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Documents - Tips Digested Cases Labor Law
CORPORATION, Respondent.
THIRD DIVISION , G.R. No. 166554, November 27, 2008
REYES, R.T., J.:
Facts:
Petitioner Julito Sagales was employed by respondent Rustans Commercial
Corporation from October 1970 until July 26, 2001, when he was terminated.
At the time of his dismissal, he was occupying the position of Chief Cook at
the Yum Yum Tree Coffee Shop. He was paid a basic monthly salary of
P9,880.00. He was also receiving service charge of not less than P3,000.00 a
month and other benefits under the law and the existing collective
bargaining agreement between respondent and his labor union.
In the course of his employment, petitioner was a consistent recipient of
numerous citations for his performance. After receiving his latest award on
March 27, 2001, petitioner conveyed to respondent his intention of retiring
on October 31, 2001, after reaching thirty-one (31) years in service.
Petitioner, however, was not allowed to retire with his honor intacts.
On June 18, 2001, Security Guard Waldo Magtangob, upon instructions from
Senior Guard Bonifacio Aranas, apprehended petitioner in the act of taking
out from Rustans Supermarket a plastic bag. Upon examination, it was
discovered that the plastic bag contained 1.335 kilos of squid heads worth
P50.00. Petitioner was not able to show any receipt when confronted. Thus,
he was brought to the Security Office of respondent corporation for proper
endorsement to the Makati Headquarters of the Philippine National Police.
Subsequently, petitioner was brought to the Makati Police Criminal
Investigation Division where he was detained. Petitioner was later ordered
released pending further investigation.
On June 19, 2001, petitioner underwent inquest proceedings for qualified
theft before Assistant Prosecutor Amado Y. Pineda. Although petitioner
admitted that he was in possession of the plastic bag containing the squid
heads, he denied stealing them because he actually paid for them. As proof,
petitioner presented a receipt. The only fault he committed was his failure to
immediately show the purchase receipt when he was accosted because he
misplaced it when he changed his clothes. He also alleged that the squid
heads were already scraps as these were not intended for cooking. Neither
were the squid heads served to customers. He bought the squid heads so
that they could be eaten instead of being thrown away. If he intended to
steal from respondent, he could have stolen other valuable items instead of
scrap.
Assistant Prosecutor Pineda believed the version of petitioner and
recommended the dismissal of the case for lack of evidence. The
recommendation was approved upon review by the City Prosecutor.
Notwithstanding the dismissal of the complaint, respondent, on June 25,
2001, required petitioner to explain in writing within forty-eight (48) hours
why he should not be terminated in view of the June 18, 2001 incident.
Respondent also placed petitioner under preventive suspension.
Respondent did not find merit in the explanation of petitioner. Thus,
petitioner was dismissed from service on July 26, 2001. At that time,
petitioner had been under preventive suspension for one (1) month.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
respondent. He also prayed for unpaid salaries/wages, overtime pay, as well
as moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and service charges.
Issues:
(1) Is the evidence on record sufficient to conclude that petitioner committed
the crime charged? and
(2) Assuming that the answer is in the affirmative, is the penalty of dismissal
proper?
Held:
1. YES. The evidence on record is sufficient to conclude that petitioner
committed the crime charged.
Security of tenure is a paramount right of every employee that is held sacred
by the Constitution. The reason for this is that labor is deemed to be
property within the meaning of constitutional guarantees. Indeed, as it is
the policy of the State to guarantee the right of every worker to security of
tenure as an act of social justice, such right should not be denied on mere
speculation of any similar or unclear nebulous basis. Indeed, the right of
every employee to security of tenure is all the more secured by the Labor
Code by providing that the employer shall not terminate the services of an
employee except for a just cause or when authorized by law. Otherwise, an
employee who is illegally dismissed shall be entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages,
In reply, complainant countered that he never struck Mr. Aberin with a bladed
weapon, and that the incident was not job related, hence cannot serve as
basis for termination.
Respondents, on the other hand in reply, argued that complainant was given
his day in court as an investigation was conducted. Moreover, complainant in
the course of his meeting with Mr. Aberin and with the union officers,
admitted that he assaulted the latter and even apologized in exchange for
the withdrawal of the criminal case filed against him.
The NLRC found that the wrong imputed to the private respondent did not
merit the penalty of dismissal. Thus, ordering his reinstatement, but omitting
the award of back wages. It held that the imposition of the supreme penalty
of dismissal is not commensurate with the gravity of the offense he
committed.
Issue:
Whether or not the reinstatement of private respondent is proper.
Held:
YES. Petitioners arguments are not persuasive. Fighting within work
premises may be deemed a valid ground for the dismissal of an employee.
Such act adversely affects the employers interests for it distracts
employees, disrupts operations and creates a hostile work atmosphere. The
facts of this case, however, do not justify the dismissal of private respondent.
As found by Respondent NLRC, the infraction was committed outside the
work premises and did not lead to any disruption of work or any hostile
environment in the work premises.
We agree with the NLRC that the acts of private respondent are not so
serious as to warrant the extreme penalty of dismissal. Private respondent
was accused of hitting the victim once with the blunt side of a bolo. Private
respondent could have attacked him with the blade of the weapon, and he
could have struck him several times. But he did not, thus negating any intent
on his part to inflict fatal injuries. In fact, the victim merely sustained a minor
abrasion and has since forgiven and reconciled with the private respondent.
If the party most aggrieved -- namely, the foreman -- has already forgiven
the private respondent, then petitioner cannot be more harsh and
condemning than the victim. Besides, no criminal or civil action has been
On June 24, 1999, while on his second leave of absence, petitioner filed a
Complaint before the NLRC for illegal dismissal, underpayment, separation
pay and damages against the Rural Bank of Lucban and/or its president,
Alejo B. Daya.
The labor arbiter held that respondent is guilty of illegal dismissal. It also
ordered the reinstatement of the complainant to his former position without
loss of seniority rights with full backwages.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the labor arbiter and held that there was no
bad faith or malice to the respondent bank for its implementation of its Board
Resolution directing the reshuffle of employees at its Tayabas branch to
positions other than those they were occupying.
After the NLRC denied his Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner brought
before the CA. The CA held that there was no grave abuse of discretion
committed by the NLRC in issuing its decision. It ruled thus that when
Mendoza was reshuffled to the position of clerk at the bank, he was not
demoted as there was no diminution of his salary benefits and rank. The
reshuffling of its employees was done in good faith and cannot be made the
basis of a finding of constructive dismissal. The fact that Mendoza was no
longer included in the bank's payroll for July 1 to 15, 1999 does not signify
that the bank has dismissed the former from its employ. Mendoza separated
himself from the bank's employ when, on June 24, 1999, while on leave, he
filed the illegal dismissal case against his employer for no apparent reason at
all. Hence, this Petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the reshuffling of private respondent's employees was done
in good faith and cannot be made as the basis of a finding of constructive
dismissal, even as the petitioner's demotion in rank is admitted by both
parties.
Held:
NO. Jurisprudence recognizes the exercise of management prerogatives. For
this reason, courts often decline to interfere in legitimate business decisions
of employers. Indeed, labor laws discourage interference in employers'
judgments concerning the conduct of their business. The law must protect
not only the welfare of employees, but also the right of employers.
In the pursuit of its legitimate business interest, management has the
prerogative to transfer or assign employees from one office or area of
operation to another provided there is no demotion in rank or diminution of
salary, benefits, and other privileges; and the action is not motivated by
discrimination, made in bad faith, or effected as a form of punishment or
demotion without sufficient cause.
This privilege is inherent in the right of employers to control and manage
their enterprise effectively. The right of employees to security of tenure does
not give them vested rights to their positions to the extent of depriving
management of its prerogative to change their assignments or to transfer
them.
Managerial prerogatives, however, are subject to limitations provided by law,
collective bargaining agreements, and general principles of fair play and
justice. The test for determining the validity of the transfer of employees was
explained in Blue Dairy Corporation v. NLRC as follows:
"Like other rights, there are limits thereto. The managerial prerogative to
transfer personnel must be exercised without grave abuse of discretion,
bearing in mind the basic elements of justice and fair play. Having the right
should not be confused with the manner in which that right is exercised.
Thus, it cannot be used as a subterfuge by the employer to rid himself of an
undesirable worker. In particular, the employer must be able to show that the
transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient or prejudicial to the employee;
nor does it involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of his salaries,
privileges and other benefits. Should the employer fail to overcome this
burden of proof, the employee's transfer shall be tantamount to constructive
dismissal, which has been defined as a quitting because continued
employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; as an offer
involving a demotion in rank and diminution in pay. Likewise, constructive
dismissal exists when an act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain
by an employer has become so unbearable to the employee leaving him with
no option but to forego with his continued employment."
Apparently Laplana was not allowed to resume her work as Cashier of the
Baguio Branch when April 16, 1984 came. She thereupon wrote again to Mrs.
Arogo advising that the directed transfer was unacceptable, reiterating the
reasons already given by her in her first letter. Subsequently, Laplana
received a telegram from Mrs. Arogo ordering her to report to Manila for a
ner job assignment but the same was refused by petitioner and asked that
she be retrenched instead.
Termination of Laplana's employment on account of retrenchment thereupon
followed. On July 4, 1984, Laplana signed the quitclaim and received the
check representing her 13th month and separation pay.
On October 9, 1984, Laplana filed with the Labor Arbiters' Office at Baguio
City, thru the CLAO, a complaint against PT & T its Baguio Northwestern
Luzon Branch, Baguio City, and Paraluman Bautista, Area Manager. In her
complaint she alleged, as right of action, that when she insisted on her right
of refusing to be transferred, the Defendants made good its warning by
terminating her services on May 16, 1984 on alleged ground of
"retrenchment," although the truth is, she was forced to be terminated and
that there was no ground at all for the retrenchment; that the company's act
of transferring is not only without any valid ground but also arbitrary and
without any purpose but to harass and force her to eventually resign.
In answer, the defendants alleged that Laplana was being transferred to
Laoag City because of increase in sales due to the additional installations of
vodex line; they also alleged that the company was exercising management
prerogatives in transferring complainant and there is no showing that this
exercise was arbitrarily and whimsically done; Lastly, Laplana's services were
terminated on her explicit declaration that "she was willing to be retrenched
rather than be assigned to Laoag City or Manila;"
Issue:
Whether or not Laplanas termination is legal.
Held:
YES. In Philippine Japan Active Carbon Corp. v. NLRC, promulgated on March
8, 1989 the Court held that it is the employer's prerogative, based on its
assessment and perception of its employees' qualifications, aptitudes, and
Facts:
Private respondent Potenciano Galanida was hired by petitioner Allied
Banking Corporation on 11 January 1978 and rose from accountant-book
keeper to assistant manager in 1991. His appointment was covered by a
notice of personnel action which provided as one of the conditions of
employment the provision on petitioners right to transfer employees as the
need arises and in the interest of maintaining smooth and uninterrupted
service to the public.
Private respondent was promoted several times and was transferred to
several branches.
Effecting a rotation/movement of officers assigned in the Cebu homebase,
petitioner listed respondent as second in the order of priority of assistant
managers to be assigned outside of Cebu City having been stationed in Cebu
Respondent replied, however, that assuming that he led such illegal strike,
he could not be liable therefore because it was done in petitioners sister
company which is a separate and distinct entity from petitioner.
Petitioner initially claimed that respondents acts were tantamount to serious
misconduct or willful disobedience, gross and habitual neglect of duties, and
breach of trust. Subsequently, petitioner amended its position paper to
include insubordination among the grounds for his dismissal, since it came
out during respondents cross-examination, and the matter was reported
only after the new personnel manager assumed his position in August 1996.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent was illegally dismissed from employment.
Held:
No.
Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC were one in concluding that petitioner
had just cause for dismissing respondent, as his act of leading a strike at
petitioners company for four days, his absence from work during such time,
and his failure to perform his duties during such absence, make up a cause
for habitual neglect of duties, while his failure to comply with petitioners
order for him to transfer to the GMA, Cavite Plant constituted insubordination
or willful disobedience. The CA, however, differed with said conclusion and
found that respondents attitude has not been proved to be visited with any
wrongdoing, and that his four-day absence does not appear to be both gross
and habitual.
The Court sustains the CAs finding that respondents four-day absence does
not amount to a habitual neglect of duty; however, the Court finds that
respondent was validly dismissed on ground of willful disobedience or
insubordination.
Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, as amended, an employer may
terminate an employment for any of the following causes: (a) serious
misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of
his employer or representative in connection with his work; (b) gross and
habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by
the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee
against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or
his duly authorized representative; and, (e) other causes analogous to the
foregoing. The employer has the burden of proving that the dismissal was for
a just cause; failure to show this would necessarily mean that the dismissal
was unjustified and, therefore, illegal.
Neglect of duty, to be a ground for dismissal, must be both gross and
habitual. Gross negligence connotes want of care in the performance of ones
duties. Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform ones duties for a
period of time, depending upon the circumstances. On the other hand, fraud
and willful neglect of duties imply bad faith on the part of the employee in
failing to perform his job to the detriment of the employer and the latters
business. Thus, the single or isolated act of negligence does not constitute a
just cause for the dismissal of the employee.
Facts:
This Case differentiates Productivity Bonuses and Commissions Productivity
bonuses are generally tied to the productivity or profit generation of the
employer corporation. Productivity bonuses are not directly dependent on
the extent an individual employee exerts himself. A productivity bonus is
something extra for which no specific additional services are rendered by any
particular employee and hence not legally demandable, absent a contractual
undertaking to pay it. Sales commissions are intimately related to or directly
proportional to the extent or energy of an employee's endeavours.
Commissions are paid upon the specific results achieved by a salesman-
EASTERN TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,versus - EASTERN TELECOMS EMPLOYEES UNION, Respondent.
February 8, 2012, G.R. No. 185665, THIRD DIVISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Facts:
Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc. (ETPI) is a corporation engaged in the
business of providing telecommunications facilities, particularly leasing
international date lines or circuits, regular landlines, internet and data
services, employing approximately 400 employees.
Eastern Telecoms Employees Union (ETEU) is the certified exclusive
bargaining agent of the companys rank and file employees with a strong
following of 147 regular members. It has an existing collective bargaining
agreement with the company to expire in the year 2004 with a Side
Agreement signed on September 3, 2001.
The Eastern Telecoms Employees Union (ETEU) claimed that Eastern
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI) had consistently and voluntarily
been giving out 14th month bonus during the month of April, and 15th and
16th month bonuses every December of each year (subject bonuses) to its
employees from 1975 to 2002, even when it did not realize any net profits.
ETEU posited that by reason of its long and regular concession, the payment
of these monetary benefits had ripened into a company practice which could
no longer be unilaterally withdrawn by ETPI. ETEU added that this longstanding company practice had been expressly confirmed in the Side
Agreements of the 1998-2001 and 2001-2004 Collective Bargaining
Agreements(CBA) which provided for the continuous grant of these bonuses
in no uncertain terms. ETEU theorized that the grant of the subject bonuses
is not only a company practice but also a contractual obligation of ETPI to the
union members.
ETEU contended that the unjustified and malicious refusal of the company to
pay the subject bonuses was a clear violation of the economic provision of
the CBA and constitutes unfair labor practice (ULP). According to ETEU, such
refusal was nothing but a ploy to spite the union for bringing the matter of
delay in the payment of the subject bonuses to the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB). It prayed for the award of moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorneys fees for the unfair labor practice allegedly
committed by the company.
The NLRC dismissed ETEUs complaint and held that ETPI could not be forced
to pay the union members the 14th, 15th and 16th month bonuses for the
year 2003 and the 14th month bonus for the year 2004 inasmuch as the
payment of these additional benefits was basically a management
prerogative, being an act of generosity and munificence on the part of the
company and contingent upon the realization of profits. The NLRC
pronounced that ETPI may not be obliged to pay these extra compensations
in view of the substantial decline in its financial condition. Likewise, the NLRC
found that ETPI was not guilty of the ULP charge elaborating that no
sufficient and substantial evidence was adduced to attribute malice to the
company for its refusal to pay the subject bonuses.
Respondent ETEU moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied by
the NLRC.
Aggrieved, ETEU filed a petition for certiorari before the CA ascribing grave
abuse of discretion on the NLRC for disregarding its evidence which allegedly
would prove that the subject bonuses were part of the union members
wages, salaries or compensations.
The CA declared that the Side Agreements of the 1998 and 2001 CBA
created a contractual obligation on ETPI to confer the subject bonuses to its
employees without qualification or condition. It also found that the grant of
said bonuses has already ripened into a company practice and their denial
would amount to diminution of the employees benefits.
Issue:
1. Whether the members of ETEU are entitled to the payment of 14th, 15th
and 16th month bonuses for the year 2003 and 14th month bonus for year
2004.
2. Whether these bonuses are demandable or not. Stated differently, can
these bonuses be considered part of the wage, salary or compensation
making them enforceable obligations?
Held:
1. YES. From a legal point of view, a bonus is a gratuity or act of liberality of
the giver which the recipient has no right to demand as a matter of right. The
grant of a bonus is basically a management prerogative which cannot be
forced upon the employer who may not be obliged to assume the onerous
burden of granting bonuses or other benefits aside from the employees
basic salaries or wages.
A bonus, however, becomes a demandable or enforceable obligation when it
is made part of the wage or salary or compensation of the employee.
Particularly instructive is the ruling of the Court in Metro Transit Organization,
Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, where it was written:
Whether or not a bonus forms part of wages depends upon the
circumstances and conditions for its payment. If it is additional
compensation which the employer promised and agreed to give without any
conditions imposed for its payment, such as success of business or greater
production or output, then it is part of the wage. But if it is paid only if profits
are realized or if a certain level of productivity is achieved, it cannot be
considered part of the wage. Where it is not payable to all but only to some
employees and only when their labor becomes more efficient or more
productive, it is only an inducement for efficiency, a prize therefore, not a
part of the wage.
2. YES. A reading of the CBA provision reveals that the same provides for the
giving of 14th, 15th and 16th month bonuses without qualification. The
wording of the provision does not allow any other interpretation. There were
no conditions specified in the CBA Side Agreements for the grant of the
benefits contrary to the claim of ETPI that the same is justified only when
there are profits earned by the company. Terse and clear, the said provision
does not state that the subject bonuses shall be made to depend on the
ETPIs financial standing or that their payment was contingent upon the
realization of profits. Neither does it state that if the company derives no
profits, no bonuses are to be given to the employees. In fine, the payment of
these bonuses was not related to the profitability of business operations.
The records are also bereft of any showing that the ETPI made it clear before
or during the execution of the Side Agreements that the bonuses shall be
subject to any condition. Indeed, if ETPI and ETEU intended that the subject
bonuses would be dependent on the company earnings, such intention
should have been expressly declared in the Side Agreements or the bonus
provision should have been deleted altogether. In the absence of any proof
that ETPIs consent was vitiated by fraud, mistake or duress, it is presumed
that it entered into the Side Agreements voluntarily, that it had full
knowledge of the contents thereof and that it was aware of its commitment
under the contract.
Verily, by virtue of its incorporation in the CBA Side Agreements, the grant of
14th, 15th and 16th month bonuses has become more than just an act of
generosity on the part of ETPI but a contractual obligation it has undertaken.
Moreover, the continuous conferment of bonuses by ETPI to the union
members from 1998 to 2002 by virtue of the Side Agreements evidently
negates its argument that the giving of the subject bonuses is a
management prerogative.
The rule is settled that any benefit and supplement being enjoyed by the
employees cannot be reduced, diminished, discontinued or eliminated by the
employer. The principle of non-diminution of benefits is founded on the
constitutional mandate to protect the rights of workers and to promote their
welfare and to afford labor full protection.
Agreement (CBA) effective January 1, 1996 to December 31, 2000. The CBA
governed the economic rights and obligations of respondents regular
monthly paid rank-and-file employees. In the CBA, the parties agreed to a 7hour work schedule from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from1:00 p.m. to 5:00
p.m. on a work week of Monday to Saturday.
Accordingly, overtime on an ordinary working day shall be remunerated in an
amount equivalent to the worker's regular basic wage plus twenty five
percent (25%) thereof. Where the employee is permitted or suffered to work
on legally mandated holidays or on his designated rest day which is not a
legally mandated holiday, thirty percent (30%) shall be added to his basic
wage for a seven hour work; while work rendered in excess of seven hours
on legally mandated holidays and rest days not falling within the aforestated
categories day shall be additionally compensated for the overtime work
equivalent to his rate for the first seven hours on a legally mandated holiday
or rest day plus thirty percent (30%) thereof.
The CBA likewise reserved in respondent certain management prerogatives,
including the determination of the work schedule.
On April 3, 1999, respondent issued an inter-office memorandum declaring
that, effective April 20, 1999, the hours of work of regular monthly-paid
employees shall be from 1:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. when horse races are held,
that is, every Tuesday and Thursday. The memorandum, however,
maintained the 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. schedule for non-race days.
On October 12, 1999, petitioner and respondent entered into an Amended
and Supplemental CBA and clarified that any conflict arising therefrom shall
be referred to a voluntary arbitrator for resolution.
Subsequently, before a panel of voluntary arbitrators of the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), petitioner questioned the
memorandum as violative of the prohibition against non-diminution of wages
and benefits guaranteed under Section 1, Article IV, of the CBA which
specified the work schedule of respondent's employees to be from 9:00 a.m.
to 5:00 p.m. Petitioner claimed that as a result of the memorandum, the
employees are precluded from rendering their usual overtime work from 5:00
p.m. to 9:00 p.m.
the potential conflict of interest would be eliminated. At the same time, they
would be able to avail of the attractive redundancy package from Astra.
In August 1999, Tecson again requested for more time resolve the problem.
