For Official Use Only: U. S. Army Engineer District Corps of Engineers Fort Worth, Texas

U. S.
ARMY ENGINEER DISTRICT

CORPS OF ENGINEERS
FORT WORTH, TEXAS
PERIODIC INSPECTION REPORT

DALLAS FLOODWAY
TRINITY RIVER
DALLAS, DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS
REPORT NO. 9
3-5 DECEMBER 2007
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DALLAS FLOODWAY
TRINITY RIVER
REPORT NO. 9
3-5 DECEMBER 2007
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION NO. TITLE PAGE NO.
I – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4
II – INSPECTION TEAM AND DATE OF INSPECTION
2.1 INSPECTION TEAM MEMBERS 5

2.2 DATE OF INSPECTION 6
III – SYSTEM BACKGROUND INFORMATION
3.1 PROJECT IDENTIFICATION 6

3.2 PROJECT AUTHORITY 6
IV – PRE-INSPECTION PACKET INFORMATION
4.1 PRE-INSPECTION BROCHURE 8
V – INSPECTION FINDINGS AND EVALUATIONS
5.1 GENERAL 8
5.2 RESULTS OF EXAMINATION FOR EACH FEATURE 8
5.3 DOCUMENTATION OF SIGNIFICANT GEOTECHNICAL FINDINGS 25
5.4 DESIGN CRITERIA REVIEW 51
VI – LEVEE SAFETY ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1 LEVEE CREST ELEVATION 55

6.2 EMBANKMENT CRACKING 55
6.3 DART BRIDGE 58
6.4 HAMPTON BRIDGE 58
6.5 WOODALL RODGERS BRIDGE 58
6.6 I-35 BRIDGE 59
6.7 EROSION AT OTHER BRIDGE PENETRATIONS 59
6.8 CONDITION OF ACCESS ROADS 59
6.9 VEGETATION 60
6.10 REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT OF CREEPING SLIDE REPAIRS 61
6.11 CHANNEL REPAIRS 62
6.12 SILTATION 63
6.13 DAMAGE DUE TO UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS 64
6.14 GATE CLOSURES 64

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SECTION NO. TITLE PAGE NO.
6.15 EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN 64
VII – REFERENCES
7.1 REFERENCES 64
VIII – ACTIONS TAKEN BY SSD SINCE PERIODIC INSPECTION
8.1 ACTIONS TAKEN 66
APPENDICES
Appendix No. Title
A PROJECT LOCATION MAP

B PRE-INSPECTION BROCHURE
C GIS MAPS
D PHOTOGRAPHS
E INSPECTION CHECKLIST (SPREADSHEETS)
F DALLAS FLOODWAY MAINTENANCE PROGRAM SUMMARY
G FLOOD 2007 GEOTECHNICAL TRIP REPORT
H LEVEE CREST SURVEYS
I CERTIFICATION LETTER
J ACTIONS TAKEN BY SSD SINCE PERIODIC INSPECTION
K AGENCY TECHNICAL REVIEW (ATR)

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DALLAS FLOODWAY
TRINITY RIVER
REPORT NO. 9
3-5 DECEMBER 2007
I – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. The Dallas Floodway project protects the CoD, Texas, a major
metropolitan area with a population in excess of 1.2 million people. Located along the Elm
Fork, West Fork and Trinity Rivers, the Dallas Floodway includes 22.6 miles of levees: 11.7
miles on the East levee and 10.9 miles along the West levee. The East levee protects the
Stemmons Corridor (a major transportation route through the City) and parts of Downtown
Dallas and the Central Business District from flooding on the Trinity River, while the West
levee protects a large portion of West Dallas.
These levees were originally constructed by the CoD in the early 1930s in response to
extreme flooding along the Trinity River in 1908. Originally constructed with 2.5H:1V side
slopes, a maximum height of 35 feet and a crown width of 6 feet, the levee system was
modified by USACE in the late 1950s by expanding the levee cross-section, flattening the
levee side slopes and increasing the crest width to 16 feet. Additionally, improvements to the
interior drainage system were also made at that time. Originally authorized to provide flood
protection to a level of SPF + 4 feet, major urban development and land-use changes in the
area since the project was completed in 1958 have reduced that level of protection.
Restoration of the authorized level of flood protection will require providing more height on
both the East and West Levees.
In 1999 at the direction of Congress, two additional systems were added to the Dallas
Floodway: Rochester Levee, which protects residential and commercial interests in East
Dallas; and the Central Wastewater Treatment Plant (CWWTP) Levee, which protects critical
infrastructure in South Dallas.
A periodic inspection (PI) of the Dallas Floodway project was performed on 3-5
December 2007. This inspection was the 9th PI for the East and West Levee systems, and
the 1st PI for both the Rochester and the CWWTP Levee systems. The inspection was
conducted using procedures utilized during all past PIs of the project (i.e., ‘legacy’ type
inspections), and did not incorporate the Levee Inspection Checklist distributed in June 2007.
When the report documenting the inspection and findings was being written, it was
determined that failure to use the new inspection checklist was inappropriate. Therefore,
information from the legacy inspection was transferred to the new inspection template.
During this transfer, it became apparent that the more subjective ratings from previous
inspections of the Floodway would be replaced by ratings determined in accordance with the
very specific language and rating criteria described on the checklist. As a result, significant
deficiencies were documented that resulted in unacceptable ratings for each of the 4
systems in the Floodway, and for the Dallas Floodway project overall. Items that generated
unacceptable ratings include:
• Insufficient crest height rendering the East and West Levees incapable of successfully
accommodating the Standard Project Flood without overtopping
• Significant encroachments and penetrations that impact the integrity and performance
of the levees, as well as inhibit access for O&M, surveillance, and flood-fighting
purposes

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• Damaged gate closures
• Unstable structures
• Severe desiccation cracking of the levees
• Erosion
• Vegetation
• Siltation
• Channel instability
In addition to numerous unacceptable ratings, it was determined that the Dallas

Floodway does not meet current USACE design criteria regarding relevant factors of safety
for embankment stability and seepage gradients.
It is noted that the results of the inspection identify negative impacts during base flood
(100-year event) conditions which would jeopardize performance of project features to
reliably function as authorized. This is a significant concern that may have a substantial
negative impact on FEMA flood mapping of the areas outside the levees and the residents
and businesses protected by those levees.
According to the Inspection Report Template, the East Levee, West Levee,
Rochester Levee, and the CWWPT Levee systems had one or more items rated as
unacceptable. Since there is a significant number of deficiencies that would prevent the
systems from performing as intended, the overall rating for the Dallas Floodway project is
unacceptable.
II – INSPECTION TEAM AND DATE OF INSPECTION
2.1 INSPECTION TEAM MEMBERS. The following were members of the inspection team:
Name Organization
David F. Garcia CoD, Street Services Department

Marie Marroquin CoD, Street Services Department
Don Lawrence CoD, Street Services Department
Frank D. Pechal CoD, Street Services Department
Mike Johnson CoD, Street Services Department
Billy Rios CoD, Street Services Department
Kelly High CoD, Director, Street Services Department
Ron Bell CESWD-RBT-W, Water Management
Les Perrin CESWF-EC-DG, Geotechnical, E&C
José Hernández (team lead) CESWF-EC-DG, Geotechnical, E&C
Anita Branch CESWF-EC-DG, Geotechnical, E&C
Steven Chen CESWF-EC-DG, Geotechnical, E&C
Kurt Ley CESWF-EC-DS, Structural, E&C
Zach Gerich CESWF-EC-DS, Structural, E&C
David Wilson CESWF-EC-HH, Hydrology & Hydraulics, E&C
Mark Sissom CESWF-OD-TM, Ops
Jeff Qunell CESWF-OD-TM, Ops
Jason Tackett CESWF-PM-ECSO, PPMD
John Wilson AZ & B
2.2 DATE OF INSPECTION. The inspection was conducted from 3 to 5 December 2007. The
weather was sunny, dry, and cool, with temperatures in the 70s and clear blue skies. The

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elevation of the Trinity River at Baker Pump Station was 383.75 feet NGVD on 2 December
2007 (All elevations mentioned in this report are expressed in feet, NGVD). Information,
data, and as-built drawings contained in previous inspection reports are referenced, but not
repeated.
This report contains the results of the inspection performed by representatives of the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), Fort Worth District (CESWF), and the CoD Street
Services Department (SSD). Authority for conducting PIs and preparing inspection reports is
contained in ER 1110-2-100, Periodic Inspection and Continuing Evaluation of Completed
Civil Works Structures, dated 15 February 1995, and Policy Guidance Letter, Periodic
Inspection Procedures for the Levee Safety Program, dated 17 December 2008.
III – SYSTEM BACKGROUND INFORMATION
3.1 PROJECT IDENTIFICATION. The Dallas Floodway, Trinity River (West Fork and Elm Fork),
Texas, is an urban flood damage reduction project consisting of the following four systems:
East Levee, West Levee, Rochester Levee, and Central Wastewater Treatment Plant
(CWWTP) Levee. The project is federally authorized and non-federally operated and
maintained.
3.2 PROJECT AUTHORITY. The authority under which the Dallas Floodway Project was
constructed was the River and Harbor Act approved 2 March 1945 (PL-79-14) (HD
403/77/1), and the River and Harbor Act approved 17 May 1980 (PL 81-516) HD 242/81/1.
The authority for the Dallas Floodway Extension construction was under Section 301, River
and Harbor Act 1965, modified by Section 351 WRDA 1996; and Section 356 of WRDA
1999. The reimbursement shown in the project cost was authorized by Section 351 WRDA
1996 for the useful portions of the Rochester and Central Wastewater Treatment Plant Levee
Systems, which were constructed by the CoD after the floods of 1989, 1990 and 1991.
Section 301 of the River and Harbor Act of 1965 (79 Stat. 1091) was modified to
provide that flood protection works constructed by the non-federal interests along the Trinity
River for Rochester Park and the Central Wastewater Treatment Plant shall be included as a
part of the project and the cost of such works shall be credited against the non-federal share
of project costs.
3.2.1 Estimated Original Cost of Federal Project. The estimated original project cost was
$23.9 million.
3.2.2 Construction Completion Date of Original Federal Project. Construction to modify

the original Dallas levees by enlarging the levee cross-section was performed between
February 1953 and April 1959.
3.2.3 Public Sponsors. The public sponsor is the SSD. The point of contact is David F.
Garcia, P.E., Senior Program Manager, at 214-671-0322.
3.2.4 Location. The project is located in the CoD, Dallas County, Texas, as shown on the
Project Location Map provided as Appendix A. The floodway alignment runs along the Elm
Fork and the West Fork of the Trinity River, Mountain Creek, and the main stem of the Trinity
River.
The East Levee system extends from river miles 497.9 to 505.5 of the Trinity River
and 3.8 miles along the Elm Fork. The West Levee system extends from river miles 498.1 to

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505.5 of the Trinity River and 3.6 miles along the West Fork and Mountain Creek. The
Rochester Levee system surrounds Rochester Park, and the Central Wastewater Treatment
Plant (CWWTP) Levee system surrounds the plant of the same name.
3.2.5 Potential Consequences. The potential consequences for the Dallas Floodway
project consisting of populations at risk and the estimated value of the property in the
protected areas are to be obtained from the National Levee Database (NLD), which has not
been populated at the time this report was prepared.
3.2.6 Investigations Prior to Construction. As-built construction drawings of the Dallas

Floodway are stored at the SSD Operations Office. The description of the embankment and
foundation materials, design data, basis of design, and stability analyses may be found in the
USACE publication “Review of Levee Design, Dallas Floodway,” June 1968. Soils data and
seepage investigations may be found in the USACE publication “Periodic Inspection and
Continuing Evaluation of Completed Civil Works Structures, Dallas Floodway, Trinity River,
Texas,” February 1969, Appendix C, “Seepage Investigations of West Levee Between
Stations 134+90 and 196+40,” September 1953.
3.2.7 History of Remedial Measures and Major Modifications. The Dallas Floodway
consists of approximately 22.6 miles of levees. The existing levees generally follow the
alignment of the original levees, which were constructed between 1928 and 1931. The East
Levee is approximately 11.7 miles long and the West Levee is approximately 10.9 miles long.
The original levees had a crown width of 6 feet, an average height of 26 feet, and a
maximum height of 37 feet. Side slopes were approximately 1 vertical (V) on 2.5 horizontal
(H). The original levees were constructed by dragline with no compaction or moisture
control.
The reconstructed levees have a crown width of 16 feet, an average height of 28 feet,
and a maximum height of approximately 35 feet. Landside slopes are generally 1V:3H and
riverside slopes vary from 1V:3H to 1V:4H. Side slopes of the sumps (excavations in the
landside used as borrow areas) range from 1V:1.5H to 1V:3H, with an average depth of 20
feet. The inside slopes of the sumps are generally separated from the landside toe of the
levee by a berm that varies in width from 15 to 40 feet. As mentioned earlier, levee
strengthening construction (from original levees to existing levees) was performed between
February 1953 and April 1959. The chronology of the levee strengthening and construction
of other features within the project (including contractors) is as follows:
Date Feature Contractor
Jun 1954 Able Pump Station E.E. Const. Co.

