FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .i ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .i INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 REGISTRATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 COMPETENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 ACCOUNTABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 HONESTY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39 APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .111 QUIZ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .113

Professional Conduct

© 2000 by the National Council of Architectural Registration Boards (NCARB). All rights reserved. No part of this document may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted for reproduction without the prior permission of the publisher. National Council of Architectural Registration Boards 1735 New York Avenue, N.W., Suite 700 Washington, DC 20006 (202) 783-6500 ISBN 0-941575-32-2 Printed in the United States of America This monograph was published in May 2000.

NCARB welcomes your comments and questions about this monograph and about the Professional Development Program in general. A monograph on the proper application of built-up roofing systems on low-slope decks was recently published.C. A monograph on other roofing material applications for low-slope decks is now in development. It is also accepted by The American Institute of Architects to meet its continuing education requirements for maintenance of membership in the Institute. reviews content and prepares quizzes for the monographs. He earned a bachelor’s degree from the University of Illinois. This program is intended to help architects meet mandatory continuing education and professional development requirements of state registration boards. specializing in the real estate industry. He practices business law. Future monograph topics include sustainable design. accountability and honesty. He has also served as chair for the University of Massachusetts Board of Trustees. a master’s degree from the University of California. NCARB’s PDP Committee selects topics. Taylor is a partner of the Boston-based law firm Hill & Barlow. He also chairs the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce Development and Transportation Committee and serves as a member of the New England Regional Advisory Committee for the Trust for Public Lands. and a master of laws from Harvard Law School. This monograph is written so that architects. An architect must practice in accordance with the legal requirements of competence. i . Please let us know what other topics you would like to see addressed. Taylor has served for over 15 years as counsel to NCARB’s Committee on Professional Conduct.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT FOREWORD This is the eighth monograph in NCARB’s Professional Development Program (PDP). students and others can have a better understanding of these terms. Thank you for your participation. P. as regent for the Massachusetts Board of Regents of Higher Education and as chairman for the Massachusetts Judicial Nominating Council. ABOUT THE AUTHOR Daniel A. Berkeley. designing within a community context and building failures.

The standards of professional conduct that they must follow. many state boards have posted their architectural registration law and regulations on their respective sites on the World Wide Web. While some few courts have stated that an architect. For the sake of simplicity. Virtually all states proscribe the kinds of conduct made illegal by the NCARB recommended rules. In addition. the reader should carefully consider NCARB’s recommended Rules of Conduct and the accompanying NCARB commentary (Item 1). and shall apply the technical knowledge and skill which is ordinarily applied by architects of good standing. therefore. It would be unwieldy to compile and compare over 50 versions of the applicable standards. implies warrants that his design is fit for its intended use. has authored these rules. a national registration exam. will result in revocation of the license. the reference to the skill and knowledge applied in the same locality may be less significant than it was in the past when 1 . 1. While NCARB’s recommended Rules of Conduct are not themselves law. differ in detail depending on the particular state. and it would be unwise to single out any particular state’s standards as being the norm.ncarb. Commentary Although many of the existing state board rules of conduct fail to mention standards of competence. it is clear that the public expects that incompetence will be disciplined and. Before proceeding.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT INTRODUCTION This monograph intends to educate architects in the standards of professional conduct that they are legally obliged to follow.1 In practicing architecture. To obtain the latest information on a particular state’s law. an architect shall act with reasonable care and competence. In an age of national television. ITEM 1 From NCARB’s Rules of Conduct. RULE 1 .COMPETENCE Rules of Conduct 1. this rule specifically rejects the minority standard in favor of the standard applied in the vast majority of jurisdictions that the architect need be careful but need not always be right. They reflect the consensus of all registration boards on the standards of professional conduct to which architects should adhere. like the manufacturer of goods.1 sets forth the common law standard which has existed in this country for a hundred years or more in judging the performance of this monograph relies on NCARB’s recommended Rules of Conduct as the hypothetical applicable “law”. where appropriate. practicing in the same locality. and the like. Architects are registered or licensed (the two words are used interchangeably) to practice in individual states. which comprises all of the architectural registration boards in the United States and its territories. national universities. Over half of the states have adopted the recommended Rules of Conduct verbatim or with only minor variations. NCARB. although perhaps by using different words. An architect runs the risk of losing the right to practice if the appropriate standards are not heeded. they do fairly represent what is the norm. contact that state’s board. Addresses and links to state board web sites can be obtained through NCARB’s own web site (http://www. July 1999.

1. an architect shall take into account all applicable state and municipal building laws and regulations. together with those whom the architect may engage as consultants. Commentary Here the state registration board is given the opportunity to revoke or suspend a license when the board has suitable evidence that the license holder’s professional competence is impaired by physical or mental disabilities. While an architect may rely on the advice of other professionals (e. 1. 1. as a professional.. Nonetheless. once having obtained such advice. Where an architect lacks experience. training. and it is true that what may be expected of an architect in a complex urban setting may vary from what is expected in a more simple. the courts have still recognized this portion of the standard.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT there was a wide disparity across the face of the United States in the degree of skill and knowledge which an architect was expected to bring to his or her work. Commentary While an architect is licensed to undertake any project which falls within the definition of the practice of architecture. The rule permits the architect to rely on the advice of such other professionals. in the board’s judgment. makes it impossible for that person to perform professional services with necessary care. Even the building laws and regulations are of sufficient complexity that the architect may be required to seek the interpretation of other professionals.g. attorneys. engineers. are qualified by education. an architect shall not knowingly design a project in violation of such laws and regulations. the board need not wait until a building fails in order to revoke the license of an architect whose addiction to alcohol. the architect must understand and be limited by the limitations of his or her own capacity and knowledge. Every major project being built in the United States is subject to a multitude of laws in addition to the applicable building laws and regulations. rural situation. it may be negligent of the architect to have failed to take them into account. Commentary It should be noted that the rule is limited to applicable state and municipal building laws and regulations.4 No person shall be permitted to practice architecture if. If an architect undertakes to do a project where he or she lacks knowledge and where he or she does not seek such supplementing consultants.2 In designing a project. As to these other laws. 2 . but the rule does not make the architect specifically responsible for such other laws. Thus. the rule supposes that he or she will retain consultants who can appropriately supplement his or her own capacity.3 An architect shall undertake to perform professional services only when he or she. and experience in the specific technical areas involved. for example. the architect has violated the rule. and other qualified persons) as to the intent and meaning of such regulations. such person’s professional competence is substantially impaired by physical or mental disabilities.

2.2 If an architect has any business association or direct or indirect financial interest which is substantial enough to influence his or her judgment in connection with the performance of professional services.1. favoring neither party to the contract. 3 . is nonetheless required. 2. The rule recognizes that that is not an inevitable role and that there may be circumstances (for example. to act with impartiality. shall disclose when he or she is being compensated for making such statement or when he or she has an economic interest in the issue.1 An architect. however. Commentary Like 2.1 An architect shall not accept compensation for services from more than one party on a project unless the circumstances are fully disclosed to and agreed to (such disclosure and agreement to be in writing) by all interested parties.4 When acting as the interpreter of building contract documents and the judge of contract performance. in fulfilling his or her role in the typical construction industry documents. this rule is directed at conflicts of interest.3 An architect shall not solicit or accept compensation from material or equipment suppliers in return for specifying or endorsing their products. It is absolute and does not provide for waiver by agreement. Commentary This rule recognizes that in some circumstances an architect may receive compensation from more than one party involved in a project but that such bifurcated loyalty is unacceptable unless all parties have understood it and accepted it. the architect will either terminate such association or interest or offer to give up the commission or employment.FULL DISCLOSURE 3. In general. making public statements on architectural questions. It requires disclosure by the architect of any interest which would affect the architect’s performance.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 2 . Commentary This rule appears in most of the existing state standards. though paid by the owner and owing the owner his or her loyalty. an architect shall render decisions impartially. RULE 3 . Commentary This rule applies only when the architect is acting as the interpreter of building contract documents and the judge of contract performance. the rule governs the customary construction industry relationship where the architect.CONFLICT OF INTEREST 2. 2. and if the client or employer objects to such association or financial interest. where the architect has an interest in the owning entity) in which the architect may appropriately decline to act in those two roles. the architect shall fully disclose in writing to his or her client or employer the nature of the business association or financial interest.

which violates applicable state or municipal building laws and regulations and which will. in the architect’s judgment. Commentary Many important projects require a team of architects to do the work. 3. On the other hand. It should be noted that a young architect who develops his or her experience working under a more senior architect has every right to claim credit for the work which he or she did. Commentary This rule holds the architect to the same standard of independence which has been applied to lawyers and accountants. experience and the scope of his or her responsibility in connection with work for which he or she is claiming credit. they doubtless have an obligation to be heard on such questions. While a proposed technical violation of building laws 4 . the architect shall have no liability to his or her client or employer on account of such termination. be representing the interests of potential developers when making statements on such issues. the architect is compelled to report the matter to a public official even though to do so may substantially harm the architect’s client.2 An architect shall accurately represent to a prospective or existing client or employer his or her qualifications. Note that the circumstances are a violation of building laws which adversely affect the safety to the public of the finished project. It is consistent with the probity which the public expects from members of the architectural profession that they not be allowed under the circumstances described in the rule to disguise the fact that they are not speaking on the particular issue as an independent professional but as a professional engaged to act on behalf of a client. against the architect’s advice. (ii) refuse to consent to the decision.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Commentary Architects frequently and appropriately make statements on questions affecting the environment in the architect’s community. In the circumstances described. As citizens and as members of a profession acutely concerned with environmental change.3 If. the architect shall (i) report the decision to the local building inspector or other public official charged with the enforcement of the applicable state or municipal building laws and regulations. capabilities. an architect becomes aware of a decision taken by his or her employer or client. materially affect adversely the safety to the public of the finished project. Regrettably. and (iii) in circumstances where the architect reasonably believes that other such decisions will be taken notwithstanding his objection. however. 3. Many architects may. in the course of his or her work on a project. In the case of a termination in accordance with clause (iii). terminate his services with reference to the project unless the architect is able to cause the matter to be resolved by other means. there has been some conflict in recent years when individual members of that team have claimed greater credit for the project than was appropriate to their work done. the public must be protected from believing that the younger architect’s role was greater than was the fact.

Clause (iii) gives the architect the obligation to terminate his or her services if he or she has clearly lost professional control. knowingly violate any state or federal criminal law.4 An architect shall not deliberately make a false statement or fail deliberately to disclose accurately and completely a material fact requested in connection with his or her application for registration or renewal or otherwise lawfully requested by the board.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (e. At present. 3. 3.g. a violation which does not affect the public safety) will cause a responsible architect to take action to oppose its implementation. experience. Some have disregarded the requirement that the conduct be related to professional practice and have provided for discipline whenever the architect engages in a crime involving “moral turpitude. Thus. The rule goes on to provide that the architect shall not be liable for a termination made pursuant to clause (iii).6 An architect possessing knowledge of a violation of these rules by another architect shall report such knowledge to the board.1 An architect shall not. or character. Commentary The registration board which grants registration or renews registration on the basis of a misrepresentation by the applicant must have the power to revoke that registration. it does not cover criminal conduct entirely unrelated to the registrant’s architectural practice. Such an exemption from contract liability is necessary if the architect is to be free to refuse to participate on a project in which such decisions are being made. in the conduct of his or her architectural practice. training.4 will cover reprehensible conduct on the part of the architect not embraced by Rule 4. 3.COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS 4. Commentary This rule is concerned with the violation of a state or federal criminal law while in the conduct of the registrant’s professional practice. There is no intent here to create a liability for the architect in this area. the Committee specifically does not make such a proposed violation trigger the provisions of this rule.. Its thrust is consistent with the special responsibility which the public expects from architects. that Rule 5. It is intended.” 5 .5 An architect shall not assist the application for registration of a person known by the architect to be unqualified in respect to education. Commentary This rule has its analogue in the Code of Professional Responsibility for lawyers. The rule specifically intends to exclude safety problems during the course of construction which are traditionally the obligation of the contractor. however.1. RULE 4 . The standard is that the architect reasonably believes that other such decisions will be taken notwithstanding his or her objection. there are several ways in which member boards have dealt with this sort of rule.

5. Note that the rule is concerned only with violations of state or federal criminal law.2 tracks a typical bribe statute. but it was the Committee’s view that 4. An architect who bribes a public official is subject to discipline by the state registration board.1 Any office offering architectural services shall have an architect resident and regularly employed in that office. The Committee specifically decided against the inclusion of violations of the laws of other nations. that distinction has been blurred in recent years. the Committee chose to limit this rule to United States jurisdictions. Some member boards discipline for felony crimes and not for misdemeanor crimes.3 An architect shall comply with the registration laws and regulations governing his or her professional practice in any United States jurisdiction. under 5. specifications.1. Not only is it extremely difficult for a member board to obtain suitable evidence of the interpretation of foreign laws. the architect is disciplined in any other United States jurisdiction. whether or not the architect has been convicted under the state criminal procedure. Commentary Here. or. except that (i) he or she may sign or seal those portions of the professional work that were prepared by or under the responsible control of persons 6 . 4.2 should be explicitly set out in the rules of conduct. RULE 5 . the failure to follow the dictates of the “anti-Israel boycott” laws found in most Arab jurisdictions is a crime under the laws of most of those jurisdictions. again. the policy of the United States of America.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT The Committee declined the use of that phrase as its meaning is by no means clear or uniformly understood. 4. gives to the member board discretion to deal with other reprehensible conduct. the Committee specifies crimes in the course of the architect’s professional practice.2 An architect shall not sign or seal drawings.2 An architect shall neither offer nor make any payment or gift to a government official (whether elected or appointed) with the intent of influencing the official’s judgment in connection with a prospective or existing project in which the architect is interested. reports or other professional work which was not prepared by or under the responsible control of the architect. while the anti-Israel boycott is contrary to the policy of the government of the United States and following its dictates is illegal under the laws of the United States. Note that all of the rules under this section look to the conduct of the architect and not to whether or not the architect has actually been convicted under a criminal law. Accordingly. Commentary 4. While the distinction between the two was once the distinction between serious crimes and technical crimes. for the reasons set out under 4. and. based on grounds substantially similar to those which lead to disciplinary action in the jurisdiction. For example. it is not unusual for such laws to be at odds with the laws.1. It is covered by the general language of 4. at least. An architect may be subject to disciplinary action if.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 5.4.

1. with the intent of influencing the judgment of an existing or prospective client in connection with a project in which the architect is interested. A state 7 . 5. or other reprehensible conduct which the board believes should warrant discipline. Commentary This provision reflects current practice by which the architect’s final construction documents may comprise the work of other architects as well as that of the architect who signs and seals professional submissions. other than gifts of nominal value (including. Any registered architect signing or sealing technical submissions not prepared by that architect but prepared under the architect’s responsible control by persons not regularly employed in the office where the architect is resident. reasonable entertainment and hospitality). and also to work prepared under the direct supervision of another architect whom he or she employs when the architect has both coordinated and reviewed the work. or reviewing and correcting. shall maintain and make available to the board upon request for at least five years following such signing and sealing. Commentary This provision refers to “private bribes” (which are ordinarily not criminal in nature) and the unseemly conduct of using gifts to obtain work. “Responsible control” shall be that amount of control over and detailed professional knowledge of the content of technical submissions during their preparation as is ordinarily exercised by architects applying the required professional standard of care. 5. technical submissions after they have been prepared by others does not constitute the exercise of responsible control because the reviewer has neither control over nor detailed knowledge of the content of such submissions throughout their preparation. for example. and (ii) he or she may sign or seal portions of the professional work that are not required by the architects’ registration law to be prepared by or under the responsible control of an architect if the architect has reviewed and adopted in whole or in part such portions and has integrated them into his or her work.4 An architect shall not engage in conduct involving fraud or wanton disregard of the rights of others.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT who are registered under the architecture registration laws of this jurisdiction if the architect has reviewed in whole or in part such portions and has either coordinated their preparation or integrated them into his or her work.3 An architect shall neither offer nor make any gifts. adequate and complete records demonstrating the nature and extend of the architect’s control over and detailed knowledge of such technical submissions throughout their preparation. Note that the rule realistically excludes reasonable entertainment and hospitality and other gifts of nominal value. Commentary Violations of this rule may involve criminal conduct not covered by 4. Reviewing. The architect is permitted to apply his or her seal to work over which the architect has both control and detailed professional knowledge.

An understanding of the Rules of Conduct is useful in another way as well: While they are themselves standards of minimum conduct. tax violations. 8 . The 1981 walkway collapse at the Kansas City Hyatt Regency hotel in Missouri. in any disciplinary matter.4. burglary. While this monograph focuses primarily on the standards of professional conduct applicable to architects. may well be grounds for discipline. discussed in a subsequent chapter. be able to point to a specific rule which has been violated. may be subject to disciplinary actions if the board concludes that the failure was serious and material.1 (crimes committed “in the conduct of his or her architectural practice”). they are well above the standards of the marketplace. similar standards apply to engineers. involved the discipline of engineers. The next three chapters—Competence. As a reading of the Rules of Conduct should make clear. murder. Accountability and Honesty—address the issues that are at the heart of NCARB’s standards of professional conduct. as opposed to minor breaches of the law.5 An architect shall not make misleading. While each board must “flesh out” the rule. Lawyers commenting on the rules had little trouble with the standard set in 5. and the like. Architects must design buildings that are safe for the public that will use them. and these rules have hard edges. rape. Registration. even when not related to the practice of architecture. it applies to conduct which would be characterized as wicked. 5. arson. would not be considered subject to the rule. have no say in the design process. even though not related to professional practice. grand larceny. The second chapter of this monograph. Serious misconduct. “Ethics” is too vague and does not fairly describe the specific kinds of minimum conduct to which architects must adhere. The legal rules under which the engineers of that project were disciplined by the state of Missouri are virtually identical to the rules applicable to architects in almost all states. while disorderly conduct. would be conduct subject to the rule. Violations often have serious consequences and can include suspension or loss of registration. Commentary An architect who fails to accurately and completely disclose information. Students of this monograph should understand that there are professional conduct rules in all states where they practice. and the like. An architect who is continuously involved in nighttime burglaries (no connection to his daytime professional practice) is not covered by 4. traffic violations. deceptive or false statements or claims. the building’s future users. extortion. discusses the basic requirements and importance of licensure.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT board must. “Let the buyer beware” standards of the marketplace are singularly inappropriate to the creation of building designs because the real parties at interest. The best assurance that they will do so is if the buck stops with the designer of the building who puts his or her name on the plans. they point toward higher professional aspirations.

An individual is then registered by a state architectural registration board to practice architecture in that state. With only limited exceptions. this monograph presents real as well as fictional cases of misconduct. This monograph aims to foster consideration of the issues raised by each scenario because that will lead to a better understanding of the professional conduct requirements all architects must follow.) DEFINITION OF PRACTICE Registration boards and courts take their cue about what constitutes the “practice of architecture” in their states from the applicable statutory definitions. the “right answer” to a scenario may not be readily apparent. as appropriate and without limitation. “Practice of Architecture” Defined … rendering or offering to render those services hereinafter described. and construction. all states limit to only registered persons the use of words like “architect” and the ability to promote oneself as an architect. if followed. Gragg. consulting engineers and landscape architects. enlargement or alteration of a building or group of buildings and the space within and the site surrounding such buildings. allow an architect registered elsewhere to become registered in that state. gain experience as an apprentice to a registered architect and pass an examination prepared by NCARB. As is often true in real life. (NCARB facilitates reciprocity registration by allowing architects registered in a state and maintaining an NCARB certificate to be admitted to practice in other states without reexamination. REGISTRATION All states register architects. drawings. The practice of architecture shall not include the practice of engineering but an architect may perform such engineering work as is incidental to the practice of architecture. specifications and other technical submissions. … 9 . one typically must hold a degree in architecture from an accredited collegiate architecture program. providing designs. the administration of construction contracts. programming. To become registered. These scenarios ask the reader to imagine the professional in question or a member of the state registration board who must make a ruling. July 1999. states only permit registered architects to practice architecture in their states.” an article describing the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration’s then pioneering case method of teaching in the Harvard Alumni Bulletin. which have as their principal purpose human occupancy or habitation: the services referred to include predesign services. planning. and the coordination of any elements of technical submissions prepared by others including. in connection with the design. in “Because Wisdom Can’t Be Told. Each state has reciprocity laws that. October 19. Model Regulations.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT In addition to discussing the NCARB recommended Rules of Conduct. Without exception.” states Professor Charles I. however. This case method of teaching is intended to challenge the reader: “The inherently dramatic and challenging character of the case system. although producing anxiety and confusion for the newcomer. ITEM 2 From NCARB’s Legislative Guidelines and Model Law. 1940. also arouses his [or her] deep interest and leads him [or her] to make the effort required for adjustment. NCARB recommends that states adopt the definition of the “practice of architecture” described in Item 2.

its interest may be represented only by the architect. THE NEED FOR REGISTRATION Registration confers on registered individuals a monopoly to engage in the profession. lawyers and accountants who serve them. and alterations of a building when such work does not affect safety features of the building. 10 . intended use or occupancy. experience and examination that registration represents. Not so with a building’s users. trained and tested in these knowledge areas are allowed to design the actual assembly of a building. Typically. such a status is not the reason why state legislatures have required that architects be registered. like engineers. equipment and material submissions incidental to the design of the entire project. Financial and time pressures often encourage the owner to seek all possible savings in costs. all of whom must demonstrate through education and examination that they have mastered the technical knowledge to carry on their professions with a minimum level of competence. They accomplish this by exempting buildings of limited scope from the definition. In this sense architects are like doctors. layouts and color schemes frequently runs afoul of architectural practice laws where changes involve egress or construction supervision (Marshall-Schule 1987). Interior design work going beyond furniture selection. That public is entitled to have as building designers only those persons who have been qualified by the education. area or volume. patients and clients are at least in some position to police such failures by the doctors. even someone exempt from what otherwise would be violations of laws prohibiting the practice of architecture may still not hold himself or herself out as an architect. farm buildings. Even though they may be poorly armed for the task. lawyers and accountants. NCARB also recommends that unregistered individuals be allowed to produce shop drawings. is absent from the cost-saving negotiations. The public. the effect of such failings on large numbers of people is usually limited. and drawings under the responsible control of a registered architect. Only those educated. lawyers and accountants can have disastrous consequences to the affected patients and clients. NCARB recommends that unregistered individuals be allowed to design singleand two-family dwellings. business cards or in contracts. number of stories or height. Such exemptions are based on factors such as cost of construction. and number of units or occupants. How buildings fit together and function is a body of highly specialized knowledge not readily accessible to most lay people. However. have a special professional standing because they are relied upon by the public to an uncommon degree.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Virtually all states limit their definition of the “practice of architecture” to substantial buildings used by the public. While incompetence or other failures to meet applicable standards of professional conduct by doctors. Sometimes the client who hires the architect may not be the best advocate for the welfare of the building’s many users over its life. architects. This means that the person may not refer to himself or herself as an architect on letterheads. Lenders furnishing financing for the building may be as eager for savings as the owner since the cash not advanced on the construction loan will add an additional margin of safety against slow leasing or sale of the finished product. which will use the building over many decades. Of course.

PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT PENALTIES FOR UNLICENSED PRACTICE Courts have uniformly upheld the power of states to require registration before individuals may engage in the practice of architecture. Under the U. Although already registered in Michigan and California. specifications. Still another level of care and attention is required of corporations and partnerships that engage in the practice of architecture in different states.000 by the Oregon State Board of Architect Examiners for starting design work in Oregon before being registered in that state. according to Rule 5. Busy practitioners have sometimes learned the hard way of the need to register in another state before offering or providing architectural services there. most states require that a majority of their boards of directors or of their stock ownership. Many states require that the entity itself register with the licensing board. be architects registered in some state. Arata. Arata was fined $5. While criminal penalties are rarely invoked against architects registered in another state but not in the state where they have unlawfully practiced. as indicated by the Howell and Anderson case excerpts in Appendix A and the Catlin case in Appendix G. states are granted broad police powers through which to regulate otherwise private affairs in order to protect the public’s health. STATE BY STATE REGISTRATION REQUIRED Registration in one state confers no rights in and of itself to practice in another state. no architect may “sign or seal drawings. Completing one’s registration in another state should be done before the architectural commission arises.S.2. The Massachusetts firm was denied any fee recovery on its contract. in which a Massachusetts architectural firm specializing in hospital design was engaged by a Vermont architectural firm to do various special consultation work for a hospital addition in Vermont but had no members registered in that state. An example of this is illustrated by the 1969 Vermont case of Markus & Nocka v. zoning and land-use laws. Practicing architecture in a state without being registered there exposes the practitioner to sanctions that are often severe. The case of Anthony M. examples of such police powers by the state include sanitation and building codes. and the licensing of restaurants and bars serving food and beverages. All states have criminal penalties for practicing architecture without being registered. safety and welfare. This can leave the client and the project in an unhappy state of limbo. civil sanctions are routinely imposed on them by registration boards. or both. found in Appendix B.” One onerous sanction often overlooked by architects is that an unregistered practitioner may be denied the right to recover any fees for professional services rendered. These include fines of up to several thousand dollars and orders that the unregistered person cease and desist from further practice on the job that gave rise to the violation and on any other project. State laws requiring that a person be registered in a state before practicing architecture in that state apply equally to contractors who employ draftspersons to design buildings that they build and to architects registered in other states but not the state where they seek a commission. illustrates this point. often called “plan stamping. Constitution. Aiding and abetting an unlicensed practitioner. reports or other professional work which was not prepared by or under the responsible control of the architect.” is also treated seriously by registration boards. 11 . With regard to corporations. Jullian Goodrich Architects. In addition to the licensing of architects and other professionals. Drawings must be started afresh by another architect since.

Florida. has permitted the preparation of plans in its state by a person unlicensed in that state because the building was to be built in another state (Rolls 1982). a position of trust and high regard in our society. Special ambiguities exist where an out-of-state architect not registered in the state where the building is to be built associates with an in-state registered architect and together they design the building from their respective offices. Calamity can occur when that focus is lost. Here is another explanation: architecture involves a sustained focus on details so that everything works as the original design intended. either of which may hold great peril to the public. so local self-interest may not explain the sheer volume of “practicing before registration” disciplinary cases. Hill & Barlow. the development of specialized skills. P.C. that is by no means all that is expected of them. §3135). 12 . Interstate practice is an accepted and growing fact of life throughout the United States. But at least one state. BEING A PROFESSIONAL While paying attention to details goes to the heart of what architects do. From “Legal Cases and Materials for the Construction Professional. Item 3 suggests what it means to be a professional and hold a government-sanctioned monopoly to practice a profession. a great number of disciplinary actions taken by the state registration boards focus on “practicing before registration” violations.” 1999. But in most states the legality of the out-of-state unregistered architect affiliation is open to question. Others require registration of the out-of-state architect unless that architect performs services under the “responsible control” (discussed below under Accountability) of the in-state registered architect. in the brave new The author is Of Counsel.. the words “professional” and “professionalism” seem to have lost their hard edge. Harvard University Graduate School of Design. Reprinted by permission.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT All states would consider the preparation of plans submitted to a building official to be the practice of architecture regardless of whether or not the plans were physically prepared in another state where the architect was registered. it strikes them as a sign of carelessness about details or of a tendency to ignore details. Jullian Goodrich Architects discovered to its regret when it tried to collect its Vermont commission. ITEM 3 Professionalism and the Public Interest. they connoted a vocation requiring considerable education. and usually more than average rewards for performance. So when architects sitting on state registration boards see other architects ignoring the registration laws and practicing in their state before they bother to register. NCARB was formed expressly to facilitate interstate practice by architects. and. as the consulting Massachusetts hospital design firm in Markus & Nocka v. Cynics might suggest that all of this is but a lot of red tape designed to erect walls protecting local practitioners from outside competition. California allows an out-of-state unregistered architect to contract with an in-state registered architect and lawfully provide architectural services in California provided that certain filing requirements are met (California Code of Regulations. Indeed. Now we live in an era in which embalmers. Some registration boards do not strictly apply the law if the in-state architect provides substantial services. Esq. Architects know they do their best work when they marshal and sustain this focus. In these days when the Orwellian vision of language being used to obfuscate rather than clarify has become a reality. hairdressers. Once. and Adjunct Professor of Studies in Professional Practice in Architecture. by Carl M. Sapers.

embalmers. by effective lobbying of their local legislators. the drycleaners. but more important. the automotive mechanics. was a trade or occupation now lays claim to being a profession. Subsequently. the real estate brokers. he or she is expected to exercise discretion wisely. It is downright undemocratic to deny any American citizen the right to call himself or herself a professional. In most cases. and in particular those hallmarks characteristic of a design professional. Everything which. The gap between what the law expects of the tradesmen and of the traditional professional has also narrowed. I propose in this note to declare those hallmarks of a professional. there is never “one remedy” but a multitude of “remedies” and each selected solution carries with it ramifications affecting other aspects of the client’s problem. he has the right to expect that the 13 . require registration under professional licensing statutes. all think of themselves as professionals. Third. some courts see the design professional (as well as the doctor. Exercising discretion is an essential characteristic of all of the learned professions. the insurance agents. in his or her practice. and thereafter to deal with the terms professional and professionalism in the terms used to define them. The good auto mechanic always chooses the correct remedy. however. in this note. For the design professional. and other members of the learned professions) as supplying a product much like the tradesmen. First. There are three important characteristics of the design professional. The auto mechanic may synthesize knowledge in order to remedy a defect in your motor. (The same can be said for lawyers and doctors in their attempt to solve their clients’ problems. First. beekeepers and babysitters who. Second.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT world of California. have had themselves declared professionals in the same way that by decree. the situation is different. Having observed the confusion in our times as to who is a professional and who is not. with a sweep of the hand. lawyer. he or she is expected to accept fiduciary responsibilities at a level well beyond the level expected of tradesmen in the marketplace. there is a correct remedy and a series of incorrect remedies. we will observe that many critics of the design professions take the view that the professional fraternities overemphasize the training aspect and neglect the other two. in our grandfathers’ era. Thus. in certain totalitarian countries. At the same time. The tradition that the buyer beware in dealing with the tradesmen has been replaced by consumer-oriented laws giving the purchaser additional rights and giving the tradesmen duties of honesty and forthrightness.) When the client selects his design professional. I clear from the table the septic tank cleaners. babysitters. he or she is expected to have had substantial and specialized education and training in the professional work before being permitted to practice it. the problem is multi-faceted and light years more complex than the problem the automotive mechanic faces. The first of these characteristics is obvious and need not be expanded on here. good is declared bad and night is declared day.

A requisition including the month’s concrete work is on the architect’s desk. the window channels. The architect. it is easier to state a general proposition than to apply it to the specific circumstances in the real world. The beneficiary need not watch his fiduciary as the prudent meat purchaser watches the scales to be sure that the heavy hand of the butcher is not nestled in next to the beefsteak when calculating the price of the meat.000. it is the characteristic of the fiduciary that he puts his own self-interest to one side and considers the interest of his beneficiary paramount.” But the architect has reason to believe that the owner knew about the cheating from the very beginning and was pleased to enjoy the money savings. It has been said that it is the design professional’s obligation to prefer his client’s interest over his own and. Under the terms of the contract documents. by the way. the architect is to be the judge of the performance of both the owner and the contractor. He tells the owner about the problem immediately. What does the architect do? 2. Here are three examples taken from the real world: 1. In the course of a weekly inspection. already installed. A fiduciary duty is the duty which a trustee has to the beneficiaries of the trust. without the necessity of skeptical oversight by the beneficiary. when the issues are clear. It is characterized by loyalty and good faith. The beneficiary expects the trustee to exercise the trustee’s skills and intelligence on the beneficiary’s behalf at all times. What does the architect do? 14 . The owner says “Don’t worry about it. not that he will simply catalog the choices which the owner must make in connection with his project. The contractor says that to remedy the situation will cost the owner $50. to prefer the public interest over both. It is the opposite of an arm’s length relationship. The architect is called upon to render a decision in the dispute.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT design professional will exercise wisely the broad discretion which has been assigned. The contractor states that the channels should have had weepholes or vent holes but that none were shown on the drawings nor specified in the specifications. is required to certify the owner/contractor’s requisitions before the construction lender will make payment of the monthly draws out of which the architect is paid. I’ll talk to my construction superintendent. The owner is taking the position that weepholes are an obvious construction method and an experienced contractor should have put them in without regard to the absence of such a requirement in the plans and specifications. he discovers that the superintendent of construction is cheating on the cement content of the concrete and that the concrete will not come up to the strength required by the specifications and by the local building code. are retaining water. In the course of construction. As with so much in life. An architect has designed housing using poured-in-place concrete as the structural system for a developer/owner who is building the housing with his own subsidiary construction company.

