Procter & Gamble

Introduction When Alan Lafley became CEO in the summer of 2000, things had not been looking good for Procter & Gamble (P&G). Under his predecessor, Dirk Jager, costs had gone up, volumes stagnated and profit margins shrunk on P&G's biggest brands like Pampers, Tide, and Crest. But in 2004, many analysts believed that the situation seemed to have improved significantly with Lafley having done a great job of turning the company around. Lafley had focused on building the core brands even as he commenced a restructuring that involved $1.7 billion in cost cuts. He had also cut prices on many P&G products. As a result, over the past three years, core volume (units sold in P&G's existing businesses) rose on an average by 7% annually. The stock price had nearly doubled. Lafley had attempted to introduce more creativity into P&G's innovation process, a major challenge for a company with a rule-bound culture. Since 2002, P&G had raised its new-product hit rate (the percentage of new entries that delivered a return above the cost of capital) from 70% to 90%. In the first quarter of 2004, 19 of P&G's 20 largest brands improved their market shares. Overall core volume also rose by 12%, due to new product launches such as Olay Regenerist anti-aging creams, Prilosec heartburn pills, Swiffer dusters, and Mr.Clean AutoDry, a power gun spray that cleaned cars. Though Lafley had made a few targeted transformation was largely driven by organic growth. acquisitions, P&G's

"It's the most precious kind of growth," Lafley remarked 1, "Organic growth is more valuable because it comes from your core competencies.Organic growth exercises your innovation muscle. It is a muscle. If you use it, it gets stronger." But Lafley admitted there were still major concerns to be addressed2: "We've had the most problems innovating two of our biggest brands." Pampers and Crest had lost their No. 1 market positions in the US to Kimberly-Clark and Colgate-Palmolive respectively, who had innovated more aggressively than P&G did. Colgate grabbed the market for teethwhitening and breath-freshening toothpastes, while Kimberly-Clark

gained share in the market for toddlers' training pants.

Background Note
Early History Procter & Gamble was established in 1837, when candle maker William Procter and his brother-in-law, soap maker James Gamble merged their small businesses. They set up a shop in Cincinnati and made candles and soaps from left over fats. By 1859, P&G had become one of the largest companies in Cincinnati, with sales of $1 million. The company introduced Ivory, a floating soap, in 1879 and Crisco, the first all-vegetable shortening, in 1911. In the 1940s and 1950s, P&G embarked on a series of acquisitions. Spic and Span (1945), Duncan Hines (1956), Chairman Paper Mills (1957), Clorox (1957; sold in 1968) and Folgers Coffee (1963). In 1973, P&G began manufacturing and selling its products in Japan through the acquisition of Nippon Sunhome Company3. In 1981, when John G. Smale became the CEO, P&G's financial performance was under pressure. Manpower strength had crossed 100,000 due to P&G's acquisitions. P&G also faced intense competition from companies like Kimberley-Clark and Colgate. P&G stumbled in many categories, losing market share and profits. It had to withdraw its Rely tampons from the market after the product was linked to the deadly disease - Toxic Shock Syndrome. P&G responded by slowing down its research efforts. It also modified compensation plans for managers and plant workers to eliminate the obsession with short-term returns. P&G moved into health care when it purchased Richardson - Vicks and G D Searle's non-prescription drugs division in 1985. In the same year, P&G announced several major organizational changes relating to category management, purchasing, manufacturing, engineering and distribution. In 1988, the company formed a joint venture to manufacture products in China. P&G became the biggest cosmetics company in USA when it acquired Noxell (1989) and Max Factor (1991). Recent History In 1990, Ed Artzt, who had been heading P&G's international operations since the 1980s, replaced Smale as the CEO. Two years later, the company initiated an everyday low-pricing policy that reduced its reliance on coupons and trade promotions. The move helped in smoothening demand fluctuations and allowed P&G to cut prices on major brands. A year later,

