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MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Main Building, Whitehall, London SWIA 2HB Telephone (Direct Dialling) 01-218 7165 (Switchboard) 01-2189000

From: ARM JAFFRA Y CB .• Deputy Under-Secretary 0/ State (Navy)

Ref: 14/2/35(21)

14 January 1983

. " ... ,

Commander-in-Chief Fleet Northwood

Middlesex HA6 3HP

... ...,- ... _

Sir

BOARD OF INQUIRY - REPORT INTO THE LOSS OF HMS ARDENT Reference: 520/241L dated 21 September 1982

1. I am commanded by the Admiralty Board of the Defence Council to inform you that they have taken note of your report and the Board of Inquiry proce~dings forwarded under the reference.

2. The Admiralty Board made the following observations:

a. As in the loss of HMS COVENTRY the Inquiry highlights the vulnerability of ships against air attack when employed in-shore and armed with AAW not optimised for that situation. This incident has demonstrated the need for multiple channels of fire, capable of local control when under such attack.

b. Greater emphasis on training in the use of GSA 4 Emergency Modes willbe beneficial, but technical limitations suggest that it will be impossible to achieve reasonable results unless the LAS is replaced by a more suitable equipment. Consideration will be given to an Electro Optical sight incorporating a wide field of view for acquisition,

a narrower field of view for tracking and a simple deflection device.

c. The observations on secondary armament are noted. It

is not clear at present why 20 mm guns were not fitted before the ship left Ascension. There is no record of demand on DNADs for GPMGs before HMS ARDENT sailed; generally HM Ships did not begin to demand them until May when the LLAD policy was clarified. It is assumed that thereafter they were allooated to ships in accordance with an assessment of priorities.

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d. The need for improved Education and more readily assimilated information on stability has been identified

by other Boards of Inquiry and the DSAC Working Party. Improvements will be sought through the NBCD Committee structure; the Training Panel of that Committee will look ~~ at the training of xxxxxx in their task of informing the -i command of ship conditions (and the priority this has over weapon repair) as well as the ethics of r-escue,

e. Provision of an Alternative Damage.Contro1 HQ is a lesson also derived from experience in HMS SHEFFIELD and HMS COYENTRY; this, and the possibility of improved control from the bridge, is under investigation for new designs and existing ships.

f. Factors leading to rapid spread of smoke and ,vulnerability of internal communications to damage·have also been identified in other incidents; action is being taken to rectify these shortcomings in the Type 23 deSign, and as much improvement as possible will be made for ships under construction and in the Running Fleet.

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It is noted that aesp1~e ~ne sever~ty of the attacks and the mental disorientation they produced, most of the ship's company evidently behaved well, kept calm and in some cases 'showed heroism. Mental unpreparedness was, however, clearly an important factor in the loss of the ship. There were many officers and senior ratings who, although well trained professionally, were badly affected by the experience.

Training policy will be reviewed, on receipt of your advice

on Flag Officer §ea Training's report on the preparation of

i ships' companies' for the stresses of action. "

h. the training aspects of the medical organisation will 'be examined by MDG(N) when all the CORPORATE medical reports have been analysed.

3. Your report and the proceedings have been taken into·account in the "Lessons Learntl1 studies in the NaVY,Department. 'The detailed lessons in both your report and the proceedings are also being followE up by the Staffs responsible. The Admiralty Board may wish to make further observations when all the lessons from Operate CORPORATE and from the Reports and Boards of Inquiry into other ship losses have been fully examined.

I am, Sir

Your obedient Servant

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Copy to: The Flag Officer First Flotilla

Internal: 1SL

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IUlS DRAKE Plymouth Devon

U'd of Inquiry \ cho 01

The Commander in Chief Fleet Northlrood

lUddlesex

HA6 3HP

6 August 1982

Sir

REPORT OF THE :BOARD OF INQUIRY nlTO THE LOSS OF m.:s ARDENT

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1. We have the honour to forward our report and findings on the loss of Her Hajestyts Ship ARDENT as directed in your letter No 00520/30!-"{ dated

11 June 1982. '.

2. The :Boartl convened at Devonport between 28 June and 6 A1lt:,"1lSt 1982.

One hundred and twenty seven members of the Ship's Company '(oTere interviet'Ted together \'Ii th three persons from other authorities. Seventy s i.x survivors l..rare given medical interviews.