They have contributed honorably and significantly to our built environment. bribed a public official. The structure and its calculations had been approved by the building department of the city. responsible for the structural design of a major skyscraper in an important and densely populated American city. there is a high probability that portions of the building will fly off and fall to the ground within six blocks of the structure. discovers a year after substantial completion that he made a basic error in his calculations with the result that the building will fail in a sixteen-year return wind. Nader and the various government agencies have their way. If a sixteen-year return wind should occur. The hurricane season in that part of the country is two months off. but the facts are that the profession.” Mr. tightens the gate by which people are admitted to the franchise. tended to disparage the notion of professionalism. I know you’re in it chiefly for money. You will note that Judge Sirica in the Mardirosian case [finding that the AIA’s ethical rule against supplanting another architect on a job was a violation of U. 15 . The Justice Department. they comment. A structural engineer. This commentator believes that if Mr. whenever given a chance. What does the structural engineer do? Persons connected with Ralph Nader’s organization and their friends in government agencies like the Federal Trade Commission have. and legislative “sunset” commissions across the country are devoting considerable energies to the deregulation of occupations and professions. in recent years. “When push comes to shove. How seldom. but enforces rules of professional conduct only when they are anti-competitive in effect. Nader would observe that all this talk about professionalism is dandy. has a design professional been called on the carpet by the profession because the professional cheated a client. or did shabby work? This dispute rages. To Mr. it follows that the public will at least have its position improved by reducing the cost of professional services if the franchise is broadened. There are architects and engineers who flourish in that exacting relationship to their clients and the public described above. But there are professionals whose careers meet the standards discussed earlier.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 3. the FTC. antitrust laws] refers to architecture as a “business”. professionalism may not survive in America.S. Under their view since so very little of the effects of registration protects the public and so much protects the income of professionals. we can assume that that word was used consciously as a way of saying. The remedial action will cost over $2 million and take three months to complete if all parties cooperate in the work. The owner and chief occupant of the building is a major insurance corporation. Nader and his allies the attempt of the American Institute of Architects [(AIA)] to discourage “supplanting” of an architect by another is consistent with the attempts by the AIA and the National Society of Professional Engineers to prevent their members from bidding for jobs on the basis of competitive fees and is closely connected to the efforts of both organizations (and other professional organizations) to establish fee schedules to which all members would adhere in seeking work.

prohibited from inflicting their incompetence on others. One such example is described in “City Perils: The Fifty-Nine-Story Crisis. the shortcut to a commission through bribes or gratuities. 5589 and 5590). COMPETENCE The public and its representative political leaders expect that architects who practice incompetently will be disciplined and. accountability and honesty underlying the Rules of Conduct. But there are singular instances of professional rectitude that exemplify the core values of competence.” a single failure to act with the care ordinarily applied by competent architects in the locality could lead to discipline. It can be found in Appendix C. An architect who does not practice with the reasonable care and competence and apply the technical knowledge and skill ordinarily applied by architects of good standing in that locality is practicing negligently.000 for fraud or negligence in practice (California Architects Practice Act. 16 . their professional liability insurers and clerks of court to report to the California Board of Architectural Examiners all settlements. where warranted.” an article by Joe Morgenstern that first appeared in the New Yorker in 1995. According to this standard of “ordinary negligence. most disciplinary actions based on incompetence have been handed down after a building fails. In some states. One exception is California.1 incorporates the customary legal standard of due care widely applied in civil actions involving architects. And the most wonderful part of my story is that when I did it nothing bad happened.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Mostly. the subject of this article. cases drawn from the annals of professional discipline feature the pursuit of self-interest over the interest of the client or the public: the rush to get started before bothering to register. close cooperation between architectural and engineering registration boards on the one hand and building code officials on the other has led code officials to alert the boards to practitioners submitting plans of marginal competence. Few states today require architects to inform their respective registration boards of suits filed against them. Says LeMessurier in the article: “In return for getting a license and being regarded with respect. awards or judgments in excess of $5. Yet there is often little opportunity for registration boards to assess the competence of practitioners before a building failure occurs. ORDINARY AND GROSS NEGLIGENCE NCARB’s Rule 1. was the structural engineer who designed Citicorp Center. §§5588.” PHOTO: © Mary Ann Sullivan Reprinted with permission. easy fees earned by selling the architect’s seal to be stamped on plans prepared by others. the careless loss of focus allowing errors to creep in because too much business is being pursued or the fee is too low. you’re supposed to be self-sacrificing and look beyond the interests of yourself and your client to society as a whole. The subtitle to this article succinctly spells out the dilemma: “What’s an engineer’s worst nightmare? To realize that the supports he designed for a skyscraper like Citicorp Center are flawed—and hurricane season is approaching.” William LeMessurier. of negligence claims reported to their professional liability insurance company or of the outcome of such lawsuits and claims. which requires architects.

particularly California and New York. readers of this monograph should review the facts: Matthys Levy’s and Mario Salvadori’s chronicle from a chapter in their book. and the architect’s failure also to register as an engineer shows a lack of qualification to do such work. while both differ in kind from willful and intentional conduct which is or ought to be known to have a tendency to injure. Why Buildings Fall Down. one 17 .” According to page 1033 of the sixth edition of Black’s Law Dictionary.” While some state boards.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT In contrast. … Ordinary and gross negligence differ in degree of inattention. most boards have not done so. In Appendix E. This was the most calamitous building failure ever to occur in the United States. State registration boards using the “gross negligence” standard appear more forgiving of an architect’s minor failings. Frequently in these states the architect’s violation is characterized as practicing beyond his or her competence or as negligence. What has happened in these cases almost always could be characterized as “gross negligence. In practice. State laws have varying requirements about sealing plans prepared by registered engineers under the architect’s supervision. even though those private disputes may assert that the architect was “negligent” or “grossly negligent” in how he or she handled the job. Some require the architect to add the architect’s seal on to the engineer’s drawings and some forbid placing the architect’s seal on the engineer’s plans. Instead. The Missouri Board for Architects. have accepted complaints from disgruntled clients who claimed that their architect neglected the project or failed to complete the drawings. killing 114 people and injuring 186. LEARNING FROM KANSAS CITY Walkways in the atrium lobby of the Kansas City Hyatt Hotel collapsed in 1981. “gross negligence” is “a heedless and palpable violation of legal duty respecting the rights of others… Gross negligence is a manifestly smaller amount of watchfulness and circumspection than the circumstances require of a person of ordinary prudence. they have left to the courts the task of settling disputes between architects and their disgruntled clients through civil lawsuits. many state Boards have as a disciplinary rule that an architect shall not practice with “gross negligence. To learn from this disaster. And neither the boards hearing those cases nor the courts handling appeals by architects of what the boards have done place much emphasis on the particular wording of the state’s prohibition against incompetent practice. Nearly all states permit architects to do engineering “incidental” to the practice of architecture without also being registered as an engineer. The reasoning of the boards that fault architects for preparing engineering drawings usually is that engineering designs are not incidental to the architecture.” PRACTICING BEYOND COMPETENCY A few state boards pay close attention to architects who seal plans for substantial buildings that include drawings for structural.” The Missouri Supreme Court also discusses this difference in Appendix E. The relatively few disciplinary cases initiated by state boards that raise issues of competency usually involve substantial defects in design following serious building failures. but who are not themselves registered engineers and do not employ registered engineers to design these systems. is reprinted in Appendix D. electrical and mechanical systems. Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors revoked the licenses of the two structural engineers found to be at fault. there is little evidence that boards have any interest in policing occasional acts of “ordinary negligence. however.

misconduct and fraudulent misrepresentation.” Rather. From The Construction Lawyer. many people noticed the design change and questioned the engineers before the calamity occurred. We each also have degrees in civil engineering with structural engineering majors. Banick Much has been discussed and written about the 442-page administrative law judge’s decision recommending [to the Missouri Board for Architects.. In fact. A third-floor walkway of the Kansas City Hyatt Regency. Texas A&M University. shop drawings should be stamped to the effect that they have been reviewed and approved solely for general consistency with the overall architectural design. Rubin and Lisa A. The decision has been viewed differently by the various people who have read and commented upon it. volume 6. 4 (August 1988). some have accepted the decision as warranted. taken from a second floor opening. Photo by Lee L. Texas A&M University. the essential Hyatt Regency error seems tragically obvious. Lowery. scapegoats of a system they did not create. attorneys advise architects never merely to stamp shop drawings “approved.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT can find out what the Missouri Supreme Court believed was the appropriate disciplinary standard to apply to these two professionals. Rubin is a partner at Postner & Rubin in New York. still hanging after the collapse. Avignone & Banick in Bozeman. 18 . others have regarded the engineers as hapless victims.. Jr.) Referring back to the Citicorp Center article in Appendix C. Jr. Attorney Lisa A. What if the architect had not only noticed the design change but had ordered reinstatement of the original onerod design instead of marking the shop drawings for the revised design “approved”? Should the Hyatt Regency architect be disciplined for “approving” the shop drawings? What do you think the architect meant by stamping the shop drawings “approved”? (As Appendix D notes. Montana. After reading Appendices D and E. consider the view presented in Item 4. Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors] suspension or revocation of the Kansas City Hyatt engineers’ professional engineering licenses on the grounds of gross negligence. Some have deemed it a travesty. Photo by Lee L. ITEM 4 The Hyatt Regency Decision: One View by Robert A. what if the engineering student who first raised the issue of a possible defective design in certain wind conditions hadn’t called LeMessieur and stimulated his thinking and there had been a “sixteen-year wind” causing Citicorp Center to collapse? The loss of life Walkway section of the Kansas City Hyatt Regency. Lowery. Reprinted by permission. no. In retrospect. His job was not to measure the relative responsibility of the engineers in Attorney Robert A. We view the decision from the perspective of lawyers whose practice is principally devoted to construction litigation. The administrative law judge was invested with authority solely to determine facts and to recommend whether the engineers in question should be sanctioned. Banick is a partner at Garrity.

specifically brought the change to Duncan’s attention. license revocation was more than warranted. Duncan personally looked at the shop drawing but did not “review” the box beam connection. There is always the possibility of injustice when one is singled out for punishment. 2. oddly enough Hyatt proves that the system really does 19 . It is paradoxical that while tragedies such as the Hyatt failure provide an incentive to change practices. Our conclusions are as follows: 1. The Judge found that the rods and the box beam hanger rod connections for each of the three walkways did not meet the design specifications of the Kansas City Building Code. the Hyatt failure is a poor example on which to base recommendations for change because essentially no change in practices would likely have averted the Hyatt tragedy. 3. Based on the facts found by the administrative law judge regarding the events that led up to the Hyatt collapse. Examination of the facts discloses an ironic twist. The cause of the walkway collapse was the failure of the fourth floor box beam hanger rod connections. No original design calculations were found for the box beam that failed. in reviewing the shop drawings. With all the alleged deficiencies in present practices. 6. They were callously indifferent to life and safety after questions relating to the particular connection that failed were repeatedly brought to their attention. 2. This was not a damage suit where everyone was sued for negligence. 3. The engineers’ conduct cannot be justified under any standard of professional practice. They were not hapless victims of the system in any sense. which had the effect of doubling the load on the connection that ultimately failed. The engineers were aware of the change that had been made to the design of the connection. A partial structural collapse in the same atrium where the walkways were located occurred before occupancy. The engineers were paid an additional fee to review the entire structural design in the atrium. He assured them that it was. The engineer’s own technician. Perhaps other professionals should have been singled out also. The Judge’s findings can be summarized as follows: 1. The detailer and the architect specifically brought the change to [the engineer] Duncan’s attention and asked if it was structurally safe. 4. His job was only to measure the conduct of these engineers against the standard of their professional responsibility. 5. They assured the owner they had done so. including the box beam connections that ultimately failed.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT relation to the others involved in the project such as the contractor and the steel fabricator.

The design and change in design of the connection that failed did not “fall through the cracks. it is inappropriate and counterproductive to blame the system. but that begs the question. It becomes a way of life. however. than anything else we can do. It instills public confidence—it removes from practice those who may cause loss of life. 4. Their failure to do so is inexcusable by any standard. The right people asked the Hyatt engineers the right questions before the collapse occurred. This is human. They deserve the strongest professional sanctions that can be imposed upon them. it is as essential. Most important. We then take more shortcuts. it is necessary. It is more effective than any other reforms we can initiate. no tragedy ensues. It is healthy. Specific questions were asked on three and possibly five occasions that should have led the engineers to catch their error. Complacency creeps into a professional’s approach to practice as the newness.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT work. But at the same time. particularly the fabricator. or others who also ought to have caught the error. We must therefore acknowledge that. We become indifferent. as painful as it is for us to participate in the process (and despite the real hardships it imposes on the few who get caught). agonizing. (Similarly. “There but for the grace of God. excitement and other early rewards of the profession fade. a human failure to which each professional is subject. It is a good opportunity for reevaluation and remediation. We take shortcuts and get away with it.. in the case of lawyers.” is an appropriate response to the Hyatt failure and the engineers’ license revocation. It is an effective weapon against the complacency to which we all may become subject. or although our errors go undetected. more than anything else. Appropriate responses to the Hyatt failure are two-fold: 1. strict punishment of drunk drivers and speeders is a more effective means of reducing highway fatalities than air bags and other safety devices). 2. if not more essential. 5. Some succumb. Hyatt collapse should be used as impetus to modify structural engineering practices in order to avert other potential tragedies—even though it is recognized their implementation might not have averted the Hyatt collapse. we stop worrying. the administrative law judge. some do not.. These engineers were given sufficient opportunity to discover the problem. The shock of an occasional failure brings us to our senses and forces us to reevaluate our conduct. is its prophylactic effect on the profession. in the case of engineers. Our errors are picked up by others. 20 . most of us are just plain lucky in that we do not get caught. We must recognize the need to police our professions (law and engineers alike) and to continually punish professional misconduct. How can their conduct be explained? An understanding of their conduct is perhaps the most important lesson that can be drawn from the Hyatt collapse because it represents. Others beside the engineers can surely be faulted. Complacency is a human failure. and serious economic or personal loss.” It did not go unnoticed.

causing the Citicorp Center to collapse before the repairs LeMessieur initiated were complete. how much weight would you give to his forthrightness in blowing the whistle on himself despite his inability to cure the problem before the hurricane hit? According to the article. Architects. The Massachusetts State Building Code. If an architect selected a code characterization that led to a loss of life and you were a member of the registration board sitting on the disciplinary proceeding. but the hurricane that in reality turned out to sea had instead hit New York City. If. it is reported that the engineers characterized the chevron braces as trusses. What would you do if you were a member of the registration board considering a complaint against LeMessieur after such a collapse? Suppose everything happened as described in the New Yorker article. Undoubtedly. the architect is required to blow the whistle on his or her client. many times the 142 dead and 200 injured in the Hyatt Regency failure. not columns. For instance.1 even though no harm has occurred? If not. thereby exempting their joints from the high strength requirements stipulated in an American Institute of Steel Construction specification for joints in structural columns. The Brown Architects scenario in Item 5 suggests that a blind eye cannot be turned to a questionable code variance obtained by an owner. in the Citicorp Center article in Appendix C. The codes. would have been detected as well. An architect must not knowingly design code violations. building code variances may be obtained. Most states follow similar procedures. would you now initiate a complaint against LeMessieur under a rule like Rule 1. If you were a member of the New York registration board.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT would have been many.2 and Rule 3. These rules show great deference to the building codes. What considerations should properly go into the architect’s characterization of such conditions for code purposes? Surely it’s something more than making the cheapest defensible choice.3. for example. too. often with startlingly different safety and cost effects. If LeMessieur were before you on a complaint alleging incompetence under these hypothetical circumstances. the architect’s client orders a construction change that violates a building code and the change is likely to adversely affect public safety. why not? CODE INTERPRETATIONS Please review again Rule 1. allows an appeal board to “vary the application of any provision of the [Code] in any particular case. the building officials should have caught the mistake when the plans were filed? Also. The cost-saving substitution of bolts for welding made by his staff. having just read the New Yorker article. for example.. frequently face choices in characterizing design conditions for codes. even if he or she made the wrong choice. what would you want to know? How is a code official’s testimony that the architect’s choice was “wrong” weighed against testimony by another architect that competent architects practicing in the community could make the same choice? Would make the same choice? Had made the same choice? And what weight should be given to the architect’s response that. are notoriously opaque and different designs are subject to different code characterizations.[if the board finds] that the decision to grant a variance shall not conflict with the general objectives set forth in the [enabling act or Code]. 21 .. of course. he and his professional liability insurer settled with Citicorp. LeMessieur’s failure to account properly for the wind design would then have been uncovered. which compounded the problem.

S. I’ll take care of getting a code variance. In addition. The board states that Brown knew or should have known that design of wooden cladding on a seven-story residential building was incompetent. Two weeks later. thereby dismissing an alternative option that adds a margin of safety but takes longer or costs more. But how should an architect make the calls when safety is implicated in the choice. NOT LIKE A MANAGER Safety choices made by an architect are often made in a context where the architect. The owner then tells Brown. Brown says that the building code doesn’t allow for a combustible wooden exterior on a building of that class and height. No engineer or architect would knowingly make a decision that leads directly to death or injury. but only ambiguously? In a thoughtful article entitled “Thinking Like an Engineer: The Place of a Code of Ethics in the Practice of a Profession.” which is excerpted in Appendix F. he draws the plans as directed and sends them to the owner. By this he means that an engineer should single-mindedly follow the engineering code of ethics and always make para- 22 . and by extension architects. the U. There are no obvious checks and balances under these conditions. The owner tells Brown to change the exterior cladding from precast panel to wooden clapboard.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT ITEM 5 Scenario: Brown Architects Brown Architects is hired to design a seven-story residential condominium. After the job starts. ? You are a member of the board that hears this case. everyone on the team may be enticed by a clever decision that ostensibly saves time or money for all parties. Three weeks later. Brown is surprised but keeps it to himself and says nothing. If you do. what is the disciplinary measure that you favor and why? THINK LIKE AN ENGINEER. the new acting building inspector declares that the purported code variance is of no effect and issues a stop work order. he asks the contractor what was going on and was told that the owner had gotten a code variance. Professor Michael Davis of the Center for the Study of Ethics at the Illinois Institute of Technology in Chicago proposes that engineers. Attorney announces that the owner of the condominium project and the local building inspector had both been indicted for bribery in procuring and issuing the code variance. For example. That same day a complaint arrives from the architectural registration board charging Brown with failing to use due care in design and aiding and abetting a building code violation. it becomes clear that the condominium cannot be built within the budget. unsafe and also in violation of the building code. when Brown visits the job and sees clapboards being installed. many safety calls are inherently ambiguous. the architect’s firm and the architect’s client all have similar stakes in the outcome. Do you vote to discipline the architect? Why or why not.” As the architect has not been paid in three months. should “think like an engineer” instead of a manager. “Just make the changes on a set of plans.

but with so much money at stake. the vice president for engineering at the company which designed and built the shuttle. Work goes smoothly. They appear to be in excellent condition. one of her best technical hands. He is being offered top dollar for the property. with a staff of 15. Dan feels it is important to dismantle three units for a closer look. feared that the O-rings sealing the shuttle segments together might fail in the unseasonably cold Florida temperature at launch time. he selects the first unit for review. When such considerations are allowed to affect a decision. However. 1997. but needs her help with some last-minute details.” Sarah assigns the survey work to Dan. Green and Sarah agree on a fee. the Space Shuttle Challenger exploded. They sign an agreement which contains Stanley Green’s usual clause that “all information discovered by the architect shall be kept in confidence and may not be disclosed to third parties without Green’s prior written consent. With a 23 . the success of the firm or the success of the client should not enter into an engineer’s or architect’s decision when safety is an issue. has carried out a number of renovations to major historic commercial buildings in the city’s financial district. ITEM 6 From “The Granite Block. She has worked hard over the last ten years to build her firm. lifts out the sash. mount the safety of the public. and who had to approve the launch. a developer client responsible for some of her largest commissions. With good reason. killing all seven of its crew. a schedule for work. The building’s windows—more than 200 of them—are more challenging to investigate. Sarah has been asked by Stanley Green. With permission for an invasive procedure from Green. In order to fine-tune the selling price. The carpet and ceiling tiles are in good shape. to undertake a building survey. a handsome office building he has owned in the downtown area for many years. the buyer has asked for a professional inventory of certain building elements: the windows. as the scenario in Item 6 suggests. and the carpeting. and procedures. Davis believes that “managerial thinking” probably led to the disastrous launch of the Space Shuttle Challenger in January 1986. Not every designer is in the clear-cut role of final decision-maker as was this vice president who changed his mind. argues Davis. Sometimes the designer plays a critical part.” Reprinted by permission from Boston Architectural Center. and the effort has paid off. allowing the Challenger launch to proceed with tragic effect. the professional is thinking like a manager. the suspended acoustical-tile ceiling. Considerations of his or her own success. Scenario: A Young Architect’s Dilemma Sarah Andrews is the sole owner of a successful architectural practice in downtown Boston. but his or her role as decision-maker is ambiguous.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Seventy-three seconds into flight. Andrews Architects. and removes the 18-inch-wide jamb and weight shaft from one side. the client—the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s Space Center—was anxious to avoid any further delays in its shuttle program and pressured the company to approve the launch. He is in the final stages of negotiating to sell The Granite Block.

The cladding. carpet and tiles. you aren’t naive. As soon as she arrives in her office. it’ll turn up in one of his periodic checks and he’ll fix it. I appreciate your worry. he ends the meeting. is more balanced on the building than attached to it. however. These kinds of problems create inordinately expensive repairs. If you feel you need it. he concludes. you did a really thorough job. Neither party needs new information at this point. “Thanks for telling me about the cladding. Stanley. Sarah relates the events and her confusion about what to do. I need this sale. “Look. She hangs up the receiver and stares at the door. I’d be happy to give you a confidential letter confirming that you fully informed me about the condition of the cladding. Maybe he already knows about it. an early example of stone-cladding on steel-frame construction. but this deal is too far along. Sarah carries the report to her meeting with Mr. Looking down from the window. A quick investigation of the two remaining windows confirms his fears. A solid steel strap for anchoring the window is clearly visible.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT flashlight. “As always. Dan sticks his head in. Dan hands in his written reports dealing only with the windows. The buyer has had access to the building. Dan sees something disturbing. the costs sometimes approaching the value of the building itself. “what about the cladding issue? That’s far more important than the finish and windows. beyond the call of duty. As Sarah walks back to the office.” “Fine. Green. The next day. Sarah. has a three-inch granite veneer attached to the building by clip angles welded to its steel frame. Stanley. Sarah. although in truth she doesn’t know what to say.. Your report on those subjects only will be passed on to the buyer. asking how the meeting went. She gives him the good news. A bad storm. he sees the immediate threat that falling cladding would pose to those on the bustling sidewalks below. The clip angles visible in the cavity appear rusted. Hang in there one more day and we’ll make better use of your thoroughness in the future. He could have uncovered the cladding problem on his own. recollections of the meeting and Stanley’s curt dismissal bother her.” she says.” Stanley sounds a bit put-upon. If not. Deeper in the cavity. Reaching in to see how rusted they are. You understand that this building represents much of my net worth. he peers into the wall cavity to see how the windows are attached. he fears. and it’s leveraged to the hilt. He has heard stories of similar buildings where improper sealants allowed water to attack cladding connections. Luckily for both of us you were only asked to investigate windows and finishes.” she replies softly. he is startled as a piece of the angle comes off in his hand. He reports orally his concern about the cladding. 24 .” And with that. The building.and the bad. could create a life-threatening situation. Tomorrow afternoon is the drop-dead meeting for completing the deal..” he says. she closes the door behind her and calls her client.

“it’s a pretty serious situation on that building. without supporting either side. In Appendix E.” In language that makes some design professionals shudder.” ? What should Sarah do? ACCOUNTABILITY One hopes that all participants in the design of a building. It’s your call. “There are very big stakes here for you. Duncan. the Court continued: “The affixing of his seal on the plans makes him responsible for the entire engineering project and all documents connected therewith unless he specifically disclaims responsibility for some documents relating to or intended to be used for any part of the engineering project. But the buck legally must stop someplace. Anderson in Appendix A ran afoul of the South Carolina registration laws for signing plans enabling Howell to engage in unlicensed architectural practice. Pull away from the situation firmly but quietly.” he says. you can eliminate your obligations in the situation and live to do more good work for other clients. According to the Missouri Court: “The thrust of these [registration] requirements is professional accountability by a specific individual certified engineer. both guilty of gross negligence. and the engineer in overall charge. Gillum. That’s what I’d do. The project engineer had immediate charge of the job but had not sealed the original engineering plans. They require that plans for construction of structures in this state which require engineering expertise be prepared by or under the direct supervision of a specified certified engineer and that that engineer bear personal and professional responsibility for those plans. but I’d sleep better with the sidewalks around that building closed to the public.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT “I don’t know. No one wants an architect who is a loose cannon. Are you really sure of the facts? You’d never get another job in the city if you stopped this deal. and the developer. The engineer in overall charge had sealed the original plans but apparently knew nothing of the change from a single-rod support system to a two-rod system. Sarah seeks advice from her husband. The Missouri Supreme Court in Appendix E also emphasized the Hyatt Regency engineers’ responsibility under Missouri’s licensing scheme. Virtually all states place responsibility and liability for design errors on the architect who signs or seals the drawings. are competent.” he says. Don’t we have to tell the new owner—or at least the Boston Building Department?” That evening. from the draftspersons to the principal-in-charge. the Missouri Supreme Court found the project engineer. By withdrawing your report and accepting no payment. the engineers had originally designed a single-rod support system but the steel fabricator subsequently changed this to a two-rod system in the shop drawings. “Going public would seriously threaten his deal and your business relationship as well. These requirements establish the public policy of the state for the protection of the public. According to the Court. responsibility for the design of the connections could not be passed off by either of these 25 .” “Withdraw your report entirely and accept no payment at all. Mr. Maybe Dan’s analysis wasn’t right.” Remember that in the Hyatt Regency example.

2 prohibits “plan-stamping. The other side of the coin is the insistence in Rule 5. Aesthetic. Theoretically. it is improbable that an architect with the choice of either devoting his talent. ITEM 7 Report Respecting the Signing and Sealing of Technical Documents … The first [reason NCARB opposes plan-stamping] derives from the design process itself.2. economic and technological considerations impact the design of each element in a building. dated February 1992. would choose the latter course. when the architect raised a question. Even if the architect is willing to bear the legal responsibility that runs with placing his or her seal on the plans. deal with an imperfect world that constrains those choices and compels compromise. understand the intricate parts and the constraints. An architect furnishes professional services to solve a client’s needs. minutely dissect them.2 that the architect sealing the plans must pay attention to the details and choices being made throughout the design process by either directly preparing the plans or being in “responsible charge” of their preparation. the architect does not sell a product. which addresses two of the reasons for having a rule of conduct such as 5. The engineer who sealed the plans was held to be responsible for the failings of the project engineer because he had sealed the original plans. safety and welfare. that care is seldom taken: first. but the architect who performs in accordance with professional standards makes certain that the final result meets at least minimum standards of health. time and energy to a design of his own creation. The project engineer ignored the change to a two-rod support system and. There is never a single right answer to a client’s design requirements. it is improbable that a client would pay for a process which is no doubt more expensive than engaging an architect to perform the conventional design services and second. Thus. like the rest of mankind. NCARB issued the Report Respecting the Signing and Sealing of Technical Documents. The way materials respond to each other. review all of the calculations involved and put the intricate parts back together with such care that the public could rely on the final product to the same extent as it could if the architect had prepared the technical submissions himself or herself from the beginning. In reality. Architects. 26 . A registered architect takes all of these considerations into account and weighs them against the safety of the final product. In the real world. Excerpts from this report are contained in Item 7.” In 1992. the tolerance of a particular design in predictable climatic and other conditions and the ways in which users of the building will react to the space are all considerations that the public expects its registered architects to include in the choices the architect makes in composing a total design. however. the public is less well- From NCARB’s Report Respecting the Signing and Sealing of Technical Documents. Fixing responsibility for plans on the sealer of those plans is one side of the coin of accountability. and the design of each element influences the design of all other elements. and review and weigh all the choices.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT engineers to the steel fabricator who actually made the change. or dissecting. Rule 5. gave assurances although he had performed no safety tests or calculations. recalculating and reassembling the work of another. the architect may review the work of another and reach a general conclusion that the design works but does not attempt to recreate the process. an architect could take technical submissions prepared by another.

A regulation to protect the public should always be based on a reasonable evaluation of the probable consequences in the absence of such regulation. 27 .PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT served by the architect who merely reviews the work of another. to carry out the public trust. in fact typically give the work only perfunctory review. the plan-stamper has arrogated himself the authority to determine the qualification of the out-of-state practitioner to meet the local standards for registration. In short. Some may argue that a different policy should be developed when the original work was prepared by a person registered in another jurisdiction but without registration in the jurisdiction in which the building will be built. They set standards of education. training and examination that an applicant for registration must meet. Regulation deals with probabilities not with unique exceptions. has never assumed a public trust. That power is delegated to the state registration board. Each state has the sovereign power to decide who may practice architecture within its borders. The foregoing discussion assumes that the original work was prepared by an unlicensed person and submitted to the plan-stamper in order to file the technical submissions with the building inspector or another public agency requiring an architect’s seal on the technical submissions. Architects who are unable to obtain their own commissions are the architects who are willing to seal the work of others. After all. isn’t the public adequately protected? NCARB believes that the argument in favor of the “second seal” does not survive careful analysis. and take responsibility for it. typically appointed by the state’s governor. If a local architect is willing to review the out-of-state architect’s work. Thus. The argument that a local architect may review and seal the work of a registrant from another state substitutes for the state registration board the judgment of a registered architect who holds no public office. It does not weaken the propositions set out above to observe that there may have been a case in which a plan-stamping architect took all the necessary steps to protect the public safety before sealing the technical submission. composed of persons. its experience confirms that plan-stampers are most often in marginal practices. seal it. that person simply was not an architect registered in the state having jurisdiction over the project. as a pragmatic judgment. The second reason NCARB opposes plan-stamping has already been alluded to: what kind of architect prefers plan-stamping the work of another to creating his own design? No one who has observed the practice of architecture in the United States would challenge the conclusion that the plan-stampers are marginal practitioners. NCARB’s Professional Conduct Committee has had many plan-stamping disciplinary cases before it over the years. NCARB has concluded that plan-stamping does not afford the public the protection it needs. the original work was prepared by an architect. that they are paid such nominal sums for their services as to preclude any detailed inquiry into the work they are asked to seal and that they. and who need not answer to the other members of a board or the state authorities who oversee the board.

that every qualified architect may be admitted to practice in all U.” Prior to 1996. NCARB had rewritten these rules so that the requirement of “direct supervision” became the requirement of “responsible control. as plan-stamping usually is. Excerpts from the decision of the Court upholding the Massachusetts Board’s action are reproduced in Appendix G. Note that Wyoming’s suspension was upheld even though the Settlement Agreement and Order between Butts and the Kentucky Board states that “[Butts]. therefore the NCARB Certificate is the key to reciprocal registration in every United States jurisdiction.2. The key words in the definition of responsible control are control over and 28 .) has virtually eliminated distinctions among the standards of each state. By 1997. When the matter is regarded as serious. engaging a local planstamper cannot be justified as a means of practice for an out-of-state architect. Butts. NCARB had recommended in its Rules of Conduct that an architect not directly preparing plans be allowed to sign only plans prepared under the architect’s “direct supervision. jurisdictions. This was done to accommodate the increasing use of technology that now allows drafting to be conducted any place in the world with the electronic results appearing on a computer monitor or printer as though they were done in the adjoining office cubicle. And it is precisely because the Certificate is available to every architect who meets the uniform standards. the degree requirement.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT It may be argued that the marked trend toward uniform registration standards (viz. The rule now provides that architects exercising responsible control over unregistered preparers not regularly employed in the architect’s office must maintain records for at least five years demonstrating the nature and extent of the architect’s control over and detailed knowledge of the plans throughout their preparation.S.” which now appears in Rule 5. Thus. of course. disciplinary action taken by one state can be the basis. … RESPONSIBLE CONTROL OVER PLAN PREPARATION State laws prohibiting plan-stamping are frequently attacked by the plan stamper. but even its remarkable success in this effort has not entirely eliminated distinctions from state to state. etc. worked hard to persuade its member boards to adopt similar standards. One such case involved a Massachusetts architect who challenged his suspension and probation by the Massachusetts Board of Registration of Architects up to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. in and of itself. but these laws have almost always been upheld. This change in NCARB rules removed the requirement that only unregistered employees could prepare plans under the architect’s oversight. a national exam. the activity of preparing plans by unregistered persons under such direct supervision was permitted only to employees of the architect. Such a situation is exemplified by two disciplinary decisions. for the purposes of this settlement agreement and order. The second is the Wyoming Supreme Court’s opinion upholding the Wyoming State Board of Architects and Landscape Architects’ suspension of Butts’ registration in Wyoming based solely on his registration suspension in Kentucky.” Moreover. neither admits nor denies the truthfulness of the allegations. NCARB has. for disciplinary action by another state. excerpts of which are reprinted in Appendix H: The first is the Kentucky State Board of Examiners and Registration of Architects Settlement Agreement and Order with Kenneth L.

detailed knowledge of the content of technical submissions during their preparation. These concepts were elaborated in a series of examples and commentary included in NCARB’s “Report of the Electronic Technology Task Force” to the 1997 NCARB Annual Meeting. A portion of that report is reproduced in Appendix I. This same Task Force considered the question of how so-called prototype building designs—standard designs intended to be replicated on multiple sites, such as for fast-food chains—should be handled for registration law purposes. Its conclusions are printed in Item 8. ITEM 8
From NCARB’s “Report of the Electronic Technology Task Force,” 1997.