P&G initiated another restructuring program, cutting 13,000 jobs and closing 30 manufacturing plants. After years of trying to penetrate the orange juice market, P&G disposed off its Citrus Hill juice line and took a $200 million charge in 1992. In 1993-94, market research revealed that families loyal to P&G brands were paying $725 more each year than families buying private label or store brands. P&G had been offering retail customers discounts from time to time, but it realized it had to offer low prices consistently to remain a market leader. To cut costs, P&G established eleven cross-functional teams to examine various work processes. P&G realized it had the highest marketing overheads in the industry due to its complex product line. There were five divisions with three sales layers, each selling more than 2,300 Stock Keeping Units (SKUs), which covered 34 product categories and 17 basic pricing brackets. Special deals meant that an average of 55 price changes worked through the system every day. To simplify this complex process, P&G reduced the number of pricing brackets from 17 to just 3 and the number of special prices from 55 to only one per day. It also reduced the number of SKUs by 25%. These changes, however, had only a short-term impact due to P&G's complex product line. Typically, P&G introduced a new brand for every significant technological innovation that occurred. In 1996, P&G decided to prune its Head & Shoulders product line which had 31 varieties, and Crest which had 52 versions. P&G also began to exercise strict control over its advertising budget to reduce overall marketing costs to 20% (from 25%) of revenues by 2000. The company announced that it would pass on the cost savings to customers. In 1996, P&G agreed to buy baby wipes brands (Baby Fresh, wash-a-byebaby, and Kid fresh) from Kimberly-Clark. P&G also purchased the Eagle Snacks brand name from Anheuser-Busch. P&G pulled off a major coup when the FDA (Food and Drug Administration) approved the use of olestra, a fat substitute developed by P&G, for use in snacks and crackers. The company indicated it would use it in a fat-free version of Pringles potato chips. P&G faced major challenges in the mid-1990s. Many of its products looked tired and worn out a Fortune report4 in October 1996 summarized P&G's competitive position: "Procter & Gamble has a cupboard full of aging brands that do mostly mundane tasks - like wash, mop, sop, and glop. No matter how many times Tide has been 'new and improved' over the years - more than 60, in case you were wondering - its still fundamentally detergent. Pampers has just turned 35, Jif Peanut butter has been sticking to kids gums since 1956, and Ivory is so long in the tooth that your grandmother might have used it. The company must look elsewhere

for growth- to new products, new countries, and new businesses. This methodical, conservative, and insular enterprise will have to become more innovative, more outward looking." In 1997, P&G formed a global alliance with the German pharmaceutical company, Hoechst to market P&G's new prescription bone health drug, Actonel, used in the treatment of osteoporosis. The company also signed a ten year agreement with Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, to develop and commercialize pharmaceutical products. This agreement sought to combine Regeneron's strengths in molecular biology with P&G's development efforts and bring more products to the market in the long term. In April 1997, P&G decided to acquire Tambrands, Inc., a company dealing in feminine protection products, for approximately $1.85 billion. The acquisition was completed on July 21,1997. In November, P&G announced that it would begin test marketing of Dryel, a new product that would enable consumers to take care of "dry clean only" clothes in the convenience of their homes. Towards the end of the year, P&G reached an agreement to sell its Duncan Hines baking mix trademark to Aurora Foods. In September 1998, P&G announced plans to redesign the company's management and operating structures. Under the Organization 2005 program, as it came to be known, P&G announced that it would revamp the work processes to improve efficiency and cut costs. P&G also explained that it would take several measures to provide a stimulating work environment to its employees. In October 1999, P&G signed a global cooperation agreement with Tupperware to explore joint-marketing and promotion opportunities. The $ 1.1 billion Tupperware, was one of the world's leading direct sellers whose premium products reached consumers in more than 100 countries. The alliance would explore global business building opportunities including the co-promotion and cross-endorsement of products. Business Segments P&G had five major business segments: Fabric and Home Care; Beauty Care; Baby and Family Care; Health Care; and Snacks and Beverages. In May 2004, P&G announced the realignment of some of its business units to streamline operations and facilitate growth. P&G decided to form three global business units: Beauty Care; Health, Baby and Family Care; and Household Care, which would include the current Fabric and Home Care business and the Snacks and Beverages business. Each of the new Global