3 •. It became clear to the :Board. that, with SOI:le five l"leeks be tween the events and the :Board first Sitting, I:leIDories had faded, some stories had changed and a degree of mythology had developed. 1Iuch of this had resulted from the Ship's Company's time together homeward bound in 55 CAJ:m:3nHl~ and ID,lS QtJE:i:;U ELIZABETH II \'There much was mixed and e:mgb'erated. Nevertheless \..ra are satisfied that we have established the great majority of the relevant facts, and that those \..ra lack trould not seriously affect our findincs.

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PP3PARATORY EVEIl7J."S

5. IDeS ARD3}lT sailed for the Falkland Islands and Operation COHPOwi..T".8 from Devonport on 19 April 1982. Despite having only four days \"laming

of deployment ,she ''(oms well' stored and in good material and operational state. Her recent programme had been ideal preparation for an operational task and had included COST, a Ji·rc and Exercise .ALLOY EXPlliillS \-lith the Amphibious Group. She had had a few recent personnel changes and ma.n;y of the~hip's Company had been onboard for t~v years.

6. It 'is clear that the ship \ms highly respected by both Sq1ia.dron OX'...d, Flotilla sta.ff,tand \ms well organised and t·:ell led. She had an enviable record in Fleet Gunnery and r,Iissile Competi tiona, and. her Flibht had C!. recent FeF3 corruaendation for efficiency. The Ship's Company \-Tere confident of their ability and had their ta.ils up.

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1. The passage South to Ascension Island was in company with HI;jS ARGONAUT

and RFAs REGENT and PLtr.·ILEAF. Six days were spent in the vicinity of Ascension and ARDENT then headed South with C.AN:BERHA and ~K to join the FEARLESS group

on 10 UaY. '

8. Throughout the passage peripd training and briefing \tere conducted sensibly and conscientiously. {XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~ad made a commendably accurate assessment of the prime threat andX.XXX, ship's future employment, and took particular pains to train xxx weapon crews in the Emergency modes of control, knO\"ing this \'I8.S likely "to be required on the day. HO\-lever, no fixed \"ing assets \"lell'e made available at any time for realistic,AAH drills.

9. The ship had attempted to acquire several Gener~l Purpose Ua.chine Guns

(JPljD~ before sa.iling from Devonport. In the event they acquired only one,

fitting this on the GDP along with four Ll~.iGs in various parts of the ship.

OPERATIONS TIT FALKLAND SOUND

10. On the 19/20 N'a3 the Amphibious Group approached the Falkland Islands from the East, preparatory' to a landing in the San Carlos area of East Falkland on 21 llIa;y. ID5.AR:lENT' s initial role waS to carry out Naval Gunfire S~port from Grantham Sound. to the South of the landing area and she was to be the first ship of the groUp to enter Falkland Sound. At

. 201.OZ on 20 Ua.Y ARDENT detached from the Amphibious Group and made a. high speed transit to Falkland Sound. passing through the North entrance into the Sound a.t midnight. She then proceeded straight to her Fire Support Station in the South of Grantham Sound. Although prepared for all eventua.li ties her arrival was uneventful.

11. Surprisingly there was no 'call for fire' before dawn at a.bout 1100Z, but from then on ARDENT was involved in regular Naval Gunfire Support on Goose Green Airfield and other targets. This was extremely successful and at least three Puca.ra.aircraft were damaged, on the ground. These engagements continued until about 1600 and by 1100 it was confirmed there \'I8.S no further NUS requirement in that area.

., ,

12. After dawn had brought in a fine, clear day with excellent viSibility, the first air attacks on the Group by Argentine aircraft oomaenced , Uost of them were concentrated on the ships near San Carlos, but A.>IDENT waS approached on three occasions by pairs of Pucara aircraft and. by the occasional r.rirage

on its \.ra.y up the Sound. to\·mrds the AOA. All turned away when engaged by ARDENT. At .about 1600Z a lone Skyhawk emerged from over the land close to

the South of the ship and dropped two bombs in the water, one on either side of ARDElfT. These failed to explode. On this occasion only the port 20 ram opened up, the wa.rn.ingbeiilg so short, but in general at other ti::les the

ship ~ time to rea.c~ to the threat. ~x.xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~ xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX) XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX10CllYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYYY xxxxxxxxX{xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx xxfxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~

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Naval Gunfire Support and A,A-defence "lere quickly and simply made using the

fle:x;ibility of the GSA 4 system.

