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Should We Fear Death?

Jonathan Boardman

Death is the most destructive reality next to time. Life never wins, no matter how long
the struggle lasts. This overwhelming reality is so certain that one must wonder why
human beings still trouble over it. One would think that acceptance would be much more
natural than fear to creatures with logical capacities. The source of this fear is likely the
mystery surrounding death’s arrival in our lives. We do not know the time, place, and
cause of death; nor do we know the suffering that will accompany it. Isaac Asimov
alluded to this problem when he said, “Life is pleasant. Death is peaceful. It's the
transition that's troublesome.” Will we die in our sleep? Will we catch a horrendous
disease? Will we slip on an icy sidewalk? No one knows. The question is not whether
we fear death, the vast majority of the populous does. The question is this: Should we
fear death? Before I address this question, however, I would like to answer the question,
“Is death a bad thing?”

In order to assess the goodness or the badness of death, the concept of death itself must
be refined. There are at least three standards that determine when a person can be called
“dead.” The cardiopulmonary standard, the whole-brain standard, and the higher-brain
standard are the most prominent demarcations. The cardiopulmonary standard is the
oldest standard and was used well into the twentieth century. The advent of mechanical
respirators made it possible to keep persons “alive,” even if they had sustained
significant, previously lethal brain damage.1 This blurred the previously distinct line
between alive and dead. Part of the confusion came from the fact that the brain, the heart,
and the lungs are distinct from one another, yet dependent on each other to support life.
The failure of any one causes failure in the others. Which one, then, should be used as
the standard? It is conceivable that brain function could continue, at least for a short
time, if the cardiopulmonary or cardiorespiratory functions no longer work. The brain
also appears to be the physical home of the mind and other things essential to
personhood. Therefore, it makes the most sense to claim that the person dies when the
brain ceases to function. In accordance with the whole-brain approach, the current legal
standards in America define death as “the irreversible cessation of functioning of the
entire brain, including the brainstem.”2 This view does not take care of all of the
problems that plague the cardiopulmonary standard, however. The cerebrum and/or
cerebellum could be completely dysfunctional, while the brainstem is still regulating
bodily functions. In other words, a person could be in a permanently vegetative state
(PVS), even a permanently comatose state, and still be considered alive. Persons in
either of these states have no chance of ever regaining consciousness; they are
biologically functional corpses. It is because of this that I propose the higher-brain
standard as the demarcation between life and death. It says that “human death is the
irreversible cessation of the capacity for consciousness.”3 On this standard, persons in
PVS or permanent comas are dead; while they are still humans, they are no longer
persons. A person can subjectively experience the world, whether real or imagined, and
respond to it. The culmination of these subjective experiences is what comprises a life.

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http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/death-definition/
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To lose higher-brain function is to lose what makes a human a person. To lose the ability
to subjectively experience is to die.

If death is the absolute end to all subjective experience and the destruction of
personhood, it may seem obvious that death is bad. The brevity of life at the hands of an
inevitable end assures us that many goals we set can never be attained. In the very least,
death obliterates any hope for the fulfillment of many potentialities. However, if death is
bad, is the alternative good? Would anyone actually want to live forever? Existence
would become boring and predictable; the only activities left would be contemplating
mathematical, geometrical, and other conceptual entities. So, is death good or bad? If
good is taken to mean desirable or beneficial and bad is taken to mean undesirable or
detrimental, then death can be either good or bad, according to an individual’s life plan. I
argue the following:

i. Depriving a moral agent y of x against the agent’s will, assuming the agent
has a legitimate claim of ownership on x, is bad

i’. Depriving a moral agent y of x in accordance with the agent’s will is good,
or, at least, not bad

ii. A moral agent y has a legitimate claim of ownership on y’s life x’

iii. Death deprives a moral agent y of x’ either in accordance with or against
the will of y
iv. Therefore,
1. Death is bad if it deprives a moral agent y of x’ against the
will of y, or
2. Death is good, or, at least, not bad, if it deprives a moral
agent y of x’ in accordance with the will of y

The two premises most likely subject to criticism are (ii) and (iii). A possible criticism of
(ii) is to question y’s legitimate ownership of x’. One could claim that control determines
ownership. Death does no wrong by claiming y’s life; y’s life simply switches owners.
There are many cases where control does not determine ownership. For example, if I
borrow a CD from a friend, I now control it. It is still my friend’s CD, however. If I
were to break or devalue that CD, my friend would most likely be angry and/or expect a
replacement. He retained ownership of the CD even though I controlled it. There is an
inherent problem in claiming that some z (i.e. – death, other moral agents) could gain
control of x’ from y. x’ is comprised of subjective experiences that are unique to y and
y’s perspective. Unless z=y, then the moment z attains x’, x’ becomes x’not. A life may
be taken from a person, but it may not be lived by anyone else. What about premise (iii)?
One might argue that death is a necessary part of life. Without death, life is incomplete.
x’ is not x’ until it has an end, just as, in geometry, a line segment is a ray until it has a
definite endpoint. The completion theory makes two mistakes. First, it assumes
completion is actually a part of life. Second, it assumes that y, the owner of x’, wishes
for a completion. Life is the continuous addition of subjective experiences to a pool of
subjective experiences that began accumulating at life’s beginning. Completion halts the

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addition of further experiences to the pool. If completion does not add to subjective
experience, but hinders the addition, then it cannot be within the bounds of life. The only
way in which completion can be a necessary component is if it is a part of a life plan.
Thus, the argument from completion actually favors premise (iv), which claims death’s
goodness or badness is contingent upon y’s will (life plan). Death can be a good thing,
but only if one wishes it.

Strangely, the question of whether we should or should not fear death does not depend on
its goodness or badness. We may find the idea of death to be negative, in which case it
becomes bad, but this does not mean that we ought to fear death. One must ask why we
fear anything. What is fear? According to dictionary.com, fear is “a distressing emotion
aroused by impending danger, evil, pain, etc., whether the threat is real or imagined; the
feeling or condition of being afraid.” It is an emotion that arises when there is a potential
threat in the future. It seems to become worse with the increased likelihood of the threat,
as well. Few people fear an attack by rabid unicorns, but if stuck in a rip tide, many
people would fear drowning. It seems that fear increases as the hope for avoidance
decreases. Once hope becomes effectively zero percent, a curious thing happens; fear
tends to fade and acceptance takes its place. In many cases, acceptance leads to peace.
None can hope to escape death; therefore, acceptance seems much more appropriate than
fear. While we ought not fear death itself, it seems perfectly logical to fear the
circumstances surrounding it. Pain and the unknown are two things that humans will
always fear, and, unfortunately, how we will die is never 100% certain and, in many
cases, death is painful. The most we can do is accept death’s inevitability and plan
around it.

Death is only as good or bad as one makes it. The old analogy of seeing the glass as half-
full or half-empty comes to mind; no matter what one does, that does not change the fact
that there is only half of a glass. In addition, being afraid of death is irrational. As long
as there is a smidgen of hope for a good outcome, it seems that fear of the bad outcome
may be justified. Fear of the inevitable, especially an inevitable end, devalues the life at
hand by polluting the subjective experiences that comprise it. Accepting death is the only
way to cope with it. Acceptance can even lead to a sort of tranquility or peace. To quote
a famous Bible verse, “You shall know the truth, and the truth shall set you free.” Death
is the truth, it is easiest to just accept it.

1,2, 3
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/death-definition/