Business Units (GBU) and the Market Development Organization would be headed by a vice-chairman reporting to the CEO. Market Research P&G was one of the first consumer product companies in the world to conduct formal market research. In 1879, when customers wrote to P&G for more of its "floating soap" (an accidental product that was a result of extra stirring during the soap making process), it quickly changed the soap so that all the bars would float. P&G was one of the pioneers in 'in-situ' research. Researchers went to the homes of customers to observe them directly as they went about their daily chores. This helped in identifying and solving problems, which the customers themselves were not aware of. In the 1970s, P&G's researchers observed consumers opening detergent packages with screwdrivers and razors. Though the consumers did not seem to mind the effort, P&G went ahead and developed a box, which would be easy to open. The new design, which incorporated a plastic insert in the cardboard, became very popular. In another such study, P&G observed that some of the liquid laundry detergent, at the time of pouring, ran down the front of the bottle. Customers were happy to wipe the drip with a piece of cloth. P&G, however, saw an opportunity. Soon, P&G came up with a simple redesign, which included a spout that funneled any drips back into the bottle. This simple innovation led to a dramatic increase in sales. In many parts of Eastern Europe, P&G's researchers found that the apartments were quite small. Since the bathroom was adjacent to the living room, the smell of the detergent filled the apartment whenever clothes were washed. The problem was worsened when inferior detergents having an offensive odor were used. When P&G conducted market research, customers articulated the need for good cleansing power. P&G, however, realized that fragrance would be equally important. The products launched by P&G became very popular in Eastern Europe. Clinical trials constituted an important part of P&G's product development activities. P&G regularly carried out tests on animals. Human tests, however, provided the most useful data. P&G's "armpit sniffers" and "bad breath brigades", inhaled employees' armpits before and after they used the company's deodorants and mouthwashes. "Trained judges" rated odor from zero (lack of offensive odor) to ten (very strong smell). P&G's dentists enlisted employees for various experiments involving dental products. P&G realized the importance of using information objectively and critically. Customers sometimes wrongly interpreted the questions asked of

them. P&G trained its researchers to frame questions carefully so that customers found it easy to answer them. In some cases, the customers gave ambiguous replies. Researchers were trained to detect such ambiguity and continue discussions with the customers to understand the true meaning. For example, researchers would ask customers whether "clean" meant the way it looked or the way it felt, whether clean hair meant lively, bouncy, fluffy, shiny or easy to comb and so on. P&G attached great importance to the quality and reliability of information. Managers regularly checked and validated data. Questionable information was ignored. P&G believed that no research was better than wrong research. While determining the best fragrance for Camay soap, P&G realized that the smell of the perfume was quite different after it was diluted and made part of a soap. Not only that, the strength of the fragrance changed after the soap was consumed and came in contact with water. As a result, P&G rejected its earlier research findings and decided to test the soap while in actual use. When P&G's researchers reported quantitative research results, they also disclosed the statistical significance of the data. P&G used qualitative research findings very carefully. The company did not arrive at generalizations or take major decisions on the basis of a few focus groups. Instead, P&G used focus groups to gain useful insights. These insights then became the basis for developing the hypothesis to be tested or for designing a quantitative research program. For example, one such hypothesis was whether using a fabric softener had any perceived connection with being a good mother. P&G emphasized on objectivity in market research. It realized the importance of separating facts from implications. The company research reports attempted to be factual. P&G believed that if researchers looked for conclusions, there might well be a bias that could distort an objective presentation of the data. Normally, it was the brand group and not the research department, which analyzed the information. To improve the quality of research, P&G imparted rigorous and extensive training to new entrants. They would typically be asked to spend months on the telephone and in the field conducting interviews with customers and collecting data. A trainer would be alongside the new recruit. Gradually, researchers learnt how customers responded to questions and how misinterpretations took place. Over a period of time, the research interview became more like a conversation as the researcher memorized the structure of the interview and did not find the need to use a questionnaire. P&G responded to consumers' letters promptly. Letters, e-mails and summaries of incoming phone calls were routinely circulated to brand managers, product development teams, production teams and the top