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MAJOR AIR ATTACKS ON m~1S ARDENT

13. Having had confizmation of the completion of her Gunfire Support task at about 170OZ, ARDElilT was told to t spl it air attacks from the South' with liS YARr,DUTH. The origin of this order is obscure but ARDE1lT proceeded to a patrol line 'I'lest of North ~iest Island with YAill·lOUTH to the t-lest of her.

14. Shortly after arrival in the new area at 1140Z a group of three A4 Sl'".yhawks was sighted by ARDEUT crossing Falkland Sound from the Ii est.

They circled the ship anti-clockwise at,about two miles and then turned

in to attack from the North East. This attack .. laS pressed home vigorously from. the port quarter, out of 4.5 gun arcs, and although 20 rom and L1';Ds blaZed a~, the Seacat, again in Emergency mode, failed to fire for no immediately obvious reasons.

15. : The aircraft attacked with cannon and bombs, two of the bombs exploding in the Hangar area, one penetrating down thro.ugh the After S\,1i tqhboard and into the After Auxiliary !'Tachinery Room without exploding, the others missing.

16. This attack caused major damage to the Hangar area, tossed the Seacat mounting onto the Flight Deck and severely damaged the Lynx helicopter. The After S~d tchboard was severely damaged with resul tant loss of pO~ier including normal supplies to the 4.5 !,Ik 8 gun. There Was flooding in the Dining Hall, Ship Control Centre and flat, and Galley areas due to fractured pipes, and

a fire started in the starboard side of the Hangar. There were al so several casual ti es.

11. The ship however still had steering and full control of main engines, S";C£

and having reported her state to xxooooooo, was ordered to proceed to San SCkO

Carlos .iater. S~

18. Shortly after this as the ship headed North at about 1800Z a further attack of five A4 Skyha.tks developed. They approached from either quarter and dropped a considerabl e number of normal and retard bombs of differing size. The ship was virtually defenceless and could not fend off this a.ttack. Two to four bombs exploded in the ship aft of the Hangar and fUrther unexploded bombs almost certainly penetrated into.the ship from. the Hangar

_... area a.ft on the port side. Several bombs exploded in the \-later nearby and the ship whipped heavily. Again most of the bombs fell aft, but there was sene damage to the plating on the starboa.rd side of the Ponrard AUJdliary I:.!a.chineI'"lJ Room resul ~ing in a minor leak.

19. The bombs aft had devastated the Dining Hall and Pa.in Shop area i-There there Here· many casual ties and. the steering failed, although the Tyne engines .. ;ere still driving the ship and uere under control.

POST DAH4.GE ACTION

20. Al1;hough a. ren damage assessment had not been compl eted the ship t steam had virtually got the fire and flooding of the first atta.ck under control ,·rhen the second attack arrived.

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21. Following this attaCk(XX%XXXXXXxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~ auickly surveyed the area fro1n i xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx!Cxxxxxxxxx.

KXxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~xxxxxxxxx~ KXxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~XXXXXXY~~vvvvxxxxxxxihe ordered • Get out' of xxxxxxxxxxxx~[XXXXXXXXXXXx.:XXXXXXXXXXX;xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] The whole after part of the ~hip's Comp~ then started to move to the Boat Deck.

.

22. Communication between Bridge and Ship Control Centre was virtually non-e:xifJ:1ient at this time, and with the ship heading fast ashorecxxxxx~ .xxxxxxx finally got orders through by zeroing the pitch lever setting. The la~t 'man out through the Ship Control Centre he~ the order as he left. He re-entered and tripped the engines. The ship stopped less than a mile·offshore and ~XXXXXXXXXX then ordered an anchor to be let go.

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24. Shortly after further limited discussion and with the ship now listing noticeably to starboard,. rxxxxxxxxxxx'made the deoision to abandon ship, and called m~.s YARMOUTH alongside to take off .xxxx Ship's Company.

THE SINKING OF lUiS ARDENT

25. At about '1855Z XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX waS the last to leave mB ARDENT, and IDIf) YARMOUTH, after a short delay when she fouled herself on ARDENT's anchor cable, then sailed at speed to San Carlos Water. There the survivors were transferred to the S5 cANBERRA. ID~ BROADSWORD had also picked up one survivor and ahe accompanied the other ships to the AOA.

26. On the w~ a check was carried . out of the Ship's Company, and once on CAN.BERRA it Was confirmed that 22 were dead or missing.