Aug 1954 East Levee Strengthening & Sump Excavation John A. Petty Co.
May Turtle Creek Pressure Sewer, Part 1 Whittle Const. Co. (WCC)
1955 Turtle Creek Pressure Sewer, Part 2 WCC & McKenzie Const. Co. (MCC)
Sep 1955 Pavaho Pump Station List and Clark Const. Co.
West Levee Strengthening & Sump Excavation Cleal T. Watts Co.
Nov 1955
Turtle Creek Pressure Sewer, Part 3 WCC & MCC
Dec 1955 Lake Cliff Pressure Sewer MCC
Mar 1956 East Levee Strengthening (I) Cleal T. Watts Co. (CWC)
Sep 1956 Turtle Creek Pressure Sewer, Part 4 WCC & MCC

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Jan 1957 Coombs Creek Diversion Facility WCC
West Levee Strengthening (I) CWC
Oct 1957
Turtle Creek Pressure Sewer, Part 5 E.H. Reeder Const. Co., Inc.
Dec 1957 East Levee Strengthening (II) CWC
Oct 1958 Hampton Road Pump Station WCC
West Levee Strengthening (II) & Channel
Apr 1959 Griffin & Dickson Co.
Excavation
IV – PRE-INSPECTION PACKET INFORMATION
4.1 PRE-INSPECTION BROCHURE. Each member of the inspection team was furnished a pre-
inspection brochure which contained an agenda, checklists, floodway maps, and actions
taken to previously identified problems. The Pre-Inspection Brochure is provided as
Appendix B.
V – INSPECTION FINDINGS AND EVALUATIONS
5.1 GENERAL. Most of the items rated as unacceptable and minimally acceptable are shown
in the GIS Maps provided as Appendix C (Plates 1 to 9). All photographs referenced in
Section 5.2 are provided as Appendix D (Plates D-1 to D-25). Inspection findings are
detailed by system, feature, and rated item in the inspection checklist (spreadsheets)
provided as Appendix E. Results of examination for each feature are presented in Section
5.2, Results of Examination for Each Feature, and significant findings of the geotechnical
project components are presented in Section 5.3, Documentation of Significant Geotechnical
Findings.
According to the Inspection Report Template, the East Levee, West Levee,
Rochester Levee, and the CWWPT Levee systems had one or more items rated as
unacceptable. Since there is a significant number of deficiencies that would prevent the
systems from performing as intended, the overall rating for the Dallas Floodway project is
unacceptable.
5.2 RESULTS OF EXAMINATION FOR EACH FEATURE. Results of the visual inspection for the
features and components of the systems are discussed below. Findings are for those items
that received a minimally acceptable or unacceptable rating.
It is noted that sufficient time was not allocated during the inspection to thoroughly
assess all the various components of project operation, maintenance, and response system;
so much of this information was requested after the inspection. The SSD has supplied
written responses to demonstrate its capability to manage the project effectively. The
responses are shown in the Dallas Floodway Maintenance Program Summary provided as
Appendix F and these addressed the following items: level of maintenance performed over
the previous five years; required operations and maintenance manuals; emergency supplies
and equipment; flood preparedness and training; and specific preventive maintenance,
inspections, communication, and security elements.
As noted in the inspection report template, some components were not inspected
while others were not available for review. In some cases a rating was able to be assigned.

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Where there was insufficient data to give a rating, a future inspection should be arranged to
assess and validate the project’s ability to function as authorized. Special attention should
be paid to ensuring permanent functioning of the closure structures and that conduit
condition surveys are conducted periodically.
5.2.1 East Levee Embankments.
The following items were rated as unacceptable (U):
• Unwanted vegetation was found at Station 147+70, where a tree is growing on the
riverside levee toe and trees were present within 50 feet of the toe near Stations
474+, 524+25, and HWY 30 (U). This vegetation should be removed to ascertain
levee integrity.
• Encroachments found along the levee consist of 18 bridges, including the DART
Bridge. Many had piers on the levee crest, slopes, or within 50 feet of the toe (U).
See Plate D-1, Photo EL 3b.
• From the DART to the I-35 Bridges (Stations 20+00 to 81+00), there are electric
power towers on the landside lower slopes (U). This was also the case at Stations
237+50, 320+ to 364+, and 612+, where electric power towers and poles are present
on the landside levee toe (U). At Station 515+70, the electric power pole was on the
riverside levee toe (U). Encroachments inhibit O&M and emergency operations, and
may negatively impact the integrity and performance of the levee.
• A construction stockpile was present on the crest of the levee at Station 147+40, and
an unauthorized encroachment from the ongoing construction of a jail annex that may
include a basement adjacent to the landside levee toe (U). The latter had damaged
the levee section and removed material from the foundation adjacent to the levee toe.
See Plate D-1, Photo EL 3c.
• Hampton Bridge at Station 292+91 had a 5-foot deep void under the landside bridge
slope paving (U). See Plate D-2, Photo EL 3d. Caving has progressed into the levee
section.
• A void was found under the pier support beam on the Highway 183 Bridge at Station
546+30 in the riverside of the levee crest (U). See Plate D-2, Photo EL 3e.
• The DART Bridge had bridge piers on the levee crest from Stations 13+50 to 22+00
(U). See Plate D-3, Photo EL 3f & 6.
• Erosion was found around each of the DART Bridge piers on the landside crest of the
levee from Stations 13+50 to 22+00 that had been created by drainage coming from
the bridge. This erosion has significantly reduced the levee crest width and height,
creating gullies and exposing the pier foundations (U). See Plate D-3, Photo EL 3f &
6.
• The crest survey performed in 2003 indicates 47% of the East Levee crest is below
the SPF elevation (U).
• No cracking of the East Levee was observed during this inspection, but a history of
severe seasonal desiccation cracking has been recorded for this system. Some
cracks measured after the PI in September 2008 were up to 4 feet in depth (U).

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• Some joint seals were out of the joints between the floodwall panels near the DART
railroad bridge (U) and brush was growing along parts of the north side of the
floodwall (M). See See Plate D-3, Photo EID 8 and ELF 7. Closures that are in poor
condition or are missing parts may compromise the system in a flood event.
• The “railroad” and “paved road” stop log gate structures have been compromised by
unauthorized removal of their sills (U). See Plate D-4, Photo ELF 3. The placement
location of the stop log center post beam for the railroad stop log structure was not
visible and appeared to be buried (U). Seepage under the stop logs through the
railroad ballast is predicted (U). At Station 13+50 the sand pile for sealing the stop
log was overgrown with weeds and brush. As mentioned earlier, closure structures
that are in poor condition or are missing parts may compromise the system in a flood
event. Additionally, trial erections have not been accomplished in accordance with
the O&M Manual. This has been a persistent problem due to coordination difficulties
with the railroad (U).
The following items were rated as minimally acceptable (M):
• Stations 54+95 and 260+90 had bushes growing at the base of power line towers off
the landside levee toes (M). See Plate D-4, Photo EL 1 and EL 3a.
• Johnson grass growth was observed to be widespread over the entire project. The
rapid growth of this grass can hinder inspection and make seepage harder to detect
(M). A survey of additional areas where unwanted vegetation is within 50 feet of the
levee toe is recommended. Localized bare areas were observed along the levee,
commonly near bridge abutments. This makes the embankment soils more
susceptible to cracking and erosion.
• The I-35 northbound bridge abutment at Station 81+00 had a void (10'L x 17'W x 4'D)
under the broken slope paving of the ramp on the landside of the levee. It also had a
cracked bridge beam on the south abutment ramp (M). Although this feature is
outside the Floodway’s ROW, the item was rated because it needs to be evaluated in
order to determine its impact on the performance of the Floodway. The situation has
been reported to TxDOT bridge authorities.
• Station 286+80 and 364+60 had fiber optic line crossings over the levee not
streamlined to the channel (M).
• Station 286+95 had a fiber optic line crossing over the levee (M). Station 621+10 had
a 48" abandoned water line under the levee (M).
• Station 292+90 had a 10-foot diameter concrete debris pile in the channel off of the
riverside levee toe next to the bridge piers (M).
• Station 175+70, 380+00, 473+90, and 568+70 had rutting on the levee slopes from
unauthorized recreational ATV use (M).
• Slide areas on the riverside slope at Stations 480+20 and 563+40, which had been
repaired, appeared to be bulging again (M).
• Station 54+95 had a repaired landside slide and Stations 320+00, 515+75, 520+00,
and 524+25 to 530+75 had repaired riverside slides. At Station 551+50, a repaired

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riverside slope slide had a 1-inch wide crack on the landside crest edge (M). At
Station 175+70, a bench on the riverside mid-slope was observed. These areas
should be repaired.
• At Station 25+00 an erosion gully (30’L x 4’W x 3’D) on the landside levee toe ditch
was observed (M). Filter fabric and 12" stone protection had been placed within the
erosion gully on the north end of each pier, but this had not been effective as an
erosion control measure and gullies have formed on the landside levee slopes.
• The TRE Railroad Bridge at Station 473+90 had two erosion gullies (20'L x 2'W x 1'D)
on the riverside slope (M). Sylvan Ave. Bridge at Station 225+00 had an erosion gully
(12'L x 3'W x 1'D) on the slope under the bridge (M). These erosion deficiencies do
not appear to threaten the levee integrity but need to be repaired.
• Highway I-30 Bridge at Station 118+30 had multiple large erosion gullies (30'L x 6'W
x 5'D each) under the bridge on the landside slope of the levee (M). Jefferson Bridge
at Station 97+50 had minor erosion on the levee slope (M). These erosion
deficiencies do not appear to threaten the levee integrity but need to be repaired.
• The drainage ditch adjacent to the landside levee toe (such as in Station 473+90) and
the sump areas is the typical project condition that would obscure seepage that may
develop during flood events (M).
• Hampton Bridge at Station 292+91 had a 2-inch displacement on the landside bridge
slope paving (M).
• Highway 183 Bridge at Station 546+30 had a 6-foot diameter caving/erosion on the
levee slope (M) and the railroad bridge at Station 147+70 had a depression on the
levee slope below the bridge (M).
• Continental Ave. Bridge at Station 163+60 had stone protection that was being
displaced down the slope (M). Homeless people appeared to be removing stone
riprap and using it to construct shelters.
5.2.2 East Levee Structures.
5.2.2.1 Belleview Pressure Conduit, Station 59+93.
• Shoaling with established vegetation on the right bank is causing the diversion of the
channel into the levee at the Belleview Pressure Conduit. The discharge channel
slopes of Belleview Pressure Conduit have been severely eroded (U). Refer to East
Levee Flood Damage Reduction Channels spreadsheet, rated item #2, page 51/53.
See Plate D-5, Photos EFD 2a and EFD 2b. This needs to be repaired before the
problem worsens and compromises the levee section and access road.
• Damage to the concrete around the perimeter of the outlet was observed. There was
slight rust on the upper bridge girder (M).
5.2.2.2 Able Pump Station, Station 99+45.

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• The left gate of the tower is either loose or out of alignment. Either the guide is
broken or the gate was raised too high and came off the guide (U). Most likely the
guide has rusted and broke. Project personnel will have to construct a cofferdam in
the outlet trench to effect repairs.
• There is a hole (12"W x 24"L) along the curb of the drive above the conduits from the
small (old) pump house, where water bubbles up at times of high water (U). See
Plate D-6, Photo APS 17.
• A concrete drainage chute at the right side of the trash racks for the small pump
house has failed due to loss of soil underneath the chute (U). See Plate D-6, Photo
EID 7a.
• The bearing for the service bridge at the outlet works is cracked and settlement of the
abutment at the levee has resulted in bending of the anchor bolts (M).
• There was a misaligned joint in the retaining wall at the discharge outlet and a large
concrete spall on the upstream side of control tower (M).
• There has been movement of masonry walls in the large pump house away from the
concrete columns (M).
• Trash in the sump pond area next to the trash racks was observed (M).
• The chain link fence with razor wire at the top was in good condition. Exterior brick
masonry is cracking near a corner of the pump house (M). Although needing repair,
these are minor structural defects that do not threaten the structural integrity or
stability of the structure, and should not impact pumping operations.
5.2.2.3 Woodall Rodgers Pressure Outfall, Station 160+98.
• Silt deposits covering 75% of the width of the channel on the right side of the
discharge channel need to be removed (M).
5.2.2.4 Baker Pump Station, Station 235+04.
• At the intake for the Baker Pump Station addition, the spalling and continuous vertical
crack on each side of the trash rack, noted in previous inspections, appeared to be
unchanged (M).
• The lower concrete wall panel right of the trash racks was displaced 1 inch inward,
possibly from construction. There was a major fracture in the retaining wall along a
set of stairs behind the old pump station (M).

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• The fracture had been sealed but either the sealant has shrunk or further separation
of the concrete has occurred, causing the sealant to fail. The other stairs have been
shifted about one foot along the upper bearing as a result of being struck by a bobcat
that was clearing trash in the area (M).
• There was a broken hand rail at the top of the stairs behind the building (M).
• There was bending of the bearing assembly for the service bridge due to settlement
of the abutment at the levee. The concrete in the corbel under the beam supports at
the control structure was showing signs of scaling (M).
• The service bridge was tilted relative to the bridge abutment and the girder was tight
against the abutment (M).
• The concrete trapezoidal channel next to the trash rack and the earthen ditch in front
of the rack had deposition that should be cleaned out. Trash in the sump pond area
next to the trash racks was observed (M).
• The pump station had erosion (4'W x 35'L) on the slope above the discharge chute,
erosion (15'W x 35'L) on the left slope, and erosion (50'W x 80'L) on the right side of
the discharge channel (M). See Plate D-7, Photo EID 7b. There was some corrosion
on the four flap gates. Although needing repair, these are minor structural defects
that do not threaten the structural integrity or stability of the structure, and should not
impact pumping operations.
5.2.2.5 Dallas Branch Pressure Conduit, Station 154+33.
• At the control structure, the bottom of two posts for the handrail at the left side of the
tower operating deck had completely rusted out. Due to the height of the tower, this
is a safety issue (U). See Plate D-7, Photo DBP 21.
• The replacement of rusted bolts at the base of the stem for the right gate operator
appeared to have caused cracking in the concrete deck. The cracks, unless sealed,
will allow future freeze/thaw damage (M).
• There was an erosion depression (3’L x 2’W x1’D) on the slope of the service bridge
abutment (M).
• Erosion (3’L x 1’W x 10”D) was found on the upstream side of the control structure
and another 6-inch erosion depression on the right side of the control structure (M).
• There was a 3-foot long crack in the right wing wall of the discharge chute with
seepage flowing slowly from the bottom 5 inches of this crack (M).
• Deposition was blocking 70% of the discharge channel (on the right side of the
channel) just downstream of the discharge chute. This area should be cleared (M).