management. In the 1970s, P&G began to follow up some of the correspondence with phone calls to get more inputs from the consumers. The company received millions of phone calls each year. When one consumer inquired whether Oil of Olay lotion came in an unscented version, P&G's brand group took the cue and developed an unscented version. The brand group also conducted focus groups among the telephone operators, who handled the Oil of Olay calls to identify key benefits, which customers were looking for. In the late 1990s, time and money constraints prompted P&G to send questionnaires by mail and conduct telephone surveys. Consumers were given scanners to register the bar codes on packages before they were stored. For some customers, P&G placed a box on their television sets to monitor what programs they watched. The company also used hidden video cameras in grocery store parking lots to monitor the habits of shoppers. Developing new products P&G sought to introduce products that offered a distinct benefit to consumers. Finding this difference involved an in-depth understanding of consumer behavior. For instance, P&G collected washing machines from around the world to study how they worked and what kind of detergents would be suitable. In the test labs, a researcher used a roller to measure how deep the lather was in a machine. Bar soaps were tested by continual hand washing to see how many movements were required to make a good lather. P&G sometimes took several years to develop a product. In the case of "Pampers", it took more than ten years just to figure out how to develop the product and commercialize production. Crest was another product that had taken a long time to develop. P&G introduced Crest toothpaste in 1955, almost 15 years after stannous fluoride had been identified as a potential anti-cavity fighter. In many cases, P&G had to deal with cultural factors and entrenched customer habits. In case of Pampers, offering value-for-money became a critical factor. When P&G was ready with Pampers, it found that customers were resistant to the idea of using disposable diapers. Research revealed that cloth diapers accounted for about 99.8% of the diaper changes in the US. Customers also felt that the quality of cloth diapers was much better than that of disposable diapers. They also found the prevailing price of about 8.6 cents too high. Most families restricted the use of disposable diapers to special occasions like when they were travelling. P&G felt that Pampers was substantially better than the prevailing brands. When it test marketed Pampers at 10 cents per piece, it realized that there would be

few takers. To bring down the price, it had to reduce costs significantly. One way to do this was to increase volumes and generate economies of scale in manufacturing, marketing and procurement. Higher volumes would also be needed to convince supermarkets to distribute the product. Distribution through super markets would be more efficient as supermarkets operated on far lower margins compared to drugstores, which are the traditional outlets for diapers. P&G conducted three more test-marketing exercises before fixing a price of 6 cents per diaper. Pampers rapidly gained popularity among customers. In the late 1990s, 98% of diaper changes in the US were made with disposable diapers of which P&G accounted for more than one third. Pringles "newfangled potato chips" was a dismal failure when it was first introduced. Subsequently, P&G scientists developed a new technology that made uniform, elliptical chips from dehydrated potatoes. The chips were stacked in a "tennis ball container" to keep them from breaking or becoming stalea problem traditionally faced by conventional bagged potato chips. It took P&G years to determine the right taste. Pringles potato chips were made of Olestra-a fat free substitute that tasted and fried like a fat but was easily digestible. In the late 1990s, a study in the Journal of American Association concluded that consumers suffered no higher levels of gastric distress from Olestra-made potato chips than from traditional ones. The Journal, however, mentioned that consumers did not like the taste of Olestra chips. In 1998, P&G announced that it would soon begin selling fatfree Pringles made with a new recipe and a new flavor. Pantene was a small shampoo brand that came along with P&G's Richardson- Vicks acquisition in 1985. Though a seemingly good product with the mystique of a high-priced department store brand, it was still a minor brand in its category. In the 1990s, P&G converted it into a shampoo-and-conditioner product with its patented "2-in-1" technology. Pantene became one of the P&G's biggest brands. P&G attempted to improve its products on an ongoing basis. The company had upgraded Tide detergent's product formulation and packaging more than seventy times. P&G had changed the formulation of its Crest toothpaste several times. In 1955, when Crest was first developed, it had stannous fluoride. Subsequently, it began to use sodium fluoride, a more effective cavity fighter. Then researchers took on the challenge of coming up with a tarter-control product. P&G scientists discovered an ingredient, soluble pyrophosphate that reduced tarter. The Wall Street Journal named Crest tarter-control toothpaste as one of the "milestones of the decade." In the 1990s, the pace of product development at P&G slowed down. In June 1999, the Economist magazine reported that P&G's last real new product innovation had come way back in 1982, when it had launched its