Prototype Building Design
The [Electronic Technology] Task Force throughout its deliberations faced a dilemma. On the one hand, many of its members believed that responsible practitioners can incorporate prototype building designs into plans for which they take responsibility without any diminution to the public’s health, safety and welfare if they carefully review and adapt the prototype designs to local conditions. These members think that prototype users are entitled to express their requirements in the form of detailed plans and to compel these requirements to be redrawn may be wasteful and unnecessary. On the other hand, all members believe that “plan stamping,” or afterthe-fact review even with corrections of a non-registrant’s plans by an architect who then affixes his or her seal, presents serious dangers. The seriousness of the latter so outweighed the value of permitting the former that the Task Force is unwilling at this time to make any recommendation that might open the door to plan stamping. To resolve this dilemma, the Task Force considered two related approaches that a few jurisdictions have taken.1 First, it considered the feasibility of allowing an architect to seal prototype plans so long as the preparer of the prototype plans was known to be an architect registered in some jurisdiction if the plans had been appropriately reviewed and adapted by the sealing architect. (NCARB now recommends in its Model Law that an architect be permitted to seal plans prepared by another architect licensed in the same jurisdiction if the plans have been appropriately reviewed and adapted.) The Task Force noted that although NCARB provides a ready means for prompt reciprocity registration, some states impose additional local requirements for registration. The burdens of having the prototype architect register in all jurisdictions where the prototype is to be constructed were thought sufficiently great as not to warrant such a requirement. Disciplinary jurisdiction will exist over the local sealing architect sufficient to uphold the purposes of the registration laws. However, following this approach requires reaching a satisfactory definition of “prototype” buildings, and the Task Force did not have the time to develop such a definition. While a few states have drafted exceptions for prototype plans, none of the definitions are satisfactory. In fact, none attempt to define prototype plans at all other than by using words like “prototype design,” “standard design” or “model design” without elaboration. Because the circumstances of prototype designs are so varied, the Task Force was left with similar vague definitions like “a building design substantially similar to designs used previously in multiple locations,” which could well mean similar building designs used two or three times before. The Task Force was unwilling to rest a major depar-



ture from the long-standing principle that the sealing architect must control the design throughout the design process on such a weak foundation.
1 North Carolina, for example, provides as follows: “Standard design documents prepared by architects who are registered in this state or in their state of origin may be sealed by a succeeding licensed architect registered in North Carolina provided: (1) the seal of the original architect appears on the documents to authenticate authorship; (2) the words “standard design document” be placed on each sheet of the documents by the original architect; (3) the succeeding North Carolina architect clearly identifies all modifications to the standard design documents; (4) the succeeding North Carolina architect assumes responsibility for the adequacy of the design for the specific application in North Carolina and for the design conforming with applicable building codes; and (5) the succeeding North Carolina architect affixes his seal to the standard design documents and a statement substantially as follows: ‘These documents have been properly examined by the undersigned. I have determined that they comply with existing local North Carolina codes, and I assume responsibility for the adequacy of the design for the specific application in North Carolina.’” N.C. Admin. Code, Title 21.0206(b)(1996).

Clients are rarely disinterested observers of how their architects meet the requirement to exercise “responsible control” over the preparation of plans. Often they are active advocates of doing whatever it takes to get a set of plans sealed and to the building department. Consider the two scenarios in Item 9 and Item 10. ITEM 9

Scenario: Jefferson
Jefferson and her firm were hired to design a St. Louis tennis club with eight indoor courts, a fitness center, locker rooms, and a clubhouse bar and restaurant. The relationship was rocky from the start. The client, Jarvis, complained that the design was too complex and costly to build. Jefferson complained that Jarvis had a complicated program and on top of that kept changing his mind. Architectural fees mounted and payments slowed to a trickle. Jefferson told Jarvis that she would not seal the working drawings so that the building permit could be obtained until she was paid in full for her work to date. Jarvis hit the roof, saying Jefferson knew she had him over the barrel because his loan commitment was expiring. Jarvis then went to McCarthy, an old friend from the army who had just moved back to the area and was re-establishing his architectural practice. By working for 48 straight hours McCarthy and his draftsmen were able to redraw the plans and make what later proved to be 99 changes, including moving 15 doors. McCarthy said that eight of these changes corrected code violations. They were able to do this by scanning Jefferson’s drawings into McCarthy’s new state-of-the-art CAD system. The building inspector complemented McCarthy and Jarvis on the excellent plans, the loan closed the next day and Jarvis told Jefferson he would pay her “when Hell freezes over.” She filed a complaint with the Missouri Architectural Registration Board against McCarthy for “plan-stamping.”


What should the Board do?

In considering this scenario, would it matter what the Jefferson-Jarvis architectural agreement said about plan ownership? AIA B141-1997 says that


drawings, specifications and other documents, including those in electronic form, are owned by the architect who prepared them and that the owner is granted a nonexclusive license to use them for the particular project so long as the owner meets all of the owner’s obligations. These obligations include prompt payment of all sums due the architect. What if Jefferson was in breach of her agreement with Jarvis when she refused to seal the plans? What if Jarvis was in breach for failing to pay her? Would it matter if McCarthy could show that Jefferson was spending most of her time on a hotel project while a young associate of hers just out of architecture school was essentially designing and running the tennis club project? What if McCarthy had missed the “code violations” when he re-drew the plans? What if the Board didn’t believe these were “code violations” at all but just one person’s way of applying the code?


Scenario: Livingston
After a vigorous design competition in which Livingston was chosen over two more experienced competitors who had previously designed other Montana prisons, Livingston was engaged by the State of Montana to design a new prison. As the project moved on to the design development phase, the Associate Prisons Commissioner and Livingston grappled with the layout of cells, the design of cell block doors and the vertical “tiering” of cell blocks. The Associate Commissioner finally said to Livingston, “Blackstone’s recent jails in Missoula and Butte seem to be the standard we should follow because they work so well. “Let’s go with how those jails handle these issues,” and he gave Livingston two rolls of plans for the two prisons. Livingston duly reported the conversation to the project architect, who in turn told a 25-year-old draftsperson to incorporate the Missoula and Butte cell layouts, door and tiering designs. The draftsperson traced the one bunk and two bunk cell layout and door details directly from Blackstone’s plans. The tiering design was also taken from Blackstone’s plans but the hallways were made one foot wider. Blackstone’s plans had the windows at a height which did not meet the Federal Bureau of Prison standards followed by Montana but that placement error was caught in construction of both the Missoula and Butte prisons although not in the draftsperson’s tracings. Blackstone saw Livingston’s plans for the new prisons when they were put out for bid and filed a complaint with the Montana Board of Architectural Registration.


Assuming you are Livingston, what is your defense? Assuming you are a member of the Montana Board, how do you vote on whether or not Livingston violated the law? Would it matter if the state of


1997. She says that an architect and owner have just called on a conference call to ask if the architect can complete the last 10 percent of plans.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Montana did not follow AIA B141-1997’s position on plan ownership (noted in Item 9) but instead had inserted the following clause in both Blackstone’s and Livingston’s design contracts: “All right. But. title and interest in all designs. we could dispense entirely with registration and simply improve the quality of building permit review. No one advocates such a regime. building departments rely more than ever before on the skill and integrity of architects and engineers. drawings and plans prepared for the State of Montana shall immediately become the sole and absolute property of the State of Montana to use on this or any other project as it sees fit”? After you have decided the Jefferson and Livingston cases. In fact. honesty is defined by specific actions. unless the designer has detailed knowledge of the content of the plans during their preparation. Within the Rules of Conduct. the board administrator calls you. and on another architect who violates the Rules 32 . What should she tell the architect and owner? Start over? Just finish them? Trace the plans? Something else? DETAILED KNOWLEDGE DURING PLAN PREPARATION Accountability is best achieved through rigorous enforcement of the laws stipulating who can seal plans and what oversight must be exercised before architects may seal plans they have not personally prepared. These choices range from the characterization of an assembly for code purposes.3). like the chevron braces on the Citicorp Center. because of local budget cuts. For example. It is a necessary handmaiden to competence. against the architect’s advice. he or she cannot possibly exercise wise professional judgment to make sound choices. which remain unfinished due to the untimely death of a solo practitioner whom the owner had previously hired. however. HONESTY It is a worthy goal for an architect to be thoroughly honest in all his or her endeavors. an architect must blow the whistle on a client who. inadequate professional training and increasingly complex designs. to “go forward/don’t go forward” decisions like the one the vice president of engineering had to make in approving the Challenger’s launch. The December 21. decides to violate a building code requirement that could adversely affect the public’s safety (Rule 3. Designers must exercise their professional judgment when making choices that bear on safety. Reviewing—even carefully reviewing—completed plans cannot substitute for a sustained focus on the details or for the sound exercise of professional judgment in making choices throughout the design process. The devil is in the details and cannot possibly be uncovered unless the designer has detailed knowledge of the content of the plans during their preparation. New York Times article reprinted in Appendix J describes this situation. If completed plan review alone were sufficient to ensure the public’s safety and welfare.

The plant visit will be from 9 to 12 Friday morning. and accurately represent his or her scope of responsibility for previously designed work (Rule 3. Five years later it. stay at the Hotel Del Coronado from Thursday night through Sunday night.4). without full disclosure.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT of Conduct (Rule 3. An architect must disclose all conflicts of interest that would influence professional judgment (Rules 2.1 and 2. Because not all bad conduct can or should be specified. Dodds.4). had had good results they didn’t press anyone.2).” A few contractors grumbled. act impartially when interpreting drawings and specifications (Rule 2. it doesn’t allow an architect to accept such compensation even if the facts are fully disclosed. R&R has made arrangements for you and your spouse. That case involved false certifications of requisitions and other matters to a lender. but since they.6).2 in being absolute.3 says categorically that an architect shall not accept compensation from suppliers for specifying their products.1 and 2. the rules also prohibit the knowing violation of any state or federal criminal law “in the conduct of the architect’s practice” (Rule 4.3). Sometimes the boundary lines are not all that clear.1) as well as any conduct involving “fraud or wanton disregard of the rights of others” (Rule 5. never make bribes to private clients (Rule 5. excerpted in Appendix K.1 and 2. It is different from Rules 2. The general conditions still had the boilerplate requirements about allowing equals.3) or public officials (Rule 4.2). and all the other R&R roofs used by contractors on your firm’s jobs. illustrates how architects can be drawn into a web of financial deceit. ITEM 11 Scenario: R&R Plant Visit Your firm was visited about five years ago by a new and very effective salesman for R&R Roofing. The Matter of James D. In fact your firm was so pleased with this roof that about three years ago it started specifying just this roof. accept compensation from more than one party on a project or have business or financial interests substantial enough to influence his or her judgment. as the scenario in Item 11 suggests. It is a reminder of the importance which others frequently place on the architect’s honest actions. enjoy golf on Coronado 33 . Today an invitation arrives in your mail inviting you to tour R&R’s San Diego facility this coming February. too. seem to be holding up well. Rule 2. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST Rules 2. never accept compensation from vendors for specifying or endorsing their products (Rule 2.2).2 say that an architect shall not. at their expense. to fly to San Diego on Thursday. You have recently been hired as the firm’s chief spec writer and learn all of this from colleagues. an up and coming manufacturer of a new kind of rubber roofing that was said to be very effective on flat roofs in cold climates. but special conditions added in the roof spec say “Any contractor wishing to substitute another roofing product for that specified shall provide the certifications of three engineers warranting that the substitute shall perform without defect or failure for at least 20 years. The firm’s president specified the roof as one of three “equals” on a small job and was surprised at its low cost and easy application.

The Agnew Saga One of the nation’s most highly publicized corruption cases was exposed on October 10. theater tickets and Red Sox tickets she had accepted from industry sources were illegal gratuities. I hope you go. § 201(c). U. 1973. Agnew admitted to one count of tax evasion in exchange for an agreement by federal prosecutors not to press 34 .S. BRIBES AND EXTORTION All state laws as well as federal law outlaw bribery. At the same time. when no one goes to the police in advance. 18 U.” ? What should you do? Would it make a difference if others from your firm had also been invited? Would it matter if this were a tour for all chief spec writers of the major architectural firms in the Midwest where your firm is located? Would it matter if the roof system had a checkered reputation instead of a good one? GRATUITIES. in a Baltimore federal courthouse. Attorney General Elliot Richardson filed one of the most extraordinary documents ever presented to the courts of the United States. Supreme Court in the 1999 case of United States v. Vice President Spiro T. and the laws of most states. as was the case described below involving Vice President Sprio T. “bribery” would be the criminal charge against the individual. also prohibit the giving of gratuities “for or because of ” an official act. Extortion is the flip side of bribery. Gratuities laws allow prosecutions to occur based on more limited evidence linking by circumstances a gift to a public official to some particular act by that public official. Sun-Diamond Growers of California. On that day. Agnew. A Massachusetts State Ethics Commission decision in Appendix L illustrates how broadly state gratuity laws have been interpreted: The Massachusetts Insurance Commissioner agreed that the meals. travel to Tijuana on Saturday and sail in San Diego harbor on Sunday. was interpreted in this way by the U.S. both bribery and extortion have been committed to various degrees. The courts have ruled that someone can be convicted for bribery if it can be demonstrated that the alleged giver or receiver of a bribe had the intent of influencing or of being influenced in performing an official governmental act. However.C.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Island on Friday afternoon. “extortion” would be the criminal charge against the official. The federal gratuity law. You mention the invitation to the firm’s president who tells you.S. Federal law. If an individual offers to pay a public official for giving the individual a contract or some other governmental benefit and the public official goes to the police before the payment is made. If a governmental official demands a payment in exchange for giving a contract and the individual from whom the payment was demanded goes to the police before the payment is made. “I’ve enjoyed that trip for the last three years.

He. and the longing to quickly seize opportunity and acquire wealth is a continuing source of downfall. District Court of Maryland. was disciplined by the Maryland Board of Architectural Registration. But that story is often only a myth. Agnew after he became Vice President. Green generated the necessary cash to make these payments through his company by various means that violated the Internal Revenue Code and that were designed to obscure the purpose for which the cash was used. ITEM 12 From court records filed October 10. corrupt government officials. Four years later he was elected Governor of Maryland and then was tapped to become Richard M. A prominent Baltimore architect was also caught up in the Agnew web. From time to time. it was his belief that such payments would probably be necessary and certainly helpful in obtaining substantial amounts of State Roads Commission work. notwithstanding his cooperation with the Department of Justice in its investigation of Agnew. their relationship was such that it was unnecessary for them to discuss openly the understanding under which these payments were given and received. Mr. According to Green. For architects pushing hard toward success. in the U. Agnew by Green either in the Vice President’s office in the 35 . a living testament to the American success story. when he obtained a modest appointment to the Baltimore County Zoning Board of Appeals. Agnew Green admitted that his principal purpose in making payments to Governor Agnew was to influence him to select Green’s company for as many state roads contracts as possible. the first Republican to hold that office in half a century. the understanding was a tactical one. in short. Green paid Governor Agnew approximately $11. He also delivered a resignation note to the Secretary of State. the Agnew story is instructive. Payments were made three or four times a year and were personally delivered to Mr. details the corruption case—which was never prosecuted—against a Vice President who had railed loudly and long against corrupting tendencies in America. The circumstances were that Green gave Governor Agnew cash payments in substantial amounts and asked for contracts.S. An excerpt of this court presentation. too. Exposition of the Evidence Against Mr. the combination of corrupt designers. Based upon his many years of experience. intermediaries and plenty of cash is unfortunately not unprecedented. he had become Chief Executive of the County. barely five years later. Nixon’s running mate for the second highest office in the land.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT more serious charges. Agnew did not hold political office of any kind until 1957. While the detailed extent of a modern Vice President’s involvement in public corruption may be unprecedented. reproduced in Item 12. based upon their respective positions and their mutual recognition of the realities of the system. He was. 1973. But.000 in each of the years he served as Governor of Maryland (1967 and 1968). Agnew never expressly stated to Green that there was any connection between the payments and the selection of the Green company for State contracts. Governor Agnew told him that contracts would be awarded to the Green company. Green continued to make cash payments to Mr.

instead of threatening to stop the project. After reading it. had just paid $10. largely on his helpful testimony. §789 dd-1 generally prohibits U. but still not blown the whistle on Zacharias? ITEM 13 ? 36 . Some architects practice internationally and the local customs and rules abroad are sometimes quite different from those in this country. Hilliard said. saying he would have no part of it. A U. The FBI learned of the payment from a disgruntled employee who had left the architectural firm.S. Zacharias said that. As Green recalls it.000 each. Zacharias. Zacharias told Brown that he. 15 U. Brown should make the second $10.000 to Hilliard. citizens and companies from making gifts to foreign government officials or political parties to influence actions.000 payment due the night of the vote. The U. or at his apartment in Sheraton Park Hotel in Washington. Brown refused. Foreign Corrupt Practice Act. What should the Board do about Zacharias? What about Brown? Should the Board view matters differently if. Zacharias was granted immunity from prosecution and.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Executive Office Building in Washington. consider what you would do as a member of an architectural registration board if the same facts were presented to you. Hilliard.S. As before. a county commissioner who had first demanded $30. these payments invariably amount to $2. Item 13 describes another corruption case. A. A fictitious scenario that involves international dealings can be found in Item 14. and Hilliard was charged with extortion.S. Its investigative staff charges both Zacharias and Brown with violations of the Board’s professional conduct rules.000. Scenario: Brown & Zacharias Brown and Zacharias were partners in a large Atlanta architectural firm. and Zacharias believed. Hilliard was convicted. and the two men were always alone when the payment was made. this time fictitious.C. that he. money was always in a plain envelope.000 but reduced his demand to $20. Green made his last payment during Christmas season in December of 1972. Zacharias then made the second payment himself. Hilliard’s extortion had consisted of threatening to have Zacharias’ young daughter kidnapped? What if Brown had resigned from the firm. The newspapers had a field day with the case and the Board learns of these facts. Hilliard cast the tie-breaking vote and the project went forward. was the tie-breaking vote between one commissioner who wanted to scrap a new courthouse project and another who favored it. since they were partners.S. architect can be criminally prosecuted in the United States for bribing a foreign official in a foreign country in connection with an architectural commission in that country.

for example. make payments to A. then C will. the Minister. reasonable entertainment and hospitality). In the course of the villa design. with the intent of influencing the judgment of an existing or prospective client in connection with a project in which the architect is interested. Turnbull gets his fee paid. using those quibbles as an excuse.” Private bribes generate many of the same concerns raised in public bribes. 37 . do you file a complaint with the California Board? If you were not involved but were on the California Board when a complaint was filed. The work is being done at Turnbull’s Los Angeles office. Turnbull. and part of that payment could be said to defray the cost of the architect’s gift to intermediary B. desperate because there is a fall-off in local work. The government has quibbled about some aspects of the working drawings and. Mawadi is confident that the Minister of Health will come around. Isn’t Intermediary B really stealing something of value from client C when he takes the architect’s $1. If Turnbull will design the beach villa without charge. visits Turnbull in Los Angeles. a member of the ruling family of Kuwait. when A. other than gifts of nominal value (including.000 gift in order to influence the client to hire the architect? If C ends up hiring architect A. Your firm in San Diego had actually done preliminary studies for Mawadi’s beach villa and you are angered to learn that you have lost the commission to Turnbull. what would you do and why? Does it matter to you whether the beach house was to be built in San Diego or Kuwait? ? Private Bribes Bribing public officials is clearly improper conduct. He says he has heard of the payment problem but believes his stepbrother. intend to share the beach villa. Sheik Mawadi. When you learn the details. At lunch.5 million to build. B and C are all in the private sector? Rule 5. of course. has held back on a payment of $1. the Minister of Health.3 million due Turnbull when working drawings were approved.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT ITEM 14 Scenario: Turnbull Turnbull has been engaged to design a general hospital for the Kingdom of Kuwait in Kuwait City. agrees. which incidentally will cost $3. it is clear that Mawadi and his stepbrother.000 cash gift to intermediary B in order to influence client C to retain A.3 prohibits private bribes as well: “An architect shall neither offer nor make any gift. What about architect A making a $1. will withdraw the Ministry’s objections if Mawadi asks the Minister to do so. Mawadi tells Turnbull that he wants a new villa at the beach similar to the one Turnbull designed for his cousin two years before.

at about the same time.” On his next annual registration renewal form to the New Hampshire 38 . A member of a state board would have little difficulty understanding the meaning of this rule when reviewing cases representing the extreme ends of the spectrum—for example. Soon realizing this was wrong.1 requires that an architect not knowingly violate criminal laws in the conduct of his or her architectural practice. where he re-established a practice with an old school chum. Rule 5. It forbids any conduct “involving fraud or wanton disregard of the rights of others. A sexual relationship ensued. Maxwell became infatuated with the 15-year-old daughter of next door neighbors. on the one hand. At her first visit to the counselor. Unable to have children.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Would we feel differently if the money went directly to client C by means of a $1. the girl learned that New Hampshire law would require the counselor to report Maxwell to the authorities if she told his name. But. He worked with a number of prominent architects and was generally accredited as a distinguished design architect himself.” Such a definition could encompass a variety of crimes.000 reduction in the architect’s fee? In that circumstance. however. they suffered a mid-life crisis. who is hurt? All of the other architects vying for the commission (who didn’t know that this particular architect was prepared to obtain the commission by. as the scenario in Item 15 suggests. giving back part of his fee) would claim to be injured parties. They decided that living in New York City was a strain they could alleviate and so moved to rural New Hampshire. Is such a “give-back” only another version of a consumer benefit produced by fee competition among architects? Free sketches Is it impermissible conduct for an architect to supply a free conceptual design to a client before he has been engaged as the architect? The registration board for the state of Oklahoma has construed Rule 5. there were various strains on the marriage. NCARB’s Professional Conduct Committee. ITEM 15 Scenario: Maxwell Maxwell practiced for a number of years in New York City following his graduation from the Harvard Graduate School of Design. in effect.” which New Hampshire law defined as “any sexual act with a person under the age of 16. She left in haste.4.3 to include giving free sketches to a prospective client in order to secure the work.3. both agreed it would be best to seek counseling separately. is not limited just to the architect’s practice. concluded that free work was not a violation of Rule 5. As he and his wife approached the end of their thirties. Maxwell then turned himself in so the girl could receive counseling. Maxwell broke off the relationship. He pleaded guilty to the felony of “sexual assault. conduct falling within the more murky middle ground may be harder to judge. WANTON DISREGARD Note that Rule 4. a reprehensible act of murder. and a more innocuous tendency to speed on the other.

led to remedial action before harm occurred. All professionals would do well to become good listeners. Again. By considering them. with the latter having a happy ending because of a belated focus and the highest sense of professional responsibility in blowing the whistle on oneself. It’s right to speak up when a client violates a law that will endanger public safety. They might catch unnoticed losses of focus before it is too late. so there must be more. the Hyatt Regency and Citicorp Center cases suggest the answer: careful listening. It’s wrong to sell your seal and stamp plans prepared by a contractor. As Item 4 notes.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Architectural Licensing Board. It’s wrong to give or take kickbacks. But how can a conscientious architect be assured that he or she is practicing competently? Recall that a focus on details was missing in both the Hyatt Regency and Citicorp Center cases. And so forth. but they paid no attention. But we all lose focus sometimes. as we have in this monograph. Most architects can fairly easily meet most of the Rules of Conduct by acting on a common sense understanding of right and wrong. so much the better. Contrast that with the Citicorp Center engineer who took a call from a unknown student who was questioning the engineer’s design in a paper he was writing for school. Maxwell truthfully answers “Yes” to the question: “Have you been convicted of a felony within the last 12 months?” What should the New Hampshire Board do? Does it matter that Maxwell’s crime had no connection with practicing architecture? What else would be “wanton disregard of the rights of others”? What serious crimes would not be “wanton disregard”? What divides serious from non-serious crimes? ? CONCLUSION The Rules of Conduct are. specific questions about the connections between the box beams and hanger rods were asked of the Hyatt Regency engineers. 39 . on at least three and perhaps as many as five occasions. If practitioners decide to conduct their businesses according to higher standards. the reader can more fully understand them. This set wheels turning for the engineer and. like criminal laws. standards for minimum acceptable conduct. It’s right to register in another state before starting a commission there. ultimately. Staying focused on the details is the best assurance an architect has that he or she will get it right—that the proper design decisions will be made. in the context of actual and hypothetical circumstances.

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Wyoming State Board of Architects . . . Howell . . . Disposition Agreement. . . . . . . . .77 Appendix G Catlin v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45 State ex rel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Board of Registration of Architects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . George L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49 Appendix C City Perils: The Fifty-Nine-Story Crisis . . . . . . . Lowe v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Howell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99 Appendix K Matter of James D. . . . . . . . . . . . . Howard G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Butts Settlement Agreement and Order. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .89 Appendix H In Re: License of Kenneth L. . . . . . . . . . . Louisiana State Board of Architectural Examiners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53 Appendix D The Worst Structural Disaster in the United States: Chapter 15 of Why Buildings Fall Down . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103 Appendix L Matter of Katherine Doughty. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .109 41 . . . . . . . .47 Appendix B Matter of Anthony M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43 Richard N. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Board of Architect Examiners of the State of Oregon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dodds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Before the Commonwealth of Kentucky State Board of Examiners and Registration of Architects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71 Appendix F Thinking Like an Engineer: The Place of a Code of Ethics in the Practice of a Profession . . . . .APPENDIX CONTENTS Appendix A State of South Carolina v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors . . . . . . . . . . Arata and Architects Pacifica. . . . . . . . .91 Butts v. . . . . State Board of Architectural Examiners . . . . . . . .65 Appendix E Duncan et al. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Missouri Board for Architects. Anderson v. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .95 Appendix J New York City Relies on the Construction lndustry to Police Itself. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . George L. . v. . . . . . . . Ltd. . . Commonwealth of Massachusetts State Ethics Commission . . . . . . .93 Appendix I Excerpt from NCARB’s Report of the Electronic Technology Task Force . . . .

42 .

.J. C. Payne notified the Board of the conclusion of his relationship with Howell on all future projects.APPENDIX A THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA IN THE SUPREME COURT State of South Carolina. . In early May 1982. . . At oral argument. Howell hired the architect to work for him. and checks with the logo “George L. . Howell & Associates. offering commercial architectural services. He hired Eric McClanahan. Howell d/b/a George L. Howell’s hiring of architects is analogous to a Notary Public employing a lawyer to sign 43 . . He is not. South Carolina. Respondent. counsel for Howell conceded that the relationship between Howell and each of the three architects was that of employer-employee. A permanent injunction was issued on November 24. . These three individuals were hired for the exclusive purpose of signing architectural plans completed and supervised by Howell so as to give them an appearance of legitimacy. . 1985 . each of them worked at some distance from Howell’s office. . 1985 REVERSED and REMANDED LITTLEJOHN. . Howell has continued to use letterhead. an elderly retired man from Greenville who was terminally ill. . . The validity of the permanent injunction was upheld by this Court in an earlier appeal . . nor has he ever been. Howell & Associates/Architectural Designers.” Howell attempted to legitimize his continuing patters of operation by employing three different architects. In October 1981. prohibiting him from practicing architecture.Filed March 6. licensed to practice architecture in South Carolina. . he secured the services of architect Harry Payne. Howell is a draftsman engaged in furnishing architectural designs and related services to the general public. . Appellant v. the Board of Architectural Examiners sought an injunction to prohibit Howell from practicing architecture. . ________________________ Heard February 6. None of them worked in Howell’s Myrtle Beach office. In February 1982. . d/b/a George L. George L. . or in any manner holding himself out as an architect to the general public. a licensed architect from Darlington. the South Carolina State Board of Architectural Examiners appeals an order which found no violations of two earlier injunctions issued by the Court of Common Pleas and found no contemptuous conduct by the respondent. It is inescapable that these three architects were mere puppets in the hands of Howell. . a licensed architect. . . . . . .: In this contempt action. . 1981. . . or using the tile of “architectural designer’ or other such title which would lead the public to believe that he was a duly registered architect. In 1979. business cards. Howell. We reverse the ruling of the trial court. Howell employed Richard Anderson. In each instance. George L. Since the date of the injunction. in June 1980. . Howell terminated McClanahan in June 1981. Howell & Associates. In fact.

Howell was in contempt of court. If the notary prepared the documents and the lawyer does nothing more than blindly endorse them and lacks any control over the drafting or use of the documents. In addition to using the “architectural designer” title. the notary would be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and clearly would be subject to appropriate sanctions. Howell continued to sign various documents in blanks provided for the architect and continued to perform duties appropriate for architects.APPENDIX A pleadings and thereby make them appear authentic. We hold that George L. 44 . The trial judge should have do held. tabulated bids. authorized change orders and payment orders. None of the architects were in fact in “responsible charge” of the projects they supposedly approved. etc. The case is remanded to the trial court not for the purpose of determining whether Howell was in civil contempt but for the purpose of imposing sanction. He consistently issued orders for the contractors to proceed. The trial judge has full authority to imprison him or fine him or both or close up his entire business operation if necessary to assure full compliance with the injunctive orders heretofore issued by the Court of Common Pleas. It is apparent that Howell will not respond to the mere dictates of the court.