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5.2.2.6 Turtle Creek Pressure Conduit, Station 194+13.
• The Turtle Creek Pressure Conduit had six trees growing in the upper section of a
gabion retaining wall on the left side of the channel leading to the intake, and a tree
growing next to the right side of the box culvert at the intake (U). See Plate D-8,
Photo EID 2.
• The left discharge wing wall was displaced 3 inches with an erosion hole behind it
(5'W x 4'L x 3'D). The offset between headwall and wing wall appeared to be getting
worse over time (U). See Plate D-8, Photo EID 6a.
• There was corrosion on the lower part of the intake trash rack at the entrance leading
to the conduit (M) and light debris in the intake. The conduit had four locations where
exposed steel reinforcement in the ceiling of conduit is corroding and two locations
where steel objects are protruding (one from the ceiling and another from the left wall
of the conduit).
• There was condensation forming on the ceiling of the conduit approximately at the
location where the water level in the floor of the conduit deepens. There was
moderate seepage at some of the joints (M).
• The service bridge abutment had settled (M) and erosion (6"W x 6'L x 6"D) was found
on the right side of the control structure (M). See Plate D-9, Photo TCP 5.
• A homeless camp was observed under the bridge at the bridge abutment. This is
considered an encroachment and should be removed (M).
• There was erosion on both the right and left slope just above the corners of the
discharge chute (M).
• A second wall joint at another location had separated by 1 to 2 inches and moved
towards the channel by 1/4 inch (M). See Plate D-9, Photo EID 6b. There was
deposition (8'L x 3'W) in the discharge channel.
5.2.2.7 New Hampton Road Pump Station, Station 309+08.
• Riprap displaced from the slopes of the discharge channel to the bottom of the
channel had exposed bedding (U) and the riprap stones accumulated at the bottom of
the channel. There was erosion (30’L x 17’W) on the right channel slope just past the
riprap slope and shallow slides on the downstream right and left slopes. See Plate D-
10, Photos EFD 10 and EID 14.
5.2.2.8 Old Hampton Road Pumping Plant, Station 312+05.

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• The concrete slabs adjacent to the structure have settled 6 inches on both sides of
the structure (M). The slab of the service bridge is uptight against the abutment (M).
The vertical joint at the corner in the left wing wall at the intake for the pump station
has a large gap between the concrete sections (M). Refer to rated item #5.
• The fiberglass dome supporting the manhole cover over the low flow for the pump
station had failed (M).
• The vertical joint at the corner in the left wing wall at the intake for the pump station
had a 2-inch separation and the left wall had tilted toward the channel by ½ inch at
the joint (M).
• An erosion gully (2'W x 10'L x 18"D) caused from run-off from the parking lot above
the left intake wing wall was observed (M).
• Metal plates at the end of the bridge deck and bridge abutment are butting up against
each other (M).
• The headwall at the outlet was showing a significant bend (M) and corrosion on the
flap gate was observed. See Plate D-11, Photo HRP 13. Although needing repair,
these are minor structural defects that do not threaten the structural integrity or
stability of the structure, and should not impact pumping operations.
5.2.2.9 Six Gravity Sluice East Levee Station 235+04.
• Erosion was found on the slope above the sluice discharge head wall and also on
both the right (70’L x 20’W x 6’D) and left (60’L x 17’W) slopes of the discharge
channel just beyond the wing walls.
5.2.2.10 Elm Fork Sluice East Levee Station 601+32.
• The Elm Fork facility was not in service. Exposed steel reinforcement at the bridge
support on the control structure and an 8-inch erosion depression on the slope side of
the service bridge abutment was observed (M). Erosion had created a 25-foot
diameter pond just upstream of the Elm Fork Sluice discharge channel.
5.2.2.11 Emergency Control Structure.
• The service bridge was tight against both the bridge abutment and control structure
(M). There was an 8-inch erosion depression on the slope side of the control structure
and the service bridge abutment on the levee (M).
5.2.3 West Levee Embankments.

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• At Eagle Ford Sluice (Station 479+72), trees were growing on the landside levee
slope (U). See Plate D-11, Photo WL 1. At Stations 350+00, 371+50, 376+50, and
near HWY 30, trees were also growing within 50 feet of the levee toe (U). This
vegetation should be removed to ascertain levee integrity.
• Encroachments found on the levee included 15 bridges. Many had piers on the levee
crest, slopes, or within 50 feet of the toe (U). See Plate D-12, Photo WL 3a.
• Walton Walker Bridge at Station 475+65 had its pier support buried in the levee (U).
The levee crest was excavated under the Houston Street Bridge and had reduced the
crest width (U).
• At Station 18+90, a power line tower was found on the landside levee toe (U). See
Plate D-12, Photo WL 3b.
• From the DART to I-35 Bridges (Stations 20+00 to 81+00), electric power towers
were found along the landside levee toe (U). See Plate D-13, Photo WL 3d.
• The previous deficiency was also the case at Stations 237+50, 320+ to 364+, and
612+ (these had either electric towers or poles and were located on the land side
levee toe) (U).
• At Station 515+70 an electric power pole was found on the riverside levee toe (U).
• A series of power line poles on the land side levee slope/toe and cabled pole vehicle
barriers on the land side levee slope was observed upstream of Station 171+40 (U).
• More power poles were found on the land side levee toe downstream of Station
267+95 (U).
• Station 500+00 had a pole on the riverside levee slope (U). Utility encroachments
crossing the levee included: a gas line crossing at Station 253+70 not streamlined to
the channel (U), a 6-inch jet fuel pipeline crossing at Station 329+70 (U), and an 8-
inch petroleum line crossing over the levee streamlined to the channel at Station
466+50 (U). See Plate D-13, Photo WL 3c.
• Stations 11+90 and 25+40 had unidentified lines crossing the levee (U).
• The crest survey in 2003 indicates 42% of the West Levee crest is below the SPF
elevation (U). The levee crown was below design elevation at Station 54+14(-1.17
feet), 70+00(-0.66 feet), 160+00 to 315+00 (max. of -2.61 feet), 340+00 (-0.33 feet),
and 380+00 to 570+00 (max. of -1.21 feet) according to the 2003 survey.
• Three-inch deep mower rutting on the riverside slope around the Pump Station Delta
service bridge was observed. No cracking of the West Levee was observed during
this inspection, but a history of severe seasonal desiccation cracking has been
recorded for this levee system. Some cracks that were measured in September of
2008 were up to 4 feet in depth (U). Tension cracks along the crest of levees or the
face of the slopes fill up with water when it rains and may cause slides to occur.

16
• Johnson grass growth was observed to be widespread over the entire system. The
rapid growth of this grass can hinder inspection and make seepage harder to detect
(M). A survey of additional areas where unwanted vegetation is within 50 feet of
levee toes is recommended. Localized bare areas were observed along the levee,
especially near bridge abutments. This makes the soil more susceptible to cracking
and erosion.
• Stations 244+80 and 309+30 had a fiber optic line crossing over the levee not
streamlined to the channel (M). I-35 Bridge northbound at Station 52+50 had four
shopping carts full of removed rock protection most likely being to be used for a
homeless shelter (M). A sewer line repaired at Station 503+50 had increased the
levee section at this location.
• Repaired slide areas were observed at Stations 316+00 (2 slides), 317+60, 338+40,
350+00, 371+50 to 376+50, and 377+50 (a 420’L repaired riverside shallow slide)
(M).
• Erosion gullies were found at the I-35 Bridge northbound, Station 52+50, on the
riverside levee slope (M). A 20-foot long erosion gully was found at Station 134+20
on the riverside levee ramp (M). An erosion gully was found next to a pier at Walton
Walker Bridge, Station 475+65 (M). See Plate D-14, Photo WL 6.
• Corinth Street Bridge at Station 5+40 and Union Pacific Railroad Bridge at Station
133+20 had depressions on the riverside levee slope protection under the bridges
(M).
5.2.4 West Levee Structures.
5.2.4.1 Charlie Pump Station, Station 68+32.
• Power poles upstream and downstream of the pump station at the same elevation as
the pump station were observed leaning in the slope direction.
• An erosion void (10’L x 1.5’D) under the concrete stairs on the west side of the pump
house and a gully running down the slope from this erosion was found. It is unclear
how far back the void goes (U). See See Plate D-15, Photo CPS 5a.
• Debris was obstructing 10% of the inlet for the small pump house (M).
• Trash was found in the sump area next to the trash racks (M).
• The concrete on the bridge support corbel under the bridge girders was scaling at the
control structure (M).
• Erosion gullies were found on both slopes of the discharge channel. The right gully
was 20’L x 5’W x 3’D and the left was 7’L x 2’W x 1’D (M).
• There was erosion on the right toe (5'W x 10'L) of the discharge channel (M). The

17
discharge outlet was submerged. Although needing repair, these are minor structural
defects that do not threaten the structural integrity or stability of the structure, and
should not impact pumping operations.
5.2.4.2 Delta Pump Station, Station 267+95.
• A slope slide (60'W x 70'L x5'D) has occurred just upstream and below the pump
house that should be stabilized (U).
• Erosion had washed out soil from under a concrete structure behind the pump house
(M). See Plate D-15, Photo DPS 5.
• Corrosion on the trash racks and trash was observed in the sump area (M). See
Plate D-16, Photo DPS 21.
• A bridge abutment bolt was found bent on the levee end of the bridge (M).
• There was erosion (50'W x 80' L x 12'D) on the right discharge channel slope next to
the discharge chute (M). Although needing repair, these are minor structural defects
that do not threaten the structural integrity or stability of the structure, and should not
impact pumping operations.
5.2.4.3 Lake Cliff Pressure Conduit, Station 75+92.
• A 6-inch erosion depression on the slope side of the service bridge abutment was
observed (M).
• Three minor erosion gullies (40’L x 8’W x 8”D) were found on the slope above the
discharge chute on the left side of the wing wall (M).
• Corrosion on flap gate was noted (M).
5.2.4.4 Coombs Creek Pressure Diversion Facilities, Station 93+57.
• The right wing wall had a 3-inch separated joint exposing the rebar (U). See Plate D-
16, Photo WID 6a.
• One of the bridges had its plate girder up against the abutment and the rocker arm
positioned back further than it should be (M).
• The non-mechanical trash racks at the inlet was bent and had corrosion (M). See
Plate D-17, Photo CCP 21.

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• Exposed steel reinforcement was found in the ceiling, and cracks were observed on
the floor and the wall of the conduit (M).
• A 16-foot long safety handrail on the right discharge wing wall has broken off and was
in the bottom of the discharge channel (M).
• Two erosion gullies (6’L x 1’W x 1’D - each) were found above the discharge chute on
the right slope (M). A slope slide (65’L x 15’W x 1.5’D) on the right slope just past the
right wing wall and deposition in the discharge channel were observed. The outlet
was submerged.
5.2.4.5 Little Coombs Creek Pressure Diversion Facilities, Station 97+29.
• The steel brace installed to prevent movement of the wing wall had become
disconnected from the right wing wall and had failed (U). See Plate D-17, Photo WID
6b.
• The service bridge abutment had moderate cracking (M).
• The bottom of the conduit had a 6" diameter hole, a scour area, and a failed patch
over a second scour area (M).
• Debris behind the flap gate was preventing it from sealing (M) and corrosion on flap
gate was noted on the flap gate (M).
• Erosion gully was found on the right channel slope (5'W x 12'L x 2'D) of the discharge
channel (M).
5.2.4.6 Pavaho Pump Station, Station 174+60.
• Erosion (20’L x 20’W x 4’D) had exposed the concrete piers supporting the driveway
on the downstream side of the pump station where the trash container is located (U).
See Plate D-18, Photo PPS 5. This is above the wing wall on the downstream side of
the trash rack and should be repaired as soon as possible.
• The chain link fencing was leaning on the east side of the building (M).
• The left intake wing wall has a 1-inch separation from the intake (M) and there was a
5"W x 8"L tear on the right side rail screen of the trash rack.
• The bottom of the trash rack was silted in at the small inlet for the left structure with
debris that obstructs 10% of the inlet (M).