In September 1999, Tecson applied for a transfer in Glaxos milk division,
thinking that since Astra did not have a milk division, the potential conflict of
interest would be eliminated. His application was denied in view of Glaxos
"least-movement-possible" policy.
In November 1999, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao CityAgusan del Sur sales area. Tecson asked Glaxo to reconsider its decision, but
his request was denied.
Tecson sought Glaxos reconsideration regarding his transfer and brought the
matter to Glaxos Grievance Committee. Glaxo, however, remained firm in its
decision and gave Tescon until February 7, 2000 to comply with the transfer
order. Tecson defied the transfer order and continued acting as medical
representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.
During the pendency of the grievance proceedings, Tecson was paid his
salary, but was not issued samples of products which were competing with
similar products manufactured by Astra. He was also not included in product
conferences regarding such products.
Because the parties failed to resolve the issue at the grievance machinery
level, they submitted the matter for voluntary arbitration. Glaxo offered
Tecson a separation pay of one-half () month pay for every year of service,
or a total of P50,000.00 but he declined the offer. On November 15, 2000,
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered its Decision
declaring as valid Glaxos policy on relationships between its employees and
persons employed with competitor companies, and affirming Glaxos right to
transfer Tecson to another sales territory.
Aggrieved, Tecson filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals
assailing the NCMB Decision.
The Court of Appeals denied the Petition for Review on the ground that the
NCMB did not err in rendering its Decision. The appellate court held that
Glaxos policy prohibiting its employees from having personal relationships
agreed period. Thereafter, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991, and from July
19, 1991 to August 8, 1991, private respondent's services as reliever were
again engaged by petitioner, this time in replacement of one Erlinda F. Dizon
who went on leave during both periods. After August 8, 1991, and pursuant
to their Reliever Agreement, her services were terminated.
On September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more asked to join
petitioner company as a probationary employee, the probationary period to
cover 150 days. In the job application form that was furnished her to be filled
up for the purpose, she indicated in the portion for civil status therein that
she was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier,
that is, on May 26, 1991.
It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in
the two successive reliever agreements which she signed on June 10, 1991
and July 8, 1991. When petitioner supposedly learned about the same later,
its branch supervisor in Baguio City, Delia M. Oficial, sent to private
respondent a memorandum requiring her to explain the discrepancy. In that
memorandum, she was reminded about the company's policy of not
accepting married women for employment.
In her reply letter, private respondent stated that she was not aware of
PT&T's policy regarding married women at the time, and that all along she
had not deliberately hidden her true civil status. Petitioner nonetheless
remained unconvinced by her explanations. Private respondent was
dismissed from the company which she readily contested by initiating a
complaint for illegal dismissal, coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost
of living allowances (COLA), before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the
National Labor Relations Commission in Baguio City.
The Labor Arbiter declared that private respondent, who had already gained
the status of a regular employee, was illegally dismissed by petitioner. Her
reinstatement, plus payment of the corresponding back wages and COLA,
was correspondingly ordered.
On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), said public
respondent upheld the labor arbiter and it ruled that private respondent had
indeed been the subject of an unjust and unlawful discrimination by her
employer, PT & T.
Issue:
of the staff handed her a memorandum. The memorandum stated that she
was being dismissed for immoral conduct. She refused to sign the
memorandum because she was on leave for twenty-one (21) days and has
not been given a chance to explain. The management asked her to write an
explanation. However, after submission of the explanation, she was
nonetheless dismissed by the company. Due to her urgent need for money,
she later submitted a letter of resignation in exchange for her thirteenth
month pay.
Respondents later filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, constructive
dismissal, separation pay and attorneys fees. They averred that the
aforementioned company policy is illegal and contravenes Article 136 of the
Labor Code.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal to the
NLRC, the Commission affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied by the NLRC.
They appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the NLRC decision
declaring illegal, the petitioners dismissal from employment and ordering
private respondents to reinstate petitioners to their former positions without
loss of seniority rights with full backwages from the time of their dismissal
until actual reinstatement;
Issue:
Whether the policy of the employer banning spouses from working in the
same company is a valid exercise of management prerogative.
Held:
NO. The Labor Code is the most comprehensive piece of legislation
protecting labor. The case at bar involves Article 136 of the Labor Code
which provides:
Art. 136. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of
employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall
not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married
a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually
dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee
merely by reason of her marriage.
It is true that the policy of petitioners prohibiting close relatives from working
in the same company takes the nature of an anti-nepotism employment
policy. Companies adopt these policies to prevent the hiring of unqualified
persons based on their status as a relative, rather than upon their ability.
These policies focus upon the potential employment problems arising from
the perception of favoritism exhibited towards relatives.
With more women entering the workforce, employers are also enacting
employment policies specifically prohibiting spouses from working for the
same company. We note that two types of employment policies involve
spouses: policies banning only spouses from working in the same company
(no-spouse employment policies), and those banning all immediate family
members, including spouses, from working in the same company (antinepotism employment policies).
A requirement that a woman employee must remain unmarried could be
justified as a bona fide occupational qualification, or BFOQ, where the
particular requirements of the job would justify the same, but not on the
ground of a general principle, such as the desirability of spreading work in
the workplace. A requirement of that nature would be valid provided it
reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job
performance.
We do not find a reasonable business necessity in the case at bar. It is
significant to note that in the case at bar, respondents were hired after they
were found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they married a coemployee. Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of Simbol, then a
Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of the
Repacking Section, could be detrimental to its business operations. Neither
did petitioners explain how this detriment will happen in the case of Wilfreda
Comia, then a Production Helper in the Selecting Department, who married
Howard Comia, then a helper in the cutter-machine. The policy is premised
on the mere fear that employees married to each other will be less efficient.
If we uphold the questioned rule without valid justification, the employer can
create policies based on an unproven presumption of a perceived danger at
the expense of an employees right to security of tenure.
The plaintiff had been employed by the defendant for an indefinite time to
work in the latter's industrial enterprises involving the manufacture of
umbrellas in the city of Manila. The defendant admitted that he discharged
the plaintiff without giving him the "written advice of six months in advance"
as provided in the contract, but alleged that the discharge was lawful on
account of absence, unfaithfulness, and disobedience of orders. The
defendant sought affirmative relief for a further alleged breach of the
contract by the plaintiff after his discharge.
That portion of the contract upon which the defendant's counterclaimed is
based reads as follows:
That during the term of this contract, and for the period of five years after
the termination of the employment of the said party of the second part,
whether this contract continue in force for the period of one, two, three or
more years, or be sooner terminated, the said party of the second party shall
not engage or interest himself in any business enterprises similar to or in
competition with those conducted, maintained or operated by the said party
of the first day in the Philippines, and shall not assist, aid or encourage any
such enterprise by the furnishing of information, advice or suggestions of any
kind, and shall not enter into the employ of any enterprises in the Philippine
Islands, whatever, save and except after obtaining special written permission
therefor from the said party of the first part. It is further stipulated and
agreed that the said party of the second part is hereby obligated and bound
to pay unto the party of the first part the sum of ten thousand pesos,
Philippine currency (P10,000) as liquidated damages for each and every
breach of the present clause of this contract, whether such breach occurred
during the employment of the said party of the second part or at any time
during the period of five years from and after the termination of said
employment, and without regard to the cause of the termination of said
employment.
The plaintiff admits that he entered the employment of Mr. Whalen in the
Philippine Islands as a foreman on some construction work for a cement
factory within a few days after his discharge and without the consent, either
written or verbal, of the defendant. This work was entirely different and
disassociated from that engaged in by the defendant Gsell, yet this act of the
plaintiff was a technical violation of the above-quoted provisions of the
contract wherein he expressly agreed and obligated himself "not to enter
into the employment of any enterprise in the Philippine Islands, whatever,
save and except after obtaining special written permission therefor" from the
defendant.
Issue:
Whether the provisions of the contract are valid and binding upon the
plaintiff.
Held:
No.
The contract under consideration, tested by the law, rules and principlest
forth is clearly one in undue or unreasonable restraint of trade and therefore
against public policy. It is limited as to time and space but not as to trade. It
is not necessary for the protection of the defendant, as this is provided for in
another part of the clause. It would force the plaintiff to leave the Philippine
Islands in order to obtain a livelihood in case the defendant declined to give
him the written permission to work elsewhere in this country.
Facts:
Shannon Richmond hired Alfonso del Castillo as pharmacist of the formers
drugstore known as the Botica Americana situated in the district of Legaspi
of the municipality and Province of Albay. In their agreement, the following
stipulation appeared:
3. That in consideration of the fact that the said Alfonso del Castillo has just
graduated as a pharmacist and up to the present time has not been
employed in the capacity of a pharmacist and in consideration of this
employment and the monthly salary mentioned in this contract, the said
Alfonso del Castillo also agrees not to open, nor own nor have any interest
directly or indirectly in any other drugstore either in his own name or in the
name of another; nor have any connection with or be employed by any other
drugstore situated within a radius of our miles from the district of Legaspi,
municipality and Province of Albay, while the said Shannon Richmond or his
heirs may own or have open a drugstore, or have an interest in any other
one within the limits of the districts of Legaspi, Albay, and Daraga of the
municipality of Albay, Province of Albay.
The said contract was acknowledge before a notary on the same day of its
execution.
The plaintiff alleges that the provisions and conditions contained in the third
paragraph of said contract constitute an illegal and unreasonable restriction
upon his liberty to contract, are contrary to public policy, and are
unnecessary in order to constitute a just and reasonable protection to the
defendant; and asked that the same be declared null and void and of no
effect. The defendant interposed a general and special defense. In his special
defense he alleges "that during the time the plaintiff was in the defendant's
employ he obtained knowledge of his trade and professional secrets and
came to know and became acquainted and established friendly relations with
his customers so that to now annul the contract and permit plaintiff to
establish a competing drugstore in the town of Legaspi, as plaintiff has
announced his intention to do, would be extremely prejudicial to defendant's
interest."
Issue:
Whether or not the qestioned stipulation is valid.
Held:
YES.
A contract by which an employee agrees to refrain for a given lenght of time,
after the expiration of the term of his employment, from engaging in a
business, competitive with that of his employer, is not void as being in
restraint of trade if the restraint imposed is not greater than that which is
necessary to afford a reasonable protection. In all cases like the present, the
question is whether, under the particular circumstances of the case and the
nature of the particular contract involved in it, the contract is, or is not,
unreasonable. Of course in establishing whether the contract is a reasonable
or unreasonable one, the nature of the business must also be considered.
What would be a reasonable restriction as to time and place upon the
manufacture of railway locomotive engines might be a very unreasonable
restriction when imposed upon the employment of a day laborer.
Considering the nature of the business in which the defendant is engaged, in
relation with the limitation placed upon the plaintiff both as to time and
place, we are of the opinion, and so decide, that such limitation is legal and
reasonable and not contrary to public policy.
Facts:
CALS Poultry Supply Corporation is engaged in the business of selling
dressed chicken and other related products and managed by Danilo Yap.
On May 16, 1995, it hired Candelaria Roco as helper, at its chicken dressing
plant on a probationary basis.
With respect to Candelaria Roco, there is no dispute that she was employed
on probationary basis. She was hired on May 16, 1995 and her services were
terminated on November 15, 1995 due to poor work performance. She did
not measure up to the work standards on the dressing of chicken. The Labor
Arbiter sustained CALS in terminating her employment. The NLRC affirmed
the Labor Arbiters ruling.
The Court of Appeals did not disagree with the NLRCs finding that Candelaria
was dismissed because she did not qualify as a regular employee in
accordance with the reasonable standards made known by the company to
her at the time of her employment.
However, the Court of Appeals set aside the NLRC ruling on the ground that
at the time Candelarias services were terminated, she had attained the
status of a regular employee as the termination on November 15, 1995 was
effected four (4) days after the 6-month probationary period had expired,
hence, she is entitled to security of tenure in accordance with Article 281 of
the Labor Code.
Issue:
What is the proper computation of the probationary employment period.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The status of the petitioner at the
time of his termination was still probationary. His dismissal on November 20,
1996 was within the 6- month probationary period. Article 13 of the Civil
Code provides that when the law speaks of years, months, and days and
nights, it shall be understood that years are of 365 days, months of 30 days,
days of 24 hours and nights are from sunset to sunrise. Since, one month is
composed of 30 days, then, 6 months shall be understood to be composed of
180 days. And the computation of the 6- month period is reckoned from the
date of appointment up to the same calendar date of the 6th month
following. Since, the number of days of a particular month is irrelevant,
petitioner was still a probationary employee at the time of his dismissal.
Wherefore, the petition is dismissed.
PUNO, J.,
FACTS
Private respondent Nelson Paras first worked with Mitsubishi Philippines as a
shuttle bus driver on March 19, 1976. He resigned on June 16, 1982 because
he went to Saudi Arabia and worked there as a diesel mechanic and heavy
machine operator from 1982 to 1993. Upon his return, Mitsubishi Philippines
re-hired him as a welder-fabricator at a tooling shop from November 1, 1994
to March 3, 1995.
On May 1996, Paras was re-hired again, this time as a probationary
manufacturing trainee at the Plant Engineering Maintenance Department. He
had an orientation on May 15, 1996 and afterwhich, with respect to the
companys rules and guidelines, started reporting for work on May 27, 1996.
Paras was evaluated by his immediate supervisors after six months of
working. The supervisors rating Paras performance were Lito R. Lacambacal
and Wilfredo J. Lopez, as part of the MMPCs company policies. Upon this
evaluation, Paras garnered an average rating.
Later, respondent Paras was informed by his supervisor, Lacambacal, that he
received an average performance rating but it is a rate which would still
qualify him to be regularized. But as part of the company protocols, the
Division Managers namely A.C. Velando, H.T. Victoria and Dante Ong
reviewed the performance evaluation made on Paras. Despite the
recommendations of the supervisors, they unanimously agreed that the
performance was unsatisfactory. As a consequence, Paras was not
considered for regularization.
Paras received a Notice of Termination on November 26, 1996 which was
dated November 25, 1996. This letters intent is to formally relieve him off of
his services and position effective the date since he failed to meet the
companys standards.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Paras termination was legal or not.
HELD:
The Court holds that a company employer may indeed hire an employee on a
probationary basis in order to determine his fitness to perform work. The
Court stresses the existence of the statements under Article 281 of the Labor
Code which specifies that the employer must inform the employee of the
standards they were to meet in order to be granted regularization and that
such probationary period shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the
employee started working, unless specified in the apprenticeship agreement.
Respondent Paras was employed on a probationary basis and was apprised
of the standards upon which his regularization would be based during the
orientation. His first day to report for work was on May 27, 1996. As per the
company's policy, the probationary period was from three (3) months to a
maximum of six (6) months. Applying Article 13 of the Civil Code, the
probationary period of six (6) months consists of one hundred eighty (180)
days. The Court conforms with paragraph one, Article 13 of the Civil Code
providing that the months which are not designated by their names shall be
understood as consisting of thirty (30) days each. This case, the Labor Code
pertains to 180 days. Also, as clearly provided for in the last paragraph of
Article 13, it is said that in computing a period, the first day shall be
excluded and the last day included. Thus, the one hundred eighty (180) days
commenced on May 27, 1996, and ended on November 23, 1996. The
termination letter dated November 25, 1996 was served on respondent Paras
only at 3:00 a.m. of November 26, 1996. The Court held that by that time, he
was actually already a regular employee of the petitioner under Article 281
of the Labor Code. His position as a regularized employee is thus secured
until further notice.
FACTS:
On September 16, 1996, Aberdeen Court, Inc. (Aberdeen), one of the
petitioners, employed Mateo C. Agustin (Agustin), herein respondent, for the
purpose of trouble shooting the electrical problems in said petitioners
establishment. Agustin was engaged on a six-month probationary basis. The
employment contract provided, inter alia, that:
Should my performance be considered unsatisfactory at any time by
management during my probationary period, I understand and agree that
the management can terminate my services at any time, even before the
termination of the agreed six-month period.
On January 12 and 13, 1997 the personnel of Centigrade Industries, Inc.
performed a reading of the exhaust air balancing at the fifth and sixth floors
of Aberdeens premises. Petitioners claim that Agustin was placed in charge
of the undertaking. On the other hand, Agustin asserts that Engr. Abad
merely requested him to accompany the aforesaid personnel to show the
location of the exhaust air outlet at the fifth and sixth floors of the premises.
He avers that:
The request of Engr. Abad is actually the responsibility of the companys
mechanical engineers. Despite the fact that the request of Engr. Abad is not
a part of his job since he is not a mechanical engineer and there were three
(3) other mechanical engineers on duty in the company premises, petitioner
[herein respondent], being a subordinate of Engr. Abad, obliged and
accompanied the aforementioned personnel to the location. There were no
other specific instructions from Engr. Abad to petitioner with respect to the
conduct or actual reading to be made by the Centigrade personnel.
It must be noted that the reading of exhaust air balancing is under the
category of heating, ventilating and air conditioning (HVAC) which are within
the realm of field of work of mechanical engineers. Being an electrical
engineer, petitioner obviously has no knowledge of the procedure and the
equipment used by mechanical engineers in the conduct of the reading of
the exhaust air balancing.
After the Centigrade personnel finished their job, they submitted their report
to Agustin. Petitioners allege that Agustin accepted and signed the report,
without verifying its correctness. Engineer Abad later checked the work of
the Centigrade employees only to find out that four rooms in the fifth floor
and five rooms in the sixth floor were incorrectly done. In contrast, Agustin
states that after the report was handed to him, he took the same to Engr.
Abad, who he claims was responsible for evaluating and confirming the said
report.
Allegedly, instead of signing it himself, Engr. Abad directed
respondent to sign it, giving the reason that Agustin was present when the
reading was conducted. Respondent Agustin complied, but he now points out
that his signature was not accompanied by any qualification that he
accepted the report on behalf of Aberdeen. He claims that he signed merely
to evidence that he received a copy of the report.
The parties also differ on the occurrences two days after the signing of the
report or on January 15, 1997.
According to petitioners, Aberdeen
management confronted Agustin with his failure to check the job and asked
him to explain his side. Agustin allegedly ignored management and left the
company, which made it impossible for Aberdeen to transmit any further
notice to him.
However, Agustin claims that:
On January 15, 1997 or two days after the report was submitted by
Centigrade Industries, petitioner [herein respondent] was summarily
dismissed. In the afternoon of that day, he received a telephone call from
the personnel office of respondent company ordering him to report to that
office after his tour of duty. At about seven p.m. at the personnel office, Ms.
Lani Carlos of the Personnel Department, informed him that Aberdeen Court
is terminating his services as electrical engineer.
Petitioner was
flabbergasted. Ms. Carlos then informed him that he could get his two (2)
weeks salary in the amount of P4,000, more or less, on the condition that he
will sign some documents which provides that the company has no more
liability and that he is voluntarily resigning from Aberdeen Court. Aware of
his rights, petitioner did not sign the offered documents. He was then
hurriedly led to the door by Ms. Carlos.
The following day or on January 16, 1997, petitioner requested assistance
from the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). A DOLE personnel
told him to report for work since private respondents did not serve him a
notice of termination. As instructed, petitioner reported for work on the
same day. Upon arriving at the company premises, petitioner asked Ms.
Carlos if he could still report for work but private respondents personnel
officer told him that he cannot do so.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Agustin qualified as a regular employee
Ruling:
It can be gleaned from Article 281 of the Labor Code that there are two
grounds to legally terminate a probationary employee. It may be done either:
a) for a just cause or b) when employee fails to qualify as a regular employee
in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to
the employee at the start of the employment.
Petitioners say that Agustin was terminated because he failed to qualify as a
regular employee.
Petitioners, however, allegedly did not show that
respondent was apprised of these reasonable standards at the start of the
employment.
In Servidad v. NLRC et al., where effectively the probationary period was for
one year, the Court stated:
If the nature of the job did actually necessitate at least one year for the
employee to acquire the requisite training and experience, still, the same
could not be a valid probationary employment as it falls short of the
requirement of Article 281 of the Labor Code. It was not brought to light that
the petitioner was duly informed at the start of his employment, of the
reasonable standards under which he could qualify as a regular employee.
The rudiments of due process demand that an employee should be apprised
beforehand of the conditions of his employment and the basis for his
advancement.
Similarly, in Secon Philippines Ltd. v. NLRC, the dismissal of the employee
was declared illegal by the Court because the employer did not prove that
the employee was properly apprised of the standards of the job at the time
of his engagement and, naturally, the employer could not show that the
employee failed to meet such standards.
The Implementing Rules of the Labor Code in Book VI, Rule I, Section 6, also
provides:
of company cellular phone for overseas personal calls and (4) the
unauthorized reimbursement of the plane tickets of his wife and child. In
short, petitioner was terminated for his failure to meet the required company
standards and for loss of trust and confidence.
ISSUES:
Whether or not De la Cruz is a probationary employee
RULING:
Petitioner was holding a managerial position in which he was tasked to
perform key functions in accordance with an exacting work ethic. His
position required the full trust and confidence of his employer. While
petitioner could exercise some discretion, this obviously did not cover acts
for his own personal benefit. As found by the court a quo, he committed a
transgression that betrayed
the trust and confidence of his employer
reimbursing his familys personal travel expenses out of company funds.
Petitioner failed to present any persuasive evidence or argument to prove
otherwise. His act amounted to fraud or deceit which led to the loss of trust
and confidence of his employer.
We reiterate the well-established rule that findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are conclusive on the parties and are not generally reviewable by
this Court when supported by substantial evidence.
Petitioner was hired by respondent Shemberg Marketing Corporation on May
27, 1996 and was terminated on September 14, 1996. Article 281 of the
Labor Code provides:
Probationary employment Probationary employment shall not exceed six
(6) months from the date the employee started working, unless it is covered
by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The services of
an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be
terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee
in accordance with reasonable standards, made known by the employer to
the employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who is allowed to
work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee.
