criminal action. This was
denied by the Manila Regional Trial Court

After their motion for reconsideration the Order was denied, petitioners
elevated the matter to this Court via petition for certiorari which was,
however, referred to public respondent Court of Appeals for disposition. A
decision adverse to petitioners once again was rendered by respondent
court, upholding the assailed Manila Regional Trial Court Order. Hence, this
petition for review after a motion for reconsideration was denied.

Issue:

If a criminal case was filed, can an independent civil action based on quasidelict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code be filed if no reservation was made
in the said criminal case?

Held:

On the chief issue of "reservation", There is no dispute that these so-called

"independent civil actions" are the exceptions to the primacy of the criminal
action over the civil action. There is no dispute that these so-called "independent
civil actions" based on the aforementioned Civil Code articles are the exceptions to
the primacy of the criminal action over the civil action Although the separate civil
action filed in this case was without previous reservation in the criminal case,
nevertheless since it was instituted before the prosecution presented evidence in
the criminal action, and the judge handling the criminal case was informed thereof,
then the actual filing of the civil action is even far better than a compliance with the
requirement of an express reservation that should be made by the offended party
before the prosecution presents its evidence.

The Supreme Court assailed with the decision of the Court of Appeals. Clearly
then, private respondent PISC, as subrogee is not exempt from the reservation
requirement with respect to its damages suit based on quasi-delict arising from the
same act or ommission of petitioner Javier complained of in the criminal case. As
private respondent PISC merely stepped into the shoes of Ms. Jao (as owner of the
insured Toyota van), then it is bound to observe the procedural requirements which
Ms. Jao ought to follow had she herself instituted the civil case.

PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC. and ROGACIONES MANILHIG,

petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF THE LATE RAMON ACUESTA, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

G.R. No. 120553 June 17, 1997

Facts:

The private respondents alleged that the petitioners were guilty of

gross negligence, recklessness, violation of traffic rules and regulations,
abandonment of victim, and attempt to escape from a crime. To support their
allegations, the private respondents presented eight witnesses. Petitioners
filed an Answer wherein they alleged that petitioner Philtranco exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees, including petitioner Manilhig who had excellent record as a driver
and had undergone months of rigid training before he was hired.

The petitioners further claimed that it was the negligence of the victim
in overtaking two tricycles, without taking precautions such as seeing first
that the road was clear, which caused the death of the victim. The latter did
not even give any signal of his intention to overtake. The petitioners were
not able to present their evidence, as they were deemed to have waived that
right by the failure of their counsel to appear at the scheduled hearings. The
trial court then issued an Order declaring the case submitted for decision.
Motions for the reconsideration of the said Order were both denied. The trial
court handed down a decision ordering the petitioners to jointly and severally
pay the private respondents.

The petitioners interposed this appeal by way of a petition for review

the Decision of the Court of Appeals that affirming the Decision of the

Regional Trial Court, which ordered the petitioners to pay the private
respondents damages as a result of a vehicular accident.

Issues:

(1)IN APPLYING ART. 2194, INSTEAD OF ART. 2180, OF THE CIVIL CODE,
AND IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER PHILTRANCO CAN NOT INVOKE THE
DEFENSE OF DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OF A FAMILY.

(2)IN AWARDING DAMAGES TO RESPONDENTS AND/OR IN NOT FINDING

THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF DAMAGES EXCESSIVE.

Held:

(1)The Supreme Court have consistently held that the liability of the
registered owner of a public service vehicle, like petitioner Philtranco,
for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary,
direct, and joint and several or solidary with the driver. As to solidarity,
Article 2194 expressly provides. Since the employer's liability is
primary, direct and solidary, its only recourse if the judgment for
damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its
employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to
the action based on quasi-delict. Article 2181 of the Civil Code.

(2)The trial court erroneously fixed the "death indemnity. We concur with
petitioners' view that the trial court intended the award of
"P200,000.00 as death indemnity" not as compensation for loss of
earning capacity. Even if the trial court intended the award as
indemnity for loss of earning capacity, the same must be struck out for
lack of basis. There is no evidence on the victim's earning capacity and
life expectancy.

RUBEN MANIAGO, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (First Division) HON. RUBEN C. AYSON, in his
capacity as Acting Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch IV, Baguio
City, and ALFREDO BOADO, respondents.

G.R. No. 104392 February 20, 1996

Facts:

Alfredo Boado owned a passenger jeepney that has figured in a

vehicular accident by a bus, his driver Herminio Andaya was charged with a
criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and
multiple physical injuries. A civil case for damages was filed by private
respondent Boado against petitioner. The complaint was assigned to the
same court. Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the
civil case against him, citing the pendency of the criminal case against his
driver. But the trial court, denied petitioner's motion on the ground that
pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could proceed independently of the
criminal action, in addition to the fact that the petitioner was not the accused
in the criminal case.