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• Light debris was found in the sump area (M) and three 36" RCPs
• appeared to be abandoned at the left side of the sump (M).
• The discharge channel had a slope slide on the left bank (35'W x 150'L) and another
slide (12'W x 20'L) on the right lower slope also (M). Although needing repair, the
minor structural defects that do not threaten the structural integrity or stability of the
structure, and should not impact pumping operations.
5.2.4.7 Eagle Ford Sluice West Levee Station 479+72.
• Trees were growing around the levee toe drainage ditch (U). This vegetation should
be removed. See Plate D-18, Photo WID 1a.
• Sediments had filled in and blocked 60% of the inlet (U). See Plate D-14, Photo WID
1b.
• The sluice had sustained significant structural damage to the walls of the structure
(U). This has supposedly been corrected but should be verified.
• The control building located on the landside of the levee crest had an erosion gully
(6"W x 3'L x 1'D) on the upstream landside corner of the pad that was eroding toward
the building. This erosion had already undermined a corner post of the guardrail (M).
These erosion deficiencies do not appear to threaten the levee integrity but need to
be repaired.
• Debris behind the left flap gate at the outlet is preventing it from closing tightly (M).
5.2.4.8 Abandoned structures.
• According to PI Report #8 (October 2002), there is an abandoned 48-inch sewer line

that runs under the levee at the downstream end of the west levee, and there might
be another 36-inch interceptor line near Cadiz Street that has been abandoned.
Project personnel should verify that these sewer lines were properly plugged and
notify SWF. Debris had obstructed 50% of the inlet at the Ledbetter Sluice (U). See
Plate D-19, Photo WID 1c.
5.2.5 Flood Damage Reduction Channels.
• The abandoned old Santa Fe Railroad Bridge catches debris and obstructs flow and
should be removed (U). See Plate D-19, Photo EFD 1.
• Shoaling with established vegetation is causing the diversion of the channel into the
levee along Belleview Pressure Conduit at East Levee Station 59+93 (U). This
condition, if not corrected, may compromise the levee section, access, and integrity.

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• Trees and other vegetative types growing in the flood plain and channel slopes on
both abutments of the Santa Fe Railroad Bridge should be removed (M).
• Debris caught in the Continental Bridge piers was observed (M). The Sylvan Ave
Lake Development Park was seen in the flood plain just downstream of Sylvan Ave
(observation).
• Construction equipment was in the flood plain at East Levee Station 157+50 (or West
Levee Station 141+80) (M).
• A concrete debris pile 10 feet in diameter was found in the channel next to Hampton
Road Bridge at Station 292+91 (M).
• A 700-foot long area of standing water in the flood plain at East Levee Station 380+00
has attracted recreational vehicles (ATVs), leaving rutting (M).
• A 100-foot diameter area of standing water in the flood plain at East Levee Station
568+70 had rutting caused by ATVs (M).
• A sludge lagoon was in the flood plain near East levee Sta. 621+00.
• The right side of river bank at Station 161+00 had failed and fallen into the river
channel (M).
5.2.6 Rochester Levee.
• Station 51+00 had a sanitary sewer control valve on the levee crest (U) and a sewer
crossing under the levee (U).
• A 24-inch diameter, 12-inch deep moist depression was found on the levee crest near
this crossing (U).
• Large trees were observed within 50 feet of the landside levee toe (U). This
vegetation should be removed.
• The mechanically stabilized earth (MSE) retaining wall on the riverside levee slope
approximately between Stations 114+00 and 120+00 had separation in its concrete
panels of up to 2 inches wide at the corner, indicating lateral movement of the wall
(U). See Plate D-20, Photo RL 5a. Project personnel have reportedly been
monitoring the gap sizes in the wall and have reported no additional movement over
the last 15 years.
• The guardrail on top of the MSE wall was leaning towards the riverside approximately
from Stations 114+00 to 120+00. See Plate D-20, Photo RL 5b.
• Power poles and their anchorages on the levee crest between Stations 121+55 to
130+00 were leaning toward the riverside of the levee (U). See Plate D-21, Photo RL

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3. The power poles encroaching on the levees should be removed off the levee to at
least 50 feet from the toe.
• Three active closures were inspected and no records of trial erections have been
verified (U).
• The first closure inspected was the "Railroad Street Closure" that was tied into berms
on both sides. At the Railroad Street closure, the ladder was bent on one of the
swinging gates and the turnbuckle was jammed between the steel attachments, thus
not being able to create a tight closure for the gate (U). See Plate D-21, Photo RFW
3a.
• The second closure inspected, the "levee closure" structure for the railroad track was
tied into berms on both sides. This closure did not have a concrete sill (U). Closure
structures that are in poor condition or are missing parts may compromise the system
in a flood event.
• The sheet pile floodwall design needs to be reviewed. Seepage along the side of the
sheet pile floodwall is a known weakness on this type of floodwall design. A
geotechnical investigation will be required (U).
• The right side of the intake gravity flow structure had a 2-foot deep gully next to the
wing wall (exposed/washing out bedding) and the left side had a 18’L x 10’W area
depression on the gabion slope next to the wing wall (U). See Plate D-22, Photo RID
15.
• Recent elevation survey records are needed to verify if the current levee elevation is
adequate (M). No cracks were found along the levee during the inspection.
However, seasonal desiccation cracking is common in this area.
• The third closure was the "floodwall stop log closure” structure for the railroad track
tied into a flood wall on one side and a berm on the other. The bottom seals on the
stop logs of this closure are deformed near the ends due to the stop logs being stored
with a section of the bottom seals resting on concrete stands (M). See Plate D-22,
Photo RFW 3b.
• When the seals are replaced, it is recommended that the concrete stands be adapted
to hold the stop logs without the rubber seals resting on the concrete by cutting a
groove in the concrete for the seals. Minor spalls on the corner of this closure
structure were observed. Light vegetation up to 6 feet high was growing against the
west side of the floodwall at several locations (M).
• An area of erosion gullies (60’L x 10’W x 18”D) on the slope was found on the right
side of the pump station inlet at Station 87+00 (M).
• A second area of erosion (6’L x 2'W x 10"D) behind the right wing wall of the intake
was observed also (M).
• Corrosion was noted on the pump station flap gates and walkway platform (M).

22
• The intake gravity flow structure at Station 89+00 had a 4-foot long crack over the left
box culvert (M) and had depressions on the gabion slopes on both sides of the intake
caused by erosion of soil under the gabions next to the wing walls.
5.2.7 CWWPT Levee.
• The levee elevation had been verified and the current levee elevation is adequate.
Encroachments found on the levee included: odor control fan poles on the river side
levee slope of the north and west side of the levee system (U). See Plate D-23,
Photo CWWTP 3a.
• A chain link fence that had a 12-inch concrete strip foundation was running along the
riverside levee crest edge along the north, east, and south side of the levee system
(U). Desiccation cracking was noted along the concrete (observation). See Plate D-
23, Photo CWWTP 3d.
• Electric towers were observed on the landside slope and crest of the north side of the
levee system (U). See Plate D-24, Photo CWWTP 3b.
• An 84-inch emergency outfall control valve on the crest was at the east corner of the
levee system and two control valves were on the crest at the south corner area of the
levee system (U).
• Penetrations crossing through and/or under the levee include: two 60-inch diameter
force main lines (U), 84-inch emergency outfall, 66-inch diameter plant outfall
(emergency use), 10’x10’ main double box culvert outlet, 84” diameter waste water
gravity main line, 60-inch diameter waste water gravity line, and an abandoned
outfall. Numerous utilities crossing under the levee are yet to be identified (U). See
Plate D-24, Photo CWWTP 3e, and Plate D-25, Photo WL 3c.
• Brush was growing between the landside north levee toe and a retention pond (M).
This retention pond may obscure any seepage that develops during a flood event (M).
• Cracks (2”W x 6”D) along the crest in the area of the fence were observed (M).
Seasonal desiccation cracking is common in this area. Records of slides, if any,
should be investigated.
• An odd 24-inch diameter depression was noted 30 feet off the riverside toe of the
north levee.
• Only a few discharges were inspected. Therefore, follow-up inspections are needed
(M).
• Riprap at one discharge had grass growing in it (M), erosion around another
discharge chute was observed (M), and vines in the riprap was found above a
discharge chute (M).
• The bottom of a 24-inch round flap gate was silted in at the sewer plant (M) and a

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second flap gate was noted as being under water.
• Pipe interiors have not been inspected. Additionally, the pump station in the center of
the facility has not been inspected.
5.2.8 Emergency Action Plan (EAP). The CoD stated that they have a general EAP and an
evacuation plan. The SSD has a written system-specific flood response plan and maintains
that it can effectively respond to emergency situations. SSD should provide a copy of the
EAP to SFW (Operations, E&C, and Levee Safety Program Manager) for review. Recent
flood activities in 2007 attest to the quick response generated by the Sponsor to protect
project features.
5.3 DOCUMENTATION OF SIGNIFICANT GEOTECHNICAL FINDINGS.
5.3.1 East and West Embankments.
5.3.1.1 Surface Cracks. None noted during the inspection, but no cracking is
actually unusual for the project. See Part VI of this report for additional discussion.
5.3.1.2 Sliding and Sloughing of Levee Slopes. Four shallow slides that had
occurred during the summer of 2007 had been repaired. See trip report provided as

24
Appendix G for details. However, these repairs appeared to be creeping. No other
significant sliding or sloughing of the levee slopes was noted.
PHOTO 1 - 3 December 2007. Slide #286 occurred during the summer of 2007. Although it had
been repaired using plastic clays blended with lime, the repair appeared to be creeping.
5.3.1.3 Vertical and Horizontal Alignment of Crest. Significant vertical or

horizontal misalignment of the crest was not observed. However, a survey of the crest
indicates that the crests of both the East and West levees are low over significant reaches.
See Part VI, Levee Safety Issues and Recommendations for additional discussion.
5.3.1.4 Cracking or Movement at Toe. None noted.
5.3.1.5 Seepage. None noted, but the presence of drainage ditches and sumps
located along most of the dry side levee toe would make it very difficult to observe seepage
under most cases since these features are generally filled with water.

25
PHOTO 2 - 3 December 2007, East Levee. View of the East Levee looking upstream. Water in the
sump areas adjacent to the levee, under both normal and flood conditions, would obscure seeps that
could develop in the dry side toe area.
5.3.1.6 Erosion. Erosion was observed at several locations along the Floodway, primarily in
the vicinity of bridges, adjacent to the channel, and in the vicinity of discharges. See Section
5.3.2, Channels (Mainstem Trinity, Inlets and Outlets). Erosion of the levee slopes was
relatively minor. However, a loss of material at the levee toe adjacent to the outlet for the
Old Baker Pump Station is a concern, as was erosion beneath the I-30 and DART Bridges
(see Photos 3 and 5a).

26
PHOTO 3 - 3 December 2007, East Levee Toe at Old Baker Outlet. Erosion behind the outlet
headwall for Old Baker has resulted in a slight loss of cross-section adjacent to the wet side levee toe.
PHOTO 4 - 3 December 2007, Hampton Pump

Station, East Levee. An erosion gully resulting from
concentrated flows coming through gaps in the curbing
was noted. Erosion damage was also evident behind
both the upstream and downstream wing walls at Old
Hampton.

27
PHOTO 5a - 3 December 2007, I-30 Bridge, East PHOTOS 5b (top) and 5c (bottom) - 3
Levee. Substantial erosion under the I-30 Bridge December 2007, DART Bridge, East
at the dry side levee toe would likely have a Levee. The erosion under the DART Bridge
negative impact on the levee during high water is a serious levee safety concern. Repairs
events since the interior drainage would exceed need to be made as soon as possible.
the capacity of the channel visible near the top of
the photo, resulting in inundation of the levee toe.
Interior drainage capacity behind the East Levee is
less than required to accommodate a 100-year
event.
5.3.1.7 Condition of Access Roads. In general, the condition of the access roads
throughout the project was good (see Photos 6a and 6b). Numerous bridge crossings on the
East and West Levees, however, prevent continuous access and restrict the ability to
maintain and repair the levees in the area of the crossings. In several places, the bridges
are at or below the levee crest. In these areas, access has been routed down the levee
slopes to the wet and/or dry side levee toes.

28
PHOTO 6a - 3 December 2007, Access Road at PHOTO 6b - 3 December 2007, Access Road
Levee Crest, East Levee. The access roads at at Wet Side Levee Toe, East Levee. The
the levee crest are graveled to allow access under access road at the toe of the levee had been
most conditions. Note bridge in background that recently graded and was in acceptable
prevents continuous access along the crest. condition. Note rutting near center of photo.
5.3.2 Channels (Mainstem Trinity, Inlets and Outlets).
5.3.2.1 Mainstem Trinity Channel. Inspection of the mainstem river channel

indicates a few areas of instability, with some debris and siltation occurring. The most
serious non-compliance with CESWF vegetation policy is generally located along the
channels, where trees are found in abundance (see Photos 7a and 7b). All vegetation,
except for short grass cover, on the channel side slopes or is within 50’ of the top of the river
bank needs to be removed.
PHOTO 7a - 3 December 2007, Typical PHOTO 7b - 3 December 2007, Channel at

Channel Looking DS from Continental Bridge. Continental Bridge, Looking US. Debris from
The left bank was in generally good condition. flooding in the summer of 2007 was lodged
However, instability is evident on the right bank. against the piers of the bridge, partially blocking
Trees along the channel do not meet vegetation the channel. Similar blockages were noted at
policy and need to be removed. bridges throughout the Floodway.

29
5.3.2.2 Pump Station Sump Areas. Silt had been recently removed from behind the
Baker and Hampton Pump Stations.
PHOTO 8a - 3 December 2007, Baker Pump PHOTO 8b - 3 December 2007, Hampton

Stations, East Levee. The sump area behind Pump Stations, East Levee. The sump had
the pump stations had been cleaned of silt and been de-silted in the September-October 2007
debris and was in good condition. time frame and was in good condition.
5.3.2.3 Inlet and Outlet Channels. Inspection of the various inlet and outlet
channels for the project indicates local areas of instability and some siltation are occurring.
PHOTO 9a - 3 December 2007, Baker Pump PHOTO 9b - 3 December 2007, Old Baker
Station, East Levee. The side slopes of the inlet Pump Station Outlet Channel, East Levee.
channel nearest Old Baker are over-steepened. The discharge channel was in minimally
However, no signs of instability were noted. acceptable condition, with some back of bank
erosion observed (see Photo 3 for another view).