Petitioner vigorously contends that he was not a probationary employee
since Shemberg failed to disclose to him the reasonable standards for
qualifying as a regular employee.
This Court notes, however, the evidence on record clearly showing that
petitioner was well informed of the standards to be met before he could
qualify as a regular employee.
G.R. No. 148931
September 12, 2006
CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS, LIMITED, petitioner, vs.
PHILIP LUIS F. MARIN and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Former
First Division), respondents.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
FACTS:
Marin used to work for Saudia Airlines as a ticketing agent. When he applied
for employment as a Reservation Officer in Cathay Pacific Airways, Ltd.
(Cathay), he was interviewed by the following: Senior Supervisor Nenita
Montallana, Reservations Manager Elizabeth Leviste, Staff and Administrative
Supervisor M.A. Canizares, and Country Manager (Philippines) Peter W.
Foster.
In a letter dated March 30, 1992, Foster confirmed Marin's appointment as
Reservations Officer effective April 6, 1992 for a probationary period of six
months. He was to receive a monthly salary of P5,334.00, including holidays
and rest days, with a promise of a salary review upon satisfactory completion
of the probationary period. The letter also stated that Cathay reserved the
right to "terminate [Marin's] services during the probationary period if [his]
performance proves to be unsatisfactory, in which case, [he] will receive the
salary due [him] at the time of the termination of [his] services." It was also
understood that Marin "had accepted the [recognized] terms of
employment," and that he would be "reconfirmed as a member of [the]
regular staff upon completion of the probationary period."
On October 15, 1992, Marin filed a complaint6 for illegal dismissal against
Cathay and Foster before the NLRC. The complaint was later amended to
include claims for 13th month pay, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees.
ISSUE:
RULING
It is settled that a probationary employee enjoys only a temporary
employment status, not a permanent status. In general terms, he is
terminable anytime as long as such termination is made before the
expiration of the six-month probationary period. The employment of a
probationary employee may only be terminated either (1) for a just cause; or
(2) when the employee fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance
with the reasonable standards made known to him by the employer at the
start of his employment. The power of the employer to terminate an
employee on probation is thus subject to the following conditions: (1) it must
be exercised in accordance with the specific requirements of the contract; (2)
the dissatisfaction on the part of the employer must be real and in good
faith, not prejudicial so as to violate the contract or the law; and (3) there
must be no unlawful discrimination in the dismissal. The burden of proving
just or valid cause for dismissing an employee rests on the employer.
In Secon Philippines, Ltd. v. NLRC, this Court held that the probationary
employment of an employee may be terminated when he fails to qualify as
regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known to
him by his employer at the time of employment and after due process; in
Manlimos v. National Labor Relations Commission, it was held that the
constitutional protection on the probationary employee ends upon the
expiration of the period provided for in the probationary contract of
employment. Thus, a probationary employee remains secure in his or her
employment during the time that the employment contract remains in effect,
but the moment the probationary employment period expires, the employee
can no longer invoke the constitutional protection. Thereafter, the parties are
free to renew the contract or not; or for the employer to extend to such
employee a regular or permanent employment. If the employee is not given
a permanent or regular employment contract on account of his
unsatisfactory work performance, it cannot be said that he was illegally
dismissed. In such case, the contract merely expired.
We agree with the rulings of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC that respondent's
employment was not terminated during the period of his probationary
employment, and that he was not extended a regular employment by
petitioner Cathay on account of his unsatisfactory work performance during
the probationary period.
G.R. No. 164582
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent M.Y. San Biscuits, Inc. (M.Y. San) was previously engaged in the
business of manufacturing biscuits and other related products.
On 27 December 2000, in a conciliation proceeding before the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) NCMB-NCR Director Leopoldo de Jesus, the
duly authorized representative of M.Y. San Workers Union-PTGWO and M.Y.
San Sales Force Union-PTGWO was informed of the closure or cessation of
business operations of respondent M.Y. San as a result of the intended sale of
the business and all the assets of respondent M.Y. San to respondent Monde
M.Y. San Corporation (Monde) and was notified of their termination, effective
31 January 2001.
On 28 December 2000, the written notice of the sale and purchase of the
assets of respondent M.Y San to respondent Monde and of the termination of
all the employees of respondent M.Y. San were filed before the DOLE
Regional Office No. IV.5
On 22 January 2001, respondent M.Y. San and the Union signed a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) embodying the agreements set forth in
the Minutes/Agreement, dated 27 December 2000. Embodied in the MOA is
an agreement that the existing Collective Bargaining Agreement shall cease
to be effective on 31 January 2001 and shall in no way be binding upon the
buyer, respondent Monde, and that respondent M.Y. San shall provide
respondent Monde a list of all its present employees who shall be given
preference in employment by the latter. Pertinent provisions of the
Agreement:
The Company agrees to submit the list of all its present employees to the
new corporation for purposes of rehiring if said employee applies and
qualifies, subject to such criteria as the new corporation may impose. In the
rehiring, the covered employees shall be given hiring preference, if qualified.
The corresponding Notice as to whom of the covered employees have been
hired by the new corporation shall be issued immediately after January 31,
2001. During the entire rehiring process and until the election and
qualification of the new officers, the PTGWO, through its National President,
or his authorized representative, shall act as the TRUSTEE of the UNION.
All employees hired by MONDE M.Y. SAN CORPORATION and/or the new
owner of the COMPANY, shall upon hiring, subject to the terms and conditions
of their probationary employment, become members of the UNION. The
continued existence of the UNION in the company and/or MONDE M.Y. SAN
CORPORATION shall not be interrupted by the payment of the Companys
employees of their separation package or the temporary closure of the
Companys operations.6
On 31 January 2001, all the employees of respondent M.Y. San received their
separation pay and the cash equivalent of their vacation and sick leaves.
Thereafter, they signed their respective Quitclaims.
On 1 February 2001, an Asset Purchase Agreement was executed between
respondents M.Y. San and Monde.
Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the
intended date thereof. x x x. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in
cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking
not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay
shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay
for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6)
months shall be considered as one (1) whole year. (Emphasis supplied.)
The phrase "closure or cessation of operations of establishment or
undertaking" includes a partial or total closure or cessation.
The closure, therefore, of the business operation of respondent M.Y. San was
not tainted with bad faith or other circumstance that would give rise to
suspicions of malicious intent. Other than their mere allegations, petitioners
failed to present independent evidence that would otherwise show that the
closure of M.Y. San was without factual basis and done in utter bad faith.
Mere allegation is not evidence. It is a basic rule in evidence that each party
must prove his affirmative allegation.
On November 9, 1995, or after working for six (6) months, he was made to
sign a three-month probationary employment and later, an extended threemonth probationary employment good until May 9, 1995.
On July 7, 1994, the petitioner was given an overall rating of 100% and 98%
in the work evaluations conducted by the company. In another evaluation,
petitioner received a rating of 98.5% given by the private respondent.
On May 9, 1995, petitioner was dismissed from the service on the ground of
alleged termination of contract of employment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Servidad is a probationary employee?
RULING:
The private respondent sought to alternatively avail of probationary
employment and employment for a fixed term so as to preclude the
regularization of the status of petitioner. The utter disregard of public policy
by the contract in question negates the ruling of NLRC that said contract is
the law between the parties. The private agreement of the parties cannot
prevail over Article 1700 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 1700. The relation between capital and labor are not merely
contractual. They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts
must yield to the common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to
special laws on labor unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts,
closed shops, wages, working conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects.
Similarly telling is the case of Pakistan Airlines Corporation vs. Pole, et al. 20
There, it was said:
. . . provisions of applicable law, especially provisions relating to matters
affected with public policy, are deemed written into the contract. Put a little
differently, the governing principle is that the parties may not contract away
applicable provisions of law especially peremptory provisions dealing with
matters heavily impressed with public interest. The law relating to labor and
employment is clearly such an area and parties are not at liberty to insulate
themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and
regulations by simply contracting with each other. . . .
On the averment that NLRC gravely abused its discretion in finding that
petitioner failed to meet the standards of the company, we find for petitioner.
The decision at NLRC on the matter simply stated that the petitioner fell
short of the expectations of the company without specifying factual basis
therefor. The public respondent overlooked the undisputed satisfactory
ratings of the performance of petitioner in the two job evaluations conducted
by the respondent company. Even granting, therefore, that the contract
litigated upon is valid; still, the petitioner, who was permitted to work beyond
six months could not be dismissed on the ground of failure to meet the
standards of Innodata. By the provisions of the very contract itself, petitioner
has become a regular employee of private respondent. Therein, it is
stipulated that: ". . . Should the EMPLOYEE continue employment beyond
November 10, 1994, he shall become a regular employee upon
demonstration of sufficient skill in the terms of his ability to meet the
standards set by the EMPLOYER. . . ."
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed?
RULING:
At the outset, it will be noted that the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in
its "Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment", dated 19 June 1995,
agreed with the findings of the labor arbiter that the petitioners were illegally
dismissed, and prayed of this Court that the questioned NLRC decision dated
24 November 1994 and resolution dated 26 January 1995, be set aside.
Petitioners contend that they were denied due process when they were
dismissed without a written notice (specifying the particular charges
constituting the grounds for their dismissal), and a hearing, as required by
law. They further contend that the memorandum dated 11 January 1993,
supposedly issued by Corfarm to petitioners directing them "to explain why
they should not be dismissed for alleged acts of negligence and
carelessness" was never received by them. Besides, said memorandum did
not specify the particular acts or omissions of petitioners. It merely stated
that based on the results of the investigation conducted by Corfarm's
internal audit staff, petitioners were found to have been negligent in the
performance of their duties.
Petitioners' contentions are meritorious.
This Court has consistently held that the twin requirements of notice and
hearing constitute essential elements of due process in the dismissal of
employees.As to the requirement of notice, it has been held that the
employer must furnish the worker with two written notices before
termination of employment can be legally effected: (a) notice which apprises
the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is
sought, and; (b) subsequent notice which informs the employee of the
employer's decision to dismiss him.
With regard to the requirement of a hearing, this Court has held that the
essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, and not that an
actual hearing should always and indispensably be held.
1992, or one year before respondent SMC even began its shift to the Preselling System in 1993. Thus, there is sufficient basis to believe that the shift
of SMC to the Pre-Selling System was not the real basis for the forging of
fixed-term contracts of employment with petitioners and that the periods
were fixed only as a means to preclude petitioners from acquiring security of
tenure. A fixed-term employment is valid only under certain circumstances,
such as when the employee himself insists upon the period, or where the
nature of the engagement is such that, without being seasonal or for a
specific project, a definite date of termination is a sine qua non. Petition is
granted.
G.R. No. 150478. April 15, 2005
HACIENDA BINO/HORTENCIA STARKE, INC./HORTENCIA L. STARKE,
Petitioners,
vs.
CANDIDO CUENCA, FRANCISCO ACULIT, ANGELINA ALMONIA,
DONALD ALPUERTO, NIDA BANGALISAN, ROGELIO CHAVEZ, ELMO
DULINGGIS, MERCEDES EMPERADO, TORIBIO EMPERADO, JULIANA
ENCARNADO, REYNALDO ENCARNADO, GENE FERNANDO, JOVEN
FERNANDO, HERNANI FERNANDO, TERESITA FERNANDO, BONIFACIO
GADON, JOSE GALLADA, RAMONITO KILAYKO, ROLANDO KILAYKO,
ALFREDO LASTIMOSO, ANTONIO LOMBO, ELIAS LOMBO, EMMA
LOMBO, LAURENCIA LOMBO, LUCIA LOMBO, JOEL MALACAPAY, ADELA
MOJELLO, ERNESTO MOJELLO, FRUCTOSO MOJELLO, JESSICA
MOJELLO, JOSE MOJELLO, MARITESS MOJELLO, MERLITA MOJELLO,
ROMEO MOJELLO, RONALDO MOJELLO, VALERIANA MOJELLO, JAIME
NEMENZO, RODOLFO NAPABLE, SEGUNDIA OCDEN, JARDIOLINA
PABALINAS, LAURO PABALINAS, NOLI PABALINAS, RUBEN
PABALINAS, ZALDY PABALINAS, ALFREDO PANOLINO, JOAQUIN
PEDUHAN, JOHN PEDUHAN, REYNALDO PEDUHAN, ROGELIO
PEDUHAN, JOSEPHINE PEDUHAN, ANTONIO PORRAS, JR., LORNA
PORRAS, JIMMY REYES, ALICIA ROBERTO, MARCOS ROBERTO, JR.,
MARIA SANGGA, RODRIGO SANGGA, ARGENE SERON, SAMUEL
SERON, SR., ANGELINO SENELONG, ARMANDO SENELONG, DIOLITO
SENELONG, REYNALDO SENELONG, VICENTE SENELONG, FEDERICO
STA. ANA, ROGELIO SUASIM, EDNA TADLAS, ARTURO TITONG, JR.,
JOSE TITONG, JR., NANCY VINGNO, ALMA YANSON, JIMMY YANSON,
MYRNA VILLANUEVA BELENARIO, SALVADOR MALACAPAY, and
RAMELO TIONGCO, Respondents.
Facts:
The respondents alleged that they were regular employees of petitioners
tasked with the maintenance and repair of the resort facilities. They did not
report for work after they were informed that the ongoing constructions and
repairs would be temporarily suspended because they caused irritation and
annoyance to the resort's guests and due to budgetary constraints. They
later on discovered that not less than ten workers were subsequently hired
by petitioners to do repairs in two cottages of the resort and two workers
were retained after the completion without respondents being allowed to
resume work.
Issue:
Whether respondents are regular or project employees
Held:
October 8, 2008
Unhappy over what they thought was ETS failure to release the balance of
their 13th month pay, private respondents brought their case before the
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-0100571-99 and entitled as Alex Albino, Renato Dulot, Miguel Alinab, Marcelito
Gamas, Julius Abanes, Christopher Biol, Sammy Mesagal, Conrado Sulibaga,
Floro Pacundo v. Equipment Technical Services or Joseph James Dequito.
Later, two other cases were filed against ETS for illegal dismissal and
payment of money claims when the complainants thereat were refused work
in another ETS project, i.e., Richville project, allegedly because they refused
to sign individual employment contracts with ETS. These two other cases
were Nelson Catong, Roger Lamayon, Christopher Lamayon v. Equipment
Technical Services or Joseph James Dequito, docketed as NLRC NCR Case No.
00-02-01429-99; and Rey Albino, Ernesto Padilla, Reynaldo Lima v.
Equipment Technical Services or Joseph James Dequito, docketed as NLRC
NCR Case No. 00-02-01615-99.
The three cases were consolidated before the labor arbiter. Following failed
conciliation efforts, all concerned, except Roger and Christopher Lamayon,
submitted, as the labor arbiter directed, their respective position papers.
Private respondents position2 is summed up as follows: (1) they are regular
employees of ETS; (2) ETS dismissed them without cause and without due
process after they filed cases for money claims against ETS in the arbitration
branch of the NLRC; (3) ETS has not paid them their salaries, 13th month
pay, service incentive leave pay, overtime pay, and premium pay for
holidays and rest days; and (4) they are entitled to reinstatement to their
former positions with paid backwages in addition to their money claims and
payment of attorneys fees.
ETS position may be summed up as follows: (1) private respondents were its
contractual/project employees engaged for different projects of the
company; (2) they were not illegally dismissed, having been hired on a per
project basis; (3) ETS was unable to fully release private respondents 13th
month pay because Uniwide failed to pay for its contracted plumbing project;
(4) ETS was forced to abandon the Uniwide project and undertake another
project, the Richville project, because the chances of being paid by Uniwide
were dim; (5) ETS asked private respondents to sign employment contracts
to formalize their previous agreement but said private respondents refused;
and (6) as a result, ETS was constrained to deny employment to private
except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at
the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services
to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration
of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the
preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee who has rendered at
least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall
be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is
employed and his employment shall continue while such actually exists.
The foregoing provision provides for three kinds of employees: (a) regular
employees or those who have been engaged to perform activities which
are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer; (b) project employees or those whose employment has been
fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of
which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee
or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season; and (c) casual employees or
those who are neither regular nor project employees. The principal test for
determining whether an employee is a project employee or a regular
employee is whether the employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at
the time of the engagement of the employee. A project employee is one
whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the
completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the
engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed
is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. A
true project employee should be assigned to a project which begins and ends
at determined or determinable times, and be informed thereof at the time of
hiring.
Petitioners contend that respondent's repeated hiring of their services
qualifies them to the status of regular employees.
On this score, the LA ruled:
This is further buttressed by the fact that the relationship between
complainants and the respondent URSUMCO, would clearly reveal that the
very nature of the terms and conditions of their hiring would show that
complainants were required to perform phases of special projects which are
not related to the main operation of the respondent for a definite period,
after which their services are available to any farm owner.
The NLRC, agreeing with the LA, further ruled that:
In the case at bar, We note that complainants never bothered to deny that
they voluntarily, knowingly and willfully executed the contracts of
employment. Neither was there any showing that respondents exercised
moral dominance on the complainants, x x x it is clear that the contracts of
employment are valid and binding on the complainants.
The execution of these contracts in the case at bar is necessitated by the
peculiar nature of the work in the sugar industry which has an off milling
season. The very nature of the terms and conditions of complainants' hiring
reveals that they were required to perform phases of special projects for a
definite period after, their services are available to other farm owners. This is
so because the planting of sugar does not entail a whole year operation, and
utility works are comparatively small during the off-milling season.
Finally, the CA noted:
Petitioner Pedy Caseres first applied with private respondent URSUMCO on
January 9, 1989 as a worker assisting the crane operator at the transloading
station. Upon application, Caseres was interviewed and made to understand
that his employment would be co-terminus with the phase of work to which
he would be then assigned, that is until February 5, 1989 and thereafter he
would be free to seek employment elsewhere. Caseres agreed and signed
the contract of employment for specific project or undertaking. After an
absence of more than five (5) months, Caseres re-applied with respondent as
a seasonal project worker assisting in the general underchassis
reconditioning to transport units on July 17, 1989. Like his first assignment,
Caseres was made to understand that his services would be co-terminus with
the work to which he would be then assigned that is from July 17, 1989 to
July 20, 1989 and that thereafter he is free to seek employment elsewhere to
which Caseres agreed and readily signed the contract of employment for
specific project or undertaking issued to him. Thereafter Caseres voluntarily
signed several other employment contracts for various undertakings with a
determinable period. As in the first contract, Caseres' services were
co-terminus with the work to which he was assigned, and that thereafter, he
was free to seek employment with other sugar millers or elsewhere.
The nature and terms and conditions of employment of petitioner Andito Pael
were the same as that of his co-petitioner Caseres. It must be noted that
there were intervals in petitioners' respective employment contracts, and
that their work depended on the availability of such contracts or projects.
Consequently, the employment of URSUMCO's work force was not permanent
but co-terminous with the projects to which the
employees were assigned and from whose payrolls they were paid
(Palomares vs. NLRC, 277 SCRA 439).
Petitioners' repeated and successive re-employment on the basis of a
contract of employment for more than one year cannot and does not make
them regular employees. Length of service is not the controlling determinant
of the employment tenure of a project employee (Rada vs. NLRC,)
G.R. No. 112629
July 7, 1995
of PNCC since 1980. Having passed the criteria set by PNCC for overseas
workers, they were assigned as company security guards at PNCC Iraq
Expressway Project with a salary of US$350.00 a month each. Their contracts
are evidenced by master employment contracts approved by the POEA which
explicitly state:
This is to confirm your employment with the Philippine National Construction
Corporation-Iraq Expressway Project (Employer/Principal)
. . . other relevant data are as follows:
Position
:Company Guard
Salary
:
US$350.00/month
Jobsite
:
Samawah, Iraq
Commencement of contract: Upon Departure
They departed for Iraq on 14 May 1985; however, before they left they were
made to sign printed forms in blank. The necessary papers for their overseas
assignment were not given to them not until they were already at the Manila
International Airport. They found out to their disgust that contrary to the
master employment plan, the printed forms they had earlier signed in blank
already contain an entry that their salary rate is US$260.00 a month. Thus,
private respondent Roquero received only US$260.00 as monthly salary
during his entire two-year assignment in Iraq and three-week extended
period of assignment therein. Private respondent Davila received the same
salary until he was repatriated prior to the expiration of his contract due to a
reduction of work force. For their four-hour daily overtime work, they were
paid only two-hour overtime pay at the rate of US$260.00 per month.
The PNCC resisted the complaint by claiming that the so-called Master
Employment Contracts relied upon by the private respondents were but
notices or offers for overseas employment, and mere offers without
acceptance by them do not constitute contracts of employment. The
contracts which bound them were those providing for a salary of US$260.00
per month.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the private respondents are employees of PNCC
RULING:
It is true that the only way by which a labor case may reach this Court is
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 8 It must,
however, be shown that the NLRC has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal, nor any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 9
Section 14, Rule VII of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC allows an
aggrieved party to file a motion for the reconsideration of any order,
resolution, or decision of the Commission based on palpable or patent errors.
Such a motion constitutes a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy which the
aggrieved party may avail of.
It is settled that before certiorari may be availed of, the petitioner must have
filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order or act complained of to
enable the tribunal, board, or office concerned to pass upon and correct its
mistakes without the intervention of the higher court. 10 The petitioner has
not endeavored to show any justifiable reason why it did not file a motion for
reconsideration to give the NLRC an opportunity to re-examine its resolution.
At any rate, at the bottom of the petitioner's grievance is an issue of fact. It
is doctrinally entrenched that the factual findings of labor officials are
conclusive and binding on this Court when supported by substantial
evidence. 11 An examination of the decision of the POEA, which was affirmed
by the NLRC, discloses that the findings of facts therein are supported by
substantial evidence. Hence, they can no longer be disturbed by this Court.