27. Shortly after dark .CANBERRA. sailed from the AOA and the ARDENT Ship's Company were on their way home. ARDENT was still afloat and WaS seen by BROADSWORD steadily burning throughout the night with several major explosions onbcard , After 0600Z on 22 May, when BBOADSl'lORD left the scene, no o'therperson can be found. to have seen ARDENT afloat. It is believed that the ship sank at about 063OZ.

28. Divers have subsequently visited the wreck which is about 4 cables South West of North West Islands.

ANALYSIS

29. IDi5 ARDENT was well prepared for the Falklands Operation. She was a

, well organised and' efficient ship who had the right programme beforehand,

had assessed the threat well and prepared as best she could to meet it. Her material state was high and personnel confident of their equipment and training.

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30. In FalklaiJ.d Sound, faced with short tem warning of attack and Emergency mode of control of weapons, she repulsed various rather halfhearted air attacks, and at the same time carried out some excellent Naval Gtmfire Supporf. However at the end of the day, in a somewhat e:xposed. part of Falkland Sound, she succwnbed to two determined mul tiaircraft attacks which sheha.d little chance of deflecting, and waS seriously d.alIla.ged. This damage would have been greater still had not ma.ny bombs failed to ~lode. The r-eaaon why Seacat failed to fire during the first of these attacks had. not been fully substantiated.

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31. The ship was abandoned follow~ this serious damage becauSe it was tho~t to be about to plunge. ~~XXXXXXXXXjxxxxxxxxxxxx~xxxxxxxx~ xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx:xxxxxx~XXXXXX)XXXXXxxxxxxxjxxxxxxxx~ XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX)xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx ·0 xxxxxxxxxxxxx.

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the Hangar. Neither was yet near the magazines and each could have been tackled provided firemain pressure remained available. ~here is a possibility that there were also minor fires in the Galley/Canteen vicinity.

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40. In abandoning ship there were no major problems and it was relatively

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43. The Board has reached the following principal conclusions:

a. m·s ARDElrT was \"1911 prepared, well stored and in good material state on arrival in the Falldands.

b. Her Ship's Company had achieved high standards in training end were confident in themselves and the ship.

c. .xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx had accurately assessed the pr~e threat to S '3'

his ship and her likely role, and trained accordingly. ~~

S'2.~ d. m:5 ARDENT'S station in Falkland Sound was isolated and e:xposed her to ::1.

air attack. This was aCknowledged and .XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX)and~XXX) ~qO

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e. The lilllitations on radar within Falkland Sound and +.he subsequent use of S?,1 Emergency modes of \'leapon . control were expected by both xxx:::xxxxxxxand the ShilH~ SL f. m·B ARDENT's weapon systems for defence against determined air attack

clqse inshore were inadequate.

g. HIfE ARDENT was hit by bombs as a result of two air attacks pressed home with detemination.

h. Failure of the Seacat system to fire during the first major air attack on ID;.5 ARDE1lT made her virtually defenceless.

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1. The decision by xxxxxx~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx to abandon ship, was justified on the evidence presented to him.

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the fire aft had been oontained it should have been no~sible to Save <a

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. RECOr,j[·mNDATIONS

44. The Board make the following prinoipal reoommendations.

a.. The GSA 4 emergenoy mode be signifioantly improved to allow a real istio chance of sUccessful AA engagement ..

, b. The Type 21 frigate be fitted with additional short range wea.pon systems. c. Further studies be undertaken to provide a basis for improving methods

of preparing men for the stresses of aotion.

d. That an alternative Damage Control HQ(HQ2) be established and manned at Action Stations.

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Your obedient Servants

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ANNEX A TO .:2__

REPOln' OF HMS ARDENT 130:; « DATED 6 AUGUST 1982 ~

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See Distribution

l( June 82

LOSS OF liMS ARDENT - BOARD OF INQumy

1. You are to assemble in HMS DRAKE at 0900 on 28 June 1982 as a board of inquiry whereof xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; is to be the President and hold a full and careful investigation into the circumstances leading

to and attending the disablement and later sinking of HMS .ARDENT under the command of.xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, between 20 and 23 May 1982, calling before you such witnesses as are necessary and reasonably. available to enable you to form correct conclusions.