30
PHOTO 10a - 3 December 2007, New Hampton PHOTO 10b - 3 December 2007, Outlet for
Pump Station Outlet, East Levee. The Belleview Pressure Sewer, East Levee.
discharge channel was in minimally acceptable Erosion at outlet of Belleview Pressure Sewer.
condition, with some back of bank erosion Repairs are necessary to protect the access road
associated with surface drainage into the channel along the wet side the levee toe, visible in the
observed. The slides need to be repaired. lower left foreground.
PHOTO 11a - 3 December 2007, Dallas Branch PHOTO 11b - 4 December 2007, Lake Cliff
Outfall, East Levee. Some siltation of the outfall Outlet, West Levee. The channel for this pump
channel is occurring. De-siltation is required to station is partially silted in. De-siltation is
restore capacity. required to restore capacity.
5.3.3 Encroachments and Penetrations. Hundreds of encroachments and penetrations of

the levee were noted during the inspection. Most of these penetrations are not new and
include electrical transmission towers, wooden power poles, fences, bridges and
miscellaneous structures.
5.3.3.1 Dallas County Jail Expansion, East Levee. Located upstream of the
Commerce Street Bridge, construction of an expansion to the Dallas County Jail was
ongoing. In addition to excavations adjacent to the levee toe, the contractor’s field office and
staging area were located on the crest of the levee and dry side levee slope. A chain link
fence had been installed along the levee crest to secure the staging area (see Photo 12).

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Discussions with the contractor revealed that during excavation of the basement, the
contractor encountered fill consisting of steel, concrete, iron, and paper. Concrete tickets
found in the excavated materials indicate that the waste fill has been in place since at least
1972.
PHOTO 12 - 3 December 2007, Dallas County Jail Expansion, East Levee. This unauthorized
encroachment is located US of the Commerce Street Bridge and includes a basement immediately
adjacent to the dry side levee toe.
This expansion worsens the unauthorized encroachment associated with construction

of the original Dallas County Jail (see Figure 1), and further impedes access for O&M. It
restricts the ability to make repairs due to reduced space at the toe of the levee, and the
basement excavation may contribute to seepage and stability problems.

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Figure 1 - Footprint of the Dallas County Jail Facility with Respect to the East Levee. This
facility presents a significant risk to the levee’s integrity. The large rectangular building south of the
bridge is the state jail facility, another unauthorized encroachment that may also impact the
performance of the levee. (Google Earth Photo)
5.3.3.2 Electricity Transmission Towers. Foundations and anchorages for

transmission towers penetrate the levees throughout the Floodway and are considered to be
unacceptable with respect to levee safety. These encroachments impact access for O&M,
restrict the ability to make repairs due to restricted clearance, and provide pathways for water
that can contribute to seepage and stability problems. Typical transmission tower
penetrations are shown in Photo 13.

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PHOTO 13 - 3 December 2007, Encroachments, East Levee. View of transmission towers at the
dry side toe of the east levee. Foundations for these towers are typically concrete piers, 6’ to 8’ in
diameter.
5.3.3.3 Bridges. Foundations elements for at least 23 bridges penetrate the East
and West Levees (see Figure 2). Many of these bridges pre-date the levee expansion
implemented when the Dallas Floodway became a USACE flood damage reduction project in
the 1950s. One of the bridges, the Houston Street Bridge, was constructed in 1918 and pre-
dates the original levee project constructed by the SSD in the 1920s.
Typical bridge penetrations are shown in Photos 14 through 16. Observations and
findings at bridges that are of particular interest or concern are discussed below.

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Figure 2. At least 23 bridges cross the Dallas Floodway. All of these encroachments have an impact on the East and West levees in the form of
penetrations and /or restrictions to access for operations and maintenance, surveillance, and flood fighting. (Google Earth Photo)
PHOTO 14a - 4 December 2007, I-35 Bridge, PHOTO 14b - 4 December 2007, Continental
West Levee. Bridge, West Levee.
PHOTO 15a - 4 December 2007, Walton PHOTO 15b - 4 December 2007, Walton
Walker Bridge, West Levee. Walker Bridge, West Levee.
PHOTO 16a - 4 December 2007, Sylvan PHOTO 16b - 4 December 2007, Highway 183
Avenue Bridge, East Levee. Bridge, East Levee.

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5.3.3.3.1 DART Bridge. Substantial erosion damage was noted on the levee at the
DART Bridge. The erosion is caused by discharge from downspouts that drain the bridge
deck. The condition of the levee in this area of the project is unacceptable, and it will not
perform as designed at the SPF level. Performance at the 100-year flood level is
questionable due to the impact of the piers on the seepage paths under and through the
levee. It is noted that this encroachment was approved by USACE more than 20 years ago.
PHOTO 17a - 3 December 2007, DART Bridge, PHOTO 17b - 3 December 2007, DART Bridge,
East Levee. This photo illustrates the serious East Levee. Approximately 1,400 feet of levee
erosion that is typical at the pier penetrations has been degraded as a result of the construction
along this section of the levee. of the DART Bridge.
5.3.3.3.2 I-35 Bridge. Adjacent to the dry side levee toe, the concrete slope
protection beneath the bridge has failed due to loss of support. The mechanism for the loss
of material is unknown, but it is possibly related to drainage from the bridge abutment. The
void under the broken slab extends under the adjacent slabs and the east abutment’s pier
cap, exposing piles used to support the abutment (see Photos 18a and 18b). This item
needs to be evaluated to determine its impact on the performance of the Floodway.
Of more critical concern for public safety is the condition of the bridge’s pier caps and
abutment, where large, structurally significant cracks were noted. This is not a SSD issue
per se, but it is noted for record as a serious public safety concern. Mr. Zach Gerich,
CESWF’s structural engineer, notified TxDOT on 7 December 2007 as to the condition of the
bridge seats.

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PHOTO 18a - 3 December 2007, I-35 Bridge, PHOTO 18b - 3 December 2007, I-35 Bridge,
East Levee. The concrete slope paving under East Levee. Piles exposed by the failure of the
this bridge has failed and needs to be replaced. concrete slab indicate significant loss of soil.
5.3.3.3.3 Hampton-Inwood Replacement Bridge. Construction of this bridge was

approved by CESWF in February 2006, prior to issuance of Section 408 policy guidance in
October 2006. This bridge replaces the old Hampton-Inwood Bridge. Pier spacing for the
new bridge is greater than that of the old bridge, resulting in reduced hydraulic conveyance
impacts (see Photo 19). Additionally, the grade of the new bridge is approximately 5 feet
higher than the old bridge, an improvement that allows access for SSD passenger vehicles
(see Photos 20 and 21). Although this bridge is considered to be an improvement to the
Floodway when compared to the structure it replaced, mitigation measures now need to be
incorporated into its design to address impacts of the penetrations on the levee and its
foundation.
PHOTO 19 - 25 July 2008, Hampton Bridge, East Levee. View of new bridge from the East Levee
crest, looking south across the Floodway. Spacing between the pier bents varies from 100’ to 120’.

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Construction of the 6-lane replacement bridge began in late 2006 with demolition of
the easternmost lanes of the old bridge. Pier construction began in May 2007. However,
several months of near record precipitation during the summer of 2007 resulted in substantial
construction delays. CESWF personnel were onsite the entire time that the pier construction
within the levee template was ongoing. On the east levee, Bents 30, 31 and 32 penetrate
the levee cross-section (see Figure 3); while the west levee was penetrated by Bents 4 and 5
(see Figure 4). Each bent consisted of eight 42-inch diameter piers socketed into the
underlying unweathered clay shale. CESWF required that all levee piers be drilled using
slurry to minimize the potential for hole collapse.
Figure 3 - Hampton Bridge, East Levee. Construction drawing showing location of Pier Bents 30,
31 and 32 with respect to the east levee cross-section. Pier Bent 30 is at the wet side levee toe, Bent
31 is through the crest, and Bent 32 is at the dry side toe of the levee.

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Figure 4 - Hampton Bridge, West Levee. Construction drawing showing location of Pier Bents 4
and 5 with respect to the west levee cross-section. Pier Bent 5 is at the wet side levee toe.
PHOTO 20a - 27 June 2008, Hampton Bridge, PHOTO 20b - 27 June 2008, Hampton Bridge,
East Levee. View of new bridge with respect to East Levee. Close-up view of new bridge
levee crest looking downstream (east). The showing that the clearance over the levee is
levee and levee crest are wider in this area due sufficient for passenger vehicles to travel across
to the access road at the dry side levee toe. the crest. Large SSD equipment must still utilize
access along the dry side levee toe (left).

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PHOTO 21a - 3 December 2007, Hampton PHOTO 21b - 3 December 2007, Hampton
Bridge, East Levee. View of new bridge Bridge, East Levee. Close-up view of new
substructure (left) compared to existing bridge bridge (foreground) with respect to the levee
substructure (right)). The bottom chord of the crest. Note the increased clearance compared
new bridge is approximately 5 feet higher than to the old structure (background).
the old bridge.
During the PI, a void was noted at the down gradient limit of the abutment paving on
the East Levee (see Photo 22a). This void was first observed in May 2007 during the
inspection of the construction for the Hampton Bridge replacement. In May 2007, the
maximum depth was greater than 18 inches. However, at the time of the PI, the void was
probed and found to be at least 4 feet deep. The lateral extent of the void was unknown but
it appeared to extend across at least 70% of the width of the slab.
PHOTO 22a - 3 December 2007, Hampton PHOTO 22b - 27 June 2008, Hampton Bridge,
Bridge, East Levee. Concrete paving at the East Levee. Reconstruction of the levee crest
levee crest had been undermined. At the time of was ongoing. The slab in Photo 22a had been
the PI, the depth of the void was more than 48” partially removed and the void backfilled.
deep.

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5.3.3.3.4 Woodall-Rodgers Bridge. Also known as the Margaret Hunt Hill Bridge, this
bridge is currently under construction. Construction of this bridge was approved by CESWF
in January 2006, prior to issuance of Section 408 policy guidance in October 2006. This
bridge has inadequate clearance above the levee crest, so access for maintenance and
surveillance is restricted. CoD should come up with a plan for adequate O&M, surveillance,
and flood-fighting for this area. Mitigation measures now need to be incorporated into its
design to address impacts of the penetrations on the levee and its foundation. This is a
significant concern since large amounts of sand were encountered during pier construction.
.
4 – 84” DIA
Figure 5 - Woodall Rodgers Bridge, East Levee. Construction drawing showing location of Pier
Bents 10, 11 and 12 with respect to the east levee cross-section. Pier Bent 10 is at the wet side
levee toe, Bent 11 is through the crest, and Bent 12 is at the dry side toe of the levee.
.
4 – 84” DIA
Figure 6 - Woodall Rodgers Bridge, West Levee. Construction drawing showing location of Pier
Bents 1 and 2 with respect to the west levee cross-section. Pier Bent 2 penetrates the wet side levee
slope above the 100-year flood elevation. Bent 1 penetrates the dry side levee slope.

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CESWF was onsite for the drilling of all piers within the levee, and required that all
levee piers be drilled using slurry to minimize the potential for hole collapse. However, due
to the presence of collapsible sands all across the Floodway, the contractor utilized slurry to
excavate the majority of the piers for this structure.
During the drilling of piers for Bent 6 (located 300’ from the wet side toe of the west
levee), the contractor reported that large quantities of sand in the formation liquefied even
though slurry was being used to hold the excavation open. The liquefaction was so
extensive that it destabilized the area within a 20’ radius of the 7-foot diameter pier. This
area had to be backfilled in order to be able to support the drill. When drilling resumed, a
casing was used to support the excavation. However, the bottom of the pier heaved and
blew out. The pier excavation was finally completed using both casing and slurry. During
concrete placement, the contractor was unable to remove the casing with a 200-ton crane,
so it remains a permanent fixture within the Floodway.
The contractor also reported that difficulties with flowing sands complicated pier
construction for Bent 7, located near the left bank of the Trinity River. The problems at this
bent were similar to those encountered at Bent 8. However, these difficulties occurred even
though a sheet pile cofferdam was first constructed around this bent. Loss of sand from the
overburden within the cofferdam resulted in concrete overruns of as much as 100% during
backfilling of the piers in this bent.
As shown in Photos 23a and 23b, sand was encountered within the levee foundation
on both the east and west levees. The depth of the sand varied, but was generally within 6’
of the base of the levees and from 5 to 24 feet thick.
PHOTO 23a - 16 April 2008, Woodall Rodgers PHOTO 23b - 4 June 2008, Woodall Rodgers
Bridge, West Levee, Bent 2. Close-up of yellow Bridge, East Levee. Close-up of gray sand that
sand that was found beneath the west levee. was found beneath the east levee. The sand
The sand varied from fine to medium. The lateral varied from fine to medium. The lateral and
and vertical extent of the sand is unknown. vertical extent of the sand is unknown.