Besides, in an earlier case brought by the petitioner and involving the same
issue but with other employees similarly situated as the private respondents,
12 this Court upheld the resolution of the NLRC affirming the POEA findings
as follows:
. . . The only dispute which remains unsolved is whether or not the monthly
salary of herein complainants is US$350.00 a month or US$260.00.
As correctly invoked by complainants paragraph (i) of Article 34 of the Labor
Code prohibits the substitution or alteration of employment contracts
approved and verified by the Department of Labor from the time (of) the
actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of
expiration of the same without the approval of the Department of Labor.
With regard to the first issue in this case the approved contract of
employment of the herein complainants with the respondent is US$350.00 a
month. This can be inferred from the POEA approved contract of employment
and by the certification issued by respondent's chief recruiting officer. This
being so, herein complainants have the right to be paid as monthly salaries
the aforementioned amount.
Complainants having been granted voluntarily by the respondent a two-hour
daily overtime (Exh. "G", "G-1") during the durations of their contract, are
also entitled to be paid thereto based on the monthly salaries of US$350.00
and not US$260.00.
The petitioner's contention that the private respondents' claims are barred
by laches do not deserve even a short shrift.
G.R. No. 106090
February 28, 1994
RICARDO FERNANDEZ, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and D. M. CONSUNJI,
INC., respondents.
NOCON, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner was hired as a laborer at the D.M. Consunji, Inc., a construction
firm, on November 5, 1974. He became a skilled welder and worked for
private respondent until March 23, 1986 when his employment was
terminated on the ground that the project petitioner had been assigned to
was already completed and there was no more work for him to do.
Skeptic of private respondent's reason, petitioner brought his plight before
the Labor Arbiter who consolidated the same with three (3) other separate
complaints for illegal dismissal and various money claims against private
respondent. After filing their respective position papers and other documents
pertinent to their causes/defenses, the parties agreed to submit the case for
decision based on record.
The Labor Arbiter held that the complainants are employees of the private
respondents. That the producers are not independent contractor but should
be considered as labor-only contractors and as such act as mere agent of the
real employer. Thus, the said employees are illegally dismissed.
The private respondents appealed to the NLRC which reversed the decision
of the Labor Arbiter declaring that the complainants were project employees
due to the ff. reasons: (a) Complainants were hired for specific movie
projects and their employment was co-terminus with each movie project;
(b)The work is dependent on the availability of projects. As a result, the total
working hours logged extremely varied; (c) The extremely irregular working
days and hours of complainants work explains the lump sum payment for
their service; and (d) The respondents alleged that the complainants are not
prohibited from working with other movie companies whenever they are not
working for the independent movie producers engaged by the respondents.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the complainants but was denied
by NLRC. In effect, they filed an instant petition claiming that NLRC
committed a grave abuse of discretion in: (a) Finding that petitioners were
project employees; (b) Ruling that petitioners were not illegally dismissed;
and (c) Reversing the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
In the instant case, the petitioners allege that the NLRC acted in total
disregard of evidence material or decisive of the controversy.
Issues:
(a) W/N there exist an employee- employer relationship between the
petitioners and the private respondents.
(b) W/N the private respondents are engaged in the business of making
movies.
(c) W/N the producer is a job contractor.
Held:
There exist an employee- employer relationship between the petitioners and
the private respondents because of the ff. reasons that nowhere in the
appointment slip does it appear that it was the producer who hired the crew
February 2, 2000
When the building occupied by the shop was demolished in 1986, the
barbershop closed. But soon a place nearby was rented by petitioners and
the barbershop resumed operations as Cesar's Palace Barbershop and
Massage Clinic. In this new location, private respondent continued to be a
barber and caretaker, but with a fixed monthly honorarium as caretaker, to
wit: from February 1986 to 1990 P700; from February 1990 to March 1991
P800; and from July 1992 P1,300.
In November 1992, private respondent had an altercation with his co-barber,
Jorge Tinoy. The bickerings, characterized by constant exchange of personal
insults during working hours, became serious so that private respondent
reported the matter to Atty. Allan Macaraya of the labor department. The
labor official immediately summoned private respondent and petitioners to a
conference. Upon investigation, it was found out that the dispute was not
between private respondent and petitioners; rather, it was between the
former and his fellow barber. Accordingly, Atty. Macaraya directed
petitioners' counsel, Atty. Prudencio Abragan, to thresh out the problem.
During the mediation meeting held at Atty. Abragan's office a new twist was
added. Despite the assurance that he was not being driven out as caretakerbarber, private respondent demanded payment for several thousand pesos
as his separation pay and other monetary benefits. In order to give the
parties enough time to cool off, Atty. Abragan set another conference but
private respondent did not appear in such meeting anymore.
Meanwhile, private respondent continued reporting for work at the
barbershop. But, on January 2, 1993, he turned over the duplicate keys of the
shop to the cashier and took away all his belongings therefrom. On January
8, 1993, he began working as a regular barber at the newly opened
Goldilocks Barbershop also in Iligan City.
On January 12, 1993, private respondent filed a complaint2 for illegal
dismissal with prayer for payment of separation pay, other monetary
benefits, attorney's fees and damages. Significantly, the complaint did not
seek reinstatement as a positive relief.
ISSUE:
No. The issue in this case has been decided already in the case of PNOC-EDC
vs Leogardo. It is true that PNOC is a GOCC and that PNOC-EDC, being a
subsidiary of PNOC, is likewise a GOCC. It is also true that under the 1973
Constitution, all GOCCs are under the jurisdiction of the CSC. However, the
1987 Constitution change all this as it now provides:
The Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters. (Article IX-B, Section 2 [1])
Hence, the above provision sets the rule that the mere fact that a
corporation is a GOCC does not automatically place it under the CSC. Under
this provision, the test in determining whether a GOCC is subject to the Civil
Service Law is the manner of its creation such that government corporations
created by special charter are subject to its provisions while those
incorporated under the general Corporation Law are not within its coverage.
In the case at bar, PNOC-EDC, even though it is a GOCC, was incorporated
under the general Corporation Law it does not have its own charter, hence,
it is under the jurisdiction of the MOLE.
Even though the facts of this case occurred while the 1973 Constitution was
still in force, the provisions of the 1987 Constitution regarding the legal
matters [procedural aspect] are applicable because it is the law in force at
the time of the decision.
February 2, 1993
term at the end of such period. 14 The general notice of termination given by
respondent university to petitioners was a mere reminder that their contracts
of employment were due to expire and that the contract would no longer be
renewed. 15 Further, it must be noted that after the employment contracts of
herein petitioners as administrative officers expired, they were retained as
faculty members by private respondent.
On the claims of herein petitioners for separation or retirement pay by
reason of the RRR Program of 1984, the contention of private respondents
that petitioners are not entitled to the same, since they were not separated,
is not well-taken. The right of herein petitioners to claim the said benefits
under the 1984 RRR Program of respondent university is unquestionably
evident.
Philips Semiconductor vs. Fardiquela, G.R. No. 141717, April 14,
2004
Facts:
The petitioner Philips Semiconductors (Phils.), Inc. is a domestic corporation
engaged in the production and assembly of semiconductors such as power
devices, RF modules, CATV modules, RF and metal transistors and glass
diods. It caters to domestic and foreign corporations that manufacture
computers, telecommunications equipment and cars. Aside from contractual
employees, the petitioner employed 1,029 regular workers. The employees
were subjected to periodic performance appraisal based on output, quality,
attendance and work attitude. One was required to obtain a performance
rating of at least 3.0 for the period covered by the performance appraisal to
maintain good standing as an employee. On May 8, 1992, respondent Eloisa
Fadriquela executed a Contract of Employment with the petitioner in which
she was hired as a production operator with a daily salary of P118. Her initial
contract was for a period of three months up to August 8, 1992, but was
extended for two months when she garnered a performance rating of 3.15.
Her contract was again renewed for two months or up to December 16,
1992, when she received a performance rating of 3.8.After the expiration of
her third contract, it was extended anew, for three months, that is, from
January 4, 1993 to April 4, 1993. After garnering a performance rating of 3.4,
the respondents contract was extended for another three months, that is,
from April 5, 1993 to June 4, 1993. She, however, incurred five absences in
the month of April, three absences in the month of May and four absences in
the month of June. Line supervisor Shirley F. Velayo asked the respondent
why she incurred the said absences, but the latter failed to explain her side.
The respondent was warned that if she offered no valid justification for her
absences, Velayo would have no other recourse but to recommend the nonrenewal of her contract. The respondent still failed to respond, as a
consequence of which her performance rating declined to 2.8. Velayo
recommended to the petitioner that the respondents employment be
terminated due to habitual absenteeism, in accordance with the Company
Rules and Regulations. Thus, the respondents contract of employment was
no longer renewed.
Issues and Rulings:
(a) whether or not the respondent was still a contractual employee of the
petitioner as of June 4, 1993;
The two kinds of regular employees under the law are (1) those engaged to
perform activities which are necessary or desirable in the usual business or
trade of the employer; and (2) those casual employees who have rendered at
least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to the
activities in which they are employed. The primary standard to determine a
regular employment is the reasonable
connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in
relation to the business or trade of the employer. The test is whether the
former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer. If the employee has been performing the job for at least one year,
even if the performance is not continuous or merely intermittent, the law
deems the repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient
evidence of the necessity, if not indispensability of that activity to the
business of the employer. Hence, the employment is also considered regular,
but only with respect to such activity and while such activity exists.[22] The
law does not provide the qualification that the employee must first be issued
a regular appointment or must be declared as such before he can acquire a
regular employee status. In this case, the respondent was employed by the
petitioner on May 8, 1992 as production operator. She was assigned to wire
building at the transistor division. There is no dispute that the work of the
respondent was necessary or desirable in the business or trade of the
petitioner.
She remained under the employ of the petitioner without any interruption
since May 8, 1992 to June 4, 1993 or for one (1) year and twenty-eight (28)
Price, et al., v Innodata Phils., G.R. No. 178505, September 30, 2008
Facts:
INNODATA had since ceased operations due to business losses in June 2002.
Petitioners Cherry J. Price, Stephanie G. Domingo, and Lolita Arbilera were
employed as formatters by INNODATA. The parties executed an employment
contract denominated as a Contract of Employment for a Fixed Period,
stipulating that the contract shall be effective from FEB. 16, 1999 to FEB. 16,
2000 a period of ONE YEAR. On 16 February 2000, the HRAD Manager of
INNODATA wrote petitioners informing them of their last day of work, at the
end of the close of business hours On February 16, 2000. According to
INNODATA, petitioners employment already ceased due to the end of their
contract.
On 22 May 2000, petitioners filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal and
damages against respondents. Petitioners claimed that they should be
considered regular employees since their positions as formatters were
necessary and desirable to the usual business of INNODATA as an encoding,
conversion and data processing company. Petitioners finally argued that they
could not be considered project employees considering that their
employment was not coterminous with any project or undertaking, the
termination of which was predetermined. Respondents asserted that
petitioners were not illegally dismissed, for their employment was terminated
due to the expiration of their terms of employment.
The Labor Arbiter issued its Decision finding petitioners complaint for illegal
dismissal and damages meritorious.
Respondent INNODATA appealed the Labor Arbiters Decision to the NLRC.
The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiters Decision dated 17 October 2000, and
absolved INNODATA of the charge of illegal dismissal.
On 25 September 2006, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision
sustaining the ruling of the NLRC that petitioners were not illegally
dismissed. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
Whether petitioners were illegally dismissed by respondents
Whether petitioners were hired by INNODATA under valid fixed-term
employment contracts
Ruling:
The Court finds merit in the present Petition. There were no valid fixed-term
contracts and petitioners were regular employees of the INNODATA who
could not be dismissed except for just or authorized cause.
The employment status of a person is defined and prescribed by law and not
by what the parties say it should be. Equally important to consider is that a
contract of employment is impressed with public interest such that labor
contracts must yield to the common good. Thus, provisions of applicable
statutes are deemed written into the contract, and the parties are not at
liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor
laws and regulations by simply contracting with each other. Regular
employment has been defined by Article 280 of the Labor
Code, as amended, which reads: Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment.
The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and
regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be
deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform
activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or
trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a
those to which the parties by free choice have assigned a specific date of
termination.
The decisive determinant in term employment is the day certain agreed
upon by the parties for the commencement and termination of their
employment relationship, a day certain being understood to be that which
must necessarily come, although it may not be known when. Seasonal
employment and employment for a particular project are instances of
employment in which a period, where not expressly set down, is necessarily
implied.
While this Court has recognized the validity of fixed-term employment
contracts, it has consistently held that this is the exception rather than the
general rule. More importantly, a fixed-term employment is valid only under
certain circumstances. In Brent, the very same case invoked by respondents,
the Court identified several circumstances wherein a fixed-term is an
essential and natural appurtenance, to wit:
Some familiar examples may be cited of employment contracts which may
be neither for seasonal work nor for specific projects, but to which a fixed
term is an essential and natural appurtenance: overseas employment
contracts, for one, to which, whatever the nature of the engagement, the
concept of regular employment with all that it implies does not appear ever
to have been applied, Article 280 of the Labor Code notwithstanding; also
appointments to the positions of dean, assistant dean, college secretary,
principal, and other administrative offices in educational institutions, which
are by practice or tradition rotated among the faculty members, and where
fixed terms are a necessity without which no reasonable rotation would be
possible. Similarly, despite the provisions of Article 280, Policy Instructions
No. 8 of the Minister of Labor implicitly recognize that certain company
officials may be elected for what would amount to fixed periods, at the
expiration of which they would have to stand down, in providing that these
officials, "x x may lose their jobs as president, executive vice-president or
vice president, etc. because the stockholders or the board of directors for
one reason or another did not reelect them."
answer the call of nature and relieve himself, afterwhich he returned to his
work place.
But private respondent Cheng Suy Eh was unhappy seeing
petitioner away from his work station and immediately demanded from him a
written explanation allegedly for abandoning his work. As a matter of policy,
respondent company discourages its employees from going to the comfort
room during working hours for sanitary or hygienic purposes as the company
is engaged in the food business.[1]
The following day, 31 July 1992, Marcela Lok, respondent company's
Personnel Manager, handed petitioner a letter asking him to explain in
writing why he left his work station on 17 and 30 July 1992. Petitioner
verbally explained that he never left his station on 17 July while on 30 July he
only went to the comfort room for a short while to answer the call of nature.
[2] Believing that this denial was enough he did not anymore submit any
written explanation. But, for his inability to submit a written explanation,
petitioner was suspended for fifteen (15) days which he contested before the
Arbitration Branch of the NLRC.
On 20 October 1992 petitioner requested a fellow worker to replace him in
his work station so he could go to the comfort room to relieve himself. Again
private respondent Cheng Suy Eh noticed petitioner's brief absence and so,
upon his return, his manager berated him again and required him to submit
once more a written explanation for allegedly abandoning his work.
Petitioner complied.
Finding petitioner's explanation not satisfactory, respondent company
through its Personnel Officer Marcela Lok served petitioner a notice of
termination.
Petitioner thereafter amended his complaint before the NLRC to include
illegal dismissal among his causes of action in view of his termination from
the service.
On 21 September 1994 the Labor Arbiter declared the suspension of
petitioner valid and legal not because he left his production area to relieve
himself but for his utter disregard of the directive of the manager to submit
his written explanation.
His dismissal however was found illegal, but
because of the strained relationship between the parties, the Labor Arbiter
further held that reinstatement was no longer feasible and thereafter
awarded petitioner a limited back wages for six (6) months without
conceived in the course of the trial to further justify his dismissal. To refer to
those alleged earlier violations as further grounds for dismissal is
undoubtedly prejudicial to petitioner. Significantly, it would also be doubly
prejudicial to him to penalize him for those committed on 17 and 30 July
1992 as he was already suspended for fifteen (15) days for those infractions.
This, obviously, denied petitioner procedural due process and deprived him
of his right to be heard, to refute and present evidence to controvert such
accusations prior to his actual dismissal from employment.
As a consequence, petitioner is entitled to reinstatement.[13] The postulate
advanced by the Labor Arbiter that there existed "strained relationship"
between the parties, thus barring reinstatement of petitioner, does not hold
water. Strained relationship may be invoked only against employees whose
positions demand trust and confidence, or whose differences with their
employer are of such nature or degree as to preclude reinstatement. In the
instant case, however, the relationship between petitioner, an ordinary
employee, and management was clearly on an impersonal level. Petitioner
did not occupy such a sensitive position as would require complete trust and
confidence, and where personal ill will would foreclose his reinstatement.[14]
But, interestingly, petitioner himself was praying for his reinstatement.
nursing aide with MCCH since August 1974. Both petitioners were dismissed
by the respondent hospital for allegedly participating in an illegal strike.
The instant controversy arose from an intra-union conflict between the
NAMA-MCCH and the National Labor Federation (NFL), the mother federation
of NAMA-MCCH. In November 1995, NAMA-MCCH asked MCCH to renew their
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), which was set to expire on
December 31, 1995. NFL, however, opposed this move by its local affiliate.
Mindful of the apparent intra-union dispute, MCCH decided to defer the CBA
negotiations until there was a determination as to which of said unions had
the right to negotiate a new CBA.
Believing that their union was the certified collective bargaining agent, the
members and officers of NAMA-MCCH staged a series of mass actions inside
MCCHs premises starting February 27, 1996. They marched around the
hospital putting up streamers, placards and posters.
On March 13 and 19, 1996, the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) office in Region 7 issued two (2) certifications stating that NAMAMCCH was not a registered labor organization. This finding, however, did not
deter NAMA-MCCH from filing a notice of strike with the Region 7 Office of the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). Said notice was, however,
disregarded by the NCMB for want of legal personality of the union.
Meanwhile, the MCCH management received reports that petitioners
participated in NAMA-MCCHs mass actions. Consequently, notices were
served on all union members, petitioners included, asking them to explain in
writing why they were wearing red and black ribbons and roaming around
the hospital with placards. In their collective response dated March 18, 1996,
the union members, including petitioners, explained that wearing armbands
and putting up placards was their answer to MCCHs illegal refusal to
negotiate with NAMA-MCCH.
Subsequently, on March 28, 1996, MCCH notified the petitioners that they
were to be investigated for their activities in the mass actions, with the
hearings being scheduled on March 28, 1996 and April 1, 1996. Petitioners,
however, denied receiving said notices. In a notice dated April 8, 1996,
MCCH ordered petitioners to desist from participating in the mass actions
conducted in the hospital premises with a warning that non-compliance
therewith would result in the imposition of disciplinary measures. Petitioners
again claimed they did not receive said order. Petitioners Bascon and Cole
were then served notices terminating their employment effective April 12,
1996 and April 19, 1996, respectively.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts of the Petitioners were just cause for their
termination?
RULING:
No, the acts of the did not constitute petitioners were terminated for
allegedly participating in an illegal strike and gross insubordination to the
order prohibiting them from wearing armbands and putting up placards, not
for ipso facto failing to show up in the scheduled investigation. Thus, the real
issue is whether or not petitioners were validly terminated for (1) allegedly
participating in an illegal strike and/or (2) gross insubordination to the order
to stop wearing armbands and putting up placards.
As to the first ground, Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code provides in part that:
Any union officer who knowingly participates in illegal strike and any
worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of
illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment
status (Emphasis ours)
Thus, while a union officer can be terminated for mere participation in an
illegal strike, an ordinary striking employee, like petitioners herein, must
have participated in the commission of illegal acts during the strike
(underscoring supplied). There must be proof that they committed illegal
acts during the strike.[14] But proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required.
Substantial evidence, which may justify the imposition of the penalty of
dismissal, may suffice.
In this case, the Court of Appeals found that petitioners actual participation
in the illegal strike was limited to wearing armbands and putting up placards.
There was no finding that the armbands or the placards contained offensive
words or symbols. Thus, neither such wearing of armbands nor said putting
up of placards can be construed as an illegal act. In fact, per se, they are
within the mantle of constitutional protection under freedom of speech.
premises, she saw a packing tape near her work area and placed it inside her
bag because it would be useful in her transfer of residence. When the lady
guard on duty inspected Helens bag, she found the packing tape inside her
bag. The guard confiscated it and submitted an incident report[5] dated
September 5, 2003 to the Guard-in-Charge, who, in turn, submitted a
memorandum[6] regarding the incident to the Human Resources and
Administration Department on the same date.
The following day, or on September 6, 2003, respondent company issued a
show cause notice[7] to Helen accusing her of violating F.2 of the companys
Code of Conduct, which says, Any act constituting theft or robbery, or any
attempt to commit theft or robbery, of any company property or other
associates property.
Penalty: D (dismissal).[8]
Paul Cupon, Helens
supervisor, called her to his office and directed her to explain in writing why
no disciplinary action should be taken against her.
Helen, in her explanation,[9] admitted the offense and even manifested that
she would accept whatever penalty would be imposed upon her. She,
however, did not reckon that respondent company would terminate her
services for her admitted offense.[10]
On September 26, 2003, Helen received a notice[11] of disciplinary action
informing her that Keihin has decided to terminate her services.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of Helen was valid based on serious misconduct
RULING:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts of Victor De Guzman constitute serious misconduct?
RULING:
After a careful and painstaking study of the records of the case, the Court
rules that the respondents dismissal from employment was not grounded on
any of the just causes enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code.
The term trust and confidence is restricted to managerial employees.[33]
In this case, it is undisputed that respondent De Guzman, as the Facilities
Section Manager, occupied a position of responsibility, a position imbued
with trust and confidence. Among others, it was his responsibility to see to it
that the garbage and scrap materials of petitioner FCPP were adequately
managed and disposed of. Thus, respondent De Guzman was entrusted with
the duty of handling or taking care of the property of his employer, i.e., the
steel purlins which the petitioners allege the respondent prematurely
declared as scrap materials.