2. Specifically you should ascertain and identify by questioning those involved and other available witnesses the matters listed in Annex A. Although the matters in Annex A are significant, they are not intended to be exhaustive and all other areas of inquiry deemed pertinent should be

scrutinized. '

3. The Commanding Officer HMS ARDENT's preliminary report is at Annex B.

4. Should any information come to light which the President considers should be communicated urgently to me or to any member of my staff, such information is to be sent by any appropriate manner in anticipation of completion of the inquiry.

5. A'list of those on board HMS ARDENT on 21 May 1982 is at Annex C.

6. The inquiry is to be conducted in accordance with the directions contained in QRRN Chapter 23, Appendix 38, and FLAGO 1619.

7. The report of the board is to be accompanied by minutes of evidence, or statements taken, and is to contain an expression of opinion on the degrees of adequacy of personnel, material and procedures.

8. The report is to be signed by each member of the board' and is to be forwarded in original and unstapled form. The President is to deliver his report personally and brief me on the principal findings.

9. Shorthand writers will be detailed from the offices of the Commanderin-Chief Fleet, Flag Officer Plymouth and Flag Officer Portsmouth.

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J D E FIELDHOUSE Admiral

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ANNEX A TO

REPORJ! OF EMS ABDENT BOI DATED 6 AUGUST 1982

Annexes:

A. Specimen Matters for Investigation.

B. The Commanding Officer EMS ARDENT's Report dated 3 June 82.

C. List of Personnel on board EMS ARDENT on 21 May 82.

Distribution:

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.ANNEX: A TO CINCFLEET'S 00520/3.X DATED 11 JUNE 82

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SPECIMEN MATTERS FOR INVESTIGATION

.AlmEX A TO

REPQRr OF EMS ARDENT BOI DATED 6 AUGUST 1982

Operational

1. The Task Group Commander's assessment of the threat before the attack.

2. The Task Group Commapder's intentions and policies in force at the time of the attack.

3. The Task Group communications plan before the attack.

4. The disposition of the Task Group.

5. The degree of readiness of the Task Group, and the ship, before, during, and after the attack.

6. The -ship's OPDEF state immediately before the attack.

7. The manning states of operations teams, weapons, propulsion and generation systems, and the locations of personnel.

8. The damage control state and condition immediately before, and at the time of, . the attack.

9. The nature and sequence of events before, during and after the attack.

10. The use of the ship's weapon systems and sensors.

11. The use of countermeasures, including chaff, against the attack.

Design/Maintenance

12. The adequacy of the Type 21's weapon and sensor fit and its ability to react to the threat.

13. The adequacy of the damage control and fire fighting organisation, procedures, equipment and training.

14. Any problems arising from the design and layout of Type 21 destroyers and their machinery and equipment, with particular regard to any hazardous materiais.

15. The degree of readiness of, and confidence in, all weapons, sensors and communication equipments, including the degree to which standard operator checks and performance servicing logs were used.

16. Any shortcomings in machinery operating procedures.

17. The influence, if any, of the material state of the ship on events.

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.A:NNElC A TO

RIDPORr OF EMS ARDENT :BOI . DATED 6 AUGUS']! 1982

Environmental

18. The environmental conditions and observed effect on picture compilation.

19. Any evidence of stress affecting the ship's company before the attack.

20. Any evidence of efficiency being reduced because of seasickness, shortage of sleep, or length of time closed up at action and defence stations, or any other cause.

Training

21. The adequacy or otherwise of individual training and preparation of personnel.

22. The adequacy or otherwise of whole-ship training and preparation of personnel.

Adininistrative/Medical

23. Whether those trained in First Aid were adequate in numbers and in expertise.

24. Whether First Aid parties were closed up.

25. Whether emergency operating station was rigged.

26. Whether access to the Sick Bay and First Aid stations was affected by damage.

27. Whether any casualties were treated.

28. Whether any clinical diagnoses of causes of death were established.

29. Whether man-made fibres rather than cotton were worn by personnel, and whether these fibres contributed to burns.

30.- Any evidence of toxic fumes arising from electrical cable insulation, plastics, cushions, etc.

31. Any evidence to assist towards the registration of deaths, and towards givirig further information to next-of-kin, such as - where each fatal casualty was last seen, his apparent physical condition at that time,and known or conjectured cause and circumstances of death.

Rescue and Salvage

32. ~rief narrative of immediate rescue assistance by other ships to HMS ARDENT and her personnel.

33. Brief narrative of any attempt to take in tow; and eventual sinking.

34. Summary of any equipment, materials, etc salvaged from the ship before she sank.

A-2 A-4