'Always' feminine hygiene range. Analysts felt that more consistent innovation would be needed to generate faster growth opportunities in the 1990s. P&G's risk-averse culture seemed to be standing in the way of commercializing new ideas quickly. The company responded by setting up innovation teams to rapidly explore promising ideas within the company and bring them fast to the market. P&G also indicated that it would take more risks, reduce pre-market laboratory testing requirements and launch products faster. In the late 1990s, P&G launched Swiffer, Febreze and Dryel, none of which were variants of old products. Launched in June 1998, Febreze was a success with sales of $230 million in the US in its first year. Swiffer went from test marketing to global launch in just 18 months. P&G also looked outside for new ideas. To develop Nutri Delight, a fortified orange drink, P&G worked with UNICEF and licensed the technology that allowed iron to exist with iodine and vitamin A in a stable form. This helped undernourished children put on weight. In the late 1990s, P&G announced the Organization 2005 program. The process for developing new products was revamped to ensure that new ideas reached the market faster. The Global Business Units (GBUs) were asked to develop and sell products on a worldwide basis replacing the old system that allowed P&G's country managers to set prices and handle products as they saw fit. In addition to marketing and pricing, GBUs supervised new product development. P&G also planned to move away from its traditional "sequential" method of testing, where products were first introduced in American cities before being launched globally. By test marketing new products worldwide instead of only in American cities, P&G attempted to cut down product development cycle time. For several years, P&G had followed the strategy of producing technologically superior goods and used clever marketing to sell them at a price that would not only cover the high R&D costs, but also generate adequate profits. In the early 1990s, P&G realized that most of the growth opportunities lay in emerging markets, where customers could not afford to pay premium prices for its technologically sophisticated products. Consequently, P&G changed its approach to R&D. P&G collected feedback from marketing executives regarding the preferred blend of price and features and then worked to make the product within the price limit. For example, P&G offered Pampers Uni, a lower-priced and simpler version of the sophisticated Pampers line, in developing markets such as Brazil. Brand Management P&G's business was all about, creating, nurturing and revitalizing brands. So brand management was an integral part of the innovation process.

Products which emerged from the R&D and were ready to be marketed were assigned to brand managers. A brand manager typically focused on a single product or a small family of products and coordinated activities ranging from market research and manufacturing to sales, package design and advertising. Brand managers held profit and loss responsibility for their brand(s). P&G's brand names were typically one or two syllables long, easy to pronounce, distinctive and easy to remember. P&G looked for design elements consistent with the brand's positioning. The Tide graphics conveyed power and heavy duty. The baby on Pampers packet suggested gentle softness. The shape of Mr.Clean bottle suggested the strength of the product. P&G attempted to maintain consistency while presenting its brands to the consumers and was very cautious about changing anything about the brand that the consumer had become familiar with logo, package design, colors or flavors. P&G encouraged rival brands within the company to compete against one another. In the early 1920s, when Lux, Palmolive and Cashmere Bouquet soaps were introduced by its competitors, P&G introduced Camay. When Camay's performance did not match expectations, the management concluded that it had been held back by "too much Ivory thinking." They felt Camay had fared poorly because it had not been allowed to compete head-to-head with Ivory. The result was the creation of a brand management system that encouraged internal competition. P&G brands had different performance characteristics and provided distinct consumer benefits. They competed with one another around the edges, while offering different primary benefits. P&G maintained a fairly centralized approach to brand management. In the beginning, the approach worked well. However, over the years, excessive centralization began to create problems. Gradually, almost every decision was pushed to the top. There were rumors that a decision about whether the company's new decaffeinated instant Folgers Coffee should have a green or a gold cap had been taken all the way to the CEO! In the early 1980s, P&G's share in a number of important markets began to slip, raising serious doubts about the effectiveness of its branding strategy. In the 1990s, P&G responded to these difficulties, by taking steps to reorient its bureaucratic culture. It decided to replace the one-page memo5 by a talk sheet. The talk sheet was an informal outline that allowed managers at several levels to develop and refine a proposal through discussions, rather than through written memos alone. P&G also formed business teams and task forces in key result areas. The management emphasized greater cross-functional cooperation. In the past, if a P&G brand manager put forward a proposal, it had to pass through the