However, to be valid ground for dismissal, loss of trust and confidence must
be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts.
A breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without
justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly,
thoughtlessly, heedlessly, or inadvertently. It must rest on substantial
grounds and not on the employers arbitrariness, whims, caprices or
suspicion; otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of
the employer.[34] Loss of confidence must not be indiscriminately used as a
shield by the employer against a claim that the dismissal of an employee
was arbitrary. And, in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act
complained of must be work-related and shows that the employee concerned
is unfit to continue working for the employer.[35]
The Court had the occasion to reiterate in Nokom v. National Labor Relations
Commission[36] the guidelines for the application of the doctrine of loss of
confidencea. loss of confidence should not be simulated;
b. it should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper,
illegal or unjustified;
c. it may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to
the contrary; and
d. it must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken
in bad faith.[37]
In the case at bar, the grounds relied upon by petitioner FCPP in terminating
the employment of respondent De Guzman are contained in the Inter-Office
Memorandum dated August 23, 1999 which effectively terminated the
latters employment:
We have carefully evaluated your case and we are convinced that you have
committed grave abuse of authority amounting to serious misconduct and
willful breach of trust and confidence.
6.
That in previous occasions, it was reported by Mr. Manaig that you
solicited from him empty drums, pails and corrugated cartons which were all
part of those scraps picked up from FCPP and you never paid any of them, a
fact which you never denied in your explanation which is tantamount to
admission.
Based on the foregoing, it is our well-discerned view that the transaction was
exclusively limited between you and Saros. Except for your self-serving
explanation, you failed miserably to present direct evidence that it was the
Sta. Rosa Baptist church which bought the subject metals from Saros, as
what you want us to believe. At best, your explanation is a mere
afterthought desperately concocted to exculpate yourself.
As Facilities Manager, a very sensitive and confidential position, the nature of
your work demands of you that your actions should not be tainted with any
suspicion or impropriety. However, you failed in this regard and abused your
position to advance your self-interest.
After her resignation, Soriano filed a suit for illegal termination alleging that
she was forced to resign due to professional and sexual harassment. She
alleged that her superiors are preventing her former colleagues in testifying
to the sexual harassment. She produced an affidavit by one of the persons
involved with Digitel stating that the employees of the company were being
forced not to testify against Go and Severino. In defense, Go and Severino
provided witnesses that testified that the acts alleged by Soriano din not
happen.
The Labor Arbiter held that Mariquit voluntarily resigned, thus dismissing the
complaint. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of NLRC. Hence,this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Soriano was forced to resign, due to professional and
sexual harassment, thus amounting to constructive dismissal.
HELD:
Sorianos own allegation, although they are so detailed, appear incredible if
not downright puny. An analysis of her statements shows that her own
conclusion that she was being sexually and professionally harassed was on
the basis of her own suppositions, conjectures, and surmises.
She could not satisfactorily explain her allegation that she was consistently
professionally harassed by respondent Severino. The latters alleged words:
How come you claim you know so much yet nothing ever gets done in your
department? do not jurisprudentially constitute nor clearly establish
professional harassment. Aside from these words, the complainant could
only venture to allege instances in general and vague terms. As to the facts
allegedly constituting sexual harassment advanced by Go and Severino,
after an objective analysis over their assertions as stated in their respective
counter-affidavits and further considering the other supporting documents
attached to the respondents pleadings, it is found that these far out weigh
the Sorianos own evidence
A reading of the affidavit of the witness, who was never an employee nor
present at the party of Digitel, reveals, however, that she merely
concluded that the employees of Digitel were instructed or harassed not to
testify in favor of Soriano when they failed to meet one Matet Ruiz, a Digitel
ISSUE1.
WON Magdalena is a credible witness
WON Belegan is guilty of grave misconduct.
HELD1.
YES. Rules on character evidence provision pertain only to criminal cases,
not to administrative offenses. Even if it is applicable to admin cases, only
character evidence that would establish the probability or improbability of
the offense charged may be proved. Character evidence must be limited to
the traits and characteristics involved in the type of offense charged. In this
case, no evidence bearing on Magdalenas chastity. What were presented
were charges for grave oral defamation, grave threats, unjust vexation,
physical injuries, malicious mischief, etc. filed against her.
Regarding Magdalenas credibility as a witness, the charges and complaints
against her happened way back in the70s and 80s while the act complained
of happened in 1994, thus, the said charges are no longer reliable proofs of
Magdalenas character or reputation. Evidence of ones character or
reputation must be confined to a time not too remote from the time in
question. In other words, what is to be determined is the character or
reputation of the person at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a
period remote from the commencement of the suit.
It is unfair to presume that a person who has wandered from the path of
moral righteousness can never retrace his steps again. Certainly, every
person is capable to change or reform.
The general rule prevailing in a great majority of jurisdictions is that it is not
permissible to show that a witness has been arrested or that he has been
charged with or prosecuted for a criminal offense, or confined in jail for the
purpose of impairing his credibility. This view has usually been based upon
one or more of the following grounds or theories: (a) that a mere unproven
charge against the witness does not logically tend to affect his credibility,
(b)that innocent persons are often arrested or accused of a crime, (c) that
one accused of a crime is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is legally
established, and (d) that a witness may not be impeached or discredited by
evidence of particular acts of misconduct.
Facts:
Corazon P. Taguiam was the Class Adviser of Grade 5-Esmeralda of the
petitioner, School of the Holy Spirit of Quezon City. On March 10, 2000, the
class president, wrote a letter to the grade school principal requesting
permission to hold a year-end celebration at the school grounds. The
principal authorized the activity and allowed the pupils to use the swimming
pool. In this connection, respondent distributed the parent's/guardian's
permit forms to the pupils. Corazon P. Taguiam admitted that Chiara Mae
Federico's permit form was unsigned.
Nevertheless, she concluded that Chiara Mae was allowed by her mother to
join the activity since her mother personally brought her to the school with
her packed lunch and swimsuit. Before the activity started, she warned the
pupils who did not know how to swim to avoid the deeper area. However,
while the pupils were swimming, two of them sneaked out. Respondent went
after them to verify where they were going.
Unfortunately, while respondent was away, Chiara Mae drowned. When she
returned, the maintenance man was already administering cardiopulmonary
resuscitation on Chiara Mae. The child was still alive when respondent rushed
her to the General Malvar Hospital where she was pronounced dead on
arrival. Corazon P. Taguiam was dismissed for gross negligence resulting to
loss of confidence.
Issue:
Was the dismissal based on the ground as stated valid?
Ruling:
Yes the dismissal was valid. Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, gross and
habitual neglect of duties is a valid ground for an employer to terminate an
employee. Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or a failure to
exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a
thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid
them. Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform one's duties for a
period of time, depending upon the circumstances. Respondent had been
grossly negligent. First , it is undisputed that Chiara Mae's permit form was
unsigned. Yet, respondent allowed her to join the activity because she
assumed that Chiara Mae's mother has allowed her to join it by personally
bringing her to the school with her packed lunch and swimsuit. The purpose
of a permit form is precisely to ensure that the parents have allowed their
child to join the school activity involved. Respondent cannot simply ignore
this by resorting to assumptions. Respondent admitted that she was around
when Chiara Mae and her mother arrived. She could have requested the
mother to sign the permit form before she left the school or at least called
her up to obtain her conformity. Second, it was respondent's responsibility as
Class Adviser to supervise her class in all activities sanctioned by the school.
Thus, she should have coordinated with the school to ensure that proper
safeguards, such as adequate first aid and sufficient adult personnel, were
present during their activity. She should have been mindful of the fact that
with the number of pupils involved, it would be impossible for her by herself
alone to keep an eye on each one of them. Notably, respondent's negligence,
although gross, was not habitual. In view of the considerable resultant
damage, however, the cause is sufficient to dismiss respondent.
This is not the first time that the SC have departed from the requirements
laid down by the law that neglect of duties must be both gross and habitual.
In Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC, we ruled that Philippine Airlines (PAL)
cannot be legally compelled to continue with the employment of a person
admittedly guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his duties
although it was his first offense. In that case, we noted that a
mere delay on PAL's flight schedule due to aircraft damage entails problems
like hotel accommodations for its passengers, re-booking, the possibility of
law suits, and payment of special landing fees not to mention the soaring
costs of replacing aircraft parts. In another case, Fuentes v. National Labor
Relations Commission, we held that it would be unfair to compel Philippine
Banking Corporation to continue employing its bank teller. In that case, we
observed that although the teller's infraction was not habitual, a substantial
amount of money was lost. The deposit slip had already been validated prior
to its loss and the amount reflected thereon is already considered as current
liabilities in the bank's balance sheet. Indeed, the sufficiency of the evidence
as well as the resultant damage to the employer should be considered in the
dismissal of the employee. In this case, the damage went as far as claiming
the life of a child. As a result of gross negligence in the present case,
petitioners lost its trust and confidence in respondent. Loss of trust and
confidence to be a valid ground for dismissal must be based on a willful
breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts. A breach is willful if
it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely, without justifiable excuse,
backwages to two (2) years only. 2 The Labor Tribunal opined that "Pinuela
could not be blamed for the accident as he relied on the signal of the
headsetman (Camina) who still signaled to him despite the fact that the nose
of the aircraft being towed was about to overshoot the yellow line and the
aircraft wing was about to hit the airbridge." 3
Hence, this recourse, the issue being whether or not the NLRC gravely
abused its discretion in appreciating the facts of the case. Petitioner PAL
contends that the records do not reveal that a tow operator can rely only on
a headsetman. According to the Engineering Manual of petitioner, a tug
operator must tipguide positive visual contact with the wing tipguide when
towing aircraft in congested areas. Thus, PAL avers that Pinuela should have
relied on the signal of Manalaysay, then wing tipguide, and not on Camina,
the headsetman.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts of Nathaniel Pinuela constitute gross and habitual
neglect of duties
RULING:
One must admit that towing an aircraft is a group activity necessitating
group coordination. This is explicit in petitioner's Engineering and
Maintenance Manual which states, "that the tug operator must undertake
and/or continue on towing/pushing procedure only when positive visual
contact with all guidemen is possible." The use of, "all necessary guidemen"
indicates plurality or group coordination. Thus, instead of relying solely on
the signals of Camina, Pinuela should have also checked with the other
ground crew personnel.
Particularly, Pinuela should have relied on Manalaysay, Exhibit 2 distinctly
shows the relative position of the plane, ground crew personnel and the
airport's aerobridge when the incident happened. Manalaysay, who was near
the marked line and the nearest obstruction which was the aerobridge and
the parked service vehicle, was strategically located. For Pinuela to claim
that he relied on Camina for signals is not credible, for he demonstrated
before the Labor Arbiter that he had to turn 180 degrees to see Camina who
was directly at his back. 9
RULING:
In the case at bar, the bank's inaction merely created a condition under
which the loss was sustained. Regardless of whether there was a failure to
investigate, the fact is that the money was lost in the first place due to
petitioner's gross negligence. Such gross negligence was the immediate and
determining factor in the loss.
Besides, the petitioner's position is anathema to banking operations. By
conducting an instant search on its depositors for every loss that occurs,
management holds suspect each depositor within its premises. Considering
that currency in the form of money bills bears no distinct earmarks which
would distinguish it from other similar bills of similar denominations except
as to its serial numbers, any innocent depositor with P50,000 in his
possession would be a likely suspect. Such act would do violence to the
fiduciary relationship between a bank and its depositors. Ultimately it will
result in the loss of valued depositors.
Petitioner argues further that the NLRC failed to consider that petitioner left
her cage at the instance of the Chief Teller. Again we are not persuaded. The
findings of the NLRC are clear. Petitioner left at her own volition to approach
her Chief Teller to ask for the remaining checks to ascertain their authenticity
and completeness. Besides, irrespective of who summoned her, her
responsibility over the cash entrusted to her remained.
Although petitioner's infraction was not habitual, we took into account the
substantial amount lost. Since the deposit slip for P200,000.00 had already
been validated prior to the loss, the act of depositing had already been
complete and from thereon, the bank had already assumed the deposit as a
liability to its depositors. Cash deposits are not assets to banks but are
recognized as current liabilities in its balance sheet.
March 5, 2004
Court agrees that human nature engenders, in the normal course of things, a
certain degree of hostility as a result of litigation, the strained relations are
not necessarily sufficient to rule out reinstatement. As aptly put by the Court
of Appeals, "if petitioners contention should be sustained, reinstatement
would thus become the exception rather than the rule in cases of illegal
dismissal."
ISSUE:
Whether the absences of the respondent constitute gross and habitual
neglect of duties
Held:
The Court affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals. Respondents rule
penalizing with discharge any employee incurring six (6) or more absences
without permission or subsequent justification is admittedly within the
Employee. Galera, on the belief that she is an employee, filed her complaint
before the Labor Arbiter. On the other hand, WPP, Steedman, Webster and
Lansang contend that Galera is a corporate officer; hence, any controversy
regarding her dismissal is under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
We agree with Galera. Corporate officers are given such character either by
the Corporation Code or by the corporation's by-laws. Galera's appointment
as a corporate officer (Vice-President with the operational title of Managing
Director of Mindshare) during a special meeting of WPP's Board of Directors
is an appointment to a non-existent corporate office. At the time of Galera's
appointment, WPP already had one Vice-President in the person of Webster
and all five directorship positions provided in the by-laws are already
occupied. Another
indicator that she was a regular employee and not a corporate officer is
Section 14 of the contract, which clearly states that she is a permanent
employee not a Vice-President or a member of the Board of Directors.
Another convincing indication that she was only a regular employee and not
a corporate officer is the disciplinary procedure, which states that her right of
redress is through Mindshare's Chief Executive Officer for the Asia-Pacific.
This implies that she was not under the disciplinary control of private
respondent WPP's Board of Directors (BOD), which should have been the
case if in fact she was a corporate officer because only the Board of Directors
could appoint and terminate such a corporate officer.
WPP's dismissal of Galera lacked both substantive and procedural due
process. Apart from Steedman's letter dated 15 December 2000 to Galera,
WPP failed to prove any just or authorized cause for Galera's dismissal.
Steedman's letter to Galera reads: The operations are currently in a shamble.
There is lack of leadership and confidence in your abilities from within, our
agency partners and some clients. Most of the staff I spoke with felt they got
more guidance and direction from Minda than yourself. In your role as
Managing Director, that is just not acceptable. I believe your priorities are
mismanaged. The recent situation where you felt an internal strategy
meeting was more important than a new business pitch is a good example.
You failed to lead and advise on the two new business pitches. In both cases,
those involved sort (sic) Minda's input.
As I discussed with you back in July, my directive was for you to lead and
review all business pitches. It is obvious [that] confusion existed internally
right up until the day of the pitch. The quality output is still not to an
acceptable standard, which was also part of my directive that you needed to
focus on back in July. I do not believe you understand the basic skills and
industry knowledge required to run a media special operation.
WPP, Steedman, Webster, and Lansang, however, failed to substantiate the
allegations in Steedman's letter. Galera, on the other hand, presented
documentary evidence 22 in the form of congratulatory letters, including one
from Steedman, which contents are diametrically opposed to the 15
December 2000 letter. The law further requires that the employer must
furnish the worker sought to be dismissed with two written notices before
termination of employment can be legally effected: (1) notice which apprises
the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is
sought; and (2) the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the
employer's decision to dismiss him. Failure to comply with the requirements
taints the dismissal with illegality. 23 WPP's acts clearly show that Galera's
dismissal did not comply with the two-notice rule.
The Motion for Reconsideration was denied, hence this petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a validly dismissed employee may be entitled to separation
pay.
RULING:
The Supreme Court DENIED petition for lack of merit.
The Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners
unauthorized absences and repeated infractions of company rules on
employee discipline manifest gross and habitual neglect of duty that merited
the imposition of the supreme penalty of dismissal from work. Serious
misconduct is said to be a transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and
indicative of wrongful intent and not mere error of judgment. Oddly,
petitioner never advanced any valid reason to justify his absences.
Following jurisprudence, it is held that a series of irregularities when put
together may constitute serious misconduct. Hence, the petitioner is not
entitled to separation pay. The liberality of the law can never be extended to
the unworthy and undeserving.
FACTS:
On 12 May 1990, petitioner asked for two (2) weeks of vacation leave from 7
May to 20 May 1990, but the same was disapproved except for two (2) days
of leave on 14 and 15 of May 1990 to enable petitioner to attend to family
problems. Petitioner did not report for work from 16 to 19 of May 1990. Upon
orders of respondent company, petitioner submitted a written explanation
citing his wife's childbirth and family problems as reasons for his absences.
Petitioner was meted five (5) days suspension for unexcused absences and
for insubordination.
In spite of his previous absences, petitioner, as union officer, asked for fiftyfour (54) days of leave from 9 July 1990 to 31 August 1990 to prepare for
CBA negotiations and union activities. The request was denied and instead
the management advised petitioner to file his leave on a weekly basis, as
approval thereof was contingent on the necessity of his presence in the
operations of the Texturizing Department of respondent company. Petitioner
completely ignored this directive and absented himself from work starting 21
July 1990 until 16 August 1990. In a memorandum of the personnel
department dated 3 August 1990, petitioner was asked to submit a written
explanation for his absences. Respondent company never received any letter
of explanation. In a memorandum dated 28 August 1990, the company,
through its personnel manager, terminated petitioner's services to take
effect on 29 August 1990 "for excessive absences, insubordination, and
violation of existing company rules and regulations".
ISSUE:
Whether or not the excessive absences of the petitioner a valid ground for
his termination.
RULING:
The NLRC found that petitioner had no regard for his work. His applications
for a series of leaves of absence attest to his unconcern for his duties in
respondent company. On the other hand, respondent company has to protect
its interests in order to have an efficient and productive enterprise. It is in
this light that the law recognizes what are clearly "management
prerogatives", or the right of the employer to hire, fire, transfer, demote or
promote employees. Doubtless, what respondent did in this case was a
management prerogative. The need for petitioner's presence in the
ISSUE
WON the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in modifying the
decision of the Labor Arbiter
HELD
declared that should he fail to report back for work at the end of his vacation,
it is understood that he would be automatically terminated by his employer.
He signed the typewritten application without reading its contents because
he was being scolded by Virginia Tan, who likewise forced him to sign.
Thereafter, he took some of his belongings from the lumbers bunkhouse and
left with his brother using a government vehicle.[5] When he left U-Need on
May 4, 1992, he had an outstanding account. However, it was not in the sum
of P1,750.00 as alleged by private respondent because as far as he knew,
amounts had been automatically deducted from his wages.[6]
It turned out that, as gleaned from the records of the Election Registrar,
Baguio City, he was a registered voter of Middle Rock Quarry, Baguio City,
not Calanasan.[7] He claimed that he only registered therein so that he
could cast his vote in Baguio should he fail to return to his domicile.[8] When
he reported for work on May 14, 1992, he was told that he had already been
dismissed from employment.
On October 16, 1993, RCPI required petitioner to explain why he should not
be dismissed from employment.[3] Two days thereafter, petitioner wrote a
letter to the Field Auditor stating that the missing funds were used for the
payment of the retirement benefits earlier referred to by the branch manager
and that he had already paid P25,000.00 to RCPI. After making two more
payments of the cash shortage to RCPI, petitioner was informed by the
district manager that he is being placed under preventive suspension.[4]
Thereafter, he again paid two more sums on different dates to RCPI leaving a
balance of P6,995.37 of the shortage.
Respondent RCPI claims that it sent a letter to petitioner on November 22,
1993 informing him of the termination of his services as of November 20,
1993 due to the following reasons:
"a) Your allegation that part of your cash shortages was used for payment of
salaries/wages and retirement benefits is not true because these have been
accounted previously per auditors report;
"b) As Station Cashier you must be aware of our company Circular No. 63
which strictly requires the daily and up-to-date preparation of Statistical
Report and depositing of cash collections twice a day. But these procedures more particularly on depositing of cash collections twice a day - was
completely disregarded by you;
"c) Deliberate withholding of collections to hide shortages/malversation or
misappropriation in any form, as emphasized under Section No. 20 of our
Rules and Regulations, is penalized by immediate dismissal;
"d) The position of Station Cashier is one which requires utmost trust and
confidence.[5]
Unaware of the termination letter, petitioner requested that he be reinstated
considering that the period of his preventive suspension had expired.
Sometime in September 1995, petitioner manifested to RCPI his willingness
to settle his case provided he is given his retirement benefits. However, RCPI
informed petitioner that his employment had already been terminated earlier
as contained in the letter dated November 22, 1993. The conflict was
submitted to the grievance committee. Despite the lapse of more than two
twenty-four long years of service - this would have been his first offense. The
Court thus holds that the dismissal imposed on petitioner is unduly harsh and
grossly disproportionate to the infraction which led to the termination of his
services. A lighter penalty would have been more just, if not humane. In any
case, petitioner paid back the cash shortage in his accounts. Considering,
however, that the latter is about to retire or may have retired from work, it
would no longer be practical to order his reinstatement.
to the CLH-Zobel Branch, Makati City, effective the next working day from
receipt thereof for violation of Section 9 of the Handbook on Company
Policies and Guidelines and Employees Code of Conduct, with a warning that
a repetition of said violation will be penalized with the supreme sanction of
dismissal. Vincent Montenegro claims that for the sexual harassment case,
he was meted 35 days suspension which he contends is a violation of the 30day suspension. Thereafter, he was transferred to Makati.