1981. and written evidence of authority to serve as the responsible individual for Coastal Design Associates. the State filed a contempt action against him. because he had filed with the Board his name. Howell. Jr. as in effect in 1982. had been enjoined from practicing architecture. has brought this action. Inc. … Plaintiff contends that the Board erred in concluding that he knowingly violated R 11-12. Anderson. Plaintiff sealed twenty-six (26) sets of architectural plans for projects for which Coastal Design Associates.. have never been licensed to perform architectural services in South Carolina. Mr. on May 13. Howell & Associates. Howell continued his illegal practice. 1982. _____________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. Howell employed Plaintiff to seal the architectural plans of Howell’s firms. responsible architect and stockholder of their firm. Inc. Howell. The Board indefinitely suspended Plaintiff Anderson’s license to practice architecture but provided that the suspension could be terminated after five years if certain conditions are met. as held by the Supreme Court.. Inc. Coastal Design Associates. … Plaintiff admitted that he worked daily with George L. managing officer. Inc. d/b/a George L. 1982. vs State Board of Architectural Examiners. During the approximate three (3) years of employment by George L. … The Board issued its Order finding Plaintiff guilty of dishonest practice and unprofessional conduct by violating state registration laws. and continued to work for him until March 1985. and on February 26. ($30. … Plaintiff was employed by George L. d/b/a George L. Anderson. claimed that he was president. Howell. George L. provided: 45 . and Plaintiff was aware of that fact at the time of his employment. and yet he sealed plans for projects of those firms which. South Carolina Code of Laws (1976).. rules and regulations. Jr.APPENDIX A STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA ) ) IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF RICHLAND Richard N. Defendant. architectural registration certificate number. Howell & Associates... Howell. Plaintiff. d/b/a George L. Howell & Associates were not licensed to practice architecture in South Carolina.00) per year. Prior to Plaintiff’s employment. George L.000.. Howell & Associates and Coastal Design Associates.. Richard N. dated January 15. enabled George Howell and his firms to continue an illegal practice of architecture in violation of the injunctive order of November 24. Several months before the contempt hearing. had contracted to provide architectural services. Mr. 86-CP-40-0546 ORDER Plaintiff. … seeking judicial review of the Order of the State Board of Architectural Examiners. Howell. which govern the practice of architecture in South Carolina. 1986. Howell & Associates and Coastal Design Associates. … Despite the injunctive order. knew that Coastal Design Associates and George L. Inc. He was paid a weekly salary which totaled. R 11-12.

However. [of indefinite suspension] be. and hereby is. 1986. since he made the necessary application for a license in July 1982. This provision clearly requires an architectural license to practice as a firm. dated January 15. The Plaintiff was obviously aware of this requirement. affirmed. the corporation had already commenced its architectural practice prior to the application being made and continued its practice of architecture while the application was pending and after it had been denied by the Board. The Board was correct in concluding that Plaintiff had knowingly violated its registration laws and regulations. 46 . Failure to notify the Board of any changes affecting this above information shall be grounds for revocation of its right to practice architecture in this state. which required a license to engage in a corporation architectural practice. corporation or partnership.APPENDIX A Each firm. corporation or partnership engaged in the practice of Architecture shall register with the State Board of Architectural Examiners on or before the first day of January in each year and upon payment of the annual fee and the submission of the information required on Board application forms shall be issued a certificate or registration for the practice of Architecture in this state. … ORDERED that the Decision and Order of the State Board of Architectural Examiners.

3. Howell. 4. Lowe. Howell. Inc. 2. Secretary-Treasurer of the South Carolina State Board of Architectural Examiners. Relator.. employee.APPENDIX A STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Civil Action No. Howell & Associates. Respondent Howell entered into discussions on April 3. with a professional engineer to provide engineering services to Howell on future architectural projects.. Howell. IT IS ORDERED. George L. 1985. Permanently dissolves George L. In addition. Love vs. Howell & Associates and Coastal Design Associates. 1985. This Court notes that the initial action was commenced against the Respondent in 1979 and the Respondent has continued his practice of architecture since that date. Petitioner. 22253 (filed March 6. Opinion No. Permanently terminates employee Richard Anderson and any other architects or draftsmen in his employ. 1985. vs. As noted by the Supreme Court in its Order. ______________________________ ORDER This matter is before the Court on remand from the South Carolina Supreme Court for the purpose of imposing a sanction for contempt in accordance with the Court’s opinion in State ex rel. that the Respondent. including. 1985). Ex Rel: Howard G.. withdrawn and refiled March 26. George L. but not limited to. Agrees to have no further business relationship with Richard Anderson as their 47 . The State has established that even after the issuance of the Supreme Court’s Order on March 6.. d/b/a George L. Agrees never to accept employment in any architectural firm in any capacity. Howell did not respond to the mere dictates of the Court. draftsman or consultant. This strongly indicates to the Court that Howell intends to continue in his illegal practice in the future. 86-CP-26-33 COUNTY OF HORRY State of South Carolina. Howell has filed with local building inspectors two sets of plans to obtain building permits for the construction of two architectural projects. be confined in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections until such time as he purges himself of his contempt by performing the following acts: 1. Respondent.

given only after the State. had had notice and opportunity to be heard upon this matter.” or “Architectural Designer. consulting.. on commercial. 5. 7. and providing the following information: (a) Name of the persons with whom he has done business. and any other forms or documents bearing the title block “George L. through its attorneys.82) Dollars to compensate the State for the costs of this enforcement proceeding.423. as a draftsman or in any other capacity to engage in the practice of architecture. or any architectural project. Howell. Pays to the State of South Carolina attorney fees of Eleven Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-three and 75/100 ($11. __________________ PRESIDING JUDGE Conway. IT IS FURTEHR [sic] ORDERED. coordinating of consultants. Inc. 11. specifying. George L.. 1985.APPENDIX A employee.75) Dollars and costs Six Thousand Six Hundred Six and 82/100 ($6. Permanently terminates his business relationship with all professional engineers.where the professional engineer would provide him with engineering services on an architectural project.” “Coastal Design Associates. Howell & Associates. single-family house plans. inspecting. Anderson. including but not limited to designing. Howell shall not be released from jail except by order of this Court.. Howell. AND IT IS SO ORDERED. 48 . (b) A full description of the business transaction and place where the transaction took place.hereby are permanently and perpetually enjoined from designing. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED. all stationery. their address and telephone number.606. Delivers to the Attorney General’s Office for destruction. Ceases drawing or supervising the drawing of architectural plans. Agrees to make quarterly reports for the next five (5) years to the Court of Common Pleas for Horry County and the Attorney General. that Richard N. Delivers to the Attorney General’s Office for destruction. 8. in engaging in an architectural practice. or otherwise assisting the Respondent.. George L. George L. (c) Amount of gross income and sources for that income.” 9. 6. planning. Anderson is permanently and perpetually enjoined from employing the Respondent. that Richard N. South Carolina April. consultant or draftsman in an architectural practice. that he is not employed by an architectural firm. Ceases any involvement.. townhouse or condominium building projects. indicating that he is not practicing architecture. under oath. stamping and consulting for architectural projects. any AIA forms in his possession and agrees never again to use such forms. except for unattached. reviewing. blue print paper. or administering of contracts. 10. planning.

.. 5. that an Oregon registered architect’s stamp and signature must appear on all drawings and the title page of the specifications prior to the issuance of a building permit.... 3.. Inc. Arata fully understands the laws governing the practice of architecture in the State of Oregon. that such person is practicing architecture or is an architect... or tending to indicate.. LTD.APPENDIX B BEFORE THE BOARD OF ARCHITECT EXAMINERS OF THE STATE OF OREGON In the matter of Assessment of a Civil ) Penalty against ANTHONY M.. and asked to stamp Arata’s plans.. no person shall practice the profession of architecture or assume or use the title of architect.. 10. The California corporation. 1991 advising him that he was applying for an application for registration as an architect in Oregon... sign cards or device indicating. ARATA and ) FINAL ORDER ARCHITECTS PACIFICA... Arata wrote a letter to Norm Abplanalp of Montgomery Ward on October 14.... Architects Pacifica. 9. Arata filed an application for registration by reciprocity in Oregon on October 15.. Ltd.. Inc. Ltd...... 11. The Department advised Architects Pacifica. 8. does not qualify under ORS 671.. health and property and to eliminate unnecessary loss and waste in this state. and that he could not commence the project until registration was granted. 1991.. rewritten analysis. OPINION ORS 671.. The construction documents were submitted by Architects Pacifica. An Oregon registered architect from Medford. 2.. 4.... Arata’s law and rules analysis was found to be inadequate and his registration was delayed..041 to practice architecture in the State of Oregon. 6. or represent in any manner that such person is an architect. 1991.. The Council Record was received by this Board on October 14.. or any title. Arata is certified by the National Council of Architectural Registration Boards (NCARB) and had his NCARB Council Record (Blue Cover) forwarded to this Board. FINDINGS OF FACT 1.020 (1) states that “In order to safeguard life. 1991 to alert the Board that he had been contacted by Tom Bond of Architects Pacific. an act done at some time prior to his application for registration in Oregon and done prior to October 22... Arata was registered initially to practice architecture in the State of Michigan (1975) and subsequently in the State of California (1989)... Inc.. without first qualify- 49 ..... 1991... as a result of Board action on November 6.... The City of Medford Building Department did not issue a building permit on the construction documents... 7... 1991.. Oregon telephoned the Board office on November 20..... Arata prepared the construction documents for the Montgomery Ward Store proposed to be constructed in Medford.... while awaiting his submittal of an acceptable... Arata is Vice President of Architects Pacifica... to the City of Medford Building Department on October 22.. Oregon.. 1991.... Arata is not now and never has been licensed to practice architecture in the State of Oregon. ) ..

or assume the title of ‘architect. a deliberate attempt was made by either Arata or members of his firm. Even though Arata knew he was violating the law. began the practice of architecture in Oregon at some point well in advance of Arata filing for registration in this state. he or employees of Architects Pacifica. Ltd.020(3) states. LTD. in part. ORS 671. Not only had Arata prepared a written analysis of the statutes and rules governing the practice of architecture in Oregon. when Arata became aware that he was in violation of the law by practicing architecture in Oregon without the benefit of registration.APPENDIX B ing before the board and obtaining a certificate or registration as provided by ORS 671.220. Ltd. or both. ORS 671. It is clear that Arata and/or Architects Pacifica.010 to 671. the Board concludes that Arata and Architects Pacifica. to circumvent the law. Ltd. However. 1999. Ltd.” Further. designed and prepared the construction documents for the 50 . knowingly sought to cover their violation of the statutes.010 to 671.’ or use in connection with the business of such person any words. that such documents were prepared either by the architect or under the direct control and supervision of the architect and that the architect accepts responsibility for them.220.” As architectural project of the size and complexity of the Montgomery Ward Store would take considerably more than seven (7) days to plan and design and to prepare the construction documents.020 (2) states that “No person shall practice or attempt to practice the profession of architecture. letters or figures indicating the title ‘architect’ without first complying with ORS 671. Instead. that the stamp of an architect “shall constitute certification that the architect has exercised the requisite professional judgment about and made the decisions upon all matters embodied within those construction documents. Arata filed his application for registration by reciprocity with this Board on October 15. sought to have the unlawfully prepared plans given the imprimatur of a registered architect. Ltd. seven days prior to the plans being submitted to the City of Medford Building Department by Architects Pacifica. … CONCLUSION OF LAW ANTHONY M. The Board is unsure as to whether or not Arata may have violated the law involuntarily through the unsupervised actions of his employees responding to pressure from Montgomery Ward. ARATA and ARCHITECTS PACIFICA. The Board has no doubt that Arata was well aware he was violating the laws governing the practice of architecture in Oregon at the time the construction documents were prepared. Based on the record. he also wrote to a Montgomery Ward executive advising he could not commence the project until he was registered. learned they could not proceed with the project until construction documents which bore the stamp and signature of an Oregon registered architect were received by the City of Medford Building Department. he should immediately have stopped the project.020 (1) and (2) when they planned. they attempted to remedy the situation by contacting Oregon registered architects to obtain their professional stamp and signature on Arata’s documents. Violated ORS 671. When Arata and Architects Pacifica.

Oregon without first qualifying and becoming registered to practice architecture in Oregon.000 pursuant to ORS 671.220.APPENDIX B Montgomery Ward Store to be constructed in Medford. Ltd. ORDER NOW. shall forfeit and pay to the Board of Architects Examiners a penalty of $5. The full amount paid within ten (10) of this Order becoming final. THEREFORE. Arata and Architects Pacifica. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Anthony M. … 51 .

52 .

This daring scheme allowed the designers to canti-lever the building’s corners seventy-two feet out over the church. Hugh Stubbins and Bill LeMessurier (he pronounces his name “LeMeasure”) set their fifty-nine story tower on four massive. whose name has been lost in the swirl of subsequent events. LeMessurier asked his caller how he could help. taught a structural-engineer- 53 . received a phone call at his headquarters. a decaying Gothic structure built in 1905. ninestory-high stilts. the engineer. When LeMessurier called the student back. The young man. and positioned them at the center of each side. “But I said.. in Cambridge. Jr. had won his own share of praise for the tower’s technical elegance and singular grace. When planning for Citicorp Center began. Peter’s Church. then fifty-two. According to his professor. the site of choice was on the east side of Lexington Avenue between Fifty-third and Fifty-fourth Streets. And. LeMessurier had put them in the wrong place. the highest honor his profession bestows. But the northwest corner of that block was occupied by St. earlier that year he had been elected to the national Academy of Engineering. rather than at each corner. too.APPENDIX C CITY PERILS THE FIFTY-NINE-STORY CRISIS What’s an engineer’s worst nightmare? To realize that the supports he designed for a skyscraper like Citicorp Center are flawed—and hurricane season is approaching. and over a plaza on the southwest. Massachusetts. LeMessurier found the subject hard to resist. Excusing himself from the meeting. The columns also produced high visual drama: a nine-hundred-and-fourteen-foot monolith that seemed all but weightless as it hovered above the street. one of the nation’s leading structural engineers. ‘Listen. even though the call caught him in the middle of a meeting. I promised to call back after my meeting and explain the whole thing. on the northwest. I want you to tell your teacher that he doesn’t know what the hell he’s talking about. he had designed the twenty-five-thousand-ton steel skeleton beneath the tower’s sleek aluminum skin. the slash-topped silver skyscraper that had become. said that his professor had assigned him to write a paper on the Citicorp tower. the church was able to strike a deal that seemed heaven-sent: its old building would be demolished and a new one built as a freestanding part of Citicorp Center. he.” The problem had been posed by a church. in the early nineteen-seventies. LeMessurier. BY JOE MORGENSTERN On a warm June day in 1978.” LeMessurier recalls. because he doesn’t know the problem that had to be solved. “I was very nice to this young man. The student wondered about the columns—there are four—that held the building up. directly across the street from Citicorp’s headquarters. on its completion in Manhattan the year before. from an engineering student in New Jersey. William J. and one of the world’s biggest banking corporations wanted the whole block. indeed. Since St. To clear space for the new church. As a structural consultant to the architect Hugh Stubbins. Peter’s owned the corner. he related this with the pride of a master builder and the elaborate patience of a pedagogue. the seventh-tallest building in the world. in a field where architects usually get all the credit.

Even the failure of his associates to flag him on the design changes was justifiable. designers of tall buildings must know the wind and respect its power. by flowing across two sides of a building at once. LeMessurier had learned of a crucial change in the way the braces were joined. Under normal circumstances. I told myself I didn’t give a damn . The meeting had been called. This news gave LeMessurier no cause for concern in the days immediately following the meeting. which are labor-intensive and therefore expensive. because Bethlehem Steel came to us and said they didn’t think we needed to do it. in a burst of almost ecstatic invention. But the circumstances were not normal.”) LeMessurier had long since established the strength of those braces in perpendicular winds—the only calculation required by New York City’s building code. This was top-ofthe-line engineering. ‘Now you really have something on your professor. That was the position taken at the May meeting by a man from U. A few weeks before.’” Bethlehem. bolted joints are more practical and equally safe. and the plans called for wind braces similar to those used in Citicorp Center. it’d be seen by God. bolts were the right way to do the job. the project might be too expensive and his firm might not want to take it on. can be needlessly strong. In the end. LeMessurier’s New York office—actually a venture in conjunction with an old-line Manhattan firm called the Office of James Ruderman—had accepted Bethlehem’s proposal. Now. to architecture students at Harvard. in the spirit of intellectual play. But welded joints. (“I’m very vain. with the same specifications for welded joints. Those towers. a quartering wind increased the strain by forty percent. LeMessurier recalls. “I would have liked my stuff to be expressed on the outside of the building. “I spoke to Stanley Goldstein and said. “Oh. arrayed like giant chevrons behind the building’s curtain of aluminum and glass. in most cases.S. far from constituting a mistake. Then he explained how the peculiar geometry of the building.” LeMessurier says. In four of the eight chevrons in each tier.APPENDIX C ing class. For further enlightenment on the matter. didn’t you know? They were changed—they were never welded at all. too. an engineer named Stanley Goldstein. he referred the student to a technical article written by LeMessurier’s partner in New York. 1974. put the columns in the strongest position to resist what sailors call quartering winds—those which come from a diagonal and. His new calculations surprised him. If welded joints were a condition. LeMessurier put in a call to his office in New York. during the month of May. two structural members joined by a skilled welder become as strong as one. On August 1. LeMessurier decided that the information would interest his own students.the structure was there. increase the forces on both. but Stubbins wouldn’t have it. And the columns were only part of the tower’s defense against swaying in severe winds. “I gave him a lot of information.’” Later that day. A classroom lecture would also look at the tower’s unusual system of wind braces. the wind braces would have absorbed the extra load without so much as a tremor. which LeMessurier had first sketched out. were designed by Hugh Stubbins with LeMessurier as structural consultant. which built the Citicorp tower. on a napkin in a Greek restaurant in Cambridge: forty-eight braces. The choice of bolted joints was technically sound and professionally correct. during a meeting in his office. 54 . like sailors. had made the same objection—welds were stronger than necessary. ‘Tell me about your success with those welded joints in Citicorp. because you can explain all of this to him yourself. To reassure him.’ and Stanley said. a potential bidder on the contract to erect the Pittsburgh towers. to review plans for two new skyscrapers in Pittsburgh. and I said. in six tiers of eight. he wanted to see if they were just as strong in winds hitting from forty-five degrees. Steel.

Thus. on a restaurant napkin.” LeMessurier says. None of his associates identified this as a problem. is offset by the force of gravity. stands for “Special Engineering Review of Events Nobody Envisioned. Most important. immense leverage can result from higher wind forces. They had chosen to define the diagonal wind braces not as columns but as trusses. To understand why.” “consideration of wind from non-perpendicular directions on ordinary rectangular buildings is generally not discussed in the literature or in the classroom.” as he calls it now—one that threatened to make the situation much worse. however. Within this seemingly simple computation. the building would never have been finished. In the stiff angular language of “Project SERENE. of pounds. “By then. and from interviews with LeMessurier and other principals in the events. modern skyscrapers are so strong that catastrophic collapse is not considered a realistic prospect. the bolts holding the joints together were perilously few. the wind may blow harder. however. the first event that nobody envisioned had taken place when LeMessurier sketched. it tries to blow the building down. In the Citicorp tower. In the case of the Citicorp tower. or even negligence. Yet now. but the structure doesn’t get any heavier. “I didn’t go into a panic over it. The wind causes tension in the structural members—that is. a margin of safety is built into the standard formulas for calculating how strong a joint must be. tends to hold the building in place. one must look at the interplay of opposing forces in a windblown building. where his hunch was soon confirmed: his people had taken only perpendicular winds into account. What LeMessurier found in New York.” What emerges from this document. lurks a powerful multiplier. If the bracing system was unusually sensitive to quartering winds. as LeMessurier had just discovered.” LeMessurier says. the substitution of bolted joints raised a troubling question. the acronym. The question was whether the Manhattan team had considered such winds when it designed the bolts. a month after the May meeting. At the same time. when engineers seek to limit a building’s sway. these formulas are contained in an American Institute of Steel Construction specification that deals with joints in structural columns. he flew to New York.” He later detailed these mistakes in a thirty-page document called “Project SERENE”. some of that tension. The joints must be strong enough to resist the differential between these forces . which has been confidential until now. “I was getting pretty shaky.” 55 . Precisely because of that leverage. which. At any given level of the building. or even millions.” On July 24th. but a series of miscalculations that flowed from a specific mind-set. let alone understood that they were compounding it with their fuzzy semantics.the amount of wind tension minus the amount of compression. measured in thousands. the compression figure remains constant. “But I was haunted by a hunch that it was something I’d better look into. they do so for the tenant’s comfort. the forty-per-cent increase in tension produced by a quartering wind became a hundred-and-sixty-per-cent increase on the building’s bolts.APPENDIX C had every decision on the site in Manhattan waited for approval from Cambridge. both rueful and apt. so were the joints that held it together. by pressing the members together. And he discovered another “subtle conceptual error. a bracing system with an inherent sensitivity to quartering winds. was that the people on his team had disregarded the standard. As a result. which are exempt form the safety factor. is not malfeasance.

he drove to the northern shore of Sebago Lake. catastrophic failure of the whole structure would follow. not dispel it. His figures told him that such an event had a statistical probability of occurring as often as once every sixteen years—what meteorologists call a sixteen-year storm. This machine. was never meant to be a safety device. the twenty-five thousand tons of steel in its skeleton contrasted with the Empire State Building’s sixty-thousand-ton superstructure. he flew to London. At best. The tale told by the wind-tunnel experts was more alarming than LeMessurier had expected. “I told her. because the Citicorp tower was an unusually lightweight building.” he says. Before making a final judgment on how dangerous the bolted joints were. and they didn’t. Presenting his new calculations.” LeMessurier said. the Canadians teased out wind-tunnel forces for each structural member in the building. the machine might reduce the danger. and met with Davenport.” he added. which is what these guys could provide for me. he took New York City weather records provided by Alan Davenport and calculated the probability of a storm severe enough to tear that joint apart. The weakest joint. Davenport had run extensive tests on scale models of the structure. “Don’t go easy if it doesn’t come out the right way. “Dorothy knew what I was up to. but it could go higher in the real world. awesomely low.” Refining their data further.APPENDIX C LeMessurier tried to take comfort from another element of Citicorp’s advanced design: the building’s tuned mass damper. During the Citicorp tower’s design. Now LeMessurier asked him and his deputy to retrieve the relevant files and magnetic tapes.” On July 26th. “That was very low. was at the building’s thirtieth floor. Reducing sway was of special importance. he discovered. joint by joint and floor by floor. the first of its kind in a large building. the director of the Boundary Layer Wind Tunnel Laboratory.” he thought. His assumption of a forty-percent increase in stress from diagonal winds was theoretically correct. if that one gave way. LeMessurier turned to a Canadian engineer named Alan Davenport. “Oh. Yet the damper. First.” LeMessurier says—the word “failure” being a euphemism for Citicorp tower’s falling down—“we would think about it in terms of the best knowledge that the state of the art can produce. my God.” It didn’t. Next. “And you have to tell me the truth. the block’s inertia worked to damp the movement and calm tenants’ queasy stomachs. “now we’ve got that on top of an error from the bolts being underdesigned. at the University of Western Ontario. and then he called his wife. was essentially a four-hundred-and-ten-ton block of concrete. his voice hushed as if the horror of discovery were still fresh. it remained for LeMessurier to interpret the numbers’ meaning. LeMessurier asked the Canadians to evaluate them in the light of the original data. with and without the tuned mass damper in operation. ‘I think we’ve got a problem here. he went to Cambridge. took an outboard motorboat a quarter of a mile across the water to his house on a twelve-acre private island. built at his behest and perched where the bells would have been if the Citicorp tower had been a cathedral. and a world authority on the behavior of buildings in high winds. when storms lashed at the building and set it vibrating like a turning fork. “To put it another way. and worked through the wind-tunnel numbers. where he talked to a trusted associate. When the building swayed. at their summerhouse in Maine.’” On July 28th. Ontario. attached to huge springs and floating on a film of oil. “If we were going to think about such things as the possibility of failure. and I’m going to sit down and try to think about it. there was one chance in sixteen 56 .

Sapers advised him against telling Citicorp until he had consulted with his own company’s liability insurers. “I had power in my hands to effect extraordinary events that only I could initiate. 57 . “wanted to meet me to find out if I was nutty. That meant facing the pain of possible protracted litigation. LeMessurier considered his options. To avert disaster. I almost said. With money and materials.” Being lawyers. including that one. Silence was one of them. built at a cost of a hundred and seventy-five million dollars. LeMessurier confined himself to statistical probabilities—a storm that might occur once in sixteen years. thanks to Hugh Stubbins’ insistence on putting the chevrons inside the building’s skin rather than displaying them outside. if LeMessurier drove along the Maine Turnpike at a hundred miles an hour and steered into a bridge abutment. The bolted joints were readily accessible. It also meant shock and dismay for Citicorp’s officers and shareholders when they learned that the bank’s proud new corporate symbol. only Davenport knew the full implications of what he had found. But time was short. was threatened with collapse. When LeMessurier called Northbrook. like giant Band-Aids. LeMessurier liked to think he could solve most structural problems. which represented the Office of James Ruderman as well.” When the steadying influence of the tuned mass damper was factored in. he says. and he would not disclose them on this own. July 31st. ‘Thank you. or ninety-five?—he insisted that such figures were not significant in themselves. someone there referred him to the company’s attorneys in New York and warned him not to discuss the matter with anyone else. whose firm was upstairs in the same building. which might fail as soon as a major storm hit. Illinois. LeMessurier would have to blow the whistle quickly—on himself. the Northbrook Insurance Company.m.” LeMessurier recalls. Suicide was another. But keeping silent required betting other people’s lives against the odds. and outlined the emergency over lunch. this was the end of July. the probability dwindled to one in fifty-five—a fifty-five-year storm. because it was so unexpected—an almost giddy sense of power. an eighty-five-mile-per-hour wind that blew for sixteen minutes from the northwest might pose less of a threat to a particular building than an eighty-mile-per-hour wind that blew for fourteen minutes from the southwest. not engineers. dear Lord. When they asked how big a storm it would take to blow the building down. the joints could be reinforced by welding heavy steel plates over them. LeMessurier tried to reach Hugh Stubbins. What seized him an instant later was entirely convincing. and the height of the hurricane season was approaching.APPENDIX C in any year. and the Citicorp tower was no exception. At 9 a. But the machine required electric current. since every structure was uniquely sensitive to certain winds. and professional disgrace. Carl Sapers. I mean sixteen years to failure—that was very simple.’” At his office in Cambridge on the morning of Monday. They also bridled at his carefully qualified answers to seemingly simple questions. for making this problem so sharply defined that there’s no choice to make. probably bankruptcy. Then he called Stubbin’s lawyer. that would be that. very clear-cut. in New York. “I had information that nobody else in the world had. but Stubbins was in California and unavailable by phone. on Tuesday. they were hard put to reconcile his dispassionate tone with the apocalyptic thrust of his prophecy. in Northbrook. while suicide struck him as a coward’s way out and—although he was passionate about nineteenth-century classical music—unconvincingly melodramatic. As an experienced engineer. When they pressed him for specific wind velocities—would the wind have to be eighty miles per hour. On the island. or ninety. LeMessurier faced a battery of lawyers who.

needed to inform Citicorp as soon as possible. went to LeMessurier’s office at 515 Madison Avenue. from another lawyer. Robertson recalls making no such dire prediction. an engineer who had been a structural consultant for the World Trade Center. They then turned to me and said. I almost fainted. For the liability lawyers. “He winced. brisk and edgily funny.” Robertson says. William I. and floods. I have other things to do—I don’t attend meetings on that basis. I went to the meeting that morning.” The two structural engineers were peers. “But he’s a man of enormous resilience. so they sent for an expert adviser they trusted: Leslie Robertson. Stubbins and LeMessurier flew to New York. together with Stubbins. He believed that the building was safe for occupancy in all but the most violent weather.” LeMessurier says. ‘Look.’ A few minutes later. and he insisted that the damper’s reliability in a storm could be assured by installing emergency generators. I got another call. because. That evening. a man fascinated by how things fit together. LeMessurier took the shuttle to Boston. ‘Well?’ I said. Robertson was a stickler for technical detail. John S. Robertson noted dryly that the twin towers’ emergency generators “lasted for fifteen minutes. who said there’d been a problem with Citicorp Center.) LeMessurier didn’t think an evacuation would be necessary. As he remembers it.I. and everyone. hurricanes. the man who has now succeeded Wriston as chairman. but not friends. He had worked with such groups as the National Science Foundation and the National Research Council on teams that studied the aftermaths of earthquakes. Robertson conceded the importance of keeping the damper running—it had performed flawlessly since it became operational earlier that year—but.”) One point on which everyone agreed was that LeMessurier. its value as a safety device was unproved. and fortunately we had a lifelong relationship of trust. he worked with the F. I must admit—here was his masterpiece. Only Stubbins had ever dealt directly with Citicorp’s chairman.” (For his part. In addition to his engineering expertise.B. but failed to penetrate the layers of secretaries and assistants that insulated Citicorp’s chairman from the outside world. with a courtly rhetorical style.’ ‘Sorry. but Stubbins finally managed to get an appointment with Citicorp’s executive vice president. thanks to the tuned mass damper. but it unsettled LeMessurier from the start. “Robertson predicted to everybody present that within hours of the time Citicorp heard about this the whole building would be evacuated. August 2nd. on the World Trade Center bombing). put in a call to Wriston. Robertson brought to the table a background in disaster management. though he was also an energetic manager. was very concerned. of course. in his view. you have a very serious problem. Wriston. and he was flying home that same day from California and still didn’t know his building was flawed. “I got a phone call out of the blue from some lawyer summoning me to a meeting. I didn’t want that to happen. 58 . “‘What’s it about?’ ‘You’ll find out when you get there. was voluble and intense. Reed. LeMessurier. older by two years. Walter B. and I didn’t know anybody there but Bill. (In a conversation shortly after the World Trade Center bombing. (In 1993. but made no effort to hide his impatience with things that didn’t interest him. LeMessurier was a visionary with a fondness for heroic designs. Spencer. if this is in fact the case.APPENDIX C But the lawyers certainly understood that they had a crisis on their hands. They were no more successful in reaching the bank’s president. a very grown man. went to Stubbins’ house in Cambridge. and broke the news.” The next morning. he flatly refused to consider it as a mitigating factor. Robertson was tall. this special perspective enhanced his stature as a consultant. trim. He stood up and explained what he perceived were the difficulties with the building.

and work at night. Reed listened impassively as LeMessurier detailed the structural defect and how he thought it could be fixed. and LeMessurier expected none now.) LeMessurier outlined his plan to fix the wind braces by welding two-inch-thick steel plates over each of more than two hundred bolted joints. “Wriston was fantastic. The plan was tentatively approved. and told them to go back to their office and await further instructions. At the end of the meeting. sir. and he had been involved in the design and construction of Citicorp Center. in an older building on Lexington Avenue. the company had called him in when it was considering the tuned mass damper. a secretary from LeMessurier’s office called to say that John Reed would be in the office in ten minutes with Walter Wriston. They did so. He had an engineering background. You might have to take up the carpet.’ Wriston said. Henry DeFord III and Robert Dexter. assuring them that Reed and other top managers could be reached by phone at any hour of the day or night.’” But he didn’t have anything to write on. when Citicorp began its expansion into global banking. Citicorp’s general was on their side. Citicorp also assigned two vice-presidents. According to LeMessurier.APPENDIX C LeMessurier and Stubbins went to see Reed at the bank’s ornate executive offices. Robertson suggested Karl Koch Erecting. and a welder could work inside it without damaging the tenants’ space. but all this could be done. to manage the repairs. so I’ll have to start drafting a press release. August 3rd. LeMessurier began by saying. Thursday. across the street from Citicorp Center. LeMessurier’s officer arranged for emergency generators for the tower’s tuned mass damper. Wriston was one of the most influential bankers in the country. so someone handed him a yellow pad. and he offered his full support in getting it fixed. As they were finishing their meal. which lasted half an hour. the press release would not go out for six days. Wriston simply took notes. both had overseen the building’s construction and knew it well. what with Citicorp Center—and his own career—literally hanging in the balance. he was not known for effusiveness in the best of circumstances. Reed thanked the two men courteously. But the real message I conveyed to him was ‘I need your help—at once. though noncommittally. (The decision to hold the initial meeting near the structure’s weakest point was strictly coincidental. Robertson. Within hours of Wriston’s visit. The next morning. and four of LeMessurier’s associates met with DeFord and Dexter in a conference room on the thirtieth floor of Citicorp Center. That made him laugh.’” In fact. “He said. ‘are won by generals writing on yellow pads.” Reed was well equipped to understand the problem. In the late nineteen-seventies. LeMessurier says. The bank issued beepers to LeMessurier and his key engineers. LeMessurier offered an estimate of a million dollars. but after waiting for more than an hour they decided to go out to lunch. a New Jersey-based firm that had put up the World Trade Center.” LeMessurier says. 59 . take down the Sheetrock. pending actual examination of a typical joint. “I have a real problem for you. ‘I guess my job is to handle the public relations of this. Since Bethlehem Steel had dropped out of the business of fabricating and erecting skyscraper structures. But his laughter put the others at ease. LeMessurier. A tall man of piercing intelligence. But the bank’s chairman was genuinely proud of the building. “‘All wars. but putting it into effect depended on the availability of a contractor and on an adequate supply of steel plate. “I’d already conceived that you could build a little plywood house around each of the connections that were critical.’” When Reed asked how much the repairs would cost.