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PHOTO 24 - 3 December 2007, Woodall Rodgers Bridge Construction on West Levee. View of
bridge construction from the left bank of the Trinity River. Note the large amount of sand exposed on
the right descending river bank during the flooding in 2007. The channel slopes in this area need to
be cleared of vegetation, regraded, and then rip-rapped to prevent erosion.
PHOTO 25a - 28 June 2007, Woodall Rodgers PHOTO 25b - 15 April 2008, Woodall Rodgers
Bridge, East Levee. Although directed to do so, Bridge, West Levee. Construction of this bridge
the bridge contractor failed to remove equipment revealed large quantities of sand that extend
and materials from the Floodway when flooding under the levees.
was predicted.

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5.3.4 Gate Closures. Both gate closures at the east levee are damaged, resulting in a rating
of unacceptable. It is also noted that the section of floodwall closed by these stop log
closures is approximately two feet below SPF.
5.3.4.1 Closure under DART Bridge. The gate closure under the DART Bridge was
damaged when Union Pacific Rail Road (UPRR) personnel removed the sills to facilitate
access to their tracks. The damage is reported to date back to a train derailment in the
1990s.
PHOTO 26a - 3 December 2007, Gate Closure, PHOTO 26b - 3 December 2007, Gate
East Levee. Located under the DART Bridge, Closure, East Levee. View of right side of
this gate closure has been damaged and the sills closure looking southeast. This section of the
removed to facilitate access to the railroad. View wall and closure was reconstructed after it was
is of the left side of the gate closure, looking damaged by a train derailment. However, the
northwest. sills were not replaced.
PHOTO 27 - 3 December 2007,

Gate Closure, East Levee. As an
interim measure, sand is stockpiled
adjacent to the gate closure in the
event of flooding. Stockpile is
covered with vegetation.

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PHOTO 28a (left) and 28b (right) - 3 December 2007, UPRR Gate Closure, East Levee. The
UPRR gate closure was damaged when the railroad operator removed the concrete sill and center
post socket for the stop logs. The photo on the left is the left guide wall for the closure. The right
guide wall is shown at the right.
5.3.5 Vegetation. In general, vegetation within the Floodway meets CESWF standards (no
vegetation on or within 50’ of the levees, or within 50’ of the top of channel bank). However,
vegetation that does not meet this standard needs to be removed. Typical vegetation
adjacent to the levees that requires removal is shown in Photos 29a and 29b. Typical
unacceptable vegetation adjacent to the river channel is visible in Photos 7a, 7b and 10b.
PHOTO 29a (left) and 29b (right) - 4 December 2007, West Levee. In general, vegetation is well
maintained within the project area. However, there are areas where vegetation violates CESWF
vegetation policy. These photos are typical of areas where trees are too close to the levee.
5.3.6 Unauthorized Access. Trespassers frequently vandalize locks and gates in order to
access the Floodway for all-terrain vehicle (ATV) recreation purposes. Typical damage
resulting from this recreational use of the Floodway is shown in Photos 30a and 30b.

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PHOTO 30a (left) and 30b (right) - 3 December 2007, Dallas Floodway. Trespassers on 4-
wheelers use the Floodway (photo left) and Levees (photo, right) as an ATV course. Rutting on the
face of the levee requires repair to prevent the development of erosion gullies.
5.3.7 Rochester Levee. Constructed by the CoD in 1993, this system of the Dallas
Floodway project became part of the Federal project in 1999 under the direction of
Congress. The December 2007 PI was the first inspection of the Rochester Levee.
5.3.7.1 Mechanically Stabilized Earth Wall. A Mechanically Stabilized Earth (MSE)

wall constitutes the wet side of the northeast ‘levee’ and is approximately 600 feet long.
Rotation of the wall reportedly began soon after construction was complete. Measurements
indicated that the rotation at the top of the wall is approximately 0.6 foot. The rotation of the
wall and misaligned guardrail that runs along the crest of the wall/levee indicates that the
wall is in active failure. The condition of this system of the Dallas Floodway is unacceptable.
PHOTO 31a - 4 December 2007, Rochester PHOTO 31b - 4 December 2007, Rochester
Levee. The Rochester Levee partially rings a Levee. Guardrail runs along the crest of the
small lake that is a popular recreation site for the northeast edge of the Rochester Levee. This
locals. The levee/MSE wall is to the left. portion of the levee is a combination of earthen
levee and MSE wall.

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PHOTO 32 - 4 December 2007, Rochester Levee. The northeast corner of the Rochester Levee is
a combination of earth (dry side) and MSE wall (wet side). The wall is rotated outward at the top
~0.6’ and appears to be in active failure. A close-up of the corner of the wall is shown in Photo 33.
PHOTO 33 - 4 December 2007, Rochester Levee. The

corner of the MSE wall has pulled apart and rotated outward
at the top. This opening would allow ready access to flood
waters, which could contribute to failure of the levee during a
flood event. CoD has reportedly monitored the movements
of the wall since construction was completed in 1993.
Results of the surveys should be provided to SWF for review.

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Rochester Levee. Erosion adjacent to
the Rochester Levee outlet needs to be
repaired.
5.3.7.2 Railroad Closures and Sheet Pile Wall. Three active railroad closures are
located at Rochester Levee. One of those structures has had the sill partially removed and is
in unacceptable condition.
Another of the Rochester closures includes approximately 1,100 feet of sheet pile that
runs along the crest of the levee adjacent to the UPRR line. The purpose and design of this
wall are unknown but, since it is higher than the adjacent levee, there is a concern that
outflanking the sheet pile during a flood event would concentrate flows sufficient to erode the
adjacent levee. It is reported that the top of the sheet pile is the top of protection. If that is
the case, then the height of the protection is deficient. Additionally, desiccation of the soil
adjacent to the sheet pile creates a preferential seepage path that would allow infiltration of
surface water. CoD should provide SWF the design documents of the sheet pile wall for
review.

Rochester Levee. This
railroad closure includes
approximately 1,100 feet of
sheet pile that runs along the
crest of the levee adjacent to
the UPRR line. Note that the
top of the sheet pile is
approximately a foot higher than
the adjacent levee.

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5.3.8 Central Wastewater Treatment Plant (CWWTP). Constructed by the CoD in the
1990s, this system of the Dallas Floodway project became part of the Federal project in
1999 under the direction of Congress. The December 2007 PI was the first inspection of the
Rochester Levee.
The levee around the CWWTP is in generally good condition with no erosion or
settlement observed. However, the hundreds of penetrations associated with CWWTP
buildings, equipment, and utilities are a concern with respect to levee integrity and
performance. Additionally, desiccation cracking was evident adjacent to many of these
penetrations. Because of this, this system of the project is rated as ‘Unacceptable’. Typical
penetrations are shown in the following photos.
PHOTO 36a - 4 December 2007, CWWTP. The PHOTO 36b - 4 December 2007, Central
levee that rings the CWWTP is riddled with Waste Water Treatment Plant. Desiccation
penetrations, including transmission tower cracking adjacent to the fence that runs along
foundations, structures, and fences. The the crest of the levee. Cracking at the time of
protected (dry) side is to the left. the inspection was 1” wide.
PHOTO 37a - 4 December 2007, CWWTP. PHOTO 37b - 4 December 2007, Central
Transmission tower foundations, structures, and Waste Water Treatment Plant. Tanks at the
drainage ditches are items of concern with sanitary plant penetrate the levee template.
respect to levee performance. The dry side of the protection is to the right.

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5.4 DESIGN CRITERIA REVIEW.
5.4.1 East and West Levees. Significant changes in the state of practice have occurred
since USACE reconstructed the Dallas Floodway project Levees in the 1950s. Additionally,
explosive, uncontrolled growth adjacent to the Dallas Floodway project has resulted in land
use changes that have increased flood heights. In order to insure acceptable performance at
authorized design levels, the East and West Levee systems need to be upgraded to meet
current design standards. Substantial data gaps that must be resolved before a complete
assessment of the project with respect to current criteria include limited subsurface data with
which to evaluate the project features, unavailable as-built conditions of existing structures in
and near the levee template, and determination of time and weather impacts on the strength
and physical properties of the levee materials.
5.4.1.1. Stability. As constructed by the CoD in the 1920s, the levees comprising the
Dallas Floodway project had side slopes of 2.5H:1V, a crest width of 6 feet, and a maximum
height of 35 feet. USACE-constructed modifications performed in the 1950s included
flattening the existing 2.5H:1V slopes to 3H:1V or flatter (up to 4H:1V) and widening
the crest from 6 to 16 feet. As shown on Figures 7 and 8, most of the additional fill
material added to the levee slopes was placed on the riverside of the levees. Prior
to placement of additional material, the levee was stripped to a depth of 6 inches
and the top 4 feet of the embankment removed to facilitate construction of the wider
crest.
Figure 7. Typical Cross-Section of East Levee Modifications
Review of design documentation from the 1950s indicates that the levees were
designed for a minimum Factor of Safety for stability of 1.3. For the Steady State Seepage
condition that generally controls levee design, current criteria presented in EM 1110-2-1913
require a Factor of Safety of 1.4.

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Figure 8. Typical Cross-Section of West Levee Modifications
5.4.1.2 Seepage. As shown on Figures 7 and 8, USACE did not include cut off
measures into the design of levee modifications. Design documentation indicates that
USACE relied on the impervious blanket found across much of the Floodway to protect
against seepage-related problems. Unfortunately, numerous activities within the Floodway
unrelated to flood control have compromised the blanket. Additionally, recent investigations
indicate that the presence of high permeability soils is more widespread within the Floodway
and under the levees than originally indicated by investigations conducted for the design of
levee re-construction performed by USACE in the 1950s.
It is noted that underseepage analyses performed by others for the design of

mitigations necessary for proposed projects (including bridges and pump stations) within the
Floodway indicate critical gradients as high as 2.0 can be expected in some areas of the
Floodway. These values are substantially greater than the 0.5 allowed under ETL 1110-2-
569, and indicate that a closer look, to include extensive subsurface investigations of the
Floodway and existing levees, is needed to evaluate this project under current criteria.
5.4.1.3 SPF. A survey of the levee crest in 2003 confirmed that the levee height is
insufficient to accommodate the authorized protection level of SPF + 4’ (see Appendix H).
It is important to note that CESWF began studies in earnest in 2004 to evaluate the
feasibility of bringing the Dallas Floodway project into compliance with current Hydraulic,
Hydrology, Geotechnical and Structural design criteria. CoD successfully lobbied Congress
for the Balanced Vision Plan (BVP), which included improvements for flood damage
reduction and interior drainage. The BVP was authorized by WRDA 2007 predicated on
CoD’s ability to demonstrate that the recreational components of the plan would not have a

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negative impact on the flood damage reduction function of the Floodway. Included in the
$459M WRDA 2007 appropriation was flood damage reduction benefits to an SPF + 2’ level.
Although it is CESWF’s intent to evaluate the existing Floodway and design

measures to bring it into compliance with current criteria using funding from the WRDA 2007
authorization, CESWF believes that the $459M authorization is insufficient to allow
construction of all the expected upgrades to the Floodway, including those necessary to
insure that the flood risk management project is in compliance with current USACE design
criteria. See Table 1 for additional discussion and recommendations associated with
addressing levee safety issues necessary to achieve an overall acceptable rating for the
Floodway.
5.4.2 Encroachments. Hundreds of encroachments within the Floodway reduce the level of
flood protection, impact access for O&M, restrict the ability to make repairs due to restricted
clearance, and provide pathways for water that can contribute to seepage and stability
problems. According to the Levee Checklist, such penetrations are considered to be
unacceptable unless mitigations to offset the negative impacts have been incorporated into
their design. Examination of available information from USACE design and construction
documentation does not indicate that any redundancies were incorporated into the project to
account for the impacts of bridges.
Each encroachment identified within the Floodway needs to be evaluated to

determine its impact on the project, to include the design and construction of mitigations that
may be required.
5.4.3 Rochester Levee. Constructed by the CoD in 1993, design information with which to
evaluate this system of the Dallas Floodway project with respect to current design criteria
was not reviewed by the inspection team at the time of the inspection. However, because
MSE walls are not allowed for use as flood retention structures, and because the existing
wall exhibits signs of distress, it is reasonable to conclude that this system does not meet
current USACE design criteria. Additionally, it is suspected that the sheet pile wall
incorporated into one of the gate closures may not comply with design criteria that were
developed for I-walls, post Katrina.
As part of the Dallas Floodway Extension project, this system of the project will be
brought into compliance with current USACE design criteria. A contract for a qualified
geotechnical engineering A/E firm to do this study will be awarded during FY 2009.
5.4.4 Central Waste Water Treatment Plant Levee. Constructed by the CoD in the 1990s,
design information with which to evaluate this system of the Dallas Floodway with respect to
current design criteria was not reviewed by the inspection team at the time of the inspection.
It is not known if the design of this levee included evaluation of penetration impacts or
whether mitigations/redundancies for these penetrations were incorporated into the design.
Because such mitigations are in doubt, it is reasonable to assume that this system probably
does not meet current USACE design criteria with respect to seepage and possibly stability.
CoD should provide SWF the design of the sheet pile wall for review.
As part of the Dallas Floodway Extension project, this segment of the project will be
brought into compliance with current design criteria. A contract for a qualified geotechnical
engineering A/E firm to do this study will be awarded during FY 2009.
5.4.5 Floodway Performance During Previous High Water Events. In May 1908, Dallas
experienced its highest flood in recorded history: a flood stage of 52.6-feet. As a result of

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that flood, the levees were constructed to provide flood protection for the City. Since the
original Dallas levees were modified by USACE in the 1950s, the ‘modern’ Flood of Record
for the Dallas Floodway occurred on 3 May 1990 (See Photo 38) when a discharge of
82,300 cfs was recorded. Although flood levels were high, the maximum flood height for this
event, Elevation 415.1 (gauge height of 47.1-feet), was more than 14 feet below the design
crest elevation. The event had an estimated probability of annual occurrence of 0.022, which
is roughly equivalent to a ‘45-year storm’.
To date, both the East