Herminia Montenegro was charged with dishonest acts committed by causing
the redemption of two (2) pieces of jewelry specifically described in pawn
tickets 008664 and 008665, allegedly, through the use of falsified affidavit of
loss. A formal administrative investigation was conducted on 15 October
1997. Findings of said investigation showed that respondent Herminia
Montenegro committed dishonesty and misconduct violative of Rule 22,
Section 2 of the Handbook on Company Policies, hence, she was dismissed
from employment. Herminia Montenegro averred, however, that her only
participation was the approval of the redemption of the pawned items by a
certain Agnes Moradas who submitted an affidavit of loss of pawnshop
tickets.
Carlos Pedro Sara was charged with incompetence and dishonesty. During
the administrative investigation conducted on 05 December 1997, the
investigating committee reported that Sara admitted having intentionally
overweighed an item in favor of a customer but the report about which he
refused to sign. It was also discovered that Sara was directly responsible for
the loss of certain jewelry as disclosed in an audit report.
Marites Noble was charged with having involved in the over-appraisal of an
item and having accepted a gold plated item. She claims that she had to
accept the over-appraised item to attract customers as the branch has just
opened. As for the fake item she accepted, Noble avers that the item is so
thickly plated that it could not be detected by merely applying the usual
procedure. During the formal investigation conducted on 05 December
1997, it was discovered and admitted by Noble that she intentionally overappraised the subject pawned fake item by increasing their true weights.
Later, it turned out that the fake items belong to Noble herself.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the termination of the respondents were with just cause?
RULING:
At the onset, it is pertinent to note that the second issue raised in the instant
petition inquires into the factual findings of the court a quo. The petitioners
are fundamentally raising a question of fact regarding the appellate courts
finding that the charge of falsification was not substantially proved. The
petitioner would have us sift through the evidence on record and pass upon
whether the signatures found on the Affidavit of Loss vis--vis the pawn
tickets are similar or not. This clearly involves a factual inquiry, the
determination of which is the statutory function of the NLRC.[20]
Elementary is the principle that this court is not a trier of facts. Judicial
review of labor cases does not go beyond the evaluation of the sufficiency of
the evidence upon which its labor officials findings rest.[21] As such, the
findings of facts and conclusion of the NLRC are generally accorded not only
great weight and respect but even clothed with finality and deemed binding
on this Court as long as they are supported by substantial evidence.[22] We
find no basis for deviating from the aforestated doctrine without any clear
showing that the findings of the labor arbiter, as affirmed by the NLRC and
the Court of Appeals, are bereft of sufficient substantiation. Well-settled is
the rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors
of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are completely
devoid of support from the evidence on record or the assailed judgment is
based on a gross misapprehension of facts.[23] What is more, factual
findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC, when affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, are conclusive upon the parties and binding on this Court.[24]
In the case at bar, the issue of the veracity of the signature appearing on the
questioned Affidavit of Loss has been undoubtedly passed upon by, not one,
not two, but three tribunals all having the same findings that there is no
evident showing that the said document is indeed falsified.
Be that as it may, we believe it proper to address and clarify petitioners
postulation that the Court of Appeals adopted the view that the degree of
proof required in Labor cases is proof beyond reasonable doubt instead of
merely substantial evidence.
Petitioners allege that they have lost trust and confidence in the respondent
due to the latters actions. The Labor Arbiter, however, found it hard to see
the basis of the loss of trust and confidence in the light of the insufficiency of
evidence presented by the petitioners, succinctly put thus:
. . . There is no showing that the affidavit of loss was a falsified one. Neither
is there any competent evidence submitted by the respondents to prove that
Mrs. Montenegro was the one who caused the execution thereof, granting
that the same is a falsified one. Henceforth, her dismissal from employment
based on the charge against her is illegal.[25]
The NLRC, affirming the aforequoted pronouncement of the Labor Arbiter,
added that:
The Affidavit of Loss not having been repudiated by the one who executed
the same, said affidavit stands and cannot be said to have been forged or a
fake one. Hence, we sustain the findings and ruling of the Labor Arbiter
relative to complainant Ms. Montenegro.
Promulgated:
Respondent.
May 9, 2005
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Bungabong had been working for five years as a food attendant
in petitioners Ermita outlet. On December 6, 1997 at around 1:30 a.m., the
Duty Manager Alvin Biscocho, allegedly caught one Felix Sabado, another
employee, consuming some beer from the establishments beer dispenser.
While the duty manager did not actually see respondent, he concluded that
respondent was involved too, because earlier that night, a driver, Jonathan
Andra, reported that he saw respondent with Sabado drinking beer from the
dispenser. The next day, the duty manager called respondent, inquiring
about the latters involvement, and showed him a letter of Sabado admitting
to the offense of drinking beer, and then told him to file an incident report.
Thereafter, Criselda Cusi, the outlets unit manager, issued an offense notice.
Respondent denied any involvement in the theft of beer, asserting that only
Sabado was involved and was caught. Cusi reported the incident to the head
office of Pizza Hut.
On December 15, respondent was informed of his preventive suspension. He
was told to report to the Human Resources Department (HRD) of the
company for investigation. During the investigation, respondent stated,
driver Andra was with the Vice-President for HRD, co-petitioner Janet Ruth M.
Solsoloy. Andra then pointed to respondent, and stated that respondent was
with Sabado in drinking the companys beer on December 5, 1997, at around
11:30 to 12:00 p.m. A guard on duty, Rossman Manaloto, also stated that on
the evening of said date, he confronted respondent and asked why
respondent smelled of beer, but respondent ignored the inquiry and hurriedly
left. A crew member of the outlet, Daniel Gatdula, also reported on how the
respondent bragged how much beer he could drink on his way passing out of
the beer dispenser area.
After the investigation, a certain Ms. Ellen of the HRD explained to the
respondent the penalty for his alleged offense. She told respondent he
should no longer report for work. Respondent was advised to go home. He
then refused to receive his letter of termination, which followed after the
investigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent held a position entrusted with trust and
confidence?
RULING:
Contrary to the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, which eventually the Court of Appeals affirmed, we find that petitioner Philippine Pizza,
Inc. established the existence of just cause to terminate respondent on the
ground of loss of trust and confidence.
Where the employee has access to the employers property in the form
of merchandise and articles for sale, the relationship of the employer and the
employee necessarily involves trust and confidence.[24] Hence, when
respondent drank stolen beer from the dispenser of Pizza Hut-Ermita on
December 6, 1997, he gave cause for his termination and his termination
was within the ambit of Article 282 of the Labor Code.
Now, however, as regards violations of the procedural requirement for
valid dismissal, the petitioners could be justly faulted. Book V, Rule XIV of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 in effect at the time
respondent was terminated, outlines the procedure for termination of employment.[25] It provides as follows:
Sec. 1. Security of tenure and due process. No worker shall be dis missed except for a just or authorized cause provided by law and after due
process.
Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. Any employer who seeks to dismiss a
worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the particular acts or
omissions constituting the grounds for his dismissal.
In cases of
abandonment of work, the notice shall be served at the workers last known
address.
. . .
Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. The worker may answer the allegations
stated against him in the notice of dismissal within a reasonable period from
receipt of such notice.
The employer shall afford the worker ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his
representatives, if he so desires.
Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. The employer shall immediately no tify a
worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons
therefor.
FACTS:
First Philippine Scales, Inc. (FPSI), a domestic corporation engaged in the
manufacturing of weighing scales, employed Bergante and Inguillo as
assemblers on August 15, 1977 and September 10, 1986, respectively.
In 1991, FPSI and First Philippine Scales Industries Labor Union (FPSILU)
[3] entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA),[4] the duration of
which was for a period of five (5) years starting on September 12, 1991 until
September 12, 1996.
On September 19, 1991, the members of FPSILU
ratified the CBA in a document entitled RATIPIKASYON NG KASUNDUAN.[5]
Bergante and Inguillo, who were members of FPSILU, signed the said
document.[6]
During the lifetime of the CBA, Bergante, Inguillo and several FPSI
employees joined another union, the Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa
(NLM), which was affiliated with a federation called KATIPUNAN (NLMKATIPUNAN, for brevity).
Subsequently, NLM-KATIPUNAN filed with the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) an intra-union dispute[7]
against FPSILU and FPSI. In said case, the Med-Arbiter decided[8] in favor of
FPSILU.
It also ordered the officers and members of NLM-KATIPUNAN to
return to FPSILU the amount of P90,000.00 pertaining to the union dues
erroneously collected from the employees. Upon finality of the Med-Arbiter's
Decision, a Writ of Execution[9] was issued to collect the adjudged amount
from NLM-KATIPUNAN. However, as no amount was recovered, notices of
garnishment were issued to United Coconut Planters Bank (Kalookan City
Branch)[10] and to FPSI[11] for the latter to hold for FPSILU the earnings of
Domingo Grutas, Jr. (Grutas) and Inguillo, formerly FPSILU's President and
Secretary for Finance, respectively, to the extent of P13,032.18. Resultantly,
the amount of P5,140.55 was collected,[12] P1,695.72 of which came from
the salary of Grutas, while the P3,444.83 came from that of Inguillo.
Meanwhile, on March 29, 1996, the executive board and members of
the FPSILU addressed a document dated March 18, 1996 denominated as
Petisyon[13] to FPSI's general manager, Amparo Policarpio (Policarpio),
seeking the termination of the services of the following employees, namely:
Grutas, Yolanda Tapang, Shirley Tapang, Gerry Trinidad, Gilbert Lucero,
registered labor organization and the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank
and file employees of the petitioner company.
A Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), was executed between TDI and
TDLU. The CBA was duly ratified by a majority of the workers in TDI including
herein private respondents and contained a union security clause which
provides that all workers who are or may during the effectivity of the CBA,
become members of the Union in accordance with its Constitution and ByLaws shall, as a condition of their continued employment, maintain
membership in good standing in the Union for the duration of the
agreement.
While the CBA was in effect and within the contract bar period the private
respondents joined another union, the Kaisahan Ng Manggagawang Pilipino
(KAMPIL) and organized its local chapter in TDI. KAMPIL filed a petition for
certification election to determine union representation in TDI, which
development compelled TDI to file a grievance with TDLU.
TDLU created a committee to investigate its erring members in accordance
with its by-laws which are not disputed by the private respondents.
Thereafter, TDLU, through the Investigating Committee and approved by
TDLU's Board of Directors, expelled the private respondents from TDLU for
disloyalty to the Union. By letter, TDLU notified TDI that private respondents
had been expelled from TDLU and demanded that TDI terminate the
employment of private, respondents because they had lost their membership
with TDLU.
The private respondents were later on terminated. In their petition, private
respondents contend that their act of organizing a local chapter of KAMPIL
and eventual filing of a petition for certification election was pursuant to
their constitutional right to self-organization.
ISSUES:
a) whether or not TDI was justified in terminating private respondents'
employment in the company on the basis of TDLU's demand for the
enforcement of the Union Security Clause of the CBA between TDI and TDLU;
and
b) whether or not TDI is guilty of unfair labor practice in complying with
TDLU's demand for the dismissal of private respondents.
HELD:
respondent WNC to call his attention. When the petitioner finally assumed
his post, he was allowed a part-time teaching job in the same school to
augment his income.
Sometime in December 1992, WNC won a case against the officials of the
union before the NLRC. Petitioner was ordered to prepare a media blitz of
this victory but the petitioner did not comply with the order on the ground
that such a press release would only worsen the already aggravated situation
and strained relations between WNC management and the union officials.
When petitioner reported for work on the first day of January 1993, he was
relieved from his post and transferred to the College of Liberal Arts as
Records Evaluator. Not for long, the Dean of the Liberal Arts sent a letter to
the Human Resources Manager complaining about the petitioners poor
performance and habitual absenteeism, as shown in the daily absence
reports.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the acts of the petitioner constitute gross and habitual
neglect of duties
RULING
Considering the submissions of the parties as well as the records before us,
we find the petition without merit. Petitioners dismissal from employment is
valid and justified.
For an employees dismissal to be valid, (a) the dismissal must be for a valid
cause and (b) the employee must be afforded due process.[7]
Serious misconduct and habitual neglect of duties are among the just causes
for terminating an employee under the Labor Code of the Philippines. Gross
negligence connotes want of care in the performance of ones duties.
Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform ones duties for a period
of time, depending upon the circumstances.[8] The Labor Arbiters findings
that petitioners habitual absenteeism and tardiness constitute gross and
habitual neglect of duties that justified his termination of employment are
sufficiently supported by evidence on record. Petitioners repeated acts of
absences without leave and his frequent tardiness reflect his indifferent
attitude to and lack of motivation in his work. More importantly, his repeated
and habitual infractions, committed despite several warnings, constitute
gross misconduct unexpected from an employee of petitioners stature. This
Court has held that habitual absenteeism without leave constitute gross
negligence and is sufficient to justify termination of an employee.[9]
However, petitioner claims that he was dismissed not for his tardiness or
absences but for his arrest as a suspected drug user. His claim, however, is
merely speculative. We find such contention devoid of basis. First, the
decisions of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court of Appeals are
indubitable. They show that indeed petitioner had incurred numerous and
repeated absences without any leave. Moreover, he was not punctual in
reporting for work.
These unexplained absences and tardiness were
reflected on the summary reports submitted by WNC before the labor arbiter,
but petitioner failed to controvert said reports.
Second, contrary to
petitioners assertion, the NLRC did not base its conclusions on the fact of
the arrest of petitioner for violation of Rep. Act No. 6425 but on the totality of
the number of infractions incurred by the petitioner during the period of his
employment in different positions he occupied at WNC. Thus:
In the case of petitioner Valiao, his services were terminated by private
respondent after having been found guilty of serious misconduct and gross
habitual neglect of duty which was aggravated by the January 28, 1993
incident. In exercising such management prerogative, due process was
properly observed. Private respondent presented sufficient evidence to
support its act in terminating the services of petitioner. Private respondent
took into consideration the totality of the infractions or the number of
violations committed by petitioner during the period of employment.
Furthermore, it hardly needs reminding that, in view of petitioners position
and responsibilities, he must demonstrate a scrupulous regard for rules and
policies befitting those who would be role models for their young charges.
[10] (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Indeed, even without the arrest incident, WNC had more than enough basis
for terminating petitioner from employment.
It bears stressing that
petitioners absences and tardiness were not isolated incidents but
manifested a pattern of habituality. In one case, we held that where the
records clearly show that the employee has not only been charged with the
offense of highgrading but also has been warned 21 times for absences
without official leave, these repeated acts of misconduct and willful breach of
Alvarez vs. Golden Tri Bloc Inc., G.R. No. 202158, September 25,
2013
FACTS:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the termination on the ground of loss was valid?
RULING:
"In Merin v. NLRC, the Court ruled that in determining the sanction imposable
to an employee, the employee may consider and weigh his other past
infractions, thus:
"'The totality of infractions or the number of violations committed during the
period of employment shall be considered in determining the penalty to be
imposed upon an erring employee. The offenses committed by petitioner
should not be taken singly and separately. Fitness for continued employment
cannot be compartmentalized into tight little cubicles of aspects of
character, conduct and ability separate and independent of each other. While
it may be true that petitioner was penalized for his previous infractions, this
does not and should not mean that his employment record would be wiped
clean of his infractions. After all, the record of an employee is a relevant
consideration in determining the penalty that should be meted out since an
employee's past misconduct and present behavior must be taken together in
determining the proper imposable penalty. Despite the sanctions imposed
upon petitioner, he continued to commit misconduct and exhibit undesirable
behavior on board. Indeed, the employer cannot be compelled to retain a
misbehaving employee, or one who is guilty of acts inimical to its interests. It
has the right to dismiss such an employee if only as a measure of selfprotection. (Citations omitted)'"
The NLRC and the CA were thus correct in applying the totality of infractions
rule and in adjudging that the petitioner's dismissal was grounded on a just
and valid cause."
Yrasuegui vs. Phil Airlines, G.R. No. 168081, Oct. 17, 2008
Facts:
Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former international flight steward of Philippine
Airlines, Inc. (PAL). He stands five feet and eight inches (58) with a large
body frame. The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is
from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by
the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual of PAL. His weight problem dates
back to 1984 when PAL advised him to go on an extended vacation leave
from December 29, 1984 to March 4, 1985 to address his weight concerns.
For failure to meet the weight standards another leave without pay from
March 5, 1985 to November 1985 was imposed. He met the required weight
and was allowed to work but his weight problem recurred, thus another leave
without pay from October 17, 1988 to February 1989. From 1989 to 1992 his
weight fluctuated from 209lb, 215lb, 217lb, 212lb, and 205. During that
period he was requested to lose weight and to report for weight checks
which he constantly failed to do. In the meantime his status was off-duty.
Finally in 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his
inability to attain his ideal weight, and considering the utmost leniency
extended to him which spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5)
years, his services were considered terminated effective immediately. He
then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL. The Labor Arbiter
ruled that he was illegally dismissed and entitles to reinstatement,
backwages and attorneys fees. The NLRC affirmed the LA. The CA reversed
the NLRC.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed.
Ruling:
The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article 282(e) of the
Labor Code. The weight standards of PAL constitute a continuing qualification
of an employee in order to keep the job. Tersely put, an employee may be
dismissed the moment he is unable to comply with his ideal weight as
prescribed by the weight standards. The dismissal would fall under Article
282(e) of the Labor Code. As explained by the CA:
x x x [T]he standards violated in this case were not mere orders of the
employer; they were the prescribed weights that a cabin crew must
maintain in order to qualify for and keep his or her position in the company.
In other words, they were standards that establish continuing qualifications
for an employees position. The failure to meet the employers qualifying
standards is in fact a ground that does not squarely fall under grounds (a) to
(d) and is therefore one that falls under Article 282(e) the other causes
analogous to the foregoing.
By its nature, these qualifying standards are norms that apply prior to and
after an employee is hired. x x x
We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work
as flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the
Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may not
be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary.
John Hancock Life Insurance Corp. vs. Davis, G.R. No. 169549, Sept.
3, 2008
Facts:
Joanna Cantre Davis was agency administration officer of John Hancock Life
Insurance Corporation. On October 18, 2000, Patricia Yuseco, JHLICs
corporate affairs manager, discovered that her wallet was missing. She
immediately reported the loss of her credit cards to AIG and BPI Express. To
her surprise, she was informed that "Patricia Yuseco" had just made
substantial purchases using her credit cards in various stores in the City of
Manila. She was also told that a proposed transaction in Abenson's-Robinsons
Place was disapproved because "she" gave the wrong information upon
verification. Because loss of personal property among its employees had
become rampant in its office, petitioner sought the assistance of NBI. The
NBI, obtained a security video from Abenson's showing the person who used
Yuseco's credit cards. Yuseco and other witnesses positively identified the
person in the video as Davis NBI and Yuseco filed a complaint for qualified
theft against Davis but because the affidavits presented by the NBI
(identifying respondent as the culprit) were not properly verified, the city
prosecutor dismissed the complaint due to insufficiency of evidence.
Meanwhile, petitioner placed Davis under preventive suspension and
instructed her to cooperate with its ongoing investigation. Davis filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal alleging that petitioner terminated her
employment without cause. The labor arbiter, in
May 21, 2002, found that Davis committed serious misconduct (she was the
principal suspect for qualified theft committed inside petitioner's office
during work hours). There was a valid cause for her dismissal. Thus, the
complaint was dismissed for lack of merit. Upon appeal, NLRC affirmed the
labor arbiter in July 31, 2003 and denied her motion for reconsideration in
October 30, 2003. Upon petition for certiorari filed with the CA, CA on July 4,
2005 granted the petition holding that the labor arbiter and NLRC merely
adopted the findings of the NBI regarding respondent's culpability. Because
the affidavits of the witnesses were not verified, they did not constitute
substantial evidence. The labor arbiter and NLRC should have assessed
evidence independently as "unsubstantiated suspicions, accusations and
conclusions of employers (did) not provide legal justification for dismissing
an employee". Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
Hence, this petition where petitioner argues that the ground for an
employee's dismissal need only be proven by substantial evidence. Thus, the
dropping of charges against an employee (especially on a technicality such
as lack of proper verification) or his subsequent acquittal does not preclude
an employer from dismissing him due to serious misconduct.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner substantially proved the presence of valid cause for
respondent's termination.
Ruling:
Supreme Court granted the petition and ruled that petitioner validly
dismissed Davis for cause analogous to serious misconduct. Article 282 of
the Labor Code provides: Termination by Employer. An employer may
terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful
orders of his employer or his representatives in connection with his work;
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Misconduct involves "the transgression of some established and definite rule
of action, forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies
wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment". For misconduct to be
serious and therefore a valid ground for dismissal, it must be: of grave and
aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant and connected
with the work of the employee.
In this case, petitioner dismissed Davis based on the NBI's finding that the
latter stole and used Yuseco's credit cards. But since the theft was not
committed against petitioner itself but against one of its employees,
respondent's misconduct was not work-related and therefore, she could not
be dismissed for serious misconduct. Nonetheless, Article 282 (e) of the
Labor Code talks of other analogous causes or those which are susceptible of
comparison to another in general or in specific detail. For an employee to be
validly dismissed for a cause analogous to those enumerated in Article 282,
the cause must involve a voluntary and/or willful act or omission of the
employee. A cause analogous to serious misconduct is a voluntary and/or
willful act or omission attesting to an employee's moral depravity. Theft
committed by an employee against a person other than his employer, if
proven by substantial evidence, is a cause analogous to serious misconduct.
Did petitioner substantially prove the existence of valid cause for
respondent's separation? Yes. The labor arbiter and the NLRC relied not only
on the affidavits of the NBI's witnesses but also on that of respondent. They
likewise considered petitioner's own investigative findings. Clearly, they did
not merely adopt the findings of the NBI but independently assessed
evidence presented by the parties. Their conclusion (that there was valid
cause for respondent's separation from employment) was therefore
supported by substantial evidence.
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) at least one month before the
intended date of termination. This procedure enables an employee to contest
the reality or good faith character of the asserted ground for the termination
of his services before the DOLE.