” Then Robertson raised an issue that LeMessurier had dreaded discussing. around-the-clock nurses—to keep its machine in perfect health.APPENDIX C Two more contracts were drawn up before the end of the following day.T. in turn. a grease gun. One of them went out to MTS Systems Corporation. which was the original contractor for Citicorp Center. because work could not go forward. I looked up at them a little apologetically. without consulting the city’s Department of Buildings. A different problem-solving approach was taken by Robertson during another nighttime meeting in Citicorp’s executive suite. the Minneapolis firm that had manufactured the tuned mass damper. Four days later. at 230 Park Avenue. but what the hell—fixing the door was a few hundred bucks. also recommended by Robertson. provided them to Koch Erecting. “so I kneeled down. Robertson told Citicorp’s representatives. were unpredictable events. And it would widen again. That night. in a letter of agreement. During the first week of August. Citicorp faced a public-relations debacle unless it came up with a plausible explanation of why its brand-new skyscraper needed fixing. and the phone company refused to budge on its leisurely installation schedule. But the circle widened on Monday. met with Mike Reilly. ripped the door off one of the machines. Robertson. From that 60 .” Robertson says. like a patient in intensive care. discussions had involved only a small circle of company officials and engineers. “They laid out the dilemma. which included three buckets. and these guys had a hundred-and-seventy-five-million-dollar building in trouble across the street. and “1 Radio with weather band. “From time to time. the veteran project manager of HRH Construction. following Robertson’s advice. and it was clearly an ominous event. eight blocks away. as Robertson reminded the officials. we’ve had small tornadoes in this area. But this required new telephone lines. and hired two independent weather forecasters to provide wind predictions four times a day. DeFord and Dexter. and there was a worry that a much bigger one would come down and take hold. which give you hours and days to anticipate. and we made our copies. MTS asked Citicorp to provide a long list of materials and spare parts. Wriston picked up the phone on his desk and called his friend Charles Brown. Wriston wanted copies of some documents that Robertson had shown him. In a meeting on Friday that included LeMessurier. the American Red Cross’s director of disaster services for the New York metropolitan area. cleaning solvent. “I’m an engineer.&T. and electrical impulses from them would be funneled to an improvised communications center in Robertson’s office. but all the secretaries had gone home—the only people on the floor were Wriston. DeFord and Dexter. to fit the building with a number of instruments. August 7th. The company flew one of its technicians to New York that night. on Long Island.” Robertson says. The gauges would be affixed to individual structural members. called strain gauges—pieces of tape with zigzag wires running through them.” Reilly recalls. The new lines went in the next morning. MTS was asked to provide full-time technical support—in effect. when final drawings for the steel plates went out to Arthur Nusbaum. the tower would have every shiver and twitch monitored.” Robertson also assembled an advisory group of weather experts from academia and the government’s Brookhaven National Laboratory. rags. that they needed to plan for evacuating Citicorp Center and a large area around it in the event of a high-wind alert. When Robertson voiced his frustration about this during a late-night meeting in Walter Wriston’s office. and John Reed—and every copying machine was locked. and Nusbaum.” The other contract engaged a California firm. the president and chief operating officer of A. “What worried us more than hurricanes.

first meeting, which was attended by Robertson but not by LeMessurier, and from half a dozen subsequent working sessions with other disaster agencies, came plans for joint action by the police and the mayor’s Office of Emergency Management, along with the Red Cross. In the event of a wind alert, the police and the mayor’s emergency forces would evacuate the building and the surrounding neighborhood, and the Red Cross would mobilize between twelve hundred and two thousand workers to provide food and temporary shelter. “Hal DeFord was the bank’s point man for all this,” Reilly says. “The anxiety was so heavy on him that we wondered if he was going to make it.” On Tuesday morning, August 8th, the public-affairs department of Citibank, Citicorp’s chief subsidiary, put out the long-delayed press release. In language as bland as a loan officer’s wardrobe, the three-paragraph document said unnamed “engineers who designed the building” had recommended that “certain of the connections in Citicorp Center’s wind bracing system be strengthened through additional welding.” The engineers, the press released added, “have assured us that there is no danger.” When DeFord expanded on the handout in interviews, he portrayed the bank as a corporate citizen of exemplary caution—“We wear both belts and suspenders here,” he told a reporter for the News—that had decided on the welds as soon as it learned of new data based on dynamicwind tests conducted at the University of Western Ontario. There was some truth in all this. During LeMessurier’s recent trip to Canada, one of Alan Davenport’s assistants had mentioned to him that probable wind velocities might be slightly higher, on a statistical basis, than predicted in 1973, during the original tests for Citicorp Center. At the time, LeMessurier viewed this piece of information as one more nail in the coffin of his career, but later, recognizing it as a blessing in disguise, he passed it on to Citicorp as the possible basis of a cover story for the press and for tenants in the building. On Tuesday afternoon, at a meeting in Robertson’s office, LeMessurier told the whole truth to New York City’s Acting Building Commissioner and nine other senior city officials. For more than an hour, he spoke about the effect of diagonal winds on the Citicorp tower, about the failure of his own office to perceive and communicate the danger, and about the intended repairs. In the discussion that followed, the city officials asked a few technical questions, and Arthur Nusbaum expressed concern over a shortage of certified welders who had passed the city’s structural-welding test. That would not be a problem, the representatives from the Department of Buildings replied; one of the area’s most trusted steel inspectors, Neil Moreton, would have the power to test and immediately certify any welder that Citicorp’s repair project required. Nusbaum recalls, “Once they said that, I knew we were O.K., because there were steamfitter welders all over the place who could do a fantastic job. Before the city officials left, they commended LeMessurier for his courage and candor, and expressed a desire to be kept informed as the repair work progressed. Given the urgency of the situation, that was all they could reasonably do. “It wasn’t a case of ‘We caught you, you skunk,’” Nusbaum says. “It started with a guy who stood up and said, ‘I got a problem, I made the problem, let’s fix the problem.’ If you’re gonna kill a guy like LeMessurier, why should anybody ever talk?” Meanwhile, Robertson’s switchboard was besieged by calls. “Every reporter in town wanted to know how come all these people were in our office,” Robertson says. Once the meeting ended, the Building Commissioner returned the reporters’ calls and, hewing to Citicorp’s line, reassured them that the structural work was only a prudent response to new meteorological data.


As a result, press coverage in New York City the next day was as uninformative as the handout: a short piece in the Wall Street Journal, which raised no questions about the nature of the new data, and one in the News, which dutifully quoted DeFord’s remark about belts and suspenders. But when LeMessurier went back to his hotel room, at about 5 P.M. on Wednesday, he learned from his wife, who had come down from Cambridge to join him, that a reporter from the Times had been trying to reach him all afternoon. That worried him greatly; being candid with city officials was one thing, but being interrogated by the Times was another. Before returning the call, LeMessurier phoned his friend Carl Sapers, the Boston attorney who represented Hugh Stubbins, and mixed himself a martini. Sapers understood the need for secrecy, but he saw no real choice; talk to them, he said, and do the best you can. Two minutes after six o’clock, LeMessurier called the Times switchboard. As he braced himself for an unpleasant conversation, he heard a recording. The Times, along with all the major papers in the city, had just been shut down by a strike. Welders started work almost immediately, their torches a dazzlement in the night sky. The weather was sticky, as it had been since the beginning of the month—New Jersey’s tomato crop was rotting from too much rain—and forecasts called for temperatures in the mid-eighties the next day, with no wind; in other words, a perfect day for Citicorp Center. Yet tropical storms were already churning the Caribbean. Citicorp pushed for repair work around the clock, but Nusbaum refused to allow welding during office hours, for fear that clouds of acrid smoke would cause panic among the tenants and set off every smoke detector in the building. Instead, he brought in drywall crews and carpenters to work from 5 P.M. to 8 P.M., putting up plywood enclosures around the chevrons and tearing down Sheetrock; welders to weld from 8. P.M. until 4 A.M., with the building’s firealarm system shut off; and then laborers to clean up the epic mess before the first secretaries arrived. The welders worked seven days a week. Sometimes they worked on unoccupied floors; sometimes they invaded lavish offices. But decor, or the lack of it, had no bearing on their priorities, which were set by LeMessurier. “It was a tense time for the whole month,” he says. “I was constantly calculating which joint to fix next, which level of the building was more critical, and I developed charts and graphs of all the consequences: if you fix this, then the rarity of the storm that will cause any trouble lengthens to that.” At Robertson’s office, a steady stream of data poured in from the weather forecasters and from the building itself. Occasionally, the strain-gauge-readings jumped, like spikes on an electrocardiogram, when the technicians from MTS Systems exercised their tuned mass damper to make sure it was working properly. One time, the readings went off the chart, then stopped. This provoked more bafflement than fear, since it seemed unlikely that a hurricane raging on Lexington and Fifty-third Street would go otherwise unnoticed at Forty-sixth and Park. The cause proved to be straightforward enough: When the instrumentation experts from California installed their strain gauges, they had neglected to hire union electricians. “Someone heard about it,” LeMessurier says, “went up there in the middle of the night, and snipped all the wires.” For most of August, the weather smiled on Citicorp, or at least held its breath, and the welders made steady progress. LeMessurier felt confident enough to fly off with his wife for a weekend in Maine. As their return flight was coming in for a landing at LaGuardia Airport Sunday night, they looked out across the east River and saw a pillar of fire on the Manhattan skyline. “The welders were working up and down the building, fixing


the joints,” LeMessurier recalls. “It was an absolutely marvelous thing to see. I said to Dorothy, ‘Isn’t this wonderful? Nobody knows what’s going on, but we know and we can see it right there in the sky.’” A great deal of work remained. Robertson was insisting on a complete re-evaluation of the Citicorp tower: not just the sensitivity of the chevrons to quartering winds but the strength of other skeletal members, the adequacy of braces that kept the supporting columns in plumb, and the rigidity of the building’s corrugated metal-and-concrete floors, which Robertson feared might be compromised by trenches carrying electrical connections. His insistence was proper—settling for less would have compromised Robertson’s own position. It amounted to a post-construction autopsy by teams of forensic engineers. For LeMessurier, the re-evaluation was harrowing in the extreme; every new doubt about his design for Citicorp Center reflected on him. In one instance, Robertson’s fears were unwarranted: tests showed that the tower floors were entirely sound—the trenches were not a source of weakness. In another, Robertson, assuming the worst about construction tolerances, decided that the columns might be slightly, even though undetectably, out of plumb, and therefore he ordered the installation of supplemental bracing above the fourteenth floor. Shortly before dawn on Friday, September 1st, weather services carried the news that everyone had been dreading—a major storm, Hurricane Ella, was off Cape Hatteras and heading for New York. At 6:30 A.M., an emergency-planning group convened at the command center in Robertson’s office. “Nobody said, ‘We’re probably going to press the panic button,’” LeMessurier recalls. “Nobody dared say that. But everybody was sweating blood.” As the storm bore down on the city, the bank’s representatives, DeFord and Dexter, asked LeMessurier for a report on the status of repairs. He told them that the most critical joints had already been fixed and that the building, with its tuned mass damper operating, could now withstand a two-hundred year storm. It didn’t have to, however. A few hours later, Hurricane Ella veered from its northwesterly course and began moving out to sea. LeMessurier spent the following night in Manhattan, having cancelled plans to spend the Labor Day weekend with his family in Maine. But the hurricane kept moving eastward, and daybreak dispelled any lingering thoughts of evacuation. “Saturday was the most beautiful day that the world’s ever seen,” LeMessurier says, “with all the humidity drawn away and the skies sunny and crystal clear.” Alone in the city, he gave himself a treat he’d been thinking about for years—his first visit to the Cloisters, where he basked in an ineffable calm. The weather watch ended on September 13th. That same day, Robertson recommended terminating the evacuation plans, too. Welding was completed in October, several weeks before most of the city’s newspapers resumed publication. No further stories on the subject appeared in the wake of the strike. The building, in fact, was now strong enough to withstand a seven-hundred-year storm even without the damper, which made it one of the safest structures ever built—and rebuilt—by the hand of man. Throughout the summer, Citicorp’s top management team had concentrated on facilitating repairs, while keeping the lawyers on the sidelines. That changed on September 13th, when Citicorp served notice on LeMessurier and Hugh Stubbins, whose firm held the


“In return for getting a license and being regarded with respect. is by turns painful. It produced heroes. “I have a lot of admiration for Bill. he says. Citicorp turned the building into a condominium.” LeMessurier reminds his students. self-deprecating. The crisis at Citicorp Center was noteworthy in another respect. ‘Well. the Northbrook Insurance Company. including management fees. and DeFord and Dexter. but selling all the office space. “But they didn’t do it with much conviction. at a handsome profit. on one side. on the other. and self-dramatizing—an engineer who did the right thing. from Walter Wriston and his Citicorp management team to the officials at the city’s Department of Buildings. The most striking example. “You have a social obligation. everyone connected with the repairs behaved in exemplary fashion. While we say that all engineers would behave as he did. to Japanese buyers.” After a second meeting. But it also speaks to the larger question of how professional people should behave.APPENDIX C primary contract. A much higher total was suggested by Arthur Nusbaum. we’ve been deeply wounded here. of course. retaining the land and the shops.” LeMessurier says. because he was very forthcoming. spent eight million dollars on structural repairs alone. When Robertson speaks of him. had agreed to pay. amounted to $4. When the terms of settlement were first discussed—without lawyers—by LeMessurier. Whatever the actual cost. Eight years ago.3 million. Their estimate of the costs. “DeFord and Dexter said. The tale. who recalled that his firm. LeMessurier spoke of two million dollars. the bank agreed to hold Stubbins’ firm harmless and to accept the twomillion dollar payment from LeMessurier and his joint-venture partners. And the most wonderful part of my story is that when I did it nothing bad happened. Citicorp’s effort to recoup it was remarkable free of the punitive impulse that often poisons such negotiations.” 64 . LeMessurier has been talking about the summer of 1978 to his classes at Harvard.’ and they tried to play hardball. but no villains. I carry in my mind some skepticism about that.” In the last few years. no litigation ever ensued. HRH Construction. Citicorp has declined to provide its own figure. of its intention to seek indemnification for all costs. you’re supposed to be self-sacrificing and look beyond the interests of yourself and your client to society as a whole. which included a Northbrook lawyer. who emerged with his reputation not merely unscathed but enhanced. according to LeMessurier. was set by LeMessurier. which was the amount that his liability insurer. as he tells it.


stopping the dancers in mid-step. (30 m). in a billowing cloud of dust. There was a large roar as the concrete decks of the steel-framed walkways cracked and crashed down. a World War II navy pilot who was in a wheel chair on the second-floor 66 . pipes broken by the falling walkways sent jets of water spraying the atrium floor. July 17.and fourth-floor walkways. (15 m) above the floor.” containing all the service areas . Tom Stoppard. The tower was connected to the function block by three pedestrian bridges. and the tea and dinner dances in its grandiose atrium were soon attended by elegant crowds. on Friday. most of them dancing to the music of a well-known band for a tea dance competition. Restaurant service was available at a bar set under the two stacked walkways on the west side of the atrium. but the last victim to be reached alive. dining rooms. Looking up toward the source of the sound. At 7:05 P. 15. bought it from the developers.APPENDIX D Chapter 15 THE WORST STRUCTURAL DISASTER IN THE UNITED STATES The bad end unhappily. the good unluckily. and his management company started one of the most ambitious and popular programs to be found in an American deluxe hotel.M. of Hallmark greeting cards fame. and at the south end a four-story reinforced concrete “function block.meeting rooms. (34 x 44 m) atrium with a steel and glass roof 50 ft. People were screaming. the two began to fall together. the atrium was filled with more than sixteen hundred people. kitchens. Rosenkranz and Guildenstern are Dead In July 1980 the plushiest and most modern hotel in Kansas City. Kansas City’s “first citizen. food in the many restaurants exquisite.2). the west glass wall adjacent to the walkways shattered. a 117 by 145 ft. The fourth-floor walkway dropped from the hangers holding it to the roof structure.1). It was a nightmare the survivors would never forget. The Hyatt Regency complex consists of three connected buildings: a slim reinforced concrete-tower on the north end. As the two walkways began to fall. (Fig. The following day the press mentioned 44 dead and 82 injured. Service in the 750 rooms and suites was refined and fast. they saw two groups of people on the second. at the second and fourth-floor levels near the west side of the atrium and one at the third-floor level near the east side of the atrium (Fig. the observers were seen holding on to the railings with terrified expressions on their faces. Missouri. observing the festivities and stomping in rhythm with the music. sending shards flying over 100 ft. etc. the Hyatt Regency. 1981. The main purpose of the walkways was to permit people to pass between the tower and the function block without crossing the often crowded atrium. on the crowd gathered around the bar below the second-floor walkway. hung from the steel trusses of the atrium roof: two. 15. when suddenly a frightening. housing the guests’ bedrooms and suites. sharp sound like a thunderbolt was heard. was ready for occupancy after two years of design and two more years of construction. leaving the hangers dangling like impotent stalactites. or walkways.” Donald Hall. one above the other. Since the second-floor walkway hung from the fourthfloor walkway.

Intermediate supports of the walkways at each end of the 30 ft. to the foundations of the three components of the complex. from the rotating restaurant at the top of the tower to the spiral canti-levered stairs connecting the upper three floors of the function block with the atrium floor. The four 30 ft. two well-known and highly respected engineers. 274). (9 m) long spans on each side. (9 m) beams were connected by steel angles bolted to the upper flanges at the beams’ ends. (9 m) beams consisted of transverse box beams. The final count reported 114 dead and over 200 injured. As is its custom. the bureau did not assign blame to any party but made it clear the responsibility for the collapse could mainly be attributed to the structural engineers. It was indeed the worst structural failure ever to occur in the United States. M. The plaintiffs’ claims. As usual. and their north ends were supported on sliding bearings in the floors of the tower. the federal government authorized the National Bureau of Standards to perform an official investigation “with the objective of determining the most probably cause of the collapse. who eventually lost their licenses in the state of Missouri. the general contractor and his subcontractors were the first to be suspected of malfeasance and malpractice. technically. and.APPENDIX D walkway. Shortly thereafter. Donald Hall settled more than 90 percent of these claims out of a sense of duty and social responsibility. 272). continued resonance can quickly destroy even a sound structure (see p. Then technical opinions blossomed. many maimed for life. The south ends of the walkways were welded to plates in the floors of the function block. Marshall of the bureau. 15. obviously. The management company of the hotel was the first to take action. amounted originally to more than three billion dollars. Within a few hours of the accident rumors about the cause of the failure began to fly. How could this tragedy have occurred in the year 1981 in the most advanced technical country in the world and after two years of design and two of construction? In order to clarify this mystery. we must understand how the walkways were originally designed and how they were eventually built. O. (400 mm) deep. For a relatively long time the only unsuspected members of the construction team were the architects and the design engineers.2). E. The purpose of the sliding supports was to allow the beams to expand or contract with temperature changes without giving rise to thermal stresses (see p. Since the people on the two walkways were stomping in rhythm with the music. Pfrang and R. It asked the design team of the hotel to prepare the drawings for a second-floor walkway supported by columns and authorized its immediate construction. thus spanning the 120 ft. also the largest ever in a structural failure case. and issued an official report in 1981. The two walkways on the west side of the atrium involved in the collapse (the third-floor walkway that was separately hung remained in place) consisted of four 30 ft. Simultaneously it entrusted to Weidlinger Associates a most thorough analysis and check of the entire structure of the hotel complex (except the walkways). at the request of the Kansas City mayor. as everybody knows. consisting of two longitudinal wide-flange steel beams each 16 in. fabricated by butt welding along their entire length two 8 67 . using theoretical calculations and experimental verification of the walkways components. succumbed from chest injuries five months later. the up-and-down vibrations of the walkways must have had exactly the same rhythm. they were in resonance with the impacts of the stomping people. Then engineers and laypeople began suspecting the quality of the materials used in the walkways (everybody knows that weaker materials are cheaper than good materials) or the skills of the workers who welded and bolted them together (everybody knows that skilled workers demand higher salaries than unskilled ones). performed an in-depth investigation. (36 m) atrium width (Fig.

(3. The box beams of the fourth-floor walkway were designed to carry the load of one walkway and instead had to carry twice that load. (200 mm) deep channels (Fig. 15. supported by a nut and washer at their upper ends—i. For this purpose they determined the dead load of the walkways by taking from engineering manuals the weight of each walkway component and adding them up. (63 people @ 150 lb. plus a cement topping not shown on the drawings but authorized in the specifications (the written document describing each component of the project accompanying the final engineering drawings). (Design engineers are advised by their attorneys never to stamp the contractor’s shop drawings “Approved”. The job of Pfrang and Marshall might be thought relatively simple: to determine whether the rods and the box beams of the final design could resist the tension in the rods and the bending in the box beams from the hanging walkways. In this design. from which they had a better view of the band and the dance contestants. By mere chance a videotape of the tea dance competition was being made on that memorable day. (50 mm) from the end and the other at 6 in.000 lb.and fourth-floor walkways. above the fourth-floor box beam—and supported at their lower ends the second-floor walkway..3). (32mm) steel rod that served as hanger for both the second. In the shop drawings (the final drawings submitted by the contractor to the design engineers and the architects) each end of the fourth-floor box beams had two holes through both flanges. Thus in this design the fourth-floor transverse box beams supported the loads of two walkways. The live load was required by the Kansas City Building Code to be 100 lb. ending at the fourth-floor level and consisting of 1 1/4 in. because the deck of the walkways consisted of a corrugated steel deck and 3 1/4 in. Two upper hangers. but the box beams of each walkway supported only the loads on that single walkway.) 68 . Two separate lower rod hangers. (82 mm) of concrete. mostly concentrated on the south half and east side of the secondfloor walkway.4). The actual live load. through each of which was threaded a single 1 1/4 in. In the original working drawings (the last engineering drawings submitted to the contractor and the architects by the design engineers) each box beam had single holes at both ends of the flanges (Fig.200 kN) for each walkway. (32mm) rods. Thus the single rods hung from the steel trusses of the atrium’s roof supported the weights of both walkways. as the in-depth investigation of the National Bureau of Standards proved to laypeople and engineers alike. (150mm) from the end (Fig. ft. one at 2 in. starting at the fourth-floor level. and it showed that there were sixty-three people on the two walkways.450 lb. 15. (5 kN / m2) or a total of 72. At this point the reader will probably think: “By now I know why the tragedy occurred.450 lb. rather than the one of the original design. But they also weighed the components recovered from the collapse and found that the dead load was actually 8 percent higher than the computed load. below the box beams of the fourth-floor walkway. which passed through only the fourth-floor box beams and supported the second-floor walkway by two additional shorter rods hanging form the fourth-floor box beams. went through the outer hole in each box beam of the fourth floor and supported the fourth-floor walkway only by means of nuts and washers at their lower end—i. / sq. His design was a change suggested by the contractor in the shop drawings and stamped “Approved” by the architects and “Reviewed” by the structural engineers. went through the inner hole of each fourth-floor box beam.e. the load of both walkways was supported every thirty feet by means of nuts screwed into a single rod on each side of the walkways at the level of the second-floor and the fourth-floor box beams. No wonder they failed!” That would not be wrong. but neither would that be completely right. 15..) In the final contractor’s design the loads of both walkways was transmitted to the roof trusses by the shorter upper rods.APPENDIX D in. 9. each = 9. was thus a small fraction of the live load required by the code.3). * (420 kN).e.

pulled up on the thin lower flanges of the fourth-floor box beams through a single nut and bolt connection. and became disconnected from the box beam (Fig. a most prudent reserve of strength in structures in public places. Under this load (twice the design load). (1. pulled out of their holes. the above statement is equivalent to saying that under the original engineering design of the connections which did not satisfy the code.5). The walkway system not only was underdesigned but also lacked redundancy (see pg. The National Bureau of Standards made it clear that even the original walkway design did not satisfy the Kansas City Building Code provisions but also stated. They could thus prove the real cause of the walkway collapse. incapable of taking over the load unsupported by the failed rod.67. they tested in the laboratory both brand-new duplicates of the box beams and some of the undamaged actual box beams. All the fourth-floor box beam-hanger connections were candidates for initiation of walkway collapse. and 1. The walkways collapsed under loads substantially less than those specified by the Kansas City Building Code.066 kN) each. They also computed and tested the ultimate strength of the hanger rods.APPENDIX D Pfrang and Marshall realized immediately that the weak elements in the chain of structural elements were the box beams of the fourth floor. 1981. carrying the load of the walkways and thus supporting 24. the original design. The National Bureau of Standards reports adds: “The ultimate capacity actually available using the original connection detail would have been approximately 60% of that expected of a connection designed in accordance with the specifications of the Kansas City Code.” Since 60% = 0. From a human point of view. Who is to blame for the tragedy? The Missouri licensing board and the Missouri Court of Appeals found fault with the design engineers because they did not notice the essential difference between their original design and the design suggested by the contractor that they acknowledged reviewing. the remaining upper rods. The box beam-hanger to rods connections under the original hanger rod detail (continuous rod) would not have satisfied the Kansas City Building Code. 4. then broke through the lower hole in it. The six upper hanger rods.000 lb. although illegal. 69 .60 is equal to 1/1. although indirectly. the fourth-floor-to-ceiling hanger rods.15. The box beam-hanger rod connections. that the original design might not have caused a collapse under the minor live load present on that fatal day. But since the stress analysis of the complex beams could not be accurately obtained by theoretical calculations. We can do better than report in abbreviated form the conclusions of the National Bureau of Standards report: 1.67 is an average coefficient of safety for steel structures. might have avoided the tragedy. The dangerous suggestion of the contractor. the bolt first bent the lower flange of the box beams. This first happened at the midspan upper hanger rod. 2. 5. was fatal because it went unnoticed by the design engineers. aimed at simplifying the construction of the walkways. pulled out of the hole in the upper flange. the walkways might not have collapsed under the actual loads on them on July 17. Neither the quality of workmanship nor the materials used in the walkway system played a significant role in initiating the collapse. 3. 55). and the third-floor walkway hanger rods did not satisfy the design provisions of the Kansas City Building Code. and both walkways fell down.

the principal and the project manager of the structural firm responsible for the design had their Missouri engineer’s licenses revoked. It got built without anybody ever figuring out if it would be strong enough. added. Nobody ever did any calculations to figure out whether or not the particular connection that held the skywalks up would work. It just slipped through the cracks. Patrick McLarney.” 70 .APPENDIX D Legally. The attorney who represented the state licensing board. they just never did it at all. “It wasn’t a matter of doing something wrong.

the second and fourth floor walkways of the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City collapsed and fell to the floor of the main lobby. Inc. The [Administrative Hearing Commissioner]. On July 17. v.C.C. The structural engineer. Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors Supreme Court of Missouri 744 S. and mechanical and electrical engineers. Gillum was identified as the individual personally in charge of and supervisory of professional engineering activities of G..1. was part of the “Design Team” which also included the architect.E.C.E. One hundred and fourteen people died and at least 186 were injured. 1988) SMITH. Upon remand for assessment of appropriate disciplinary action. He was further found guilty of misconduct in misrepresenting to the architects the safety of a connection (the double hanger rod-box beam connection) when he was ignorant of the safety due to a failure to perform engineering tests and calculations to determine such safety. the Missouri Board for Architects. His professional seal was utilized on structural engineering plans for the Hyatt. G.W.APPENDIX E Daniel M. Gillum is a practicing structural engineer holding a license to practice professional engineering in Missouri. Sections 10 and 11). Gillum was found vicariously liable and responsible for the acts and omissions of Duncan which liability and responsibility he assumed by affixing his professional engineering seal on the structural drawings. The walkways together weighed 142. He is president of G. In February 1984. Gillum was also found to have engaged in unprofessional conduct in failing and refusing to take responsibility for the entire engineering project as. the National Bureau of Standards concluded this was the most devastating structural collapse ever to take place in this country. 327. 1981. Upon appeal the trial court affirmed. after hearing. He was further found grossly negligent in failing to himself review or assure that someone had reviewed drawing S405. and in failing to review shop drawings of the Hyatt project (in particular Shop Drawing 30 and Erection Drawing E3).E.C. is a Missouri corporation holding a certificate of authority to perform professional engineering services in Missouri.E. Duncan was the project engineer for the Hyatt construction in direct charge of the actual structural engineering work on the project. Duncan was found [by the Commission] to have been guilty of gross negligence in the preparation and completion of a structural drawing (S405.000 pounds. 71 . Gillum and GCE International. in Missouri. He was under the direct supervision of Gillum. Missouri Board for Architects. the Board ordered all three certificates revoked.C. Duncan.441 RSMo 1978. International were subject to discipline pursuant to Sec.E.1 before affixing his seal thereto. In terms of loss of life and injuries.2d 524 (Mo. J. G. Professional Engineers and Land surveyors filed its complaint seeking a determination that the engineering certificates of registration of Daniel Duncan and Jack Gillum and the engineering certificates of authority of G.E. We do likewise. found that such certificates were subject to suspension or revocation. Jack D. Duncan is a practicing structural engineer holding a license to practice professional engineering in Missouri and is an employee of G.C.

No. It would be difficult to imagine statutory language more clearly evidencing the total responsibility imposed upon the engineer.1 The law in this state is clearly stated … Gillum’s testimony included the following: Q. Why not. was found vicariously liable and responsible for the acts and omissions of Duncan and Gillum … . that [the fabricator] would design the connections and they are not and should not be responsible for [the fabricator’s] failures or the errors in [the fabricator’s] shop drawings or design.E. [the appealing engineers] assert that reliance upon fabricators to design certain structural steel connections is the custom and practice within the profession and appellants’ reliance thereon is not negligence. and accepted by him when he contracted to provide his services. I cannot accept the responsibility for anything that they do. and without authority and ability to direct them in how they are preparing that drawing. … The Commission defined the phrase in the licensing context as “an act or course of conduct which demonstrates a conscious indifference to a professional duty.APPENDIX E the Commission concluded. and for continuing misrepresentations to the owner and architect concerning such atrium design review. The affixing of his seal on the plans makes him responsible for the entire engineering project and all documents connected therewith unless he specifically disclaims responsibility for some document relating to or intended to be used for any part of the engineering project. is required by [Missouri law]. The thrust of Duncan and Gillum’s defense was that it was expected by them. The statutory provisions make clear that Missouri has established a stringent set of requirements for professional engineers practicing in the state. Of greatest importance are the contentions concerning “custom” within the profession and the imposition of “vicarious” liability on Gillum and G. The thrust of those requirements is professional accountability by a specific individual certified engineer. do you consider the seal you placed on your drawing relating to your structural engineering design made you responsible for this later drawing prepared by somebody else on behalf of the steel fabricator? A. Rather the assessment of the individual “qualifications” of the engineer include his willingness and ability to accept the responsibilities imposed on him by the statutes. They require that plans for construction of structures in this state which require engineering expertise be prepared by or under the direct supervision of a specified certified engineer and that that engineer bear personal and professional responsibility for those plans. sir. The statutory statement that the right to engage in the profession is a personal right based upon the individual’s qualifications in no way impacts upon the responsibilities imposed upon an engineer. Gillum. which inference may arise from the conduct of the licensee in light of all surrounding circumstances … It imposes discipline for more than mere inadvertence and requires a finding that the conduct is so egregious as to warrant an inference of a mental state unacceptable in a professional engineer.” 1 72 .C.C.E. The Commission utilized a definition recognizing that gross negligence is different in kind from ordinary negligence . These requirements establish the public policy of the state for the protection of the public. the employees of the companies that prepared that were not under my personal direction. the Commission found. Mr. sir? A. and therefore I had no authority over these employees. Q. The statutory level of responsibility impacts directly on several contentions of respondents. requires at least some inferred mental state. This definition. As to “custom”. Gillum was found guilty of misconduct for his failure to perform a review of the Hyatt atrium design following specific request by the architect for such review. G. in keeping with custom and practice. First of all. Finally.

nor inclination. The statute specifically exempts from certification. However. under the statute. and all of the conduct of G. Its true basis is largely one of public or social policy under which it has been determined that. Sec. It is the assumption of this responsibility for which he is compensated.APPENDIX E “Where established customs and practices are challenged and found to run counter to plain and unambiguous language of controlling regulatory statutes such customs and practices must give way to the law.” Sec. to establish a public policy contrary to that established by the General Assembly. of the one vicariously liable. Sec. 327. Gillum made no such disclaimer here. It has not done so and we have no authority.C. a matter requiring engineering expertise. 327. have challenged the imposition of ‘“vicarious liability for the failures of Duncan. either by act or omission. A corporation may engage in engineering activities if it has assigned responsibility for proper conduct of its professional engineering to a registered professional engineer. Design of connections is. for which discipline was imposed. irrespective of fault. Not all of the charges found against Gillum are based upon Duncan’s failings but relate also to Gillum’s own acts or omissions. Custom. or laymen.191 authorizes non-certificated engineers to perform engineering work “under the direction and continuing supervision of and is checked by” a certificated engineer. The statute imposes on the project engineer the responsibility for the design of such connections whether he in fact designs them himself or not. 327. as having that responsibility. under seal. disclaims such responsibility. Chapter 327 has established the responsibility a certified engineer bears when he undertakes a contract in his professional capacity.E. and therefore from the rigors of licensing and Board discipline. This is the responsibility the engineer assumes in exchange for the right to practice his profession. the legislature can provide. The statutory framework is established to protect the public and to hold responsible licensed 73 . Gillum was the engineer designated by G.E. arose under a vicarious liability theory.” If as a matter of public policy it is desirable that project structural engineers be authorized to rely upon connections requiring engineering expertise designed by certified or non-certified engineers. under which it has been determined as a matter of policy that one person should be liable for the act of the other. or “bottom line” necessity cannot alter that responsibility. which this court must declare as it is and not as some would prefer that it had been written. … It is self-evident that a custom or usage repugnant to the express provision of a statute is void. Given the rigorous responsibilities imposed on engineers by the statute it is inconceivable that the legislature contemplated relieving certified engineers of responsibility for engineering decisions made by non-certified engineers or laymen. Gillum and G. practice.401 Affixing his seal to plans imposes upon the engineer responsibility for the whole engineering project unless he.201. “Vicarious liability” has been defined as “based on a relationship between the parties. 327-401. employees of steel fabricators. It is a misdemeanor for a certified engineer to affix his seal to plans which have not been prepared “‘by him or under his immediate personal supervision. The entire thrust of Chapter 327 is to place individual personal and professional responsibility upon a known and identified certificated engineer. Sec. An engineer affixing his seal to plans is personally and professionally responsible therefor. but rather the protection of the public. irrespective of participation.” The purpose of disciplinary action against licensed professionals is not the infliction of punishment. on the facts of this record.C. Design of connections is. a party should be held to respond for the acts of another.C.E. a matter for which the engineer is responsible. employed by a fabricator having neither contractual nor statutory responsibility for the structural engineering of the project. some of the conduct for which Gillum was disciplined.