Levee and the West Levee
have performed acceptably at
the flood levels that have
occurred since 1958. All
other conditions being
equal, levees that have
performed well at higher
levels will usually perform
well at floods of equivalent
or lesser height. However,
acceptable performance at
higher flood levels is not
guaranteed since higher
flood levels exert
significantly higher forces
on the levees and their
foundations. In addition to Photo 38. View of Downtown Dallas and East Levee. This
stability-related concerns photo was taken during the modern Flood of Record for the
generated by these greater project, 3 May 1990. This event was a ’45-year’ event.
forces, underseepage is of
far greater consequence during higher floods since the higher water pressures may
find previously unidentified weaknesses in the embankment and foundation.
Proposed modifications to the Floodway include excavation of millions of cubic yards

of borrow to construct lakes, realignment of the river to create meanders, and construction of
hundreds of pier penetrations in and adjacent to the levees. If these proposals are
implemented, significant impacts to the hydrogeology of the Floodway will occur, and past
performance will no longer be an indicator of good performance at similar design flood
events.
5.4.6 FEMA Certification. On 7 July 2006, a letter was sent from CESWF to Halff
Associates that stated that the Dallas Floodway East and West Levee systems were
considered acceptable with respect to the 100-year (i.e., base flood) event for FEMA
certification purposes. Additionally, structural stability of the Rochester and CWWTP Levee
systems was not addressed in the 2006 letter. However, results of PI #9 indicate that the
levees may not perform adequately at the Base Flood Event.
Several areas of concern, including both authorized (DART Bridge, Woodall Rodgers
Bridge, and Hampton Bridge) and unauthorized encroachments (Dallas County Jail,
transmission tower foundations, power poles, fences, etc.) need to be investigated more
thoroughly (to include but not be limited to seepage and stability analyses) in order to
evaluate the impacts of these encroachments on the performance of the East and West
Levees and to determine whether these systems continue to provide protection at both the
base and SPF design levels. Once this evaluation is completed, the certification letter from

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CESWF will have to be re-examined. A copy of the certification letter is provided as
Appendix I.
VI – LEVEE SAFETY ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1 LEVEE CREST ELEVATION. As part of the study to upgrade the Dallas Floodway to meet
current criteria, CESWF utilized contract forces to survey the levee crest in 2003. The
survey was made at 100-foot intervals, and indicated that substantial portions of both the
East and West levees are below the SPF elevation. A spreadsheet that compares the crest
elevation with the SPF and 100-year flood elevations is provided as Appendix H.
6.1.1 East Levee. The East Levee was surveyed between Stations 21+00 and 622+00
(Station 625+78 is the upstream end of the East Levee). Within this reach, approximately
27,900 feet of levee (~47%) were found to be below the SPF level. The approximate
deficiency ranges from 0.02’ to a maximum of 5.83’ at Station 25+00 (upstream of the DART
Bridge). The height deficiency includes the concrete floodwall section on the East Levee
(see Photos 26, 27 and 28).
6.1.2 West Levee. The West Levee was surveyed between Stations 0+00 and 515+00 (the
upstream limit of the West Levee is at Station of 575+05). Within this reach, approximately
21,500 feet of levee (~42%) were found to be below the SPF level. The deficiency in crest
height ranges from 0.03’ to a maximum of 2.5’ at Station 71+00 (near Houston Street
Bridge).
6.2 EMBANKMENT CRACKING. During this inspection, no significant cracking was observed,
an unusual occurrence that is likely attributable to above average precipitation in 2007 that
allowed the expansive soils in the levee embankments to swell, thereby making cracks
undetectable during the inspection. Typical cracking of the levees observed during site visits
after the inspection is shown in Photos 39 and 40.
PHOTO 39 - 18 July 2008, West Levee.

Cracking at levee crest. This crack was
18” deep and is typical. Cracks like these
were observed along several miles of the
levee crest.

55
PHOTO 40 - 14 August
2008, West Levee.
Extensive cracking was
observed on the wet side
levee slope. At the time of
this photo, these cracks
extended to a depth of at
least 28 inches. Over the
course of the drought, the
cracks continued to widen
and deepen. When
measured in September
2008, they were as wide as
6” and extended to a depth
of at least 47”.
6.2.1 Desiccation Induced Cracking. The semi-arid, windy environment found in the North
Central Texas area renders the highly plastic clays that comprise the levees prone to
desiccation. As a result,
desiccation cracks are the usual
condition for the Dallas
Floodway Levees. These cracks
frequently extend deep into the
levee cross-section, both parallel
and transverse to the levee
crest, and are believed to be a
significant contributing factor in
the development of shallow
slides of the levees; more than
300 of which have occurred
since the USACE completed
reconstruction of the levees in
1958. It should be noted that
although referred to as ‘shallow’
slides, these slides are generally
deeper than what is considered
‘normal’ for most shallow slides. Photo 41 - 3 July 2007, East Levee. This slide was
This is due to the deep approximately 10’ deep and removed a portion of the
levee crest. The location of this slide was fortunate since
desiccation cracks that develop it occurred in an area where the levee cross-section is
in the moisture deficient wider due to the access ramp.
embankments. Slides as deep
as 15’ are reported to have occurred after cracks have become filled with water. As seen in
Photo 41, these slides occasionally remove a portion of the levee crest. Examination of the
moisture contents of levee samples obtained by USACE in 2004 indicates that more than
half of the samples had moisture contents less than the plastic limit. These samples

56
were found at depths from just below the levee crest to more than 30’- essentially
the full height of the levees, so deeper cracking is theoretically possible.
The standardized Inspection Checklist used for Periodic Inspections indicates that
any cracking greater than 6” deep is considered to be ‘Unacceptable’. Under this criterion, it
will be a long term challenge for the 23 miles of Dallas Floodway levees.
6.2.2 Correction of Desiccation Cracking. Although desiccation cracks may not be visible
when the clays swell after being wetted, cracks are still present since wetting alone does not
provide the mechanical action necessary to realign and bond the plate-like clay particles.
Chemical action can also repair cracks, but since this method requires carefully controlled
conditions and substantial periods of time to achieve acceptable results, it is not realistically
achievable outside the laboratory.
Repair of cracking by removal, moisture conditioning, and replacement of existing

soils is not a viable long term solution. Remedial options are discussed in the upcoming
paragraphs.
6.2.3 Potential Mitigations to Accommodate Desiccation Cracking.
6.2.3.1 Partial Remove and Replace. Once defined by rigorous field investigations,
the limits of the extremely desiccated zones of the levees could be removed and replaced.
Use of lime-stabilized fill would improve the longevity of the rebuilt levees, and would also
reduce the amount of maintenance associated with frequent repair of shallow slides.
Additionally, since soils removed from the levees could be treated with 8% lime and re-used,
borrow requirements would be minimized. Although this option will not eliminate the
problems associated with desiccation, many decades of good performance could be
expected with this alternative.
A significant issue associated with this option, however, is the necessity to construct
temporary cofferdams to protect the City from flooding during levee re-construction. These
cofferdams would likely have negative impacts on conveyance and would be challenging to
design and construct efficiently over 23 miles of levee.
6.2.3.2 Earthen Overbuild Sections. The extremes of moisture variation that induce
shrink-swell behavior in highly plastic clays can be mitigated by adding sacrificial overbuild
sections. This will not eliminate cracking and associated sliding, but if the overbuild section
is large enough to accommodate the cracking that can develop over the full seasonal
moisture depth (at least 15’ in Dallas), cracking will not be of structural significance with
respect to levee safety and performance.
Utilizing overbuild sections would require large volumes of borrowed fill. Additionally,
increasing the footprint of the levees would likely have negative impacts on Floodway
conveyance capacity if the overbuild was restricted to the wet side of the levees. Expansion
of the levee footprint on the dry side would require substantial acquisition of real estate.
6.2.3.3 Structural Methods. To accommodate desiccation cracking, the existing

levees could be replaced with structural walls (T or L-base walls). Alternatively, structural
walls or barriers (diaphragms) could be incorporated into the levee cross-section. Each of
these options is very expensive, but they are alternatives that could be properly designed
and constructed to enhance the integrity and performance of the protective works as
mitigations for the desiccation cracking.

57
6.3 DART BRIDGE. The bridge piers are evenly spaced along the centerline of the levee at
approximate 110’ center-to-center spacing. These penetrations of the levee and the erosion
around them are significant levee safety concerns that result in a higher risk of failure at
design flood elevations. Permanent mitigation of this encroachment is expected to include
the expansion of the levee cross-section by the addition of impervious fill on the wet side
levee face. Until such time as this mitigation can be designed and constructed, the erosion
damage needs to be repaired. Repairs will include:
• Re-direction of drainage from the bridge deck to move it away from the levee
entirely.
• Removal of filter fabric and stone currently in place.
• Excavation of the eroded areas around the perimeter of each pier. The required
depth of excavation will be 6-inches below the base of the erosion (if this depth
exceeds 5 feet, contact USACE for additional recommendations). The lateral
limits of excavation are a function of the size of compaction equipment that will be
used to compact the fill. The base of the excavation needs to be slightly larger
than the compaction equipment. Side slopes shall be angled away from the pier
(1H:1V, minimum; 1.5H:1V, maximum) and benched to ensure that each lift
blends well with the adjacent undamaged levee.
• Backfill the excavated areas with moisture conditioned impervious fill placed in 6-
inch loose lifts. Compact each lift with a small Sheepsfoot compactor to 95% of
the Standard Proctor density. Prior to placing subsequent lifts, scarify the surface
of the compacted lift to a depth of 1 to 2” to insure good adhesion between lifts.
• Re-vegetate the disturbed area with Bermuda grass.
• Inspect frequently to insure good performance, particularly during and after heavy
rainfall events.
NOTE: Prior to the start of excavation, laboratory testing of levee fill materials is required in
order to determine the appropriate moisture and density characteristics of the fill.
6.4 HAMPTON BRIDGE.
6.4.1 Correction of Void at Crest. Subsequent to the inspection, the void beneath the
concrete paving was repaired by the Contractor constructing the new bridge (see Photo 22b).
The repairs were made without USACE or SSD personnel present, so the cause of the
erosion is still undetermined. Because of this, this area of the project should be inspected
frequently, especially after heavy rainfall events, to insure that the erosion is not
redeveloping.
6.4.2 Mitigation of Pier Penetrations. The levee needs to be evaluated to determine

mitigation measures that may be necessary to offset the impact of the pier penetrations.
6.5 WOODALL RODGERS BRIDGE. Since the Woodall Rodgers Bridge is currently under
construction, the mitigations identified below should be addressed immediately, since
mitigations implemented before the bridge deck is constructed will be less complicated than
at any time in the future.
6.5.1 Access at Crest. The Woodall Rodgers Bridge provides inadequate clearance at the
crest of the levee. This lack of clearance will complicate future levee raises, and will have
significant negative impacts for O&M, flood-fighting and surveillance purposes. Therefore,
mitigation measures now need to be incorporated in the design. CoD should come up with a
plan for adequate O&M, surveillance, and flood-fighting for this area.

58
6.5.2 Mitigation of Pier Penetrations. The levee needs to be evaluated to determine
mitigation measures that may be necessary to offset the impact of the pier penetrations.
This will include rigorous field investigations to determine the extent of problematic soils that
were encountered during construction of the piers.
6.6 I-35 BRIDGE. It is recommended that the broken slab and the slabs on either side of it be
removed entirely in order to evaluate the underlying fill, and to determine the extent and
method of remediation that is most appropriate. This abutment is located on the dry side of
the Floodway, so this is not considered to be critical for performance of the Floodway except
possibly under high design flood conditions, to include flooding associated with interior
drainage. This item should be further evaluated.
6.7 EROSION AT OTHER BRIDGE PENETRATIONS. It is recommended that all slopes underneath
bridges that are not already retrofitted with concrete slope paving be paved as soon as
resources allow. Paving is considered to be the best method for protecting the levees within
the shadow line for several reasons, including:
• Riprap and other ‘permeable’ slope protection measures allow the development of
increased moisture contents at the interface between the levee and riprap. This is
particularly a concern at the toes of the levee since the increased moisture content
results in decreased soil strength that can trigger sliding.
• Riprap can be easily displaced (homeless people within the Floodway currently
use it to make shelters).
• Properly designed and constructed paving is more permanent that other slope
protection methods and does not reduce capacity of the Floodway.
Until such time as paving can be designed and constructed, repairs need to be made.
These repairs are outlined as followed:
• Identify cause of erosion and correct it (re-direct deck drainage, re-grade surfaces
to facilitate drainage away from the levee, etc.).
• Excavate eroded areas to a depth approximately 6-inches below the base of the
erosion.
• Backfill the excavated areas with moisture conditioned impervious fill placed in 6-
inch loose lifts. Compact each lift with a small sheepsfoot compactor to 95% of
the Standard Proctor density. Prior to placing subsequent lifts, scarify the surface
of the compacted lift to a depth of 1 to 2” to insure good adhesion between lifts.
Take care to bench each lift of the repair into the undamaged levee section to
insure that a failure plane is not built into the repair.
• Cover the repaired surface with an impervious geo-membrane, and weight that
membrane down with rock or articulated concrete block.
• Inspect frequently to insure good performance, particularly during and after heavy
rainfall events.
6.8 CONDITION OF ACCESS ROADS. In general, the condition of the access roads throughout
the project was good. However, numerous bridge crossings seriously impact access along
the crest of both the East and West Levees. In several places, the bridges are at or below
the levee crest. In these areas, access has been routed down the levee slopes to the wet
and/or dry side levee toes. This could be very problematic in the event of flooding at design

59
levels since the wet side access would be underwater, and the dry side access will hinder
observation of conditions in the Floodway.
Photo 42 - 3 December 2007, East Levee. Access along the levee crest is prevented in several
places along the Floodway due to bridges that block the crest. This forces access to the dry side toe
which may be inundated from interior drainage during high water events. Without a direct line of sight,
and with the access road underwater, surveillance and flood fighting of the Floodway would be very
difficult.
6.9 VEGETATION.
6.9.1 Trees and Shrubby Vegetation. Trees within 50’ of the levee toes and top of channel
banks should be removed. Removal should include removal of the entire root ball and
backfilling the resulting hole with compacted impervious material.
6.9.2 Grass Cover on Levees. The Bermuda grass cover on the levees has been
overwhelmed by Johnson grass and other weeds. During the high water events in 2007,
inspection of the levees was difficult because the 4’+ high Johnson grass obscured the levee
surface. Although the SSD mows frequently to keep the grass less than 10 inches high, the
extended period of rainfall in the spring and summer of 2007 accelerated the growth rate of
the weeds and prevented safe access to the levees for mowing.