Petitioner took the matter on certiorari and prohibition to the Court of

Appeals, the Court of Appeals dismissed his petition. Hence this petition for
review on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether despite the absence of such reservation, private respondent may

nonetheless bring an action for damages against petitioner under the
provisions of article 1276 & 1280.

Held:

Based on these provisions, petitioner argues that the civil action against him
was impliedly instituted in the criminal action previously filed against his
employee because private respondent did not reserve his right to bring this
action separately. In the present case, the criminal action was filed against
the employee, bus driver. Had the driver been convicted and found insolvent,
his employer would have been held subsidiarily liable for damages. But if the
right to bring a separate civil action (whether arising from the crime or from
quasi delict) is reserved, there would be no possibility that the employer
would be held liable because in such a case there would be no
pronouncement as to the civil liability of the accused. In such a case the
institution of a separate and independent civil action under the Civil Code
would not result in the employee being held liable for the same act or
omission. That the action is against the employer to enforce his vicarious
liability under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. Though not an accused in the
criminal case, the employer is very much a party, as long as the right to
bring or institute a separate action (whether arising from crime or from quasi
delict) is not reserved.

RAYMUNDO ODANI SECOSA, EL BUENASENSO SY and DASSAD

WAREHOUSING and PORT SERVICES, INCORPORATED, petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF ERWIN SUAREZ FRANCISCO, respondents.

G.R. No. 160039. June 29, 2004

Facts:

Erwin Suarez Francisco, a student of the Manila Central University, was

riding a motorcycle. At the same time, petitioner, Raymundo Odani Secosa,
was driving an Isuzu cargo truck it was owned by petitioner, Dassad
Warehousing and Port Services, Inc. Traveling behind the motorcycle driven
by Francisco was a sand and gravel truck, which in turn was being tailed by
the Isuzu truck driven by Secosa.

When Secosa overtook the sand and gravel truck, he bumped the
motorcycle causing Francisco to fall. The rear wheels of the Isuzu truck then
ran over Francisco, which resulted in his instantaneous death. Fearing for his
life, petitioner Secosa left his truck and fled the scene of the collision.

Respondents, the parents of Erwin Francisco, filed an action for

damages against Raymond Odani Secosa, Dassad Warehousing and Port
Services, Inc. and Dassads president, El Buenasucenso Sy. The complaint
was docketed as Civil case of the RTC the court a quo rendered a decision in
favor of herein respondents.

Petitioners appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which

affirmed the appealed decision in toto.

Issue:

Whether petitioner Dassad Warehousing and Port Services, Inc. exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees, we find the assailed decision to be in full accord with pertinent
provisions of law and established jurisprudence.

Held:

Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides: Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing

contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and in Article

2180, in pertinent part, states:The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible. Employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry. Thus, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision
is AFFIRMED Dassas Warehousing and Port Services, Inc. exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees, we find the assailed decision to be in full accord with pertinent
provisions of law and established jurisprudence.

AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

Versus
NOEL CORDERO

G.R. No. 138550 October 14, 2005

Facts:

American Express International was a foreign corporation that issues

charge cards use to purchase goods and services at accredited merchants
worldwide to its customers. Nilda Cordero, wife of respondent Noel Cordero,
was issued an American Express charge card. An extension charge card, was
likewise issued to respondent Noel Cordero which he also signed.
Respondent, together with his family went on a three-day holiday trip to
Hong Kong. The group went to the Watsons Chemist Shop Noel picked up
some chocolate candies and handed to the sales clerk his American Express
extension charge card to pay for his purchases. Susan Chong, the store
manager, informed respondent that she had to confiscate the card.
Thereupon, she cut respondents American Express card in half with a pair of
scissors. This, according to respondent, caused him embarrassment and
humiliation. Hence, Nilda had to pay for the purchases using her own
American Express charge card.
The card is placed in the Inspect Airwarn Support System. Once a
card suspected of unauthorized use is placed in the system, the person to

whom the card is tendered must verify the identity of the holder. If the true
identity of the card owner is established, the card is honored and the charges
are approved. Otherwise, the card is revoked or confiscated.
Respondent filed with the RTC, a complaint for damages against
petitioner, docketed as Civil Case. He prayed for the award of moral
damages and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees as a result of
the humiliation he suffered. The trial court found that the inexcusable failure of
defendant (petitioner herein) to inform plaintiff (respondent herein) of the incident
despite sufficient time was the proximate cause of the confiscation and cutting of
plaintiffs extension card which exposed the latter to public humiliation for which
defendant should be held liable.

Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision

affirming the trial courts Decision with modification in the sense that the
amounts of damages awarded were reduced

Hence, the instant petition is raise.

Issues:

Whether the lower courts gravely erred in holding for moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorneys fees

Held:

Petitioner can revoke respondents card without notice, as was done. It

bears reiterating that the subject card would not have been confiscated and
cut had respondent talked to petitioners representative and identified
himself as the genuine cardholder. It is thus safe to conclude that there was
no negligence on the part of petitioner and that, therefore, it cannot be held
liable to respondent for damages.