2 [The fabricator] supplied Duncan with its shop 2 The National Bureau of Standards found as originally designed the connection capacity was 60 percent of that required by the Building Code. He did so without having conducted all necessary engineering tests and calculations to determine the soundness and safety of the double rod arrangement. The box beam-hanger rod connections and the hanger rods themselves on all three walkways. as shown by the structural drawings. The drawings did not contain information indicating that the connections were to be designed by the fabricator and omitted important engineering load calculations necessary to enable the fabricator to design the connections. therefore. from the cases relied upon by Gillum and G. 74 .APPENDIX E engineers who fail to afford that protection. That which might constitute inadvertence where no danger exists may well rise to conscious indifference where the potential danger to human life is great.E. were subject to discipline for the acts or omissions of Duncan. The connections in the walkway were non-redundant so that if any one within a single walkway failed they all would fail and the walkway would collapse. This case differs. Because of certain difficulties in fabrication [the fabricator] requested a change to the double rod configuration. That Code is intended to provide a required level of safety for buildings within the City. Duncan had never designed a system similar to the Hyatt walkways. The design of the connections in the walkways themselves were included in that responsibility. The walkways were intended to carry pedestrian traffic. He was the project engineer for the Hyatt and as such had primary responsibility within his company for designing and approving those aspects of the Hyatt which required structural engineering expertise. They appeared to be connections fully designed by the engineer and were reasonably so interpreted by the fabricator. concrete.E. It is self-evident that the walkways offered a potential of great danger to human life if defectively designed. The drawings failed to properly identify the type of weld required. They were suspended above the main lobby of the hotel. The Commission did not err in finding that Gillum and G. The result of this change was to double the load on the fourth floor walkway and impose a similar increase on the connections which were already substantially below Code requirements.C. Duncan testified that he intended the fabricator to design the connections. Under standard engineering practice Duncan could either design the box beam-hanger rod connections or cause the drawings to reflect his intention that they be designed by the fabricator. and erroneously identified the hanger rods as standard rather than high-strength steel. The Commission could properly consider the potential of danger in determining the question of gross negligence. The walkways each weighed approximately 35 tons and comprised heavy and largely non-malleable materials such as steel. It is difficult to conclude that gross failure to comply with that Code can constitute other than conscious indifference to duty by a structural engineer. where the statute did not impose such non-delegable responsibility. The structural drawings of Duncan furnished to the fabricator contained several serious errors. We look first to Duncan. His concern was with its architectural acceptability not its structural acceptability. recognized to be the main point of congregation within the hotel.C. This request was transmitted to Duncan who approved it and verified its structural soundness and safety to the architect. This is simply to say that the level of care required of a professional engineer is directly proportional to the potential for harm arising from his design and as we have previously stated indifference to harm and indifference to duty are closely related if not identical. as ultimately constructed the capacity was 31 percent of Code requirements. These drawings did neither. the need for bearing plates and/or stiffeners. It is clear that the statute expresses the intent to impose disciplinary sanctions on the engineer responsible for the project whether the improper conduct is that of himself or attributable to the employees or others upon whom he relies. did not meet the design specifications of the Kansas City Building code. glass and wood.

He breached that duty in continuing fashion. Shop drawing review by the engineer is contractually required. which did not collapse. The conduct of Duncan from initial design through shop drawing review and through the subsequent requested connection review following the atrium roof collapse fully supports the Commission’s finding of conscious indifference to a professional duty. As finally built. The Commission further found Gillum to be subject to discipline for unprofessional conduct and gross negligence in his refusal to accept his responsibility as mandated by Chapter 327 and his denial that such responsibility existed. look for an assembled detail of the connection and did not assemble the components. The responsibility for the structural integrity and safety of the walkway connections was Duncan’s and that responsibility was non-delegable. They reported that they had done so and included in that report was the statement “we then checked the suspended bridges and found them to be satisfactory. Following the atrium roof collapse [the appealing engineers] were requested by the architect and owner to recheck all the steel in the atrium. All of these findings arise from the same basic attitude of Gillum that the responsibility imposed by Chapter 327 is not in keeping with usual and customary engineering practices and that that responsibility did not mandate his personal involvement in the design of the Hyatt. No review was made nor calculations performed to determine whether the box beam-hanger rod connection shown on the shop drawings met Code requirements. either in his mind or on a sketch. walkways. The Commission found such representation to have been made either knowing of its falsity or without knowledge of the truth or falsity. The determination of conscious indifference to a professional duty. review and approval of the shop drawings is an engineering function. The walkway collapse was the result of the failure of the fourth floor box rod connections. the hanger rods and the box beam hanger rod connections did not meet the requirements of the Code. i. Duncan’s representation to the architect concerning a material fact. and under the statute.. In either event it subjected Duncan to disciplinary action. Duncan was aware of the change to the two-rod system but did not review the box beamhanger rod connection on the fourth floor walkway. to determine what the connection looked like in detail. The third floor walkway. The box beam-hanger rod connections and the hanger rod shown on the shop drawings did not meet design specifications of the Code. Duncan did not. His reliance upon others to perform that duty serves as no justification for his indifference to his obligations and responsibility. [The appealing engineers] normal in-house procedures called for detailed check of all special connections during shop drawing review. without a basis for knowledge of its truth or falsity. gross negligence.” In fact [the appealing engineers] did not do a complete check of the design of all steel in the atrium and did not do a complete check of the suspended “bridges” i.e.e.APPENDIX E drawings. We find no error in either the factual finding or legal conclusion of the Commission. The shop drawings did not reflect the use of stiffeners or bearing plates necessary to bring the connections within Code requirements. The Commission also found Duncan subject to discipline for misconduct in misrepresenting to the architects the engineering acceptability of the double rod configuration when he performed no engineering calculations or other engineering activities to support his representation. Under the contract. In essence he placed the 75 . The findings of the Commission as to Duncan’s gross negligence are fully supported by the record. is a determination of fact. had a “high probability” of failure during the life of the building. universally accepted and always done as part of the design engineer’s responsibility. could properly be viewed as either misconduct as an engineer or gross negligence. The Commission found Duncan’s misrepresentation to be the willful doing of an act with wrongful intention which it had defined as misconduct. as is standard practice.

APPENDIX E responsibility for the improper design of the connections on [the fabricator] and took the position that the structural engineer was entitled to rely on [the fabricator’s] expertise. What we have heretofore said in regard to the requirements of Chapter 327 and the responsibility imposed upon an engineer thereby sufficiently deals with Gillum’s contentions. and non-performance of. for reasons heretofore stated. a review of the atrium design upon direct request of the architect and owner.C. His argument here that utilization of his seal without disclaimer could not impose responsibility upon him for the shop drawings of another entity prepared after impression of the seal is clearly rejected by the language of the statute.411. By section 327.2 the owner of the seal is responsible for the “whole … engineering project” when he places his seal on “any plans” unless he expressly disclaims responsibility and specifies the documents which he disclaims. Appellant G. The shop drawings were part of the documents comprising the engineering project and were “intended to be used for any part or parts of the … engineering project …” Gillum was by statute responsible for those drawings and he accepted such responsibility when he entered into the contract and utilized his seal.E. is. subject to discipline for the conduct of its employees and particularly for the conduct of the engineer assigned the responsibility for the “proper conduct of all its … professional engineering … in this state … 76 . His refusal to accept a responsibility so clearly imposed by the statute manifests both the gross negligence and unprofessional conduct found by the Commission. These findings are further bolstered by the evidence of Gillum’s participation in the misrepresentations concerning.

with the worst erosion occurring on the coldest preceding lift-off. Robert Lund was worried...” Harper’s 257 (1978): 30-33.. pp. Note also how small a part codes have in a text on engineering ethics.. “The Quest for a Code of Professional Ethics: An Intellectual and Moral Confusion. e. But.. and resiliency decreased with temperature. permitting Thiokol to build the huge rocket in Utah and ship it in pieces to the Space Center two thousand miles away’.. He had not approved because the temperature at the launch site would be close to freezing at lift-off.... The shuttle contract had earned Thiokol $150 million in profits. “The Ideological Use of Professional Codes. 1986).. D.... the decision seemed clear enough: Safety first.. Lund.. had earlier presided over a meeting of engineers that unanimously recommended against the launch. 1See. such as Mike Martin and Roland Schinzinger. and Sallie B.1 I will not do that here. I shall not argue that here. esp. Codes are described as self-serving...... The Space Center was counting down for a shuttle launch the next morning. Building in Utah was so much more efficient than building on-site that Thiokol had been able to underbid the competition. Lund had not approved.. and Heinz C..... Unfortunately.. Jerald Mason.g... 2The following narrative is based on testimony contained in The Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Disaster (Washington. esp.: U.. I... Mason informed the Space Center.” Business and Professional Ethics Journal 2 (1983): 0-61.... mere guides for novices.. Data from previous flights indicated that the rings tended to erode in flight. almost no testing had been done below 40ÞF... or unnecessary. Frankel.. Experimental evidence was sketchy but ominous.. vice-president for engineering at Morton Thiokol. The engineers’ scarce time had had to be devoted to other problems.. 2d ed.. Erosion seemed to increase as the rings lost their resiliency... They had been a great idea. finding my general argument in a detailed analysis of a particular choice... Lund had expected the flight to be postponed.C... unrealistic. Samuel Florman. ed. He had concurred and informed his boss. I will argue that a code of professional ethics is central to advising individual engineers how to conduct themselves... The Space Center was worried about the ice already forming in places on the boosters.... Instead... the shuttle could explode.. It was good because the Center would not allow a launch unless the technical people approved.. But. but Lund’s worry was the “O-rings” sealing the boosters’ segments... Mark S.. 86-92. as everyone now knows.... 1:82-103. THE CHALLENGER DISASTER2 On the night of 27 January 1986. 154-59..... with the lives of seven astronauts at stake... too vague. At a certain temperature. to judging their conduct.APPENDIX F Thinking Like an Engineer: The Place of a Code of Ethics in the Practice of a Profession* By Michael Davis Most discussions of engineering ethics dismiss the idea of codes of ethics from the outset. the rings could lose so much resiliency that one could fail to seal properly... If a ring failed in flight. Luegenbiehl. Chafer (Washington. 1980). Government Printing Office.. John Ladd.. pp. D... While I believe the analysis to be applicable to all professions. The Center’s safety record was good. forcing them to extrapolate from the little data they had. inconsistent. Rosemary Chalk.S..: American Association for the Advancement of Science. I will begin with a case now commonly discussed in engineering ethics... 77 .. . “Codes of Ethics and the Moral Education of Engineers..C... and ultimately to understanding engineering as a profession...” In AAAS Professional Ethics Project.... 103-4.. (New York: McGraw-Hill.. the 0-rings were not perfect. John Kultgen...” Business and Professional Ethics Journal 1 (1982): 53-69......... Ethics in Engineering. “Moral Blueprints.... 1989)..

To think like a manager rather than an engineer is to focus on people rather than on things. They urged Mason to reconsider. Joseph Kilminster. before we can say more about what Lund should have done. (The exact words seem to have been. but only if Lund approved. Lund was asked to concern himself primarily with how best to handle his boss. So. to help him communicate with his engineers. was ready to sign a launch approval. and his own engineers. it may be asked. But they would not launch without Thiokol’s. the answer is obvious: No. Should Lund have reversed his decision and approved the launch? In retrospect. and the experts in ethics are philosophers or clergy. himself an engineer. They did not say why. or. 78 . Thiokol’s vice-president for shuttle programs. very good publicity just when the shuttle program needed some. of course. before we can consider that. Lund’s first response was to repeat his objections.” even “appalled. The next morning the shuttle exploded during lift-off. Mason asked him to think like a manager rather than an engineer. That may seem odd. then for experts. He was to draw upon his knowledge of engineering only as he might draw upon his knowledge of a foreign language. Now Lund was not so sure. He reexamined the evidence and decided the rings should hold at the expected temperature.APPENDIX F Or so it had seemed earlier that day. And since Lund seems to have reversed his decision and approved the launch because he began to think like a manager rather than an engineer. engineers. According to this explanation. but they did not have to. for example. we have to understand the connection.” by the evidence on which the no-launch recommendation had been based. do engineering societies have promulgating codes of ethics? What could they be thinking? Ethics is not a matter for majority vote but for private conscience. should have been thinking like a manager rather than an engineer. killing all aboard. The shuttle program was increasingly falling behind its ambitious launch schedule. we need to know what the difference is between thinking like a manager and thinking like an engineer. not engineers. The Space Center had been “surprised. But most problems concerning what we should do would hardly be problems at all if we could foresee all the consequences of what we do. But then Mason said something that made him think again. we need to consider whether Lund. Answers have often been expressed in a formal code of ethics. But. If that explanation of what Mason was asking of Lund seems implausible (as I think it does). approval. Congress had been grumbling for some time. what is the alternative? If Mason did not mean that Lund should make his knowledge of engineering peripheral (as it seems Mason. “Take off your engineering hat and put on your management hat. an engineer. to handle things. The Space Center wanted to launch. And. One explanation of the difference stresses technical knowledge. An O-ring had failed. Such thoughts make any connection between engineering and ethics look dubious. did not when he personally reexamined the evidence). what was he asking Lund to do? What is it to think like an engineer if not simply to use one’s technical knowledge of things? That is a question engineers have been asking for almost a century.”) Lund did and changed his mind. if not for private conscience. Fairness to Lund requires us to ask whether he should have approved the launch given only the information available to him at the time. the president would be able to announce the first teacher in space as part of his State of the Union message the following evening. They wanted to launch. Managers. He was to act much as he would have acted had he never earned a degree in engineering. Lund was now all that stood in the way of launching. it might be said. if the launch went as scheduled. What business. the Space Center. are trained to handle people.

see my “The Moral Authority of a Professional Code.” Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 2 (1988): 352-66. Veatch. “The Origin of Professionalism: Sociological Conclusions and Ethical Implications. Even when formalization is put off. e. 1987). and “The Ethics Boom: What and Why. “The Use of Professions. the code is put in writing and formally adopted. professions are organized for public service.” Business Economics 22 (1987): 5-10. but only if. PP. for example. construction. the code may still be a subject of frequent reference. When a group of individuals constitute themselves as a “profession” they explicitly invoke this way of understanding what they are up to. in contrast. Chapman (New York: New York University Press. like businesses. “That would not be proper for one of us. the sole right to do certain work) if. Once an occupation has become a profession. For more on this explanation. THE POSSIBILITY OF ENGINEERING ETHICS A code of (professional) ethics generally appears when an occupation organizes itself into a profession.. Robert M.” Ethics 89 (1978): 1-19. Usually. But it is not a mere semantic truth.3 But. I think. the pressure to cut corners to save money) by making it reasonably likely (and more likely than otherwise) that most other members of the profession will not take advantage of her good conduct.APPENDIX F II. That. 302-38. They invite examination according to the standards proper to such an undertaking. Understanding a code of (professional) ethics as a convention between professionals. society wants to support serving the ideal in question in the way the profession has chosen to serve it. Benjamin Freedman. is true by definition.” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 4 (1979): 1-19. A code of ethics would then prescribe how professionals are to pursue their common ideal so that each may do the best she can at minimal cost to herself and those she cares about (including the public. as such. They exist for the benefit of their members. J. “Professional Ethics and Role-Specific Duties.4 According to this explanation. as in “our code of ethics. But professions differ from unions in the interests they are organized to serve. just as businesses exist for the profit of their owners.” Centennial Review 34 (1990): 163-86 4 79 . is organized to help members serve others—according to a certain ideal expressed in its code of ethics. Otherwise.” or implicitly. it may leave the profession unrecognized. A code is a solution to a coordination problem. Roland Pennock and John W. for our purposes. ed. Unions are. It needs only a practice among its members of cooperating to serve. society has a reason to give it special privileges (for example. the most helpful is that a code of ethics is primarily a convention between professionals. They give what they do a distinct context. According to this explanation. a profession is a group of persons who want to cooperate in serving the same ideal better than they could if they did not cooperate. we can explain why engineers cannot depend on mere private conscience when choos- 3 See. Engineers. is like a union in that it is organized to serve the interests of its members. The code is to protect each professional from certain pressures (for example. however. and maintenance of safe and useful objects. A profession.g. which is organized to serve someone else’s interests. primarily organizations of self-interest. “Professionalism Means Putting Your Profession First. might be thought to serve the ideal of efficient design. A profession. a certain ideal. and Lisa Newton. “A Meta-Ethics for Professional Morality. an occupation does not need society’s recognition in order to be a profession.” Why this connection between codes of (professional) ethics and organized professions? Several explanations have been offered over the years.” NOMOS XXIX: Authority Revisited.” Business and Professional Ethics Journal 1 (1982): 33-43. In this sense. A code protects members of a profession from certain consequences of competition. as in. and unlike a charity or government. whether explicitly. if looking after the public is part what she cares about).

ethics to know. like law and medicine. 80 .” Yale Law Review 85 (1976). not simply according to those rules but all things considered? This is not an empty question. so we must know engineering.” Business and Professional Ethics Journal 7 (1988): 83-94. what (more or less) “the rules of the game” are. no matter how good that private conscience. then Lund’s engineers had a right to expect his support. have responded as “the rules of the engineering game” require. If we block this launch. he would. we have not explained why anyone should be an engineer in this sense. Suppose Lund’s boss had responded to what we just imagined Lund to say to him: “Yes. of a game in which you score points—by cutting off your fingers or by shooting people who happen to pass in the street below.”6 If Lund had so responded. have responded. “Advocacy as Moral Discourse. one who understood just how much weight a rational person gives a code of ethics in decisions of this kind.” If acting as one’s professional code requires is really justified. blame. take account of his profession’s code of ethics. is an important contrast between my Position and the “personal analysis” of professional duties one finds. or whatever). When Lund’s boss asked him to think like a manager rather than an engineer. too. he should. for example. if you wanted a vice-president who would think like a manager rather than an engineer. The appeal of the personal analysis probably comes from focusing too much on professions. and why engineers should take into account what an organization of engineers has to say about what engineers should do. that have a clearly defined client. as we shall see. you should not have hired an engineer. Your job and mine are on the line. In this respect. as engineers. Safety counts a lot. we should merely weigh safety against the wishes of our employer or instead give safety preference over those wishes. Lund should support his profession’s code as a guide for all engineers and why. I do not treat professional activity as primarily involving a relation between one person with an important skill (the professional) and a series of others (the client. we hired an engineer. Unlike these others. part of being an engineer is putting safety first. moral agents who cannot escape conscience. for example. patient. lnsofar as a code of professional ethics is a kind of (morally permissible) convention/it provides a guide to what engineers may reasonably expect of one another. A code of ethics should also provide a guide to what we may expect other members of our profession to help us do. but—we supposed—an engineer with common sense. While we have now explained why an engineer should. my “The Special Role of Professionals in Business Ethics. engineering may represent the future of law. we should be able to explain to Lund (and his boss) why.1060-89. as an engineer. They are also persons with responsibilities beyond their professions. The future of Thiokol is also on the line. as a rational person. he cannot justify treating himself as an exception. or punishment just by showing that they did what they did because their profession required it. for example. 6 Cf. in Thomas Shaffer. and perhaps even of medicine. Be reasonable. But other things do. (Think. Just as we must know the rules of baseball to know what to do with the ball. 5 Here. If. the Space Center will start looking for someone more agreeable to supply boosters. Even games can be irrational or immoral. But would he have done the right thing. “Sorry. One feature of engineering that should make it more interesting to students of professional ethics than it has been is the absence (or relative unimportance) of individual clients.5 What conscience would tell us to do absent a certain convention is not necessarily what conscience would tell us given that convention.) People are not merely members of this or that profession.” North Carolina Law Review 57 (1979): 647-70. for example. Let me put the point more dramatically.APPENDIX F ing how to practice their profession. even in his trying circumstances. “The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation. criticism. as an engineer. whether. or Charles Fried. then.

an engineer should obey her profession’s code. 81 .” The fundamental principles simply describe in general terms an ideal of service. the code of ethics drafted by the Accreditation Board of Engineering and Technology (ABET) and adopted by all major American engineering societies except the National Society of Professional Engineers and the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers. so-called Professional Engineers (PEs). Yet. provide a reason to do as one’s profession requires quite independently of what in particular the profession happens to require.S. can we honestly say that society wants engineers to do as their code requires (treat safety as paramount. who must ultimately “sign off” on their work. The public opinion supporting such laws could not have been much less irrational or immoral than the laws themselves. even on the matter before us. One way society has of saying things is through law.” They can practice engineering only through a company with a PE. The obligations of an engineer do not seem to rest on anything so contingent as a promise. for example. for example. oath. So. And. honor and dignity of the engineering profession by: 1. But it seems doubtful that the public knows enough about engineering to have an opinion on most matters of engineering ethics. No law binds all engineers to abide by their profession’s code (as the law does bind all lawyers to abide by theirs). One is that Lund should do as his profession requires because he “promised. The answers do not take account of the contents of the code of ethics. it seems plain that neither public opinion nor law should decide what it is rational or moral to do. Consider. But most engineers in the United States—nearly 90 percent—are not so licensed. The other plausible alternative we can quickly dismiss is that Lund should do as his profession requires because “society” says he should. doctors.” “fundamental canons. Lund could. it seems such a refusal would not excuse him from conducting himself as an engineer should.” and (much more detailed) “guidelines. using their knowledge and skill for 7 Some engineers. an obligation resting not on an actual agreement (whether express or tacit) but on what it is fair to require of someone given what he has voluntarily done. those enforcing slavery). The two answers we have now dismissed share one notable feature. We may dismiss this answer in part because it is not clear that society does say that. society has ways of saying things other than by law. It is more like what lawyers call a “quasicontract” or a “contract implied in law”.” for example.7 Of course. They are formal. by joining an engineering society having a code of ethics. and other statelicensed professionals are. there have been both irrational laws (for example. engineers do). such as accepted the benefits that go with claiming to be an engineer. Either would. that is. by public opinion. for example. or vow. all things considered. are bound by law In exactly the way lawyers. The code is divided into “fundamental principles. have refused to join any professional society having a code (as perhaps half of all U. Engineers uphold and advance the integrity. as explained below) rather than (as most people would) treat safety as an important consideration to balance against others? However that question is answered. The answer we shall now consider is not formal. It is that supporting a code of ethics with a certain content is rational because supporting any code with a content of that sort is rational.APPENDIX F III. They Practice engineering under the “manufacturer’s exemption. the “convention between professionals” (as I called it) is not a contract. WHY OBEY ONE’S PROFESSIONAL CODE? The question now is why. After all. those requiring the use of outmoded techniques) and immoral laws (for example. We should begin by dismissing two alternatives some people find plausible. We must dismiss this answer because it is at least possible that Lund never did anything we could plausibly characterize as promising to follow a formal code. if defensible.

The benefits for an engineer as ordinary person are obvious: As an ordinary person. But why should an engineer adhere to it himself when. healthier. Below the fundamental principles are the fundamental canons. including Lund. being honest and impartial. for example. then. or accepting a job for which professional status is required). I think. for example. For example.” and to “avoid all conflicts of interest. let us try a thought experiment. they prefer to have the benefits of being an engineer. still object “personally” and refuse to do the job. No one is born into a profession. Imagine what engineering would be like if engineers did not generally act as the canons require. much like a tendency to make errors. engineers are required to “hold paramount the safety. he would risk being replaced by an engineer who would not object. of course. If. some perhaps about whom he cared a great deal. even given what is required of them in exchange. 2. an engineer is likely to be safer. and serving with fidelity the public.” to “act in professional matters for each employer or client as faithful agents and’ trustees.APPENDIX F the enhancement of human welfare. His interests as an engineer would conflict with his interests as a person. honor. The engineer would be under tremendous pressure to keep “personal opinions” to himself and get on with the job. an engineer could not object as an engineer. only make truthful public statements. every engineer. it seems he (or his employer or client) stands to benefit by departing from it? 82 . clearly substantial enough to explain how an individual could rationally enter into a convention that would equally limit what he himself can do. are not always worth the trouble of maintaining them. shown that every engineer must benefit overall from such a convention. and otherwise better off if engineers generally hold paramount the public safety. Professions are voluntary in a way that governments are not. or even that any engineer will consider these benefits sufficient to justify the burdens required to achieve them. though apparently profitable to his employer or client. Professions nonetheless differ from governments in at least one way relevant here. and welfare come first. We therefore have. is why each engineer can generally expect to benefit from other engineers’ acting as their common code requires. I have not. what would it be like to be an engineer? The day-to-day work would. The benefits are. But if he did. be much the same. as we shall now assume. the only way to obtain the benefits in question is to make it part of being an engineer that the public safety. and welfare of the public. The canons lay down general duties. engineers did not generally hold paramount the safety. An employer or client might rightly treat an engineer’s personal qualms as a disability. and so on. and dignity of engineering in that way. what rational person could object so long as their doing so did not interfere with what she was doing? Surely every engineer—indeed.” to “issue public statements only in an objective and truthful manner. their employers and clients [and so on]. good reason to suppose that people are engineers because. How engineers stand to benefit as engineers is less obvious.” What rational person could object to others’ trying to achieve that ideal? Or at least. Professions. of course. Without a professional code. health and welfare of the public. If. But every now and then an engineer would be asked to do something that. One must claim professional status to have it (by taking a degree. That.” Each engineer stands to benefit from these requirements both as ordinary person and as engineer. An engineer could. health. Whether a particular profession is worth the trouble is an empirical question. as in Lund’s case. every member of society is likely to be better off overall if engineers uphold and advance the integrity. So. health. however. like governments. on balance. has good reason to want engineers generally to adhere to something like the ABET code. would put other people at risk.

Lund should have done as his profession’s code requires. An appeal to such considerations is just what Lund could not incorporate into a code of ethics for engineers or generally allow other engineers to use in defense of what they did. and why. when Lund’s boss asked him to think like a manager rather than an engineer. John Simmons. Yet. Lund could not incorporate such an exception into a code because its incorporation would defeat the purpose of the code. A. engineers are not the only professionals for whom the written code seems to play so small a part. the answer is obvious. he has good reason to endorse the convention generally. and most subsequent criticism. without it. Lund would have had no professional reason to do as the code requires. State. To allow such appeals would be to contribute to the breakdown of a practice Lund has good reason to support. Most attacks on the principle of fairness have been on the “Involuntary benefits” version. See. she is likely to tell you she studied the ABA code in law school and. all things considered.” Ethics 97 (1987): 576-94. I have been assuming that engineers do in fact generally act in accordance with the ABET code. Lund could not allow other engineers to defend what they did by appeal to their own interests or that of their employer for much the same reason. or even their selfless devotion to their employer. he was in effect asking Lund to think in a way that Lund must consider unjustified for engineers generally and for which Lund can give no morally defensible principle for making himself an exception. Since Lund voluntarily accepts the benefits of being an engineer (by claiming to be an engineer).9 So. They did what. upon careful examination. and Utopia (New York: Basic Books. could lead them to harm everyone overall. not a living practice. Confidentiality. A code of ethics is necessary in part because. If that assumption were mistaken. The moral principle on which this argument primarily relies is the principle of fairness. pp. Lund’s engineers seem to have recommended as they did because they thought the safety of the public. Lund would have had to rely on private judgment. depends on examples that. One can either refine the principle. paramount. he in effect let down all I hope this appeal to fairness will raise no red flags. according to the code. The engineers’ code of ethics seems to be “hard-wired” into them. even though the principle of fairness has been under a cloud ever since the seemingly devastating criticism It received in Robert Nozick. Interestingly. 1979). 9 8 83 .g. all things considered. see my “Vocational Teachers. will produce It after only a few minutes of searching her desk or bookshelves. or the rules of a cooperative game no one plays. including astronauts. whether or not they know it exists.8 What I have been at pains to show is how that convention helps to make those benefits possible. as in my “Nozick’s Argument for the Legitimacy of the Welfare State. When Lund did as his boss asked (supposing he did). I take this argument to explain why. as Richard Arneson has done In “The Principle of Fairness and Free-Rider Problems. I am not claiming that the engineers treated safety as paramount because they knew what the ABET code said. The code would be a dead letter. fail to support the criticism.” International Journal of Applied Philosophy 4 (1988): 11-20. When you ask a lawyer about a professional code. even now.J. And even those attacks are hardly devastating. N. it should be noted.” Ethics 92 (1982): 616-33. For another example. engineers are supposed to do. When you ask an engineer the same question. anyone who has spent much time with working engineers knows they do not treat safety In the same way managers do (hence Mason’s plea to “take off your engineering hat”). claiming to have a copy around. 118-36. Their recommendation is itself evidence that the code corresponds to a living practice. 1974). But relying on private judgment is not necessary here. I am answering the question “Why be ethical?” not “Why be moral?” I therefore have the luxury of falling back on ordinary moral principles to determine what is right. e.. and Professional Ethics. he is morally obliged to follow the (morally permissible) convention that helps to make those benefits possible. or.: Princeton University Press. the self-interest of individual engineers. he is likely to tell you that his profession has a code while admitting both that he never studied it and that he has none around to refer to. Anarchy. not why he should have done so in some pre-moral sense. 1 have. It would have much the same status as a “model statute” no government ever adopted.APPENDIX F If the question is one of justification. limited my use to obligations generated by voluntarily claiming benefits of a cooperative practice that are otherwise not available. Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton. show that Nozick’s original criticism. Lund would have to justify his departure from the code by appealing to such considerations as the welfare of Thiokol and his own self-interest.

and to his employer’s coming to view him as an embarrassment. that is. Ordinary morality seems to allow such weighing.11 If engineering ethics allows that too.APPENDIX F those engineers who helped to establish the practice that today allows engineers to say “no” in such circumstances with the reasonable hope that the client or employer will defer to their professional judgment. I certainly may have. I have not examined Lund’s decision in order to condemn him but in order to bring to light the place of a code of ethics in engineering.. all things considered. health and welfare of the public” and (4) “[acting] in professional matters for each employer or client as faithful agents or trustees. his employer’s. that is. rather than letting him take the bus. only two seem relevant: (1) “[holding] paramount the safety. INTERPRETING A CODE OF ETHICS So far we have assumed that Lund did as his boss asked. What he cannot do is show that what he did was right.” What do these provisions tell Lund to do? The answer is not all that clear.g. then. Does “public” include the seven astronauts? They are. I think his explanation would be quite different. e. employees of Thiokol’s client. the Space Center. rather. Indeed. those ordinary citizens who watch launches from the beach opposite the Space Center. now put that assumption aside and consider whether engineering ethics actually forbids Lund to do what it seemed he did. then Lund—whatever he may have thought he was doing—would not actually have acted unprofessionally. weigh his own interests. or may an engineer make an independent assessment? After all. though no less troubling. And what is it to be a “faithful agent or trustee” of one’s client or employer? Is it to serve all the interests of a client or employer. no one would think you did something morally wrong if you drove your child to school. that he thought like a manager rather than an engineer. Morality allows us to give special weight to the interests of those close to us. is why I reject the “universalistic” interpretation of engineering ethics in. the actual result of Lund’s decision was a disaster for both employer 10 I do not claim that he would explain his decision in this way. however. how they seemed to at the time). IV. and his client’s against the safety of the seven astronauts. not part of the public as are. of course. or only the financial ones? And how is one to determine even those? Does the client or employer have the final word. 84 . Let us then imagine Lund’s reading of the ABET code. We must.” Journal of Social Philosophy 20 (1989): 74-90. say. though that would probably lead to the government’s barring him from working on any project it funds. and that other engineers will come to their aid if the client or employer does not defer. after all. Assuming that allowed us to give a relatively clear explanation of what was wrong with what Lund did: Lund acted like a manager when he was also an engineer and should have acted like one. What could he infer? Of the code’s seven fundamental canons. to fellow engineers’ refusing to have anything to do with him. For example. There is more to understand. See my “Explaining Wrongdoing. Lund could. “Moral Responsibility for Engineers. But that is not important here. 11 Here. still explain how his action served his own interests and those of Thiokol (or. This conclusion assumes that I have not overlooked any relevant consideration. Kenneth Alpern.10 He could also just thumb his nose at all talk of engineering ethics. even if your presence on the road increased somewhat the risk that someone would be killed in a traffic accident.” Business and Professional Ethics Journal 2 (1983): 39-48.