hierarchy of functional unit heads and the top management. Under the new approach, teams included representatives from different functional areas who were involved right from the start of the proposal. As a result, P&G could cut costs, reduce product development time and generate more sales. P&G attempted to lengthen the product life cycle by regularly revitalizing its brands, be it through performance improvement or through added functionality. In the 1950s, white cotton was the predominant fabric. So P&G improved Tide's whitening power with fluorescers. In the 1960s and 1970s, brighter colors and synthetic fabrics became more popular, resulting in clothes that were tougher to clean. P&G's "Extra Action" Tide came with new technology that facilitated soil removal from all kinds of clothing. In 1984, a liquid version of Tide was introduced. In the case of Crest, the development of tartar control technology was a major achievement and added vitality to the brand. P&G also evolved products through different forms, such as gels and pump dispensers. In the late 1990s, a key issue for P&G was the rationalization of its product line. Hardly 25% of P&G's new products remained in national distribution in the US for more than two years after the launch. The company began to review its brand extension policies. In the late 1980s, P&G had launched separate disposable diapers for boys and girls. Later, P&G announced that its diapers had become so absorbent that such segmentation was not necessary anymore. The company continued its efforts to prune the product line. The Road Ahead In the early 2000s, P&G continued to streamline its idea generation, test marketing and new product development activities. P&G cut its reliance on focus groups. P&G believed the real opportunities lay in meeting needs that consumers might not articulate. Marketers spent time with consumers in their homes, watching the ways they washed their clothes, cleaned their floors, and put diapers on their babies, and asked them about their habits and frustrations. Back in 2000, the typical brand marketer spent less than four hours a month with consumers. By 2004, this number had tripled. When P&G opened a diaper-testing center right in its office premises, several young mothers watched their children get undressed and diapered. P&G realised that parents were frustrated by "how long it took their youngsters to be toilet trained". P&G decided to launch a new line, Pampers Feel 'n Learn Advanced Trainers, designed to stay wet for two minutes, alerting toddlers to try and use the toilet. Pampers' value proposition changed from "we want the driest diapers" to "helping moms with baby's development."

P&G also launched knowledge management initiatives to accelerate the innovation process. P&G's 7,500 R&D people, located in 20 technical facilities in nine countries, posted problems on an internal website and also met in "communities of practice" dedicated to areas of expertise. Lafley evaluated the degree of idea sharing amongst scientists and marketers when he conducted half-day "innovation reviews" in each business unit annually. There were signs that sharing of ideas was gaining momentum. For example, the Head of North American oral-care, took the help of her colleagues in other departments while developing Crest's new flavors. This Aroma helped her develop a scratch-and-sniff feature on Crest packages. She also looked for marketing advice when she went to the "top-15 meetings" convened every quarter for the key people who worked on P&G's 15 biggest brands. Lafley's goal was to derive half of P&G's invention from external sources, up from 20% in 2000 to about 35% in 20046. "Inventors are evenly distributed in the population, and we're as likely to find invention in a garage as in our labs," he explained. P&G started bringing technology from entrepreneurs. It bought SpinBrush from an inventor named John Osher in 2001. Getting ideas from outside also meant working with other companies. In 2002, some P&G managers spotted an eraser that took marks off walls in Japanese retail outlets, and developed Mr. Clean Magic Eraser. P&G's biggest success lately had been in selling Prilosec, the over-the-counter version of AstraZeneca's prescription heartburn medicine launched in September 2003. Sales in the first year were expected to total $300 million. Lafley was also keen on forming alliances, in some cases even with outright competitors. In 2002, he held an auction to find a company that could market patented adhesive-film technology that P&G used in its packaging and in Crest Whitestrips. The winner was Clorox, which owned the Glad brand (and competed with P&G in floor mops and water purification). The joint venture and the product that had come out of it, Glad Press 'n Seal, had benefited both parties. Glad Press 'n Seal had overtaken S C Johnson's Saran as the top-selling food wrap in the US More products were on the way. P&G generated 20% of its revenues in developing countries, compared to 45% for Colgate and 35% for Unilever. P&G's costs had always been so high that it could not sell its products at affordable prices and still earn an adequate profit. So the company began coming up with smarter, cheaper ways to make products for the developing markets. It began to use contract manufacturers to produce Safeguard soap and Always feminine pads. In China, it used a different business model to manufacture Tide. P&G-owned factories produced the concentrate of secret cleaning ingredients. Then contractors added standard ingredients like sulfates and

phosphates, and packaged it. As in the US, P&G invested heavily in gathering deeper insights about what consumers across the world wanted. When P&G talked to ordinary Russian women, it learned that most of them disliked the technologically advanced thin Always pads for feminine protection. A thick pad made them feel more secure. By designing one, P&G had recently gained eight share points in Russia. Discuss the case with reference to any one of the following theoretical aspects. 1. 2. 3. Product Management Brand Management Marketing strategies for future growth