Redundancy
Asian Alcohol Corporation v. NLRC
G.R. No. 131108, March 25, 1999
Facts: In September, 1991, the Parsons family, who originally owned the
controlling stocks in Asian Alcohol, were driven by mounting business losses
to sell their majority rights to prior Holdings, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as
Prior Holdings). The next month, Prior Holdings took over its management
and operation. To thwart further losses, Prior Holdings implemented a
reorganizational plan and other cost-saving measures. Some one hundred
seventeen (117) employees out of a total workforce of three hundred sixty
(360) were separated. Seventy two (72) of them occupied redundant
positions that were abolished. Of these positions, twenty one (21) were held
by union members and fifty one (51) by non-union members. The six (6)
private respondents are among those union members whose positions were
abolished due to redundancy. Private respondents Carias, Martinez, and
Sendon were water pump tenders; Amacio was a machine shop mechanic;
Verayo was a briquetting plant operator while Tormo was a plant helper
under him. They were all assigned at the Repair and Maintenance Section of
the Pulupandan plant. In October, 1992, they received individual notices of
termination effective November 30, 1992.
Issue: Was the termination valid due to redundancy?
Ruling: In the case at bar, Prior Holdings took over the operations of Asian
Alcohol in October 1991. Plain to see, the last quarter losses in 1991 were
already incurred under the new management. There were no signs that these
losses would abate. Irrefutable was the fact that losses have bled Asian
Alcohol incessantly over a span of several years. They were incurred under
the management of the Parsons family and continued to be suffered under
the new management of Prior Holdings. Ultimately, it is Prior Holding that will
absorb all the losses, including those incurred under the former owners of
the company. The law gives the new management every right to undertake
measures to save the company from bankruptcy. We find that the
Multimedia, Incorporated (SNMI). Since SNMI was formed to do the sales and
marketing work, SMART abolished the CSMG/FSD, Astorgas division. To
soften the blow of the realignment, SNMI agreed to absorb the CSMG
personnel who would be recommended by SMART. SMART then conducted a
performance evaluation of CSMG personnel and those who garnered the
highest ratings were favorably recommended to SNMI. Astorga landed last in
the performance evaluation, thus, she was not recommended by SMART.
SMART, nonetheless, offered her a supervisory position in the Customer Care
Department, but she refused the offer because the position carried lower
salary rank and rate. Despite the abolition of the CSMG/FSD, Astorga
continued reporting for work. But on March 3, 1998, SMART issued a
memorandum advising Astorga of the termination of her employment on
ground of redundancy, effective April 3, 1998. Astorga received it on March
16, 1998.
Issue: Was there redundancy to justify the termination of Astorga?
Ruling: The Court agrees with the CA that the organizational realignment
introduced by SMART, which culminated in the abolition of CSMG/FSD and
termination of Astorgas employment was an honest effort to make SMARTs
sales and marketing departments more efficient and competitive. Indeed, out
of our concern for those lesser circumstanced in life, this Court has inclined
towards the worker and upheld his cause in most of his conflicts with his
employer. This favored treatment is consonant with the social justice policy
of the Constitution. But while tilting the scales of justice in favor of workers,
the fundamental law also guarantees the right of the employer to reasonable
returns for his investment.38 In this light, we must acknowledge the
prerogative of the employer to adopt such measures as will promote greater
efficiency, reduce overhead costs and enhance prospects of economic gains,
albeit always within the framework of existing laws. Accordingly, we sustain
the reorganization and redundancy program undertaken by SMART. However,
as aptly found by the CA, SMART failed to comply with the mandated one (1)
month notice prior to termination. The record is clear that Astorga received
the notice of termination only on March 16, 199839 or less than a month
prior to its effectivity on April 3, 1998. Likewise, the Department of Labor and
Employment was notified of the redundancy program only on March 6, 1998.
Retrenchment
justified. Any claim of actual or potential business losses must satisfy certain
established standards, all of which must concur, before any reduction of
personnel becomes legal. These are: (1) That retrenchment is reasonably
necessary and likely to prevent business losses which, if already incurred, are
not merely de minimis, but substantial, serious, actual and real, or if only
expected, are reasonably imminent as perceived objectively and in good
faith by the employer; (2) That the employer served written notice both to
the employees and to the Department of Labor and Employment at least one
month prior to the intended date of retrenchment; (3) That the employer
pays the retrenched employees separation pay equivalent to one (1) month
pay or at least one-half () month pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher; (4) That the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench
employees in good faith for the advancement of its interest and not to defeat
or circumvent the employees right to security of tenure; and, (5) That the
employer used fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be
dismissed and who would be retained among the employees, such as status,
efficiency, seniority, physical fitness, age, and financial hardship for certain
workers. In view of the facts and the issues raised, the resolution of the
instant petition hinges on a determination of the existence of the first, fourth
and the fifth elements set forth above, as well as compliance therewith by
PAL, taking to mind that the burden of proof in retrenchment cases lies with
the employer in showing valid cause for dismissal; that legitimate business
reasons exist to justify retrenchment.
lay off 40% of the employees due to financial losses incurred from 19891990, AG & P implemented and effected, starting August 3, 1991, the
temporary lay-off of some 705 employees. By reason thereof, the AG & P
United Rank and File Association (URFA, for facility), which was the
employees' union, staged a strike. In a conciliation conference over the labor
dispute held before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board on August
13, 1991, the parties agreed to submit the legality of the lay-offs to voluntary
arbitration.
Issue: Was there a need for retrenchment to prevent losses?
Ruling: The Court is accordingly convinced, and so hold, that both the
retrenchment program of private respondent and the dismissal of petitioners
were valid and legal. First, it has been sufficiently and convincingly
established by AG & P before the voluntary arbitrator that it was suffering
financial reverses. Even the rank and file union at AG & P did not contest the
fact that management had been undergoing financial difficulties for the past
several years. Hence, the voluntary arbitrator considered this as an
admission that indeed AG & P was actually experiencing adverse business
conditions which would justify the exercise of its management prerogative to
retrench in order to avoid the not so remote possibility of the closure of the
entire business which, in the opinion of the voluntary arbitrator, would in the
last analysis be adverse to both the management and the union. Second, the
voluntary arbitrator's conclusions were premised upon and substantiated by
the audited financial statements and the auditor's reports of AG & P for the
years 1987 to 1991. 14 These, financial statements audited by independent
external auditors constitute the normal and reliable method of proof of the
profit and loss performance of a company. Third, contrary to petitioners'
asseverations, proof of actual financial losses incurred by the company is not
a condition sine qua non, for retrenchment. Retrenchment is one of the
economic grounds to dismiss employees, which is resorted to by an
employer primarily to avoid or minimize business losses. In its ordinary
connotation, the phrase "to prevent losses" means that retrenchment or
termination of the services of some employees is authorized to be
undertaken by the employer sometime before the anticipated losses are
actually sustained or realized. It is not, in other words, the intention of the
lawmaker to compel the employer to stay his hand and keep all his
employees until after losses shall have in fact materialized. If such an intent
were expressly written into the law, that law may well be vulnerable to
review of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC. It is however not enough for a
company to merely declare that positions have become redundant. It must
produce adequate proof of such redundancy to justify the dismissal of the
affected employees. In Panlilio v. NLRC, we said that the following evidence
may be proffered to substantiate redundancy: the new staffing pattern,
feasibility studies/proposal, on the viability of the newly created positions,
job description and the approval by the management of the restructuring. In
another case, it was held that the company sufficiently established the fact
of redundancy through affidavits executed by the officers of the respondent
PLDT, explaining the reasons and necessities for the implementation of the
redundancy program. According to the CA, Legend proved the existence of
redundancy when it submitted a status review of its project division where it
reported that the 78-man personnel exceeded the needs of the company.
The report further stated that there was duplication of functions and
positions, or an over supply of employees, especially among architects,
engineers, draftsmen, and interior designers. Thus, in the same way, we held
that the basis for retrenchment was not established by substantial evidence,
we also rule that Legend failed to establish by the same quantum of proof
the fact of redundancy; hence, petitioners termination from employment
was illegal.
losses, that the employees affected have been given separation pay
equivalent to month pay for every year of service or one month pay,
whichever is higher. The decision to close business is a management
prerogative exclusive to the employer, the exercise of which no court or
tribunal can meddle with, except only when the employer fails to prove
compliance with the requirements of Art. 283, to wit: a) that the
closure/cessation of business is bona fide, i.e., its purpose is to advance the
interest of the employer and not to defeat or circumvent the rights of
employees under the law or a valid agreement; b) that written notice was
served on the employees and the DOLE at least one month before the
intended date of closure or cessation of business; and c) in case of
closure/cessation of business not due to financial losses, that the employees
affected have been given separation pay equivalent to month pay for
every year of service or one month pay, whichever is higher.
Industrial Timber Corporation v. NLRC G.R. No. 107302 and 107306,
June 10, 1997
Facts: Industrial Timber Corporation (ITC) is a corporation registered under
Philippine laws and is engaged in the business of manufacturing and
processing veneer and plywood products. It used to operate a veneer
processing plant known as the Butuan Logs Plant and a veneer and plywood
processing plant known as the Stanply Plant. Both plants occupied a single
compound with a common point for ingress and egress and were both leased
from Industrial Plywood Group Corporation. Both plants had also two (2)
distinct bargaining units represented by separate labor unions and had
separate collective bargaining agreements with their respective principals.
ITC Butuan Logs Workers Union-WATU (Union) represented the rank and file
employees of the Butuan Logs Plant. Sometime in 1989, ITC decided to
permanently stop and close its veneer production at its Butuan Logs Plant
due to impending heavy financial losses resulting from high production
costs, erratic supply of raw materials and depressed prices and market
conditions for its wood products. Accordingly, on November 9, 1989, ITC
served a written notice to all its employees in the said plant and to the
Butuan District Office of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
stating that effective December 10, 1989 or thirty (30) days thereafter, it
would cease operations at said plant. After receiving the notice, the
employees therein, through their union representative, filed a formal
objection to the intended shutdown. Consequently, conciliation proceedings
were conducted at the DOLE District Office pursuant to the provisions of the
Disease or illness
Crayons Processing, Inc., v. Pula G.R. No. 167727, July 30, 2007
Facts: Petitioner Crayons Processing, Inc. (Crayons) employed respondent
Felipe Pula (Pula) as a Preparation Machine Operator beginning June 1993.
On 27 November 1999, Pula, then aged 34, suffered a heart attack and was
rushed to the hospital, where he was confined for around a week. Pulas wife
duly notified Crayons of her husbands medical condition. Upon his discharge
from the hospital, Pula was advised by his attending physician to take a
leave of absence from work and rest for three (3) months. Subsequently, on
25 February 2000, Pula underwent an Angiogram Test at the Philippine Heart
Center under the supervision of a Dr. Recto, who advised him to take a twoweek leave from work. Following the angiogram procedure, respondent was
certified as fit to work by Dr. Recto. On 11 April 2000, Pula returned to
work, but 13 days later, he was taken to the company clinic after
complaining of dizziness. Diagnosed as having suffered a relapse, he was
advised by his physician to take a leave of absence from work for one (1)
month. Pula reported back for work on 13 June 2000, armed with a
certification from his physician that he was fit to work. However, Pula
claimed that he was not given any post or assignment, but instead, on 20
June 2000, he was asked to resign with an offer from Crayons of P12,000 as
financial assistance. Pula refused the offer and instead filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal with prayer for damages and the payment of holiday
premium, 5 days service incentive leave pay, and 13th month pay for 1999.
The complaint was filed against Crayons, Clothman Knitting Corp., Nixon Lee,
Paul Lee, Peter Su, and Ellen Caluag.
Issue: Was the dismissal valid on account of illness?
Ruling: For a dismissal on the ground of disease to be considered valid, two
requisites must concur: (a) the employee must be suffering from a disease
which cannot be cured within six months and his continued employment is
prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the health of his coemployees; and (b) a certification to that effect must be issued by a
competent public health authority. The burden falls upon the employer to
establish these requisites and in the absence of such certification, the
dismissal must necessarily be declared illegal. As succinctly stressed in Tan v.
NLRC, it is only where there is a prior certification from a competent public
Ruling: No. The dismissal was not proper. Under Article 282 of the Labor
Code, an employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall
be considered a regular employee. Pilones was already on permanent status
when he was dismissed on August 21, 1978, or four days after he ceased to
be a probationer. As such, he could validly claim the security of tenure
guaranteed to him by the Constitution and the Labor Code. The petitioner
claims it could not have dismissed the private respondent earlier because
the x-ray examination was made only on August 17, 1978, and the results
were not immediately available. That excuse is untenable. We note that
when the petitioner had all of six months during which to conduct such
examination, it chose to wait until exactly the last day of the probation
period. The applicable rule on the ground for dismissal invoked against him is
Section 8, Rule I, Book VI, of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Labor Code which states that the employer shall not terminate his
employment unless there is a certification by a competent public health
authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot
be cured within a period of six (6) months even with proper medical
treatment. The record does not contain the certification required by the
above rule. Hence, dismissal was illegal. It is also worth noting that the
petitioners application for clearance to terminate the employment of the
private respondent was filed with the Ministry of Labor only on August 28,
1978, or seven days after his dismissal. As the NLRC has repeatedly and
correctly said, the prior clearance rule (which was in force at that time) was
not a trivial technicality. It required not just the mere filing of a petition or
the mere attempt to procure a clearance but that the said clearance be
obtained prior to the operative act of termination. Although we must rule in
favor of his reinstatement, this must be conditioned on his fitness to resume
his work, as certified by competent authority.
Procedural due process
1) Procedure to be observed in just causes termination
Twin-Notice Rule
Ruffy v. NLRC G.R. No. 84193, February 15, 1990
Facts: The complainant was employed in December 1977 by the respondent
with the salary of P37.31 a day. He was assigned in the Materials and Supply
Section, Supply and Warehousing Department of the respondent. His duties,
among others, were to verify and check incoming materials and supplies and
issuing requisitioned materials and supplies to authorized personnel of the
Report against the employee, indicating the nature and details of the
irregularity. Thereafter, the concerned employee is asked to explain the
incident by making a written statement or counter-affidavit at the back of the
same Irregularity Report. After considering the explanation of the employee,
the company then makes a determination of whether to accept the
explanation or impose upon the employee a penalty for committing an
infraction. That decision shall be stated on said Irregularity Report and will be
furnished to the employee. Upon audit of the October 28, 2001 Conductors
Report of respondent, KKTI noted an irregularity. It discovered that
respondent declared several sold tickets as returned tickets causing KKTI to
lose an income of eight hundred and ninety pesos. While no irregularity
report was prepared on the October 28, 2001 incident, KKTI nevertheless
asked respondent to explain the discrepancy. In his letter,[3] respondent said
that the erroneous declaration in his October 28, 2001 Trip Report was
unintentional. He explained that during that days trip, the windshield of the
bus assigned to them was smashed; and they had to cut short the trip in
order to immediately report the matter to the police. As a result of the
incident, he got confused in making the trip report. On November 26, 2001,
respondent received a letter terminating his employment effective November
29, 2001. The dismissal letter alleged that the October 28, 2001 irregularity
was an act of fraud against the company.
Issue: Was there compliance with the procedural due process for dismissal?
Ruling: None. First, respondent was not issued a written notice charging him
of committing an infraction. The law is clear on the matter. A verbal appraisal
of the charges against an employee does not comply with the first notice
requirement. In Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRC, the Court held that
consultations or conferences are not a substitute for the actual observance
of notice and hearing. Also, in Loadstar Shipping Co., Inc. v. Mesano, the
Court, sanctioning the employer for disregarding the due process
requirements, held that the employees written explanation did not excuse
the fact that there was a complete absence of the first notice. Second, even
assuming that petitioner KKTI was able to furnish respondent an Irregularity
Report notifying him of his offense, such would not comply with the
requirements of the law. We observe from the irregularity reports against
respondent for his other offenses that such contained merely a general
description of the charges against him. The reports did not even state a
company rule or policy that the employee had allegedly violated. Likewise,
there is no mention of any of the grounds for termination of employment
under Art. 282 of the Labor Code. Thus, KKTIs standard charge sheet is not
sufficient notice to the employee. Third, no hearing was conducted.
Regardless of respondents written explanation, a hearing was still necessary
in order for him to clarify and present evidence in support of his defense.
Moreover, respondent made the letter merely to explain the circumstances
relating to the irregularity in his October 28, 2001 Conductors Trip Report.
He was unaware that a dismissal proceeding was already being effected.
Thus, he was surprised to receive the November 26, 2001 termination letter
indicating as grounds, not only his October 28, 2001 infraction, but also his
previous infractions.
IBM Philippines v. NLRC G.R. No. 117221, April 13, 1999
Facts: Private Respondent filed a complaint before the Arbitration Branch of
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) for an illegal dismissal by
herein petitioner, private respondent claimed that he was not given the
opportunity to be heard and was summarily dismissed. Petitioner contend
that he was given a chance or warning to improve his attitude toward
attendance but never did, and was duly informed thru emails, it also pointed
out that as an employee of IBM they are assigned IDs and passwords,
employees may also respond/reply thru email by encoding his messageresponse and admits also that the system automatically records the time and
date of each message was sent or received including the identification of the
sender and the receiver thereof. Petitioner attached to its position papers
copies of print-outs which allegedly contains computer message/entries sent
by petitioner to private respondent thru IBMs internal computer system.
Through this computer print-outs petitioner sought to prove that private
respondent was sufficiently notified of the charges and was guilty thereof for
failure to deny the same. Prior to the release of the labor arbiters decision
private respondent filed a Motion to admit attached new evidence for the
complainant. The Labor arbiters decision upheld the print-out attached by
petitioner as evidence and promulgated a resolution ordering petitioner to
pay private respondent salary from June 1 to August 31, 1990 excluding all
benefits. Aggrieved with the decision private respondent appealed to the
NLRC which ordered reinstatement to complainant to its former position with
his seniority rights, backwages from August 31, 1990 in the amount of P40,
516, 65 a month including all its benefits and bonuses. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Did NLRC commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that no just
cause or due process was observed in dismissing private respondent
because computer print-outs are inadmissible in evidence?
Ruling: Petitioner contend that in administrative /labor cases the technical
rules on evidence are not binding hence, the computer print-outs need not
be identified nor authenticated, same reason why private respondent was
allowed to submit additional evidences even after the case was deemed
submitted for resolution. However, the liberality of procedure in
administrative actions is subject to limitations imposed by basic
requirements of due process; this procedural rule should not be construed as
a license to disregard certain fundamental evidenciary rules. The evidence
presented before us must be at least have a modicum of admissibility for it
to be given some probative value. The computer print-outs, which constitute
only evidence of petitioners, afford no assurance of their authenticity since
they are unsigned. The liberal view in the conduct of proceedings before
administrative agencies, have nonetheless consistently required some
PROOF OF AUTHENTICITY OR RELIABILITY as condition for the admission of
documents. The procedural technicality and concerns are more paramount
principles and requirements of due process, which may not be sacrificed to
speed or expediency, Article 22 of the Labor Code which states that DUE
PROCESS MUST NEVER BE SUBORDINATED TO EXPEDIENCY OR DISPATCH
Administrative Hearing
Asia Terminals, Inc., v. Marbella G.R. No. 149074, August 10, 2006
Facts: Asian Terminals, Inc. (Asian Terminals) petitioner, is a domestic
corporation and the exclusive provider of arrastre and stevedoring services
at the Manila South Harbor. Rodolfo G. Corvite, Jr., also a petitioner, is its
President. Respondents are employees as stevedores of Asian Terminals. It is
not disputed that early in the evening of April 30, 1994, respondents and
other stevedores, who formed one group, were assigned to unload the cargo
of the M/V Huang Jin Shua. The work of the group could not be completed if
one stevedore was absent. The parties, however, have opposing versions of
what transpired next. Officer-in-charge R.F. Salazar of Asian Terminals Legal
Department conducted an investigation of the incident. In his report and
investigation dated May 15, 1994, he found respondents liable for refusal to
work penalized by dismissal from the service considering that they
committed the same offense for the second time. On September 23, 1994,
Elevating the case to the Supreme Court, petitioners raised the following
grounds inter alia: (a) That for employer-employee to exist, the following
requirements must be satisfied, namely: (1) selection and engagement of the
employees; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the
power to control employees' conduct; and (b) Since the manpower agencies
themselves admitted per their respective position papers that they selected,
hired, paid, disciplined, dismissed and controlled the private respondents, it
followed that the latter are not the employees of the petitioner corporation
but of the agencies only.
Issue: Was the dismissal illegal?
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that what was controlling in the issue is the
provisions of Artcile 106 of the Labor Code and not that of Article 208. The
former clearly defines what constitute labor-only contractor as differentiated
from a direct contractor, including the legal effects of each, while the latter is
merely for the purpose of determining whether or not an employee is
considered regular. Based on the provision of Article 106, the Supreme Court
ruled that the petitioner was indeed the direct employer of private
respondents and was therefore 0bliged to pay them separation pay. The
Supreme Court reasoned that since it is undeniable that the private
respondents' work as merchandisers, cashiers, baggers, check-out
personnel, sales ladies, warehousemen and so forth were directly related,
necessary and vital to the day-to-day operations of the supermarket and that
their jobs involved normal and regular functions in the ordinary business of
the petitioner corporation, the provision of Article 106 clearly applied thus
making the manpower agencies merely agents of petitioner corporation.
Consequently, private respondents are considered employees of petitioner
Shoppers Gain Supermart.