So. remembering especially that a code is not a stone tablet inscribed with divine wisdom but the work of engineers. We could not understand it as a professional code.S. That is the reasonable interpretation because we know that marriages usually involve single males (as well as single females) rather than people with baccalaureates while just the reverse is true of graduation ceremonies. single or married. It is therefore reasonable to suppose that their code of ethics would not require them to risk their own safety. though one both employer and client may have thought themselves justified in risking. Most engineers are probably morally decent people. what must “public” mean? 12 I am not here committing the “originalist fallacy” common a few years back in debates over how to interpret the U. including the duty to act as a faithful agent or trustee. We would have to leave the presuppositions of ethics behind. 85 . Rational engineers would want to avoid situations in which only their private qualms stood between them and a use of professional knowledge they considered morally wrong or otherwise undesirable. health. or the like. we instead interpret it as referring to all students getting their baccalaureate. all have undergone radical revision within the last two decades. Law’s Empire (Cambridge. Nazi statutes. Constitution. and probably harder. or welfare. But what if that were not true? What if most engineers were moral monsters or just self-serving opportunists? What then? Interpreting their code would certainly be different. or that of anyone for whom they care. even when the interests of the public conflicted with those of employer or client. I use “authors” to Include all those who must currently support the code. They differ from most other rational persons only in knowing what engineers must know in order to be engineers and in performing duties they could not perform (or could not perform as well) but for that knowledge.” we should be able to decide whether interpreting “public” so that it includes “employees” is what engineers intend (or at least what. whether male or female. Though the first codes of ethics for American engineers were adopted early in this century. we can easily explain why a code of engineering ethics would make holding the public safety paramount a duty taking precedence over all others. if “bachelor” appears undefined in a marriage statute. once we figure out what it is reasonable to suppose engineers intend by declaring the “public” safety. codes included. as rational persons. It also seems reasonable to suppose that no code they authored would include anything people generally consider immoral. We would have to switch to principles of interpretation we reserve for mere folkways. Given this purpose.: Harvard University Press. My notion of interpretation is therefore much closer to that found in Ronald Dworkin. unlikely to endorse an immoral rule. high pay or service to some ideal to which they are committed). but if the same word appears in directions for a college’s graduation ceremony. and welfare “paramount. But. we interpret it as referring to single males.12 For example. Each would. 1986). Mass. More importantly. they should intend) and also whether they intend the paramountcy requirement to take precedence over the duty to act as a faithful agent or trustee.APPENDIX F and client. health. must be interpreted in light of what it is reasonable to suppose its authors intend. as will be made plain below. as we saw. given those presuppositions. And what is Lund to do if the public welfare requires what no faithful agent or trustee could do? Does “holding paramount” the public welfare include sometimes acting as a faithful agent or trustee would not act? These questions are surprisingly easy to answer if we keep in mind the connection between professions and codes of ethics. The authors of a code of engineering ethics (whether those who originally drafted or approved it or those who now give it their support) are all more or less rational persons. a set of rules that is supposed to win the support of engineers because the rules help engineers do what they want to do. except for some substantial good (for example. want to be reasonably sure that the knowledge of other engineers would serve the public. The language of any document.

or whatever). having been fully informed of that danger. or whatever). Insisting that the astronauts be briefed and decide for themselves would hold the safety of the public paramount by transferring the astronauts from the category of members of the public to that of informed participants in the decision. they were in no position to abort the launch to avoid the danger.” This interpretation must be rejected. or those of his client the Space Center as comparable to those of the public (assuming. in contrast. and welfare to assure that engineers will not be forced to give too little regard to the welfare of these “innocents. But there is good reason to think we have. the “public safety” would mean the safety of everyone more or less equally. Refusing authorization would protect the public by holding the safety of the astronauts paramount. We now seem to have a sense of “holding the public safety paramount” that we may reasonably suppose rational engineers would endorse. For example. to need an interpretation of “public” invoking some more relevant feature of people. or only those with bad lungs. of course. technical knowledge. they were in a position to abort the launch if they were unwilling to take the risk the ice posed. even allowing for the occasional benefit they might obtain as individuals. it is hard to imagine how we could have electric power stations. or the like. This third interpretation of “public” thus seems to be free of the difficulties that discredited the preceding two. mountain tunnels.” On this third interpretation. someone might be part of the public in one respect but not in another. A danger that struck only children. under the circumstances. We might also interpret “public” as referring to “anyone” (in the society. On this interpretation. That alternative is that “public” refers to all “innocents” except employees of the 86 . For example. On this interpretation. I would suggest that what makes people a public is their relative innocence. public safety would be equivalent to the safety of some or all. of course.APPENDIX F We might interpret “public” as equivalent to “everyone” (in the society. We can easily show that the only obvious alternative is wrong. as we have so far. “public” would refer to those persons whose lack of information. Since few dangers are likely to threaten everyone. The astronauts would. An engineer should hold paramount the public safety. the astronauts would be part of the public with respect to the 0-rings because. what is not true. On this interpretation. not knowing of the danger. or passivity. On this interpretation. helplessness. Either way. Have we? There is. have had to treat his own interests. local. We seem. interpreting “public” to mean “everyone” would yield a duty to the public too weak to protect most engineers from having to do things that would generally make life for themselves (and those they care about) far worse than it would otherwise be. not be part of the public with respect to the ice forming on the boosters because. rather than. Is this the correct interpretation of “public”? It is if we have taken into account every relevant consideration. that we have considered all the public interests relevant here). no way to know. this second would make them too strong. Lund would not. then. those of his employer Thiokol. just their number. would not endanger “the public. No rational engineer could endorse a code of ethics that made engineering virtually impossible. or time for deliberation renders them more or less vulnerable to the powers an engineer wields on behalf of his client or employer. or chemical plants without some risk to someone. the engineer’s code of ethics would (all else equal) require Lund either to refuse to authorize the launch or to insist instead that the astronauts be briefed in order to get their informed consent to the risk. If our first interpretation of “public” made provisions protecting the public too weak. health. locale. Holding the public safety paramount would mean never putting anyone in danger.

Employees are to be excluded because. engineers should support their profession’s code because supporting it will help protect them and those they care about from being injured by what other engineers do. also not in that respect be part of the public to which an engineer owed a paramount duty. if the employee lacked the information to evaluate the risk. training. engineers should support their profession’s code because supporting it helps make their profession a practice of which they need not feel morally justified embarrassment. in other words. She would. as vulnerable to. On this interpretation Lund would not have to hold the safety of the astronauts paramount. She could not be said to be paid to take those risks. and as unpaid for the risks in question as anyone else in the public. they are paid to take the risks associated with their job. from being the employee unknowingly at risk. since they would not be part of the public. She would not be an “innocent. shame. So. She would have given informed consent to the risk in question. An employee who takes a job knowing the risks (and is otherwise able to avoid them) might be able to insist on being paid enough to compensate for them. supporting the code will also help assure each engineer a working environment in which it will be easier than it would otherwise be to resist pressure to do much that the engineer would rather not do. Engineers should not only do as their profession’s code requires. ostracizing. I think. that is. She could then truly be said to be paid to take those risks. or otherwise calling to account those who do not. Do their professional responsibilities go beyond the code? The answer. or time for deliberation renders them vulnerable to the powers an engineer wields on behalf of his client or employer. she would be in no position to insist on adequate compensation. is clearly yes. we understood “innocents” to include all persons whose lack of information. And fourth. Since nothing prevents an engineer. Third. What is wrong with this fourth interpretation of “public”? Earlier. or someone for whom an engineer cares. one has an obligation of fairness to do his part insofar as he claims to be an engineer and other engineers are doing their part in generating these benefits for all engineers. On the other hand. or guilt. but should also support it less directly by encouraging others to do as it requires and by criticizing. it might be said. V. the third and fourth interpretations would not differ concerning such an employee. engineers have as much reason to want to protect such employees as to protect the public in general. be as innocent of. They should support their profession’s code in these ways for at least four reasons: First. “Public” should be interpreted accordingly. Second.” But she would. under our third interpretation. according to our third interpretation. 87 .APPENDIX F client or employer in question. engineers clearly are responsible for acting as their profession’s code of ethics requires. PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES Given the argument developed so far.

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Pursuant to G.). and Ziegler Cooper eventually contracted with another registered architect. 112. Nolan. held that: (1) architect did not “prepare” final drawings to which he affixed his seal within meaning of statute governing revocation and suspension of architect’s certificate of registration. Architect appealed. Suffolk. C.APPENDIX G 414 Mass 1 JOHN CATLIN v. contracted with the owners of the Border Cafe Restaurant in Cambridge to provide “schematic designs. 1986. interior architectural design. The Board of Registration of Architects ruled that architect had improperly affixed his seal to plans not prepared by himself or his subordinates and placed architect on probation for two years. J. Ziegler Cooper submitted completed plans and drawings to the designated local architect on or about June 3. Ziegler Cooper. 23.. John Catlin. and furnishings selection services” for a proposed renovation of the restaurant. Decided Dec. 1992. Argued Nov. BOARD OF REGISTRATION OF ARCHITECTS Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. reserved and reported case to full Court. LYNCH. but stayed the suspension and placed Catlin on probation for two years. (2) assuming failure of Board to review transcript from related federal trial which was part of architect’s brief. NOLAN. On March 7. JJ. Affirmed. an out-of-State architectural firm with no member of its staff registered in Massachusetts. design development. Suffolk County. The restaurant owners retained their rights to final review and approval of the designs. and (3) Board’s reading of statute did not violate commerce clause. The local architect was fired. A single justice of this court reserved and reported the case to the full court on the administrative record. O’Connor. 1992. Inc.. Ziegler Cooper was to “coordinate with” a local architect regarding site investigations and existing conditions and to confer with regulatory authorities to ensure that the design was in compliance with local building codes. The Supreme Judicial Court.” and that John Catlin & Associates 89 . we conclude that there was no error in the board’s decision. Architect disciplinary proceeding was brought. Catlin appealed from the board’s decision. (Ziegler Cooper). J. Justice … The board suspended for six months Catlin’s registration to practice architecture in the Commonwealth. 2. WILKINS. … Before LIACOS. The terms of that agreement provided that Ziegler Cooper was to “prepare construction documentation for the project. 1986. After reviewing the record.. such error was harmless. The facts of this case are undisputed. According to the contract. Nolan. L. & GREANEY.J. The Supreme Judicial Court. § 64 (1990 ed. A dispute subsequently arose between the restaurant owners and the local architect over whether the plans were in compliance with local codes. c.

Ziegler Cooper informed the restaurant owners of its proposed agreement with Catlin and also informed them that Catlin’s seal would appear on the drawings submitted for final permit approval. 112. Webster’s New Int’l Dictionary 1952 (2d ed. electrical. Thus. Catlin reviewed at least two “progress sets” of drawings. or made ready the plans for use. provides that “[a] registered architect shall impress his seal on any plans or specifications only if … he was the author of such plans and specifications or in responsible charge of their preparation” (emphasis added). without sufficient evidence that the board’s interpretation of “prepared” in § 60G is inconsistent with its statutory authority. 1959) (“To fit. … Supervision is not enough. suspend or annul the certificate of registration … or otherwise discipline a registrant. we defer to the board’s judgment. L. 1986. made onsite evaluations. and plumbing] engineers for the purpose of completing the construction documentation”. nor did he produce the plans in this case. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1182 (6th ed. specifications or drawings not prepared by him or under his personal supervision by his regularly employed subordinates” (emphasis added). …”). which parallels § 60G. Catlin was not the author of the plans. and noted revisions in the plans which would be necessary to satisfy the building code. First. adapt. … … Read in conjunction with other provisions in the statute. Catlin argues that his actions were proper because he “prepared” the plans within the plain meaning of the statute. The heart of this dispute is the proper interpretation of the word “prepared” in G. He urges that the proper interpretation of “prepared” would include any acts which adapted.APPENDIX G would be responsible only for “permitting and coordination with local authorities … [and] [a]ny necessary field verification and coordination with structural or [mechanical. “prepared” in § 60G excludes the actions taken by Catlin in this case. or qualify beforehand for a particular purpose …”). qualified. … Error of law. The seal is meant to show authorship of or responsibility for the plans. § 60F. Catlin affixed his seal on the final drawings which were submitted to the Cambridge building department for approval on October 14. § 60G (e). 1990) (“To provide with necessary means. Ziegler Cooper then revised the plans in accordance with Catlin’s notations. The board reads its statutory mandate to require a greater degree of involvement by a registered Massachusetts architect to ensure the safety of the people of the Commonwealth. to make ready. upon proof satisfactory to the board … (e) that the holder of such certificate of registration has permitted or suffered his official seal to be affixed to any plans. c. met with local building code authorities. There is no evidence that either Catlin or his associates drafted any part of the construction documents. but rather plans drawn by an independent architectural firm based outside Massachusetts. The statute authorizes the board to “revoke. he reviewed not the work of his regularly employed subordinates in his normal place of business. … 90 .

which ends June 30. IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED between the undersigned parties that this matter shall be settled and resolved upon the following terms: … The RESPONDENT. for the purposes of this settlement agreement and order. that following this period of suspension. the parties desire to informally resolve the complaint in an expeditious manner. RESPONDENT agrees further. … The RESPONDENT submits and agrees to the imposition of a civil penalty in the sum of One Thousand Dollars. and. 3219) (hereinafter “RESPONDENT”) alleging violations of the statutes or regulations controlling the practice of architecture in Kentucky. the KENTUCKY STATE BOARD OF EXAMINERS AND REGISTRATION OF ARCHITECTS (hereinafter “BOARD”) has filed and properly served notice of an administrative complaint and hearing against registered architect KENNETH LEROY BUTTS (License No. … 91 . neither admits nor denies the truthfulness of the allegations set forth in the complaint on file against him. without a formal hearing. 1994. … Upon acceptance of the settlement agreement by the BOARD. RESPONDENT’s license to practice architecture in the Commonwealth of Kentucky shall be suspended for the remainder of the current licensure period. #3219 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND ORDER WHEREAS.APPENDIX H BEFORE THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY STATE BOARD OF EXAMNERS AND REGISTRATION OF ARCHITECTS IN RE: THE LICENSE OF KENNETH LEROY BUTTS. WHEREAS. that he will not renew his license or certificate of registration.

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investigation memorandum and the settlement agreement and order for the Kentucky action. and ordered that his license not be considered for reinstatement for a minimum of three years from that date. the Board filed a formal complaint against Butts.. Butts and the Kentucky Board entered into a settlement agreement and order in November. No. agreed not to attempt to renew his license in Kentucky. WYOMING STATE BOARD OF ARCHITECTS. The Board received into evidence a certified copy of the Kentucky settlement and order.2 The Board noticed and held a hearing based on the charges against Butts in Wyoming. Appellee (Respondent). He made his living reviewing architectural plans for stores in malls across the country and reviewing plans for prototypical buildings erected by major franchises. an investigation memorandum from Kentucky. Supreme Court of Wyoming. 1996. 1994. several exhibits presented by Butts in mitigation of the Kentucky “plan stamping” charge and testimony from Butts and one of his colleagues in Kentucky.S. Butts faced disciplinary action in Kentucky before the Kentucky Board of Examiners and Registration of Architects (Kentucky Board) for “plan stamping” in violation of K. charging him with violating WYO.R.. Based on the information from Kentucky. § 33-4-115(a)(v) and (vii) Supp.APPENDIX H Kenneth Leroy BUTTS. The Board suspended Butts’ architect license in Wyoming until December 31. Feb. against a licensee upon finding of: (v) Affixing. … … An agency’s factual finding will be set aside if it is not supported by substantial evidence.STAT. which ended June 30. Butts did not admit or deny the truthfulness of the allegations or that his conduct was inappropriate in the settlement agreement and order. a seal upon a document which the architect or landscape architect was not responsible for preparing. 323. 1995) provide: (a) the board may take disciplinary actions. 26.STAT. Butts agreed to suspension of his license until the end of his current licensure period. 1993. … Butts was previously licensed to practice architecture in all fifty states. Appellant (Petitioner). or permitting to be affixed. 93 . v. However. (vii) Suspension or revocation of licensure by another state.. the administrator asked for and obtained certified copies of the notice of hearing. Having heard of the Kentucky action. 2 WYO.120(1)(f). singularly or in combinations. § 33-4-115(a)(v) and (vii). 95-106. The National Council of Architectural Registration Boards revoked its certification of Butts due to the Kentucky suspension and notified the Wyoming Board’s administrator of the disciplinary action taken in Kentucky. 1995. and was fined one thousand dollars.

§ 33-4-115 (b). Butts contends the Board is required to substantiate the underlying basis for the suspension of his license in Kentucky before it revoked his license based on a reciprocal statute. If another state revokes or suspends licensure. held a hearing and found that Butts’ license to practice architecture was suspended or revoked in Kentucky.STAT. which suspended Butts’ license in Kentucky. The Board then imposed sanctions pursuant to WYO. The terms are not vague or subject to different interpretations. the board may take disciplinary action. The copy of the settlement agreement. Nothing in the statute requires the Board to prove the underlying basis for Kentucky’s action against Butts. Affirmed. not (v). … … Despite Butts’ exhortations to the contrary. … … The Wyoming State Board of Architects and Landscape Architects acted within its authority when it suspended Butts’ architect license based on a suspension or revocation in another state. 94 .APPENDIX H … The party challenging the sufficiency of the evidence has the burden of demonstrating the agency’s decision is not supported by substancial evidence. § 33-4-115(a)(vii). … … The statute providing for reciprocal suspension or revocation of an architect license is not ambiguous. … … Further. … … The Board in this case gave Butts notice of the complaint against him. due process rights are not violated when the Board considers a sister state’s revocation or suspension of an architect’s license as long as the Board meets requirements of notice and a hearing.STAT. provided sufficient evidence that Butts’ license was suspended in Kentucky. the Board’s decision was based on its finding of a violation of WYO.

ft. Whether the Technician worked in the Technician’s office. all of the elements of “responsible control” are present. a contractual relationship establishing the Technician as an independent contractor to the Architect will give the Architect the legal means to exercise control over the Technician throughout the Technician’s work. • Weekly review and critique of the progress of construction documents for an office building of this size would satisfy the professional standard of care. but nonetheless enable the registered architect to exercise control over and have detailed knowledge of the work. 1A: Outsourced Construction Documents Properly Supervised.1 • The Architect posts the design drawings on the Architect’s world wide web site for the Technician to copy and download. even if that office is in a different state or country. at home or in another office. Based on this premise the following case studies outline both proper and improper applications of Responsible Control. The Architect has detailed the design concept sufficiently so that he or she thoroughly understands the design and has furnished the necessary guidance to the Technician. asking the Technician to post the Technician’s progress prints weekly for the Architect’s review. • Based on the above circumstances the Architect would have responsible control over the construction documents and could sign and seal them and the Technician would be exempt from registration since the Technician’s preparation of the documents would be under the Architect’s responsible control. office building from design drawings the Architect has prepared. critique and approval. also has no bearing on the issue so long as the Architect has detailed knowledge of and control over the plans during their preparation. • Assume the Architect engaged an unregistered person (Technician) to prepare construction documents for a 20.000 sq. the Architect has detailed knowledge of the construction documents during their preparation. • The Architect has engaged the Technician and thus has control over the Technician’s work.APPENDIX I Remote Plan Preparation: The Electronic Technology Task Force made a case before the 1996 Annual Meeting that technological innovations permit work to be done in other than the traditional office setting. Commentary Case Study “1A” • In this example. Whether the Technician is an independent contractor to the Architect or a full or part-time employee no longer has any bearing on the issue. Because the Architect both prepared the design drawings and reviewed and critiqued progress prints of the construction documents weekly. 95 . Review may need to be more or less frequent to meet the professional standard of care depending on the complexity of the building type. 1 Meaning drawings of the kind referred to as “design development documents” in AIA B141.

would have made the choices in the exercise of his or her professional judgments to solve the client’s needs. 1C: Outsourced Construction Documents Improperly Prepared. 96 . Commentary Case Study “1B” • While the Architect would have furnished general guidance to the Technician about the intended design drawings. • Assume that the Architect prepared the design drawings and periodically oversaw their elaboration into final construction documents by the Technician. 1D: Outsourced Design Drawings Properly Prepared. If the Technician is not a registered Architect. • In this case the Architect would have had both control over and detailed knowledge of the elaboration of the design even though the Architect didn’t personally execute the actual drawings. Therefore responsible control would not have been exercised. • The Architect could sign and seal the construction documents 1E: Outsourced Technical Submissions Must By Performed Under A Contractual Relationship. • Assume that through frequent sketches. because the Architect only reviewed the construction documents at the end the Architect would not have the detailed knowledge of the construction documents during their preparation. • Thus the Architect could not sign and seal the construction documents. therefore the Architect could not sign and seal the resulting plans. but the client’s contractor engaged the Technician directly. the detailed knowledge the Architect brought to bear through schematic designs alone would not in and of itself have been sufficiently detailed to furnish the necessary guidance to the Technician in elaborating these into design drawings. critique and approval at completion. the Architect.e. • Assume in the same circumstances as case study “A” that the Architect had prepared only schematic designs and engaged the Technician to develop these sketches into completed design drawings which the Architect would then review. • Assume that the Architect prepared detailed design drawings but engaged the Technician to prepare the construction documents and submit them to the Architect for review. As a result. the Architect could not sign and seal the plans because the Architect would not have had control over the plans during their preparation • Thus the Architect could not sign and seal the resulting plans. While the Architect in this case would have detailed knowledge of the project through the design stage. i. Wherever the Technician is physically located. the Architect would not have had either control over or detailed knowledge of the plans during their preparation. critique and approve.. not the Technician. mark-ups and other instructions the Architect continuously directs the elaboration of the design from the initial schematic designs into the completed design drawings. • The Technician alone would have been in control of the preparation. their elaboration from the schematic designs into the fully developed design drawings.APPENDIX I 1B: Outsourced Design Drawings Improperly Prepared.

The DesignBuilder’s preparation would not constitute the unlawful practice of architecture because the preparation would have been under the Architect’s responsible control exercised through the contract between the DesignBuilder and the Architect. and (d) the rendering or architectural services by such registered architect will conform to the provisions of the chapter and the rules adopted hereunder. . • The DesignBuilder engages the Architect under an agreement specifically providing that the Architect will have responsible control over the preparation of all plans and specifications for the project through the DesignBuilder’s employees. (1) the 2”Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prevent: . • In particular. Architects practicing with the required professional standard of care must enter into some form of written contractual relationship with the person preparing the plans so they have the means to exercise control over and give direction to that person. a partnership (including a registered limited liability partnership). Inc. The Architect issues frequent sketches and instructions to DesignBuilder’s employees throughout both the design and the construction documents phases. (b) there is written disclosure at the time of the offering that a registered architect is engaged by and contractually responsible to such partnership. with the right at all times to review. under provisions similar to Section 11 (8) of the Model Law2. • In this example. a firm not having in its employ an architect registered in the jurisdiction. 1F: Design Build • Assume DesignBuilder. the agreement provides that the Architect will direct development of the design and oversee implementation of the design into construction documents. 8. limited liability company or corporation (including a professional corporation) from offering a combination of (i) services involved in the practice of architecture and (ii) construction services. • In this case the Technician. limited liability company or corporation agrees that the registered architect will have responsible control of the work and that such architect’s services will not be terminated without the consent of the person engaging the partnership. the Architect had a written contractual relationship with DesignBuilder giving the Architect the means for exercising control over the unlicensed plan preparers and.. limited liability company or corporation. the Architect did not have sufficient control over the preparation of the plans to meet the required professional standard of care. would not give the Architect sufficiently direct means to control the work of the Technician. the Architect could sign and seal the construction documents because the Architect exercised responsible control over their preparation. critique and reject any matter. provided that (a) a registered architect or person otherwise permitted under paragraph 9 of this Section to offer architectural services participates substantially in all material aspects of the offer. . the DesignBuilder would have unlawfully offered architectural services unless. in fact. Relying on the contractual relationship of another.” 97 . has been hired by a client to provide design and construction of a project. • However.APPENDIX I Commentary Case Study “E” • Because the Architect had no contractual relationship with the Technician (in this example the contractor engaged the Technician). Commentary Case Study “F” • Although the Architect was engaged by the DesignBuilder. exercised such control. and perhaps the Technician’s employer and the client would be engaging in the unlawful practice of architecture. here the contractor’s engagement of the Technician.

Architect substantially participated in all material aspects of offering the architectural and construction services to the client, (2) there was written disclosure to the client of the Architect’s contractual status with the DesignBuilder at the time of the offering, and (3) the agreement between the Architect and the DesignBuilder, in addition to providing that the Architect will have responsible control of the work, also provided that the Architect’s services cannot be terminated without the client’s consent. 1G: Signing Plans Prepared By Another Architect Registered in the same Jurisdiction. • Assume that a owner engages a Design Architect who is a registered architect in the jurisdiction in which the project is planned to prepare the design drawings for a project to be built in that jurisdiction. The client (having a right with the Design Architect to do so) then takes a Design Architect’s drawings and gives them to a Production Architect, who also is a registered architect in the jurisdiction, to prepare construction documents. • In this example, because the Production Architect reviewed the work of another architect registered in the same jurisdiction and incorporated it into the Production Architect’s work, the Production Architect could sign and seal the construction documents.


New York Report
Sunday, December 21, 1997

The New York Times
New York City Relies on the Construction Industry to Police Itself
After building mishaps, questioning the wisdom of untangling red tape. By Randy Kennedy Over the last two decades, driven by budget cuts and what it calls the impossibility of overseeing the city’s vast construction projects, New York City has largely handed over the regulation of the building industry to the industry itself. Asserting that licensed architects and engineers hired by developers are more qualified than municipal inspectors to insure the safety of everything from singe-family homes to skyscrapers, New York City has now moved further than any other large American city in allowing licensed professionals to approve their own blueprints, inspect work at construction sites and conduct regular follow-up examinations of buildings, according to officials. Bur recent problems at two buildings have renewed questions about whether too much regulatory responsibility has been vested in builders, especially in a city with so many huge, fast-paced construction jobs and aging buildings. In the most recent case, in which a ton of bricks rained from the wall of an office tower on Madison Avenue, the structural problems that caused the bricks to come loose were described in a long-running lawsuit that began in the mid-1970s. But the city was never told of the defects because no one was required to do so. In 1982, a privately hired inspector also found minor cracks and shifting in one wall, which he reported to the city’s Buildings Department. But the law did not require the department to send its own inspectors to the site, and so it did not. In the second case, in early November, on Donald J. Trump’s 18-building Riverside South project on the Upper West Side, five batches of weak concrete were found to have been poured on one floor of a high-rise and 15 floors then erected atop it, even though a private engineer had rejected the concrete. The contractor apparently ignored the engineer’s judgments, the engineer was not required to report the problem to the city and a city inspector learned of the problem only by accident. In both cases, there is no guarantee that city inspectors would have caught the problems even if they had been authorized to inspect walls or construction sites. But critics of the current system say that the city—in its rush to untangle the legendary red tape that has hindered construction—has all but abandoned its independent oversight role and now relies heavily on architects and engineers to police the very people who write their paychecks.