60
The SSD needs to undertake an aggressive program to eradicate Johnson grass and
other invasive species within the ‘no-vegetation zone’; i.e. the levee slopes, and 50 feet from
the levee toes.
PHOTO 43 - 3 July 2007, East Levee. Heavy growth of Johnson grass and other weeds obscured
the levee surface during the flood event of 2007. To compensate, the SSD patrolled the levees from
the air.
6.10 REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT OF CREEPING SLIDE REPAIRS. During flooding in the
summer of 2007, a total of twenty shallow slides developed in the Floodway. See trip report
provided as Appendix G. Fifteen of those slides occurred on the levees while five occurred
in the sumps. At the time of the PI, all but five of the slides had been repaired. Of the slides
that had been repaired, it was noted during the inspection that four of them exhibited creep-
type failures. According to the database maintained by the SSD, Slides #286, #291, #292
and #297 were the four that were moving.
The four repaired slides that appear to be creeping should be removed and reconstructed as
follows:
• Vegetation and erosion control matting should be stripped prior to removal of the
slides.
• Excavate the entire repair. To insure that the slide interface is completely removed,
soil removal should extend beyond the limits of the repaired areas (approximately 5
to 10 feet on each side).

61
• Beginning at the base of the repair, place the soil in loose lifts that do not exceed an
8” thickness (as required, soil should be amended with 8% lime). Each lift should be
benched into the levee 3 to 5 feet to insure good bond between the levee and the
repair.
• Compact each lift with a sheepsfoot roller to a minimum of 95% Standard Proctor
density.
• “Dress the slope” to the appropriate geometry by working a dozer from the base of
the repair to the top.
• Seed or sod the slope with Bermuda grass, using mulch or matting as required to
keep the seed moist and in place.
6.11 CHANNEL REPAIRS.
6.11.1 Belleview Outfall. There are no wingwalls at the outlet pipe that help to control
discharges that have eroded the bank in this area. Currently, the erosion comes within 20’ of
the access road at the wet side levee toe (see Figure 9). Reconstruction of the outfall
channel to the original as-built geometry (see Figure 10b) is necessary. Alternatively,
extension of the pipe approximately 75 feet to allow it to discharge directly into the Trinity
River Channel and the addition of wing walls could be designed and constructed.
Figure 9. The location of the

eroded Belleview outfall shown
in Photo 10b with respect to
the access road that runs
along the toe of the levee. The
power line encroachments
along with the close proximity
of the sump area, which is wet
most of the time, make the
reduced seepage path
associated with this erosion
potentially more problematic.
Vegetation along the channel
should also be removed to a
distance of 50 feet from the top
of bank channel to insure
compliance with vegetation
standards. (Google Earth
Photo)

62
Figure 10a - Belleview Pressure Sewer Outfall, Figure 10b - Belleview Pressure Sewer
2005. Comparison of this photo from 2005 with Outfall, As-Built. Construction drawings indicate
the Google mapping from 2007 shown in Figure 9 that a channel was constructed to move
indicates substantial erosion occurred due to discharges from this outfall into the Trinity River.
heavy discharges during the summer of 2007. This channel has essentially been eroded away
since it was constructed in the late 1950s.
Until such time as permanent repairs can be made, appropriately sized riprap with
filter fabric and a graded filter (if required) can be placed along the perimeter of the eroded
area and below the outfall exit. Excavation of the riprap placement surface to a stable
geometry will be required for a temporary repair.
6.11.2 Slides along Outlets and River Channels.
6.11.2.1 Repair ‘In-the-Wet’. If the slide areas cannot be dewatered, slide repairs
will consist of:
• Removal of failed materials to a stable geometry.

• Placement of filter fabric on the excavated surface.
• Placement of a stone riprap blanket designed to accommodate expected flow
velocities and site specific geotechnical conditions (including back of bank
seepage such as was evident on the left bank of the New Hampton Outlet
Channel). The limits of the riprap placement will be determined in the field based
on site conditions.
6.11.2.1 Repair ‘In-the-Dry’. If the slides can be repaired ‘in-the-dry’, then they can
be repaired using the procedure described previously for the repair/removal of creeping
slides. Once the repair is made, appropriately designed stone riprap should be placed. The
limits of the riprap placement will be determined in the field based on site conditions.
6.12 SILTATION. At the time of the inspection, siltation associated with flooding during the
summer of 2007 was abundant. That silt and other debris need to be removed in order to
maximize discharge capacity of the Floodway.

63
6.13 DAMAGE DUE TO UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS. Damage caused by unauthorized access to
the Floodway includes rutting within the Floodway and on the levees. To prevent worsening
of these ruts, they should be backfilled, compacted and reseeded.
6.14 GATE CLOSURES. Until permanent repairs to sills and sockets are made, the SSD needs
to stockpile soil materials near each deficient closure in case of a flood emergency. Sand
should be stockpiled if sand bags will be used to make a closure. Otherwise, more
impervious materials would be suitable. The procedure described below should be followed
if sand bags are used:
• Remove as much ballast as possible. Ballast should be removed from both sides
of the closure to a distance of at least 1.5 times the height of the closure.
• Install stop logs as accurately as possible.
• Stack sandbags precisely, using the stop logs to support the sandbags. The base
of the sandbags as measured from the face of the stop logs should be at least 1.5
times the height of the sand bags plus approximately 3’.
If impervious fill is used to make an emergency closure, the procedure described

below should be followed:
• Remove as much ballast as possible. Ballast should be removed from both sides
of the closure to a distance of at least 1.5 times the height of the closure
• Install stop logs as accurately as possible.
• Attach 6 mil plastic to the dry side face of the stop logs, and extend it away from the
stop logs a distance equal to at least the height of the closure.
• Dump impervious materials onto the plastic and compact by tamping with the
equipment bucket.
• Continue dumping and tamping fill until the fill is at least 2/3rds the height of the
closure (the base of the fill as measured from the face of the stop logs should be at
least 1.5 times the height of the fill plus approximately 5 feet).
6.15 EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN (EAP). The EAP for this project has not been reviewed.
Given the concerns over the performance of the levee at both the 100-year and SPF flood
levels, this plan needs to be reviewed and updated as necessary to insure the safety of
persons living and working behind the levees.
VII – REFERENCES
7.1 REFERENCES.
• River and Harbor Act approved 2 March 1945 (PL-79-14) (HD 403/77/1).
• River and Harbor Act of 1965 (79 Stat. 1091), Section 301, (modified by Section 351
WRDA 1996), Section 356 of WRDA 1999 authorized by Section 351 WRDA 1996
• River and Harbor Act approved 17 May 1980 (PL 81-516) (HD 242/81/1)
• Water Resources Development Act 2007 (WRDA 2007) approved 9 November 2007
(PL110-114, HR1495)

64
• Policy Guidance Letter, 17 December 2008, Periodic Inspection Procedures for the
Levee Safety Program
• Review of Levee Design, Dallas Floodway, Trinity River, June 1968
• Seepage Investigations of West Levee Between Stations 134+90 and 196+40, Trinity
River and Tributaries, Texas, Dallas Floodway, Trinity River, September 1953
• Draft Engineer Technical Letter (ETL) 1110-2-569, May 2005, Design Guidance for
Levee Underseepage
• Engineer Manual (EM) 1110-2-1913, 30 April 2000, Engineering and Design - Design
and Construction of Levees
• Periodic Inspection and Continuing Evaluation of Completed Civil Works Structures,

Dallas Floodway, Trinity River, Texas, February 1969 (Periodic Inspection Report No.
1)

Dallas Floodway, Trinity River, Texas, May 1973 (Periodic Inspection Report No. 2).

Dallas Floodway, Trinity River, Texas, May 1978 (Periodic Inspection Report No. 3)
• Periodic Inspection Report No. 4, Dallas Floodway, Trinity River, Texas, November
1982
• Periodic Inspection Report No. 5, Dallas Floodway, Trinity River, Texas, November
1987
• Periodic Inspection Report No. 6, Dallas Floodway, Trinity River, Texas, April 1993
• Periodic Inspection Report No. 7, Dallas Floodway, Trinity River, Texas, October
1997
• Periodic Inspection Report No. 8, Dallas Floodway, Trinity River, Texas, October
2002
• Annual Inspection Report Dallas Floodway, 30 March 1960

• Annual Inspection Report Dallas Floodway, 28 September 1961
• Annual Inspection Report Dallas Floodway, 15 February 1962
• Annual Inspection Report Dallas Floodway, 8 April 1968
• Annual Inspection Report Dallas Floodway, 11 December 1974
• Annual Inspection Report Dallas Floodway, 10 November 1976

65
• Annual Inspection Report Dallas Floodway, 7 May 1981
• Annual Inspection Report Dallas Floodway, 12 June 1984
• Annual Inspection Report Dallas Floodway, 23 September 1985
• Annual Inspection Report Dallas Floodway, 30 July 1986
• Annual Inspection Report, Dallas Floodway, 7 October 1998
• Annual Inspection Report, Dallas Floodway, 20 October 1999
• Annual Inspection Report, Dallas Floodway, 18 December 2000
• Annual Inspection Report, Dallas Floodway, 16 July 2002
• Annual Inspection Report, Dallas Floodway, 13 November 2003
• Annual Inspection Report, Dallas Floodway, 30 December 2008
VIII – ACTIONS TAKEN BY SSD SINCE PERIODIC INSPECTION
8.1 ACTIONS TAKEN. Since the PI was conducted, SSD has taken action in some of the
deficiencies reported at the exit briefing after the inspection, especially those related to O&M.
A list of the actions has been submitted by SSD and is provided as Appendix J.

66

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U. S.

ARMY ENGINEER DISTRICT

PERIODIC INSPECTION REPORT

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SECTION NO. TITLE PAGE NO.

1.1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4

II – INSPECTION TEAM AND DATE OF INSPECTION

2.1 INSPECTION TEAM MEMBERS 5

III – SYSTEM BACKGROUND INFORMATION

3.1 PROJECT IDENTIFICATION 6

IV – PRE-INSPECTION PACKET INFORMATION

4.1 PRE-INSPECTION BROCHURE 8

V – INSPECTION FINDINGS AND EVALUATIONS

VI – LEVEE SAFETY ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 LEVEE CREST ELEVATION 55

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

6.15 EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN 64

VIII – ACTIONS TAKEN BY SSD SINCE PERIODIC INSPECTION

8.1 ACTIONS TAKEN 66

Appendix No. Title

A PROJECT LOCATION MAP

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

In addition to numerous unacceptable ratings, it was determined that the Dallas

II – INSPECTION TEAM AND DATE OF INSPECTION

David F. Garcia CoD, Street Services Department

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

III – SYSTEM BACKGROUND INFORMATION

3.2.2 Construction Completion Date of Original Federal Project. Construction to modify

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

3.2.6 Investigations Prior to Construction. As-built construction drawings of the Dallas

Date Feature Contractor

Jun 1954 Able Pump Station E.E. Const. Co.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

IV – PRE-INSPECTION PACKET INFORMATION

V – INSPECTION FINDINGS AND EVALUATIONS

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

5.2.1 East Levee Embankments.

The following items were rated as unacceptable (U):

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The following items were rated as minimally acceptable (M):

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

5.2.2 East Levee Structures.

5.2.2.1 Belleview Pressure Conduit, Station 59+93.

The following items were rated as unacceptable (U):

The following items were rated as minimally acceptable (M):

5.2.2.2 Able Pump Station, Station 99+45.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The following items were rated as minimally acceptable (M):

5.2.2.3 Woodall Rodgers Pressure Outfall, Station 160+98.

The following items were rated as minimally acceptable (M):

5.2.2.4 Baker Pump Station, Station 235+04.

The following items were rated as minimally acceptable (M):

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

5.2.2.5 Dallas Branch Pressure Conduit, Station 154+33.

The following items were rated as unacceptable (U):

The following items were rated as minimally acceptable (M):

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The following items were rated as unacceptable (U):

The following items were rated as minimally acceptable (M):

5.2.2.7 New Hampton Road Pump Station, Station 309+08.

The following items were rated as unacceptable (U):

5.2.2.8 Old Hampton Road Pumping Plant, Station 312+05.