Caingat v. NLRC G.R. No. 154308, March 10, 2005
Facts: Petitioner Benardino A. Caingat was hired by respondent Sta. Lucia
Realty and Development, Inc. (SLRDI) as the General Manager of SLRDIs
sister companies, R.S. Night Hawk Security and Investigation Agency, Inc.,
and R.S. Maintenance and Services Inc. both organized to service the malls
and subdivisions owned by SLRDI. In connection with this, he was allowed to
use 10% of the total payroll of respondent R.S. Maintenance to defray
operating expenses. Later, the Finance Manager discovered that petitioner
deposited company funds in the latters personal account and used the funds
to pay his credit card purchases, utility bills, trips abroad and acquisition of a
lot in Laguna. Thus, complainant received a memorandum stating that upon
verification of financial records, it was found that the latter have
misappropriated company funds in the sum of about P5, 000,000.00 and is
hereby suspended from his duties as Manager of the stated companies.
Without conducting any investigation, respondent R.S. Maintenance filed a
complaint for sum of money and damages with prayer for writ of preliminary
attachment. Petitioner in turn filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
the respondents.
Issue: Did respondents illegally dismiss petitioner?
Ruling: As firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence, loss of trust and confidence
as a just cause for termination of employment is premised on the fact that an
employee concerned holds a position where greater trust is placed by
management and from whom greater fidelity to duty is correspondingly
expected. This includes managerial personnel entrusted with confidence on
delicate matters, such as the custody, handling, or care and protection of the
employers property. The betrayal of this trust is the essence of the offense
for which an employee is penalized. Managements loss of trust and
confidence on petitioner was well justified. Private respondents had every
right to dismiss petitioner. Petitioners long period of disappearance from the
scene and departure for abroad before making a claim of illegal dismissal
does not contribute to its credibility. Nonetheless, while dismissal may truly
be justified by loss of confidence, the management failed to observe fully the
procedural requirement of due process for the termination of petitioners
employment. Two notices should be sent to the employee. The respondents
only sent the first notice, gleaned from the memorandum. There was no
second notice.
Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC G.R. No. 80587, February 8, 1989
Facts: Private respondent was hired by petitioner on January 18, 1984 as a
crew member at its Cubao Branch. He thereafter became the assistant head
of the Backroom department of the same branch. At about 2:30 P.M. on May
20, 1985 private respondent had an altercation with a co-employee, Job
Barrameda, as a result of which he and Barrameda were suspended on the
following morning and in the afternoon of the same day a memorandum was
issued by the Operations Manager advising private respondent of his
dismissal from the service in accordance with their Personnel Manual. The
notice of dismissal was served on private respondent on May 25, 1985. Thus
private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for unfair labor
practice, illegal suspension and illegal dismissal. After submitting their
respective position papers to the Labor Arbiter and as the hearing could not
be conducted due to repeated absence of counsel for respondent, the case
was submitted for resolution. Thereafter a decision was rendered by the
Labor Arbiter on December 3, 1986 dismissing the complaint for lack of
merit.
Issue: Was there compliance with the procedural due process for dismissal?
Ruling: The failure of petitioner to give private respondent the benefit of a
hearing before he was dismissed constitutes an infringement of his
constitutional right to due process of law and equal protection of the laws.
The standards of due process in judicial as well as administrative
proceedings have long been established. In its bare minimum due process of
law simply means giving notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment
is rendered.
Maneja v. NLRC G.R. No. 124013, June 5, 1998
Facts: Petitioner Rosario Maneja worked with private respondent Manila
Midtown Hotel beginning January, 1985 as a telephone operator. She was a
member of the National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied
Industries (NUWHRAIN) with an existing Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) with private respondent. In the afternoon of February 13, 1990, a
fellow telephone operator, Rowena Loleng received a Request for Long
Distance Call (RLDC) form and a deposit of P500.00 from a page boy of the
hotel for a call by a Japanese guest named Hirota Ieda. The call was
unanswered. The P500.00 deposit was forwarded to the cashier. In the
evening, Ieda again made an RLDC and the page boy collected another
P500.00 which was also given to the operator Loleng. The second call was
also unanswered. Loleng passed on the RLDC to petitioner for follow-up.
Petitioner monitored the call. On February 15, 1990, a hotel cashier inquired
about the P1,000.00 deposit made by Ieda. After a search, Loleng found the
first deposit of P500.00 inserted in the guest folio while the second deposit
was eventually discovered inside the folder for cancelled calls with deposit
and official receipts. When petitioner saw that the second RLDC form was not
time-stamped, she immediately placed it inside the machine which stamped
the date February 15, 1990. Realizing that the RLDC was filed 2 days
earlier, she wrote and changed the date to February 13, 1990. Loleng then
delivered the RLDC and the money to the cashier. The second deposit of
P500.00 by Ieda was later returned to him. Petitioner and Loleng thereafter
submitted their written explanation. On March 20, 1990, a written report was
submitted by the chief telephone operator, with the recommendation that
the offenses committed by the operators concerned covered violations of the
Offenses Subject to Disciplinary Actions (OSDA): (1) OSDA 2.01: forging,
falsifying official document(s), and (2) OSDA 1.11: culpable carelessness negligence or failure to follow specific instruction(s) or established
procedure(s). On March 23, 1990, petitioner was served a notice of dismissal
effective April 1, 1990. Petitioner refused to sign the notice and wrote therein
"under protest."
Issue: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the illegal
dismissal case.
Ruling: The procedure introduced in RA 6715 of referring certain grievances
originally and exclusively to the grievance machinery, and when not settled
at this level, to a panel of voluntary arbitrators outlined in CBAs does not
only include grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of
the CBA but applies as well to those arising from the implementation of
company personnel policies. No other body shall take cognizance of these
cases. x x x. (Sanyo v. Caizares, 211 SCRA 361, 372) THE Court finds that
the respondent Commission has erroneously interpreted the aforequoted
portion of our ruling in the case of Sanyo, as divesting the Labor Arbiter of
jurisdiction in a termination dispute. Moreover, the dismissal of petitioner
does not fall within the phrase grievances arising from the interpretation or
implementation of collective bargaining agreement and those arising from
the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies, the
jurisdiction of which pertains to the grievance machinery or thereafter, to a
voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. It is to be stressed that
under Article 260 of the Labor Code, which explains the function of the
grievance machinery and voluntary arbitrator, (T)he parties to a Collective
Bargaining Agreement shall include therein provisions that will ensure the
mutual observance of its terms and conditions. They shall establish a
machinery for the adjustment and resolution of grievances arising from the
interpretation or implementation of their Collective Bargaining Agreement
and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company
personnel policies. Article 260 further provides that the parties to a CBA
shall name or designate their respective representative to the grievance
it shall
advance
thus be
shall be
Eastern
Overseas
Employment
Center,
Inc.
v.
NagkakaisangxEmpleyadongWellcome-DFA G.R. No. 149349, March
11, 2005
Facts: On July 20, 1990, [respondent] union NAGKAKAISANG EMPLEYADO NG
WELLCOME-DFA (NEW-DFA) filed a Petition for Certification Election with the
DOLE-NCR seeking to represent the bargaining unit comprised of all the
regular rank-and-file employees of [petitioner] company GLAXO-WELLCOME.
Acting upon such petition, the Med-Arbiter ordered that a Certification
Election be conducted on September 10, 1990. The election, however,
resulted in a stand-off or a tie between NO UNION and NEW-DFA. As a
consequence thereof, NEW-DFA filed an election protest with the Medarbitration Branch of the Department of Labor and Employment.
[Respondent] union claimed that its failure to obtain the required majority
vote can be ascribed to several acts of manipulation, interference and
intimidation committed by [petitioner] company GLAXO-WELLCOME prior to
and during the conduct of the certification elections. Perceiving the
enumerated events to be unduly oppressive to labor, [respondent] union
NEW-DFA, Jossie De Guzman and Norman Cerezo lodged a complaint before
the Labor Arbiter against [petitioner] company, GLAXO-WELLCOME, for unfair
labor practice, illegal dismissal and illegal suspension. According to the
[respondent] union, the massive electioneering and manipulative acts of
GLAXO-WELLCOME prior to and during the certification election unduly
interfered with the workers right to self-organization and are constitutive of
unfair labor practice. NEW-DFA likewise averred that the new Car Allocation
Policy adopted by the company was intended to harass, retaliate and
discriminate against union officers and members. [Respondent] union also
challenged the legality of the suspension and dismissal of two of its officers,
namely: Norman Cerezo and Jossie Roda de Guzman. It argued that the
suspension and dismissal were effected without any prior hearing.
Issue: Did petitioner observe due process in dismissing the employees?
Ruling: The CA affirmed the findings of the labor arbiter and the NLRC that
the termination of the employment of De Guzman and the suspension of
Cerezo were based on a just cause. These findings are not at issue here.
The only question to be determined is whether the notice and hearing
requirements were complied with. To stress, if the dismissal is based on a just
cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code, the employer must give the
employee (1) two written notices and (2) a hearing (or at least, an
opportunity to be heard). The first notice is intended to inform the employee
of the employers intent to dismiss and the particular acts or omissions for
which the dismissal is sought. The second notice is intended to inform the
employee of the employers decision to dismiss. This decision, however,
must come only after the employee has been given a reasonable period,
from receipt of the first notice, within which to answer the charge; and ample
opportunity to be heard with the assistance of counsel, if the employee so
desires. The twin requirements of (a) two notices and (b) hearing are
necessary to protect the employees security of tenure, which is enshrined in
the Constitution, the Labor Code and related laws. The notices to be given
and the hearing to be conducted generally constitute the two-part due
process requirement of law that the employer must accord the employee. In
Kingsize Manufacturing Corporation v. NLRC, the Court held that this
requirement was not a mere technicality but a requirement of due process
to which every employee is entitled to insure that the employers prerogative
to dismiss or lay-off is not abused or exercised in an arbitrary manner.
Development of Doctrines
Wenphil Corporation v. NLRC G.R. No. 80587 February 8, 1989, En
Banc
Facts: Private respondent was hired by petitioner on January 18, 1984 as a
crew member at its Cubao Branch. He thereafter became the assistant head
of the Backroom department of the same branch. At about 2:30 P.M. on May
20, 1985 private respondent had an altercation with a co-employee, Job
Barrameda, as a result of which he and Barrameda were suspended on the
following morning and in the afternoon of the same day a memorandum was
issued by the Operations Manager advising private respondent of his
dismissal from the service in accordance with their Personnel Manual. The
notice of dismissal was served on private respondent on May 25, 1985. Thus
private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for unfair labor
practice, illegal suspension and illegal dismissal. After submitting their
respective position papers to the Labor Arbiter and as the hearing could not
be conducted due to repeated absence of counsel for respondent, the case
was submitted for resolution. Thereafter a decision was rendered by the
Labor Arbiter on December 3, 1986 dismissing the complaint for lack of
merit.
Issue: Was the dismissal proper without compliance with the requirements of
due process?
Ruling: The failure of petitioner to give private respondent the benefit of a
hearing before he was dismissed constitutes an infringement of his
constitutional right to due process of law and equal protection of the laws. 2
The standards of due process in judicial as well as administrative
proceedings have long been established. In its bare minimum due process of
law simply means giving notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment
is rendered. 3 The claim of petitioner that a formal investigation was not
necessary because the incident which gave rise to the termination of private
respondent was witnessed by his co- employees and supervisors is without
merit. The basic requirement of due process is that which hears before it
condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after
trial. However, it is a matter of fact that when the private respondent filed a
complaint against petitioner he was afforded the right to an investigation by
the labor arbiter. He presented his position paper as did the petitioner. If no
hearing was had, it was the fault of private respondent as his counsel failed
to appear at the scheduled hearings. The labor arbiter concluded that the
dismissal of private respondent was for just cause. He was found guilty of
grave misconduct and insubordination. This is borne by the sworn
statements of witnesses. The Court is bound by this finding of the labor
arbiter.
Serrano v. NLRC G.R. No. 117040, May 4, 2000, En Banc
Facts: Respondent Isetann Department Store moves for reconsideration of
the decision in this case insofar as it is ordered to pay petitioner full
backwages from the time the latter's employment was terminated on
October 11, 1991 up to the time it is determined that the termination of
employment is for an authorized cause. The motion is opposed by petitioner.
The decision is based on private respondent's failure to give petitioner a
written notice of termination at least thirty (30) days before the termination
of his employment as required by Art. 283 the Labor Code. Kycalr In support
of its motion, private respondent puts forth three principal arguments, to wit:
(1) that its failure to give a written notice to petitioner at least thirty (30)
days in advance in accordance with Art. 283 of the Labor Code is not in issue
in this case because, as a matter of fact, it gave its employees in the
affected security section thirty (30) days pay which effectively gave them
thirty (30) days notice, and petitioner accepted this form of notice although
he did not receive payment; (2) that payment of thirty (30) days pay in lieu
of the thirty (30) days prior formal notice is more advantageous to an
employee because instead of being required to work for thirty (30) days, the
employee can look for another job while being paid by the company; and (3)
that in any event the new ruling announced in this case should only be
applied prospectively.
Issue: Was the dismissal valid?
Ruling: The decision in Columbia Pictures does not mean that if a new rule is
laid down in a case, it should not be applied in that case but that said rule
should apply prospectively to cases arising afterwards. Private respondent's
view of the principle of prospective application of new judicial doctrines
would turn the judicial function into a mere academic exercise with the result
that the doctrine laid down would be no more than a dictum and would
deprive the holding in the case of any force. Indeed, when the Court
formulated the Wenphil doctrine, which we reverse in this case, the Court did
not defer application of the rule laid down imposing a fine on the employer
for failure to give notice in a case of dismissal for cause. To the contrary, the
new rule was applied right then and there. For that matter, in 20th Century
Fox Film Corp. v. Court of Appeals the Court laid down the rule that in
determining the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a search
warrant in copyright infringement cases, the court must require the
production of the master tapes of copyrighted films in order to compare
them with the "pirated" copies. The new rule was applied in opinion of the
Court written by Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. in the very same case of 20th
Century Fox in which the new requirement was laid down. Where the new
rule was held to be prospective in application was in Columbia Pictures and
that was because at the time the search warrant in that case was issued, the
new standard had not yet been announced so it would be unreasonable to
expect the judge issuing the search warrant to apply a rule that had not been
announced at the time. A good illustration of the scope of overruling
decisions is People v. Mapa, where the accused was charged with illegal
possession of firearms. The accused invoked the ruling in an earlier case that
denial of due process that will nullify the termination. However, the dismissal
is ineffectual and the employer must pay full backwages from the time of
termination until it is judicially declared that the dismissal was for a just or
authorized cause. The rationale for the re-examination of the Wenphil
doctrine in Serrano was the significant number of cases involving dismissals
without requisite notices. We concluded that the imposition of penalty by
way of damages for violation of the notice requirement was not serving as a
deterrent. Hence, we now required payment of full backwages from the time
of dismissal until the time the Court finds the dismissal was for a just or
authorized cause. Serrano was confronting the practice of employers to
dismiss now and pay later by imposing full backwages. We believe,
however, that the ruling in Serrano did not consider the full meaning of
Article 279 of the Labor Code which states: ART. 279. Security of Tenure. In
cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services
of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An
employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his
full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their
monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. This means
that the termination is illegal only if it is not for any of the justified or
authorized causes provided by law. Payment of backwages and other
benefits, including reinstatement, is justified only if the employee was
unjustly dismissed.
should not be beyond 15 May 2001, the day he manifested his refusal to be
reinstated. T he NLRC vacated the re-computation, holding that since Talde
did not appeal the Labor Arbiters decision granting him only reinstatement
and backwages, not separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, he may not be
afforded affirmative relief, and since he refused to go back to work, he may
recover backwages only up to 20 May 2001, the day he was supposed to
return to the job site. When Taldes motion for reconsideration was denied by
the NLRC, he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals set aside the NLRC findings and held that Talde was entitled
to both backwages and separation pay, even if separation pay was not
granted by the Labor Arbiter, in view of the strained relations between the
parties. Consequently, the company filed a petition for review on certiorari
before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not Talde was entitled to separation pay in lieu of actual
reinstatement on account of strained relations between him and the
company.
Ruling: An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs: backwages
and reinstatement. The two reliefs are separate and distinct. When
reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained relations between the
employee and the employer, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month
salary for every year of service should be awarded as an alternative. The
payment of separation pay is in addition to payment of backwages. In effect,
an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either reinstatement, if viable,
or separation pay if reinstatement is nolonger viable, and backwages. (Citing
Macasero v. Southern Industrial Gases Philippines, G.R. No. 178524; 30
January 2009) Under the doctrine of strained relations, the payment of
separation pay is considered an acceptable alternative to reinstatement
when the latter option is no longer desirable or viable. On one hand, such
payment liberates the employee from what could be a highly oppressive
work environment. On the other hand, it releases the employer from the
grossly unpalatable obligation of maintaining in its employ a worker it could
no longer trust. Strained relations must be demonstrated as a fact and must
be supported by substantial evidence showing that the relationship between
the employer and the employee is indeed strained as a necessary
consequence of the judicial controversy. In this case, the Labor Arbiter found
that actual animosity existed between the owner-manager Azul and Talde as
a result of the filing of the illegal dismissal case. Such finding, especially
when affirmed by the appellate court as in the case at bar, is binding upon
the Supreme Court, consistent with the prevailing rules that the Supreme
Court will not try facts anew and that findings of facts of quasi-judicial bodies
are accorded great respect, even finality. The Court of Appeals erroneously
computed his separation pay from 1990 (when he was hired to 1999 (when
he was unjustly dismissed), covering a period of 8 years. He must be
considered to have been in the service of the company not only until 1999,
but until 30 June 2005, the day he is deemed to have been actually
separated (his reinstatement having been rendered impossible) from the
company, or for a total of 15 years.
rule out reinstatement which would, otherwise, become the rule rather than
the exception in illegal dismissal cases. Absent illegal dismissal on the part of
LSIA and abandonment of employment on the part of respondents, we find
that the latters reinstatement without backwages is, instead, in order. In
addition to respondents alternative prayer therefor in their position paper,
reinstatement is justified by LSIAs directive for them to report for work at its
Mandaluyong City office as early of 10 May 2005. As for the error ascribed
the CA for failing to correct the NLRCs disregard of the evidence showing
LSIAs payment of respondents SILP, suffice it to say that the NLRC is not
precluded from receiving evidence, even for the first time on appeal,
because technical rules of procedure are not binding in labor cases.
Considering that labor officials are, in fact, encouraged to use all reasonable
means to ascertain the facts speedily and objectively, with little resort to
technicalities of law or procedure, LSIA correctly faults the CA for likewise
brushing aside the evidence of SILP payments it submitted during the appeal
stage before the NLRC.
approved by the Labor Arbiter who thereupon issued the writ of execution.
The company questioned the recomputation before the NLRC, arguing that
since Talde refused to report back to work as the company advised, he
should be deemed to have abandoned the same, thus, the re-computation
should not be beyond 15 May 2001, the day he manifested his refusal to be
reinstated. The NLRC vacated the re-computation, holding that since Talde
did not appeal the Labor Arbiters decision granting him only reinstatement
and backwages, not separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, he may not be
afforded affirmative relief, and since he refused to go back to work, he may
recover backwages only up to 20 May 2001, the day he was supposed to
return to the job site. When Taldes motion for reconsideration was denied by
the NLRC, he filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals set aside the NLRC findings and held that Talde was entitled
to both backwages and separation pay, even if separation pay was not
granted by the Labor Arbiter, in view of the strained relations between the
parties. Consequently, the company filed a petition for review on certiorari
before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Is respondent entitled to backwages?
Ruling: The basis for the payment of backwages is different from that for the
award of separation pay. Separation pay is granted where reinstatement is
no longer advisable because of strained relations between the employee and
the employer. Backwages represent compensation that should have been
earned but were not collected because of the unjust dismissal. The basis for
computing backwages is usually the length of the employees service while
that for separation pay is the actual period when the employee was
unlawfully prevented from working. As to how both awards should be
computed, Macasero v. Southern Industrial Gases Philippines instructs: [T]he
award of separation pay is inconsistent with a finding that there was no
illegal dismissal, for under Article 279 of the Labor Code and as held in a
catena of cases, an employee who is dismissed without just cause and
without due process is entitled to backwages and reinstatement or payment
of separation pay in lieu thereof: Thus, an illegally dismissed employee is
entitled to two reliefs: backwages and reinstatement. The two reliefs
provided are separate and distinct. In instances where reinstatement is no
longer feasible because of strained relations between the employee and the
employer, separation pay is granted. In effect, an illegally dismissed
employee is entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if
reinstatement is no longer viable, and backwages. The normal consequences
Constructive dismissal
Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club v. NLRC G.R. No. 154503, February
29, 2008
Facts: Amalia P. Kawada (private respondent) started her employment with
Uniwide sometime in 1981 as a saleslady. Over the years, private respondent
worked herself within Uniwides corporate ladder until she attained the rank
of Full Assistant Store Manager with a monthly compensation of P13,000.00
in 1995. As a Full Assistant Store Manager, private respondents primary
function was to manage and oversee the operation of the Fashion and
Personal Care, GSR Toys, and Home Furnishing Departments of Uniwide, to
ensure its continuous profitability as well as to see to it that the established
company policies and procedures were properly complied with and
implemented in her departments. Sometime in 1998, Uniwide received
reports from the other employees regarding some problems in the
departments managed by the private respondent. Thus, on March 15, 1998,
Uniwide, through Store Manager Apduhan, issued a Memorandum addressed
to the private respondent summarizing the various reported incidents
signifying unsatisfactory performance on the latters part which include the
commingling of good and damaged items, sale of a voluminous quantity of
damaged toys and ready-to-wear items at unreasonable prices, and failure to
submit inventory reports. Uniwide asked private respondent for concrete
plans on how she can effectively perform her job. In a letterdated March 23,
1998, private respondent answered all the allegations contained in the March
allowance,
and
car