“It has gotten to the point where it seems the city’s only enforcement responsibilities come after something has fallen or someone has been hurt,” said Councilwoman Ronnie M. Eldridge, who recently introduced a bill to require concrete testing labs to inform the city of weak samples. “It seems to me that even in a city this big, it is not a challenge beyond the powers of government to put a system in place that enforces the laws better than this,” Ms. Eldridge said. City officials concede that there are inherent conflicts in the system and that there is a chance that professionals can cheat. “You always have a few rotten apples,” said Richard C. Visconti, the deputy buildings commissioner. “That’s human nature, unfortunately.” But officials say the public is protected because architects and engineers know they risk losing their licenses if they cut corners. “We believe very strongly that we license trades, and the state licenses professionals, specifically to insure public safety,” Mr. Visconti said. “And they have a personal stake in it: their livelihoods.” Shortcuts or omissions like those apparently taken on the 39-story tower at 540 Madison “are extremely, extremely rare,” he said. The problems there include the failure to install many of the ties holding the brick facade to the inner structural wall. Furthermore, city officials and engineers say licensed professionals can do the job better and faster than the staff of about 60 municipal construction inspectors, whose chief job requirement is five years’ experience in a construction trade. Frank J. Lorenz, president of the New York Association of Consulting Engineers, said most of the construction inspectors “don’t have any strict professional training.” He compared the experience of being supervised at a job site by a city inspector to “going for your college exam and having a high-school student grade you on it.” Over the years, city officials say, dozens of inspectors have also been arrested for accepting bribes to pad their salaries (about $50,000 a year including benefits, for construction inspectors). But an underlying question remains about the self-policing system: Does it employ enough checks and balances to catch unscrupulous professionals, or even honest mistakes? Although the city performs audits on a certain percentage of other self-certified jobs—like boiler and plumbing inspections and building plan approvals—it has not performed spot checks on construction sites since at least 1985, city inspectors say. It also never audits facade inspections, a program under which owners of buildings seven stories or higher must hire engineers or architects to regularly examine walls facing public streets and sidewalks. The law was passed after a Barnard College freshman was killed in 1979 by a falling chunk of terra cotta. City inspectors recall that shortly after that measure took effect, they made it an informal practice to go out occasionally with binoculars to check on some self-inspected walls, especially those examined by professionals who performed hundreds of facade inspections the same year.


said in an interview last week. the Real Estate Board of New York even offered to build 3. and the third involves an engineer who certified that construction was following an approved plan when the plan had not yet been approved.” said one veteran Manhattan inspector. By 1985. architects. Miele. you might have had to stop your job and wait on approval for days. the real-estate industry was pushing hard for greater freedom. whose name was kept confidential as part of a kind of plea agreement. Relying on a professional certification. an inspector walks through with a set of plans. Joseph Margolis. And in 1994. people would be more tempted to cut corners because we’re always fighting the clock. Despite the incident. the Buildings Department has filed complaints with state licensing officials against 33 architects and engineers. two involve improper asbestos removal. the city made many of the changes sought by the real estate industry. said that “without inspectors. “There weren’t enough of us to do it anyway. the Buildings Department changed rules so that engineers. president of the board. making it impossible to tell whether they concern possible lies about whether a project complied with codes. which was weakened by holes for pipes and electrical lines. Of the remaining three cases. In fact.APPENDIX J But the law did not require the checks. for example. “You can’t do work like that in this city. the final document tenants need. It is unclear how aggressively the city pursues the professionals if it does catch them breaking the rules. even greater strides were made toward self-regulation. who spoke on the condition that his name not be used.” And more troubling questions were raised about the system in 1990. plumbers and electricians could approve their own plans and conduct inspections on minor jobs. In new buildings.” Steven Spinola. many people in the building trades opposed the idea. Although provisions for self-regulation have existed at least since the city’s 1938 building code. who came to head the department from a private civil engineering practice. “Depending on which administration you were in and what cutbacks might have been made. Since 1990.” But at the time. the city had made only a cursory review of plans for work on the ceiling.000 apartments on a nonprofit basis if the city would eliminate barriers to development. after a ceiling in a croissant shop on the Upper West Side collapsed and killed a woman. Municipal buildings inspectors say their power has been diluted to the point that they now only respond to complaints or conduct quick inspections of new buildings after they are finished. The engineer. allowing architects and engineers to approve their own blueprints for new construction and to make inspections even on major jobs and new construction. under Buildings Commissioner Joel A. 101 . then the executive vice president of the New York City Builders Association. But because 30 of the cases resulted in no disciplinary action or are still being pursued. and they continued only about three months. In 1975. including much of the inspection system. one of the least severe penalties. was fined $500. the roots of the present system can be traced to the fiscal crisis two decades ago. such as renovations. making sure stairs are wide enough or fire doors are where they should be before issuing a certificate of occupancy. with the city inspection staff cut back significantly. the records are sealed.

based in San Francisco. head of the Structural Engineers Association of Northern California. I mean.” 102 . said “Above everything else.” said Pat Buscovich. we wouldn’t have city building departments if there weren’t some problems in the industry. It’s kind of a joke.” In interviews last week. third-party review by somebody who has no vested interest. engineers in several other large cities said they were surprised by how far New York has moved toward self-regulation. But I’ve run across too many who don’t. a consulting engineer in Miami.” the Manhattan inspector said.” John C.APPENDIX J “But we can’t tell how well the walls are made or anything about the structure. Pistorino. There wouldn’t be a need for a building code. engineers are supposed to hold public safety the highest. “The whole idea of a thing like a plan check is that you’re getting an independent. “It’s just a safety inspection. “I don’t know of any jurisdiction in the sate of California that would allow that kind of certification by an engineer with no city input.

000. Jr. 2) Certifying or participating in the certification of documents to Sun Belt about the architectural fees due and owing on Jefferson Lakes. the Board makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. DODDS FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW A.S. 37:153(A) (5).807 sq. R. (4) The total hard costs on the project were approximately $7.S.00 and the total soft costs were approximately $4. Bonfanti-Fackrell was both the contractor and the owner. 1989.S.S.000. 103 . 37:153(A) (1).S. and Board rule § 1701(P).S. Thomas Russell Iglehart.000. La. (“Fackrell”) obtaining more than $600.000. and Board rule § 1701(P). R. FINDINGS OF FACTS (1) By virtue of a verbal agreement with Bonfanti-Fackrell. La. 37:153(A) (6).000. and issue a certificate of occupancy for the City.S. (3) Signing a lease for 6. more than Dodds intended to lease. R. (2) By his verbal agreement Dodds was not required to inspect the project. of office space in Essen Center which was 5. 37:153(A) (1). Dodds testified that Fackrell had never previously asked him to do anything wrong and that Fackrell was one of Dodds’ best friends. INTRODUCTION On October 12. Dodds lived in close proximity to the project and visited the project on an almost daily basis. 37:153(A) (5). La. in violation of La.256 sq. The lender was Sun Belt. perform progress reviews on the draw requests. Louisiana. ft.00 . R.$5. 37:153(A) (6). or suspended for any or all of the following reasons: (1) Certifying false information to Sun Belt Federal Bank (“Sun Belt”) about the progress of construction on the Jefferson Lakes apartment project (“Jefferson Lakes”) on Old Jefferson Highway in Baton Rouge. Dodds served as architect for Jefferson Lakes. (3) Dodds had a ten year relationship with Fackrell which had been very satisfactory. and Board rule § 1701(P).000. 37:153(A) (6).00 from the bank for non-existent work at the site in violation of La.S.00 (5) The Contract Document prepared by Dodds included the AIA 201 General Conditions (1976 edition). Dodds (“Dodds”) should be revoked. or both. and William Brockway and the exhibits. R. Based upon the testimony of Dodds. the full board conducted a hearing for the purposes of determining whether the certificate of registration or license. R. ft.000. rescinded. B. R. 37:153(A) (5). of James D.S.APPENDIX K LOUISIANA STATE BOARD OF ARCHITECTURAL EXAMINERS PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE STATE OF LOUISIANA IN THE MATTER OF JAMES D. in violation of La. R. but only required to do the construction documents. R. La. resulting in George Bonfanti (“Bonfanti”) and Gerald Fackrell. 37:153(A) (1).

69 sq. Initially Dodds refused to sign the request. As soon as Dodds did not get the letter.3. Inc. By observations in the field Dodds estimated the amount of excess in the first draw request was approximately $600. Dodds knew that the amount of work set forth in the draw request allegedly performed was not in fact performed and that the amount of the draw request was inaccurate and false.143. Introduced in evidence was an Affidavit from Patricia S. (D-10) (15) Dodds testified that he was “duped” and “taken in. GC 9.528.807. (7) Dodds testified that Fackrell first presented this draw request to him about two weeks before 09/07/84.. (13) Fackrell never furnished the promised letter. Limited for 6. On the second and later draw request Dodds testified that he “started cutting the draw significantly. (14) Dodds never spoke to anybody at the bank about the promised letter. stating that Dodds came to Fackrell’s office and asked whether a letter had come for him from Sun Belt regarding the First Hard Cause Draw Request.2 was applicable.” (9) Fackrell claimed that the loan agreement between Bonfanti-Fackrell and Sun Belt was part of the “Contract Documents.00 of work had been performed and requested payment for $1.” (11) On or about 09/07/84 Dodds testified that the bank had the letter ready and that Fackrell would bring the letter back with the signed draw request. Draw will catch up later.. he knew something was wrong.” but no documentary evidence to support this testimony was produced. Fackrell claimed that GC 9. Dees.000. 1 dated 09/04/84 stated that $1.2 provides: “Unless otherwise provided in the Contract Documents.” (17) On April 8. on the fifth floor of the Essen Centre Building in Baton Rouge at a time when he did not intend to occupy that space. ft. 104 .” (16) Dodds admitted that what he had done with respect to the first request was “totally wrong. Dodds further testified that by the end of the job the draw requests were within $100. Fackrell’ secretary.. payments will be made on account of materials or equipment not incorporated in the work but delivered and suitably stored at the site.” that the first draw request was part of the loan agreement.3. Dodds signed a lease agreement with BFC 8.450. and that this first draw contained more money than justified by the work performed because the bank was to use the excess for some other purpose.00.200. Fackrell promised a letter from Sun Belt explaining the excess draw. This hard draw request was signed by Dodds on 09/07/84 indicating his approval thereof. (10) Dodds’ project diary for 09/04/84 states: “Gerry explains that the bank had to do it.000.00 or so of the actual work performed.00 (8) Dodds further knew that the AIA General Conditions prohibited an architect from certifying this draw request. 1985.APPENDIX K (6) Contractor’s Request for Payment No. but believed that the bank was aware that the draw request was inflated. (12) Dodds was aware of the significance of the draw request as far as the bank was concerned.

(21) Dodds never notified the bank that he did not intend to occupy all of the space mentioned in the lease. A draft of this counter letter was furnished to Dodds. explained to him that a counterletter in Louisiana was legal. R. CONCLUSION OF LAW (25) La. rather than the 6. or suspend the certificate of registration or the license. Dodds testified that about four or five months after the project was underway he learned that Bonanti-Fackrell was representing to the bank that the architectural fees were $195.00.S.000.” (27) “Dishonesty” within the meaning of La. 37:153 is a broad term which includes any conduct which lacks honesty. ft. (24) Dodds cooperated with and provided assistance to the subcontractors in completing the project.S. or both.00. and (6) Willfully violating the provisions of this Chapter or any lawful rule or regulation adopted by the Board pursuant to law. (22) Dodds’ fee for the project was $100. Dodds cooperated with the federal government in its successful prosecution of Bonfanti and Fackrell. 37:153. (5) Willfully misleading or defrauding any person employing him as an architect. Dodds testified that Jimmy Stewart. (20) Dodds knew that the lease agreement that he signed would be presented to the bank. or breaches a trust. or gross negligence in the practice or architecture.807. of an architect found guilty of any of the following: “(1) Gross incompetence.500 sq. rescind. no formal charges were filed by the federal government against Dodds.S. an attorney. wants of integrity. R. but Fackrell explained that they owed a fee to an architectural firm in Houston and also had a clerk of the works. R.” (26) Board Rule § provides: “An architect shall not engage in conduct involving fraud or wanton disregard of the rights of others. (19) At that time Dodds knew that banks normally require a certain amount of the building to be leased before approval of financing. stated in the lease. ft. 105 .APPENDIX K (18) Dodds testified that Fackrell had promised a counterletter that Dodds would only be responsible for a maximum of 1.800 sq. or that he was seeking a counterletter from the lessor. 37:153 provides that the Board shall revoke. dishonesty. At that time Dodds was actually occupying approximately 1. (23) Formal charges were filed against Fackrell and Bonanti in connection with this false draw request. C.000. ft.” (28) Knowingly certifying for payment work not actually performed in draw request is “dishonesty” in the practice of architecture within the meaning of La. Conduct which involves a disposition to deceive or fraud is also “dishonesty.69 sq. Dodds felt this was a plausible explanation. which he leased from Bonfanti-Fackrell.

if it finds an architect guilty of the conduct described therein.00 in work not performed was “dishonesty” within the meaning of La. Nonetheless.APPENDIX K Regardless of motive. 106 . (38) La. “Gross negligence” differs from “ordinary negligence” in degree. the Board finds it unnecessary to decide whether this conduct would be a violation of the Licensing Law or its Rules. R. Such certification can have a disastrous effect upon bankers. (30) Such conduct is also a violation of La.S. 37:153 connotes such an extreme deficiency on part of a professional in the basic knowledge and skill necessary that one may reasonably question his ability to practice that profession at the threshold level of professional competence. (36) Finding Dodds did not certify or participate in the certification of documents to Sun Belt about architectural fees due and owing on Jefferson Lakes. (37) Finding that Dodds signed the lease agreement after he knew that Fackrell had not told him the truth about the first draw request. and subcontractors. 37:153. certifying incomplete work as complete on a draw request is an intentional misrepresentation. rescind. R. or suspend the certificate of registration or License.S.S.” it is unnecessary for the Board to decide whether Dodds’ conduct in certifying the false draw request would also be “gross negligence” within the meaning of La. … (32) In the area of certifying draw requests the duty of an architect extends to persons other than the owner.S. R. (31) In defining the negligence of an architect. R. R. (34) Since the board has concluded that Dodds’ knowing and intentional certification of non-existent work in the draw request was “dishonesty. owners. including sureties. His conclusion is supported by the testimony of Dodds’ own expert. and further finding that Dodds did not receive any of the “excess” architectural fees. R. the Board concludes that Dodds did not violate the Licensing Law or these Rules insofar as any certification of documents to Sun Belt concerning architectural fees. (29) The Board concludes that the knowing certification by Dodds of $600.000. 37:153. Dodds testified that he was aware of such Rule at the time he certified the draw request. “gross negligence” is negligence substantially and appreciably greater than ordinary negligence. subcontractors. 37:153(6) in that it is a violation of Board Rule §1701(P). 37:153 provides that the Board shall revoke. 37:153. or both. and others involved in a construction project. lenders. the Board is concerned about Dodds’ signing a lease for more office space than he intended to lease when he knew that this lease would be furnished to and relied upon by the bank. Louisiana cases have held that an architect’s conduct is to be measured by the standard of skill and care exercised by other professionals in the same locality. sureties.S. … (33) The Board recognizes that there is a difference between the ordinary professional negligence involved in a civil suit and the “gross negligence” mentioned in La.S. The issue of “gross incompetence” is not involved herein. (35) “Gross incompetence” within the meaning of La.

APPENDIX K (39) Although Dodds is guilty of conduct prohibited by the licensing law. … 107 . and Dodds cooperated with federal officials in the criminal proceedings against Bonfanti and Fackrell. 1 has caused unfavorable publicity to the architectural profession. ORDER For the foregoing reasons: IT IS ORDERED that Dodds’ license to practice architecture be suspended for a period of six (6) months. Dodds attempted to correct the excess draw by cutting subsequent draws. If either of the aforesaid conditions are violated. extenuating circumstances in Dodds’ favor are: the contractor and the owner were the same entity. however. the probationary period shall be immediately revoked and the aforesaid suspension shall take effect beginning with the date of this revocation. Dodds did not receive any excess funds paid as a result of the wrongful certification. Dodds voluntarily assisted subcontractors in completing the project. Dodds recognized the wrongful and serious nature of his conduct. the unfavorable publicity which has already damaged Dodds. due to the extenuating circumstances mentioned herein the imposition of this six month suspension is hereby withheld and Dodds is placed upon unsupervised probation for a period of one (1) year subject to the following conditions: (1) Dodds shall refrain from violating any rules or regulations of the board. and (2) Dodds shall immediately notify the board of any complaints or claims against him which arise out of his practice of architecture. (40) Dodds’ false certification of unperformed work in draw request No.

108 .

(5) Doughty attended entertainment activities with interested parties. Doughty regularly participated in meetings with insurance company lobbyists and other representatives and employees of insurance companies having an interest in matters before the Division of Insurance. (3) As the Insurance Commissioner. (4) In addition to meetings held at the Division of Insurance office. recommendations and enforcement of all applicable statutes pertaining to entities engaged in insurance or insurance-related enterprises. The interested parties routinely paid for Doughty’s expenses. Les Miserables.APPENDIX L COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS STATE ETHICS COMMISSION IN THE MATTER OF KATHERINE DOUGHTY DISPOSITION AGREEMENT This Disposition Agreement (“Agreement”) is entered into between the State Ethics Commission (“Commission”) and Katherine Doughty (“Doughty”) pursuant to Section 5 of the Commission’s Enforcement Procedures. The Division of Insurance is contained within the Consumer Affairs Secretariat. This Secretariat has as its primary function the protection of the consumer and the regulation of certain industries doing business within the Commonwealth. approximately three times a week. the agency responsible for regulating every facet of insurance business transacted within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Doughty attended with interested parties performances of The Phantom of the Opera. The Insurance Commissioner is the appointing authority for the Division of Insurance. (“interested parties”). The Four Seasons and Biba. on average.1 109 . … The Commission and Doughty now agree to the following facts and conclusions of law: (1) Doughty served as Insurance Commissioner from July 1991 until June 1993. Doughty regularly met with interested parties outside of the office at restaurants and at entertainment events (“entertainment activities”). (2) The Insurance Commissioner has overall responsibility and authority concerning regulation. The Bay Tower Room. The Insurance Commissioner is appointed by the Governor. Such entertainment activities included meals at restaurants such as the Parker House. a Boston Red Sox game and a concert at Tanglewood. The objective of the Secretariat is to strike a fair balance between consumer protection and the fostering of a beneficial business climate. In addition.

the entertainment activities listed above had both a social and business purpose. §23(b)(3) prohibits a public employee from knowingly.000. (8) Doughty did not disclose in writing to her appointing authority that interested parties were paying on a regular basis for her expenses associated with the entertainment activities.L.00) as a civil penalty for her course of conduct in violation of G. on the basis of the following terms and conditions agreed to by Doughty: (1) that Doughty pay to the Commission the sum of two thousand dollars ($2. c. acting in a manner which would cause a reasonable person having knowledge of the relevant circumstances to conclude that anyone can improperly influence or unduly enjoy her favor in the performance of her official duties. (12) In view of the foregoing violations of G. §23(b)(3) by attending entertainment activities as the guest of interested parties under the circumstances described above without disclosing in writing such activity to her appointing authority. It shall be unreasonable to so conclude if the public employee has disclosed in writing to her appointing authority the facts which would otherwise lead to such a conclusion. (7) At all relevant times. Therefore. (10) By engaging in a practice of accepting benefits in meals and entertainment on a regular basis from individuals who had an interest in matters before the Division of Insurance. a written public disclosure of these facts to Doughty’’ appointing authority pursuant to §23(b)(3) was required. or with reason to know.APPENDIX L (6) According to Doughty. c. … 110 . Doughty knew that the interested parties paying her expenses had interests in matters before the Division of Insurance. In so doing. (9) General laws. who relocated to Massachusetts from Texas in order to take the position of Insurance Commissioner. 268A. (11) Doughty cooperated with the Commission’s investigation. a reasonable person would conclude that such interested parties can unduly enjoy the Insurance Commissioner’s favor in the performance of her official duties when matters concerning the interested parties come before the Division of Insurance.268A by Doughty.L. all while Doughty was in a position to take official action which could benefit the givers. the Commission has determined that the public interest would be served by the disposition of this matter without further enforcement proceedings. C. she violated §23(b)(3). and without notifying her appointing authority. Doughty acted in a manner which would cause a reasonable person knowing all of the facts to conclude that the interested parties can improperly influence her in the performance of her official duties. In other words. when interested parties who have business pending before the Division of Insurance invite the Insurance Commissioner to attend entertainment events with them on a regular basis and where the interested parties pay for the Insurance Commissioner to attend such events. 268A.

1991. 911 P. Harvard Alumni Bulletin. 111 . Rules of Conduct. DC: AIA. Matthys and Mario Salvadori. 604 N. New York City Relies on the Construction Industry to Police Itself. Joe. Board of Registration of Architects. Legal Cases and Materials for the Construction Professional. DC: NCARB (February). (Spring): 150-167. Morgenstern. Washington. New Yorker. 6. Butts v. Wyoming State Board of Architects. Sapers. National Council of Architectural Registration Boards. The Hyatt Regency Decision: One View. In Why Buildings Fall Down. AIA Contract Document B141. DC: NCARB (July). 1992.E. 4 (August). Rubin. State Board of Architectural Examiners. 744 S. Randy. Missouri Board for Architects. New York: W. Norton & Company. NEWSPAPERS Kennedy. Gragg. Philosophy and Public Affairs. Carl M. MA. 41. 1992. 1999. 1988. The Worst Structural Disaster in the United States. Anderson v. Charles I. Unpublished teaching material. City Perils: The Fifty-Nine-Story Crisis.W. Washington. Duncan et al. 1999. 1997. Boston Architectural Center. v. _____. 21 December. Unpublished teaching material for Harvard Graduate School of Design in Cambridge. _____. 29 May. DC: NCARB (July). Washington. ARTICLES Davis. 2d 1301 (MA 1992). Robert and Lisa Banick. 1997. Report of the Electronic Technology Task Force. Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors. 2d 524 (MO 1988). DOCUMENTS FROM EDUCATIONAL AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS The American Institute of Architects. Washington. LEGAL CASES Richard N. Presented at the 1997 Annual Meeting. 1997. Because Wisdom Can’t Be Told. 1995. Catlin v. no. Michael. Legislative Guidelines and Model Law.W. _____. 1997. New York Times. 1940. Thinking Like an Engineer: The Place of a Code of Ethics in the Practice of a Profession. 2d 1062 (WY 1996).BIBLIOGRAPHY BOOKS Levy. Model Regulations. Report Respecting The Signing and Sealing of Technical Documents. 1999. 19 October. The Construction Lawyer. The Granite Block.

Sun-Diamond Growers of California. Gratuity Law). Web Sites Online Ethics Center for Engineering and Science (http://onlineethics. Marshall-Schule Assocs. St. U. Butts Settlement Agreement and Order. STATE STATUTES California Architects Practice Act. 2d 381 (1984). Howell & Associates.E.C.235-7 (FL App. 127 VT 404 (1969). Exposition of the Evidence Against Mr. 112 .4. Before the Board of Architects Examiners of the State of Oregon. §3135. Louisiana State Board of Architectural Examiners. 1026-7 (NY 1987). 1989. Jullian Goodrich Architects. 5589 and 5590. Goldman.S. Bliss & Nyitray. §789 dd-1 (U.BIBLIOGRAPHY Markus & Nocka v.S. 463. Howell. 526 U. Matter of James D.A. 1973. 2d 1359 (1982). 780 Code of Massachusetts Regulation 122. Paul. 2d 229. Commonwealth of Massachusetts State Ethics Commission. Foreign Corrupt Practice Act). 1993. OTHER LEGAL DOCUMENTS Black’s Law Dictionary. d/b/a George L. 1981). Title 21. 1973. Before the Commonwealth of Kentucky State Board of Examiners and Registration of Architects. appeal dismissed. Arata and Architects Pacifica. 18 U. November 19. Agnew as of October 10. NC Admin. d/b/a George L. U. Inc.S.0206(b)(1996). FEDERAL STATUTES 15 U.S. In Re: License of Kenneth L. Dodds. 1992. Disposition Agreement. 316 S. Matter of Katherine Doughty. 2d 1024. District Court of Maryland. STATE REGULATIONS California Code of Regulations. George L. State ex rel. Howell & Associates. Ltd. 6th edition. Howell. 1995. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS Matter of Anthony M. United States v.. Department of Justice. So.. Howard G. October 10.C. November 3. 408 So. 137 Misc. George L. February 9.S.S. 1990. State of South Carolina v.2. Code. 281 S.S. §§5588. 398 (1999).C. v.. January 21. Rolls v. MN: West Publishing Co. §201(c) (U. Lowe v.


PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT QUIZ True These questions assume that the applicable professional conduct requirements are those set forth in the recommended Rules of Conduct in Item 1. An architect need not disclose to the owner the architect’s father’s 75% silent financial interest in the construction company he/she has recommended that the owner engage. An architect with knowledge that another architect has engaged in unlawful plan stamping is required to report this to that state’s architectural registration board. An architect need not worry about registering as an architect in other states if the architect incorporates and practices in the other states through the corporation. even under someone else’s supervision. Even if an architect has been given immunity from prosecution for the violation. it is a breach of the architect’s professional responsibility obligations to violate criminal laws in the conduct of the architect’s practice. An architect may claim credit for designing any building so long as the architect has spent at least forty hours working on the building. an architect must render decisions impartially if the architect has agreed to do so under the architect’s contract. In interpreting contract documents. False (A) (B) QUESTION 2 (A) (B) QUESTION 3 (A) (B) QUESTION 4 (A) (B) QUESTION 5 (A) (B) QUESTION 6 (A) (B) QUESTION 7 (A) (B) QUESTION 8 (A) (B) 115 . even if that may mean that the architect jeopardizes his/her chances of receiving future commissions from the owner. QUESTION 1 An architect may accept referral fees from subcontractors on a project without disclosing these to the owner as long as the fees are reasonable. An architect may accept compensation from equipment suppliers in return for specifying their products as long as the architect does not solicit the compensation from the suppliers.

If work such as designing a single-family residence is exempted from a state’s definition of the “practice of architecture.” anyone can design such exempted buildings. an architect may not practice architecture in a state in which he or she is not registered.” that person may refer to himself as an “architect” of that category of exempted buildings. An architect practicing out of state and disciplined there for a violation of that state’s rules of conduct is not subject to discipline in the architect’s home state under similar rules of conduct because his/her home state registration board cannot look beyond its borders in meting out discipline. the architect must report the decision to the code authority having juridiction. To exercise responsible control over plan preparation. an architect must have control over and detailed knowledge of the content of the plans during their preparation. An architectural firm offering architectural services through multiple offices must have a registered architect regularly employed in each of the offices. Architects may not be legally able to collect fees for architectural services rendered in states where they are not registered.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT QUIZ True QUESTION 9 If an architect knows that his/her client is refusing against the architect’s advice to correct a building code violation that makes the building unsafe. an architect may give substantial gifts to prospective clients as long as none of the clients are government officials. Even though an architect may be registered in many states. In connection with seeking commissions. False (A) (B) QUESTION 10 (A) (B) QUESTION 11 (A) (B) QUESTION 12 (A) (B) QUESTION 13 (A) (B) QUESTION 14 (A) (B) QUESTION 15 (A) (B) QUESTION 16 (A) (B) QUESTION 17 (A) (B) 116 . If an unregistered person is permitted to design a building that is exempt from a state’s definition of the “practice of architecture.

An architect may be in “responsible control” of the preparation of plans if the architect does nothing more than carefully review the plans at the end for code compliance and then seal them. False (A) (B) QUESTION 19 (A) (B) QUESTION 20 (A) (B) QUESTION 21 (A) (B) QUESTION 22 (A) (B) QUESTION 23 (A) (B) QUESTION 24 (A) (B) QUESTION 25 (A) (B) 117 . when making public statements on architectural issues.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT QUIZ True QUESTION 18 An architect with an office in State A. can submit those plans to a building official in State B without the architect registering in State B because the plans were physically prepared in State A. An NCARB certificate entitles an architect to practice in any US state without necessarily needing to be registered in that state. an architect need not disclose any economic interest the architect has in the issue. An architect may not deliberately make a materially false statement on his/her registration renewal. An architect charged by an architectural registration board with incompetence because of instances of numerous code violations in his/her plans may avoid discipline by showing that the building code officials reviewing the plans missed the violations. where all of the plans are prepared. An architect is not subject to discipline for incompetence unless there is an actual building failure. In most states. In most states it is acceptable for architects to sign a contract to provide architectural services and to design a project to the point of submitting building permit drawings before registering in the state.

The architect will fully discharge his/her professional conduct responsibilities by simply sending a memo to the structural engineer. QUESTION 30 Excessive trip benefits beyond ordinary hospitality give the appearance of compensation in return for specifying the product. the architectural registration board has no jurisdiction in the matter because of its criminal nature. In the Scenario regarding Brown Architects. The architect should order additional testing of the concrete to verify its strength. False (A) (B) QUESTION 27 (A) (B) QUESTION 28 (A) (A) (B) (B) QUESTION 29 (A) (A) (B) (B) QUESTION 31 QUESTION 32 (A) (B) 118 . QUESTION 26 The architect’s professional conduct responsibilities are fully discharged if the architect simply tells the owner that the concrete fails to meet strength tests. The architect should rely on the owner to resolve the problem. A plant trip is a legitimate means of investigating a product.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT QUIZ True The next four questions refer to the discussion of a housing project with a poured-in-place concrete structural system found on page 14. The next two questions refer to the discussion of the R & R Plant Visit Scenario found on page 33. noting that the structural engineer should review recent concrete tests.

the state’s architectural registration board could properly discipline Zacharias. False (A) (B) QUESTION 34 (A) (B) (A) (B) QUESTION 36 (A) (B) QUESTION 37 (A) (B) 119 . QUESTION 35 Zacharias. the architect who made the payments to the county commissioner. Brown has no obligation under the recommended Rules of Conduct to report Zacharias’ payments to the state’s architectural registration board even though he knows them to be wrong. The next three questions refer to the discussion of the Brown & Zacharias Scenario found on page 36.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT QUIZ True The next two questions refer to the discussion of A Young Architect’s Dilemma Scenario found on page 23. Under these facts. The recommended Rules of Conduct require Sarah to identify the problem and then notify the buyer. Assume that Zacharias had provided the county commissioner with free working drawings for his Big Sur beach house instead of cash. QUESTION 33 Sarah should write to her client stating what she found in her inspection concerning the granite veneer and recommend the owner report the problem to the building department. is not subject to discipline by the state’s architectural registration board because the county commissioner engaged in extortion.

Jarvis. the original architect. The specifications supporting the drawings and details for the cabinetry call for the construction and installation of all millwork to be a deduct alternate. to construct and install of the cabinetry in accordance with the construction documents for $90. QUESTION 38 Copyright issues and plan ownership issues are civil issues that fall outside the jurisdiction of an architectural registration board. the architect saved the general contractor’s markup while the architect’s fee remains the same for providing design and specifications for the cabinetry. False (A) (B) QUESTION 39 (A) (B) 120 . Inc. The architect provides the owner with a separate agreement between the owner and Ajax Millwork. and her client. Questions 40 through 44 refer to the scenario presented below: An architect is hired to design a medical clinic whose design and construction will incorporate a great deal of cabinetry.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT QUIZ True The next two questions refer to the discussion of the Jefferson Scenario found on page 30.. company. The owner accepts the architect’s recommendation and agrees to sign the contract without the cabinetry being the general contractor’s responsibility.000 for the owner.000. Inc. or a savings of $10. but recommends to the owner a millwork contractor who he believes will construct and install the cabinets for less than $100. The architect prepares construction documents in order to bid the project. The owner does not know that the architect’s spouse is a partner and part owner in the Ajax Millwork. The project is bid and a general contractor is selected to begin construction. is a matter an architectural registration board would likely take jurisdiction of and seek to resolve under the recommended Rules of Conduct. The architect prepares the contract for the owner to execute with the general contractor. The contractual dispute between Jefferson.000. By deleting this work from the general contractor’s contract.

The architect’s project schedule now permits the architect to fulfill this request. the developer/contractor returned to the architect and asked the architect to review and make necessary modifications and then seal the plans. The architect should have informed the owner that the architect’s spouse is a partner in Ajax Millwork earlier. and you are a member of the board. As construction began a complaint was brought to the state’s architectural registration board alleging plan stamping. The architect was unable to perform this work due to prior time commitments. and should have done so before the agreement with Ajax Millwork is signed. The architect should approve the contractor’s request for a markup on Ajax Millwork’s contract. The architect should offer a reduced fee for design of cabinetry. After the plans were completed. The architect should avoid any direct communication with Ajax Millwork. Questions 45 through 48 refer to the scenario presented below: An architect was approached by a developer/contractor to design an apartment complex. The developer/contractor hired a drafting service without a registered architect to prepare plans. the architect seals the plans and they are submitted to the local code authority for permitting. (A) False (B) (A) (B) QUESTION 42 (A) (A) (B) (B) QUESTION 43 QUESTION 44 (A) (B) 121 .PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT QUIZ True QUESTION 40 QUESTION 41 The architect should ask Ajax Millwork for a referral fee. After the architect’s review of the plans the drafting service makes some modifications recommended by the architect.

the architect can do all the work in his home state and have the developer’s State B architect stamp the plans. The developer says that he has two new projects underway. If the architect is not registered in State B. The architect should have sealed the plans with a note on the plans that the architect is only responsible for the modifications made to the plans. If the architect’s reduces his fee he may seal the plans prepared by others as long as he confirms the plans are accurate and complete. If the architect is not registered in State B. but holds an NCARB certificate. the architect can start the project immediately. the architect can do the work in either State A or B without registering in State B. QUESTION 49 If the architect is already registered in State B. False (A) (B) QUESTION 46 (A) (B) QUESTION 47 (A) (B) QUESTION 48 (A) (B) (A) (B) QUESTION 50 (A) (B) QUESTION 51 (A) (B) QUESTION 52 (A) (B) 122 . If the architect is not registered in State B. that his regular architect in State B can only handle one of them and that he would like the college classmate (the State A registered architect) to handle the second project. but holds an NCARB certificate.PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT QUIZ True QUESTION 45 The architect did not have responsible control over preparation of the drawings and should not seal them. the architect should ask NCARB to transmit the architect’s record to State B and ask the State B architectural resgistration board to consider his registration promptly. The drafting service is guilty of practicing architecture without a license. Questions 49 through 52 refer to the scenario presented below: An architect from State A gets a call from a college classmate who has successfully built several housing developments in State B.

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